---
title: "Against Timocrates · Κατὰ Τιμοκράτους"
author: "Demosthenes"
translator: "James Herbert Vince"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
section: 3 of 4
url: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-against-timocrates/3/
cite: "Demosthenes, tr. James Herbert Vince, Against Timocrates · Κατὰ Τιμοκράτους, section 3. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-against-timocrates/3/"
---

# Against Timocrates · Κατὰ Τιμοκράτους

*Demosthenes, tr. James Herbert Vince*

Against a law that would have let state debtors go free.

> Greek: ed. Samuel Henry Butcher, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0014.tlg024, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: James Herbert Vince, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0014.tlg024.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 3. Sections 109–162

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-against-timocrates/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-against-timocrates/3/#p-N

[¶0] 109. Further, you have also heard the statutes with which the defendant’s law is manifestly at variance; and you are aware that he has introduced it without repeal of those statutes. And you have certainly heard that the law is detrimental, for I have only just left off telling you so. Therefore he is unquestionably guilty on every count, and in nothing has he shown consideration or scruple; but, as it seems to me, if anything else had been forbidden by the existing statutes, he would have done that as well.

> Greek: 109. καὶ μὴν κἀκείνων ἠκούετε τῶν νόμων οἷς ἐναντίος ὢν ἐφαίνεθʼ ὁ τούτου· καὶ τούτους ὅτι πρὶν λῦσαι τόνδε τέθηκεν ἐπίστασθε. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γʼ οὐκ ἐπιτήδειος, ἀκηκόατε· ἄρτι γὰρ λέγων ἐπαυσάμην. οὐκοῦν κατὰ πάντʼ ἀδικεῖ φανερῶς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔσθʼ ὅ τι φροντίσας οὐδʼ εὐλαβηθεὶς φαίνεται, ἀλλʼ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, κἂν εἰ πρὸς τούτοις ἄλλο τι μὴ ποιεῖν ἐγέγραπτʼ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι νόμοις, κἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι.

[¶1] 110. From every point of view it is clear that he framed his proposals with a sinister purpose, and that he offends of malice prepense and not by error of judgement, especially as the character of his law is preserved down to the very last syllable. He proposed nothing that was right, nothing likely to be serviceable to you, even unintentionally. Surely you are bound to abhor and to punish a man who had no thought for wrongs done to the people, but enacted laws for the benefit of those who have injured you before and will injure you again.

> Greek: 110. πανταχόθεν μὲν τοίνυν δῆλός ἐσθʼ ὅτι ταῦτʼ ἔγραψʼ ἐπιβουλεύσας [μετὰ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι ταῦτʼ ἀδικεῖν] καὶ οὐ γνώμῃ διαμαρτών, μάλιστα δʼ ἐκ τοῦ πάντα τὸν νόμον μέχρι τῆς ὑστάτης συλλαβῆς τοιοῦτον εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδʼ ἄκων οὐδὲν ἔθηκεν ὀρθῶς ἔχον, οὐδʼ ὡς ὑμῖν ἔμελλε λυσιτελήσειν. πῶς οὖν οὐκ εἰκὸς μισεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι τοῦτον, ὅστις τοῦ μὲν δήμου ἠδικημένου ἠμέλησεν, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν ἠδικηκότων καὶ ὕστερον ἀδικησόντων τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν;

[¶2] 111. Gentlemen of the jury, I am amazed at the man’s effrontery. To think that, when he and Androtion were in office, he never had any compassion for the great body of your fellow-citizens, who were exhausted with paying income-tax, and that then when Androtion was called upon to refund money, both sacred and civil, which he had long before stolen from the State, he must needs propose a law to deprive you of the double repayment of civil, and the tenfold repayment of sacred, liabilities! Thus the whole mass of you citizens has been attacked by a man who was immediately afterwards to pretend that he had framed his law as a friend of the people.

> Greek: 111. θαυμάζω δʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τῆς ἀναιδείας αὐτοῦ, τὸ ἡνίκα μὲν ἦρχεν αὐτὸς μετʼ Ἀνδροτίωνος, τὸν ἔλεον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῷ πλήθει τῷ ὑμετέρῳ μὴ ποιήσασθαι, τῷ ἀπειρηκότι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ χρήματʼ εἰσφέροντι, ἐπειδὴ δʼ Ἀνδροτίωνʼ ἔδει ἃ πάλαι ὑφῄρητο τῆς πόλεως χρήματα καταθεῖναι, τὰ μὲν ἱερά, τὰ δʼ ὅσια, τότε θεῖναι τὸν νόμον ἐπʼ ἀποστερήσει τῶν μὲν ὁσίων τῆς διπλασίας, τῶν ἱερῶν δὲ τῆς δεκαπλασίας. καὶ οὕτω πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον προσενήνεκται ὁ αὐτίκα δὴ μάλʼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου φήσων τὸν νόμον τοῦτον θεῖναι.

[¶3] 112. In my view, no punishment could be too severe for a man who, when some market-clerk, or street-inspector, or judge of a local court,—some poor, unskilled man, without experience, and appointed to his office by lot,—has been found guilty of peculation at the audits, demands from him a tenfold restitution, and has no new law to propose for the relief of such delinquents, and then, when ambassadors, elected by vote of the people, men of substance, have embezzled and long retained large sums of money, the property in part of the temples, in part of the treasury, is at great pains to invent for them a way of escape from penalties ordained both by decree and by statute.

> Greek: 112. δικαίως δʼ ἂν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ παθεῖν ὁτιοῦν, ὅστις οἴεται δεῖν, εἰ μέν τις ἀγορανόμος ἢ ἀστυνόμος ἢ δικαστὴς κατὰ δήμους γενόμενος κλοπῆς ἐν ταῖς εὐθύναις ἑάλωκεν, ἄνθρωπος πένης καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πολλῶν ἄπειρος καὶ κληρωτὴν ἀρχὴν ἄρξας, τούτῳ μὲν τὴν δεκαπλασίαν εἶναι, καὶ νόμον οὐδένα τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐπικουροῦντα τίθησιν· εἰ δέ τινες πρέσβεις αἱρεθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, πλούσιοι ὄντες, ὑφείλοντο χρήματα πολλά, τὰ μὲν ἱερά, τὰ δʼ ὅσια, καὶ εἶχον χρόνον πολύν, τούτοις ὅπως μηδὲν πείσονται μήθʼ ὧν οἱ νόμοι μήθʼ ὧν τὰ ψηφίσματα προστάττει, μάλʼ ἀκριβῶς εὗρεν.

[¶4] 113. And yet Solon, gentlemen of the jury,—and even Timocrates cannot pretend to be a legislator of the same calibre as Solon,—so far from providing such defaulters with the means of swindling in security, actually introduced a law to ensure that they should either refrain from crime or be adequately punished. For a theft in day-time of more than fifty drachmas a man might be arrested summarily and put into custody of the Eleven. If he stole anything, however small, by night, the person aggrieved might lawfully pursue and kill or wound him, or else put him into the hands of the Eleven, at his own option. A man found guilty of an offence for which arrest is lawful was not allowed to put in bail and refund the stolen money; no, the penalty was death.

> Greek: 113. καίτοι γʼ ὁ Σόλων, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ᾧ οὐδʼ ἂν αὐτὸς Τιμοκράτης φήσειεν ὅμοιος νομοθέτης εἶναι, οὐχ ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς κακουργήσουσι φαίνεται παρασκευάζων τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἢ μὴ ἀδικήσουσιν ἢ δώσουσι δίκην ἀξίαν, καὶ νόμον εἰσήνεγκεν, εἰ μέν τις μεθʼ ἡμέραν ὑπὲρ πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς κλέπτοι, ἀπαγωγὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἕνδεκʼ εἶναι, εἰ δέ τις νύκτωρ ὁτιοῦν κλέπτοι, τοῦτον ἐξεῖναι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τρῶσαι διώκοντα καὶ ἀπαγαγεῖν τοῖς ἕνδεκα, εἰ βούλοιτο. τῷ δʼ ἁλόντι ὧν αἱ ἀπαγωγαί εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐγγυητὰς καταστήσαντι ἔκτισιν εἶναι τῶν κλεμμάτων, ἀλλὰ θάνατον τὴν ζημίαν.

[¶5] 114. Or suppose that he stole a cloak, or an oil-flask, or any such trifle, from the Lyceum, or the Academy, or Cynosarges, or any utensil from the gymnasia or the harbors, above the value of ten drachmas, for such thefts also Solon enacted the capital penalty. If a man was found guilty on a private prosecution for theft, while the normal penalty was double reparation, the court was empowered to add to the fine the extra penalty of imprisonment for five days and as many nights, so that everybody might see the thief in jail. You heard those laws read not long ago.

