90. I am well aware, men of Athens, that, although Aristocrates will be quite unable to disprove the charge of framing his decree in open defiance of the laws, he will make an attempt to shuffle away the most serious part of the accusation,—namely, that from beginning to end of his decree he does not order any trial of a very grave indictment. On that point I do not think I need say much; but I will prove clearly from the actual phrasing of the decree that he himself does not suppose that the man accused will get any trial at all.
90. οὐκ ἀγνοῶ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι ὡς μὲν οὐ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους φανερῶς γέγραφεν τὸ ψήφισμα Ἀριστοκράτης οὐχ ἕξει δεῖξαι, ὃ δὲ δεινότατον πάντων ἐστίν, τὸ μηδεμίαν κρίσιν ἐν παντὶ ποιῆσαι τῷ ψηφίσματι τοιαύτης αἰτίας, τοῦθʼ ὑφαιρεῖσθαι πειράσεται. ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου πολλὰ μὲν λέγειν οὐκ οἶμαι δεῖν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ψηφίσματος αὐτοῦ δείξω σαφῶς οὐδʼ αὐτὸν τοῦτον ἡγούμενον εἶναι κρίσιν οὐδεμίαν τῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχοντι.
91. The words are: “If any man kill Charidemus, he shall be liable to seizure; and if any person or any city rescue him, they shall be put under ban,”—not merely in case they refuse to give up for trial the man they have rescued, but absolutely and without more ado. And yet if he were permitting instead of disallowing a trial, he would have made the penal clause against the rescuers conditional upon their not giving up for trial the person rescued.
91. γέγραφεν γὰρ ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Χαρίδημον, ἀγώγιμος ἔστω, ἐὰν δέ τις ἀφέληται ἢ πόλις ἢ ἰδιώτης, ἔκσπονδος ἔστω, οὐκ ἐὰν μὴ παράσχῃ εἰς κρίσιν τὸν ἀφαιρεθέντα, ἀλλʼ ὅλως εὐθύς. καίτοι εἴ γʼ ἐδίδου κρίσιν καὶ μὴ ἀφῃρεῖτο, τότʼ ἂν προσέγραψεν κατὰ τῶν ἀφελομένων τὴν τιμωρίαν, ὁπότʼ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν μὴ παρέσχον ὃν ἐξείλοντο.
92. I dare say that he will use the following argument, and that he will try very hard to mislead you on this point. The decree, he will urge, is invalid because it is merely a provisional resolution, and the law provides that resolutions of the Council shall be in force for one year only; therefore, if you acquit him today, the commonwealth can take no harm in respect of his decree.
92. οἶμαι τοίνυν αὐτὸν κἀκεῖνον ἐρεῖν τὸν λόγον, καὶ σφόδρα ταύτῃ ζητήσειν ἐξαπατᾶν ὑμᾶς, ὡς ἄκυρόν ἐστι τὸ ψήφισμα· προβούλευμα γάρ ἐστιν, ὁ νόμος δʼ ἐπέτεια κελεύει τὰ τῆς βουλῆς εἶναι ψηφίσματα, ὥστε κἂν αὐτοῦ νῦν ἀποψηφίσησθε, ἥ γε πόλις φλαῦρον οὐδὲν πείσεται κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦτο.
93. I think your rejoinder to that argument should be that the defendant’s purpose in drafting the decree was, not that it should be inoperative and have no disagreeable results,—for it was open to him not to draft it at all, if he had wished to consult the best advantage of the commonwealth;—but that you might be misled and certain people might be enabled to carry through projects opposed to your interests. That the decree has been challenged, that its operation has been delayed, and that it has now become invalid, you owe to us; and it is preposterous that the very reasons that ought to make you grateful to us should be available as reasons for acquitting our opponents.
93. ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτʼ οἶμαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς ἐκεῖνʼ ὑπολαμβάνειν, ὅτι τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦθʼ οὗτος ἔγραψεν οὐχ ἵνʼ ὄντος ἀκύρου μηδὲν ἀηδὲς ὑμῖν συμβῇ (τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ γράφειν, εἴ γε τὸ βέλτιστον τῇ πόλει σκοπεῖν ἐβούλετο) ἀλλʼ ἵνʼ ἐξαπατηθέντων ὑμῶν διαπράξαιντό τινες τἀναντία τοῖς ὑμῖν συμφέρουσιν. οἱ δὲ γραψάμενοι καὶ χρόνους ἐμποιήσαντες καὶ διʼ οὓς ἄκυρόν ἐστιν, ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν. ἄτοπον δὴ γένοιτʼ ἄν, εἰ ὧν ἡμῖν χάριν εἰκὸς ὑπάρχειν, ταῦτα τούτοις εἰς σωτηρίαν ὑπάρξειεν.
94. Moreover the question is not so simple as some suppose. If there were no other man likely to propose decrees like his without regard to your interests, the matter might, perhaps, be a simple one. But in fact there are many such; and that is why it is not right that you should refuse to annul this decree. If it is pronounced flawless, who will not move decrees in future without misgiving? Who will refuse to put them to the vote? Who will impeach them? What you have to take into account is, not that this decree has become invalid by lapse of time, but that, if you now give judgement for the defendant, by that verdict you will be offering impunity to every man who may hereafter wish to do you a mischief.
94. ἔτι τοίνυν οὐδʼ ἁπλοῦν τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἐστίν, ὥς τις οἴεται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἦν ὅστις ἔμελλεν ὁμοίως τούτῳ τῶν συμφερόντων ὑμῖν ὀλιγωρήσας γράφειν, ἴσως ἂν ἦν τοῦτο· νῦν δʼ ὄντων οὐκ ὀλίγων οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχει μὴ λῦσαι τὸ ψήφισμʼ ὑμῖν. τίς γὰρ οὐ γράψει θαρρῶν πάλιν, ἡνίκʼ ἂν ᾖ τοῦτʼ ἀποπεφευγός; τίς δʼ οὐκ ἐπιψηφιεῖ; τίς δὲ γράψεται; οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, εἰ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἄκυρον τοῖς χρόνοις, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι τῇ περὶ τούτου ψήφῳ, νῦν ἐὰν ἀποψηφίσησθε, τοῖς ἀδικεῖν βουλομένοις αὖθις ὑμᾶς ἄδειαν δώσετε.
95. It also occurs to my mind, men of Athens, that Aristocrates, having no straightforward or honest defence, nor indeed any defence at all, to offer, will resort to such fallacious arguments as this,—that many similar decrees have been made before now in favour of many persons. That is no proof, gentlemen, of the legality of his own proposal. There are many pretences by which you have often been misled.
95. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνό μʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λέληθεν, ὅτι ἁπλῆν μὲν οὐδὲ δικαίαν οὐδʼ ἡντινοῦν ἀπολογίαν Ἀριστοκράτης ἕξει λέγειν, παραγωγὰς δέ τινας τοιαύτας ἐρεῖ, ὡς ἄρα πολλὰ τοιαῦτʼ ἤδη γέγονε ψηφίσματα πολλοῖς. ἔστι δʼ οὐδέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο σημεῖον τοῦ τοῦτον ἔννομʼ εἰρηκέναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ προφάσεις εἰσὶν διʼ ἃς πολλάκις ὑμεῖς ἐξηπάτησθε.
