---
title: "Against Aristocrates · Κατὰ Ἀριστοκράτους"
author: "Demosthenes"
translator: "James Herbert Vince"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
section: 2 of 5
url: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-against-aristocrates/2/
cite: "Demosthenes, tr. James Herbert Vince, Against Aristocrates · Κατὰ Ἀριστοκράτους, section 2. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-against-aristocrates/2/"
---

# Against Aristocrates · Κατὰ Ἀριστοκράτους

*Demosthenes, tr. James Herbert Vince*

Against a decree making the mercenary captain Charidemus untouchable, with a survey of the Athenian homicide courts.

> Greek: ed. Samuel Henry Butcher, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0014.tlg023, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: James Herbert Vince, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0014.tlg023.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 2. Sections 51–89

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-against-aristocrates/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-against-aristocrates/2/#p-N

[¶0] 51. Read the statute that comes next. Statute “No man shall be liable to proceedings for murder because he lays information against exiles, if any such exile return to a prohibited place.” This statute, men of Athens, like all the other excerpts from the law of homicide which I have cited for comparison, is a statute of Draco; and you must pay attention to his meaning. “No man is to be liable to prosecution for murder for laying information against manslayers who return from exile illegally.” Herein he exhibits two principles of justice, both of which have been transgressed by the defendant in his decree. In the first place, though he allows information to be laid against the homicide, he does not allow him to be seized and carried off; and secondly, he allows it only if an exile returns, not to any place, but to a prohibited place.

> Greek: 51. λέγε τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα νόμον. ΝΟΜΟΣ. φόνου δὲ δίκας μὴ εἶναι μηδαμοῦ κατὰ τῶν τοὺς φεύγοντας ἐνδεικνύντων, ἐάν τις κατίῃ ὅποι μὴ ἔξεστιν. ὁ μὲν νόμος ἐστὶν οὗτος Δράκοντος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δὲ ὅσους ἐκ τῶν φονικῶν νόμων παρεγραψάμην· δεῖ δʼ ἃ λέγει σκέψασθαι. κατὰ τῶν ἐνδεικνύντων φησὶ τοὺς κατιόντας ἀνδροφόνους ὅποι μὴ ἔξεστι δίκας φόνου μὴ εἶναι. ἐνταυθὶ δύο δηλοῖ δίκαια, ἃ παρʼ ἀμφότερʼ οὗτος εἴρηκεν τὸ ψήφισμα, ὅτι τʼ ἐνδεικνύναι δίδωσι τὸν ἀνδροφόνον καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸν ἀγώγιμον οἴχεσθαι λαβόντα, καὶ ὅτι, ἐὰν κατίῃ τις ὅποι μὴ ἔξεστι, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίδωσιν, οὐχ ὅπου βούλεταί τις.

[¶1] 52. Now the prohibited place is the city from which he has gone into exile. That the law makes very clear indeed when it says, “if any man return,”—a word that cannot be used in relation to any other city except that from which he has fled; for of course a man cannot return from exile to a place from which he was never expelled. What is allowed by the statute is an information, and that only in case of return to a prohibited place; whereas Aristocrates has proposed that a man shall be liable to seizure even in places where the law does not forbid him to take refuge.

> Greek: 52. οὐκ ἔξεστι δὲ ποῖ; ἐξ ἧς ἂν φεύγῃ τις πόλεως. ποῦ καὶ σφόδρα τοῦτο δηλοῖ; ἐάν τις κατίῃ φησί. τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἔστʼ ἐπενεγκεῖν ἄλλῃ πόλει πλὴν ἣν ἂν φεύγῃ τις· ὅθεν γὰρ μηδʼ ἐξέπεσέν τις τὴν ἀρχήν, οὐκ ἔνι δήπου κατελθεῖν εἰς ταύτην. ὁ μὲν τοίνυν νόμος ἔνδειξιν δέδωκεν, καὶ ταύτην, ἂν κατίῃ ὅποι μὴ ἔξεστιν· ὁ δὲ ἀγώγιμος ἔστω γέγραφεν κἀντεῦθεν, ὅποι φεύγειν οὐδεὶς κωλύει νόμος.

[¶2] 53. Read another statute. Statute “If a man kill another unintentionally in an athletic contest, or overcoming him in a fight on the highway, or unwittingly in battle, or in intercourse with his wife, or mother, or sister, or daughter, or concubine kept for procreation of legitimate children, he shall not go into exile as a manslayer on that account.” Many statutes have been violated, men of Athens, in the drafting of this decree, but none more gravely than that which has just been read. Though the law so clearly gives permission to slay, and states under what conditions, the defendant ignores all those conditions, and has drawn his penal clause without any suggestion as to the manner of the slaying.

> Greek: 53. λέγʼ ἄλλον νόμον. ΝΟΜΟΣ. ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ ἐν ἄθλοις ἄκων, ἢ ἐν ὁδῷ καθελὼν ἢ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀγνοήσας, ἢ ἐπὶ δάμαρτι ἢ ἐπὶ μητρὶ ἢ ἐπʼ ἀδελφῇ ἢ ἐπὶ θυγατρί, ἢ ἐπὶ παλλακῇ ἣν ἂν ἐπʼ ἐλευθέροις παισὶν ἔχῃ, τούτων ἕνεκα μὴ φεύγειν κτείναντα. πολλῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νόμων ὄντων, παρʼ οὓς εἴρηται τὸ ψήφισμα, παρʼ οὐδένα μᾶλλον ἢ παρὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἀνεγνωσμένον νῦν εἴρηται. διδόντος γὰρ τοῦ νόμου σαφῶς οὑτωσὶ καὶ λέγοντος ἐφʼ οἷς ἐξεῖναι κτεῖναι, οὗτος ἅπαντα παρεῖδε ταῦτα, καὶ γέγραφεν, οὐδὲν ὑπειπὼν πῶς, ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, τὴν τιμωρίαν.

[¶3] 54. Yet mark how righteously and admirably these distinctions are severally defined by the lawgiver who defined them originally. “If a man kill another in an athletic contest,” he declared him to be not guilty, for this reason, that he had regard not to the event but to the intention of the agent. That intention is, not to kill his man, but to vanquish him unslain. If the other combatant was too weak to support the struggle for victory, he considered him responsible for his own fate, and therefore provided no retribution on his account.

> Greek: 54. καίτοι σκέψασθʼ ὡς ὁσίως καὶ καλῶς ἕκαστα διεῖλεν ὁ ταῦτʼ ἐξ ἀρχῆς διελών. ἄν τις ἐν ἄθλοις ἀποκτείνῃ τινά, τοῦτον ὥρισεν οὐκ ἀδικεῖν. διὰ τί; οὐ τὸ συμβὰν ἐσκέψατο, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ δεδρακότος διάνοιαν. ἔστι δʼ αὕτη τίς; ζῶντα νικῆσαι καὶ οὐκ ἀποκτεῖναι. εἰ δʼ ἐκεῖνος ἀσθενέστερος ἦν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς νίκης ἐνεγκεῖν πόνον, ἑαυτῷ τοῦ πάθους αἴτιον ἡγήσατο, διὸ τιμωρίαν οὐκ ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ.

[¶4] 55. Again, “if in battle unwittingly”—the man who so slays is free of bloodguiltiness. Good: If I have destroyed a man supposing him to be one of the enemy, I deserve, not to stand trial, but to be forgiven. “Or in intercourse with his wife, or mother, or sister, or daughter, or concubine kept for the procreation of legitimate children.” He lets the man who slays one so treating any of these women go scot-free; and that acquittal, men of Athens, is the most righteous of all.