> Greek: 114. καὶ εἴ τίς γʼ ἐκ Λυκείου ἢ ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας ἢ ἐκ Κυνοσάργους ἱμάτιον ἢ ληκύθιον ἢ ἄλλο τι φαυλότατον, ἢ εἰ τῶν σκευῶν τι τῶν ἐκ τῶν γυμνασίων ὑφέλοιτο ἢ ἐκ τῶν λιμένων, ὑπὲρ δέκα δραχμάς, καὶ τούτοις θάνατον ἐνομοθέτησεν εἶναι τὴν ζημίαν. εἰ δέ τις ἰδίαν δίκην κλοπῆς ἁλοίη, ὑπάρχειν μὲν αὐτῷ διπλάσιον ἀποτεῖσαι τὸ τιμηθέν, προστιμῆσαι δʼ ἐξεῖναι τῷ δικαστηρίῳ πρὸς τῷ ἀργυρίῳ δεσμὸν τῷ κλέπτῃ, πένθʼ ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ἴσας, ὅπως ὁρῷεν ἅπαντες αὐτὸν δεδεμένον. καὶ τούτων ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ἠκούσατε τῶν νόμων.

[¶6] 115. Solon’s view was that the doer of infamous deeds ought not to get off with mere repayment of the money stolen; for it seemed to him that there would be no lack of thieves on such terms,—if they had the chance of keeping their booty if undetected, and of simply restoring it if caught. They must pay double; they must be imprisoned as well as fined, and so live in disgrace for the rest of their lives. Not so Timocrates; he made arrangements for a simple, instead of a double, reparation, and for no sort of additional penalty.

> Greek: 115. ᾤετο γὰρ δεῖν τόν γε τὰ αἴσχρʼ ἔργʼ ἐργαζόμενον μὴ ἃ ὑφείλετο μόνον ἀποδόντʼ ἀπηλλάχθαι (πολλοὶ γὰρ [ἂν] αὐτῷ ἐδόκουν οὕτω γʼ οἱ κλέπται ἔσεσθαι, εἰ μέλλοιεν λαθόντες μὲν ἕξειν, μὴ λαθόντες δʼ αὐτὰ μόνον καταθήσειν), ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν διπλάσια καταθεῖναι, δεθέντα δὲ πρὸς τούτῳ τῷ τιμήματι ἐν αἰσχύνῃ ζῆν ἤδη τὸν ἄλλον βίον. ἀλλʼ οὐ Τιμοκράτης, ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἁπλᾶ μέν, ἃ δεῖ διπλάσια, καταθήσουσιν παρεσκεύασε, μηδʼ ὁτιοῦν δʼ ἐπιτίμιον ἔσται πρὸς τούτοις.

[¶7] 116. Nor was he content to be guilty of this iniquity in respect of future offences only; he released even the man who had already committed his crime, and already been punished. I, however, used to suppose that legislators were concerned with the future, making laws to direct how people should behave, how every thing should he managed, and what should be the proper penalties for different transgressions. That is what is meant by making the laws the same for all citizens. To frame statutes for past transactions is not to legislate, but to rescue malefactors.

> Greek: 116. καὶ οὐκ ἀπέχρησεν ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων αὐτῷ ταῦτʼ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴ τις ἄρʼ ἠδικηκὼς καὶ κεκολασμένος ἦν, καὶ τοῦτον ἀφῆκεν. καίτοι ἔγωγʼ ᾤμην δεῖν τὸν νομοθετοῦντα περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, οἷα δεῖ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὡς ἕκαστʼ ἔχειν, καὶ τὰς τιμωρίας ὁποίας τινὰς ἐφʼ ἑκάστοις δεῖ τοῖς ἀδικήμασιν εἶναι, περὶ τούτων νομοθετεῖν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐφʼ ἅπασι τοῖς πολίταις κοινοὺς τοὺς νόμους τιθέναι. τὸ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων πραγμάτων νόμους γράφειν, οὐ νομοθετεῖν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας σῴζειν.

[¶8] 117. You may judge that what I am telling you is true by reflecting that, if Euctemon had been convicted on the charge of illegal legislation, Timocrates would never have proposed his law, and the State would never have wanted his law; his friends would have been content to plunder the property of the State, without any concern for other people. But in fact Euctemon was acquitted and therefore Timocrates demands that your decision, the judgement of the court, and every other statute shall be invalidated, and that he and his law shall alone be authoritative.

> Greek: 117. σκοπεῖτε δʼ ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἐκ τωνδί. εἰ μὲν γὰρ Εὐκτήμων ἑάλω τὴν τῶν παρανόμων γραφήν, οὐκ ἂν ἔθηκε τοῦτον τὸν νόμον [ὁ] Τιμοκράτης, οὐδʼ ἂν ἐδεῖθʼ ἡ πόλις τούτου τοῦ νόμου, ἀλλʼ ἐξήρκει ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀπεστερηκόσι τὴν πόλιν τὰ χρήματα τῶν ἄλλων μὴ φροντίζειν. νῦν δʼ, ἐπειδὴ ἀπέφυγεν, τὸ μὲν ὑμέτερον δόγμα καὶ τὴν τοῦ δικαστηρίου ψῆφον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νόμους ἀκύρους οἴεται δεῖν εἶναι, αὑτὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ νόμον κύριον.

[¶9] 118. —And yet, Timocrates, laws which are still authoritative have given supreme authority to the gentlemen of the jury. The laws permit them, after hearing the case, to adjust their condemnation of the offender to their view of the gravity of the offence; light for light, heavy for heavy. Whenever the phrase is, “what penalty, corporal or pecuniary, should be awarded,” the award is at the discretion of the jury.

> Greek: 118. καίτοι, ὦ Τιμόκρατες, οἱ μὲν ὄντες ἡμῖν κύριοι νόμοι τουτουσὶ ποιοῦσι κυρίους ἁπάντων, καὶ διδόασιν αὐτοῖς ἀκούσασιν, ὁποῖον ἄν τι νομίζωσι τἀδίκημα, τοιαύτῃ περὶ τοῦ ἠδικηκότος χρῆσθαι τῇ ὀργῇ, μέγα μεγάλῃ, μικρὸν μικρᾷ. ὅταν γὰρ ᾖ ὅ τι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, τὸ τιμᾶν ἐπὶ τούτοις γίγνεται.

[¶10] 119. You, then, abolish the corporal penalty by remitting imprisonment. For whom? For thieves and temple-robbers, for parricides, murderers, shirkers, and deserters. All such men you protect by your law. And yet does not a man who, under a free constitution, legislates, not to protect the temples, not to protect the people, but to protect such people as I have named, deserve to suffer the extreme penalty?

> Greek: 119. σὺ τοίνυν τὸ παθεῖν ἀφαιρεῖς τὸν δεσμὸν ἀφιείς· καὶ ταῦτα τίσιν; τοῖς κλέπταις, τοῖς ἱεροσύλοις, τοῖς πατραλοίαις, τοῖς ἀνδροφόνοις, τοῖς ἀστρατεύτοις, τοῖς λιποῦσι τὰς τάξεις· τούτους γὰρ πάντας σῴζεις τῷ νόμῳ. καίτοι ὅστις ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ νομοθετῶν μήθʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶν μήθʼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου νομοθετεῖ, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ ὧν εἶπον ἀρτίως, πῶς οὐ δίκαιός ἐστι τῆς ἐσχάτης τιμωρίας τυχεῖν;

[¶11] 120. —Certainly he cannot deny that such people ought to be, and that the laws make them, liable to the heaviest punishments. Neither can he deny that the men for whose protection he has invented his law are thieves and temple-robbers; for the have robbed the temples of the ten per cent due to Athena and of the two per cent due to the other gods; they keep the money in their own pockets instead of making restitution, and they have stolen the public share, which belonged to you. Their sacrilege differs from other forms of sacrilege to this extent,—that they never even paid the money into the Acropolis as they ought.

> Greek: 120. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐρεῖ γʼ ὡς τοὺς τοιούτους οὐ καὶ προσήκει καὶ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν ταῖς μεγίσταις τιμωρίαις ἐνόχους εἶναι, οὐδʼ ὡς οὗτοι, ὑπὲρ ὧν εὕρηκε τὸν νόμον, οὐ καὶ κλέπται καὶ ἱερόσυλοί εἰσιν, τὰ μὲν ἱερά, τὰς δεκάτας τῆς θεοῦ καὶ τὰς πεντηκοστὰς τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν, σεσυληκότες καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποδοῦναι αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, τὰ δʼ ὅσια, ἃ ἐγίγνετο ὑμέτερα, κεκλοφότες. διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν ἡ ἱεροσυλία τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδʼ ἀνήνεγκαν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, δέον αὐτούς.

[¶12] 121. As Heaven is my witness, gentlemen of the jury, I believe Androtion became the victim of this arrogant, overbearing temper, not by accident, but by the visitation of the gods, to the end that, as the mutilators of the statue of Victory perished by their own hands, so these men should perish by litigation among themselves, and should either make tenfold restitution, as the laws direct, or be cast into prison.