96. For instance, suppose that one of those decrees which have in fact been disallowed had never been impeached in this Court. It would certainly have been operative; nevertheless it would have been moved contrary to law. Or suppose that a decree, being impeached, was pronounced flawless, because the prosecutors, either collusively or through incompetence, had failed to make good their case: that failure does not make it legal. Then the jurors do not give conscientious verdicts? Yes, they do; I will explain how. They are sworn to decide to the best of an honest judgement; but the view that commends itself to their judgement is guided by the speeches to which they listen, and, inasmuch as they cast their votes in accordance with that view, they are true to their oath.
96. οἷον εἴ τι τῶν ἑαλωκότων ψηφισμάτων παρʼ ὑμῖν μὴ ἐγράφη, κύριον ἂν δήπουθεν ἦν· καὶ μὴν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους γʼ ἂν εἴρητο. καὶ εἴ τί γε γραφὲν ἢ καθυφέντων τῶν κατηγόρων ἢ μὴ δυνηθέντων μηδὲν διδάξαι ἀπέφυγεν, καὶ τοῦτʼ οὐδὲν κωλύει παράνομον εἶναι. οὐκ ἄρʼ εὐορκοῦσιν οἱ δικάσαντες αὐτό; ναί. πῶς; ἐγὼ διδάξω. γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ δικάσειν ὀμωμόκασιν, ἡ δὲ τῆς γνώμης δόξα ἀφʼ ὧν ἂν ἀκούσωσι παρίσταται· ὅτε τοίνυν κατὰ ταύτην ἔθεντο τὴν ψῆφον, εὐσεβοῦσιν.
97. Every man keeps his oath who does not, through spite or favour or other dishonest motive, vote against his better judgement. Suppose that he does not apprehend some point that is explained to him, he does not deserve to be punished for his lack of intelligence. The man who is amenable to the curse is the advocate who deceives and misleads the jury. That is why, at every meeting, the crier pronounces a commination, not upon those who have been misled, but upon whosoever makes a misleading speech to the Council, or to the Assembly, or to the Court.
97. πᾶς γὰρ ὁ μήτε διʼ ἔχθραν μήτε διʼ εὔνοιαν μήτε διʼ ἄλλην ἄδικον πρόφασιν μηδεμίαν παρʼ ἃ γιγνώσκει θέμενος τὴν ψῆφον εὐσεβεῖ· εἰ γὰρ ἠγνόησέν τι διδασκόμενος, τοῦ μὴ συνεῖναι δίκην οὐκ ὀφείλει δοῦναι· ἀλλʼ εἴ τις εἰδὼς ἐκείνους προδέδωκεν ἢ ἐξαπατᾷ, οὗτός ἐστʼ ἔνοχος τῇ ἀρᾷ. διόπερ καταρᾶται καθʼ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν ὁ κῆρυξ, οὐκ εἴ τινες ἐξηπατήθησαν, ἀλλʼ εἴ τις ἐξαπατᾷ λέγων ἢ βουλὴν ἢ δῆμον ἢ τὴν ἡλιαίαν.
98. Do not listen to proof that the thing has happened, but only to proof that it ought to have happened. Do not let them tell you that those old decrees were upheld by other juries; ask them to satisfy you that their plea for this decree is fairer than ours. Failing that, I do not think that you ought to give greater weight to the delusions of others than to your own judgement.
98. μὴ δὴ τοῦθʼ ὑμῖν ἐᾶτε λέγειν, ὡς γέγονεν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἔστι δίκαιον γίγνεσθαι, μηδʼ ὡς ἕτεροι δικάσαντες ἐκύρωσαν ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλʼ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀξιοῦτε διδάσκειν ὡς δικαιότερʼ ἡμῶν περὶ τοῦδε λέγουσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ δυνήσονται, οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ὑμῖν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν ἑτέρων ἀπάτην κυριωτέραν ποιήσασθαι τῆς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν γνώμης.
99. Moreover, I cannot but think that there is something uncommonly impudent in such a plea as that other people have before now got decrees of this sort.—If, sir, an illegal act has already been done, and you have imitated that act, that is no reason why you should be acquitted. On the contrary, it is an additional reason why you should be convicted. If one of them had been found guilty, you would never have moved our decree and similarly another will be deterred, if you are found guilty today.
99. ἔτι τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ σφόδρʼ ἀναιδὴς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι λόγος, ὡς γέγονεν καὶ πρότερόν τισιν ἄλλοις τοιαῦτα ψηφίσματα. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τι πώποτε μὴ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐπράχθη, σὺ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἐμιμήσω, διὰ τοῦτʼ ἀποφεύγειν σοι προσήκει, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον πολὺ μᾶλλον ἁλίσκεσθαι διὰ ταῦτα. ὥσπερ γάρ, εἴ τις ἐκείνων ἑάλω, σὺ τάδʼ οὐκ ἂν ἔγραψας, οὕτως, ἐὰν σὺ νῦν ἁλῷς, ἄλλος οὐ γράψει.
100. I say that I do not expect that Aristocrates will be able to deny that he has moved a decree in open violation of all the laws; but before now, men of Athens, I have seen a man contesting an indictment for illegal measures, who, though convicted by law, made an attempt to argue that his proposal had been to the public advantage, and insisted strongly on that point,—a simple-minded argument, surely, if it was not an impudent one.
100. ὡς μὲν τοίνυν οὐ παρὰ πάντας τοὺς νόμους φανερῶς γέγραφεν τὸ ψήφισμʼ Ἀριστοκράτης, οὐκ οἶμαι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἕξειν· ἤδη δέ τινʼ εἶδον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, γραφὴν ἀγωνιζόμενον παρανόμων τοῖς νόμοις μὲν ἁλισκόμενον, ὡς δὲ συμφέρονθʼ ὑμῖν γέγραφεν λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦντα καὶ ταύτῃ βιαζόμενον, εὐήθη μέν, οἶμαι, μᾶλλον δʼ ἀναιδῆ λόγον.
101. Admit a man’s proposition to be in every other respect advantageous; it is still disadvantageous in so far as he begs you, who are sworn to give judgement according to law, to ratify a decree which he himself cannot prove to have been honestly drawn, seeing that every man is bound to set the highest value upon fidelity to his oath. At the same time the plea, though impertinent, has reason in it; but not a reason which Aristocrates will be able to submit to you. Entirely opposed as his decree is to the laws, it is not less pernicious than illegal.
101. εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τἄλλα πάντα συμφέρει τὰ εἰρημένα, ᾗ γʼ ὀμωμοκότας κατὰ τοὺς νόμους δικάσειν ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῖ κυροῦν ἃ μηδʼ αὐτὸς ἔχει δικαίως δεῖξαι γεγραμμένα, ἀσύμφορʼ ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ τὸ εὐορκεῖν περὶ πλείστου πᾶσίν ἐστι ποιητέον· οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἔχει τινʼ ὅμως ἡ ἀναίδειʼ αὕτη λόγον. τούτῳ τοίνυν οὐδʼ οὗτος ἐνέσται πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὁ λόγος· οὕτω γὰρ σφόδρʼ ἐναντίον ὂν τοῖς νόμοις τὸ ψήφισμα μᾶλλον ἀσύμφορόν ἐστιν ἢ παράνομον.
