1. It has been conclusively proved, men of Athens, that the defendant, Aristogeiton, is a state-debtor and disfranchised, and that the laws expressly forbid all such to address the Assembly. But it is your duty to restrain and check all law-breakers, but especially those who hold office and take part in public affairs, because such men tend to injure the community, if they are unprincipled, and on the other hand to confer the greatest benefit upon it, if they are honest men and willing to abide by the laws.
1. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν καὶ ὀφείλει τῷ δημοσίῳ Ἀριστογείτων οὑτοσὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπίτιμος, καὶ οἱ νόμοι διαρρήδην ἀπαγορεύουσιν μὴ ἐξεῖναι λέγειν τοῖς τοιούτοις, φανερῶς ἐπιδέδεικται, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. δεῖ δʼ ὑμᾶς ἅπαντας μὲν ἀπείργειν καὶ κωλύειν τοὺς παρανομοῦντας, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὄντας καὶ τοὺς πολιτευομένους·
2. If you once allow those who administer any part of our public affairs to break the laws and override the established principles of justice, everyone who has a stake in the country is bound to suffer from their wickedness.
2. διὰ γὰρ τούτους τὰ κοινὰ καὶ βλάπτεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἐὰν ὦσι φαῦλοι, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα πάλιν ὠφελεῖσθαι, ἐὰν ὦσιν ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ θέλωσιν ἐμμένειν τοῖς νόμοις. ὡς ἐὰν ἅπαξ δῶτε τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἐγχειροῦσί τι πράττειν τὸ παρανομεῖν καὶ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ὡρισμένων δικαίων, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἅπαντας ἀπολαύειν τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πόλεως.
3. For just as on a voyage an error committed by a common sailor causes little damage, but, when the helmsman is at fault, he brings disaster on everyone aboard, so the faults of private persons cause loss not so much to the general public as to themselves, while the faults of rulers and statesmen come home to all citizens alike.
3. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἃ συμβαίνει περὶ τοὺς πλοῦς, ὅταν μὲν τῶν ναυτῶν τις ἁμάρτῃ, βραχεῖαν τὴν βλάβην ἤνεγκεν, ὅταν δʼ ὁ κυβερνήτης ἀποσφαλῇ, κοινὴν τὴν ἀτυχίαν ἅπασι τοῖς ἐμπλέουσι παρεσκεύασεν, ὡσαύτως τὰ μὲν τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἁμαρτήματα οὐκ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος, εἰς δʼ αὐτοὺς ἤνεγκε τὰς βλάβας, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ πολιτευομένων εἰς ἅπαντας ἀφικνεῖται.
4. That was why Solon ordained that the penalties for private citizens should be slow, but for magistrates and political leaders swift, assuming that from the former one can get satisfaction even after some delay, but that one cannot wait for the latter, because there will be no prospect of punishment if the constitution is destroyed. No one will be so impudent or so pretentious that he will attempt to gainsay these principles, except Aristogeiton here with his reckless wickedness. On the contrary we shall find that, when once you have given an adverse verdict, all magistrates and all statesmen accept them.
4. διὸ καὶ τὰς τιμωρίας ὁ Σόλων τοῖς μὲν ἰδιώταις ἐποίησε βραδείας, ταῖς δʼ ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς δημαγωγοῖς ταχείας, ὑπολαμβάνων τοῖς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸ δίκαιον λαβεῖν, τοῖς δʼ οὐκ ἐνεῖναι περιμεῖναι· τὸ γὰρ τιμωρησόμενον οὐχ ὑπέσται τῆς πολιτείας καταλυθείσης. καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δικαίοις οὐδεὶς οὕτως οὔτʼ ἀναιδὴς οὔθʼ ὑπὲρ ὑμᾶς φρονῶν ἐστὶν ὅστις ἀντιλέγειν ἐπιχειρήσει, πλὴν Ἀριστογείτονος τουτουὶ καὶ τῆς τούτου πονηρίας. ἀλλὰ πάσας καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τοὺς πολιτευομένους εὑρήσομεν, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τι καταγνῶθʼ ὑμεῖς, τούτοις ἐμμένοντας.