> Greek: 121. οἶμαι δέ, νὴ τὸν Δία τὸν Ὀλύμπιον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὐκ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου τὴν ὕβριν καὶ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν ἐπελθεῖν Ἀνδροτίωνι, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τῆς θεοῦ ἐπιπεμφθεῖσαν, ἵνʼ, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ἀκρωτήρια τῆς Νίκης περικόψαντες ἀπώλοντʼ αὐτοὶ ὑφʼ αὑτῶν, οὕτω καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς δικαζόμενοι ἀπόλοιντο, καὶ τὰ χρήματα καταθεῖεν δεκαπλάσια κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἢ δεθεῖεν.

[¶13] 122. I should like to make an observation about his law which occurred to my mind while I was speaking about these matters,—something quite out of the common, indeed surprisingly so. The defendant, gentlemen of the jury, has proposed that the penalty inflicted upon farmers of taxes, if they did not pay their dues, should be in accordance with the earlier statutes, in which the penalty provided is imprisonment and double restitution for men who, in consequence of losses on their contract, might possibly do the State a wrong unintentionally. On the other hand, he abolishes imprisonment for men who steal the property of the State and rob the temples of the Goddess.—If you tell us, Timocrates, that the latter are guilty of a less serious offence than the former, you must admit that you are out of your senses; and if you think their offence more serious, as indeed it is, and yet release them and refuse to release the others, is it not evident that you have sold your services to these men for a bribe?

> Greek: 122. βούλομαι δʼ ὑμῖν, ὃ μεταξὺ λέγων περὶ τούτων ἐνεθυμήθην, εἰπεῖν περὶ οὗ τέθηκε νόμου, παράδοξόν τι, θαυμαστὸν ἡλίκον. οὗτος γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοῖς μὲν τὰ τέλη ὠνουμένοις ἔγραψε τὰς τιμωρίας εἶναι, εἰ μὴ καταβάλοιεν τὰ χρήματα, κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς προτέρους, ἐν οἷς καὶ ὁ δεσμὸς καὶ ἡ διπλασία γέγραπται, ἀνθρώποις οἳ διὰ τὸ ζημιοῦσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ ὠνῇ ἄκοντες ἔμελλον τὴν πόλιν ἀδικήσειν· τοῖς δʼ ὑφαιρουμένοις τὰ τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἱεροσυλοῦσι τὰ τῆς θεοῦ τὸν δεσμὸν ἀφεῖλεν. καίτοι εἰ μὲν ἐλάττω τούτους ἀδικεῖν ἐκείνων νομίσαι φήσεις, ἀνάγκη μαίνεσθαί σʼ ὁμολογεῖν, εἰ δὲ μείζω νομίζων, ὥσπερ ἔστιν, [ἐκεῖνα τἀδικήματα] τοὺς μὲν ἀφίης, τοὺς δὲ μή, οὐκ ἤδη δῆλος εἶ πεπρακὼς τὸ πρᾶγμα τούτοις;

[¶14] 123. Another remark worth making, gentlemen of the jury, is that you are far more magnanimous than the politicians. Anyhow you do not repeal the harsh enactments made against the common people,—against those, for instance, who take fees from both parties, or attend the Assembly or sit on a jury while in debt to the treasury, or do anything else forbidden by the laws,—although you know that any man who commits one of these offences may do so because he is poor. You do not enact laws to give liberty of transgression, but rather to take it away. They, on the other hand, make laws to rescue from punishment persons guilty of the most infamous and outrageous misconduct.

> Greek: 123. ἄξιον τοίνυν καὶ τοῦτʼ εἰπεῖν, ὅσον ὑμεῖς διαφέρετʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, μεγαλοφροσύνῃ τῶν ῥητόρων. ὑμεῖς μέν γε τἀπὶ τῷ πλήθει νενομοθετημένα δεινά, ἐάν τις ἢ διχόθεν μισθοφορῇ ἢ ὀφείλων τῷ δημοσίῳ ἐκκλησιάζῃ ἢ δικάζῃ, ἢ ἄλλο τι ποιῇ ὧν οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν, οὐ λύετε, καὶ ταῦτʼ εἰδότες ὅτι διὰ πενίαν ⟨ἂν⟩ ποιήσειεν ὁ τούτων τι ποιῶν, οὐδὲ νόμους τοιούτους τίθεσθʼ ὅπως ἐξουσία ἔσται ἐξαμαρτεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ὅπως μή· οὗτοι δʼ, ὅπως οἱ τὰ αἴσχιστα καὶ τὰ δεινότατα ποιοῦντες δίκην μὴ δώσουσιν.

[¶15] 124. And then in private they talk insultingly about you, as though they were superior persons, though they are really behaving like ill-conditioned, ungrateful servants. Servants who have been manumitted, you know, gentlemen of the jury, are never grateful to their masters for their liberation, but hate them more bitterly than they hate anyone else, as sharing in the secret of their former servitude. In the same spirit politicians are not satisfied with having risen from poverty to affluence at the expense of the City, but calumniate the common people,—because the common people know what their style of life was when they were young and poor.

> Greek: 124. εἶτα προπηλακίζουσιν ὑμᾶς ἰδίᾳ τοῖς λόγοις, ὡς αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί, πονηρῶν καὶ ἀχαρίστων οἰκετῶν τρόπους ἔχοντες. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὅσοι ἂν ἐλεύθεροι γένωνται, οὐ τῆς ἐλευθερίας χάριν ἔχουσι τοῖς δεσπόταις, ἀλλὰ μισοῦσι μάλιστʼ ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι συνίσασιν αὐτοῖς δουλεύσασιν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ οὗτοι οἱ ῥήτορες οὐκ ἀγαπῶσιν ἐκ πενήτων πλούσιοι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως γιγνόμενοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ προπηλακίζουσι τὸ πλῆθος, ὅτι σύνοιδεν αὐτῶν ἑκάστῳ τὰ ἐν τῇ πενίᾳ καὶ νεότητι ἐπιτηδεύματα.

[¶16] 125. But it would perhaps, as he may suggest, have been a great shame for Androtion to be sent to prison, or for Glaucetes, or Melanopus. No, indeed, gentlemen of the jury! It will be a far greater shame if an injured and insulted commonwealth shall exact no retribution for the Goddess or for itself. Does not imprisonment run in Androtion’s family? Why, you know yourselves that his father often went to jail for five years at a stretch; and then he was not discharged—he ran away.

> Greek: 125. ἀλλὰ νὴ Δίʼ αἰσχρὸν ἴσως ἦν Ἀνδροτίωνα δεθῆναι ἢ Γλαυκέτην ἢ Μελάνωπον. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἀλλὰ πολὺ αἴσχιον τὴν πόλιν ἀδικουμένην καὶ ὑβριζομένην μὴ λαβεῖν δίκην καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς θεοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ αὑτῆς. ἐπεὶ Ἀνδροτίωνί γε πότερʼ οὐ πατρῷον τὸ δεδέσθαι; ἀλλʼ αὐτοὶ ἴστε πολλὰς πεντετηρίδας ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ διατρίψαντα τὸν πατέρʼ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀποδράντα, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀφεθέντα.

[¶17] 126. Or has he earned forgiveness by his conduct in youth? Why, he deserves imprisonment for that conduct just as much as for his embezzlements. Do you mean because he frequented the market-place before he was qualified, and with his own hands haled men of respectable life from the market-place to the jail? But there is Melanopus, you say, and what a dreadful thing it would be if Melanopus were committed to prison today!

> Greek: 126. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τὰ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ; ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δεδέσθαι αὐτῷ οὐχ ἧττον προσήκει ἢ διʼ ἅπερ ὑφείλετο. ἢ ὅτι εἰσῄει εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἐξὸν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τοὺς σωφρόνως βεβιωκότας αὐτὸς ἦγεν εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον; ἀλλὰ Μελάνωπος δεινὸν νὴ Δίʼ ἐστὶν εἰ δεθήσεσθαι νῦν ἔμελλεν.

[¶18] 127. Well, about his father I will say nothing disrespectful; though I could tell you a long story about thieving,—however, so far as I am concerned, let his father be worthy of all the compliments that Timocrates may lavish upon him. But suppose that the son of this virtuous father was himself a rascal and a thief; suppose that he once paid a fine of three talents on conviction for treason; suppose that, after he had sat in the Allied Congress, the court found him guilty of embezzlement, and ordered him to make tenfold restitution; suppose that he played false when he went on embassy to Egypt; suppose that he swindled his own brothers—does he not deserve imprisonment all the more if his father was virtuous, and he is what he is? For my part, I fancy that, if Laches really was virtuous and patriotic, he should himself have sent his degenerate son to jail for implicating him in such infamous scandals. However, let us pass Melanopus by, and fix our gaze upon Glaucetes.