> Greek: 55. πάλιν ἂν ἐν πολέμῳ φησὶν ἀγνοήσας, καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι καθαρόν. καλῶς· εἰ γὰρ ἐγώ τινα τῶν ἐναντίων οἰηθεὶς εἶναι διέφθειρα, οὐ δίκην ὑπέχειν, ἀλλὰ συγγνώμης τυχεῖν δίκαιός εἰμι. ἢ ἐπὶ δάμαρτι φησὶν ἢ ἐπὶ μητρὶ ἢ ἐπʼ ἀδελφῇ ἢ θυγατρί, ἢ ἐπὶ παλλακῇ ἣν ἂν ἐπʼ ἐλευθέροις παισὶν ἔχῃ, καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τούτων τῳ κτείναντʼ ἀθῷον ποιεῖ, πάντων γʼ ὀρθότατʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτον ἀφιείς. τί δήποτε;

[¶5] 56. Why? Because in the defence of those for whose sake we fight our enemies, to save them from indignity and licentiousness, he permitted us to slay even our friends, if they insult them and defile them in defiance of law. Men are not our friends and our foes by natural generation: they are made such by their own actions; and the law gives us freedom to chastise as enemies those whose acts are hostile. When there are so many conditions that justify the slaying of anyone else, it is monstrous that that man should be the only man in the world whom, even under those conditions, it is to be unlawful to slay.

> Greek: 56. ὅτι ὑπὲρ ὧν τοῖς πολεμίοις μαχόμεθα, ἵνα μὴ πάσχωσιν ὑβριστικὸν μηδʼ ἀσελγὲς μηδέν, ὑπὲρ τούτων καὶ τοὺς φιλίους, ἐὰν παρὰ τὸν νόμον εἰς αὐτοὺς ὑβρίζωσι καὶ διαφθείρωσιν, ἔδωκεν ἀποκτεῖναι. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐ γένος ἐστὶν φιλίων καὶ πολεμίων, ἀλλὰ τὰ πραττόμενʼ ἐξεργάζεται τούτων ἑκάτερον, τοὺς ἐχθρὰ ποιοῦντας ἐν ἐχθροῦ μέρει κολάζειν ἀπέδωκεν ὁ νόμος. οὐκοῦν δεινόν, εἰ τοσούτων ὄντων ἐφʼ οἷς τοὺς ἄλλους ἔξεστιν ἀποκτιννύναι, μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἐκεῖνον μηδʼ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐξέσται ἀποκτεῖναι.

[¶6] 57. Let us suppose that a fate that has doubtless befallen others before now should befall him—that he should withdraw from Thrace and come and live somewhere in a civilized community; and that, though no longer enjoying the licence under which he now commits many illegalities, he should be driven by his habits and his lusts to attempt the sort of behavior I have mentioned, will not a man be obliged to allow himself to be insulted by Charidemus in silence? It will not be safe to put him to death, nor, by reason of this decree, to obtain the satisfaction provided by law.

> Greek: 57. φέρε, ἂν δέ τι συμβῇ τοιοῦτον οἷον ἴσως ἤδη τῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ, ἀπαλλαγῇ μὲν ἐκ Θρᾴκης, ἐλθὼν δʼ εἰς πόλιν οἰκῇ που, τῆς μὲν ἐξουσίας μηκέτι κύριος ὢν διʼ ἧς πολλὰ ποιεῖ τῶν ἀπειρημένων ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων, τοῖς δʼ ἔθεσιν καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ταῦτʼ ἐπιχειρῶν πράττειν, ἄλλο τι ἢ σιγῶντα δεήσει Χαρίδημον ἐᾶν αὑτὸν ὑβρίζειν; οὐ γὰρ ἀποκτεῖναί γʼ ἀσφαλὲς οὐδὲ τιμωρίαν λαβεῖν ἣν δίδωσʼ ὁ νόμος, διὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τουτί.

[¶7] 58. If anyone interrupts me with a question, “And where, pray, are such things likely to happen?” there is nothing to prevent me from asking, “And who is likely to kill Charidemus?” Well, we need not go into those questions; only, inasmuch as the decree now on trial refers, not to any past transaction, but to something of which nobody knows whether it will happen or not, let the uncertainty of the future be common ground to both sides; let us, as mankind are wont, adjust our expectations thereto, and consider the matter on the presumption that both the one contingency and the other may possibly happen.

> Greek: 58. καὶ μὴν εἴ τις ἐκεῖνʼ ὑπολαμβάνει, ποῦ δὲ γένοιτʼ ἂν ταῦτα; τί κωλύει κἀμὲ λέγειν, τίς δʼ ἂν ἀποκτείναι Χαρίδημον; ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο σκοπῶμεν· ἀλλʼ ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶ τὸ φεῦγον ψήφισμα οὐκ ἐπʼ ἤδη γεγενημένῳ τινὶ πράγματι, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τοιούτῳ ὃ μηδʼ εἰ γενήσεται μηδεὶς οἶδεν, τὸ μὲν τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπαρχέτω, πρὸς δὲ τοῦθʼ ὑποθέντες ἀνθρωπίνως τὰς ἐλπίδας οὕτω σκοπῶμεν, ὡς τάχʼ ἄν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τούτων κἀκείνων συμβάντων.

[¶8] 59. Moreover, if you annul the decree, should anything happen to Charidemus, the legitimate means of avenging him are still there. On the other hand, if you let it stand, and if before he dies he maltreats any man, the man whom he insults has been defrauded of his legal remedy. Therefore on every ground the decree is contrary to law, and ought to be annulled.

> Greek: 59. λύσασι μὲν τοίνυν τὸ ψήφισμα, ἂν ἄρα συμβῇ τι παθεῖν ἐκείνῳ, εἰσὶν αἱ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τιμωρίαι· ἐῶσι δέ, ἂν ἄρʼ ἐκεῖνος ζῶν ἀδικῇ τινα, ἀνῄρηται τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἡ μετὰ τῶν νόμων δίκη. ὥστε πανταχῇ καὶ ἐναντίον ἐστὶ τοῖς νόμοις τὸ ψήφισμα καὶ λῦσαι συμφέρει.

[¶9] 60. Read the next statute. Statute “If any man while violently and illegally seizing another shall be slain straightway in self-defence, there shall be no penalty for his death.” Here are other conditions of lawful homicide. If any man, while violently and illegally seizing another, shall be straightway slain in self-defence, the legislator ordains that there shall be no penalty for his death. I beg you to observe the wisdom of this law. By adding the word “straightway” after indicating the conditions of lawful homicide, the legislator has excluded any long premeditation of injury and by the expression, “in self-defence,” he makes it clear that he is giving indulgence to the actual sufferer, and to no other man. Thus the law permits homicide in immediate self-defence; but Aristocrates has made no such exception. He says, without qualification, “if anyone ever kills,”—that is, even if he kill righteously, or as the laws permit.

> Greek: 60. λέγε τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα νόμον. ΝΟΜΟΣ. καὶ ἐὰν φέροντα ἢ ἄγοντα βίᾳ ἀδίκως εὐθὺς ἀμυνόμενος κτείνῃ, νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι. ἄλλα ταῦτʼ ἐφʼ οἷς ἔξεστι κτεῖναι. ἐὰν ἄγοντα ἢ φέροντα βίᾳ ἀδίκως εὐθὺς ἀμυνόμενος κτείνῃ, νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι κελεύει. θεάσασθε πρὸς Διὸς ὡς εὖ· τῷ μὲν ὑπειπών, ἐφʼ οἷς ἐξεῖναι κτείνειν, προσγράψαι τὸ εὐθὺς ἀφεῖλε τὸν τοῦ βουλεύσασθαί τι κακὸν χρόνον· τῷ δὲ ἀμυνόμενος γράψαι δηλοῖ τῷ πάσχοντι διδοὺς τὴν ἐξουσίαν, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινί. ὁ μὲν δὴ νόμος εὐθὺς ἀμυνομένῳ δέδωκεν ἀποκτιννύναι, ὁ δʼ οὐδὲν εἴρηκεν, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, κἂν ὡς οἱ νόμοι διδόασιν.