5. For on the one hand, whenever any officials have been rejected by vote, they instantly cease to hold office and are stripped of their official crowns; and on the other hand, all the judicial archons who are disqualified for promotion to the Areopagus forbear to force their way in and submit humbly to your decision. And this is only reasonable; for just as they believe that private citizens ought to obey them when they are rulers, so when they in their turn descend to the rank of private citizens, they ought to submit to the laws, which are the real rulers of the State.
5. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἀποχειροτονηθῶσι τινες τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, παραχρῆμα πέπαυνται ἄρχοντες καὶ τοὺς στεφάνους περιῄρηνται· τοῦτο δʼ ὅσοις τῶν θεσμοθετῶν εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἐστὶν ἀνελθεῖν, παρέντες τὸ βιάζεσθαι στέργουσιν ταῖς ὑμετέραις γνώσεσι. καὶ τοῦτʼ εἰκότως· ὥσπερ γάρ, ὅταν ἄρχωσι, τοὺς ἰδιώτας οἴονται δεῖν αὑτοῖς πειθαρχεῖν, ὡσαύτως, ὅταν αὐτοὶ ἰδιῶται γένωνται πάλιν, τοῖς τῆς πόλεως ἄρχουσι νόμοις δικαίως ἂν ἀκολουθοῖεν.
6. Again, all the statesmen, if you will pass them in review from the earliest times, can be proved to have submitted in the same way to your constitutional decrees. It is said that Aristeides was banished by your ancestors and lived in Aegina till the people recalled him, and that Miltiades and Pericles, being fined thirty and fifty talents respectively, did not try to harangue the people until they had paid in full.
6. ἔτι τοίνυν οἱ πολιτευόμενοι πάντες, ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰ βούλεσθʼ ἀρξάμενοι χρόνων θεωρεῖν, ὡσαύτως φαίνονται εἴκοντες τοῖς ὑμετέροις δικαίοις. Ἀριστείδην μέν γέ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων μετασταθέντʼ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ διατρίβειν, ἕως ὁ δῆμος αὐτὸν κατεδέξατο, Μιλτιάδην δὲ καὶ Περικλέα ὀφλόντας, τὸν μὲν τριάκοντα, τὸν δὲ πεντήκοντα τάλαντα, ἐκτείσαντας οὕτω δημηγορεῖν.
7. It would be a most scandalous state of things if, while these men, to whom you were indebted for so many services, were not allowed to do anything contrary to your established laws, this man, who has never done you a single good service, but has committed a prodigious number of offences, should be found to have received at your hands, so readily and so contrary to justice and expediency, the right to transgress the laws. And why appeal to ancient history? Count up the men of your own days and see if anyone has ever been found so shameless. A careful scrutiny will not reveal a single instance.
7. ὃ καὶ δεινότατον ἂν εἴη συμβαῖνον, τοὺς μὲν πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ποιήσαντας ὑμᾶς ἀγαθὰ μὴ τυχεῖν ταύτης τῆς δωρειᾶς, ὥστε παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τι τοὺς κειμένους ὑμῖν πρᾶξαι, τὸν δὲ μηδὲν μὲν ἀγαθὸν εἰργασμένον, ὑπερπληθῆ δʼ ἐξημαρτηκότα, τοῦτον οὕτω προχείρως φαίνεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐξουσίαν παρʼ ὑμῶν τοῦ παρανομεῖν εἰληφότα. καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν; ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐφʼ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἀναλογίσασθε, εἴ τις οὕτως ἀναιδὴς γέγονεν πώποτε· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν εὕροιτε, εἰ βουλήσεσθʼ ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάζειν.
8. Now apart from all this, whenever a man lodges with the judicial Archons an objection against a decree or law, that law or decree is invalid and the mover or proposer has not the impudence to employ violence, but loyally accepts your decision, even if he is the foremost orator or administrator in your city. Yet is it not absurd that, while decrees passed by you in full assembly as in accordance with the laws should be invalid, you should imagine that you ought to make the whim of Aristogeiton to flout the laws more authoritative than the laws themselves?