> Greek: 127. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἂν φλαῦρον εἴποιμι, οὐδʼ εἰ πάνυ πόλλʼ ἔχω περὶ κλοπῆς λέγειν, ἀλλʼ ἔστω ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖνός γε τοιοῦτος οἷον ἂν Τιμοκράτης αὐτὸν ἐγκωμιάσειεν. ἀλλʼ εἰ χρηστοῦ πατρὸς ὢν πονηρὸς καὶ κλέπτης ἦν, καὶ προδοσίας γʼ ἁλοὺς τρία τάλαντʼ ἀπέτεισε, καὶ συνέδρου γενομένου κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ τὸ δικαστήριον κατέγνω καὶ δεκαπλάσιον ἀπέτεισεν, καὶ παρεπρεσβεύσατʼ εἰς Αἴγυπτον, καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἠδίκει, οὐ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον αὐτὸν ἔδει δεδέσθαι, εἰ χρηστοῦ πατρὸς ὢν τοιοῦτος ἦν; οἶμαι γὰρ ἔγωγε, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι χρηστὸς ἦν Λάχης καὶ φιλόπολις, ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ ἂν ἐκείνου δεθῆναι αὐτὸν τοιοῦτόν γʼ ὄντα καὶ οὕτως αἰσχροῖς ὀνείδεσιν περιβάλλοντʼ ἐκεῖνον. καὶ τοῦτον μὲν δὴ ἐῶμεν, Γλαυκέτην δὲ σκεψώμεθα.

[¶19] 128. Was not he the man who first ran away to Deceleia, and, with Deceleia as his base, overran and harried your country? But you all know that. Was it not he who scrupulously paid to the Spartan governor at that place tithes due upon your wives and children and all the rest of his booty;

> Greek: 128. οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς Δεκέλειαν αὐτομολήσας, κἀκεῖθεν ὁρμώμενος καταθέων καὶ φέρων καὶ ἄγων ὑμᾶς; ἀλλὰ πάντες ἴστε ταῦτα. καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ὑμετέρων παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χρημάτων ὅσα λάβοι, δεκάτας ἐκεῖ τῷ ἁρμοστῇ κατατιθεὶς τούτων ἀκριβῶς, τὴν δέ γʼ ἐνθάδε θεόν, πρεσβευτὴς ἀξιωθεὶς εἶναι ὑφʼ ὑμῶν, ἀποστερῶν τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων πολεμίων δεκάτας;

[¶20] 129. and yet, when you had honored him with the office of ambassador, robbed the Goddess at Athens of her tithe of the plunder he took from your enemies? Was it not he who, being appointed treasurer at the Acropolis, stole from that place those prizes of victory which our ancestors carried off from the barbarians, the throne with silver feet, and Mardonius’s scimitar, which weighed three hundred darics? These exploits, however, are so celebrated that they are known to everybody. But in everything else is he not a man of violence? Aye, he has no equal for that.

> Greek: 129. ἔπειτα ταμιεύσας ἐν ἀκροπόλει τἀριστεῖα τῆς πόλεως ἃ ἔλαβεν ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ὑφῃρημένος ἐξ ἀκροπόλεως, τόν τε δίφρον τὸν ἀργυρόποδα καὶ τὸν ἀκινάκην τὸν Μαρδονίου, ὃς ἦγε τριακοσίους δαρεικούς; ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γʼ οὕτω περιφανῆ ἐστιν ὥστε πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰδέναι.

[¶21] 130. Is it right, then, that you should deal tenderly with any one of them, and disregard for their sakes the tithes of Athena or the double repayment of public moneys? Is it right to leave unpunished the man who is exerting himself to save them? What is there, gentlemen, to prevent everybody turning knave, if knavery is to be profitable? Nothing that I can see.

> Greek: 130. ἀλλὰ τἄλλʼ οὐ βίαιος; ὡς οὐδείς γʼ ἀνθρώπων. εἶτα φείσασθαί τινος αὐτῶν ἄξιόν ἐστιν, ὥστε διὰ τούτους ἢ τῶν δεκατῶν τῶν τῆς θεοῦ ἀμελῆσαι ἢ τῆς διπλασίας τῶν ὁσίων χρημάτων, ἢ τὸν τούτους πειρώμενον σῴζειν μὴ τιμωρήσασθαι; καὶ τί κωλύσει ἅπαντας εἶναι πονηρούς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰ διὰ ταῦτα πλέον ἕξουσιν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι οὐδέν.

[¶22] 131. You must punish crime, not encourage it by your own teaching. Do not let them make a grievance of going to prison with your money in their pockets, but bring them under the yoke of law. People convicted under the alien acts do not think themselves aggrieved when they are kept in yonder building until the trial for false evidence is over; they simply stay there without expecting to get the freedom of the streets by putting in bail.

> Greek: 131. μὴ τοίνυν αὐτοὶ διδάσκετε, ἀλλὰ τιμωρεῖσθε. καὶ μὴ ἐᾶτʼ ἀγανακτεῖν εἰ δεθήσονται ἔχοντες τὰ ὑμέτερα ἀλλʼ ἄγετʼ αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ τοὺς νόμους. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ τῆς ξενίας ἁλισκόμενοι ἀγανακτοῦσιν ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι τούτῳ ὄντες, ἕως ἂν τῶν ψευδομαρτυριῶν ἀγωνίσωνται, ἀλλὰ μένουσιν καὶ οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν ἐγγυητὰς καταστήσαντες περιιέναι.

[¶23] 132. The commonwealth, having decided to distrust them, did not choose to be cheated of retribution by the process of putting in bail, but preferred that they should stay in a place where many genuine Athenians have sojourned. Yet. people have been imprisoned there before now both for debt and on judgement, and have taken it quietly. Perhaps it is rather invidious to mention names, but I cannot help giving you a list for comparison with the men before you.

> Greek: 132. ἔδοξε γὰρ τῇ πόλει ἀπιστεῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὐκ ᾤετο δεῖν διακρουσθῆναι τῆς τιμωρίας διʼ ἐγγυητῶν καταστάσεως, ἀλλʼ ἐνταῦθα μένειν αὐτοὺς οὗ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν. καίτοι καὶ ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἤδη τινὲς ἐδέθησαν καὶ ἐπὶ κρίσεσιν, ἀλλʼ ὅμως ὑπέμενον. ἀηδὲς μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἐστὶν ὀνομαστὶ περί τινων μεμνῆσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ παρεξετάσαι αὐτοὺς παρὰ τούτους.

[¶24] 133. I will not mention very ancient instances, or any earlier than the archonship of Eucleides; but I must observe that many men, who in their own generation were highly esteemed for their earlier conduct, were nevertheless most severely treated by the People for the offences of their later life. The commonwealth was not content with a period of honesty followed by knavery, but expected uninterrupted honesty in public dealings. The previous honesty of such a person was not, in their view, attributable to innate virtue; it was part of a scheme to attract confidence.

> Greek: 133. τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸ Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος ἐάσω καὶ τοὺς σφόδρα παλαιούς. καίτοι κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους οὓς ἕκαστοι αὐτῶν ἦσαν, πολλοῦ ἄξιοι δοκοῦντες γεγενῆσθαι τὸν ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον ὅμως ἰσχυρᾶς παρὰ τοῦ δήμου ὀργῆς ἐτύγχανον ἐπὶ τοῖς ὕστερον γιγνομένοις ἀδικήμασιν· οὐ γὰρ χρόνον τινὰ δικαίους ᾤετο δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἡ πόλις εἶναι, εἶτα κλέπτας, ἀλλὰ περί γε τὰ κοίνʼ ἀεὶ δικαίους· ἐδόκει γὰρ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον οὐ φύσει, ἀλλʼ ἐπιβουλεύων, τοῦ πιστευθῆναι, δίκαιος γεγονέναι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος.

[¶25] 134. But after the archonship of Eucleides, gentlemen of the jury, first, you all remember that the well-known Thrasybulus of Colyttus was twice imprisoned and condemned at both his trials before the Assembly; and yet he was one of the heroes of the march from Phyle and Peiraeus. Then there was Philepsius of Lamptra. Next take Agyrrhius of Colyttus, a good man, a liberal politician, and an ardent defender of popular rights;

> Greek: 134. ἀλλὰ μετʼ Εὐκλείδην ἄρχοντʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, πρῶτον μὲν Θρασύβουλον τὸν Κολλυτέα πάντες μέμνησθε δὶς δεθέντα καὶ κριθέντʼ ἀμφοτέρας τὰς κρίσεις ἐν τῷ δήμῳ· καίτοι τῶν ἐκ Πειραιῶς κἀπὸ Φυλῆς οὗτος ἦν. ἔπειτα Φιλέψιον τὸν Λαμπτρέα. ἔπειτʼ Ἀγύρριον τὸν Κολλυτέα, ἄνδρα χρηστὸν καὶ δημοτικὸν καὶ περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον πολλὰ σπουδάσαντα·

[¶26] 135. and yet even he admitted that the laws must be as binding upon him as upon people without influence, and he stayed in that building for many years, until he had repaid the money in his possession which was adjudged to be public property; nor did Callistratus, who was in power, and who was his nephew, try to make new laws to meet his particular case. Or take Myronides; he was the son of that Archinus who occupied Phyle, and whom, after the gods, we have chiefly to thank for the restoration of popular government, and who had achieved success on many occasions both as statesman and as commander.

