1. Gentlemen of the jury, it is chiefly because I consider that the State will benefit by the repeal of this law, but partly also out of sympathy with the young son of Chabrias, that I have consented to support the plaintiffs to the best of my ability. It is clear, men of Athens, that Leptines and anyone else who defends the law will have nothing fair to say in its favor, but will urge the unworthiness of certain persons who have used their exemption as a means of shirking the public services, and he will take his stand chiefly on that ground.
1. ἄνδρες δικασταί, μάλιστα μὲν εἵνεκα τοῦ νομίζειν συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει λελύσθαι τὸν νόμον, εἶτα καὶ τοῦ παιδὸς εἵνεκα τοῦ Χαβρίου ὡμολόγησα τούτοις, ὡς ἂν οἷός τʼ ὦ, συνερεῖν. ἔστι δʼ οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθʼ, ὅτι Λεπτίνης, κἄν τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου λέγῃ, δίκαιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐρεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ, φήσει δʼ ἀναξίους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους εὑρομένους ἀτέλειαν ἐκδεδυκέναι τὰς λῃτουργίας, καὶ τούτῳ πλείστῳ χρήσεται τῷ λόγῳ.
2. For my own part, I shall forbear to retort that it is unjust to take away this privilege from all because you find fault with some; for that objection has already been partially stated, and you probably realize its force. But I should like to ask Leptines on what grounds, even if not some, but all the recipients had been to the last degree undeserving, he has meted out the same treatment to you as to them; for by the clause “none shall be exempt” he has taken away the privilege from those who now enjoy it, while by the addition “nor shall it be lawful hereafter to grant it” he takes away from you the right to bestow it. For surely he cannot mean that precisely as he thought the holders of this privilege unworthy, so he thought the people unworthy of the right to dispense its own favors to whomsoever it wishes.
2. ἐγὼ δʼ ὅτι μὲν τινῶν κατηγοροῦντα πάντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δωρειὰν τῶν ἀδίκων ἐστίν, ἐάσω· καὶ γὰρ εἴρηται τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἴσως γιγνώσκεται· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνʼ ἂν ἐροίμην ἡδέως αὐτόν, τίνος εἵνεκα, εἰ τὰ μάλιστα μὴ τινὲς ἀλλὰ πάντες ἦσαν ἀνάξιοι, τῶν αὐτῶν ἠξίωσεν ὑμᾶς τε καὶ τούτους. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ γράψαι μηδένʼ εἶναι ἀτελῆ, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἀφείλετο τὴν ἀτέλειαν, ἐν δὲ τῷ προσγράψαι μηδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐξεῖναι δοῦναι, ὑμᾶς τὸ δοῦναι ὑμῖν ἐξεῖναι. οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γʼ ἔνεστιν εἰπεῖν, ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ὅνπερ τοὺς ἔχοντας [ἀφείλετο] τὴν δωρειὰν ἀναξίους ἐνόμιζεν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν δῆμον ἀνάξιον ἡγεῖτο κύριον εἶναι τοῦ δοῦναι, ἐάν τῳ βούληται.
3. But perhaps he may object here that he framed his law in this way because the people are so easily gulled. But by parity of reasoning why should you not be deprived of all your rights—of the whole constitution in fact? For there is no single—right which has not been abused in this way. You have often been deceived into passing decrees; you have sometimes been induced to choose weak allies rather than strong; and generally, I suppose, in many of your public proceedings the same thing is bound to happen.
3. ἀλλὰ νὴ Διʼ ἐκεῖνʼ ἂν ἴσως εἴποι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ῥᾳδίως ἐξαπατᾶσθαι τὸν δῆμον, διὰ τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔθηκε τὸν νόμον. τί οὖν κωλύει πάντʼ ἀφῃρῆσθαι καὶ ὅλως τὴν πολιτείαν ὑμᾶς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον; οὐ γὰρ ἔστʼ ἐφʼ ὅτου τοῦτʼ οὐ πεπόνθατε τῶν πάντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψηφίσματα πολλὰ πολλάκις ἐξαπατηθέντες κεχειροτονήκατε, καὶ συμμάχους ἤδη τινὰς ἥττους ἀντὶ κρειττόνων ἐπείσθηθʼ ἑλέσθαι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν οἶμαι πολλοῖς οἷς πράττετε καὶ τοιοῦτόν τι συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη.
4. Shall we then make a law that hereafter neither Council nor Assembly shall be permitted to deliberate or to vote on any subject? Not so, in my opinion; for we ought not to be deprived of our rights, where we have been misled; we ought to be instructed how to avoid such mistakes, and we ought to make a law, not to strip us of our own authority, but to punish those who mislead us.
4. ἆρʼ οὖν θησόμεθα νόμον διὰ ταῦτα μηδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐξεῖναι τῇ βουλῇ μηδὲ τῷ δήμῳ μήτε προβουλεύειν μήτε χειροτονεῖν μηδέν; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶμαι· οὐ γάρ ἐσμεν ἀφαιρεθῆναι δίκαιοι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐξαπατηθῶμεν, ἀλλὰ διδαχθῆναι πῶς τοῦτο μὴ πεισόμεθα, καὶ θέσθαι νόμον οὐχ ὃς ἀφαιρήσεται τὸ κυρίους ἡμᾶς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ διʼ οὗ τὸν ἐξαπατῶντα τιμωρησόμεθα.
5. Now if, putting these considerations aside, you would examine the real problem, whether it is more advantageous that you should possess the power of bestowing this privilege, even though you are sometimes duped into bestowing it on a scoundrel, or that by being wholly dispossessed of it you should be unable to grant honors even where they are deserved, you would find the former course the more advantageous. And why? Because the result of rewarding too many citizens is to encourage many to do you good service, but the result of rewarding no one, even if deserving, is to discourage emulation in all.
5. εἰ τοίνυν τις ἐάσας ταῦτʼ αὐτὸ καθʼ αὕτʼ ἐξετάσειεν, πότερόν ποτε λυσιτελέστερόν ἐστι κυρίους μὲν ὑμᾶς εἶναι τῆς δωρειᾶς, ἐξαπατηθέντας δέ τι καὶ φαύλῳ τινὶ δοῦναι, ἢ διὰ τοῦ παντελῶς ἀκύρους γενέσθαι μηδʼ ἂν ἄξιόν τινʼ εἰδῆτʼ ἐξεῖναι τιμῆσαι, εὕροιτʼ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνο λυσιτελοῦν. διὰ τί; ὅτι ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πλείονας ἢ προσήκει τιμᾶν πολλοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν προκαλεῖσθʼ ὑμᾶς, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μηδενὶ μηδέν, μηδʼ ἂν ἄξιος ᾖ, διδόναι, πάντας ἀπείρξετε τοῦ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι.
6. There is also this other reason, that those who reward an undeserving individual may be credited with some degree of artlessness, but those who never requite their benefactors are charged with baseness. Just so far as it is better to be thought artless than unscrupulous, it is more honorable to repeal this law than to enact it.
6. πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ καὶ διʼ ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀνάξιόν τινα τιμήσαντες εὐηθείας τινὰ δόξαν ἔχοιεν ἄν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς μὴ τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἀμειβόμενοι, κακίας. ὅσῳ δὴ κρεῖττον εὐήθη δοκεῖν ἢ πονηρὸν εἶναι, τοσούτῳ λῦσαι τὸν νόμον κάλλιον ἢ θέσθαι.
7. Nor again, men of Athens, on reflection does it seem to me reasonable, when finding fault with some on the ground of the rewards they already enjoy, to rob useful citizens of their honors. For if, while these immunities exist, some of the recipients are, as our opponents say, worthless and unprofitable, what result are we to expect when there is no chance whatever of reward for the good citizens?
7. οὐ τοίνυν ἔμοιγʼ οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνʼ εὔλογον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, σκοπουμένῳ φαίνεται, καταμεμφόμενόν τινας ἐπὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις δωρειαῖς τοὺς χρησίμους ὄντας τῶν τιμῶν ἀποστερεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ὑπαρχουσῶν τούτων φαῦλοι καὶ ἀνάξιοί τινες κατὰ τὸν τούτων λόγον εἰσίν, τί χρὴ προσδοκᾶν ἔσεσθαι τότε, ὅταν παντελῶς μηδὲ πλέον μέλλῃ μηδὲν εἶναι τοῖς χρηστοῖς οὖσιν;
8. Then again, you must consider this point, that in accordance with the existing laws of long standing—laws of which Leptines himself cannot deny the soundness—there is an interval of a year between each public service, so that half the time a citizen is immune. And then, when all citizens, even those who have not benefited you in the least, enjoy a half share in that privilege, are we to take away from your real benefactors the addition that we made to it? Surely not; for that would be dishonorable and, in your case, especially unbecoming.