8. χωρὶς τοίνυν τούτων, ὅταν τις ψηφίσματος ἢ νόμου γραφὴν ἀπενέγκῃ πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας, ὁ μὲν νόμος ἢ τὸ ψήφισμʼ ἄκυρόν ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ θεὶς ἢ γράψας οὐδὲν ἀναισχυντεῖ βιαζόμενος, ἀλλʼ ὅ τι ἂν ὑμεῖς ψηφίσησθε, τούτῳ ἐμμένει, κἂν ᾖ πρῶτος τῷ δύνασθαι λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἐν ὑμῖν. καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, ἃ μὲν ἅπαντες ὑμεῖς συλλεγέντες ἐψηφίσασθε, διὰ τοὺς νόμους ἄκυρʼ εἶναι, τὴν δʼ Ἀριστογείτονος βούλησιν εἰς τὸ παρανομεῖν κυριωτέραν οἴεσθαι δεῖν τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν καταστῆσαι;
9. Again, when a plaintiff fails to obtain a fifth part of the votes, in cases where the laws forbid him henceforward to indict anyone or arrest him or give him into custody, in the same way none of those liable to these disqualifications ever dreams of defying them. But for Aristogeiton, it seems, and for Aristogeiton alone, no court, no law has authority higher than his own caprice.
9. πάλιν τοίνυν ὅταν τις ἐπεξιὼν μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, ἐφʼ οἷς οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσι τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ γράφεσθαι μηδʼ ἀπάγειν μηδʼ ἐφηγεῖσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον παρὰ ταῦτʼ οὐδεὶς οἴεται δεῖν πράττειν τῶν ἐνόχων ὄντων τούτοις τοῖς ἐπιτιμίοις. Ἀριστογείτονι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μόνῳ τῶν ἁπάντων οὐδὲν οὔτε δικαστήριον οὔτε νόμος κυριώτερόν ἐστι τῆς αὑτοῦ βουλήσεως.
10. Neither you nor your ancestors ever repented of observing these rules, for it is the salvation of democracy that it overcomes its enemies either by good counsel or by arms, but submits to its laws either by free choice or under constraint; and that this principle is sound, is allowed even by the defendant himself.
10. καὶ ταῦτα πάνθʼ οὕτω διαφυλάττουσιν οὐδεπώποτʼ οὔθʼ ὑμῖν οὔτε τοῖς προγόνοις μετεμέλησεν. ἔστι γὰρ δημοκρατίας φυλακὴ τῶν μὲν ἐχθρῶν ἢ βουλευομένους ἢ μαχομένους περιεῖναι, τῶν δὲ νόμων ἢ προαιρουμένους ἢ συναναγκαζομένους ἡττᾶσθαι. καὶ ταῦθʼ ὅτι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον προσήκει πράττεσθαι, καὶ παρʼ αὐτοῦ τούτου συνωμολόγηται.
11. For after the disasters to the Greek forces at Chaeroneia, when the very foundations of our State were threatened with the utmost danger, when Hypereides proposed that the disfranchised citizens should be reinstated in order that, if any such danger should menace our State, all classes might unite wholeheartedly in the struggle for liberty, the defendant indicted this decree as unconstitutional and conducted his case in court.
11. ὅτε γὰρ Ὑπερείδης ἔγραψε, τῶν περὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἀτυχημάτων τοῖς Ἕλλησι γενομένων, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐδαφῶν εἰς κίνδυνον μέγιστον κατακεκλειμένης, εἶναι τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους, ἵνʼ ὁμονοοῦντες ἅπαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας προθύμως ἀγωνίζωνται, ἐάν τις κίνδυνος τηλικοῦτος καταλαμβάνῃ τὴν πόλιν, τούτου τοῦ ψηφίσματος γραφὴν παρανόμων ἀπενέγκας ἠγωνίζετʼ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ.
12. But is it not monstrous that, where the safety of the State is involved, the defendant should allow none of his fellow-citizens to obtain enfranchisement, but should claim that same favour from you all, in order to cover his own lawlessness? Yet the former vote, Aristogeiton, was far more lawful and equitable than the vote which you now require the jurors to cast in your favour.
12. καίτοι πῶς οὐ δεινὸν εἰς μὲν τὴν [ὑπὲρ] τῆς πατρίδος σωτηρίαν μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν Ἀριστογείτονα τουτονὶ συγχωρῆσαι τυχεῖν τῆς ἐπιτιμίας, εἰς δὲ τὴν αὑτοῦ παρανομίαν παρὰ πάντων ὑμῶν ἀξιοῦν λαμβάνειν τὴν αὐτὴν δωρειάν; καίτοι πολύ γε νομιμώτερον καὶ δικαιότερον τὸ ψήφισμʼ ἐκεῖνʼ ἦν οὗ σὺ νῦν ἀξιοῖς ψηφίσασθαί σοι τουτουσί.