> Greek: 135. ἀλλʼ ὅμως τοὺς νόμους ᾤετο δεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος ὁμοίως, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις, οὕτω καὶ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ἰσχύειν, καὶ ἐγένετʼ ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι τούτῳ πόλλʼ ἔτη, ἕως τὰ χρήματα ἀπέτεισεν ἃ ἔδοξε τῆς πόλεως ὄντʼ ἔχειν· καὶ ἐπʼ ἐκείνῳ Καλλίστρατος δυνάμενος καὶ ἀδελφιδοῦς ὢν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐτίθει νόμους. καὶ Μυρωνίδης ὁ Ἀρχίνου υἱός, τοῦ καταλαβόντος Φυλὴν καὶ μετά γε τοὺς θεοὺς αἰτιωτάτου ὄντος τῆς καθόδου τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ πεπολιτευμένου καὶ ἐστρατηγηκότος πολλάκις.

[¶27] 136. In spite of their merits, these men all submitted to the laws. Again, the treasurers of Athena and of the other gods, during whose term the Inner Treasury was burned down, were lodged in yonder building pending their trial; so too were the persons suspected of the corn-market frauds, and many others, gentlemen of the jury,—all better men than Androtion.

> Greek: 136. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἅπαντες οὗτοι ὑπέμενον τοὺς νόμους. καὶ οἱ ταμίαι ἐφʼ ὧν ὁ Ὀπισθόδομος ἐνεπρήσθη, καὶ οἱ τῶν τῆς θεοῦ καὶ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν, ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι τούτῳ ἦσαν, ἕως ἡ κρίσις αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο. καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν σῖτον ἀδικεῖν δόξαντες, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, πάντες βελτίους Ἀνδροτίωνος ὄντες.

[¶28] 137. Then if it was right that for them the old-established laws should be operative, and that they should be punished in accordance with the existing laws, can it be right that for the sake of Androtion, Glaucetes, and Melanopus, a brand-new statute should be made,—for men who have been found guilty and condemned by verdict in pursuance of old-established laws, and who are declared to be detaining sacred and public moneys? Will not Athens be a laughing-stock if she is discovered enacting laws for the deliverance of temple robbers?

> Greek: 137. εἶτα τούτοις μὲν ἔδει κυρίους τοὺς πάλαι κειμένους νόμους εἶναι, καὶ δεδωκέναι δίκην αὐτοὺς κατὰ τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας νόμους· διʼ Ἀνδροτίωνα δὲ καὶ Γλαυκέτην καὶ Μελάνωπον καινὸν δεῖ γενέσθαι νόμον, διὰ τοὺς ἑαλωκότας καὶ ψήφῳ κεκριμένους κατὰ τοὺς πάλαι κειμένους νόμους καὶ δόξαντας ἔχειν ἱερὰ χρήματα καὶ ὅσια; εἶτʼ οὐ καταγέλαστος δόξει ἡ πόλις εἶναι, εἰ τοῖς ἱεροσύλοις, ὅπως σωθήσονται, νόμον φανεῖται τιθεμένη; ἔγωγʼ οἶμαι.

[¶29] 138. So I should say. Then do not tolerate any insult to yourselves or to the State. Remember how, no longer ago than the archonship of Evander, you put Eudemus of Cydathenaeum to death, because you held him to have proposed an objectionable statute; and that you were within an ace also of putting to death Philip, the son of Philip the ship-owner, but, by a very small majority, you accepted his own counter-assessment of the penalty, and made him pay a very heavy fine. Treat the defendant today in the same spirit of severity. And there is another consideration for you to bear in mind,—how injuriously you would have been treated by Timocrates, if he alone had been your ambassador. I really believe that there is nothing from which such a fellow would have kept his hands. Have regard also to the disposition of the man; for the law which he has had the audacity to propose is significant of his character.

> Greek: 138. μὴ τοίνυν ἐάσηθʼ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὑβρίζεσθαι μηδὲ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ μνησθέντες ὅτι Εὔδημον τὸν Κυδαθηναιᾶ νόμον δόξαντα θεῖναι οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον, οὐ πάλαι ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ Εὐάνδρου ἄρχοντος ἀπεκτείνατε, καὶ Φίλιππον τὸν Φιλίππου τοῦ ναυκλήρου υἱὸν μικροῦ μὲν ἀπεκτείνατε, χρημάτων δὲ πολλῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου ἀντιτιμωμένου παρʼ ὀλίγας ψήφους ἐτιμήσατε, ταύτην τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ τουτονὶ λάβετε, ἐκεῖνο πρὸς τούτοις ἅπασιν ἐνθυμηθέντες, τί ποτʼ ἂν ἐπάθετε ὑπὸ τούτου αὐτοῦ, εἰ οὗτος εἷς ὢν ἐπρέσβευεν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν. οἶμαι γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν εἶναι ὅτου ἂν ἀπέσχετο. ὁρᾶτε δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν αὐτοῦ· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὃν ἐτόλμησε θεῖναι τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ δείκνυσιν.

[¶30] 139. I should like, gentlemen of the jury, to give you a description of the method of legislation among the Locrians. It will do you no harm to hear an example, especially one set by a well-governed community. In that country the people are so strongly of opinion that it is right to observe old-established laws, to preserve the institutions of their forefathers, and never to legislate for the gratification of whims, or for a compromise with transgression, that if a man wishes to propose a new law, he legislates with a halter round his neck. If the law is accepted as good and beneficial, the proposer departs with his life, but, if not, the halter is drawn tight, and he is a dead man.

> Greek: 139. βούλομαι δʼ ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐν Λοκροῖς ὡς νομοθετοῦσι διηγήσασθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ χείρους ἔσεσθε παράδειγμά τι ἀκηκοότες, ἄλλως τε καὶ ᾧ πόλις εὐνομουμένη χρῆται. ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὕτως οἴονται δεῖν τοῖς πάλαι κειμένοις χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ τὰ πάτρια περιστέλλειν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὰς βουλήσεις μηδὲ πρὸς τὰς διαδύσεις τῶν ἀδικημάτων νομοθετεῖσθαι, ὥστʼ ἄν τις βούληται νόμον καινὸν τιθέναι, ἐν βρόχῳ τὸν τράχηλον ἔχων νομοθετεῖ, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δόξῃ καλὸς καὶ χρήσιμος εἶναι ὁ νόμος, ζῇ ὁ τιθεὶς καὶ ἀπέρχεται, εἰ δὲ μή, τέθνηκεν ἐπισπασθέντος τοῦ βρόχου.

[¶31] 140. In very truth they are not bold enough to propose new laws, but punctually obey the old ones. And, during quite a long series of years, we are told, gentlemen of the jury, that they have enacted only one new statute. They had a law in that country that, if any one destroyed his neighbor’s eye, he must submit to the destruction of one of his own eyes; and there was no alternative of a fine. The story goes that a man, whose enemy had only one eye, threatened to knock that one eye out.

> Greek: 140. καὶ γάρ τοι καινοὺς μὲν οὐ τολμῶσι τίθεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ πάλαι κειμένοις ἀκριβῶς χρῶνται. καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς δὲ πάνυ ἔτεσιν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἷς λέγεται παρʼ αὐτοῖς νόμος καινὸς τεθῆναι. ὄντος γὰρ αὐτόθι νόμου, ἐάν τις ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκόψῃ, ἀντεκκόψαι παρασχεῖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ οὐ χρημάτων τιμήσεως οὐδεμιᾶς, ἀπειλῆσαί τις λέγεται ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρῷ ἕνʼ ἔχοντι ὀφθαλμὸν ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἐκκόψει τοῦτον τὸν ἕνα.

[¶32] 141. The one-eyed man was much perturbed by the threat, and, reflecting that his life would not be worth keeping after such a loss as that, he plucked up courage, as we are told, to introduce a law that whosoever struck out the eye of a man who had only one, should submit to the loss of both his own eyes, in order that both might suffer the same affliction. And that, according to the story, is the only new statute adopted by the Locrians for more than two hundred years.

> Greek: 141. γενομένης δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀπειλῆς χαλεπῶς ἐνεγκὼν ὁ ἑτερόφθαλμος, καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀβίωτον αὑτῷ [εἶναι] τὸν βίον τοῦτο παθόντι, λέγεται τολμῆσαι νόμον εἰσενεγκεῖν, ἐάν τις ἕνα ἔχοντος ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκόψῃ, ἄμφω ἀντεκκόψαι παρασχεῖν, ἵνα τῇ ἴσῃ συμφορᾷ ἀμφότεροι χρῶνται. καὶ τοῦτον μόνον λέγονται Λοκροὶ θέσθαι τὸν νόμον ἐν πλεῖν ἢ διακοσίοις ἔτεσιν.