8. ἔτι τοίνυν ὑμᾶς κἀκεῖνʼ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων καὶ πάλαι κυρίων, οὓς οὐδʼ ἂν αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀντείποι μὴ οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχειν, ἐνιαυτὸν διαλιπὼν ἕκαστος λῃτουργεῖ, ὥστε τὸν ἥμισύν ἐστʼ ἀτελὴς τοῦ χρόνου. εἶθʼ ἧς πᾶσι μέτεστι τὸ ἥμισυ καὶ τοῖς μηδʼ ὁτιοῦν ἀγαθὸν πεποιηκόσιν ὑμᾶς, ταύτης τοὺς εὖ ποιήσαντας, ὃ προστεθείκαμεν αὐτοῖς, τοῦτʼ ἀφελώμεθα; μηδαμῶς· οὔτε γὰρ ἄλλως καλὸν οὔθʼ ὑμῖν πρέπον.
9. When we have a law which forbids cheating in the marketplace, where a falsehood entails no public injury, is it not disgraceful that in public affairs the same state should not abide by the law which it enjoins on private individuals, but should cheat its benefactors, and that although it is itself likely to incur no small penalty?
9. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀγορὰν ἀψευδεῖν νόμον γεγράφθαι, ἐφʼ οἷς οὐδέν ἐστι δημοσίᾳ βλάβος εἴ τις ψεύδεται, ἐν δὲ τῷ κοινῷ μὴ χρῆσθαι τῷ νόμῳ τούτῳ τὴν πόλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιτάξασαν τοῖς ἰδιώταις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀγαθόν τι πεποιηκότας ἐξαπατῆσαι, καὶ ταῦτʼ οὐ μικρὰν ζημίαν ὀφλήσειν μέλλουσαν;
10. For we must take account not only of loss of money, but of loss of good fame, which you are more anxious to keep than your money—yes, you and your ancestors also. The proof of this is that when they had accumulated vast sums, they spent all for honor, and when reputation was at stake, they never shrank from danger, but even lavished their private fortunes without stint. As it stands, then, this law reflects on your city not honor but disgrace, unworthy alike of your ancestors and of yourselves; for Athens is incurring the three worst reproaches—that men should think us envious, faithless, ungrateful.
10. οὐ γὰρ εἰ μὴ χρήματʼ ἀπόλλυτε μόνον σκεπτέον, ἀλλʼ εἰ καὶ δόξαν χρηστήν, περὶ ἧς μᾶλλον σπουδάζετʼ ἢ περὶ χρημάτων, καὶ οὐ μόνον ὑμεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι. τεκμήριον δέ· χρήματα μὲν γὰρ πλεῖστά ποτε κτησάμενοι πάνθʼ ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας ἀνήλωσαν, ὑπὲρ δὲ δόξης οὐδένα πώποτε κίνδυνον ἐξέστησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδίας οὐσίας προσαναλίσκοντες διετέλουν. νῦν τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ νόμος ταύτην ἀντὶ καλῆς αἰσχρὰν τῇ πόλει περιάπτει, καὶ οὔτε τῶν προγόνων οὔθʼ ὑμῶν ἀξίαν. τρία γὰρ τὰ μέγιστʼ ὀνείδη κτᾶται, φθονεροὺς ἀπίστους ἀχαρίστους εἶναι δοκεῖν.
11. Next, men of Athens, that it is absolutely contrary to the national character to ratify such a law as this, I will also endeavor to show you briefly by an example of our conduct in the past. The Thirty Tyrants are said to have borrowed money from the Lacedaemonians for use against the patriots in the Piraeus. But when unity was restored to the State and those disputes were settled, the Lacedaemonians sent envoys to demand payment.
11. ὅτι τοίνυν οὐδʼ ἐστὶν ὅλως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦ ἤθους τοῦ ὑμετέρου κύριον ποιῆσαι τοιοῦτον νόμον, καὶ τοῦτο πειράσομαι δεῖξαι διὰ βραχέων, ἕν τι τῶν πρότερον πεπραγμένων τῇ πόλει διεξελθών. λέγονται χρήμαθʼ οἱ τριάκοντα δανείσασθαι παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν Πειραιεῖ. ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἡ πόλις εἰς ἓν ἦλθεν καὶ τὰ πράγματʼ ἐκεῖνα κατέστη, πρέσβεις πέμψαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ χρήματα ταῦτʼ ἀπῄτουν.
12. When the question was discussed and some were for ordering the city-party, who were the real borrowers, to repay, while others claimed that the first sign of reconciliation should be the joint settlement of the debt, they say that the people chose to pay their contribution and bear their share of the loss, so that there should be no breach of the agreement. On that occasion, men of Athens, to avoid a breach of faith, you consented to pay money to those who had injured you, but now, when you might without any expense requite your benefactors by repealing this law, will it not be strange if you prefer to break your faith? I for one cannot approve of it.
12. λόγων δὲ γιγνομένων καὶ τῶν μὲν τοὺς δανεισαμένους ἀποδοῦναι κελευόντων, τοὺς ἐξ ἄστεως, τῶν δὲ τοῦτο πρῶτον ὑπάρξαι τῆς ὁμονοίας σημεῖον ἀξιούντων, κοινῇ διαλῦσαι τὰ χρήματα, φασὶ τὸν δῆμον ἑλέσθαι συνεισενεγκεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μετασχεῖν τῆς δαπάνης, ὥστε μὴ λῦσαι τῶν ὡμολογημένων μηδέν. πῶς οὖν οὐ δεινόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ τότε μὲν τοῖς ἠδικηκόσιν ὑμᾶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ψεύσασθαι τὰ χρήματʼ εἰσφέρειν ἠθελήσατε, νῦν δʼ ἐξὸν ὑμῖν ἄνευ δαπάνης τὰ δίκαια ποιῆσαι τοῖς εὐεργέταις, λύσασι τὸν νόμον, ψεύδεσθαι μᾶλλον αἱρήσεσθε; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἀξιῶ.
13. The instance I have quoted, men of Athens, as well many others, will show what our national character is—truthful, honest, and, where money is concerned, not asking what pays best, but what is the honorable thing to do. But as to the character of the proposer of this law, I have no further knowledge of him, nor do I say or know anything to his prejudice; but if I may judge from his law, I detect a character very far removed from what I have described.
13. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τῆς πόλεως ἦθος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπʼ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ ἐφʼ ὧν εἶπον ἴδοι τις ἂν τοιοῦτον, ἀψευδὲς καὶ χρηστόν, οὐ τὸ λυσιτελέστατον πρὸς ἀργύριον σκοποῦν, ἀλλὰ τί καὶ καλὸν πρᾶξαι. τὸ δὲ τοῦ θέντος τὸν νόμον, τὰ μὲν ἄλλʼ ἔγωγʼ οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ λέγω φλαῦρον οὐδὲν οὐδὲ σύνοιδα, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ νόμου σκοπῶν εὑρίσκω πολὺ τούτου κεχωρισμένον.
14. I say, then, that it would be more honorable for Leptines to be guided by you in repealing the law than for you to be guided by him in ratifying it, and it would be more profitable for you, as well as for him, that Athens should persuade Leptines to assume a likeness to herself than that she should be persuaded by Leptines to be like him; for even if he is a really good man—and he may be, for aught I know—he cannot excel her in character.
14. φημὶ τοίνυν ἐγὼ κάλλιον εἶναι τοῦτον ὑμῖν ἀκολουθῆσαι περὶ τοῦ λῦσαι τὸν νόμον ἢ ὑμᾶς τούτῳ περὶ τοῦ θέσθαι, καὶ λυσιτελέστερον εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὴν πόλιν πεπεικέναι Λεπτίνην ὅμοιον αὐτῇ γενέσθαι δοκεῖν ἢ αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τούτου πεπεῖσθαι ὁμοίαν εἶναι τούτῳ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ πάνυ χρηστός ἐσθʼ, ὡς ἐμοῦ γʼ ἕνεκʼ ἔστω, βελτίων ἐστὶ τῆς πόλεως τὸ ἦθος.
15. Moreover, gentlemen, I think that you would come to a sounder judgement in this matter if you would observe this further truth, that the present law removes just the one advantage which the rewards of a democracy have over those of other constitutions. For in the material value to the recipients of the rewards bestowed, a tyranny or an oligarchy has an immense advantage in that they can make anyone they choose instantaneously rich; but in honor and in security of possession you will find that the gifts of a democracy are to be preferred.
15. νομίζω τοίνυν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἄμεινον ἂν περὶ τοῦ παρόντος βουλεύσασθαι, εἰ κἀκεῖνο μάθοιτε, ὅτι ᾧ μόνῳ μείζους εἰσὶν αἱ παρὰ τῶν δήμων δωρειαὶ τῶν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν [διδομένων], καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀφαιρεῖται νῦν τῷ νόμῳ. τῇ μὲν γὰρ χρείᾳ τῇ τῶν εὑρισκομένων τὰς δωρειὰς οἱ τύραννοι καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔχοντες μάλιστα δύνανται [τιμᾶν]· πλούσιον γὰρ ὃν ἂν βούλωνται παραχρῆμʼ ἐποίησαν· τῇ δὲ τιμῇ καὶ τῇ βεβαιότητι τὰς παρὰ τῶν δήμων δωρειὰς εὑρήσετʼ οὔσας βελτίους.