13. For the one was fair and equal for all citizens alike, but this is unfair and brings profit to you alone of all the people of Athens. The first was intended to prevent a peace by which one man would have been put in control of the whole government; the effect of this vote will be that you have received authority to transgress with impunity the decisions of the jury and the laws handed down by our ancestors—to do, in fact, whatever you please.
13. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον καὶ κοινὸν ἅπασι τοῖς πολίταις ἦν, τὸ δʼ ἄνισον καὶ σοὶ μόνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὴν πλεονεξίαν κατασκευάζον· καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ γενέσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην ἐφʼ ᾧ θʼ ἕνα κύριον τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας καταστῆναι, τὸ δʼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰ τουτωνὶ δόγματα καὶ νόμιμα ἐκ παλαιοῦ παραδοθένθʼ ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων σοὶ μόνῳ δεδόσθαι ἐξουσίαν ἀδεῶς παραβαίνοντι καὶ πράττοντι ὅ τι ἂν βουληθῇς.
14. I should like to ask him whether his indictment of the decree was lawful and right or on the other hand unjust and illegal. For if the indictment was inexpedient and against the interests of the people, on that very ground he richly deserves death; but if it was useful and advantageous to the majority, why, pray, do you now insist on the jury giving a verdict which is contrary to your indictment? No; your proceedings then were unjust and now are neither lawful nor beneficial to the citizens.
14. ἡδέως δʼ ἂν ἔγωγʼ αὐτὸν ἐρωτήσαιμι πότερʼ ἔννομον καὶ δικαίαν ἐποιήσατο τοῦ ψηφίσματος τὴν γραφὴν ἢ τοὐναντίον ἄδικον καὶ παράνομον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀσύμφερον καὶ τῷ δήμῳ βλαβεράν, διʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δικαίως ἂν ἀποθάνοι· εἰ δὲ συμφέρουσαν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὠφέλιμον, διὰ τί νῦν τἀναντίʼ οἷς αὐτὸς ἔγραψας ψηφίζεσθαι τούτους ἀξιοῖς; ἀλλʼ οὔτʼ ἐκεῖνα δίκαια οὔτε ταῦτʼ ἔννομʼ οὐδὲ συμφέροντʼ ἐστὶν ὑμῖν.
15. I can see that you, men of Athens, are of this opinion in your own behalf, for you have ere now decided many such “informations” laid against private men. Yet is it not all wrong that in your own case you should so scrupulously examine the laws, but in the case of these mischief-makers, who annoy everyone alike and pretend to be superior to the rest, you should display such indifference?
15. ὁρῶ δʼ ὑμᾶς ἔγωγʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτην ἔχοντας τὴν γνώμην καὶ περὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν· πολλὰς γὰρ ἐνδείξεις ἤδη κατεψηφίσασθʼ ἰδιωτῶν ἀνθρώπων. καίτοι πῶς οὐ δεινὸν ἐφʼ ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἐξετάζεσθαι ἀκριβῶς τοὺς νόμους, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν περιεργαζομένων τι καὶ κοινῇ πάντας ἐνοχλούντων καὶ προσποιουμένων ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι ῥᾳθύμως οὕτως ἔχειν;
16. It is impossible that any of you are of opinion that things ought to be as I say, but that, because of the decorous behavior of Aristogeiton and his usefulness to you, you ought to wink even at his violation of the laws. I think Lycurgus in his speech has satisfactorily proved that the defendant is an unscrupulous man and has an extraordinary faculty for injustice; and that he is not a useful citizen, anyone can see from his public performances.
16. οὐ γὰρ δή τινες ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὡς προσῆκον μὲν ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν τὴν Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον αὐτὸν ὑμῖν εἶναι παροπτέον τι καὶ παρανομοῦντʼ αὐτόν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ πονηρὸς καὶ τὸν τρόπον δεινῶς ἄδικος, ἱκανῶς ὑμῖν, ὡς ἔγωγʼ οἶμαι, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων Λυκοῦργος ἐπιδέδειχεν· ὅτι δʼ οὐδὲ χρήσιμος, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πολιτευμάτων ἄν τις αὐτοῦ θεωρήσειεν.
17. For whom has he brought into court that he succeeded in convicting on the charges that he laid against him? Or what source of revenue has he provided for you? Or what decree has he ever drafted that you were not afterwards glad to disown? The truth is, he is so tactless, so un-Greek in his temperament, that when he sees you somewhat angry with anyone and rather more exasperated than the occasion calls for, he at once anticipates your wishes in the moment of your wrath and so opposes your interests.
17. τίνα γὰρ παραγαγὼν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὧν ᾐτιᾶτο, τούτων καὶ ᾕρηκεν [καὶ εἷλεν]; ἢ ποῖον πόρον ὑμῖν πεπόρικεν; ἢ τί ψήφισμα γέγραφεν ᾧ πεισθέντες ὑμεῖς οὐ πάλιν μετανοῆσαι προείλεσθε; καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα· οὕτω σκαιός ἐστι καὶ βάρβαρος τὸν τρόπον ὥστε, ὅταν ὑμᾶς ἴδῃ πρός τινας ὀργισθέντας τι καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος παροξυνθέντας, τηνικαῦτα παρὰ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑμῶν τὰ βουλήματα λαβὼν τοῖς καιροῖς ἐναντιοῦται.
18. But a statesman, acting on your behalf, ought not to follow up the hasty sentiments that accompany your anger, but should be guided by reasons, by events, by the opportunities that present themselves. For sentiments are wont to change quickly, but reasons to subsist for a longer period. Paying no regard to this the defendant detects the secret weakness of community, so that the same policy is bound to be ratified one day and repealed the next.
18. δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολιτευόμενον ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν οὐχὶ τοῖς ἐξαίφνης μετʼ ὀργῆς πάθεσιν ὑμῖν συμπίπτουσιν ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι καιροῖς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ταχὺ μεταπίπτειν εἴθισται, τὰ δὲ διαμένειν καὶ πλείω χρόνον ὑπάρχειν· ὧν οὗτος οὐδὲν ἐνθυμούμενος ἐλέγχει τἀπόρρητα τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστε ταὔτʼ ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ κύρια καὶ πάλιν ἄκυρα ποιεῖν.
19. But perhaps because the role he adopts is to rail at everyone, to shout people down and find fault with their speeches, therefore it is convenient in these times to protect him. Gentlemen of the jury, I swear by the goddess of Athens that what takes place on the hustings is a disgrace to our city, and it is through the recklessness of such speakers that political life is now discredited with all decent citizens. But if any of you happen to like that sort of thing, you will never want for such performers. Why, even now the platform swarms with them. For to pick holes in the counsel offered is not difficult, but it is difficult to advise you and persuade you to pass any indispensable resolution.
19. ἀλλʼ ἴσως ὅτι πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀεὶ προαιρεῖται λοιδορεῖσθαι καὶ διαβοᾶσθαι καὶ μέμφεσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα, διὰ ταῦτα περιποιῆσαι νῦν αὐτὸν ἁρμόττει. ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε νὴ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ὄνειδός ἐστιν, ἄνδρες δικασταί, τῇ πόλει γιγνόμενʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος, καὶ διὰ τὰς τούτων ἀπονοίας ἐπονείδιστον ἤδη τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ὑμῶν ἐστιν. εἰ δʼ οὖν τινι τοῦθʼ ὑμῶν ἐν ἡδονῇ συμβέβηκεν, οὐκ ἀπορήσετε τῶν τοιαῦτα ποιησόντων, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν μεστὸν τὸ βῆμʼ ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς συμβεβουλευμένοις χαλεπόν, ἀλλὰ συμβουλεῦσαι καὶ πεῖσαί τι τῶν δεόντων ὑμᾶς ψηφίσασθαι.
20. Furthermore, if he had not already deceived you by using these same arguments, when he was on trial at the earlier information, even so it would not be just to make any concession contrary to the existing laws; for you must not allow some persons to break the law and insist on the rest obeying it. Yet just possibly it might then have been more reasonable to trust him and grant him privileges and sacrifice some of these principles.
20. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὲν μὴ καὶ πρότερον τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις χρώμενος λόγοις ἐξηπάτησεν ὑμᾶς, ὅτʼ ἠγωνίσατο τὴν προτέραν ἔνδειξιν, ἦν μὲν οὐδʼ οὕτω δίκαιον παρὰ τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας νόμους τι συγχωρεῖν (οὐ δεῖ γὰρ παρανομεῖν δόντας τισὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀξιοῦν πράττειν), οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἴσως γʼ εὐλογώτερον ἦν τὸ πιστεῦσαι καὶ καταχαρίσασθαι καὶ προέσθαι τι τῶν τοιούτων.
21. But after you had let him off, admittedly in hope of amendment, and then shortly after had to punish the same man again for speaking and acting against the best interests of the city, what reasonable excuse is left you if you are a second time hoodwinked? When you have tried him by deeds, why need you trust his words? In cases where you have not yet an accurate test ready to hand, it may perhaps be necessary to judge by words.
21. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τότʼ ἀφέντες ἐπὶ ταῖς ὁμολογουμέναις ἐλπίσιν, μικρὸν ὕστερον τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ, πάλιν ἐκολάσατε, τίς ὑπολείπεται σκῆψις ὑμῖν ἁρμόττουσα, ἂν νῦν παρακρουσθῆτε; ὧν μὲν γὰρ ἔργῳ πεῖραν εἰλήφατε, τί δεῖ τοῖς λόγοις πιστεύειν; ὧν δὲ μηδέπω τὴν δοκιμασίαν ἔχετʼ ἀκριβῆ παρʼ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ἴσως ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι κρίνειν.
22. But, for myself, I am amazed that there are men so constituted that, though they deposit private property with those only whose past record shows them to be honest, they entrust public affairs to men who have been admittedly proved unscrupulous. No one would dream of setting a sorry mongrel to guard a flock; yet some people say that, to keep watch on those who administer the State, one need only employ the first comers, men who pretend to detect delinquents, but need the most careful watching themselves.
22. θαυμάζω δʼ ἔγωγε τῶν οὕτως ἐχόντων ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἴδια τοῖς ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων χρόνων οὖσιν ἐπιεικέσι, τούτοις παρακατατίθεσθαι, τὰ δʼ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κοινὰ τοῖς ὁμολογουμένως ἐξεληλεγμένοις οὖσι φαύλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. καὶ κύνα μὲν ἐπὶ ποίμνην ἀγεννῆ καὶ φαῦλον οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς ἐπιστήσειε φυλάττειν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ πράττοντας τοὺς τυχόντας ἀνθρώπους φασὶν ἔνιοι φύλακας δεῖν ἐπιπέμπειν, οἳ προσποιούμενοι μηνύειν τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας αὐτοὶ τῆς μεγίστης εἰσὶ φυλακῆς δεόμενοι.
23. If you are wise, you will bear this in mind. Turn a deaf ear to those who profess to be devoted to you, and take your own precautions to ensure that you grant to no one the power to make your laws null and void, especially to no one of those who pretend to be able to speak and legislate in the interests of the masses. It is preposterous that your ancestors faced death to save the laws from destruction, but that you do not even punish those who have offended against the laws; that you set up in the market-place a bronze statue of Solon, who framed the laws, but show yourselves regardless of those very laws for the sake of which he has received such exceptional honor.
23. ὧν, ἐὰν ἔχητε νοῦν, ἐνθυμούμενοι τοὺς μὲν φάσκοντας τούτους τῷ λόγῳ φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς χαίρειν ἐάσετε, αὐτοὶ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παραφυλάξετε, ὅπως μηδενὶ δῶτʼ ἐξουσίαν ἀκύρους τοὺς νόμους ποιεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῶν [πολλῶν] ὑπὲρ τοῦ πλήθους καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν δύνασθαι προσποιουμένων. ὡς πάνδεινόν ἐστιν τοὺς μὲν προγόνους ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καταλυθῆναι τοὺς νόμους ἀποθνῄσκειν τολμᾶν, ὑμᾶς δὲ μηδὲ τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας εἰς αὐτοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸν μὲν γράψαντα τοὺς νόμους Σόλωνα [ἐψηφίσθαι] χαλκοῦν ἐν ἀγορᾷ στῆσαι, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν νόμων ὀλιγωροῦντας φαίνεσθαι, διʼ οὓς κἀκεῖνον ὑπερβαλλόντως συμβέβηκε τιμᾶσθαι.
24. Is it not an absurd situation that you should by legislating express your anger against the criminals, but, when you have caught any of them red-handed, should proceed to let them go unscathed? That the lawgiver, a single individual, should on your behalf incur the hostility of all the worthless, but that you yourselves, collected together to defend your own interests, should not even display your hatred of the wicked, but should be overpowered by the wickedness of a single individual? That you should have fixed death as the penalty if anyone cites a law which does not exist, and yet should allow men to escape unpunished who reduce the existing laws to the level of laws which do not exist?
24. πῶς δʼ οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ συμβαῖνον ἄλογον, εἰ νομοθετοῦντες μὲν ὀργίζεσθε τοῖς πονηροῖς, ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ δέ τινας εἰληφότες ἀθῴους ἐάσετε; καὶ τὸν μὲν νομοθέτην ἕνʼ ὄντα πᾶσιν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς φαύλοις, ὑμᾶς δὲ μηδʼ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν κοινῇ συλλεγέντας ἐπιδείξασθαι μισοῦντας τοὺς πονηρούς, ἀλλʼ ὑφʼ ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς πονηρίας ἡττηθῆναι; καὶ θάνατον μὲν ὡρικέναι τὴν ζημίαν, ἐάν τις οὐκ ὄντα νόμον παράσχηται, τοὺς δὲ τοὺς ὄντας εἰς τὴν τῶν οὐκ ὄντων νόμων τάξιν ἄγοντας, τούτους ἀτιμωρήτους περιορᾶν;
25. The surest way to realize the blessing of obedience to the established laws, and the curse of despising and disobeying them, is to put before your eyes and examine separately the advantages that you derive from the laws and the results of lawlessness. For you will find that the fruits of lawlessness are madness, intemperance and greed, but from the laws come wisdom, sobriety and justice.
25. οὕτω δʼ ἂν ἀκριβέστατα συνθεωρήσαιτε τὸ τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις πείθεσθαι ἡλίκον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν καὶ τὸ μὴ πειθαρχεῖν αὐτοῖς ἡλίκον κακόν, εἰ τά τʼ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἀγαθὰ χωρὶς καὶ τὰ διὰ τῆς παρανομίας συμβαίνοντα πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιησάμενοι θεωρήσαιτε. εὑρήσετε γὰρ τὴν μὲν τὰ τῆς μανίας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ πλεονεξίας, τοὺς δὲ τὰ τῆς φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἔργα διαπραττομένους.
26. This is clearly so, because we can see that those cities are best ordered which have given birth to the best lawgivers. For as the distempers of the body are arrested by the discoveries of physicians, so savagery is expelled from the soul by the wise purposes of the legislator. To sum up we shall find nothing venerable or admirable which is not associated with law, since the whole round world, the heavenly bodies and what we call the seasons are plainly, if we can trust our senses, controlled by law and order.
26. δῆλον δέ· τῶν γὰρ πόλεων ταύτας ἄριστʼ οἰκουμένας ἴδοιμεν ἂν ἐν αἷς ἄριστοι νομοθέται γεγόνασιν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἀρρωστήματα τοῖς τῶν ἰατρῶν εὑρήμασι καταπαύεται, τὰς δʼ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀγριότητας αἱ τῶν νομοθετῶν ἐξορίζουσι διάνοιαι. ὅλως δʼ οὐδὲν οὔτε σεμνὸν οὔτε σπουδαῖον εὑρήσομεν ὃ μὴ νόμου κεκοινώνηκεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὰς καλουμένας ὥρας νόμος καὶ τάξις, εἰ χρὴ τοῖς ὁρωμένοις πιστεύειν, διοικεῖν φαίνεται.
27. Therefore, men of Athens, exhort one another to come to the rescue of the laws, and cast your votes against those who deliberately dishonor what is divine; and if you do this, you will be doing your duty and making the best use of your votes.
27. παρακαλέσαντες οὖν ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βοηθήσατε μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, καταψηφίσασθε δὲ τῶν εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβεῖν προῃρημένων. καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐὰν πράξητε, τὰ δέοντα ποιήσετε καὶ τὰ κράτιστα ψηφιεῖσθε.