[¶33] 142. But in this city, gentlemen of the jury, our politicians rarely let a month go by without legislating to suit their private ends. When in office they are always haling private citizens to jail; but they disapprove of the application of the same measure of justice to themselves. They arbitrarily repeal those well-tried laws of Solon, enacted by their forefathers, and expect you to obey laws of their own, proposed to the detriment of the community.

> Greek: 142. οἱ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῖν ῥήτορες, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, πρῶτον μὲν ὅσοι μῆνες μικροῦ δέουσι νομοθετεῖν τὰ αὑτοῖς συμφέροντα, ἔπειτʼ αὐτοὶ μὲν τοὺς ἰδιώτας εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἄγουσιν ὅταν ἄρχωσιν, ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῖς δʼ οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν ταὐτὸ δίκαιον τοῦτʼ εἶναι· ἔπειτα τοὺς μὲν τοῦ Σόλωνος νόμους τοὺς πάλαι δεδοκιμασμένους, οὓς οἱ πρόγονοι ἔθεντο, λύουσιν αὐτοί, τοῖς δʼ ἑαυτῶν, οὓς ἐπʼ ἀδικίᾳ τῆς πόλεως τιθέασιν, χρῆσθαι ὑμᾶς οἴονται δεῖν.

[¶34] 143. If, then, you decline to punish the men before you, in a very little time the People will be in slavery to those beasts of prey. But you may be sure, gentle men of the jury, that, if you are really very angry with them, their ferocity will soon be mitigated. If not, you will have plenty of ruffians to insult you under pretence of patriotic fervor.

> Greek: 143. εἰ οὖν μὴ τιμωρήσεσθε τούτους, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοι τὸ πλῆθος τούτοις τοῖς θηρίοις δουλεῦον. εὖ δʼ ἴστʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν σφόδρʼ ὀργίζησθε, ἧττον ἀσελγανοῦσιν, ἂν δὲ μή, πολλοὺς τοὺς ἀσελγεῖς εὑρήσετε καὶ τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι προφάσει.

[¶35] 144. Let me now say a word, gentlemen of the jury, about the statute which, as I am informed, he intends to cite as a precedent and which he will claim to have followed in his own proposal. I mean the statute which contains these words: “Nor will I imprison any Athenian citizen who offers three sureties taxed in the same class as himself, except any person found guilty of conspiring to betray the city or to subvert popular government, or any tax-farmer or his surety or collector being in default.” Listen to my reply.

> Greek: 144. ἵνα δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐκείνου εἴπω τοῦ νόμου, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ᾧ ἀκούω μέλλειν παραδείγματι χρῆσθαι τοῦτον καὶ φήσειν ἀκόλουθον αὐτῷ τεθηκέναι, ἐν ᾧ ἔνι οὐδὲ δήσω Ἀθηναίων οὐδένα, ὃς ἂν ἐγγυητὰς τρεῖς καθιστῇ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος τελοῦντας, πλὴν ἐάν τις ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ τῆς πόλεως ἢ ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου συνιὼν ἁλῷ, ἢ τέλος πριάμενος ἢ ἐγγυησάμενος ἢ ἐκλέγων μὴ καταβάλῃ, ἀκούσατέ μου καὶ περὶ τούτου.

[¶36] 145. I will say nothing about Androtion himself dragging people to prison and putting them in irons after the enactment of this law, but I must inform you to whom it really applies. This statute, gentlemen of the Jury, is not intended for the protection of people who have stood their trial and argued their case, but for those who are still untried and its purpose is that they shall not plead at a disadvantage, or even without any preparation at all, because they have been sent to jail. But Timocrates is going to speak to you of regulations made for untried culprits, as though they had been framed to include everybody.

> Greek: 145. οὐ γὰρ ἐρῶ ὅτι αὐτὸς Ἀνδροτίων ἦγεν εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον καὶ ἔδει τούτου κειμένου τοῦ νόμου, ἀλλʼ ἐφʼ οἷς κεῖται ὁ νόμος οὗτος, διδάξω ὑμᾶς. οὗτος γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς κεκριμένοις καὶ ἠγωνισμένοις κεῖται, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκρίτοις, ἵνα μὴ διὰ τὸ δεδέσθαι χεῖρον ἀναγκάζοιντʼ ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπαράσκευοι εἶεν. οὑτοσὶ δέ, ἃ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκρίτοις κεῖται, ὡς περὶ ἁπάντων εἰρημένα μέλλει πρὸς ὑμᾶς λέγειν.

[¶37] 146. Let me give you a proof that my account of the matter is correct. It would not have been lawful for you, gentlemen of the jury, to assess any penalty, corporal or pecuniary, for imprisonment is a corporal punishment, and therefore you could not have inflicted it as a penalty, nor could it have been provided by statute, in cases where information is laid or summary arrest is allowed, that “the Eleven shall put in the stocks any man against whom information is laid, or who has been arrested,” if it had been unlawful to imprison any offenders other than those who conspire to betray the commonwealth, or to overthrow popular government, or tax-farmers who do not satisfy their contract.

> Greek: 146. ὡς δὲ σαφῶς γνώσεσθʼ ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ. οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τιμᾶν ἐξῆν ὑμῖν ὅ τι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι (ἐν γὰρ τῷ παθεῖν καὶ ὁ δεσμὸς ἔνι· οὐκ ἂν οὖν ἐξῆν δεσμοῦ τιμῆσαι), οὔθʼ ὅσων ἔνδειξίς ἐστιν ἢ ἀπαγωγὴ προσεγέγραπτʼ ἂν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τὸν δʼ ἐνδειχθέντα ἢ ἀπαχθέντα δησάντων οἱ ἕνδεκα ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ, εἴπερ μὴ ἐξῆν ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ τῆς πόλεως ἢ ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου συνιόντας ἢ τοὺς τὰ τέλη ὠνουμένους καὶ μὴ καταβάλλοντας δῆσαι.

[¶38] 147. But as matters stand you must accept these facts as proving that imprisonment is lawful, otherwise penal sentences would at once have been entirely inoperative. In the second place, gentlemen of the jury, the formula, “I will not imprison any Athenian citizen,” is not in itself a statute; it is merely a phrase in the written oath taken by the Council, to prevent politicians who are in the Council from caballing to commit any citizen to prison.

> Greek: 147. νῦν δὲ ταῦθʼ ὑμῖν τεκμήριʼ ἔστω ὅτι ἔξεστι δῆσαι· παντελῶς γὰρ ἤδη ἄκυρʼ ἂν ἦν τὰ τιμήματα. ἔπειτα δʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα αὐτὸ μὲν καθʼ αὑτὸ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, τὸ οὐδὲ δήσω Ἀθηναίων οὐδένα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὅρκῳ τῷ βουλευτικῷ γέγραπται, ἵνα μὴ συνιστάμενοι οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ δεσμὸν κατά τινος τῶν πολιτῶν λέγοιεν.

[¶39] 148. Solon therefore, wishing to deprive the Council of authority to imprison, included this formula in the Councillors’ oath; but he did not include it in the judicial oath. He thought it right that a Court of Justice should have unlimited authority, and that the convicted criminal should submit to any punishment ordered by the court. To make good this view the clerk will read the judicial oath of the Court of Heliaea. Read.

> Greek: 148. ἄκυρον οὖν τοῦ δῆσαι τὴν βουλὴν ποιῶν ὁ Σόλων τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν ὅρκον τὸν βουλευτικὸν προσέγραψεν, ἀλλʼ οὐ πρὸς τὸν ὑμέτερον· ἁπάντων γὰρ κυριώτατον ᾤετο δεῖν εἶναι τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ ὅ τι γνοίη, τοῦτο πάσχειν τὸν ἁλόντα. ἀναγνώσεται δʼ ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα τὸν τῶν ἡλιαστῶν ὅρκον. λέγε σύ.

[¶40] 149. The Oath of the Heliasts “I will give verdict in accordance with the statutes and decrees of the People of Athens and of the Council of Five-hundred. I will not vote for tyranny or oligarchy. If any man try to subvert the Athenian democracy or make any speech or any proposal in contravention thereof I will not comply. I will not allow private debts to be cancelled, nor lands nor houses belonging to Athenian citizens to be redistributed. I will not restore exiles or persons under sentence of death. I will not expel, nor suffer another to expel, persons here resident in contravention of the statutes and decrees of the Athenian People or of the Council.”