16. For not the receipt of a flatterer’s pay with its taint of shame, but to be honored, where speech is free, as one who is deemed worthy—that is true glory; and to enjoy the willing admiration of equals seems better than to accept the richest gift from a tyrant’s hand. For in those communities the fear of tomorrow outweighs the favor of today, but in your city a man could keep what he won without fear of loss, at any rate in time past.
16. τό τε γὰρ μὴ μετʼ αἰσχύνης ὡς κολακεύοντα λαμβάνειν, ἀλλʼ ἐν ἰσηγορίᾳ δοκοῦντʼ ἄξιόν τινος εἶναι τιμᾶσθαι τῶν καλῶν ἐστι, τό θʼ ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἑκόντων θαυμάζεσθαι τοῦ παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου λαμβάνειν ὁτιοῦν κρεῖττον εἶναι δοκεῖ. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνοις μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ μέλλοντος φόβος τῆς παρούσης χάριτος, παρὰ δʼ ὑμῖν ἀδεῶς ἃν λάβῃ τις ἔχειν ὑπῆρχε τὸν γοῦν ἄλλον χρόνον.
17. So the law which destroys confidence in the rewards takes away the one thing that gives a higher value to rewards which you bestow. And indeed, if from any one of all known forms of government you take away the right of loyal supporters of the constitution to receive favors, you will find that you have deprived those governments of no unimportant safeguard.
17. ὁ τοίνυν τὴν πίστιν ἀφαιρῶν τῶν δωρειῶν νόμος, οὗτος, ᾧ μόνῳ κρείττους εἰσὶν αἱ παρʼ ὑμῶν δωρειαί, τοῦτʼ ἀφαιρεῖται. καίτοι τῶν ἁπασῶν ἧς ἄν τινος πολιτείας τὸ κομίζεσθαι τοὺς εὔνους τοῖς καθεστῶσιν χάριν ἐξέλῃς, οὐ μικρὰν φυλακὴν αὐτῶν ταύτην ἀφῃρηκὼς ἔσει.
18. Now perhaps Leptines will try to divert your attention from these points and assert that at present the public services fall upon the poor, but that under his law they will be performed by the wealthiest class. At first hearing, the plea seems to have some weight; but examine it strictly and the fallacy will be exposed. For there are, as you know, among us some services that fall upon resident aliens and others that fall upon citizens, and the exemption, which Leptines would remove, has been granted in the case of both. For from special contributions for war or for national defence and also from the equipment of war-galleys, rightly and justly in accordance with earlier laws, no one is exempt, not even the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton, whom Leptines has specially named.
18. τάχα τοίνυν ἴσως ἐκεῖνο λέγειν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειε Λεπτίνης, ἀπάγων ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τούτων, ὡς αἱ λῃτουργίαι νῦν μὲν εἰς πένητας ἀνθρώπους ἔρχονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ νόμου τούτου λῃτουργήσουσιν οἱ πλουσιώτατοι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦθʼ οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἀκοῦσαι λόγον τινʼ ἔχον· εἰ δέ τις αὔτʼ ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάσειε, ψεῦδος ἂν φανείη. εἰσὶ γὰρ δήπου παρʼ ἡμῖν αἵ τε τῶν μετοίκων λῃτουργίαι καὶ αἱ πολιτικαί, ὧν ἑκατέρων ἐστὶ τοῖς εὑρημένοις ἡ ἀτέλεια ἣν οὗτος ἀφαιρεῖται. τῶν γὰρ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον καὶ τὴν σωτηρίαν τῆς πόλεως εἰσφορῶν καὶ τριηραρχιῶν ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως οὐδείς ἐστʼ ἀτελὴς ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν νόμων, οὐδʼ οὓς οὗτος ἔγραψε, τοὺς ἀφʼ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος.
19. Let us then see what additional contributors he provides to perform those public services, and how many will be passed over if we turn a deaf ear to him. Now the richest citizens, when equipping a war-galley, are already exempt from the ordinary services, while those whose wealth is insufficient necessarily enjoy exemption and are out of the reach of this tax; so his law will not provide us with another contributor from either of these classes.
19. σκεψώμεθα δὴ τίνας ἡμῖν εἰσποιεῖ χορηγοὺς εἰς ἐκείνας τὰς λῃτουργίας, καὶ πόσους, ἐὰν μὴ τούτῳ προσέχωμεν, ἀφήσει. οἱ μὲν τοίνυν πλουσιώτατοι τριηραρχοῦντες ἀεὶ τῶν χορηγιῶν ἀτελεῖς ὑπάρχουσιν, οἱ δʼ ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν κεκτημένοι, τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀτέλειαν ἔχοντες, ἔξω τοῦ τέλους εἰσὶ τούτου· οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν οὐδετέρων οὐδεὶς διὰ τὸν νόμον ἡμῖν προσέσται χορηγός.
20. He may reply that he recruits many aliens for the services. But if he can point to five such, I will eat my words. I will assume, then, that this is not the case, but that if the law stands, both the number of aliens performing public services will be greater, and of the citizens none will be excused because he is equipping a war-galley. Now let us consider what the State will gain if all these perform the services, for it will prove to be no compensation at all for the disgrace it will entail.
20. ἀλλὰ νὴ Δίʼ εἰς τὰς τῶν μετοίκων λῃτουργίας εἰσποιεῖ πολλούς. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν δείξῃ πέντε, ἐγὼ ληρεῖν ὁμολογῶ. θήσω τοίνυν ἐγὼ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων πλείονας ἢ τοσούτους, ἐὰν ὁ νόμος τεθῇ, τοὺς λῃτουργοῦντας ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν μηδένʼ ἐκ τριηραρχίας ὑπάρξειν ἀτελῆ. σκεψώμεθα δὴ τί τοῦτο τῇ πόλει, ἐὰν ἅπαντες οὗτοι λῃτουργῶσιν· φανήσεται γὰρ οὐδὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ τῆς γενησομένης ἄξιον αἰσχύνης.
21. Put it thus. Of aliens there are exempt—I will assume ten. And by Heaven, as I said before, I do not believe there are five. Moreover of the citizens there are not half a dozen. Sixteen of both, then. Let us call it twenty, or thirty, if you like. How many, pray, are there that annually perform the regularly recurring services—chorus-masters, presidents of gymnasia, and public hosts? Perhaps sixty in all, or a trifle more.
21. ὅρα δʼ οὑτωσί. εἰσὶ τῶν ξένων ἀτελεῖς—δέκα θήσω· καὶ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὅπερ εἶπον ἀρτίως, οὐκ οἶμαι πέντʼ εἶναι. καὶ μὴν τῶν γε πολιτῶν οὐκ εἰσὶ ⟨πλείους ἢ⟩ πέντʼ ἢ ἕξ. οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρων ἑκκαίδεκα. ποιήσωμεν αὐτοὺς εἴκοσιν, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, τριάκοντα. πόσοι δή ποτʼ εἰσὶν οἱ κατʼ ἐνιαυτὸν τὰς ἐγκυκλίους λῃτουργίας λῃτουργοῦντες, χορηγοὶ καὶ γυμνασίαρχοι καὶ ἑστιάτορες; ἑξήκοντʼ ἴσως ἢ μικρῷ πλείους σύμπαντες οὗτοι.
22. In order, then, that we may have thirty more men for the public services, spread over the whole period, is it worth our while to excite the distrust of all? But surely we must know this, that as long as Athens stands, there will be plenty of citizens, without fail, to perform the services, but not a soul will want to do us a good turn, if he sees our previous benefactors wronged.
22. ἵνʼ οὖν τριάκοντʼ ἄνθρωποι πλείους παρὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον λῃτουργήσωσιν ἡμῖν, τοὺς ἅπαντας ἀπίστως πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαθῶμεν; ἀλλʼ ἴσμεν ἐκεῖνο δήπου, ὅτι λῃτουργήσουσιν μέν, ἄνπερ ἡ πόλις ᾖ, πολλοὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιλείψουσιν, εὖ δὲ ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς οὐδεὶς ἐθελήσει, τοὺς πρότερον ποιήσαντας ἐὰν ἠδικημένους ἴδῃ.
23. So far, so good. But if there were the most serious shortage of possible contributors, in Heaven’s name, which would you prefer—to organize syndicates for those services as for the equipment of war-vessels, or to rob your benefactors of what you have given them? I think I should prefer the syndicates. By the present law, while each of these thirty is performing a public service, Leptines affords a respite for the others, and that is all; after that, each of them will have to spend as much as before; but in the other case, each would pay a small contribution, proportioned to his means, and none would be hardly treated, even if his property were quite small.