102. That is the point which I wish now to make good to you; and, in order to do what I wish in as few words as possible, will cite an illustration that is well known to you all. You are aware that it is for the advantage of Athens that neither the Thebans nor the Lacedaemonians should be powerful; that the Thebans should be counterbalanced by the Phocians, and the Lacedaemonians by other communities; because, when that is the position of affairs, you are the strongest nation, and can dwell in security.
102. βούλομαι δʼ ἤδη καὶ τοῦθʼ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεικνύναι. ἵνα δʼ ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτου λόγου δῆλον ὃ βούλομαι ποιήσω, παράδειγμά τι γνώριμον πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἐρῶ. ἴσθʼ ὅτι συμφέρει τῇ πόλει μήτε Θηβαίους μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους ἰσχύειν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν Φωκέας ἀντιπάλους, τοῖς δʼ ἄλλους τινὰς εἶναι· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχειν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει μεγίστοις οὖσιν ἀσφαλῶς οἰκεῖν.
103. You must, then, take the view that for those of our fellow-citizens who live in the Chersonese the same condition is advantageous, that is, that no one man shall be all-powerful among the Thracians. In fact the quarrels of the Thracians, and their jealousy of one another, afford the best and most trustworthy guarantee of the safety of the Chersonese. Now the decree before us, by offering security to the minister who controls the affairs of Cersobleptes, and by putting the commanders of the other kings in imminent fear of being accused of crime, makes those kings weak, and the king who stands by himself strong.
103. τοῦτο τοίνυν νομίζετε ταὐτὸ καὶ τοῖς Χερρόνησον οἰκοῦσι τῶν πολιτῶν συμφέρειν, μηδένʼ εἶναι τῶν Θρᾳκῶν ἰσχυρόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐκείνων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ταραχὴ καὶ ὑποψία φρουρὰ Χερρονήσου μεγίστη τῶν πασῶν ἐστιν καὶ βεβαιοτάτη. τὸ τοίνυν ψήφισμα τουτὶ τῷ μὲν ἡγουμένῳ τῶν Κερσοβλέπτου πραγμάτων ἀσφάλειαν διδόν, τοῖς δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων βασιλέων στρατηγοῖς φόβον καὶ δέος μή τινʼ αἰτίαν ἔχωσι παριστάν, τοὺς μὲν ἀσθενεῖς, τὸν δʼ ἕνʼ ὄντʼ ἰσχυρὸν καθίστησιν.
104. And that you may not be quite surprised to hear that decrees made in Athens have so powerful an effect, I will remind you of a piece of history within the knowledge of all of you. After the revolt of Miltocythes against Cotys, when the war had already lasted a considerable time, when Ergophilus had been superseded, and Autocles was on the point of sailing to take command, a decree was proposed here in such terms that Miltocythes withdrew in alarm, supposing that you were not well disposed towards him, and Cotys gained possession of the Sacred Mountain and its treasures. Now observe that later, men of Athens, although Autocles was put on his trial for having brought Miltocythes to ruin, the time for indicting the author of the decree was past; and, so far as Athens was concerned, the whole business had come to grief.
104. ἵνα δὲ μὴ πάνυ θαυμάζητʼ εἰ τὰ παρʼ ὑμῖν ψηφίσματα τηλικαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν, γεγονὸς καὶ ὃ πάντες ἐπίστασθε πρᾶγμʼ ὑμᾶς ὑπομνήσω. ὅτε Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυος, συχνὸν ἤδη χρόνον ὄντος τοῦ πολέμου, καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένου μὲν Ἐργοφίλου, μέλλοντος δʼ Αὐτοκλέους ἐκπλεῖν στρατηγοῦ, ἐγράφη τι παρʼ ὑμῖν ψήφισμα τοιοῦτον, διʼ οὗ Μιλτοκύθης μὲν ἀπῆλθε φοβηθεὶς καὶ νομίσας ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχειν αὐτῷ, Κότυς δʼ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τʼ ὄρους τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἐγένετο. καὶ γάρ τοι μετὰ ταῦτʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Αὐτοκλῆς μὲν ἐκρίνεθʼ ὡς ἀπολωλεκὼς Μιλτοκύθην, οἱ δὲ χρόνοι κατὰ τοῦ τὸ ψήφισμʼ εἰπόντος τῆς γραφῆς ἐξεληλύθεσαν, τὰ δὲ πράγματʼ ἀπωλώλει τῇ πόλει.
105. Even so today, if you do not annul this decree, the kings and their commanders will be immensely discouraged. They will regard themselves as altogether slighted, and will imagine that your favour is inclining towards Cersobleptes. Now suppose that on this assumption they surrender their royalty, whenever Cersobleptes seizes opportunity and attacks them; and again observe what will happen.— In heaven’s name, tell me this.
105. εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθʼ ὅτι καὶ νῦν, εἰ μὴ λύσετε τὸ ψήφισμα τοδί, καὶ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι θαυμαστὴ γενήσεται διʼ αὔτʼ ἀθυμία καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς αὐτῶν· ὅλως γὰρ ἡγήσονται παρεῶσθαι μὲν αὐτοί, πρὸς Κερσοβλέπτην δʼ ἀποκλίνειν ὑμᾶς. εἰ δʼ ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνῶναι παραχωρήσονται τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ καιροῦ τινος αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεμένου τοῦ Κερσοβλέπτου, πάλιν ὁρᾶτε τί συμβήσεται.
106. If Cersobleptes attacks us,—and he is more likely than not to do so, when he has the power,—shall we not have recourse to those kings? Shall we not try to reduce him through them? Very well; then suppose they reply: “Athenians, so far from helping us when we were ill-treated, you made us grievously afraid of defending ourselves, for you issued a decree that anyone who should kill the man who was working against your interests and ours alike, should be liable to seizure. Therefore you have no right to call upon us to help you in a matter which you mismanaged for us as well as for yourselves.” Tell me this, I say: will not they have the best of the argument? I think so.
106. φέρε γὰρ πρὸς θεῶν, ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀδικῇ Κερσοβλέπτης, ὃ μᾶλλον ἐλπὶς ἢ μὴ δυνηθέντα ποιῆσαι, οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐκείνους ἴμεν καὶ διʼ ἐκείνων ἀσθενῆ ποιεῖν αὐτὸν ζητήσομεν; ἂν οὖν εἴπωσʼ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐ μόνον ἡμῖν ἀδικουμένοις οὐκ ἐβοηθήσατε, ἀλλὰ καὶ φόβον, ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀμυνώμεθα, θαυμαστὸν παρεστήσατε, ψήφισμα ποιησάμενοι, τὸν ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμῖν συμφέρουσι καὶ ἡμῖν πράττοντʼ ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, ἀγώγιμον εἶναι· οὔκουν ἐστὲ δίκαιοι βοηθοὺς καλεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἐφʼ οἷς καὶ περὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ περὶ ἡμᾶς κακῶς ἐβουλεύσασθε, εἰπέ μοι, ταῦτʼ ἐὰν λέγωσιν, οὐ δικαιότερʼ ἡμῶν ἐροῦσιν; ἔγωγʼ οἶμαι.