> Greek: 149. ΟΡΚΟΣ ΗΛΙΑΣΤΩΝ. ψηφιοῦμαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων. καὶ τύραννον οὐ ψηφιοῦμαι εἶναι οὐδʼ ὀλιγαρχίαν· οὐδʼ ἐάν τις καταλύῃ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἢ λέγῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίζῃ παρὰ ταῦτα, οὐ πείσομαι· οὐδὲ τῶν χρεῶν τῶν ἰδίων ἀποκοπὰς οὐδὲ γῆς ἀναδασμὸν τῆς Ἀθηναίων οὐδʼ οἰκιῶν· οὐδὲ τοὺς φεύγοντας κατάξω, οὐδὲ ὧν θάνατος κατέγνωσται, οὐδὲ τοὺς μένοντας ἐξελῶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῆς βουλῆς οὔτʼ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὔτʼ ἄλλον οὐδένα ἐάσω.

[¶41] 150. “I will not confirm the appointment to any office of any person still subject to audit in respect of any other office, to wit the offices of the nine Archons or of the Recorder or any other office for which a ballot is taken on the same day as for the nine Archons, or the office of Marshal, or ambassador, or member of the Allied Congress. I will not suffer the same man to hold the same office twice, or two offices in the same year. I will not take bribes in respect of my judicial action, nor shall any other man or woman accept bribes for me with my knowledge by any subterfuge or trick whatsoever.”

> Greek: 150. οὐδʼ ἀρχὴν καταστήσω ὥστʼ ἄρχειν ὑπεύθυνον ὄντα ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς, καὶ τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων καὶ τοῦ ἱερομνήμονος καὶ ὅσοι μετὰ τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων κυαμεύονται ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, καὶ κήρυκος καὶ πρεσβείας καὶ συνέδρων· οὐδὲ δὶς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα, οὐδὲ δύο ἀρχὰς ἄρξαι τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐνιαυτῷ. οὐδὲ δῶρα δέξομαι τῆς ἡλιάσεως ἕνεκα οὔτʼ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὔτʼ ἄλλος ἐμοὶ οὔτʼ ἄλλη εἰδότος ἐμοῦ, οὔτε τέχνῃ οὔτε μηχανῇ οὐδεμιᾷ.

[¶42] 151. “I am not less than thirty years old. I will give impartial hearing to prosecutor and defendant alike, and I will give my verdict strictly on the charge named in the prosecution. The juror shall swear by Zeus, Poseidon, and Demeter, and shall invoke destruction upon himself and his household if he in any way transgress this oath, and shall pray that his prosperity may depend upon his loyal observance thereof.” The oath, gentlemen of the jury, does not contain the words “I will not imprison any Athenian citizen.” The courts alone decide every question brought to trial; and they have full authority to pass sentence of imprisonment, or any other sentence they please.

> Greek: 151. καὶ γέγονα οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ τριάκοντα ἔτη. καὶ ἀκροάσομαι τοῦ τε κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν, καὶ διαψηφιοῦμαι περὶ αὐτοῦ οὗ ἂν ἡ δίωξις ᾖ. ἐπομνύναι Δία, Ποσειδῶ, Δήμητρα, καὶ ἐπαρᾶσθαι ἐξώλειαν ἑαυτῷ καὶ οἰκίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, εἴ τι τούτων παραβαίνοι, εὐορκοῦντι δὲ πολλὰ κἀγαθὰ εἶναι. ἐνταῦθʼ οὐκ ἔνι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὐδὲ δήσω Ἀθηναίων οὐδένα. τὰ γὰρ κρίνοντα τὰς κρίσεις ἁπάσας τὰ δικαστήριʼ ἐστίν, οἷς ἐξουσία ἐστὶ καὶ δεσμὸν καὶ ἄλλʼ ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται καταγιγνώσκειν.

[¶43] 152. That you are empowered to pass sentence of imprisonment I prove by this argument; and I take it that everybody will agree that to invalidate judicial decisions is monstrous, impious, and subversive of popular government. Our commonwealth, gentlemen of the jury, is administered by laws and by votes of the people; and if once decisions by vote are repealed by a new law, where will be the end of it? Can we justly call this thing a law? Is it not rather the negation of law? Does not such a lawgiver merit our strongest resentment?

> Greek: 152. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔξεστιν ὑμῖν δεσμὸν καταγιγνώσκειν ταῦτʼ ἐπιδείκνυμι· ὡς δὲ τὰ δεδικασμένʼ ἄκυρα ποιεῖν καὶ δεινὸν καὶ ἀνόσιόν ἐστι καὶ δήμου κατάλυσις, πάντας ἂν οἶμαι ὁμολογῆσαι. ἡ γὰρ πόλις ἡμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, νόμοις καὶ ψηφίσμασιν διοικεῖται. εἰ δή τις τὰ ψήφῳ κεκριμένα νόμῳ καινῷ λύσει, τί πέρας ἔσται; ἢ πῶς τοῦτον δίκαιόν ἐστι νόμον προσαγορεύειν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνομίαν; ἢ πῶς οὐ τῆς μεγίστης ὀργῆς ὁ τοιοῦτος νομοθέτης ἄξιός ἐστιν;

[¶44] 153. Indeed in my view he merits the severest punishment, not merely for proposing this law, but for revealing to everyone else a method of destroying the courts of Justice, restoring exiles, and introducing every sort of atrocity. If the author of this law goes on his way rejoicing, what is there, gentlemen of the jury, to prevent another man from coming forward to overthrow our most powerful institutions with a fresh statute?

> Greek: 153. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐσχάτων νομίζω, οὐχ ὅτι τοῦτον μόνον τὸν νόμον ἔθηκεν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁδὸν δείκνυσι καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων καταλύσεως καὶ περὶ τῶν φευγόντων καθόδου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν δεινοτάτων. τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰ οὗτος χαίρων ἀπαλλάξει ὁ τοιοῦτον νόμον τιθείς, ἕτερον φανῆναι ἄλλο τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἰσχυροτάτων καταλύοντα νόμῳ καινῷ;

[¶45] 154. In my opinion, nothing. I have been told that in time past popular government was overthrown in this way, when indictments for illegal legislation were abolished, and courts of justice were stripped of authority. Someone may perhaps object that, when I talk of subverting popular government, I am ignoring the difference of conditions between that time and this. Yes, but no man ought even to drop the seed of such a policy in our commonwealth, though for the moment it may not germinate; rather should every man who by word or deed attempts anything of the kind be brought to justice.

> Greek: 154. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι οὐδέν. ἀκούω δʼ ἔγωγε καὶ τὸ πρότερον οὕτω καταλυθῆναι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, παρανόμων πρῶτον γραφῶν καταλυθεισῶν καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἀκύρων γενομένων. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ὅτι οὐχ ὁμοίων ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων νῦν καὶ τότε λέγω περὶ καταλύσεως τοῦ δήμου. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ σπέρμα δεῖ καταβάλλειν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὐδένα, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοιούτων πραγμάτων, οὐδʼ εἰ μήπω ἂν ἐκφύοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐγχειροῦντα λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν τι τοιοῦτον δίκην διδόναι.

[¶46] 155. It is also proper that you should be informed how craftily he laid his plans to injure you. Having observed that everybody, whether in public life or outside it, constantly attributes all the prosperity of Athens to her laws, he began to consider how he could destroy those laws without detection, and how, even if caught in the act, he might be thought to have done nothing formidable or presumptuous.

> Greek: 155. ὅτι τοίνυν καὶ τέχνῃ κακῶς ἐνεχείρησε ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἀκοῦσαι. ὁρῶν γὰρ ἑκάστοτε πάντας, καὶ τοὺς πολιτευομένους καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, τοὺς νόμους τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ὑπολαμβάνοντας, ἐσκόπει πῶς λήσει τούτους καταλύσας, κἂν ἄρα ληφθῇ τοῦτο ποιῶν, μὴ δόξει δεινὸν μηδʼ ἀναιδὲς μηδὲν εἰργάσθαι.

[¶47] 156. He invented the method which he has actually employed, that of overthrowing old laws by a new one, in the hope that his iniquities might be described as preservative. It is true that the city is preserved by laws; and the thing he introduced, though widely different from other laws, certainly was a law. He saw that the beneficent associations of that name were bound to win your approval; and he did not choose to see that in its actual effect it would be found very different.

> Greek: 156. εὗρεν οὖν τοῦθʼ ὃ πεποίηκεν, νόμῳ τοὺς νόμους καταλῦσαι, ἵνα τἀδικήματʼ αὐτοῦ τὸ τῆς σωτηρίας ὄνομʼ ἔχῃ. οἵ τε γὰρ σῴζοντες τὴν πόλιν εἰσὶ νόμοι, ὅν θʼ οὗτος ἔθηκεν οὐδὲν ἐκείνοις τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχοντα, νόμος. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοῦ ὀνόματος φιλανθρωπίαν, ὅτι ταύτην ἂν μάλιστα προσεῖσθε, κατεῖδεν· τὴν δὲ χρείαν, ὅτι τἀναντίʼ ἔχουσα φανήσεται, παρεῖδεν.