23. εἶεν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τὰ μάλιστʼ ἐπέλειπον οἱ χορηγεῖν οἷοί τε, πρὸς Διὸς πότερον κρεῖττον ἦν εἰς συντέλειαν ἀγαγεῖν τὰς χορηγίας ὥσπερ τὰς τριηραρχίας, ἢ τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἀφελέσθαι τὰ δοθέντα; ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκεῖνʼ οἶμαι. νῦν μέν γε τὸν χρόνον, ὃν ἂν τούτων ἕκαστος λῃτουργῇ, δίδωσι τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον, μετὰ ταῦτα δʼ οὐδὲν ἔλαττον ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἀναλώσει· τότε δʼ ἄν, μικρᾶς συντελείας ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἑκάστῳ γιγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἔπασχε δεινὸν οὐδείς, οὐδʼ εἰ πάνυ μικρὰ κεκτημένος ἦν.
24. Now some of our opponents, men of Athens, are so illogical that they make no attempt to answer these arguments, but take a different line, saying for instance how monstrous it is that on the one hand there is nothing left in the Exchequer, but on the other hand private individuals will grow wealthy because they have secured an immunity. But it is not fair to combine both these statements. For if a man has great wealth without doing you any wrong, there is surely no need to look on him with envy; but if they are prepared to say that he has stolen it or gained it in some other disreputable way, there are laws by which he can be suitably punished. But as long as they do not prosecute him, neither have they any right to make this allegation.
24. οὕτω τοίνυν τινές, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, σφόδρʼ ἔχουσʼ ἀλογίστως ὥστʼ ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν πρὸς μὲν ταῦτʼ οὐδέν, ἄλλα δὲ τοιαδί, ὡς ἄρα δεινόν, εἰ ἐν κοινῷ μὲν μηδʼ ὁτιοῦν ὑπάρχει τῇ πόλει, ἰδίᾳ δέ τινες πλουτήσουσʼ ἀτελείας ἐπειλημμένοι. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτʼ ἀμφότερʼ οὐχὶ δίκαιον λέγειν. εἰ μὲν γάρ τις ἔχει πολλὰ μηδὲν ὑμᾶς ἀδικῶν, οὐχὶ δεῖ δήπου τούτῳ βασκαίνειν· εἰ δʼ ὑφῃρημένον φήσουσιν ἤ τινʼ ἄλλον οὐχ ὃν προσήκει τρόπον, εἰσὶ νόμοι καθʼ οὓς προσήκει κολάζειν. ὅτε δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ποιοῦσιν, οὐδὲ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῖς τοῦτον λεκτέον.
25. Further, with regard to the alleged poverty of the Exchequer, you must reflect that you will not be a whit the better off if you abolish these exemptions, for the expenditure on these services has nothing to do with the revenues or the surplus of the State. And apart from all this, of two possible advantages—wealth and credit with the rest of the world—our State today enjoys the latter. But if anyone imagines that because we have no money we need not also keep our honor bright, his judgement is at fault. For myself indeed, I pray Heaven that, if so it may be, our wealth also may increase, but if not, then at least that our reputation for good faith and constancy may remain sure.
25. καὶ μὴν περὶ τοῦ γε μὴ εἶναι χρήματα κοινὰ τῇ πόλει, ἐκεῖνʼ ὑμᾶς δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔσεσθʼ εὐπορώτεροι, τὰς ἀτελείας ἐὰν ἀφέλησθε· οὐ γὰρ κοινωνεῖ ταῖς δημοσίαις προσόδοις καὶ περιουσίαις ταῦτα τἀναλώματʼ οὐδέν. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων νυνὶ τῇ πόλει, δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν ὄντοιν, πλούτου καὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἅπαντας πιστεύεσθαι, ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς πίστεως ὑπάρχον. εἰ δέ τις οἴεται δεῖν, ὅτι χρήματʼ οὐκ ἔχομεν, μηδὲ δόξαν ἔχειν ἡμᾶς χρηστήν, οὐ καλῶς φρονεῖ. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ εὔχομαι τοῖς θεοῖς, μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ γενέσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε πιστοῖς εἶναι καὶ βεβαίοις δοκεῖν διαμεῖναι.
26. Now take the large fortunes which, according to our opponents, some citizens will amass if relieved of the services, but which I will show to be available for your needs. For of course you are aware that no one is exempt from the equipment of war-galleys or from the special contributions for war. So this person, whoever he may be, who owns much, contributes much to those objects; there is no getting out of it. And again, all would agree that the resources which the State can rely on for these objects should be as great as possible. For money spent by the chorus-masters affords those of us who are in the theater gratification for a fraction of a day; but money lavished on equipment for war gives security to the whole city for all time.
26. φέρε δὴ καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας, ἃς ἀναπαυομένους τινὰς εὐπορήσειν οὗτοι φήσουσιν, εἰς δέον ὑμῖν γιγνομένας δείξω. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθʼ ὅτι τῶν τριηραρχιῶν οὐδείς ἐστʼ ἀτελὴς οὐδὲ τῶν εἰσφορῶν τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον. οὔκουν ὁ πολλὰ κεκτημένος, οὗτος, ὅστις ἂν ᾖ, πόλλʼ εἰς ταῦτα συντελεῖ; πᾶσʼ ἀνάγκη. καὶ μὴν ὅτι δεῖ τὴν εὐπορίαν εἰς ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχειν πλείστην τῇ πόλει, πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν· παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν χορηγιῶν δαπάνας ἡμέρας μέρος μικρὸν ἡ χάρις τοῖς θεωμένοις ἡμῶν, παρὰ δὲ τὰς τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον παρασκευῶν ἀφθονίας πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἡ σωτηρία πάσῃ τῇ πόλει.
27. Therefore whatever you remit with one hand, you receive with the other; and you grant as an honor exemptions which even those who receive them cannot enjoy, if they have wealth sufficient for the equipment of a war-vessel. But although I suppose you all know that no one is exempt from the latter service, the clerk shall read to you the actual statute. Take the law about the trierarchy and read this clause only. [The clause is read] [And none shall be exempt from the trierarchy except the nine archons.]
27. ὥσθʼ ὅσον ἐνθάδʼ ἀφίετε, ἐκεῖ κομίζεσθε, καὶ δίδοτʼ ἐν τιμῆς μέρει ταῦθʼ ἃ καὶ μὴ λαβοῦσιν ἔστιν ἔχειν τοῖς τοῦ τριηραρχεῖν ἄξια κεκτημένοις. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι τῶν τριηραρχιῶν οὐδείς ἐστʼ ἀτελής, οἶμαι μὲν ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι πάντας, ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὸν νόμον ὑμῖν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώσεται. λαβὲ τὸν περὶ τῶν τριηραρχιῶν νόμον καὶ λέγε τοῦτʼ αὐτό. ΝΟΜΟΣ. ἀτελῆ δὲ μηδένα εἶναι τριηραρχίας πλὴν τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων.
28. You see, Athenians, how explicitly the law lays down that none shall be exempt from the equipment of a war-galley except the nine archons. So those whose wealth falls short of the qualification for that service will contribute by groups to the special war-tax, but those who reach that qualification will be available both for the war-galleys and for the war-tax. Then what relief does your law, Leptines, afford to the main body of citizens, if from one or two tribes it provides a single contributor, who, having relieved one other citizen on one occasion, will thereafter be exempt? I can see no relief. On the other hand it taints the honor and credit of the whole State. Therefore, when the damage it will inflict is greater than the benefit it confers, ought it not to be repealed by this court? Such would be my verdict.
28. ὁρᾶθʼ ὡς σαφῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μηδένʼ εἶναι τριηραρχίας ἀτελῆ διείρηκεν ὁ νόμος πλὴν τῶν ἐννέʼ ἀρχόντων. οὐκοῦν οἱ μὲν ἐλάττω κεκτημένοι τοῦ τριηραρχίας ἄξιʼ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς εἰσφοραῖς συντελοῦσιν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, οἱ δʼ ἐφικνούμενοι τοῦ τριηραρχεῖν εἰς ἀμφότερʼ ὑμῖν ὑπάρξουσι χρήσιμοι, καὶ τριηραρχεῖν καὶ εἰσφέρειν. τίνʼ οὖν ῥᾳστώνην τοῖς πολλοῖς ὁ σός, ὦ Λεπτίνη, ποιεῖ νόμος, εἰ μιᾶς ἢ δυοῖν φυλαῖν ἕνα χορηγὸν καθίστησιν, ὃς ἀνθʼ ἑνὸς ἄλλου τοῦθʼ ἅπαξ ποιήσας ἀπηλλάξεται; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐχ ὁρῶ. τῆς δέ γʼ αἰσχύνης ὅλην ἀναπίμπλησι τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῆς ἀπιστίας. οὔκουν ὅτε πολλῷ μείζονα βλάψει τῶν ὠφελειῶν ὧν ἔχει, προσήκει λελύσθαι παρὰ τοῖσδʼ αὐτόν; ἔγωγʼ ἂν φαίην.