[¶10] 61. I shall be told that this is a quibble of ours; who will ever be “violently and illegally seized” by Charidemus? Everybody. Surely you are aware that any man who has troops at command lays hands on whomsoever he thinks he can overpower, demanding ransom. Heaven and Earth! Is it not monstrous, is it not manifestly contrary to law,—I do not mean merely to the statute law but to the unwritten law of our common humanity,—that I should not be permitted to defend myself against one who violently seizes my goods as though I were an enemy? And that will be so, if the slaying of Charidemus is forbidden even on those terms,—if even though he be iniquitously plundering another man’s property, his slayer is to be liable to seizure, though the statute ordains that he who takes life under such conditions shall have impunity.

> Greek: 61. ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία συκοφαντοῦμεν τὸ πρᾶγμα· τίνα γὰρ οἴσει ἢ ἄξει βίᾳ ἀδίκως Χαρίδημος; πάντας ἀνθρώπους. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθʼ ὅτι πάντες οἱ στράτευμʼ ἔχοντες, ὧν ἂν οἴωνται κρείττους ἔσεσθαι, ἄγουσι καὶ φέρουσι χρήματʼ αἰτοῦντες. εἶτʼ οὐ δεινόν, ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί, καὶ φανερῶς παράνομον, οὐ μόνον παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὸν κοινὸν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων, τὸν ἄγοντʼ ἢ φέροντα βίᾳ τἄμʼ ἐν πολεμίου μοίρᾳ μὴ ἐξεῖναί μοι ἀμύνεσθαι, εἴ γε μηδὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐξέσται Χαρίδημον ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀλλά, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄγῃ καὶ φέρῃ βίᾳ τά τινος λῃζόμενος, ἀγώγιμος ὁ κτείνας ἔσται, τοῦ νόμου διδόντος, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἀθῷον εἶναι;

[¶11] 62. Read the next statute. Statute “Whosoever, whether magistrate or private citizen, shall cause this ordinance to be frustrated, or shall alter the same, shall be disfranchised with his children and his property.” You have heard the statute, men of Athens, declaring in plain terms that “whosoever, whether magistrate or private citizen, shall cause this ordinance to be frustrated or shall alter the same, shall be disfranchised with his children and his property.” Do you then count this a trifling or worthless precaution taken by the author of the statute to secure its validity, and to save it from being either frustrated or altered? Yet the defendant Aristocrates, with very little regard for the lawgiver, is trying both to alter it and to frustrate it. For surely, to permit punishment outside the established tribunals and beyond the limits of the prohibited areas, or to rob people of the right of fair hearing, and make them outcasts—what is that but alteration? To draft a series of clauses, all of them exactly contradicting the provisions of the statute-book—what is that but frustration?

> Greek: 62. λέγε τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα νόμον. ΝΟΜΟΣ. ὃς ἂν ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης αἴτιος ᾖ τὸν θεσμὸν συγχυθῆναι τόνδε, ἢ μεταποιήσῃ αὐτόν, ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ παῖδας [ἀτίμους] καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου. ἠκούσατε μὲν τοῦ νόμου λέγοντος ἄντικρυς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὃς ἂν ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης αἴτιος ᾖ τὸν θεσμὸν συγχυθῆναι τόνδε, ἢ μεταποιήσῃ αὐτόν, ἄτιμος ἔστω καὶ οἱ παῖδες καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου. ἆρʼ οὖν μικρὰν ἢ φαύλην πρόνοιαν ἔχειν ὑμῖν ὁ θεὶς τὸν νόμον δοκεῖ, ὅπως κύριος ἔσται καὶ μήτε συγχυθήσεται μήτʼ αὖ μεταποιηθήσεται; ἀλλʼ Ἀριστοκράτης οὑτοσὶ μικρὰ φροντίσας αὐτοῦ μεταποιεῖ καὶ συγχεῖ. τί γὰρ ἄλλʼ ἐστὶν τὸ μεταποιεῖν ἢ ὅταν ἔξω τῶν τεταγμένων δικαστηρίων καὶ ὅρων, [ὧν εἴργεσθαι δεῖ,] διδῷ τις τὰς τιμωρίας, καὶ τὸ λόγου τυχεῖν ἀναιρῶν ἐκδότους ποιῇ; τί δʼ ἄλλο τὸ συγχεῖν ἢ ὅταν ἑξῆς οὑτωσὶ πάντα τἀναντία τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τις γεγραμμένων γράφῃ;

[¶12] 63. Besides the laws cited, he has violated many other statutes, which we have not put on the schedule because they are so numerous. I offer a summary statement. Take the laws which deal with courts of homicide, and which order the contending parties to summon one another, or to tender evidence, or to take their oaths, or which give them any other direction; he has violated every one of them; he has drafted this decree in contravention of them all. What other account can one give, when there is no summons, no evidence by witnesses of the fact, no oath-taking,—when the penalty follows on the heels of the accusation, and that a penalty forbidden by the laws? Yet all the proceedings I have named are in use, as ordered by statute, at five different tribunals.

> Greek: 63. οὐ τοίνυν τούτους μόνον τοὺς νόμους, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παραβέβηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς οὓς οὐ παραγεγράμμεθα διὰ τὸ πλῆθος. ἀλλʼ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ λέγω· ὁπόσοι νόμοι περὶ τῶν φονικῶν δικαστηρίων εἰσίν, καλεῖσθαι λέγοντες ἢ μαρτυρεῖν ἢ διόμνυσθαι τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους ἢ ἄλλʼ ὁτιοῦν προστάττοντες, πάντας ὑπερβέβηκε τούτους καὶ πᾶσιν ἐναντίον εἴρηκεν τὸ ψήφισμα τουτί. οὗ γὰρ οὐ κλῆσις, οὐ κρίσις, οὐ μαρτυρία συνειδότος, οὐ διωμοσία, ἀλλʼ ἀπʼ αἰτίας εὐθὺς ἡ τιμωρία γέγραπται, καὶ αὕτη ἣν ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι, τί ἂν ἄλλο τις εἴποι; καίτοι ταῦτα πάντʼ ἐπὶ πέντε δικαστηρίοις γίγνεται προστεταγμένα τοῖς νόμοις.

[¶13] 64. —Yes, but,—someone will say,—those tribunals are worthless and unfairly constituted, whereas the proposals of the defendant are righteous and admirable.—I deny it. I say that of all the proposals ever laid before you I know of none more outrageous than this decree, and that of all the tribunals to be found in the whole world there are none that can be shown to be more venerable or more righteous than ours. I desire to speak briefly of certain truths, the relation of which reflects credit and honor upon the city, and which you will be gratified to hear. I will begin with a statement which you will find especially instructive, first referring to the free gift which has already been conferred upon Charidemus.

> Greek: 64. νὴ Δία, ἴσως εἴποι τις ἄν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὐδενός ἐστʼ ἄξιʼ οὐδὲ δικαίως εὑρημένα, ἃ δʼ ἔγραψεν οὗτος, δίκαια καὶ καλά. ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον τούτου μὲν τοῦ ψηφίσματος οὐκ οἶδʼ εἴ τι δεινότερον γέγονεν πώποτʼ ἐν ὑμῖν, τούτων δὲ τῶν πάντων ὁπόσʼ ἐστὶ δικαστήριʼ ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὐδὲν οὔτε σεμνότερον οὔτε δικαιότερον φανήσεται. βούλομαι δʼ εἰπεῖν διὰ βραχέων ἃ καὶ ζῆλόν τινα καὶ τιμὴν φέρει τῇ πόλει ῥηθέντα καὶ ἡδίους ἔσεσθʼ ἀκούσαντες. ἄρξομαι δʼ ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν μάλιστα μαθήσεσθε, ἐπὶ τὴν δωρειὰν ἐπανελθὼν ἣ τῷ Χαριδήμῳ δέδοται.

[¶14] 65. It was we, men of Athens, who made Charidemus a citizen, and by that gift bestowed upon him a share in our civil and religious observances, in our legal rights, and in everything in which we ourselves participate. There are many institutions of ours the like of which are not to be found elsewhere, but among them one especially peculiar to ourselves and venerable,—I mean the Court of Areopagus. Concerning that Court I could relate a greater number of noble stories, in part traditional and legendary, in part certified by our own personal testimony, than could be told of any other tribunal. It is worth your while to listen to one or two of them by way of illustration.

> Greek: 65. ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Χαρίδημον ἐποιησάμεθα πολίτην, καὶ διὰ τῆς δωρειᾶς ταύτης μετεδώκαμεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων καὶ νομίμων καὶ πάντων ὅσων περ αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν ἡμῖν. πολλὰ μὲν δὴ παρʼ ἡμῖν ἐστι τοιαῦθʼ οἷʼ οὐχ ἑτέρωθι, ἓν δʼ οὖν ἰδιώτατον πάντων καὶ σεμνότατον, τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ δικαστήριον, ὑπὲρ οὗ τοσαῦτʼ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν καλὰ παραδεδομένα καὶ μυθώδη καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ μάρτυρές ἐσμεν, ὅσα περὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου δικαστηρίου· ὧν ὡσπερεὶ δείγματος εἵνεκʼ ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἓν ἢ δύʼ ἀκοῦσαι.

[¶15] 66. First, then, in ancient times, as we are told by tradition, in this court alone the gods condescended both to render and to demand satisfaction for homicide, and to sit in judgement upon contending litigants,—Poseidon, according to the legend, deigning to demand justice from Ares on behalf of his son Halirrothius, and the twelve gods to adjudicate between the Eumenides and Orestes. These are ancient stories; let us pass to a later date. This is the only tribunal which no despot, no oligarchy, no democracy, has ever dared to deprive of its jurisdiction in cases of murder, all men agreeing that in such cases no jurisprudence of their own devising could be more effective than that which has been devised in this court. In addition to these great merits, here, and here alone, no convicted defendant and no defeated prosecutor has ever made good any complaint against the justice of the verdict given.

> Greek: 66. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν τὰ παλαιά, ὡς ἡμῖν ἀκούειν παραδέδοται, ἐν μόνῳ τούτῳ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δίκας φόνου θεοὶ καὶ δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν ἠξίωσαν καὶ δικασταὶ γενέσθαι διενεχθεῖσιν ἀλλήλοις, ὡς λόγος· λαβεῖν μὲν Ποσειδῶν ὑπὲρ Ἁλιρροθίου τοῦ υἱοῦ παρʼ Ἄρεως, δικάσαι δʼ Εὐμενίσιν καὶ Ὀρέστῃ οἱ δώδεκα θεοί. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ παλαιὰ ταῦτα· τὰ δʼ ὕστερον, τοῦτο μόνον τὸ δικαστήριον οὐχὶ τύραννος, οὐκ ὀλιγαρχία, οὐ δημοκρατία τὰς φονικὰς δίκας ἀφελέσθαι τετόλμηκεν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἀσθενέστερον ἂν τὸ δίκαιον εὑρεῖν ἡγοῦνται περὶ τούτων αὐτοὶ τοῦ παρὰ τούτοις εὑρημένου δικαίου. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τοιούτοις οὖσιν, ἐνταυθοῖ μόνον οὐδεὶς πώποτʼ οὔτε φεύγων ἁλοὺς οὔτε διώκων ἡττηθεὶς ἐξήλεγξεν ὡς ἀδίκως ἐδικάσθη τὰ κριθέντα.

[¶16] 67. And so, in defiance of this safeguard of justice, and of the lawful penalties that it awards, the author of this decree has offered to Charidemus a free licence to do what he likes as long as he lives, and to his friends the right of vindictive prosecution when he is dead. For look at it in this light. You are all of course aware that in the Areopagus, where the law both permits and enjoins the trial of homicide, first, every man who brings accusation of such a crime must make oath by invoking destruction upon himself, his kindred, and his household;

> Greek: 67. ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν φυλακὴν καὶ τὰς ἐν ταύτῃ νομίμους τιμωρίας παραβὰς ὁ γράφων τὸ ψήφισμα τοδὶ ζῶντι μὲν ἐξουσίαν γέγραφεν τῷ Χαριδήμῳ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, παθόντος δέ τι τοῖς οἰκείοις συκοφαντίαν δέδωκεν. σκέψασθε γὰρ οὑτωσί. ἴστε δήπου τοῦθʼ ἅπαντες, ὅτι ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ, οὗ δίδωσʼ ὁ νόμος καὶ κελεύει τοῦ φόνου δικάζεσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν διομεῖται κατʼ ἐξωλείας αὑτοῦ καὶ γένους καὶ οἰκίας ὅ τινʼ αἰτιώμενος εἰργάσθαι τι τοιοῦτον, εἶτʼ οὐδὲ τὸν τυχόντα τινʼ ὅρκον [τοῦτο ποιήσει] ἀλλʼ ὃν οὐδεὶς ὄμνυσʼ ὑπὲρ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου, στὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τομίων κάπρου καὶ κριοῦ καὶ ταύρου, καὶ τούτων ἐσφαγμένων ὑφʼ ὧν δεῖ καὶ ἐν αἷς ἡμέραις καθήκει, ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ ἐκ τῶν μεταχειριζομένων ἅπαν, ὅσον ἔσθʼ ὅσιον, πεπρᾶχθαι.

[¶17] 68. secondly, that he must not treat this oath as an ordinary oath, but as one which no man swears for any other purpose; for he stands over the entrails of a boar, a ram, and a bull, and they must have been slaughtered by the necessary officers and on the days appointed, so that in respect both of the time and of the functionaries every requirement of solemnity has been satisfied. Even then the person who has sworn this tremendous oath does not gain immediate credence; and if any falsehood is brought home to him, he will carry away with him to his children and his kindred the stain of perjury,—but gain nothing. If, on the other hand, he is believed to be laying a just charge, and if he proves the accused guilty of murder, even then he has no power over the convicted criminal; only the laws and the appointed officers have power over the man for punishment. The prosecutor is permitted to see him suffering the penalty awarded by law, and that is all. Such are the prosecutor’s rights. As for the defendant, the rules for his oath are the same, but he is free to withdraw after making his first speech, and neither the prosecutor, nor the judges, nor any other man, has authority to stop him.

> Greek: 68. καὶ μετὰ ταῦθʼ ὁ τὸν τοιοῦτον ὅρκον ὀμωμοκὼς οὔπω πεπίστευται, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἐξελεγχθῇ μὴ λέγων ἀληθῆ, τὴν ἐπιορκίαν ἀπενεγκάμενος τοῖς αὑτοῦ παισὶν καὶ τῷ γένει πλέον οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν ἕξει. ἂν δὲ δόξῃ τὰ δίκαιʼ ἐγκαλεῖν καὶ ἕλῃ τὸν δεδρακότα τοῦ φόνου, οὐδʼ οὕτω κύριος γίγνεται τοῦ ἁλόντος, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνου μὲν οἱ νόμοι κύριοι κολάσαι καὶ οἷς προστέτακται, τῷ δʼ ἐπιδεῖν διδόντα δίκην ἔξεστιν, ἣν ἔταξʼ ὁ νόμος, τὸν ἁλόντα, πέρα δʼ οὐδὲν τούτου. καὶ τῷ μὲν διώκοντι ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, τῷ δὲ φεύγοντι τὰ μὲν τῆς διωμοσίας ταὐτά, τὸν πρότερον δʼ ἔξεστιν εἰπόντα λόγον μεταστῆναι, καὶ οὔθʼ ὁ διώκων οὔθʼ οἱ δικάζοντες οὔτʼ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς κύριος κωλῦσαι.

[¶18] 70. Now why is that so, men of Athens? Because they who originally ordained these customs, whoever they were, heroes or gods, did not treat evil fortune with severity, but humanely alleviated its calamities, so far as they honestly could. All those regulations, so nobly and equitably conceived, the author of the decree now in question has manifestly infringed, for not a single shred of them is to be found in his decree.—That is my first point: here is one tribunal whose written laws and unwritten usages he has contravened in drafting his decree.

> Greek: 70. τί δήποτʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει; ὅτι οἱ ταῦτʼ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ νόμιμα διαθέντες, οἵτινές ποτʼ ἦσαν, εἴθʼ ἥρωες εἴτε θεοί, οὐκ ἐπέθεντο τοῖς ἀτυχήμασιν, ἀλλʼ ἀνθρωπίνως ἐπεκούφισαν, εἰς ὅσον εἶχε καλῶς, τὰς συμφοράς. ταῦτα μέντοι πάνθʼ οὕτω καλῶς καὶ νομίμως ἔχονθʼ ὁ γράφων τὸ ψήφισμα τουτὶ παραβεβηκὼς φαίνεται· ἓν γὰρ οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν ἔνι τούτων ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι τῷ τούτου. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν παρʼ ἑνὸς τούτου δικαστηρίου καὶ [παρὰ] τοὺς γεγραμμένους νόμους καὶ τἄγραφα νόμιμα τὸ ψήφισμʼ εἴρηται.

[¶19] 71. Secondly, there is another tribunal, the court by the Palladium, for the trial of involuntary homicide; and it shall be shown that he nullifies that tribunal also, and transgresses the laws there observed. Here also the order is first the oath-taking, secondly the pleadings, and thirdly the decision of the court; and not one of these processes is found in the defendant’s decree. If the culprit be convicted, and found to have committed the act, neither the prosecutor nor any other person has any authority over him, but only the law. And what does the law enjoin?

> Greek: 71. δεύτερον δʼ ἕτερον δικαστήριον τὸ τῶν ἀκουσίων φόνων φανήσεται συγχέων, τοὐπὶ Παλλαδίῳ, καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τούτῳ νόμους παραβαίνων. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθʼ ὑπόκειται πρῶτον μὲν διωμοσία, δεύτερον δὲ λόγος, τρίτον δὲ γνῶσις τοῦ δικαστηρίου, ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ τούτου ψηφίσματι. ἂν δʼ ἁλῷ καὶ δοκῇ τοὔργον εἰργάσθαι, οὔθʼ ὁ διώκων τοῦ δεδρακότος κύριος οὔτʼ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς πλὴν ὁ νόμος.

[¶20] 72. That the man who is convicted of involuntary homicide shall, on certain appointed days, leave the country by a prescribed route, and remain in exile until he is reconciled to one of the relatives of the deceased. Then the law permits him to return, not casually, but in a certain manner; it instructs him to make sacrifice and to purify himself, and gives other directions for his conduct. In all these provisions, men of Athens, the law is right.

> Greek: 72. τί οὖν ὁ νόμος κελεύει; τὸν ἁλόντʼ ἐπʼ ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ ἔν τισιν εἰρημένοις χρόνοις ἀπελθεῖν τακτὴν ὁδόν, καὶ φεύγειν ἕως ἂν αἰδέσηταί τινα τῶν ἐν γένει τοῦ πεπονθότος. τηνικαῦτα δʼ ἥκειν δέδωκεν ἔστιν ὃν τρόπον, οὐχ ὃν ἂν τύχῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ θῦσαι καὶ καθαρθῆναι καὶ ἄλλʼ ἄττα διείρηκεν ἃ χρὴ ποιῆσαι, ὀρθῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάντα ταῦτα λέγων ὁ νόμος.

[¶21] 73. It is just to allot a lesser penalty for involuntary than for willful homicide; it is quite right, before ordering a man to go into exile, to provide for his safe departure; and the provisions for the reinstatement of the returning exile, for his purification by customary rites, and so forth, are excellent. Well, everyone of these ordinances, so righteously enacted by the original legislators, has been transgressed by the defendant in drafting his decree. So we have now two tribunals, of great antiquity and high character, and usages handed down from time immemorial, which he has insolently overridden.

> Greek: 73. καὶ γὰρ τὸ τῶν ἀκουσίων ἐλάττω τὴν τιμωρίαν ἢ τῶν ἑκουσίων τάξαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ παρασχόντʼ ἀσφάλειαν ἀπελθεῖν οὕτω προστάττειν φεύγειν ὀρθῶς ἐστιν ἔχον, καὶ τὸ τὸν κατιόνθʼ ὁσιοῦν καὶ καθαίρεσθαι νομίμοις τισί, καὶ τὸ τοὺς νόμους κυρίους ἁπάντων εἶναι, καὶ πάντα ταῦτʼ ἔχει καλῶς. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἅπαντα δικαίως οὕτω διορισθένθʼ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς νομοθετησάντων παρέβη γράφων τὸ ψήφισμʼ οὑτοσί. ταῦτα μὲν δὴ δύο τηλικαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα δικαστήρια καὶ νόμιμʼ ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου παραδεδομένα οὕτως ἀναιδῶς ὑπερπεπήδηκεν.

[¶22] 74. Besides these two tribunals there is also a third, whose usages are still more sacred and awe-inspiring, for cases in which a man admits the act of slaying, but pleads that he slew lawfully. That is the court held at the Delphinium. It appears to me, gentlemen of the jury, that the first inquiry made by those who originally defined the rules of jurisprudence in these matters was, whether we are to regard no act of homicide as righteous, or whether any kind of homicide is to be accounted righteous; and that, arguing that Orestes, having slain his own mother, confessing the fact, and finding gods to adjudge his case, was acquitted, they formed the opinion that there is such thing as justifiable homicide,—for gods could not have given an unjust verdict. Having formed this opinion, they immediately set down in writing an exact definition of the conditions under which homicide is lawful.

> Greek: 74. τρίτον δʼ ἕτερον πρὸς τούτοις δικαστήριον, ὃ πάντων ἁγιώτατα τούτων ἔχει καὶ φρικωδέστατα, ἄν τις ὁμολογῇ μὲν κτεῖναι, ἐννόμως δὲ φῇ δεδρακέναι. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τοὐπὶ Δελφινίῳ. δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ζητῆσαι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἁπάντων οἱ περὶ τούτων ἐν ἀρχῇ τὰ δίκαιʼ ὁρίσαντες, πότερʼ οὐδένα χρὴ φόνον ὅσιον εἶναι νομίζειν ἢ τινά γʼ ἔσθʼ ὅσιον νομιστέον, λογιζόμενοι δʼ ὅτι μητέρʼ Ὀρέστης ἀπεκτονὼς ὁμολογῶν θεῶν δικαστῶν τυχὼν ἀποφυγγάνει, νομίσαι δίκαιόν τινʼ εἶναι φόνον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τά γε μὴ δίκαια θεοὺς ψηφίσασθαι. ὡς δὲ τοῦτʼ ἐνόμισαν, γράφουσιν ἤδη καὶ διορίζουσι σαφῶς ἐφʼ οἷς ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτιννύναι.

[¶23] 75. The defendant, however, admitted no exception; he simply makes an outcast of any man who kills Charidemus, even though he kill him justly or as the laws permit. And yet to every act and to every word one of two epithets is applicable: it is either just or unjust. To no act and to no word can both these epithets be applied at the same time, for how can the same act at the same time be both just and not just? Every act is brought to the test as having the one or the other of these qualities; if it be found to have the quality of injustice, it is adjudged to be wicked, if of justice, to be good and honest.—But you, sir, used neither qualification when you wrote the words, “if any man kill.” You named the mere accusation, without any definition, and then immediately added, “let him be liable to seizure.” Thereby you have evidently ignored this tribunal and its usages as well as the other two.

> Greek: 75. ἀλλʼ οὐχ οὗτος οὐδὲν ἀφεῖλεν, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Χαρίδημον, κἂν δικαίως, κἂν ὡς οἱ νόμοι διδόασιν, ἔκδοτον ποιεῖ. καίτοι πᾶσίν εἰσι πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις δύο προσθῆκαι, ἡ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου· ἃς ἅμα μὲν ταὐτὸ πρᾶγμʼ οὐδὲν ἂν δύναιτο σχεῖν οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδείς (πῶς γὰρ ἂν δίκαιʼ ἅμα ταὐτὰ καὶ μὴ γένοιτο;) τὴν ἑτέραν δʼ ἕκαστον ἔχον δοκιμάζεται, κἂν μὲν τὴν ἄδικον φανῇ, πονηρὸν κρίνεται, ἂν δὲ τὴν δικαίαν, χρηστὸν καὶ καλόν. σὺ τοίνυν οὐδετέραν προσέθηκας τούτων, ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ γράφων· ἀλλʼ ἀόριστον εἰπὼν αὐτὴν τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτʼ εὐθὺς προσγράψας ἀγώγιμον εἶναι, τρίτον τουτὶ δικαστήριον καὶ τὰ τούτου νόμιμα παραβεβηκὼς φαίνει.

[¶24] 76. There is also a fourth tribunal, that at the Prytaneum. Its function is that, if a man is struck by a stone, or a piece of wood or iron, or anything of that sort, falling upon him, and if someone, without knowing who threw it, knows and possesses the implement of homicide, he takes proceedings against these implements in that court. Well, if it is not righteous to deny a trial even to a lifeless and senseless thing, the object of so grave an accusation, assuredly it is impious and outrageous that a man who may possibly be not guilty, and who in any case,—and I will assume him to be guilty,—is a human being endowed by fortune with the same nature as ourselves, should be made an outcast on such a charge without a hearing and without a verdict.

> Greek: 76. τέταρτον τοίνυν ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις τοὐπὶ Πρυτανείῳ. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τί; ἐὰν λίθος ἢ ξύλον ἢ σίδηρος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἐμπεσὸν πατάξῃ, καὶ τὸν μὲν βαλόντʼ ἀγνοῇ τις, αὐτὸ δʼ εἰδῇ καὶ ἔχῃ τὸ τὸν φόνον εἰργασμένον, τούτοις ἐνταῦθα λαγχάνεται. εἰ τοίνυν τῶν ἀψύχων καὶ μὴ μετεχόντων τοῦ φρονεῖν οὐδέν ἐσθʼ ὅσιον, τοιαύτην ἔχον αἰτίαν, ἐᾶν ἄκριτον, ἦ που τόν γʼ ἀδικοῦντα μὲν οὐδέν, ἐὰν τύχῃ, θήσω δʼ ἀδικοῦντα, ἀλλʼ ἄνθρωπόν γʼ ὄντα καὶ μετειληφότα [τῇ τύχῃ] τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμῖν φύσεως, ἀνόσιον καὶ δεινὸν ἄνευ λόγου καὶ ψήφου ποιεῖν ἔκδοτον ἐπʼ αἰτίᾳ τοιαύτῃ.

[¶25] 77. Then there is a fifth tribunal which he has overruled,—and I beg you to take note of its character; I mean the court held in the precinct of Phreatto. In that court, men of Athens, the law orders every man stand his trial who, having gone into exile on a charge of unintentional homicide, and being still unreconciled to the persons who procured his banishment, incurs a further charge of willful murder. The author of the several rules of court did not let such a man alone, on the ground that he was unable to return to Athens, nor did he, because the man had already committed a like offence, treat the similarity of the accusation as proof positive against him;

> Greek: 77. ἔτι τοίνυν πέμπτον δικαστήριον ἄλλο θεάσασθʼ οἷον ὑπερβέβηκε, τὸ ἐν Φρεαττοῖ. ἐνταῦθα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κελεύει δίκας ὑπέχειν ὁ νόμος, ἐάν τις ἐπʼ ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ πεφευγώς, μήπω τῶν ἐκβαλλόντων αὐτὸν ᾐδεσμένων, αἰτίαν ἔχῃ ἑτέρου φόνου ἑκουσίου. καὶ οὐχ, ὅτι δεῦρʼ οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἐλθεῖν αὐτῷ, παρεῖδεν αὐτὸν ὁ ταῦθʼ ἕκαστα τάξας, οὐδʼ, ὅτι καὶ πρότερόν τι τοιοῦτον ἐποίησε, καὶ δὴ τὴν ὁμοίαν ἐποιήσατο πιστὴν αἰτίαν κατʼ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τό τʼ εὐσεβὲς εὗρεν ὅπως ἔσται, κἀκεῖνον οὐκ ἀπεστέρησε λόγου καὶ κρίσεως.

[¶26] 78. he found a way of satisfying the requirements of religion without depriving the culprit of a fair hearing and a trial. How did he manage it? He conveyed the judges who were to sit to a place to which the accused was able to repair, appointing a place within the country but on the sea-coast, known as the precinct of Phreatto. The culprit approaches the shore in a vessel, and makes his speech without landing, while the judges listen to him and give judgement on shore. If found guilty, the man suffers the penalty of willful murder as he deserves; if acquitted, he goes his way scot-free in respect of that charge, but still subject to punishment for the earlier homicide.

> Greek: 78. τί οὖν ἐποίησεν; ἤγαγε τοὺς δικάσοντας οἷ προσελθεῖν οἷόν τʼ ἐκείνῳ, τῆς χώρας ἀποδείξας τόπον τινʼ ἐν Φρεαττοῖ καλούμενον ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ. εἶθʼ ὁ μὲν ἐν πλοίῳ προσπλεύσας λέγει τῆς γῆς οὐχ ἁπτόμενος, οἱ δʼ ἀκροῶνται καὶ δικάζουσιν ἐν τῇ γῇ· κἂν μὲν ἁλῷ, τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις φόνοις δίκην ἔδωκε δικαίως, ἂν δʼ ἀποφύγῃ, ταύτης μὲν ἀθῷος ἀφίεται, τὴν δʼ ἐπὶ τῷ πρότερον φόνῳ φυγὴν ὑπέχει.

[¶27] 79. Now with what object have these regulations been made so carefully? The man who drew them up accounted it equally irreligious to let slip the guilty, and to cast out the innocent before trial. But if such great pains are taken in the case of persons already adjudged to be homicides, to ensure for them a hearing, a trial, and fair treatment in every respect upon any subsequent accusation, surely it is most outrageous to provide that a man who has not yet been found guilty, and of whom it is still undecided whether he committed the act or not, and whether the act was involuntary or willful, should be handed over to the mercy of his accusers.

> Greek: 79. τίνος οὖν ποθʼ εἵνεκα ταῦθʼ οὕτω διεσπούδασται; ἴσον ἡγεῖτʼ ἀσέβημʼ ὁ ταῦτα διαιρῶν τόν τʼ ἀδικοῦντʼ ἐᾶν καὶ τὸν ἀναίτιον ἐκδιδόναι πρὸ δίκης. καίτοι εἰ περὶ τῶν ἀνδροφόνων τῶν ἤδη κεκριμένων τοσαύτη σπουδή, ὅπως λόγου καὶ κρίσεως καὶ πάντων ὁπόσʼ ἐστὶ δίκαια τεύξονται περὶ τῶν ὕστερον αἰτιῶν, ἦ που περί γε τοῦ μήθʼ ἑαλωκότος μήτʼ ἐγνωσμένου πότερον δέδρακεν ἢ οὒ καὶ πότερʼ ἄκων ἢ ἑκών, πάνδεινον γράφειν ὡς ἐκδοτέον τοῖς ἐγκαλοῦσιν.

[¶28] 80. In addition to all these provisions for legal redress there is a sixth, which the defendant has equally defied in his decree. Suppose that a man is ignorant of all the processes I have mentioned, or that the proper time for taking such proceedings has elapsed, that for any other reasons he does not choose to prosecute by those methods; if he sees the homicide frequenting places of worship or the market, he may arrest him and take him to jail; but not, as you have permitted, to his own house or wherever he chooses. When under arrest he will suffer no injury in jail until after his trial; but, if he is found guilty, he will be punished with death. On the other hand, if the person who arrested him does not get a fifth part of the votes, he will be fined a thousand drachmas.

> Greek: 80. ἔτι τοίνυν ἔσθʼ ἕκτη τιμωρία πρὸς ἁπάσαις ταύταις, ἣν ὁμοίως παραβὰς γέγραφεν τὸ ψήφισμʼ οὑτοσί. εἰ πάντα ταῦτά τις ἠγνόηκεν, ἢ καὶ παρεληλύθασιν οἱ χρόνοι ἐν οἷς ἔδει τούτων ἕκαστα ποιεῖν, ἢ διʼ ἄλλο τι οὐχὶ βούλεται τούτους τοὺς τρόπους ἐπεξιέναι, τὸν ἀνδροφόνον δʼ ὁρᾷ περιιόντʼ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀγοράν, ἀπάγειν ἔξεστιν εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον, οὐκ οἴκαδʼ οὐδʼ ὅποι βούλεται, ὥσπερ σὺ δέδωκας. κἀνταῦθʼ ἀπαχθεὶς οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν, πρὶν ἂν κριθῇ, πείσεται, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν μὲν ἁλῷ, θανάτῳ ζημιωθήσεται, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων ὁ ἀπαγαγών, χιλίας προσοφλήσει.

[¶29] 81. The proposals of the defendant are quite different: the accuser is to prosecute without risk, the culprit to be given up incontinently and without trial; and if any person, or indeed any entire city, shall intervene to prevent the destruction of all those usages which I have described and the overthrow of all the tribunals I have mentioned; tribunals introduced by the gods and frequented by mankind from that day to this,—and to rescue the victims of outrage and lawless violence, he proposes that any such person shall be banned; for him also he allows no hearing and no trial, but punishes him instantly and without trial. Could any decree be more monstrous and more unconstitutional?

> Greek: 81. ἀλλʼ οὐχ οὗτος ἔγραψε ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἀθῷον αἰτιᾶσθαι, τὸν δʼ ἄκριτον παραχρῆμʼ ἐκδίδοσθαι. ἂν δέ τις ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ ὅλη πόλις τοσούτοις νομίμοις ἀναιρουμένοις ὅσοις ἐγὼ διεξελήλυθα, καὶ τοσούτοις δικαστηρίοις καταλυομένοις ὅσοις εἴρηκα, ἃ θεοὶ κατέδειξαν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτʼ ἄνθρωποι χρῶνται πάντα τὸν χρόνον, βοηθήσῃ καὶ τὸν ὑβριζόμενον καὶ παρανομούμενον ἀφέληται, ἔκσπονδον ἔγραψεν εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲ τούτῳ λόγον οὐδὲ κρίσιν πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτον εὐθὺς ἄνευ κρίσεως κολάζει. πῶς ἂν ἢ δεινότερον γένοιτʼ ἢ παρανομώτερον τούτου ψήφισμα;

[¶30] 82. Have we any statute left?... Let me see it..... Yes, that is the one; read it. The Statute “If any man die a violent death, his kinsmen may take and hold hostages in respect of such death, until they either submit to trial for bloodguiltiness, or surrender the actual manslayers. This right is limited to three hostages and no more.” We have many well-conceived laws, men of Athens; but I am inclined to think that this statute is as wise and just as any of them. Observe the spirit of equity and the remarkable humanity with which it is drawn up.

> Greek: 82. ἆρά τις ἡμῖν ἔτι λοιπός ἐστι νόμος; δεῖξον. οὑτοσί. λέγε τοῦτον. ΝΟΜΟΣ. ἐάν τις βιαίῳ θανάτῳ ἀποθάνῃ, ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῖς προσήκουσιν εἶναι τὰς ἀνδροληψίας, ἕως ἂν ἢ δίκας τοῦ φόνου ὑπόσχωσιν ἢ τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας ἐκδῶσι. τὴν δὲ ἀνδροληψίαν εἶναι μέχρι τριῶν, πλέον δὲ μή. πολλῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καλῶς ἐχόντων νόμων οὐκ οἶδʼ εἴ τινος ἧττον οὗτος ἔχει καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὁ νόμος. σκέψασθε γὰρ ὡς νομίμως καὶ σφόδρʼ ἀνθρωπίνως κεῖται.

[¶31] 83. “If any man die a violent death,” says the legislator. First, by adding the epithet “violent,” he has given an indication by which we understand his meaning to be, “if a man die wrongfully.” “His kinsmen may take and hold hostages in respect of such death, until they either submit to trial for bloodguiltiness, or surrender the actual manslayers.” You will note what an admirable provision this is. He requires the hostages, in the first instance, to stand trial; and then if they refuse, he enjoins them to give up the murderers; but, if they decline both these duties, he adds that the right to hold hostages is limited to three and no more. The whole of this statute is defied in the wording of the decree.

> Greek: 83. ἐάν τις βιαίῳ θανάτῳ ἀποθάνῃ, φησίν. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τοῦτο προσγράψας τὸ βιαίως, σύμβολον πεποίηκεν ᾧ γιγνώσκομεν ὅτι, ἂν ἀδίκως, λέγει. ὑπὲρ τούτου φησὶ τοῖς προσήκουσιν εἶναι τὰς ἀνδροληψίας, ἕως ἂν ἢ δίκας τοῦ φόνου ὑπόσχωσιν ἢ τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας ἐκδῶσιν. σκοπεῖσθʼ ὡς καλῶς. πρότερον μὲν ὑποσχεῖν δίκας ἀξιοῖ, μετὰ ταῦτα δέ, ἂν τοῦτο μὴ βούλωνται, προσέταξεν ἐκδοῦναι· ἐὰν δὲ μηδέτερον τούτων ἐθέλωσι, τὸ ἀνδρολήψιόν φησιν εἶναι μέχρι τριῶν, πλέον δὲ μή. παρὰ τοίνυν ὅλον τοῦτον τὸν νόμον εἴρηται τὸ ψήφισμα.

[¶32] 84. In the first place, when writing the words, “if any man shall kill,” he did not add “wrongfully,” or “violently,” or any qualification at all. Secondly he proposes that the culprit shall be liable to seizure instantly and before any claim of redress has been made. Furthermore, while the statute ordains that, if the persons in whose house the death took place will neither submit to trial nor give up the perpetrators, as many as three may be detained as hostages, Aristocrates dismisses those persons scot-free, and takes no account of them whatever, but proposes to put under a ban those who, in obedience to that common law of mankind which enjoins hospitality to a fugitive, have harbored the culprit, who, as I will assume, has already gone into exile, if they refuse to surrender their suppliant.

> Greek: 84. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ γράφων, οὐ προσέγραψʼ ἀδίκως οὐδὲ βιαίως οὐδʼ ὅλως οὐδέν. εἶτα πρὸ τοῦ δίκην ἀξιῶσαι λαβεῖν, εὐθὺς ἔγραψεν ἀγώγιμον εἶναι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁ μὲν νόμος, ἐὰν μήτε δίκας ὑπόσχωσι παρʼ οἷς ἂν τὸ πάθος γένηται, μήτε τοὺς δεδρακότας ἐκδῶσι, κελεύει κατὰ τούτων εἶναι μέχρι τριῶν τὸ ἀνδρολήψιον·

[¶33] 85. Thus, by omitting to specify the mode of the homicide, by not providing for a trial, by omitting the claim of redress, by permitting arrest in any place whatsoever, by punishing those who harbor the fugitive, and by not punishing those in whose house the death took place,—in every respect I say that his proposal is in manifest contravention of this statute also.

> Greek: 85. ὁ δὲ τούτους μὲν ἀθῴους παρῆκε, καὶ οὐδὲ λόγον πεποίηται περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδένα, τοὺς δὲ τὸν ἤδη πεφευγότα (θήσω γὰρ οὕτω) κατὰ τὸν κοινὸν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων νόμον, ὃς κεῖται τὸν φεύγοντα δέχεσθαι, ὑποδεξαμένους ἐκσπόνδους εἶναι γράφει, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν ἱκέτην ἔκδοτον διδῶσιν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ μὴ προσθεῖναι πῶς, ἐὰν ἀποκτείνῃ, καὶ τῷ μηδεμίαν κρίσιν εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῷ μὴ δίκας αἰτεῖν, καὶ τῷ πανταχόθεν διδόναι λαβεῖν, καὶ τῷ τοὺς ὑποδεξαμένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ παρʼ οἷς ἂν τὸ πάθος γένηται κολάζειν, καὶ πᾶσιν οὑτωσὶ φανερῶς καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον εἴρηκε τὸν νόμον.

[¶34] 86. Read the next one. [“And it shall not be lawful to propose a statute directed against an individual, unless the same apply to all Athenians.”] The statute just read is not, like the others, taken from the Laws of Homicide, but it is just as good—as good as ever law was. The man who introduced it was of opinion that, as every citizen has an equal share in civil rights, so everybody should have an equal share in the laws; and therefore he moved that it should not be lawful to propose a law affecting any individual, unless the same applied to all Athenians. Now seeing that it is agreed that the drafting of decrees must conform to the law, a man who draws a decree for the special benefit of Charidemus, such as is not applicable to all the rest of you, must evidently be making a proposal in defiance of this statute also; of course what it is unlawful to put into a statute cannot legitimately be put into a decree.

> Greek: 86. λέγε δὴ τὸν ἐφεξῆς. ΝΟΜΟΣ. μηδὲ νόμον ἐπʼ ἀνδρὶ ἐξεῖναι θεῖναι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις. ἔστι μὲν οὐκέτι τῶν φονικῶν ὅδʼ ὁ νῦν ἀνεγνωσμένος νόμος, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν δʼ ἧττον ἔχει καλῶς, εἴπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας ἴσον μέτεστιν ἑκάστῳ, οὕτως ᾤετο δεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ἴσον μετέχειν πάντας ὁ θεὶς αὐτόν, καὶ διὰ ταῦτʼ ἔγραψεν μηδὲ νόμον ἐπʼ ἀνδρὶ ἐξεῖναι θεῖναι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφʼ ἅπασιν Ἀθηναίοις. ὁπότε τοίνυν τὰ ψηφίσματα δεῖν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ὁμολογεῖται γράφειν, ὁ γράφων ἰδίᾳ τι Χαριδήμῳ τοιοῦτον ὃ μὴ πᾶσι καὶ ὑμῖν ἔσται, σαφῶς καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον ἂν εἰρηκὼς εἴη τὸν νόμον. οὐ γὰρ δήπου, ἃ μηδὲ νομοθετεῖν ἔξεστιν, ταῦτʼ ἐν ψηφίσματι γράψας τις ἔννομʼ ἂν εἰρηκὼς εἴη.

[¶35] 87. Read the next statute,—or is that all of them? The Statute [“No decree either of the Council or of the Assembly shall have superior authority to a statute.”] Put it down.—I take it, gentlemen, that a very short and easy argument will serve me to prove that this statute has been violated in the drafting of the decree. When there are so many statutes, and when a man makes a motion that contravenes every one of them, and incorporates a private transaction in a decree, how can anyone deny that he is claiming for his decree authority superior to that of a statute?

> Greek: 87. λέγε τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα νόμον. ἢ οὗτοι πάντες εἰσίν; ΝΟΜΟΣ. ψήφισμα δὲ μηδὲν μήτε βουλῆς μήτε δήμου νόμου κυριώτερον εἶναι. κατάθου. πάνυ μικρὸν ὑπείληφά μοι τὸν λόγον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι περὶ τοῦ παρὰ τοῦτον εἰρῆσθαι τὸν νόμον τὸ ψήφισμα. ὃς γὰρ ὑπαρχόντων τοσούτων νόμων πάντας ὑπερβὰς τούτους γέγραφεν καὶ κατέκλεισʼ ἴδιον πρᾶγμα ψηφίσματι, τοῦτον τί τις ἄλλο ποιεῖν φήσει πλὴν ψήφισμα νόμου κυριώτερον ἀξιοῦν εἶναι;

[¶36] 88. Now I wish to cite for your information one or two decrees drawn in favour of genuine benefactors of the commonwealth, to satisfy you that it is easy to frame such things without injustice, when they are drawn for the express purpose of doing honor to a man, and of admitting him to a share of our own privileges, and when, under the pretence of doing so, there is no malicious and fraudulent intention.—Read these decrees.—To save you a long hearing, the clauses corresponding to that for which I am prosecuting the defendant have been extracted from the several decrees. (The Clerk reads excerpts from sundry Decrees.)

> Greek: 88. βούλομαι τοίνυν ὑμῖν καὶ ἓν ἢ δύο ψηφίσματα δεῖξαι τῶν γεγραμμένων τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐεργέταις τῆς πόλεως, ἵνʼ εἰδῆθʼ ὅτι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι γράφειν τὰ δίκαια, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τις εἵνεκα τούτου γράφῃ, τοῦ τιμῆσαί τινα καὶ μεταδοῦναι τῶν ἡμῖν ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ μὴ διὰ τοῦ ταῦτα δοκεῖν ποιεῖν βούληται κακουργεῖν καὶ παρακρούεσθαι. λέγε τὰ ψηφίσματα ταυτί. ἀλλʼ ἵνα μὴ μακρὸν ὑμῖν ἀκούειν ᾖ, ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν ψηφισμάτων αὐτὸ τοῦτʼ ἐξείλεκται περὶ οὗ τούτου κατηγορῶ. λέγε. ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑΤΑ.

[¶37] 89. You see, men of Athens, that they have all drawn them in the same fashion. For instance: “There shall be the same redress for him as if the person slain were an Athenian.” Here, without tampering with your existing laws respecting such offences, they enhance the dignity of those laws by making it an act of grace to allow a share in them to others. Not so Aristocrates: he does his very best to drag the laws through the mire; anyhow, he tried to compose something of his own, as though they were worth nothing; and he makes light even of that act of grace which you bestowed your citizenship upon Charidemus. For when he assumes that you still owe the man a debt of gratitude, and has proposed that you should protect him into the bargain, so that he may do just what he likes with impunity, does not such conduct merit my description?

> Greek: 89. ὁρᾶθʼ ὅτι πάντες, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον γεγράφασιν. ἔστω φησὶν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτὴ τιμωρία καθάπερ ἂν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἀποκτείνῃ, κυρίους μὲν ἐῶντες τοὺς περὶ τούτων ὑπάρχοντας ὑμῖν νόμους, σεμνοὺς δʼ ἀποφαίνοντες, οἵ γʼ ἐν δωρειᾶς ἐποιήσαντο τάξει τὸ τούτων μεταδοῦναι. ἀλλʼ οὐκ Ἀριστοκράτης, ἀλλὰ προπηλακίζει μὲν καθʼ ὅσον δύναται τούτους (ὡς γοῦν οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἴδιόν τι γράφειν ἐπεχείρησεν), μικρὰν δʼ ἀποφαίνει κἀκείνην τὴν δωρειὰν ᾗ τὴν πολιτείαν δεδώκατε τῷ Χαριδήμῳ. ὃς γάρ, ὡς ἀγαπώντων τοῦθʼ ὑμῶν καὶ προσοφειλόντων χάριν αὐτῷ, γέγραφεν καὶ πρὸς φυλάττειν ὑμᾶς ἐκεῖνον, ὅπως ἀδεῶς ὅ τι ἂν βούληται ποιῇ, πῶς οὐ τοῦθʼ ὃ λέγω διαπράττεται;