107. Again, it cannot possibly be alleged that it was natural that you should be hoodwinked and misled. For even though you had no other basis of calculation, even though you were unable of yourselves to grasp the state of affairs, you had before your eyes the example of those people at Olynthus. What has Philip done for them? And how are they treating him? He restored Potidaea to them, not at a time when he was no longer able to keep them out, as Cersobleptes restored the Chersonesus to you; no,—after spending a great deal of money on his war with you, when he had taken Potidaea, and could have kept it if he chose, he made them a present of the place, without even attempting any other course.
107. καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνό γʼ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι νὴ Δίʼ εἰκότως ἐφενακίσθητε καὶ παρεκρούσθητε. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν εἴχετε τῶν ἄλλων λογίσασθαι, μηδʼ ἐφʼ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν οἷοί τʼ ἦτε ταῦτα συνεῖναι, ἦν ἰδεῖν παράδειγμα Ὀλυνθίους τουτουσί, οἳ τί πεποιηκότος αὐτοῖς Φιλίππου πῶς αὐτῷ χρῶνται; ἐκεῖνος ἐκείνοις Ποτείδαιαν οὐχὶ τηνικαῦτʼ ἀπέδωκεν, ἡνίκʼ ἀποστερεῖν οὐκέθʼ οἷός τʼ ἦν, ὥσπερ ὑμῖν Κερσοβλέπτης Χερρόνησον· ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολεμῶν χρήματα πόλλʼ ἀναλώσας, ἑλὼν καὶ δυνηθεὶς ἂν αὐτὸς ἔχειν, εἴπερ ἐβουλήθη, παρέδωκεν καὶ οὐδʼ ἐπεχείρησεν ἄλλο ποιεῖν οὐδέν.
108. Nevertheless, although so long as they saw that he was not too powerful to be trusted, they were his allies and fought us on his account, when they found that his strength had grown too great for their confidence, they did not make a decree that whosoever should kill any man who had helped to consolidate Philip’s power should be liable to seizure in the country of their allies.
108. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐκεῖνοι, τέως μὲν ἑώρων αὐτὸν τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος ὢν πιστὸς ὑπῆρχεν, σύμμαχοί τʼ ἦσαν καὶ διʼ ἐκεῖνον ἡμῖν ἐπολέμουν, ἐπειδὴ δʼ εἶδον μείζω τῆς πρὸς αὑτοὺς πίστεως γιγνόμενον, τοσοῦτʼ ἀπέχουσι τοῦ ψηφίσασθαι, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνῳ συγκατεσκευακότων τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτῶν συμμάχων ἀγώγιμον εἶναι, ὥσθʼ ὑμᾶς, οὓς ἴσασιν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἥδιστʼ ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνου φίλους καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον ἀποκτείναντας, φίλους πεποίηνται, φασὶ δὲ καὶ συμμάχους ποιήσεσθαι.
109. No, indeed; they have made friendship, and promise to make alliance, with you,—you who of all men in the world would be most delighted to kill Philip’s friends or even Philip himself. When mere Olynthians know how to provide for the morrow, will not you, who are Athenians, do likewise? It is discreditable that you, who have a reputation for superior ability in political deliberation, should be convicted of a duller perception of your own advantage than Olynthians.
109. εἶτʼ Ὀλύνθιοι μὲν ἴσασι τὸ μέλλον προορᾶν, ὑμεῖς δʼ ὄντες Ἀθηναῖοι ταὐτὸν τοῦτʼ οὐχὶ ποιήσετε; ἀλλʼ αἰσχρὸν τοὺς ⟨τῷ⟩ περὶ πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι βουλεύσασθαι δοκοῦντας προέχειν ἧττον Ὀλυνθίων τὸ συμφέρον εἰδότας ὀφθῆναι.
110. I am informed that Aristocrates will also say something to the same effect as a speech once made in the Assembly by Aristomachus,—that it is inconceivable that Cersobleptes would ever deliberately provoke your enmity by trying to rob you of the Chersonesus, because, even if he should take it and hold it, it will be of no use to him. Indeed when that country is not at war, its revenue is no more than thirty talents, and when it is at war, not a single talent. On the other hand the revenue of his ports, which, in the event supposed, would be blockaded, is more than two hundred talents. They wonder,—as they will put it,—what he could possibly mean by preferring small returns and a war with you, when he might get larger returns and be your friend.
110. ἀκούω τοίνυν αὐτὸν καὶ τοιοῦτόν τινʼ ἐρεῖν λόγον, οἷον καὶ πρότερόν ποτʼ Ἀριστόμαχος παρʼ ὑμῖν ἐδημηγόρει, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ποτὲ Κερσοβλέπτης αἱρήσεται Χερρόνησον ἀποστερεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν ἐχθρὸς ὑμῖν εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ λάβοι καὶ κατάσχοι, λυσιτελήσειν αὐτῷ. ἐκ μέν γʼ ἐκείνης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα τάλανθʼ ἡ πρόσοδος μὴ πολεμουμένης, εἰ πολεμήσεται δέ, οὐδὲ ἕν· ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἐμπορίων, ἃ τότʼ ἂν κλεισθείη, πλεῖν ἢ διακόσια [τάλαντά ἐσθʼ ἡ πρόσοδος]· ὥστε τί βουλόμενος μικρὰ λαμβάνειν καὶ πολεμεῖν ἂν ἕλοιτο, ἐξὸν τὰ πλείω καὶ φίλος εἶναι, θαυμάζειν φήσουσιν.
111. But I am at no loss for plenty of instances in the light of which a man might reasonably be skeptical, instead of putting his trust in those orators, and allowing Cersobleptes to become a potentate. However, I will be content with the instance that lies nearest to hand. Of course, gentlemen, you all know that Macedonian, Philip. It was certainly more profitable for him to draw the revenues of all Macedonia in safety, than the revenue of Amphipolis with risks attached; and more agreeable to have you, his hereditary friends, on his side, than the Thessalians who once ejected his own father.
111. ἐγὼ δʼ οὐκ ἀπορῶ μὲν εἰπεῖν πόλλʼ ἅ μοι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἄν τις ἰδὼν ἀπιστεῖν εἰκότως ἢ τούτοις πιστεύων ἐκεῖνον ἐᾶν μέγαν γίγνεσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ὃ μάλιστα πρόχειρον ἔχω, τοῦτʼ ἐρῶ. ἴστε δήπου Φίλιππον, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τουτονὶ τὸν Μακεδόνα, ᾧ πολὺ δήπου μᾶλλον ἐλυσιτέλει τὰς ἐξ ἁπάσης Μακεδονίας προσόδους ἀδεῶς λαμβάνειν ἢ μετὰ κινδύνων τὰς ἐξ Ἀμφιπόλεως, καὶ χρῆσθαι φίλοις αἱρετώτερον ἦν αὐτῷ τοῖς πατρικοῖς ὑμῖν ἢ Θετταλοῖς, οἳ τὸν πατέρʼ αὐτοῦ ποτʼ ἐξέβαλον.
112. Apart from that, it may be observed that you, Athenians, never yet betrayed any of your friends, while the Thessalians have betrayed every one of theirs. Nevertheless, in spite of all that, you see that he has deliberately chosen small gains, faithless friends, and big risks, in preference to a life of security.
112. ἄνευ γὰρ τούτου κἀκεῖνʼ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν· ὑμεῖς μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδένα προὐδώκατε πώποτε τῶν φίλων, Θετταλοὶ δʼ οὐδένα πώποθʼ ὅντινʼ οὔ. ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὕτως ἐχόντων τούτων μικρὰ λαμβάνειν καὶ τοὺς ἀπίστους φίλους καὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μετʼ ἀσφαλείας ζῆν ὁρᾶτε προῃρημένον αὐτόν.
113. Now what can be the reason? For the logic of the thing is certainly not so very obvious. The truth is, men of Athens, that there are two things that are excellent for everybody: good luck, the chiefest and greatest of goods, and good counsel, inferior to good luck, but greater than any other; but men do not get both these good things at once, and no successful man sets any limit or end to his desire to get more. And that is why men, in the desire for more, so often throw away what they already have.
113. τί δή ποτʼ αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ λόγον γε τὸ πρᾶγμʼ οὑτωσὶ πρόχειρον ἔχει. ὅτι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν ὄντοιν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, τοῦ μὲν ἡγουμένου καὶ μεγίστου πάντων, τοῦ εὐτυχεῖν, τοῦ δʼ ἐλάττονος μὲν τούτου, τῶν δʼ ἄλλων μεγίστου, τοῦ καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι, οὐχ ἅμʼ ἡ κτῆσις παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδʼ ἔχει τῶν εὖ πραττόντων οὐδεὶς ὅρον οὐδὲ τελευτὴν τῆς τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐπιθυμίας· διʼ ὅπερ πολλοὶ πολλάκις μειζόνων ἐπιθυμοῦντες τὰ παρόντʼ ἀπώλεσαν.
114. But what need to name Philip, or any other man? Why, Cersobleptes’ own father, Cotys, whenever he had a quarrel on hand, used to send his ambassadors, and was ready to do anything, and then he could see that being at war with Athens was quite unprofitable. But, as soon as he had all Thrace at his command, he would occupy cities, do mischief, discharge his drunken fury, first on himself, and then on us; he must needs subjugate the whole country; there was no dealing with the fellow. For everybody who attempts improper enterprises for the sake of aggrandizement is apt to look, not to the difficulties of his task, but to what he will achieve if successful.
114. καὶ τί δεῖ Φίλιππον λέγειν ἤ τινʼ ἄλλον; ἀλλʼ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὸς ὁ Κερσοβλέπτου Κότυς, ἡνίκα μὲν στασιάζοι πρός τινας, πρέσβεις πέμπων ἅπαντα ποιεῖν ἕτοιμος ἦν, καὶ τότʼ ᾐσθάνετο ὡς ἀλυσιτελὲς τὸ τῇ πόλει πολεμεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δʼ ὑφʼ αὑτῷ τὴν Θρᾴκην ἔχοι, κατελάμβανε τὰς πόλεις, ἠδίκει, μεθύων ἐπαρῴνει μάλιστα μὲν εἰς αὑτόν, εἶτα καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς, τὴν χώραν ἐποιεῖθʼ ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ πρᾶγμʼ ἀμήχανον ἦν. τῶν γὰρ ὑπὲρ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐπιχειρούντων οἷς οὐ χρὴ οὐ τὰ δυσχερέσταθʼ ἕκαστος εἴωθε λογίζεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἃ κατορθώσας διαπράξεται.
115. My own opinion, then, is that your policy should be fashioned in such a way that, if Cersobleptes’ views in regard to you are what they should be, he shall not be unjustly treated by you, but that, if he is so unreasonable as to treat you unjustly, he may not be too strong to be punished. I will read to you the letter which Cersobleptes sent at the time of the revolt of Miltocythes, and also that which, when the whole kingdom was his, he sent to Timomachus before seizing your outposts. (The Letters are read.)
115. ἐγὼ δὴ δεῖν ὑμᾶς οἶμαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον βεβουλεῦσθαι, ὅπως, ἂν μὲν ἃ χρὴ περὶ ὑμῶν γιγνώσκῃ Κερσοβλέπτης, μηδὲν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἀδικήσεται, ἂν δʼ ἀλόγως ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειρῇ, μὴ μείζων ἔσται τοῦ δίκην δοῦναι. ἀναγνώσομαι δʼ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἥν, ὅτʼ ἀφειστήκει Μιλτοκύθης, Κότυς ἔπεμψεν, καὶ ἣν [ὅτε] πᾶσαν ἔχων τὴν ἀρχὴν πέμψας Τιμομάχῳ τὰ χωρίʼ ὑμῶν ἐξεῖλεν. ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΑΙ.
116. Here is a warning, men of Athens, which, if you will be guided by me, you will bear in mind; and, remembering also that, when Philip was besieging Amphipolis, he pretended to be doing so in order to hand the place over to you, but that, when he had got it, he annexed Potidaea into the bargain, you will sh to have the same sort of assurance that, according to the story, Philocrates, son of Ephialtes, once opposed to the Lacedaemonians.
116. τοῦτʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ παράδειγμʼ ἑορακότες, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, κἀκεῖνʼ εἰδότες, ὅτι Φίλιππος, ὅτε μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν ἐπολιόρκει, ἵνʼ ὑμῖν παραδῷ πολιορκεῖν ἔφη, ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἔλαβεν, καὶ Ποτείδαιαν προσαφείλετο, ἐκείνην τὴν πίστιν βουλήσεσθʼ ἔχειν, ἥνπερ φασὶ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ποτʼ εἰπεῖν Φιλοκράτην τὸν Ἐφιάλτου.
117. It is said that, when the Lacedaemonians were trying to overreach him, and offered any assurance he was willing to accept, Philocrates replied that the only possible assurance would be that they should satisfy him that, if they had a mind to injure him, they would not have the power; “for,” he added, “I am quite certain that you will always have the mind, and there can be no assurance so long as you have the power.” That,—if you will let me advise you,—is the sort of assurance that you will hold against this Thracian. If he ever became master of all Thrace, you need not inquire what his sentiments toward you would be.
117. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνόν φασιν, ἐξαπατώντων τι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ προτεινόντων πίστιν ἥντινα βούλεται λαμβάνειν, εἰπεῖν ὅτι πίστιν ἂν οἴεται γενέσθαι μόνην, εἰ δείξειαν ὅπως, ἂν ἀδικεῖν βούλωνται, μὴ δυνήσονται, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γʼ ἀεὶ βουλήσονται εὖ εἰδέναι· ἕως ἂν οὖν δύνωνται, πίστιν οὐκ εἶναι. ταύτην, ἂν ἐμοὶ χρῆσθε συμβούλῳ, φυλάξετε τὴν πίστιν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν Θρᾷκα, καὶ μὴ βουλήσεσθʼ εἰδέναι τινʼ ἄν, εἰ πάσης ἄρξειε Θρᾴκης, πρὸς ὑμᾶς σχοίη γνώμην.
118. That it is entirely the act of insane men to compose such decrees, or to bestow such favours as this, may easily be learned from many examples. I am sure, men of Athens, that you all know as well as I do that you once admitted Cotys over yonder to your citizenship, evidently because you regarded him at the time as a sincere well-wisher. Indeed, you decorated him with golden crowns; and you would never have done that, if you had thought him your enemy.
118. ὅτι τοίνυν ὅλως οὐδʼ ὑγιαινόντων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων τοιαῦτα γράφειν ψηφίσματα καὶ διδόναι τισὶ τοιαύτας δωρειάς, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐκ πολλῶν ῥᾴδιον γνῶναι. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου πάντες, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθʼ ὁμοίως ἐμοί, ὅτι τὸν Κότυν ποτʼ ἐκεῖνον ἐποιήσασθε πολίτην, δῆλον ὡς κατʼ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον εὔνουν ἡγούμενοι. καὶ μὴν καὶ χρυσοῖς στεφάνοις ἐστεφανοῦτε, οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γʼ ἐχθρὸν ἡγεῖσθε.
119. Nevertheless, when he was a wicked, unprincipled man, and was doing you serious injury, you treated the men who put him to death, Pytho and Heracleides of Aenos, as benefactors, made them citizens, and decorated them with crowns of gold. Now suppose that, at the time when the disposition of Cotys was thought to be friendly, it had been proposed that any one who killed Cotys should be given up for punishment, would you have given up Pytho and his brother? Or would you, in defiance of the decree, have given them your citizenship, and honored them as benefactors?
119. ἀλλʼ ὅμως, ἐπειδὴ πονηρὸς καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθρὸς ἦν καὶ μεγάλʼ ὑμᾶς ἠδίκει, τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας ἐκεῖνον Πύθωνα καὶ Ἡρακλείδην, τοὺς Αἰνίους, πολίτας ἐποιήσασθʼ ὡς εὐεργέτας καὶ χρυσοῖς στεφάνοις ἐστεφανώσατε. εἰ δὴ τότε, ὅθʼ ὑμῖν οἰκείως ἔχειν ὁ Κότυς ἐδόκει, ἔγραψέ τις, ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Κότυν, ἔκδοτον αὐτὸν εἶναι, πότερʼ ἐξέδοτʼ ἂν τὸν Πύθωνα καὶ τὸν ἀδελφόν, ἢ παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦτο πολίτας ἐποιεῖσθε καὶ ὡς εὐεργέτας ἐτιμᾶτε;
120. Again, there was Alexander of Thessaly. At the time when he had imprisoned Pelopidas, and was holding him captive, when he was the most bitter enemy of the Thebans, when his feelings towards you were so fraternal that he applied to you for a commander, when you gave aid to his arms, when it was Alexander here and Alexander there,—why, gracious heavens! if anybody had moved that whoever killed Alexander should be liable to seizure, would it have been safe for any man to try to give him due punishment for his subsequent violence and brutality?
120. τί δʼ; Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκεῖνον τὸν Θετταλόν, ἡνίκʼ εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον δήσας Πελοπίδαν, ἐχθρὸς δʼ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦν Θηβαίοις, ὑμῖν δʼ οἰκείως διέκειθʼ οὕτως ὥστε παρʼ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβοηθεῖτε δʼ αὐτῷ καὶ πάντʼ ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, πρὸς Διὸς εἴ τις ἔγραψεν, ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀγώγιμον εἶναι, ἆρʼ ἂν ὧν μετὰ ταῦθʼ ὕβρισεν καὶ προὐπηλάκισεν ἀσφαλὲς ἦν τῳ παρʼ αὐτοῦ δίκην πειρᾶσθαι λαβεῖν;
121. But why need one talk about the other instances? Take Philip, who is now accounted our very worst enemy. At the time when, having caught some of our citizens in the act of trying to restore Argaeus, he released them and made good all their losses, when he professed in a written message that he was ready to form an alliance with us, and to renew his ancestral amity, if at that time he had asked us for this favour, and if one of the men he had released had proposed that “whoever shall kill Philip” should be liable to seizure, a fine insult we should have had to swallow!
121. τί δὲ τἄλλα λέγοι τις ἄν; ἀλλʼ ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐχθρὸς εἶναι Φίλιππος οὑτοσί, εἰ τότε, ὅτʼ Ἀργαῖον κατάγοντας λαβὼν τῶν ἡμετέρων τινὰς πολιτῶν ἀφῆκε μὲν αὐτούς, ἀπέδωκε δὲ πάνθʼ ὅσʼ ἀπώλεσαν αὐτοῖς, πέμψας δὲ γράμματʼ ἐπηγγέλλεθʼ ἕτοιμος εἶναι συμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν πατρικὴν φιλίαν ἀνανεοῦσθαι, εἰ τότʼ ἠξίωσε τυχεῖν τούτων καί τις ἔγραψε τῶν ἀφεθέντων ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Φίλιππον, ἀγώγιμον εἶναι, καλήν γʼ ὕβριν ἦμεν ἂν ὑβρισμένοι.
122. Do you not see, gentlemen, do you not understand, how you would have been chargeable with sheer lunacy in every one of these instances, if you had carried by vote any such resolution as this? I say it is not the part of sane men either to put such confidence in a man, whenever they imagine him to be friendly, as to deprive themselves of all defence against possible aggression, or, on the other hand, when they regard anyone as an enemy, to hate him so fiercely that, if he ever wants to reform and be their friend, they have taken it out of his power to do so. But we should, I think, carry both our friendship and our hatred only so far as not to exceed the due measure in either case.
122. ἆρά γʼ ὁρᾶτε καὶ καταμανθάνετʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐφʼ ἑκάστου τούτων ἡλίκην ἂν ὠφληκότες ἦτε παράνοιαν, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἐτυγχάνετʼ ἐψηφισμένοι; ἔστι γὰρ οὐχ ὑγιαινόντων, οἶμαι, ἀνθρώπων, οὔθʼ ὅταν τινʼ ὑπειλήφωσι φίλον, οὕτω πιστεύειν ὥστε, ἂν ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειρῇ, τὸ ἀμύνασθαι σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀφελέσθαι, οὔθʼ ὅταν ἐχθρόν τινʼ ἡγῶνται, οὕτως αὖ μισεῖν ὥστε, ἂν παυσάμενος βούληται φίλος εἶναι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἐξεῖναι ταῦτα κωλῦσαι· ἀλλʼ ἄχρι τούτου καὶ φιλεῖν, οἶμαι, χρὴ καὶ μισεῖν, μηδετέρου τὸν καιρὸν ὑπερβάλλοντας.
123. For my part, I cannot see why everybody who has any sort of claim to be your benefactor should not expect to get this favour, if you bestow it upon Charidemus,—Simon, for example, if you want a name, or Bianor, or Athenodorus, or thousands more. No; if we make the same decree in favour of the whole company, we shall unconsciously make ourselves a bodyguard for every one of them, like jobbing mercenaries; but if we do it for one but not for another, those who are disappointed will have a right to complain.
123. οὐ τοίνυν ἔγωγʼ οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνʼ ἰδεῖν δύναμαι, ὡς οὐχὶ πάντες ἄνθρωποι τούτων ἀξιώσουσι τυχεῖν, ὅσοις πέρ ἐστι καὶ ἡτισοῦν εὐεργεσίας πρόφασις πρὸς ὑμᾶς, εἰ Χαριδήμῳ δώσετε, οἷον, εἰ βούλεσθε, Σίμων, Βιάνωρ, Ἀθηνόδωρος, ἄλλοι μυρίοι. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν πᾶσι ψηφιούμεθα ταῦτα, λήσομεν, ὡς ἔοικε, μισθοφόρων ἔργον ἀνθρώπων ποιοῦντες τὴν ἑκάστου σωτηρίαν τούτων δορυφοροῦντες· εἰ δὲ τῷ μέν, τοῖς δʼ οὔ, δικαίως ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ μὴ τυχόντες.
124. Now just suppose that Menestratus of Eretria were to require us to make the same decree for him, or Phayllus of Phocis, or any other autocrat,—and I need not say that we often make friends, to serve our occasions, with many such people,—are we to vote decrees for all of them, or are we not? You say, Yes. Then what decent excuse shall we have, men of Athens, if, while asserting ourselves as the champions of all Hellas in the cause of liberty, we make our appearance as yeomen of the guard to men who maintain troops on their own account to keep down the populace?
124. φέρʼ, ἐὰν δὲ δὴ καὶ Μενέστρατος ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐρετριεὺς ἀξιοῖ ταὐτὰ καὶ αὑτῷ ψηφίσασθαι, ἢ Φάυλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς ἤ τις ἄλλος δυνάστης (πολλοῖς δὲ δήπου διὰ καιρούς τινας πολλάκις φίλοι γιγνόμεθα), πότερον ψηφιούμεθα πᾶσιν ἢ οὔ; ψηφιούμεθα νὴ Δία. καὶ τί φήσομεν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καλόν, εἰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπʼ ἐλευθερίᾳ προεστάναι φάσκοντες τοὺς ἰδίᾳ δυνάμεις ἐπὶ τοῖς πλήθεσι κεκτημένους δορυφοροῦντες φανούμεθα;
125. If we ought, though I say we ought not, to grant such a favour to anyone, let it be even in the first instance to the man who has never done us wrong; secondly, to the man who will never have the power, though he have the will, to injure us; and finally the man who is known by everyone to be seeking it for his own protection, and not in the hope of maltreating his neighbors with impunity—it is to him truly that it should be given. I will spare you the proof that Charidemus is neither a man void of offence towards us, nor one who, for his own safety, tries to win your support; but I do ask you to listen to me when I declare that he is not even one who can be trusted for the future, and to consider carefully whether my argument is sound.
125. εἰ γάρ ἐστί τῳ δοτέον τι τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔγωγʼ οὔ φημι, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ μηδὲν ἠδικηκότι πώποτε, δεύτερον δὲ μηδʼ ἂν ἀδικεῖν βούληται δυνησομένῳ, ἔπειθʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅστις ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἔσται φανερὸς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μή ⟨τι⟩ παθεῖν ταῦθʼ εὑρισκόμενος, καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ ποιεῖν μετʼ ἀδείας ἑτέρους κακῶς, τούτῳ δοτέον. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ὁ Χαρίδημος οὔτε τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων ἐστὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς οὔτε τῶν ἵνα μή τι πάθῃ ταῦθʼ εὑρισκομένων, ἐάσω· ἀλλʼ ὡς οὐδὲ πιστὸς εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, ἀκούσατέ μου, καὶ σκοπεῖτε, ἂν ὑμῖν ὀρθῶς ἐξετάζειν δοκῶ.
126. In my judgement, men of Athens, everyone who desires to become an Athenian citizen, because he has fallen in love with our customs and laws, will make his home in our midst, as soon as he receives our franchise, and will enjoy his share in the advantages he coveted. But as for those who are not moved by any desire or emulation of those institutions, but value only the advantage they derive from the credit of being distinguished by you, I fancy, indeed I am quite certain, that as soon as they discern a prospect of larger advantage elsewhere, they will devote their attention to that prospect, without the least concern for you.
126. ἐγὼ νομίζω, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐθῶν καὶ νόμων ἐπιθυμηταὶ γενόμενοι πολῖται γενέσθαι ἐσπούδασαν, ἅμα τʼ αὐτοὺς ἂν τυγχάνειν τούτων καὶ παρʼ ἡμῖν οἰκεῖν καὶ μετέχειν ὧν ἐπεθύμησαν· ὅσους δὲ τούτων μὲν μηδενὸς μήτʼ ἐπιθυμία μήτε ζῆλος εἰσέρχεται, τὴν πλεονεξίαν δʼ ἀγαπῶσιν ἣν διὰ τοῦ δοκεῖν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν τιμᾶσθαι καρποῦνται, τούτους δʼ οἴομαι, μᾶλλον δʼ οἶδα σαφῶς, ὅταν ποτὲ μείζονος πλεονεξίας ἑτέρωθεν ἐλπίδʼ ἴδωσιν, οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν ὑμῶν φροντίσαντας ἐκείνην θεραπεύσειν.
127. For example, to make clear to you my purpose in saying this, when that man Pytho, having just killed Cotys, did not think it safe to take his chance of a place of refuge, he came to you, applied for your citizenship, and thought you the finest people in the world. But now that he thinks relations with Philip more advantageous to him, he takes Philip’s side, without the slightest regard for you. No, men of Athens; when men give their lives to the pursuit of their own ambitions, I say that there is no stability and no honesty to be found in them. Every sensible man must get the better of such people by wary conduct: he should not begin by trusting and end by denouncing them.
127. οἷον, ἵνʼ εἰδῆτε καὶ ὑμεῖς πρὸς ὃ ταῦτʼ ἐγὼ βλέπων λέγω, Πύθων οὑτοσί, ὅτε μὲν Κότυν εὐθὺς ἀπεκτονὼς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἡγεῖτʼ ἀπελθεῖν ὅποι τύχοι, ἦλθεν ὡς ὑμᾶς καὶ πολιτείαν ᾔτησεν καὶ πάντων ἐποιήσατο πρώτους ὑμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ δʼ οἴεται τὰ Φιλίππου πράγματα συμφέρειν αὑτῷ μᾶλλον, οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν ὑμῶν φροντίσας τἀκείνου φρονεῖ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παρὰ τούτοις τοῖς ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν προαιρέσει ζῶσιν οὐδὲν οὔτε βέβαιον οὔθʼ ὅσιον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τούτων, ὅστις εὖ φρονεῖ, φυλαττόμενον περιεῖναι, μὴ προπιστεύσαντα κατηγορεῖν.
128. Athenians, if we should assume,—though it is the reverse of the truth,—that Charidemus himself has been, is still, and will remain devoted to us, and that he will never entertain any other sentiment, it is not a whit the more wise to pass such decrees for him. If he had accepted the security offered by the decree for any other purpose than the interests of Cersobleptes, the danger would have been less; but, in fact, I find on a calculation of probabilities that the man for whose benefit he will turn to account the advantage given by the decree is himself equally unworthy of his confidence and of ours.
128. εἰ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὐναντίον ἢ τἀληθὲς ὑπάρχει, θείημεν τὸν Χαρίδημον αὐτὸν καὶ γεγενῆσθαι περὶ ἡμᾶς σπουδαῖον καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μηδέποτʼ ἄλλην γνώμην ἢ ταύτην σχήσειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἔχει καλῶς ταῦτʼ αὐτῷ ψηφίσασθαι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπʼ ἄλλο τι ταύτην τὴν ἄδειαν ἐλάμβανε, τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ψηφίσματος, ἢ τὰ Κερσοβλέπτου πράγματα, ἧττον ἂν ἦν δεινόν· νῦν δέ, ὑπὲρ οὗ καταχρήσεται τῇ διὰ τοῦ ψηφίσματος πλεονεξίᾳ, οὐκ ἀξιόπιστον οὔθʼ ἡμῖν οὔτʼ ἐκείνῳ λογιζόμενος [αὐτὸν] εὑρίσκω.
129. Observe how honestly I examine the several points, and how entirely reasonable are my apprehensions. I look at Cotys, and I find that he was related by marriage to Iphicrates in the same degree as Cersobleptes to Charidemus; and that the achievements of Iphicrates on behalf of Cotys were far more important and meritorious than anything that Charidemus has done for Cersobleptes. Let us consider it in this way.
129. σκέψασθε δʼ ὡς δικαίως ἕκαστʼ ἐξετάζω, καὶ σφόδρα γʼ εἰκότως δεδιώς. ἐγὼ σκοπῶ Κότυν, ὅτι κηδεστὴς ἦν Ἰφικράτει τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ Χαριδήμῳ Κερσοβλέπτης, καὶ τὰ πεπραγμένʼ ὁρῶ πολλῷ μείζονα καὶ χάριτος πλείονος ἄξιʼ ὑπὲρ Κότυος Ἰφικράτει ἢ ὑπὲρ Κερσοβλέπτου Χαριδήμῳ.
130. No doubt you remember, men of Athens, that Iphicrates was a very fortunate man, with his bronze effigy, his free board at the Town Hall, and other grants and distinctions. Nevertheless he had the courage to fight a battle at sea against our commanders in defence of Cotys, setting a higher value on the salvation of that king than upon all the honors he enjoyed in your city. If your resentment had not been more restrained than his impetuosity, nothing could have saved him from being the most miserable of mankind.
130. σκεψώμεθα δʼ οὑτωσί. ἴστε δήπου τοῦτʼ, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι χαλκῆς εἰκόνος οὔσης παρʼ ὑμῖν Ἰφικράτει καὶ σιτήσεως ἐν πρυτανείῳ καὶ δωρειῶν καὶ τιμῶν ἄλλων, διʼ ἃς εὐδαίμων ἐκεῖνος ἦν, ὅμως ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ τῶν Κότυος πραγμάτων ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμετέροις στρατηγοῖς ναυμαχεῖν, καὶ περὶ πλείονος ἐποιήσατο τὴν ἐκείνου σωτηρίαν ἢ τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἑαυτῷ παρʼ ὑμῖν τιμάς· καὶ εἰ μὴ μετριωτέραν ἔσχετε τὴν ὀργὴν ὑμεῖς τῆς ἐκείνου προπετείας, οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτὸν ἐκώλυεν ἀθλιώτατον ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων εἶναι.
131. In spite of that, when Cotys, who owed his deliverance to Iphicrates, and had had practical experience of his loyalty, believed himself to be permanently out of danger, he took no pains to reward him, and never showed you any civility through his agency in the hope of winning forgiveness for his past conduct. On the contrary, he claimed his help in besieging the rest of your strongholds, and, on his refusal, he made an attack in person on the strongholds, taking with him the forces collected by Iphicrates as well as his barbarian troops, and engaging the services of Charidemus. He reduced Iphicrates to such helplessness that he withdrew to Antissa, and afterwards to Drys, and lived there; for he did not think he could honorably return to you, whom he had slighted for the sake of a Thracian and a barbarian. On the other hand, he thought it dangerous to remain at the court of a king whom he had found so negligent of his safety.
131. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ὁ Κότυς, ὑπʼ ἐκείνου σωθεὶς καὶ λαβὼν ἔργῳ τῆς ἐκείνου φιλίας πεῖραν, ἐπειδὴ βεβαίως ἡγήσατο σῶς εἶναι, οὐχ ὅπως ἀποδώσει χάριν ἐσπούδασεν αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς διʼ ἐκείνου τι φιλάνθρωπον ἔπραξεν, ἵνα συγγνώμης ἐπὶ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις τύχῃ, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἠξίου μὲν αὐτὸν συμπολιορκεῖν τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ὑμετέρων χωρίων, οὐκ ἐθέλοντος δʼ ἐκείνου, λαβὼν αὐτὸς τήν τε βαρβαρικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ὑπʼ ἐκείνου συνειλεγμένην, καὶ τὸν Χαρίδημον τοῦτον προσμισθωσάμενος, προσέβαλλε τοῖς ὑμετέροις χωρίοις, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο κατέστησε τὸν Ἰφικράτην ἀπορίας, ὥστʼ ἀπελθόντʼ εἰς Ἄντισσαν οἰκεῖν καὶ πάλιν εἰς Δρῦν, ἡγούμενον ὡς μὲν ὑμᾶς οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ἐλθεῖν, οὓς ὑστέρους ἐπεποίητο τοῦ Θρᾳκὸς καὶ τοῦ βαρβάρου, παρʼ ἐκείνῳ δʼ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι μένειν, ὃν οὕτως ὀλιγωροῦνθʼ ἑώρα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίας.
133. Now suppose, men of Athens, that Cersobleptes also, having his power enhanced by the immunity that is being procured for Charidemus, should disdain that man, and initiate plots and disturbances against you,—are you content, as long as Charidemus is misled, to have furnished the Thracian with strength to fight you? I hope not! Here is the view that I think the just one: if Charidemus makes it his business to get these decrees, after perceiving and foreseeing that peril, you must distrust him as an intriguer.
133. ἂν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κερσοβλέπτης ἐκ τῆς τῷ Χαριδήμῳ νῦν ἀδείας κατασκευαζομένης αὐξηθεὶς ὀλιγωρῇ μὲν ἐκείνου, νεωτερίζῃ δέ τι καὶ κινῇ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐξαρκεῖ τοῦθʼ ὑμῖν, ἐὰν Χαρίδημος ἐξαπατηθῇ, τὸν Θρᾷκʼ ἰσχυρὸν ἐφʼ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς κατεσκευακέναι; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἀξιῶ. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο νομίζω δίκαιον, εἰ μὲν αἰσθάνεται ταῦτα καὶ προορᾷ Χαρίδημος, εἶθʼ ὅπως τοιούτων ψηφισμάτων τεύξεται διαπράττεται, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοντι μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ λέληθεν αὐτόν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον εὔνουν τις αὐτὸν ὑπείληφεν εἶναι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον προϊδέσθαι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου.
134. On the other hand, if he has failed to discern the peril, the more you credit him with good intentions, the more forethought you should exercise for his sake as well as your own. Honest friends should not bestow upon their well-wishers such favours as will bring disaster to both alike, but should rather cooperate in any action that tends to their common advantage; and when a man is more far-sighted than his friend, he should order things for the best, and not treat the gratification of the moment as of more value than all future time.
134. ἔστι γὰρ φίλων ἀγαθῶν οὐ τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς εὔνοις, ἐξ ὧν κἀκείνοις καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἔσται τις βλάβη, ἀλλʼ ὃ μὲν ἂν μέλλῃ συνοίσειν ἀμφοῖν, συμπράττειν, ὃ δʼ ἂν αὐτὸς ἄμεινον ἐκείνου προορᾷ, πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ἔχον τίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὴν ἤδη χάριν τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνου παντὸς περὶ πλείονος ἡγεῖσθαι.