29. My next point is this, gentlemen of the jury. The law of Leptines explicitly states that “none, whether citizen or enfranchised alien or foreigner, shall be exempt,” and does not specify from what, whether from the public service or from any other charge, but simply that “none shall be exempt except the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton.” The word “none” must be taken to include all classes, and foreigner is not further defined as resident at Athens.
29. ἔτι δʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, διὰ τὸ γεγράφθαι ἐν τῷ νόμῳ διαρρήδην αὐτοῦ μηδένα μήτε τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε τῶν ἰσοτελῶν μήτε τῶν ξένων εἶναι ἀτελῆ, μὴ διῃρῆσθαι δʼ ὅτου ἀτελῆ, χορηγίας ἤ τινος ἄλλου τέλους, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς ἀτελῆ μηδένα πλὴν τῶν ἀφʼ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ μηδένα πάντας περιλαμβάνειν τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐν δὲ τῷ τῶν ξένων μὴ διορίζειν τῶν οἰκούντων Ἀθήνησιν, ἀφαιρεῖται καὶ Λεύκωνα τὸν ἄρχοντα Βοσπόρου καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὐτοῦ τὴν δωρειὰν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἔδοτʼ αὐτοῖς.
30. It follows that Leptines deprives Leucon, the ruler of the Bosporus, and his children of the reward which you bestowed on them. For, of course, Leucon is a foreigner by birth, though by adoption an Athenian citizen, but on neither ground can he claim exemption, if this law stands. And yet, while of our other benefactors each has made himself useful to us on one occasion, Leucon will be found on reflection to be a perpetual benefactor, and that in a matter especially vital to our city.
30. ἔστι γὰρ γένει μὲν δήπου ὁ Λεύκων ξένος, τῇ δὲ παρʼ ὑμῶν ποιήσει πολίτης· κατʼ οὐδέτερον δʼ αὐτῷ τὴν ἀτέλειαν ἔστιν ἔχειν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ νόμου. καίτοι τῶν μὲν ἄλλων εὐεργετῶν χρόνον τινʼ ἕκαστος ἡμῖν χρήσιμον αὑτὸν παρέσχεν, οὗτος δέ, ἂν σκοπῆτε, φανήσεται συνεχῶς ἡμᾶς εὖ ποιῶν, καὶ ταῦθʼ ὧν μάλισθʼ ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις δεῖται.
31. For you are aware that we consume more imported corn than any other nation. Now the corn that comes to our ports from the Black Sea is equal to the whole amount from all other places of export. And this is not surprising; for not only is that district most productive of corn, but also Leucon, who controls the trade, has granted exemption from dues to merchants conveying corn to Athens, and he proclaims that those bound for your port shall have priority of lading. For Leucon, enjoying exemption for himself and his children, has granted exemption to every one of you.
31. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθʼ, ὅτι πλείστῳ τῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἡμεῖς ἐπεισάκτῳ σίτῳ χρώμεθα. πρὸς τοίνυν ἅπαντα τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐμπορίων ἀφικνούμενον ὁ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου σῖτος εἰσπλέων ἐστίν. εἰκότως· οὐ γὰρ μόνον διὰ τὸ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον σῖτον ἔχειν πλεῖστον τοῦτο γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κύριον ὄντα τὸν Λεύκωνʼ αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἄγουσιν Ἀθήναζε ἀτέλειαν δεδωκέναι, καὶ κηρύττειν πρώτους γεμίζεσθαι τοὺς ὡς ὑμᾶς πλέοντας. ἔχων γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τὴν ἀτέλειαν ἅπασι δέδωκεν ὑμῖν.
32. See what this amounts to. He exacts a toll of one-thirtieth from exporters of corn from his country. Now from the Bosporus there come to Athens about four hundred thousand bushels; the figures can be checked by the books of the grain commissioners. So for each three hundred thousand bushels he makes us a present of ten thousand bushels, and for the remaining hundred thousand a present of roughly three thousand.
32. τοῦτο δʼ ἡλίκον ἐστὶ θεωρήσατε. ἐκεῖνος πράττεται τοὺς παρʼ αὑτοῦ σῖτον ἐξάγοντας τριακοστήν. αἱ τοίνυν παρʼ ἐκείνου δεῦρʼ ἀφικνούμεναι σίτου μυριάδες περὶ τετταράκοντʼ εἰσί· καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐκ τῆς παρὰ τοῖς σιτοφύλαξιν ἀπογραφῆς ἄν τις ἴδοι. οὐκοῦν παρὰ μὲν τὰς τριάκοντα μυριάδας μυρίους δίδωσι μεδίμνους ἡμῖν, παρὰ δὲ τὰς δέκα ὡσπερανεὶ τρισχιλίους.
33. Now, so little danger is there of his depriving our state of this gift, that he has opened another depot at Theudosia, which our merchants say is not at all inferior to the Bosporus, and there, too, he has granted us the same exemption. I omit much that might be said about the other benefits conferred upon you by this prince and also by his ancestors, but the year before last, when there was a universal shortage of grain, he not only sent enough for your needs, but such a quantity in addition that Callisthenes had a surplus of fifteen talents of silver to dispose of.
33. τοσούτου τοίνυν δεῖ ταύτην ἀποστερῆσαι τὴν δωρειὰν τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε προσκατασκευάσας ἐμπόριον Θευδοσίαν, ὅ φασιν οἱ πλέοντες οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν χεῖρον εἶναι τοῦ Βοσπόρου, κἀνταῦθʼ ἔδωκε τὴν ἀτέλειαν ἡμῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα σιωπῶ, πόλλʼ ἂν ἔχων εἰπεῖν, ὅσʼ εὐεργέτηκεν ὑμᾶς οὗτος ἁνὴρ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι· ἀλλὰ πρωπέρυσιν σιτοδείας παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις γενομένης οὐ μόνον ὑμῖν ἱκανὸν σῖτον ἀπέστειλεν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον ὥστε πεντεκαίδεκʼ ἀργυρίου τάλαντα, ἃ Καλλισθένης διῴκησε, προσπεριγενέσθαι.
34. What, then, men of Athens, do you expect of this man, who has proved himself such a friend to you, if he learns that you have deprived him by law of his immunity, and have made it illegal to bestow it hereafter, even if you change your minds? Are you not aware that this same law, if ratified, will take away the immunity, not only from Leucon, but from those of you who import corn from his country?
34. τί οὖν οἴεσθʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτον τὸν τοιοῦτον περὶ ὑμᾶς γεγενημένον, ἐὰν ἀκούσῃ νόμῳ τὴν ἀτέλειαν ὑμᾶς ἀφῃρημένους αὐτὸν καὶ μηδʼ ἂν μεταδόξῃ ποτὲ ψηφισαμένους ἐξεῖναι δοῦναι; ἆρʼ ἀγνοεῖθʼ ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς νόμος οὗτος ἐκεῖνόν τʼ ἀφαιρήσεται τὴν ἀτέλειαν, κύριος ἂν γένηται, καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς παρʼ ἐκείνου σιτηγοῦντας;
35. For surely no one dreams that he will tolerate the cancelling of your gifts to him, and let his own gifts to you stand good. So to the many disadvantages that this law will obviously entail upon you, may be added the immediate loss of part of your resources. In view of this, are you still considering whether you ought to erase it from the statute-book? Have you not made up your minds long ago? Take and read them the decrees touching Leucon. [The decrees are read] How reasonable and just was the immunity which Leucon has obtained from you, these decrees have informed you, gentlemen of the jury.
35. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τοῦτό γʼ ὑπείληφεν οὐδείς, ὡς ἐκεῖνος ὑπομενεῖ ἑαυτῷ μὲν ἀκύρους εἶναι τὰς παρʼ ὑμῶν δωρειάς, ὑμῖν δὲ μένειν τὰς παρʼ ἑαυτοῦ. οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολλοῖς οἷς βλάψειν ὑμᾶς ὁ νόμος φαίνεται, καὶ προσαφαιρεῖταί τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη. εἶθʼ ὑμεῖς ἔτι σκοπεῖτʼ εἰ χρὴ τοῦτον ἐξαλεῖψαι, καὶ οὐ πάλαι βεβούλευσθε; ἀνάγνωθι λαβὼν αὐτοῖς τὰ ψηφίσματα τὰ περὶ τοῦΛεύκωνος. ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑΤΑ.
36. Copies of all these decrees on stone were set up by you and by Leucon in the Bosporus, in the Piraeus, and at Hierum. Just reflect to what depths of meanness you are dragged by this law, which makes the nation less trustworthy than an individual.
36. ὡς μὲν εἰκότως καὶ δικαίως τετύχηκεν τῆς ἀτελείας παρʼ ὑμῶν ὁ Λεύκων, ἀκηκόατʼ ἐκ τῶν ψηφισμάτων, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί. τούτων δʼ ἁπάντων στήλας ἀντιγράφους ἐστήσαθʼ ὑμεῖς κἀκεῖνος, τὴν μὲν ἐν Βοσπόρῳ, τὴν δʼ ἐν Πειραιεῖ, τὴν δʼ ἐφʼ Ἱερῷ. σκοπεῖτε δὴ πρὸς ὅσης κακίας ὑπερβολὴν ὑμᾶς ὁ νόμος προάγει, ὃς ἀπιστότερον τὸν δῆμον καθίστησʼ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός.
37. For you must not imagine that the pillars standing there are anything else than the covenants of all that you have received or granted; and it will be made clear that Leucon observes them and is always eager to benefit you, but that you have repudiated them while they still stand; and that is a far worse offence than to pull them down; for when men wish to traduce our city, there will stand the pillars to witness to the truth of their words.
37. μὴ γὰρ οἴεσθʼ ὑμῖν ἄλλο τι τὰς στήλας ἑστάναι ταύτας ἢ τούτων πάντων ὧν ἔχετʼ ἢ δεδώκατε συνθήκας, αἷς ὁ μὲν Λεύκων ἐμμένων φανεῖται καὶ ποιεῖν ἀεί τι προθυμούμενος ὑμᾶς εὖ, ὑμεῖς δʼ ἑστώσας ἀκύρους πεποιηκότες, ὃ πολὺ δεινότερον τοῦ καθελεῖν· αὗται γὰρ οὑτωσὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις κατὰ τῆς πόλεως βλασφημεῖν τεκμήριον ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν ἑστήξουσιν.
38. Now mark! Suppose Leucon sends and asks us on what charge or for what fault we have taken away his immunity; what, in the name of wonder, shall we say, or in what terms will the proposer of your reply draft it? He will say, I suppose, that some of those who obtained immunity did not deserve it!
38. φέρʼ, ἐὰν δὲ δὴ πέμψας ὡς ἡμᾶς ὁ Λεύκων ἐρωτᾷ, τί ἔχοντες ἐγκαλέσαι καὶ τί μεμφόμενοι τὴν ἀτέλειαν αὐτὸν ἀφῄρησθε, τί πρὸς θεῶν ἐροῦμεν ἢ τί γράψει ποθʼ ὁ τὸ ψήφισμʼ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν γράφων;
39. If, then, Leucon replies to this, “Yes; I dare say some of the Athenians are scoundrels, but I have not made that a reason for robbing the good citizens; on the contrary, because I think the Athenians, as a nation, are good men, I allow them all a share”; will there not be more fairness in his words than in ours? To me, at least, it seems so. For it is the custom of all nations, for the sake of their benefactors, rather to include some bad men in their rewards, than to make the worthless men an excuse for withholding their rewards from those who are acknowledged to merit them.
39. ὅτι νὴ Δίʼ ἦσάν τινες τῶν εὑρημένων ἀνάξιοι. ἐὰν οὖν εἴπῃ πρὸς ταῦτʼ ἐκεῖνος καὶ γὰρ Ἀθηναίων τινὲς ἴσως φαῦλοι, καὶ οὐ διὰ ταῦτʼ ἐγὼ τοὺς χρηστοὺς ἀφειλόμην, ἀλλὰ τὸν δῆμον νομίζων χρηστὸν πάντας ἔχειν ἐῶ, οὐ δικαιότερʼ ἡμῶν ἐρεῖ; ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ. παρὰ πᾶσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποις μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἔθος διὰ τοὺς εὐεργέτας καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς εὖ ποιεῖν τῶν μὴ χρηστῶν ἢ διὰ τοὺς φαύλους τοὺς ὁμολογουμένως ἀξίους χάριτος τὰ δοθέντʼ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.
40. Nay more, upon consideration, I cannot even see why anyone should not, if he wishes, challenge Leucon to an exchange of property. For there is always property of his at Athens, and by this law, if anyone tries to lay hands on it Leucon will either forfeit it or be compelled to perform public service. And it is not the question of expense that will trouble him most, but the reflection that you have robbed him of his reward.
40. καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ ὅπως οὐκ ἀντιδώσει τῷ Λεύκωνί τις, ἂν βούληται, δύναμαι σκοπούμενος εὑρεῖν. χρήματα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀεὶ παρʼ ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ, κατὰ δὲ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον, ἐάν τις ἐπʼ αὔτʼ ἔλθῃ, ἢ στερήσεται τούτων ἢ λῃτουργεῖν ἀναγκασθήσεται. ἔστι δʼ οὐ τὸ τῆς δαπάνης μέγιστον ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλʼ ὅτι τὴν δωρειὰν ὑμᾶς αὐτὸν ἀφῃρῆσθαι νομιεῖ.
41. Again then, Athenians, it is not merely necessary to consider how Leucon may be spared injustice—a man whose anxiety about his privilege would arise from a sense of honor rather than from his needs—but we must also consider whether another man, who did you service when he was prosperous, may not find that the exemption he received from you then is a matter of necessity to him now. To whom, then, do I refer? To Epicerdes of Cyrene, than whom no recipient of this honor ever deserved it better, not because his gifts were great or extraordinary, but because they came at a time when we were hard put to it to find, even among those whom we had benefited, anyone willing to remember our benefactions.
41. οὐ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ Λεύκων ἀδικηθῇ μόνον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ᾧ φιλοτιμίας ἕνεχʼ ἡ περὶ τῆς δωρειᾶς σπουδὴ γένοιτʼ ἄν, οὐ χρείας, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος εὖ μὲν ἐποίησεν ὑμᾶς εὖ πράττων, εἰς δέον δὲ νῦν γέγονʼ αὐτῷ τὸ λαβεῖν παρʼ ὑμῶν τὴν ἀτέλειαν. τίς οὖν οὗτός ἐστιν; Ἐπικέρδης ὁ Κυρηναῖος, ὅς, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος τῶν εἰληφότων, δικαίως ἠξιώθη ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς, οὐ τῷ μεγάλʼ ἢ θαυμάσιʼ ἡλίκα δοῦναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ παρὰ τοιοῦτον καιρὸν ἐν ᾧ καὶ τῶν εὖ πεπονθότων ἔργον ἦν εὑρεῖν ἐθέλοντά τινα ὧν εὐεργέτητο μεμνῆσθαι.
42. For Epicerdes, as this decree then passed in his honor declares, gave a hundred minae to our fellow-countrymen at that time prisoners in Sicily under such distressing circumstances, and thus he became the chief instrument in saving them from all perishing of hunger. Afterwards, when you had rewarded him with immunity, seeing that in the war just before the rule of the Thirty the people were straitened for want of funds, he gave them a talent as a freewill offering.
42. οὗτος γὰρ ἁνήρ, ὡς τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦτο δηλοῖ τὸ τότʼ αὐτῷ γραφέν, τοῖς ἁλοῦσι τότʼ ἐν Σικελίᾳ τῶν πολιτῶν, ἐν τοιαύτῃ συμφορᾷ καθεστηκόσιν, ἔδωκε μνᾶς ἑκατὸν καὶ τοῦ μὴ τῷ λιμῷ πάντας αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν αἰτιώτατος ἐγένετο. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, δοθείσης ἀτελείας αὐτῷ διὰ ταῦτα παρʼ ὑμῶν, ὁρῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ [πρὸ τῶν τριάκοντα μικρὸν] σπανίζοντα τὸν δῆμον χρημάτων, τάλαντον ἔδωκεν αὐτὸς ἐπαγγειλάμενος.
43. In the name of Zeus and all the gods, men of Athens, ask yourselves how a man could more clearly show his goodwill towards you, or how he could be less deserving of an ill return than if, being first an eye-witness of that national disaster, he should prefer the beaten side and such favors as they might some day bestow, rather than the victors among whom he found himself in their hour of triumph; or if next, seeing a further need arise, he should be found once more a donor, anxious not to hoard his own private means, but to ensure that no cause of yours should fall short of success, so far as in him lay.
43. σκέψασθε δὴ πρὸς Διὸς καὶ θεῶν, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πῶς ἂν ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον φανερὸς γένοιτʼ εὔνους ὢν ὑμῖν, ἢ πῶς ἧττον ἄξιος ἀδικηθῆναι, ἢ πρῶτον μὲν εἰ παρὼν τῷ τῆς πόλεως ἀτυχήματι μᾶλλον ἕλοιτο τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας καὶ τὴν παρὰ τούτων χάριν, ἥτις ποτʼ ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι, ἢ τοὺς ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ κεκρατηκότας καὶ παρʼ οἷς ἦν, δεύτερον δέ, ἑτέραν χρείαν ἰδών, εἰ φαίνοιτο διδοὺς καὶ μὴ πῶς ἰδίᾳ τὰ ὄντα σώσει προνοούμενος, ἀλλʼ ὅπως τῶν ὑμετέρων μηδὲν ἐνδεῶς ἕξει τὸ καθʼ αὑτόν.
44. Yet this man, who in actual deed on those momentous occasions shared his wealth with the people, but enjoyed only a nominal and honorary immunity, will be robbed by you, not of his immunity, for it is evident that he did not use it when he had it, but of his trust in you; and what could be more discreditable than that? Now you shall hear the very words of the decree then passed in his honor. And observe, men of Athens, how many decrees this law annuls, how many individuals it wrongs, and what occasions they chose for making themselves serviceable to you; for you will find that the law wrongs just the men who least deserve it. Read. The decree is read Gentlemen of the jury, you have heard from the decrees what were the services for which Epicerdes obtained his immunity.
44. τοῦτον μέντοι τὸν τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ παρὰ τοὺς μεγίστους καιροὺς οὑτωσὶ κοινὰ τὰ ὄντα τῷ δήμῳ κεκτημένον, τῷ δὲ ῥήματι καὶ τῇ τιμῇ τὴν ἀτέλειαν ἔχοντα, οὐχὶ τὴν ἀτέλειαν ἀφαιρήσεσθε (οὐδὲ γὰρ οὔσῃ χρώμενος φαίνεται), ἀλλὰ τὸ πιστεύειν ὑμῖν, οὗ τί γένοιτʼ ἂν αἴσχιον; τὸ τοίνυν ψήφισμʼ ὑμῖν αὔτʼ ἀναγνώσεται τὸ τότε ψηφισθὲν τῷ ἀνδρί. καὶ θεωρεῖτʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅσα ψηφίσματʼ ἄκυρα ποιεῖ ὁ νόμος, καὶ οἵους ἀνθρώπους ἀδικεῖ, καὶ ἐν ὁποίοις καιροῖς χρησίμους ὑμῖν παρασχόντας ἑαυτούς· εὑρήσετε γὰρ τούτους, οὓς ἥκιστα προσῆκεν, ἀδικοῦντα. λέγε. ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑ.
45. Do not stop to ask whether he gave you a hundred minae and a talent as well—for I expect that even those who received it were not struck by the amount of his gift—but think of his zeal, his spontaneous act, and the occasion that he chose.
45. τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνθʼ ὧν εὕρετο τὴν ἀτέλειαν ὁ Ἐπικέρδης ἀκηκόατʼ ἐκ τῶν ψηφισμάτων, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί. σκοπεῖτε δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, εἰ μνᾶς ἑκατὸν καὶ πάλιν τάλαντον ἔδωκεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ τοὺς λαβόντας ἔγωγʼ ἡγοῦμαι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν χρημάτων θαυμάσαι), ἀλλὰ τὴν προθυμίαν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς ἐν οἷς.
46. For recompense is due to all alike who are forward to do us service, but in a special degree to those who are friends in time of need; and such an one clearly was Epicerdes. Are we not then ashamed, men of Athens, if it appears that we have retained no memory of these services and have robbed of their reward the sons of such a benefactor, though we can charge them with no fault?
46. πάντες μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἴσως ἄξιοι χάριν ἀνταπολαμβάνειν οἱ προϋπάρχοντες τῷ ποιεῖν εὖ, μάλιστα δʼ οἱ παρὰ τὰς χρείας, ὧν εἷς οὗτος ἁνὴρ ὢν φαίνεται. εἶτʼ οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς τοῦ τοιούτου παῖδας εἰ μηδεμίαν ποιησάμενοι τούτων μηδενὸς μνείαν ἀφῃρημένοι φανούμεθα τὴν δωρειάν, μηδὲν ἔχοντες ἐγκαλέσαι;
47. For if those who were then saved by him and who bestowed on him this immunity were a different generation from you who now propose to take it away, yet that does not remove the infamy of the act; nay, it is just there that its atrocity lies. For if those who knew and experienced his generosity felt that it merited this return, while we, who have only heard the story told, shall revoke the gift as undeserved, shall we not be guilty of more than ordinary atrocity?
47. οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἕτεροι μὲν ἦσαν οἱ τότε σωθέντες ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ δόντες τὴν ἀτέλειαν, ἕτεροι δʼ ὑμεῖς οἱ νῦν ἀφαιρούμενοι, ἀπολύει τοῦτο τὴν αἰσχύνην, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δεινόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν εἰδότες καὶ παθόντες ἄξια τούτων ἐνόμιζον εὖ πάσχειν, ἡμεῖς δʼ οἱ λόγῳ ταῦτʼ ἀκούοντες ὡς ἀναξίων ἀφαιρησόμεθα, πῶς οὐχ ὑπέρδεινον ποιήσομεν;
48. Now my plea is the same in this case as for those who overthrew the Four Hundred, and for those who proved helpful to the democrats in exile; for I think they would all be atrociously treated if any portion of the rewards then decreed to them should be revoked.
48. ὁ αὐτὸς τοίνυν ἐστί μοι λόγος οὗτος καὶ περὶ τῶν τοὺς τετρακοσίους καταλυσάντων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὅτʼ ἔφευγεν ὁ δῆμος χρησίμους αὑτοὺς παρασχόντων· πάντας γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἡγοῦμαι δεινότατʼ ἂν παθεῖν, εἴ τι τῶν τότε ψηφισθέντων αὐτοῖς λυθείη.
49. Now if any of you is persuaded that our city is far from needing such a benefactor today, let him pray Heaven it may be so, and I will join in that prayer; but let him also reflect, first, that he is going to give his vote on a law under which, if unrepealed, he will have to live, and secondly, that bad laws can injure even communities which fancy they are dwelling in security. For there would have been no changes for better or for worse in the fortunes of states, had it not been that a nation in peril is guided to safety by good policy, good laws, and good citizens and by the observance of order in all things, but in the case of a nation that seems established in perfect prosperity, all these things, being neglected, slip away from it little by little.
49. εἰ τοίνυν τις ὑμῶν ἐκεῖνο πέπεισται, πολὺ τοῦ δεηθῆναί τινος τοιούτου νῦν ἀπέχειν τὴν πόλιν, ταῦτα μὲν εὐχέσθω τοῖς θεοῖς, κἀγὼ συνεύχομαι, λογιζέσθω δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι περὶ νόμου μέλλει φέρειν τὴν ψῆφον ᾧ μὴ λυθέντι δεήσει χρῆσθαι, δεύτερον δʼ ὅτι βλάπτουσιν οἱ πονηροὶ νόμοι καὶ τὰς ἀσφαλῶς οἰκεῖν οἰομένας πόλεις. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέπιπτε τὰ πράγματʼ ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα, εἰ μὴ τοὺς μὲν ἐν κινδύνῳ καθεστηκότας καὶ πράξεις χρησταὶ καὶ νόμοι καὶ ἄνδρες χρηστοὶ καὶ πάντʼ ἐξητασμένʼ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον προῆγε, τοὺς δʼ ἐν ἁπάσῃ καθεστάναι δοκοῦντας εὐδαιμονίᾳ πάντα ταῦτʼ ἀμελούμενʼ ὑπέρρει κατὰ μικρόν.
50. For most men achieve prosperity by planning soundly and by despising nothing; but they do not take the trouble to guard it by the same means. Let not this mistake be yours today, and do not think that you ought to ratify a law which will taint the reputation of our city in the time of her prosperity and, if ever a crisis comes, will leave her destitute of those who would be willing to do her service.
50. τῶν γὰρ ἀνθρώπων οἱ πλεῖστοι κτῶνται μὲν τἀγαθὰ τῷ καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι καὶ μηδενὸς καταφρονεῖν, φυλάττειν δʼ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις. ὃ μὴ πάθητε νῦν ὑμεῖς, μηδʼ οἴεσθε νόμον τοιοῦτον θέσθαι δεῖν, ὃς καλῶς τε πράττουσαν τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν πονηρᾶς δόξης ἀναπλήσει, ἐάν τέ τι συμβῇ ποτέ, ἔρημον τῶν ἐθελησόντων ἀγαθόν τι ποιεῖν καταστήσει.
51. Again, Athenians, it is not only the men who, in a private capacity, chose to benefit you and to offer their services on those important occasions that have been described a little while ago by Phormio and mentioned by me just now—it is not only these men that you must be careful not to wrong, but many others also, who drew whole states, their own native cities, into alliance with us in the war against the Lacedaemonians, thus furthering by word and deed the interests of your city;
51. οὐ τοίνυν μόνον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς ἰδίᾳ γνόντας εὖ ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς καὶ παρασχόντας χρησίμους αὑτοὺς ἐπὶ τηλικούτων καὶ τοιούτων καιρῶν, οἵων μικρῷ πρότερον Φορμίων διεξελήλυθε κἀγὼ νῦν εἴρηκα, ἄξιόν ἐστιν εὐλαβηθῆναι ἀδικῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ πόλεις ὅλας, τὰς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδας, συμμάχους ὑμῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους πολέμου παρέσχον, καὶ λέγοντες ἃ συμφέρει τῇ πόλει τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ καὶ πράττοντες·
52. and some of these men through their goodwill to you have no longer a fatherland. The first example that I propose to examine is that of the Corinthian exiles. And here I am obliged to mention facts which I myself have only heard from the lips of the older among you. Some occasions, then, on which they made themselves useful to us, I will pass over; but when the great battle against the Lacedaemonians was fought near Corinth, and when the party in that city determined after the battle not to admit our soldiers within their walls, but to send heralds to greet the Lacedaemonians, these men, though they saw that Athens had lost the day and that our enemies were holding the pass, refused to betray us or to take steps for their own individual safety, but with the whole armed force of the Peloponnese close upon them, they opened their gates to us in defiance of the majority and chose along with you, who had been engaged in the battle, to suffer whatever might betide, rather than without you to enjoy a safety that involved no danger; and so they admitted the troops and succeeded in saving both you and your allies.
52. ὧν ἔνιοι διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εὔνοιαν στέρονται τῆς πατρίδος. ὧν ἐπέρχεταί μοι πρώτους ἐξετάσαι τοὺς ἐκ Κορίνθου φεύγοντας. ἀναγκάζομαι δὲ λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ταῦθʼ ἃ παρʼ ὑμῶν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων αὐτὸς ἀκήκοα. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλʼ ὅσα χρησίμους ὑμῖν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκεῖνοι παρέσχον, ἐάσω· ἀλλʼ ὅθʼ ἡ μεγάλη μάχη πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγένεθʼ ἡ ἐν Κορίνθῳ, τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βουλευσαμένων μετὰ τὴν μάχην μὴ δέχεσθαι τῷ τείχει τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι, ὁρῶντες ἠτυχηκυῖαν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῆς παρόδου κρατοῦντας Λακεδαιμονίους, οὐχὶ προὔδωκαν οὐδʼ ἐβουλεύσαντʼ ἰδίᾳ περὶ τῆς αὑτῶν σωτηρίας, ἀλλὰ πλησίον ὄντων μεθʼ ὅπλων ἁπάντων Πελοποννησίων ἀνέῳξαν τὰς πύλας ὑμῖν βίᾳ τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον εἵλοντο μεθʼ ὑμῶν τῶν τότε στρατευσαμένων, εἴ τι δέοι, πάσχειν ἢ χωρὶς ὑμῶν ἀκινδύνως σεσῶσθαι, καὶ εἰσέφρουν τὸ στράτευμα, καὶ διέσωσαν καὶ ὑμᾶς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους.
54. And afterwards, when peace, the peace of Antalcidas, was concluded with the Lacedaemonians, the latter requited their acts with exile. But you, in giving them shelter, acted like good men and true; for you decreed them all that they needed. Yet now are we actually debating whether those decrees should remain valid? No! The bare statement is a disgrace, if it should be reported that Athenians are debating whether they ought to let their benefactors keep what they have given them; for that question ought to have been debated, yes, and decided, long ago. Read this decree also to the court. [The decree is read] Such, gentlemen of the jury, is the decree passed by you in favor of the Corinthians who were exiled on your account.
54. ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἡ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους εἰρήνη μετὰ ταῦτʼ ἐγένετο, ἡ ἐπʼ Ἀνταλκίδου, ἀντὶ τῶν ἔργων τούτων ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐξέπεσον. ὑποδεξάμενοι δʼ ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς ἐποιήσατʼ ἔργον ἀνθρώπων καλῶν κἀγαθῶν· ἐψηφίσασθε γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἅπανθʼ ὧν ἐδέοντο. εἶτα ταῦτα νῦν εἰ χρὴ κύριʼ εἶναι σκοποῦμεν; ἀλλʼ ὁ λόγος πρῶτον αἰσχρὸς [τοῖς σκοπουμένοις], εἴ τις ἀκούσειεν ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι σκοποῦσιν εἰ χρὴ τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἐᾶν τὰ δοθέντʼ ἔχειν· πάλαι γὰρ ἐσκέφθαι ταῦτα καὶ ἐγνῶσθαι προσῆκεν. ἀνάγνωθι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμʼ αὐτοῖς. ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑ.
55. But think! If one who knew those critical times—whether as an eye-witness or hearing the story from one who knew—if he should hear this law which revokes the gifts that were then bestowed, how he would denounce the baseness of us who made the law—and who were so generous and obliging when our need was pressing, but when we have satisfied all our hopes, are so thankless and churlish that we have robbed men of the rewards they enjoy, and have made a law that hereafter no, such rewards should be bestowed!
55. ἃ μὲν ἐψηφίσασθε τοῖς φεύγουσιν διʼ ὑμᾶς Κορινθίων ταῦτʼ ἐστίν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί. ὅρα δέ, εἴ τις ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς εἰδὼς [ἢ παρὼν] ἤ τινος εἰδότος διεξιόντος ἀκούσας, ἀκούσαι τοῦ νόμου τούτου τὰς τότε δωρειὰς δοθείσας ἀφαιρουμένου, ὅσην ἂν κακίαν τῶν θεμένων τὸν νόμον καταγνοίη, οἳ παρὰ μὲν τὰς χρείας οὕτω φιλάνθρωποι καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντες, ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἐπράξαμεν πάνθʼ ὅσʼ ἂν εὐξαίμεθα, οὕτως ἀχάριστοι καὶ κακοί, ὥστε τούς τʼ ἔχοντας ἀφῃρήμεθα καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μηδενὶ δοῦναι ταῦτʼ ἐξεῖναι νόμον τεθήκαμεν.
56. “Oh but,” we shall be told, “some of those who received these rewards did not deserve them”; for that thought will run through all their argument. In that case shall we confess that we do not know that a man’s deserts should be examined at the time of the reward, and not an indefinitely long time after? For to give no reward in the first instance is an exercise of judgement; to take it away when given shows a grudging spirit, and you must not seem to have been prompted by that.
56. νὴ Δίʼ ἀνάξιοι γάρ τινες τῶν εὑρημένων ταῦτʼ ἦσαν· τουτὶ γὰρ παρὰ πάντʼ ἔσται τὸν λόγον αὐτοῖς. ἔπειτʼ ἐκεῖνʼ ἀγνοεῖν φήσομεν, ὅτι τὴν ἀξίαν, ὅταν διδῶμεν, δεῖ σκοπεῖν, οὐ μετὰ ταῦθʼ ὕστερον χρόνῳ παμπληθεῖ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τι μὴ δοῦναι γνώμῃ χρησαμένων ἔργον ἀνθρώπων ἐστί· τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἔχοντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι φθονούντων, τοῦτο δʼ οὐ δεῖ δοκεῖν ὑμᾶς πεπονθέναι.
57. Furthermore, on the question of merit I shall not shrink from saying this to you: I for one do not think that merit should be examined by the State in the same way as by an individual, because the examination is not concerned with the same questions. For in private life each of us tries to find who is worthy, say, to marry into our family, or something of that sort, and such questions are determined by convention and opinion; but in public affairs the State and the people try to find who is their benefactor and savior, and that question you will find is best decided by reference not to birth or opinion, but to plain fact. So, whenever we want to receive benefits, are we to allow anyone to confer them, but when we have received them, then shall we scrutinize the merits of the benefactor? That will be a topsy-turvy policy.
57. καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνʼ ὀκνήσω περὶ τῆς ἀξίας αὐτῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον νομίζω πόλει τὸν ἄξιον ἐξεταστέον εἶναι καὶ ἰδιώτῃ· οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἡ σκέψις. ἰδίᾳ μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν σκοπεῖ τίς ἄξιός ἐστιν ἑκάστου κηδεστὴς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τι γίγνεσθαι, ταῦτα δὲ καὶ νόμοις τισὶ καὶ δόξαις διώρισται· κοινῇ δʼ ἡ πόλις καὶ ὁ δῆμος, ὅστις ἂν αὐτὸν εὖ ποιῇ καὶ σῴζῃ, τοῦτο δʼ οὐ γένει καὶ δόξῃ κρινόμενον ἴδοι τις ἄν, ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν εὖ πάσχειν δέῃ, τὸν βουλόμενον εὖ ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐάσομεν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ πάθωμεν, τότε τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ ποιήσαντος σκεψόμεθα; οὐκ ἄρʼ ὀρθῶς βουλευσόμεθα.