[¶48] 157. But tell me this,—is there any chairman or any president who would ever have put to the vote the proposals contained in his law? I should say, none. Then how did the thing slip through? He gave the name of law to his own knaveries. For these men do not injure you artlessly or casually, but deliberately and of set purpose; and I do not mean these men alone, but a great company of politicians, who will shortly appear and reinforce the defence,—not, I need hardly say, because they want to oblige Timocrates,—why should they?—but because every man of them imagines that Timocrates’ law will serve his own purposes. As these people, then, rally round one another to your prejudice, so it is your business to rally round yourselves.

> Greek: 157. φέρε γὰρ πρὸς Διός, ἔστιν ὅστις ἂν ἢ πρόεδρός ποτʼ ἐπεψήφισεν ἢ πρύτανις τούτων τι τῶν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γεγραμμένων; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδένʼ ἂν οἶμαι. πῶς οὖν τοῦθʼ ὑπέδυ; νόμον ἔθετʼ ὄνομα τοῖς αὑτοῦ κακουργήμασιν. οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς, οὐδʼ ὅπως ἔτυχον, ποιοῦσι κακῶς ὑμᾶς, ἀλλʼ ἐσκεμμένως καὶ τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ πράττοντες, οὐχ οὗτοι μόνον, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτευομένων, οἳ τούτῳ παριόντες αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα συναπολογήσονται, οὐ μὰ Δίʼ οὐ Τιμοκράτει χαρίσασθαι βουλόμενοι, πόθεν; ἀλλʼ αὑτῷ συμφέρειν ἕκαστος ἡγούμενος τὸν νόμον. ὥσπερ τοίνυν οὗτοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς βοηθοῦσιν ἐφʼ ὑμᾶς, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ ὑμᾶς ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν.

[¶49] 158. Somebody asked him for what purpose he had chosen to bring forward such a proposal, and tried to explain to him that he had a difficult task before him in this trial. His reply was: “You talk like a fool. Androtion will be there to help me; and he has thought out at leisure such fine arguments on every point, that I am quite certain that no harm will come to me from this indictment.”

> Greek: 158. καίτοι ἀνερωτῶντός τινος αὐτὸν ὅτου ἕνεκα τοιαῦτʼ ἠθέλησε γράφειν, καὶ διεξιόντος ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸν ἀγῶνʼ ὑπολαμβάνοι τόνδε, τετυφῶσθαι τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντʼ ἔφη· συμπαρέσεσθαι γὰρ Ἀνδροτίωνʼ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τοιούτους λόγους σχολὴν ἄγοντʼ ἐσκέφθαι περὶ πάντων ὥστʼ εὖ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ γενήσοιτο φλαῦρον ἀπὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆσδε.

[¶50] 159. I am simply amazed at the effrontery of the pair of them,—of Timocrates, if he calls Androtion, and of Androtion, if he appears and speaks for the defence; for, of course, you will then have the clearest testimony that Timocrates proposed his law for the special benefit of Androtion, not as a law of general application. Nevertheless, it will be useful to you to hear a brief account of Androtion’s political performances, including those in which the defendant took part, and for which he, no less than the other, should be the just object of your detestation. I will tell you nothing that you have heard already, unless indeed any of you were in court at the trials of Euctemon.

> Greek: 159. καὶ δῆτα καὶ τεθαύμακα τὴν ἀναισχυντίαν τὴν τούτου τε κἀκείνου, τοῦ μέν, εἰ καλεῖ, τοῦ δέ, εἰ πάρεισι καὶ συναπολογήσεται. μαρτυρία γὰρ δήπου φανερὰ γενήσεται πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ὅτι τὸν νόμον τούτου ἕνεκʼ ἐτίθει, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τὸν αὐτόν. ὅμως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐκείνῳ πεπολιτευμένων ὑμᾶς μικρὰ βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ τούτων ταῦθʼ ὧν κεκοινώνηκεν οὗτος, καὶ διʼ ἃ τοῦτον οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκείνου δικαίως ἂν μισοῖτε. λέξω δʼ οὐδὲν ὧν ἀκηκόαθʼ ὑμεῖς, εἰ μή τινες ἄρʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς Εὐκτήμονι γιγνομένοις ἀγῶσι παρῆσαν.

[¶51] 160. Let us first of all inquire into the exploit on which he chiefly prides himself,—his collection of the money which he extracted from all of you, with the help of this honorable gentleman. Having accused Euctemon of retaining revenue money in his own hands, he promised that he would either make good the charge, or pay the money out of his own pocket; and on that pretext he turned out a magistrate appointed by lot, and insinuated himself into the tax-collecting business. He also proposed the appointment of Timocrates, pleading his own ill-health; “I shall be glad of his help in the work of the office,” he said.

> Greek: 160. καὶ πρῶτον μέν, ἐφʼ ᾧ μέγιστον φρονεῖ, τὴν τῶν χρημάτων εἴσπραξιν ἐξετάσωμεν αὐτοῦ, ἣν μετὰ τούτου τοῦ χρηστοῦ πάντας εἰσέπραξεν ὑμᾶς. αἰτιασάμενος γὰρ Εὐκτήμονα τὰς ὑμετέρας ἔχειν εἰσφοράς, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐξελέγξειν ἢ παρʼ ἑαυτοῦ καταθήσειν ὑποσχόμενος, καταλύσας ψηφίσματι κληρωτὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει ταύτῃ, ἐπὶ τὴν εἴσπραξιν παρέδυ, καὶ τοῦτον προὐβάλετο, εἰπὼν τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀρρωστίαν, ἵνʼ, ἔφη, συνδιοικῇ μοι.

[¶52] 161. He made a speech to the people on that occasion, advising you that you had the choice of three courses, either to break up the processional plate, or to pay your taxes over again, or to recover arrears from defaulters. You naturally preferred to collect your debts; and as by virtue of his promises he had the upper hand, and enjoyed special powers to suit the emergency, he did not think proper to observe the statutes made and provided for such business, nor, if he considered them unsatisfactory, to propose new ones. Instead of that, he moved at the Assembly some truculent and unconstitutional decrees, and used those decrees for jobbery, with Timocrates as his jackal.

> Greek: 161. δημηγορίαν δʼ ἐπὶ τούτοις ποιούμενος, ὡς ἔστι τριῶν αἵρεσις, ἢ τὰ πομπεῖα κατακόπτειν ἢ πάλιν εἰσφέρειν ἢ τοὺς ὀφείλοντας εἰσπράττειν, αἱρουμένων εἰκότως ὑμῶν τοὺς ὀφείλοντας εἰσπράττειν, ταῖς ὑποσχέσεσιν κατέχων καὶ διὰ τὸν καιρὸν ὃς ἦν τότʼ ἔχων ἐξουσίαν, τοῖς μὲν κειμένοις νόμοις περὶ τούτων οὐκ ᾤετο δεῖν χρῆσθαι, οὐδʼ, εἰ μὴ τούτους ἐνόμιζʼ ἱκανούς, ἑτέρους τιθέναι, ψηφίσματα δʼ εἶπεν ἐν ὑμῖν δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα, διʼ ὧν ἠργολάβει, προσαγωγεῖ τούτῳ χρώμενος τῶν λημμάτων.

[¶53] 162. With the help of this man he has stolen a great deal of your property, for he had included in his decree an order that the police-magistrates, the receivers, and their clerks, should all follow his instructions. Taking these officers with him, he proceeded to invade your dwelling-houses; and you, Timocrates, were the only one of his colleagues, though there were ten of them, who went with him. And let no one suppose that I am hinting that payment ought not to be exacted from defaulters. It ought; but how? As the law directs, and disinterestedly; that is the democratic way. Men of Athens, you got far less benefit from the five talents that this man collected, than injury from the practices that he introduced into your government.

> Greek: 162. καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὑμετέρων κέκλοφεν μετὰ τούτου, γράψας τοὺς ἕνδεκα καὶ τοὺς ἀποδέκτας καὶ τοὺς ὑπηρέτας ἀκολουθεῖν μεθʼ αὑτοῦ. εἶτʼ ἔχων τούτους ἦγʼ ἐπὶ τὰς ὑμετέρας οἰκίας, καὶ σύ, ὦ Τιμόκρατες, συνηκολούθεις μόνος τῶν συναρχόντων δέκʼ ὄντων. καὶ μηδεὶς ὑπολαμβανέτω με λέγειν ὡς οὐ χρῆν εἰσπράττειν τοὺς ὀφείλοντας. χρῆν γάρ. ἀλλὰ πῶς; ὡς ὁ νόμος ἀγορεύει· τῶν ἄλλων ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι δημοτικόν. οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πέντε ταλάντων ὑμῖν, ὧν οὗτοι τότʼ εἰσέπραξαν, τεθέντων ὠφέλησθε, ὅσον βέβλαφθε τοιούτων ἐθῶν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσαγομένων.