---
title: "Exordia · Προοίμια δημηγορικά"
author: "Demosthenes"
translator: "Norman W. DeWitt"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
url: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/
cite: "Demosthenes, tr. Norman W. DeWitt, Exordia · Προοίμια δημηγορικά. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/"
---

# Exordia · Προοίμια δημηγορικά

*Demosthenes, tr. Norman W. DeWitt*

Fifty-six openings for speeches to the assembly.

> Greek: ed. William Rennie, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0014.tlg062, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Norman W. DeWitt, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0014.tlg062.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## Contents

1. [Exordia 1–22](https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/1.md)
2. [Exordia 22–39](https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/2.md)
3. [Exordia 39–56](https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/3.md)

## 1. Exordia 1–22

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/1/#p-N

[¶0] If it had been proposed to discuss some new measure, men of Athens, I should have waited until most of the regular speakers had declared their opinions, and if any of their views had pleased me, I should have held my peace; otherwise, I should then have attempted to say what I myself think. But since you are now considering matters on which these speakers have often spoken before, I feel that, even if the first to rise, I may reasonably appear to be speaking after them.

> Greek: Α εἰ μὲν περὶ καινοῦ τινος πράγματος προὐτίθετʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λέγειν, ἐπισχὼν ἂν ἕως οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν εἰωθότων γνώμην ἀπεφήναντο, εἰ μὲν ἤρεσκέ τί μοι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἦγον, εἰ δὲ μή, τότʼ ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπειρώμην ἃ γιγνώσκω λέγειν· ἐπειδὴ δʼ ὑπὲρ ὧν πολλάκις εἰρήκασιν οὗτοι πρότερον, περὶ τούτων νυνὶ σκοπεῖτε, ἡγοῦμαι καὶ πρῶτος ἀναστὰς εἰκότως ἂν μετὰ τούτους δοκεῖν λέγειν.

[¶1] 1.2. Now, if our interests were prospering, there would be no need to deliberate; but since, as you all observe, they are in straits, I shall try, on that assumption, to advise what I consider best. In the first place, you ought to recognize that none of the policies you pursued while engaged in the war are to be used henceforth, but quite their opposites. For if those policies have brought your fortunes low, it is very likely that their opposites will improve them.

> Greek: 1.2. εἰ μὲν οὖν εἶχεν καλῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει συμβουλεύειν· ἐπειδὴ δʼ ὅσην ἅπαντες ὁρᾶτʼ ἔχει δυσκολίαν, ὡς ἐκ τοιούτων πειράσομαι συμβουλεύειν ἃ κράτιστʼ εἶναι νομίζω. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑμᾶς ἐκεῖνʼ ἐγνωκέναι δεῖ, ὡς οὐδὲν ὧν ἐποιεῖτʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν ὄντες τοῦ λοιποῦ πρακτέον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πάντα τἀναντία· εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα φαῦλα πεποίηκε τὰ πράγματα, τἀναντίʼ εἰκὸς βελτίω ποιῆσαι.

[¶2] 1.3. Next, you must consider that it is not the speaker who places upon you little or no burden who is in the right, for you see that, as a consequence of such optimistic speeches, our present condition has reached the limit of wretchedness, but rather the speaker who, putting aside the thought of pleasing you, shall tell you what ought to be done and by what means we may cease bringing disgrace upon ourselves and incurring losses. For, to speak truthfully, if all that a man passes over in his speech through reluctance to pain you is going to be passed over also by the course of events, it is right to harangue you for your pleasure; but if the charm of words, when unbecoming the occasion, becomes a penalty in action, it is shameful to cheat yourselves, and to do only under the utmost necessity what you should have done voluntarily long before.

> Greek: 1.3. ἔπειτα νομιστέον οὐχ ὃς ἂν ὑμῖν ἢ μηδὲν ἢ μικρὰ προστάττῃ, τοῦτον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ʽὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὡς ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ἐλπίδων καὶ λόγων εἰς πᾶν προελήλυθε μοχθηρίας τὰ παρόντἀ, ἀλλʼ ὃς ἂν τὸ χαρίζεσθαι παρείς, ἃ δεῖ καὶ διʼ ὧν παυσαίμεθʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ αἰσχύνην ὀφλισκάνοντες καὶ ζημιούμενοι, ταῦτα λέγῃ. καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μέν, ὅσʼ ἂν τῷ λόγῳ τις ὑπερβῇ λυπῆσαι μὴ βουλόμενος, καὶ τὰ πράγμαθʼ ὑπερβήσεται, δεῖ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δημηγορεῖν· εἰ δʼ ἡ τῶν λόγων χάρις, ἂν ᾖ μὴ προσήκουσα, ἔργῳ ζημία γίγνεται, αἰσχρόν ἐστιν φενακίζειν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνάγκης πρᾶξαι ταῦθʼ ἃ πάλαι ʼθελοντὰς προσῆκεν ποιεῖν. Β οὐχὶ ταὐτὰ γιγνώσκειν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παρίσταταί μοι, ὅταν τε τὸ τῆς πολιτείας ὄνομʼ ὑμῶν ἀκούσω, καὶ ὅταν τὸν τρόπον ὃν προσφέρονταί τινες ὑμῶν τοῖς ὑπὲρ ταύτης λέγουσιν ἴδω.

[¶3] 2.1. The same thoughts do not present themselves to me, men of Athens, when I hear you refer by name to our form of government and again when I see the manner in which some of you treat those who speak in its defence. As you all know, the name you give to our government is democracy, but I see that some of you listen with more pleasure to those who advocate the opposite to it. I wonder just what their motive may be. Or do you imagine they are making these speeches gratis? Well, the masters of the oligarchies, whose cause these men are pleading, might quietly increase their fees. But honestly, have you assumed that their principles are better than the other kind? So oligarchy, presumably, looks better to you than democracy! Then do you think the men themselves are better? And yet who could reasonably be regarded by you as honest when he speaks in public against the interest of the established government? Therefore it remains to conclude that you are mistaken when you hold this opinion. Consequently, be on your guard against falling into this error, men of Athens, so that you shall not some day give those who are plotting against you an opening, and only then learn that you have made a mistake, when it will no longer be of the least advantage to you.

> Greek: 2.1. τὴν μὲν γὰρ πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἅπαντες ἴστε, ὀνομάζετε, τῶν δὲ τἀναντία ταύτῃ λεγόντων ἐνίους ἥδιον ἀκούοντας ὁρῶ. ὃ καὶ θαυμάζω τίς ποθʼ ἡ πρόφασις. πότερον προῖκα λέγειν ταῦτʼ αὐτοὺς οἴεσθε; ἀλλʼ οἱ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν, ὑπὲρ ὧν οὗτοι λέγουσιν, κύριοι καὶ πλείω σιωπῆς μᾶλλον ἂν δοῖεν. ἀλλὰ βελτίω ταῦτʼ εἶναι τῶν ἑτέρων ὑπειλήφατε; βελτίων ἄρʼ ὑμῖν ὀλιγαρχία δημοκρατίας φαίνεται. ἀλλʼ αὐτοὺς εἶναι βελτίους ἡγεῖσθε; καὶ τίς ἂν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν χρηστὸς νομίζοιτʼ εἰκότως, ἐναντία τῇ καθεστώσῃ πολιτείᾳ δημηγορῶν; οὐκοῦν λοιπὸν ἁμαρτάνειν ὑμᾶς, ὅταν οὕτως ἔχητε τὴν γνώμην. τοῦτο τοίνυν φυλάττεσθε μὴ πάσχειν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅπως μή ποτε τοῖς ἐπιβουλεύουσιν λαβὴν δώσετε, εἶτα τότʼ αἰσθήσεσθʼ ἡμαρτηκότες, ἡνίκʼ οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν ὑμῖν πλέον ἔσται.

[¶4] 2.3. Now, the fact that everything is not going as we might wish, men of Athens, either at home or among our allies, is perhaps not astonishing; for in many things the whim of Fortune prevails and there are many plausible reasons why everything does not turn out according to plan, men being but men. Yet for the common people to have no portion at all and their opponents a superabundance is something to astound and alarm intelligent men, as I judge it, men of Athens. This, then, is the starting point of my entire speech.

> Greek: 2.3. β τὸ μὲν [οὖν], ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ πάνθʼ ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλοίμεθʼ ἔχειν μήτε παρʼ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν μήτε παρὰ τοῖς συμμάχοις, ἴσως οὐδέν ἐστι θαυμαστόν· πολλῶν γὰρ τὸ τῆς τύχης αὐτόματον κρατεῖ, καὶ πολλαὶ προφάσεις τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ γνώμην συμβαίνειν ἀνθρώποις οὖσιν. τὸ δὲ μηδʼ ὁτιοῦν μεταλαμβάνειν τὸν δῆμον, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀντιπράττοντας περιεῖναι, τοῦτο καὶ θαυμαστόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ φοβερὸν τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν, ὡς ἐγὼ κρίνω. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ παντός ἐστιν αὕτη μοι τοῦ λόγου. Γ ἀντὶ πολλῶν ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρημάτων τὸ μέλλον συνοίσειν ὑμῖν περὶ ὧν νυνὶ τυγχάνετε σκοποῦντες, οἶμαι πάντας ἂν ὑμᾶς ἑλέσθαι.

[¶5] 3.1. I believe, men of Athens, that in preference to a large sum of money you would choose the plan that will pay you in the matters you are now considering. This being so, it is then your duty to show yourselves willing hearers of your prospective counsellors; for not only in the event of someone having come here with a useful idea thought out, would you, having listened, have the benefit of it, but I also assume it to be part of your good fortune that many timely suggestions would occur to some men on the spur of the moment, so that from the whole number the choice of the advantageous is made easier for you.

> Greek: 3.1. ὅτε τοίνυν τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει, προσήκει παρέχειν ἐθέλοντας ἀκούειν ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς τῶν βουλομένων συμβουλεύειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον εἴ τι χρήσιμον ἐσκεμμένος ἥκει τις, τοῦτʼ ἂν ἀκούσαντες λάβοιτε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας τύχης ὑπολαμβάνω πολλὰ τῶν δεόντων ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμʼ ἐνίοις ἐπελθεῖν ἂν εἰπεῖν, ὥστʼ ἐξ ἁπάντων ῥᾳδίαν τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ὑμῖν αἵρεσιν γενέσθαι. Δ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δίκαιον, ἐπειδὴ ἐφʼ ὑμῖν ἐστιν ἑλέσθαι τῶν ῥηθέντων ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε, ἁπάντων ἀκοῦσαι.

[¶6] 4.1. It is your duty, men of Athens, to listen to every proposal made, since it is your prerogative to adopt whichever of them you choose. For it often happens that the same person is wrong on one point and right on another; and so by shouting him down when displeased you may perhaps deprive yourselves of many useful ideas, whereas by attending with decorum and in silence, you will act on every sound proposal, and if you think someone is making a foolish suggestion, you will ignore it. As for me, I am not accustomed to make long speeches, and even if previously I had been in the habit, I should not have taken this occasion to do so; instead, I shall tell you as briefly as I can what I consider to be in your interests.

> Greek: 4.1. καὶ γὰρ πολλάκις συμβαίνει τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτο μὲν μὴ λέγειν ὀρθῶς, ἕτερον δέ τι· ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦ θορυβεῖν τάχʼ ἂν δυσχεράναντες πολλῶν χρησίμων ἀποστερηθείητε, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μετὰ κόσμου καὶ σιγῆς ἀκοῦσαι καὶ τὰ καλῶς ἔχονθʼ ἅπαντα ποιήσετε, κἂν δοκῇ τις [παρα]ληρεῖν, παραλείψετε. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὔτʼ εἴωθα μακρολογεῖν, οὔτʼ ἄν, εἰ τὸν ἄλλον εἰώθειν χρόνον, νῦν ἐχρησάμην τούτῳ, ἀλλʼ ἃ συμφέρειν ὑμῖν νομίζω, ταῦθʼ ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι διὰ βραχυτάτων ἐρῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς. Ε ὁρῶ μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παντάπασι πρόδηλον ὂν οὕς τʼ ἂν ἀκούσαιτε λόγους ἡδέως καὶ πρὸς οὓς οὐκ οἰκείως ἔχετε·

[¶7] 5.1. I observe, men of Athens, that there is no mistaking what kind of speeches you would like to hear and to what kind you are averse. Yet to say what one thinks will find favour I consider to be the badge of those who wish to work some deception, whereas to endure, when one is speaking for measures he is convinced are advantageous to the State, either your heckling or what else you choose to do, I judge to be the part of a loyal and honest citizen.

> Greek: 5.1. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν λέγειν ἅ τις οἴεται χαριεῖσθαι τῶν παρακρούσασθαί τι βουλομένων εἶναι νομίζω, τὸ δʼ ὑφίστασθαι, περὶ ὧν πέπεικεν ἑαυτὸν συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει, καὶ θορυβηθῆναι κἂν ἄλλο τι βούλησθʼ ὑμεῖς, εὔνου καὶ δικαίου τοῦτο πολίτου κρίνω.

[¶8] 5.2. And I should like to have you bear patiently with the speeches of both sides to this end, if for no other, in order that, if someone shall be found to offer a proposal better than those upon which you are intent, you may avail yourselves of it, but, if he falls short and is unable to make his point, that he may seem to have suffered this repulse through his own fault and not because of your refusing to listen. Furthermore, your experience would not be so disagreeable if you should listen to some fool making a long speech as it would if you prevented a man from speaking who had something timely to propose.

> Greek: 5.2. βουλοίμην δʼ ἂν ὑμᾶς, εἰ καὶ μηδὲ διʼ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, διʼ ἐκεῖνʼ ὑπομεῖναι τοὺς λόγους ἀμφοτέρων, ἵνʼ ἐὰν μὲν ὀρθότερον φανῇ τις λέγων ὧν ὑμεῖς ὡρμήκατε, χρήσησθε τούτῳ, ἂν δʼ ἀπολειφθῇ καὶ μὴ δύνηται διδάξαι, διʼ αὑτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διʼ ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ἀκούειν τοῦτο πεπονθέναι δοκῇ. ἔτι δʼ οὐδὲ πάθοιτʼ ἂν ἀηδὲς οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον, εἰ πολλά τινος ληροῦντος ἀκούσαιτε, ὅσον εἰ τῶν δεόντων τι λέγειν ἔχοντός τινος εἰπεῖν κωλύσαιτε.

[¶9] 5.3. In all matters, of course, the first step toward right judgement is never to imagine you understand before learning, especially knowing as you do that many men before now have often changed their minds. If, then, you on your part are now convinced of these truths, I think that I on my part shall seem justified in speaking briefly in opposition and be found to propose the plans that are best for you.

> Greek: 5.3. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ δοκιμάζειν ὀρθῶς ἅπαντʼ ἐστὶν μηδὲν οἴεσθαι πρότερον γιγνώσκειν πρὶν μαθεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ συνειδότας πολλάκις ἤδη πολλοὺς μετεγνωκότας. ἂν τοίνυν ὑμεῖς ταῦθʼ ὑπάρξητε νῦν πεπεισμένοι, οἴομαι μετὰ βραχέων λόγων καὶ αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγειν εἰκότως δόξειν καὶ ὑμῖν τὰ βέλτιστα φανεῖσθαι λέγων. Ϛ πολλῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λόγων εἰρημένων παρὰ πάντων τῶν συμβεβουλευκότων, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς νῦν ὁρῶ ὄντας ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ τί πρακτέον ηὑρῆσθαι ἢ πρὶν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀναβῆναι.

[¶10] 6.1. Although many speeches have been made, men of Athens, by all your counsellors, I do not see that you are now any nearer to discovering what ought to be done than before you came up to the Assembly. The cause of this, in my opinion, is the same as the cause of the wretched plight of our affairs in general, that the speakers do not offer advice about the business before you, but accuse and revile one another, accustoming you, in my judgement, to hearing, without process of law, all the mischief of which they are the cause, in order that if, after all, they do come to face the test some day, you, thinking you are hearing nothing new, but only the charges over which you have often been angry, may so become more merciful jurors and judges of their misdeeds.

> Greek: 6.1. αἴτιον δὲ τούτου ταὔθʼ ὅπερ οἶμαι τοῦ κακῶς ἔχειν τὰ ὅλα· οὐ γὰρ παραινοῦσιν ὑμῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν παρόντων οἱ λέγοντες, ἀλλʼ ἑαυτῶν κατηγοροῦσι καὶ λοιδοροῦνται, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ κρίνω, συνεθίζοντες ὑμᾶς ἄνευ κρίσεως, ὅσων εἰσὶν αἴτιοι κακῶν, ἀκούειν, ἵνʼ ἄν ποτʼ ἄρʼ εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστῶνται, μηδὲν ἡγούμενοι καινὸν ἀκούειν, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ ὧν ὤργισθε πολλάκις, πραότεροι δικασταὶ καὶ κριταὶ γίγνησθε τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτοῖς.

[¶11] 6.2. Perhaps it would be foolish at the moment to inquire into the exact reason why they do this; but because it harms you, for this reason I censure them. For my own part, I will accuse no one today nor will I sponsor any charge that I shall not make good on the spot, nor, in general, will I do any of the things which these men do; but when I have stated as briefly as I can what I think best for your interests and most profitable for you who deliberate, I will step down.

> Greek: 6.2. τὴν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν διʼ ἣν ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, ἴσως ἀνόητον ἀκριβῶς ζητεῖν [εἴη ἂν] ἐν τῷ παρόντι· ὅτι δʼ ὑμῖν οὐχὶ συμφέρει, διὰ τοῦτʼ ἐπιτιμῶ. ἐγὼ δʼ οὔτε κατηγορήσω τήμερον οὐδενός, οὔθʼ ὑποσχήσομαι τοιοῦτʼ οὐδὲν ὃ μὴ παραχρῆμʼ ἐπιδείξω, οὐδʼ ὅλως τῶν αὐτῶν τούτοις οὐδὲν ποιήσω· ἀλλʼ ἃ βέλτιστα μὲν τοῖς πράγμασιν, συμφέροντα δὲ τοῖς βουλευομένοις ὑμῖν ἡγοῦμαι, ταῦθʼ ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι διὰ βραχυτάτων εἰπὼν καταβήσομαι. Ζ οἱ μὲν ἐπαινοῦντες, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς προγόνους ὑμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν μοι δοκοῦσι προαιρεῖσθαι κεχαρισμένον, οὐ μὴν συμφέροντά γʼ ἐκείνοις οὓς ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ποιεῖν.

[¶12] 7.1. Those who praise your forefathers, men of Athens, in my judgement choose a charming theme upon which to speak, and yet I do not think they do a favour to those whom they extol. For instance, when they undertake to tell of the deeds of those men, to which no speaker could do justice, while winning for themselves a reputation for ability to speak, they cause the valor of those men to seem to their hearers less than had been supposed. As for me, I consider the greatest commendation of those heroes to be the test of time, for although a long interval has gone by, no others have been able to exhibit greater deeds than those performed by them, and I shall myself merely try to tell you after what manner I think you will be best able to make your preparations.

> Greek: 7.1. περὶ γὰρ πραγμάτων ἐγχειροῦντες ⟨λέγειν⟩ ὧν οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς ἀξίως ἐφικέσθαι δύναιτο τῷ λόγῳ, αὐτοὶ μὲν τοῦ δύνασθαι λέγειν δόξαν ἐκφέρονται, τὴν δʼ ἐκείνων ἀρετὴν ἐλάττω τῆς ὑπειλημμένης παρὰ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ δὲ τῆς μὲν ἐκείνων ἀρετῆς μέγιστον ἔπαινον ἡγοῦμαι τὸν χρόνον, οὗ πολλοῦ γεγενημένου μείζω τῶν ὑπʼ ἐκείνων πραχθέντων οὐδένες ἄλλοι παραδείξασθαι δεδύνηνται·

[¶13] 7.2. For this is the situation; though we should all prove ourselves to be clever speakers, I know well that your interests would not be advanced in the slightest, but if just one speaker, no matter who, should come forward and be able to demonstrate convincingly what kind of preparation, and how great, and provided from what funds, would be to the State’s advantage, all our present apprehension is as good as dispelled. This I shall try to do, if, after all, I am able, having first told you briefly how my opinion stands with respect to our relations with the King.

> Greek: 7.2. αὐτὸς δὲ πειράσομαι τὸν τρόπον εἰπεῖν ὃν ἄν μοι δοκεῖτε μάλιστα δύνασθαι παρασκευάσασθαι. καὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει· εἰ μὲν ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες οἱ λέγοντες δεινοὶ φανείημεν, οὐδὲν ἂν τὰ ὑμέτερʼ εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι βέλτιον σχοίη· εἰ δὲ παρελθὼν ⟨εἷς⟩ ὁστισοῦν δύναιτο διδάξαι καὶ πεῖσαι, τίς παρασκευὴ καὶ πόση καὶ πόθεν πορισθεῖσα χρήσιμος ἔσται τῇ πόλει, πᾶς ὁ παρὼν λέλυται φόβος. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο, ἂν ἄρʼ οἷός τʼ ὦ, πειράσομαι ποιῆσαι, μικρὰ προειπὼν ὑμῖν ὡς ἔχω γνώμης περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. Η ἀμφότεροί μοι δοκοῦσιν ἁμαρτάνειν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ οἱ τοῖς Ἀρκάσιν καὶ οἱ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις συνειρηκότες·

[¶14] 8.1. Both parties seem to me to be in the wrong, men of Athens, both those who have supported the Arcadians and those who have supported the Spartans. For, just as if they had come here from one or the other of the two countries and were not of your own citizen body, to which both embassies are appealing, they are denouncing and abusing one another. This, however, was a concern of the visiting envoys, while to discuss the questions in the common interest and to consider your own interest without self-seeking is the duty of those who see fit to offer advice here in Athens.

> Greek: 8.1. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀφʼ ἑκατέρων ἥκοντες, οὐχ ὑμῶν ὄντες, πρὸς οὓς ἀμφότεροι πρεσβεύονται, κατηγοροῦσιν καὶ διαβάλλουσιν ἀλλήλους. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τῶν ἀφιγμένων ἔργον, τὸ δὲ κοινῶς ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων λέγειν καὶ τὰ βέλτισθʼ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν σκοπεῖν ἄνευ φιλονικίας τῶν ἐνθάδε συμβουλεύειν ἀξιούντων.

[¶15] 8.2. Yet as things now are, if one could cancel the fact of their being known and their using the Attic speech, many people, I believe, would think the one group Arcadians and the other Spartans! I know myself how difficult it is to propose the best procedure, for when you have been deceived and some of you want this and others that, if someone undertakes to suggest a compromise and then you do not wait to learn the facts, he will please neither party and will be put in the wrong with both sides.

> Greek: 8.2. νῦν δʼ ἔγωγε, εἴ τις αὐτῶν ἀφέλοι τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι καὶ τὸ τῇ φωνῇ λέγειν ἀττικιστί, πολλοὺς ἂν οἶμαι τοὺς μὲν Ἀρκάδας, τοὺς δὲ Λάκωνας αὐτῶν εἶναι νομίσαι. ἐγὼ δʼ οἶδα μὲν ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ τὰ βέλτιστα λέγειν ἐστίν· συνεξηπατημένων γὰρ ὑμῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ταυτί, τῶν δὲ ταυτὶ βουλομένων, ἐὰν τὰ μεταξύ τις ἐγχειρῇ λέγειν κᾆθʼ ὑμεῖς μὴ περιμένητε μαθεῖν, χαριεῖται μὲν οὐδετέροις, διαβεβλήσεται δὲ πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους·

[¶16] 8.3. Nevertheless, I shall choose to be thought to talk nonsense, if that, after all, is to be my fate, rather than to abandon you to certain people to be deceived in violation of what I consider best for you. And so, with your permission, I shall go into other details later, and proceed to explain what I think is best, starting from the premises upon which both sides agree.

> Greek: 8.3. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ αἱρήσομαι μᾶλλον αὐτός, ἐὰν ἄρα τοῦτο πάθω, δοκεῖν φλυαρεῖν ἢ παρʼ ἃ βέλτιστα νομίζω τῇ πόλει, προέσθαι τισὶν ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατῆσαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλʼ ὕστερον, ἐὰν ὑμῖν βουλομένοις ᾖ, λέξω· ἐκ δὲ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ὑφʼ ἁπάντων ἄρξομαι ἃ κράτιστα νομίζω, διδάσκειν. Θ οὐχὶ ταὐτὰ γιγνώσκων ἐνίοις τῶν εἰρηκότων ἀνέστηκʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

[¶17] 9.1. I have taken the floor, men of Athens, because I do not hold the same views as some of those who have spoken. Still I shall not allege that these men out of villainy have expressed sentiments opposed to your best interests, but I say that many, while neglecting to judge events critically, make a practice of considering the words they will use, and if they chance to find an ample supply of these, of haranguing the people without more ado. In this they are wrong nor do they reflect in their own minds that, since it is the experience of all that over a long period many plans have worked out happily and some of them, because of the times, quite contrary to their promise, if some speaker cites the one kind and passes over the other, he will unconsciously be doing the easiest thing in the world, deceiving himself.

> Greek: 9.1. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τούτους αἰτιάσομαι κακίᾳ τἀναντία τοῖς βελτίστοις εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλʼ ὅτι πολλοὶ τοῦ τὰ πράγματα κρίνειν ἀμελήσαντες τοὺς λόγους σκοπεῖν οὓς ἐροῦσιν εἰώθασιν, κἂν τούτοις ἀφθόνοις ἐντύχωσιν, ἑτοίμως δημηγορεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐγνωκότες, οὐδὲ λογιζόμενοι παρʼ ἑαυτοῖς ὅτι πολλῶν πράξεων ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσι πεπραγμένων καὶ διὰ τοὺς καιροὺς ἐνίων ὑπεναντίων αὑταῖς, ἂν τὰς ἑτέρας τις ὑπερβαίνων τὰς ἑτέρας λέγῃ, λήσει τὸ ῥᾷστον τῶν ἔργων ποιῶν, αὑτὸν ἐξαπατῶν.

[¶18] 9.2. Now those who thus use the privilege of advising you seem to me to look upon the reputation for eloquence accruing to them from their speeches as an adequate ambition, but it is my opinion that the man who proposes to advise the State on matters of policy should rather consider how the measures adopted shall prove of benefit, and not how his remarks of the moment may find favour. For those who win esteem by their words ought to add to it the accomplishment of some useful work in order that not only now, but for all time, their utterances may have merit.

> Greek: 9.2. οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτω χρώμενοι τῷ συμβουλεύειν δοκοῦσί μοι τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ῥηθέντων τοῦ δύνασθαι λέγειν δόξαν γιγνομένην αὑτοῖς ἱκανὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἡγεῖσθαι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω χρῆναι τὸν πόλει περὶ πραγμάτων ἐπιχειροῦντα συμβουλεύειν μᾶλλον ὅπως τὰ δόξαντα συνοίσει σκοπεῖν, ἢ πῶς οἱ παραχρῆμα λόγοι χάριν ἕξουσι. δεῖ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων εὐδοκιμοῦσι συμφέροντός τινος ἔργου πρᾶξιν προσεῖναι, ἵνα μὴ νῦν μόνον, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ τὰ ῥηθέντα καλῶς ἔχῃ. Ι εἰ μὲν ἐγνώκατʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τί βέλτιστον ὂν τυγχάνει πρᾶξαι περὶ τῶν παρόντων, ἁμάρτημα τὸ συμβουλεύειν προτιθέναι·

[¶19] 10.1. If you have decided, men of Athens, what it is best to do in the circumstances, it is a mistake to propose debate; for why should you be needlessly bored by listening to what you have yourselves judged to be expedient before hearing it discussed? But if, assuming that you must reach a judgement on the basis of what shall be said, you are exploring and deliberating, it is wrong to stop those who wish to speak, since by so doing you are deprived entirely of whatever practical proposal some speakers have thought up, and you cause other speakers to abandon their own conclusions in favour of what they think you desire to hear.

> Greek: 10.1. ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι δοκιμάζετε συμφέρειν, τί δεῖ ταῦτʼ ἀκούοντας μάτην ἐνοχλεῖσθαι; εἰ δὲ σκοπεῖτε καὶ βουλεύεσθʼ ὡς ἐκ τῶν ῥηθησομένων δοκιμάσαι δέον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ κωλύειν τοὺς βουλομένους λέγειν. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὅλως ἀποστερεῖσθʼ ἐκ τοῦ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, εἴ τι χρήσιμον ἐντεθύμηνται· τοὺς δʼ ἀφέντας ἃ τυγχάνουσιν ἐγνωκότες, ὧν ὑμᾶς ἐπιθυμεῖν οἴονται, ταῦτα ποιεῖτε συμβουλεύειν.

[¶20] 10.2. While to unite in forcing the speaker to express your wishes shows an intention to do wrong, the willingness to deliberate is proved when you listen to his views, scan them and, if any Is good, adopt it. I say this, not as one about to recommend measures opposed to those you are favouring, but as one who knows that, if you refuse to hear the opposition, they will say you have been deceived, while, if you do listen and are not persuaded, they will have been proved on the spot to be offering the worse proposals.

> Greek: 10.2. ἔστιν δʼ ἁμαρτάνειν μὲν βουλομένων τὸ συναναγκάζειν τὸν παριόνθʼ ἃ βούλεσθε λέγειν, βουλευομένων δʼ ἀκούσαντας ἃ γιγνώσκει σκοπεῖν, κἄν τι καλῶς ἔχῃ, χρῆσθαι. λέγω δὲ ταῦτʼ οὐκ ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμῖν ἀρέσκουσιν μέλλων παραινεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνʼ εἰδώς, ὅτι ἂν μὲν μὴ ʼθελήσητε τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων ἀκοῦσαι, ἐξηπατῆσθαι φήσουσιν ὑμᾶς, ἂν δʼ ἀκούσαντες μὴ πεισθῆτε, ἐξεληλεγμένοι παραχρῆμʼ ἔσονται τὰ χείρω παραινοῦντες. ΙΑ οἴομαι πάντας ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, γιγνώσκειν ὅτι οὐ κρινοῦντες ἥκετε τήμερον οὐδένα τῶν ἀδικούντων, ἀλλὰ βουλευσόμενοι περὶ τῶν παρόντων.

[¶21] 11.1. I think you all know, men of Athens, that you have not come here today to put any of the wrongdoers on trial but to deliberate about the present state of affairs. So it is our duty to defer all accusations and only when we put someone on trial should this or that man speak before you against another who, he has convinced himself, is an offender. But if anyone has something practical or profitable to say, now is the time to declare it. For accusation is for those who have fault to find with past actions, but in deliberative session the discussion is solely about present and future actions. Therefore the present is no occasion for abuse or blame but for taking counsel together, it seems to me. For this reason I shall try to guard against falling myself into the error which I condemn in these men and to offer the advice that I think best in the present state of affairs.

> Greek: 11.1. δεῖ τοίνυν τὰς μὲν κατηγορίας ὑπερθέσθαι πάσας, καὶ τότʼ ἐν ὑμῖν λέγειν καθʼ ὅτου πέπεικεν ἕκαστος ἑαυτόν, ὅταν τινὰ κρίνωμεν· εἰ δέ τίς τι χρήσιμον ἢ συμφέρον εἰπεῖν ἔχει, τοῦτο νῦν ἀποφαίνεσθαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατηγορεῖν τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἐγκαλούντων ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ συμβουλεύειν περὶ τῶν παρόντων καὶ γενησομένων προτίθεται. οὐκοῦν οὐ λοιδορίας οὐδὲ μέμψεως ὁ παρὼν καιρός, ἀλλὰ συμβουλῆς εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ. διὸ πειράσομαι μὲν φυλάξασθαι, ὃ τούτοις ἐπιτιμῶ, μὴ παθεῖν αὐτός, συμβουλεύσαι δʼ ἃ κράτιστα νομίζω περὶ τῶν παρόντων. ΙΒ οὐδένʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀντειπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίζω, ὡς οὐ κακοῦ πολίτου καὶ φαύλου τὴν γνώμην ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὕτω τινὰ μισεῖν ἢ φιλεῖν τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ προσιόντων ὥστε τοῦ τῇ πόλει βελτίστου μηδὲν φροντίζειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸς ἐπήρειαν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν δημηγορεῖν·

[¶22] 12.1. I think that no man will deny, men of Athens, that it is the mark of a disloyal citizen and a low-minded man so to hate or favour anyone who enters into public life that he takes no thought for the State’s best interests, but shapes his public utterances sometimes to vent his malice and sometimes to prove his friendship, as a number of those are doing who come forward here to speak. To these I would say no more than this: that in my opinion, if they have done something of the kind, their greatest offence is not this, but rather that they show themselves unprepared ever to stop doing it!

> Greek: 12.1. ἃ ποιοῦσιν ἔνιοι τῶν δευρὶ παριόντων. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις μὲν τοσοῦτον ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι μοι δοκοῦσιν οὐδʼ εἴ τι πεποιήκασιν τοιοῦτον μέγισθʼ ἡμαρτηκέναι, ἀλλʼ ὅτι δηλοῦσιν οὐδέποτʼ οὐδὲ παύσασθαι παρεσκευασμένοι.

[¶23] 12.2. As for yourselves, I give you this advice: do not be guilty of self-ruin and think it enough if you punish these men when you see fit; but, while holding them in check so far as lies in your power, you must yourselves, as becomes men deliberating on behalf of the State, put aside your own private feuds and aim at what is most to the common good, reflecting that the punishment of no individual, nor even of all the politicians in a body, can square the account if once the laws should be destroyed on which your very life depends.

> Greek: 12.2. ὑμῖν δὲ παραινῶ μὴ προϊεμένους ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἱκανὸν τοῦτο νομίζειν, δίκην, ὅταν ὑμῖν δόξῃ, παρὰ τούτων λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτους, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν ὑμῖν, κωλύειν, καὶ αὐτούς, ὥσπερ ὑπὲρ πόλεως προσήκει βουλευομένους, τὰς ἰδίας ἀνελόντας φιλονικίας τὸ κοινῇ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι οὐδείς, οὐδʼ ἅμα πάντες οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, τῶν νόμων, ἐφʼ οἷς ὑμεῖς ἐστε, ἀξιόχρεῴ εἰσι διαφθαρέντων δίκην δοῦναι. ΙΓ ἴσως ἐπίφθονον ἄν τισιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δόξειεν εἶναι, εἴ τις ὢν ἰδιώτης καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ὑμῶν εἷς, ἑτέρων συμβεβουλευκότων, οἳ καὶ τῷ πάλαι πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ παρʼ ὑμῖν δόξαν ἔχειν προέχουσιν, παρελθὼν εἴποι, ὅτι οὐ μόνον αὑτῷ δοκοῦσιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἐγγὺς εἶναι τοῦ τὰ δέοντα γιγνώσκειν.

[¶24] 13.1. Perhaps it might seem offensive to certain persons, men of Athens, if someone, an ordinary citizen and one of the common people like yourselves, should come forward after others who are eminent for both long political experience and reputation among you have already stated their opinions, and say that he thinks the others are not only wrong but not even near to discerning what ought to be done. Nevertheless, I feel so confident that I am going to give more profitable counsel than theirs that I shall not hesitate to declare all they have said to be worthless. I think that you too would be doing well if you kept in view, not the speaker, but the advice being offered. For the right thing, men of Athens, is to extend your goodwill, not to certain persons as though by hereditary privilege, but to those who from time to time offer the best counsel.

> Greek: 13.1. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἔγωγʼ οὕτω σφόδρʼ οἶμαι μᾶλλον ὑμῖν συμφέροντʼ ἐρεῖν τούτων, ὥστʼ οὐκ ὀκνήσω πάνθʼ ἃ τυγχάνουσιν εἰρηκότες, ἄξια μηδενὸς εἶναι φῆσαι. νομίζω δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς ὀρθῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ τὸν λέγοντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβουλευόμενα σκοποῖτε. δεῖ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν παρʼ ὑμῶν εὔνοιαν μή τισιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ γένους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τὰ βέλτιστʼ ἀεὶ λέγουσιν ὑπάρχειν. ΙΔ βουλοίμην ἂν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, προσέχοντας, ἃ μέλλω λέγειν, ἀκοῦσαι·

[¶25] 14.1. I should like you to listen attentively to what I am going to say, men of Athens; it is not unimportant. I wonder just why it is that, before we come up to the Assembly, any one of you whom a person may chance to meet is prepared to say readily by what means the present state of affairs may be improved; and then again, the minute you leave the Assembly, each man will be just as ready to say what we ought to do. But when we are met together and dealing with these problems, you hear anything rather than this from certain speakers.

> Greek: 14.1. καὶ γάρ ἐστιν οὐ μικρά. ἐγὼ θαυμάζω τί δή ποτε, πρὶν μὲν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀναβῆναι, ὅτῳ τις ἂν ὑμῶν ἐντύχῃ, οὗτος εὐπόρως εἰπεῖν ἔχει διʼ ὧν ἂν τὰ παρόντα πράγματα βελτίω γένοιτο· καὶ πάλιν αὐτίκα δὴ μάλʼ ἐὰν ἀπέλθητε, ὁμοίως ἕκαστος ἐρεῖ τὰ δέοντα· ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ τούτων σκοπεῖν ὄντες καὶ συνειλεγμένοι πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ ταῦτα λεγόντων τινῶν ἀκούετε.

[¶26] 14.2. Then has each one of you, men of Athens, the gift of deciding what ought to be done, and does each know how to state the duties of the rest, while he is reluctant himself to do his own, and then again, does each man as an individual, as if to give the impression of being one who would of course promptly do what is best, find fault with everyone else, but as a body are you committed to fighting shy of voting such measures as will ensure that you will one and all become engaged in performing some duty to the State?

> Greek: 14.2. ἆρά γʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, γνῶναι μὲν ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ τὰ δέονθʼ ὑμῶν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰπεῖν ἐπίσταται, ποιῶν δʼ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος οὐ χαίρει, εἶτʼ ἰδίᾳ μέν, ὡς ἄρʼ αὐτὸς ἑτοίμως τὰ βέλτιστʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ πράττειν δόξων, τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμᾷ, κοινῇ δʼ εὐλαβεῖσθε τὰ τοιαῦτα ψηφίζεσθαι διʼ ὧν ἐν τῷ λῃτουργεῖν τι τῶν καθηκόντων ἅπαντες ἔσεσθε;

[¶27] 14.3. Well then, if you really think that no crisis will arrive to make a breach in this fence of evasiveness, it would be grand to carry on after this fashion. But if you see your troubles drawing nearer, you must plan that you shall not have to grapple with them at close range when it is possible to forestall them from a distance, and that you shall not have those whom you now disregard exulting later on at your discomfiture As for the problems now confronting the State, men of Athens, even though things are not as they should be, I do not consider it altogether difficult to discover by what action one may effect an improvement.

> Greek: 14.3. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν μηδένα καιρὸν οἴεσθʼ ἥξειν ὃς εἴσω τῆς εἰρωνείας ἀφίξεται ταύτης, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διάγειν· εἰ δὲ τὰ πράγμαθʼ ὁρᾶτʼ ἐγγυτέρω προσάγοντα, δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι ὅπως μὴ πλησίον αὐτοῖς μαχεῖσθε, ἃ πόρρωθεν ἔξεστι φυλάξασθαι, καὶ τοὺς νῦν περιοφθέντας ἐφηδομένους ὕστερον ἕξεθʼ οἷς ἂν πάσχητε. ΙΕ περὶ μὲν τῶν παρόντων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πραγμάτων τῇ πόλει, καίπερ οὐκ ἐχόντων ὡς δεῖ, οὐ πάνυ μοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν χαλεπῶν εἶναι ζητῆσαι τί ἄν τις πράξας βελτίω ποιήσειεν.

[¶28] 15.1. I judge, on the other hand, that the manner in which I must speak to you about them means very grave irritation; not because you will fail to understand what a person will say but because you seem to me to have become so accustomed to hearing many untruths and anything rather than what best meets your needs, that I fear it may be the lot of the man who now makes the best proposal to earn for his reward at your hands the hostility which would properly have been the due of those who have deceived you.

> Greek: 15.1. ὅντινα μέντοι χρὴ τρόπον πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, τοῦτο παμπόλλην δυσκολίαν ἔχειν νομίζω, οὐχ ὡς οὐ συνησόντων ὅ τι ἄν τις λέγῃ, ἀλλʼ οὕτω πολλὰ καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ βέλτιστα τοῖς πράγμασιν συνειθίσθαι μοι δοκεῖτʼ ἀκούειν, ὥστε δέδοικα μὴ τῷ νῦν τὰ βέλτιστʼ εἰπόντι, ἣν τοῖς ἐξηπατηκόσιν προσῆκεν ἀπέχθειαν ὑπάρχειν παρʼ ὑμῶν, ταύτην ἀπενέγκασθαι συμβῇ.

[¶29] 15.2. For I observe that often you hate, not those who are to blame for your troubles, but those who have most recently made mention of them to you. Nevertheless, although I am so precisely measuring this hazard, I still think that I must put all other subjects aside and confine myself to saying what I think is the best advice about the present situation.

> Greek: 15.2. ὁρῶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς πολλάκις οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν πραγμάτων μισοῦντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὑστάτους περὶ αὐτῶν εἰπόντας τι πρὸς ὑμᾶς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ οὕτως ἀκριβῶς ταῦτα λογιζόμενος, ὅμως οἶμαι δεῖν πάντα παρεὶς τἄλλα περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν παρόντων ἃ κράτιστα νομίζω λέγειν. ΙϚ ἐβουλόμην ἂν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ᾗ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας εἰώθατε προσφέρεσθαι φιλανθρωπίᾳ, ταύτῃ καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς χρῆσθαι·

[¶30] 16.1. I should have wished, men of Athens, that you treat yourselves with that benevolence which you are accustomed to practise toward all other peoples. As it now is, you are better at rectifying the woes of others than you are at taking to heart the troubles which befall yourselves. Someone may perhaps say, of course, that this is exactly what brings the greatest glory to the State—to have deliberately chosen to assume many risks for the sake of sheer justice with no thought of selfish advantage. Now, while I for one believe this reputation which prevails concerning the State to be true and desire it to be, yet I assume it also to be an obligation of prudent men to exercise as much foresight in their domestic affairs as in those of strangers, so that you may show yourselves to be not only men of goodwill but sensible also.

> Greek: 16.1. νυνὶ δʼ ἀμείνους ἐστὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων δείνʼ ἐπανορθοῦν ἢ τῶν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς συμβαινόντων φροντίζειν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ τοῦτό τις ἂν φήσειε μέγιστον ἔπαινον φέρειν τῇ πόλει, τὸ μηδενὸς ἕνεκα κέρδους ἰδίου πολλοὺς κινδύνους ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δικαίου προῃρῆσθαι. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην τʼ ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι νομίζω κατὰ τῆς πόλεως καὶ βούλομαι, κἀκεῖνο δʼ ὑπολαμβάνω σωφρόνων ἀνθρώπων ἔργον εἶναι, ἴσην πρόνοιαν τῶν αὑτοῖς οἰκείων ὅσηνπερ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα μὴ φιλάνθρωποι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντες φαίνησθε. ΙΖ ἴσως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, προσήκει τῷ βουλομένῳ τι παραινεῖν ὑμῖν οὕτω πειρᾶσθαι λέγειν ὡς καὶ δυνήσεσθʼ ὑπομεῖναι·

[¶31] 17.1. Perhaps it really is the duty, men of Athens, of one who wishes to recommend some measure to you to attempt to speak in such a way that you will find it possible to hear him to the end; but otherwise his duty is to leave aside all other themes and discuss only those matters you are considering, and these as briefly as possible. For I do not think it due to any lack of speeches that now once more you observe all your affairs to be in a muddle, but the reason is that some are orating and playing politics for their own gain, and others, who have so far not given evidence of this offence, are more concerned to be thought good speakers than that some concrete good may be effected by what they say. As for me, that I may not unwittingly do the opposite of what I myself say is right, and say more about other matters than about those of which I have risen to speak, I shall disregard all other topics and endeavor to tell you forthwith what I recommend.

> Greek: 17.1. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀφέντα τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας λόγους, περὶ αὐτῶν ὧν σκοπεῖτε συμβουλεύειν, καὶ ταῦθʼ ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. οὐ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ μοι δοκεῖτε λόγων οὐδὲ νῦν ὁρᾶν τὰ πράγματα πάντα λελυμασμένα, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοὺς μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα δημηγορεῖν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ μήπω τούτου δεδωκότας πεῖραν μᾶλλον ὅπως εὖ δόξουσι λέγειν σπουδάζειν, ἢ πῶς ἔργον ἐξ ὧν λέγουσί τι συμφέρον πραχθήσεται. ἐγὼ δʼ ἵνα μὴ λάθω τοὐναντίον οὗ φημὶ δεῖν αὐτὸς ποιῶν, καὶ πλείω περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ περὶ ὧν ἀνέστην λέγων, ἀφεὶς τἄλλα πάντα, ἃ παραινῶ καὶ δὴ πειράσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν. ΙΗ δοκεῖτέ μοι δικαίως ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, εἴ τις ὑπόσχοιθʼ ὑμῖν ταὐτὰ δίκαια καὶ συμφέροντα δείξειν ὄνθʼ ὑπὲρ ὧν βουλευόμεθα.

[¶32] 18.1. I think that you would rightly pay attention, men of Athens, if any man should promise to demonstrate that in the matters you are considering justice and expediency coincide. Now I believe that I shall do this without difficulty if you on your part will comply with a very slight request of mine. Let none of you, according as one or another has an opinion about the present situation, be positive that he is right in all his conclusions; but, if it turns out that something be said against these, let him consider it, listening to all the points patiently, and then, if some suggestion seems to have been rightly made, adopt it. For the measure that succeeds will belong no less to you who adopted it than to him who proposed it to you. Surely the first step toward sound deliberation is not to have reached a decision before you have heard the discussions upon which you should base your decision. For the occasion and the method of ratifying your resolutions and of deciding in the first instance what seems expedient are not the same.

> Greek: 18.1. ἐγὼ τοίνυν οἴομαι τοῦτο ποιήσειν οὐ χαλεπῶς, ἂν ὑμεῖς βραχύ τί μοι πεισθῆτε πάνυ. μὴ πάντα, ὡς ἕκαστος ἔχει γνώμης ὑμῶν περὶ τῶν παρόντων, ὀρθῶς ἐγνωκέναι πεπείσθω, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν παρὰ ταῦτά τι συμβαίνῃ λέγεσθαι, σκοπείτω πάνθʼ ὑπομείνας ἀκοῦσαι, εἶτʼ ἂν ὀρθῶς εἰρῆσθαί τι δοκῇ, χρήσθω. οὐ γὰρ ἧττον ὑμέτερον ἔσται τῶν χρησαμένων τὸ κατορθωθὲν ⟨ἢ⟩ τοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπόντος. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ σκοπεῖν ὀρθῶς ἐστιν μὴ βεβουλεῦσθαι πρὶν ἐξ ὧν δεῖ βουλεύσασθαι ἀκοῦσαι. οὐ γὰρ αὑτὸς οὔτε καιρὸς οὔτε τρόπος τοῦ τʼ ἐπικυρῶσαι τὰ δοκοῦντα καὶ τοῦ σκέψασθαι τί πρῶτον δοκεῖ συμφέρειν. ΙΘ μεθʼ ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παρελήλυθα βουλευσόμενος, πότερον χρή με λέγειν ἢ μή.

[¶33] 19.1. I have come forward, men of Athens, to consult with you whether I should speak or not, and I shall explain to you for what reason I am at a loss how to decide this by myself. It is obligatory, in my opinion, that one who seeks to gratify neither himself nor certain people, but wishes to say on your behalf what he is convinced is most expedient, should both support good measures proposed by either side, and, conversely, oppose all unfair proposals which either side thinks fit to urge. Accordingly, if you should submit to hear both these lines of argument briefly, you would deliberate much better on the remaining questions; but, if you should desert me before learning my views, it would be my lot to be put in the wrong with both sides without being guilty of injustice to either. Now, I do not deserve to be in this plight. Therefore, if you bid me, I am prepared to speak; otherwise it is well for me to keep silence.

> Greek: 19.1. διὸ δʼ αὐτὸς τοῦτʼ ἀπορῶ κρῖναι, φράσω πρὸς ὑμᾶς. ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ τῷ μήθʼ αὑτῷ μήτε τισὶν χαρίσασθαι βουλομένῳ, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν εἰπεῖν ἃ πέπεικεν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα συμφέρειν, καὶ συνειπεῖν ἃ καλῶς λέγουσιν ἀμφότεροι, καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀντειπεῖν ὅσα μὴ δίκαιʼ ἀξιοῦσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὑμεῖς ὑπομείναιτʼ ἀκοῦσαι ταῦτʼ ἀμφότερα διὰ βραχέων, πολλῷ βέλτιον ἂν περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν βουλεύσαισθε· εἰ δὲ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἀποσταίητε, γένοιτʼ ἂν ἐμοὶ μηδετέρους ἀδικοῦντι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους διαβεβλῆσθαι. τοῦτο δʼ οὐχὶ δίκαιός εἰμι παθεῖν. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν κελεύητε, ἕτοιμός εἰμι λέγειν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ σιωπᾶν ἔχει μοι καλῶς. Κ καὶ δίκαιον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ συμφέρον ὑμῖν ἡγοῦμαι τὰς μὲν αἰτίας καὶ τὰς κατηγορίας, ὅταν βουλεύεσθαι δέῃ, παραλείπειν, περὶ τῶν παρόντων δὲ λέγειν ὅ τι βέλτιστον ἕκαστος ἡγεῖται.

[¶34] 20.1. I consider it both just and profitable, men of Athens, for you to lay aside charges and accusations when we are to deliberate, and for each one to say what he thinks is best concerning the matters before you. For while we all understand that through the fault of certain men our affairs are in a bad way, it is the task of your counsellor to suggest by what means they may be improved.

> Greek: 20.1. ὅτι μὲν γάρ τινων αἰτίων ὄντων κακῶς τὰ πράγματʼ ἔχει, πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα· ἐξ ὅτου δὲ τρόπου βελτίω δύναιτʼ ἂν γενέσθαι, τοῦτο τοῦ συμβουλεύοντος ἔργον εἰπεῖν.

[¶35] 20.2. Moreover, I for my part regard as stern accusers of the wrongdoers, not those who scrutinize their past actions on such occasions as this, when they will pay no penalty, but those who prove able to offer such advice as may effect some amelioration of our present situation; for with the help of these men it would also be possible at your leisure to bring those guilty men to justice.

> Greek: 20.2. ἔπειτʼ ἔγωγε νομίζω καὶ κατηγόρους εἶναι τῶν ἀδικούντων χαλεποὺς οὐ τοὺς ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς ἐξετάζοντας τὰ πεπραγμένα, ὅτʼ οὐδεμίαν δώσουσι δίκην, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοιοῦτό τι συμβουλεῦσαι δυνηθέντας ἀφʼ οὗ βελτίω τὰ παρόντα γένοιτʼ ἄν· διὰ γὰρ τούτους ἐφʼ ἡσυχίας καὶ παρʼ ἐκείνων ἐγγένοιτʼ ἂν ὑμῖν δίκην λαβεῖν.

[¶36] 20.3. Accordingly, I consider all other topics to be out of place but shall attempt to tell you what I think would be expedient in the matters you are now considering, making this request only: if after all I do make mention of any of those things done in the past, do not think that I am speaking by way of accusation, but in order that, having shown you wherein you then erred, I may now avert your suffering the same misfortune again.

> Greek: 20.3. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλους λόγους πάντας περιέργους ἡγοῦμαι, ἃ δʼ ἂν οἶμαι συνενεγκεῖν περὶ ὧν νυνὶ σκοπεῖτε, ταῦτʼ εἰπεῖν πειράσομαι, τοσοῦτον ἀξιώσας μόνον· ἂν ἄρα του μεμνῶμαι τῶν πεπραγμένων, μὴ κατηγορίας μʼ ἕνεχʼ ἡγεῖσθε λέγειν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα δείξας ἃ τόθʼ ἡμάρτετε, νῦν ἀποτρέψω ταὐτὰ παθεῖν. ΚΑ εἰ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μηδενὶ συμπολιτευόμενοι τοσαύτην ἤγομεν ἡσυχίαν ὅσηνπερ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, οὔτε τὰ νῦν ἂν γεγενημένα συμβῆναι νομίζω, τῶν τʼ ἄλλων οἶμαι πολλὰ βέλτιον ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχειν.

[¶37] 21.1. If all along, men of Athens, we had been as peaceful as at this moment, playing into the hands of no politician, I believe that the events which now have happened would never have taken place and that in many other respects we should be in better shape. But of late, because of the high-handedness of some men, it is impossible either to come forward or speak, or in general to get in a word. The consequences of this are numerous and perhaps not to our liking. Accordingly, if what you wish is to be all the time getting this kind of news, to be considering what you ought to do, and to be in such a plight as at present, you will vote the same measures as for years past—to launch triremes, to embark, to pay a special war-tax and all that sort of thing, forthwith. Then in three or five days, if rumors of hostile movements cease and our enemies become inactive, you will once more assume that there is no longer need to act. This is just what happened when we heard that Philip was in the Hellespont and again when the pirate triremes put in at Marathon.

> Greek: 21.1. νῦν δʼ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνίων ἀσελγείας οὔτε παρελθεῖν οὔτʼ εἰπεῖν οὔθʼ ὅλως λόγου τυχεῖν ἔστιν. ὅθεν συμβαίνει πολλὰ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιτήδειʼ ἴσως. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀεὶ ταὐτά, πυνθάνεσθαι, καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιῆσαι, καὶ πάσχειν οἷάπερ νυνὶ βούλεσθε, ψηφιεῖσθʼ ἅπερ ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων χρόνων, καθέλκειν τριήρεις, ἐμβαίνειν, εἰσφέρειν, πάντα ταῦτʼ ἤδη· ἃ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἢ πέντε, ἂν σιωπηθῇ τὰ παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ σχῶσιν ἡσυχίαν ἐκεῖνοι, πάλιν οὐκέτι καιρὸν εἶναι πράττειν ὑπολήψεσθε. ὅπερ, ἡνίκʼ ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ Φίλιππον ἠκούσαμεν, συνέβη, καὶ πάλιν ἡνίκʼ εἰς Μαραθῶνα τριήρεις αἱ λῃστρίδες προσέσχον.

[¶38] 21.3. For just as a man would properly employ a force in arms, men of Athens, you are accustomed to handle your deliberations, with dispatch. What you ought to do, however, is to deliberate at leisure but put your decisions into effect with speed, and to make up your minds to this, that unless you shall provide an adequate food-supply and place some general of good sense in charge of the war, and be willing to abide by the decisions so taken, you will have to your credit just a lot of decrees, and while you will have squandered all that you have spent, your interests will be not a whit advanced and in angry mood you will put on trial whomever it pleases you. For my part, I wish you to be seen repelling your enemies before sitting in judgement on your fellow-citizens; for it is a crime for us to make war upon one another rather than upon them.

> Greek: 21.3. ὡς γὰρ ἂν χρήσαιτό τις, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καλῶς δυνάμει παρεσκευασμένῃ, οὕτως ὑμεῖς εἰώθατε τῷ βουλεύεσθαι χρῆσθαι, ὀξέως. δεῖ δὲ βουλεύεσθαι μὲν ἐφʼ ἡσυχίας, ποιεῖν δὲ τὰ δόξαντα μετὰ σπουδῆς, καὶ λογίσασθαι τοῦθʼ ὅτι εἰ μὴ καὶ τροφὴν ἱκανὴν ποριεῖτε καὶ στρατηγόν τινα τοῦ πολέμου νοῦν ἔχοντα προστήσεσθε καὶ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν οὕτω δοξάντων ἐθελήσετε, ψηφίσμαθʼ ὑμῖν περιέσται, καὶ παραναλώσετε μὲν πάνθʼ ὅσʼ ἂν δαπανήσητε, βελτίω δʼ οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν τὰ πράγματʼ ἔσται, κρινεῖτε δʼ ὃν ἂν βούλησθʼ ὀργισθέντες. ἐγὼ δὲ βούλομαι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμᾶς ἀμυνομένους ὀφθῆναι πρότερον ἢ τοὺς πολίτας κρίνοντας· οὐ γὰρ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ʼκείνοις ἐσμὲν δίκαιοι.

[¶39] 21.4. In order, therefore, that I may not censure only— the easiest of all things shall explain how I think you may accomplish this, requesting you not to make an uproar or get the idea that I am merely procrastinating and interposing delay. For it is not those who say “At once” and “Today” who speak most to the point, for we could not prevent by the present reinforcement what has already happened; but it will be the man who shows what armament, once furnished, will be able to hold out until we either get the upper hand of our enemies or by accepting terms bring the war to an end. For in this way we should no longer suffer aggression in time to come.

> Greek: 21.4. ἵνʼ οὖν μή, τὸ ῥᾷστον ἁπάντων, ἐπιτιμήσω μόνον, ὃν τρόπον ἄν μοι δοκεῖτε ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διδάξω, δεηθεὶς ὑμῶν μὴ θορυβῆσαι μηδʼ ἀναβάλλειν νομίσαι με καὶ χρόνον ἐμποιεῖν. οὐ γὰρ οἱ ταχὺ καὶ τήμερον εἰπόντες μάλιστʼ εἰς [τὸ] δέον λέγουσιν ʽοὐ γὰρ ἂν τά γʼ ἤδη γεγενημένα κωλῦσαι δυνηθείημεν τῇ νυνὶ βοηθείᾀ, ἀλλʼ ὃς ἂν δείξῃ τίς πορισθεῖσα παρασκευὴ διαμεῖναι δυνήσεται, τέως ἂν ἢ περιγενώμεθα τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ πεισθέντες διαλυσώμεθα τὸν πόλεμον· οὕτω γὰρ οὐκέτι τοῦ λοιποῦ πάσχοιμεν ἂν κακῶς. ΚΒ οἶμαι πάντας ἂν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὁμολογῆσαι, ὅτι δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν, ὅταν μὲν περὶ τῶν ἰδίων τινὸς τῶν αὑτῆς βουλεύηται, ἴσην πρόνοιαν ἔχειν τοῦ συμφέροντος ὅσηνπερ τοῦ δικαίου, ὅταν δʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν συμμαχικῶν ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, οἷον καὶ τὸ νυνὶ παρόν, μηδενὸς οὕτως ὡς τοῦ δικαίου φροντίζειν.

[¶40] 22.1. I believe that all of you, men of Athens, would agree that our city, when deliberating about any of her domestic affairs, should have as much concern for advantage as for justice, but when the question has to do with our allies or the general interests of Greece, as in the present instance, she ought to be mindful of nothing so scrupulously as of justice. Because in the former matters, expediency suffices, but in such as the latter, honor as well ought to play a part. For, of the actions themselves they become arbiters to whom the decisions belong; of the opinion formed of them, however, no man is so powerful as to be the arbiter; but whatever opinion shall attach to the actions, such is that which the multitude spreads abroad concerning the actors. Therefore you must look to it diligently that your actions shall be manifestly just.

> Greek: 22.1. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνοις τὸ λυσιτελὲς ἐξαρκεῖ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τὸ καλὸν προσεῖναι δεῖ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων, εἰς οὓς ἂν ἥκωσι, κύριοι καθίστανται· τῆς δʼ ὑπὲρ τούτων δόξης οὐδεὶς τηλικοῦτός ἐσθʼ ὅστις ἔσται κύριος, ἀλλʼ ὁποίαν τινʼ ἂν τὰ πραχθέντʼ ἔχῃ δόξαν, τοιαύτην οἱ πολλοὶ περὶ τῶν πραξάντων διήγγειλαν. διὸ δεῖ σκοπεῖν καὶ προσέχειν ὅπως δίκαια φανεῖται.

## 2. Exordia 22–39

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/2/#p-N

[¶0] 22.3. By rights, of course, all men should feel toward those who are wronged as each would think fit to demand of all others to feel toward himself if something should go amiss, which I pray may not happen. Since, however, certain persons, contrary to their own judgement, take the opposite stand, I shall first address a few words to them and thereupon offer what I assume to be the best advice for you.

> Greek: 22.3. χρῆν μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἅπαντας ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν περὶ τῶν ἀδικουμένων ὥσπερ ἄν, εἴ τι γένοιτο, ὃ μὴ συμβαίη, τοὺς ἄλλους ἀξιώσειε πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕκαστος ἔχειν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν γνώμην ἐναντιοῦνταί τινες, μικρὰ πρὸς τούτους εἰπών, ἃ βέλτισθʼ ὑμῖν ὑπολαμβάνω, ταῦτʼ ἤδη συμβουλεύσω. ΚΓ οὐ μικρὰν ἄν μοι δοκεῖτʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ζημίαν νομίσαι, εἴ τις ἀηδὴς δόξα καὶ μὴ προσήκουσα τῇ πόλει παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς περιγίγνοιτο.

[¶1] 23.1. No small detriment you would esteem it, as I believe, men of Athens, if some offensive opinion and discreditable to the city should come to prevail abroad. Now then, right as you are in this judgement, your actions in general are not consistent with it; but time and again you are misled into doing things that not even you yourselves would say are honorable. And while I am aware that all men receive with more pleasure those who praise than those who rebuke, yet I do not think it right in quest of this goodwill to say anything but what I judge to be in your interests.

> Greek: 23.1. τοῦτο τοίνυν οὕτω καλῶς ἐγνωκότες οὐκ ἀκόλουθα ποιεῖτε τὰ λοιπά, ἀλλʼ ὑπάγεσθʼ ἑκάστοτε πράττειν ἔνια, ἃ οὐδʼ ἂν αὐτοὶ φήσαιτε καλῶς ἔχειν. ἐγὼ δʼ οἶδα μὲν τοῦθʼ ὅτι τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας ἥδιον προσδέχονται πάντες τῶν ἐπιτιμώντων· οὐ μὴν οἴομαι δεῖν, ταύτην τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν διώκων, λέγειν παρʼ ἃ συμφέρειν ὑμῖν ἡγοῦμαι.

[¶2] 23.2. If, then, at the outset your judgement had been sound, there would have been no need to assume that as a body you must do what as individuals you condemn, so that this very thing should not be happening which is now going on. While every man goes about saying “How disgraceful, how shocking!” and “How long will this business go on?”, every man sitting here with you is himself one of those who do such things. As for me, I should certainly have wished that, just as I know it pays you to listen to the speaker who makes the best proposals, so I might be sure it would also pay the one who made them; for so I should be much happier. As it now is, I have fears; nevertheless, I shall not be deterred from saying what I am confident will prove to be best, even if you shall not be convinced.

> Greek: 23.2. κγ τὴν μὲν [οὖν] ἀρχὴν εἰ καλῶς ἐγιγνώσκετε, οὐδὲν δεῖν κοινῇ ποιεῖν ὑποληπτέον ἦν ὧν ἰδίᾳ μέμφεσθε, ἵνα μὴ συνέβαινεν ὅπερ νυνὶ γίγνεται· περιιὼν μὲν ἕκαστος ὡς αἰσχρὰ καὶ δεινά λέγει καὶ μέχρι τοῦ προβήσεται τὰ πράγματα; συγκαθεζόμενος δʼ αὐτὸς ἕκαστός ἐστι τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιούντων. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἐβουλόμην ἄν, ὥσπερ ὅτι ὑμῖν συμφέρει τοῦ τὰ βέλτιστα λέγοντος ἀκούειν οἶδα, οὕτως εἰδέναι συνοῖσον καὶ τῷ τὰ βέλτιστʼ εἰπόντι· πολλῷ γὰρ ἂν ἥδιον εἶχον. νῦν δὲ φοβοῦμαι μέν, ὅμως δʼ ἅ γε πιστεύω χρηστὰ φανεῖσθαι, κἂν ὑμεῖς μὴ πεισθῆτε, οὐκ ἀποτρέψομαι λέγειν. ΚΔ εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο τις, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρότερον παρʼ ὑμῖν εἰρηκὼς εἴη, νῦν γε λέγων περὶ ὧν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ πρέσβεις τῇ πόλει, παρὰ πάντων ἄν μοι δοκεῖ δικαίως συγγνώμης τυχεῖν.

[¶3] 24.1. Even if the speaker were one who had never spoken on another subject before you, men of Athens, surely now, discussing the groundless charges which the ambassadors bring against the State, he might well, I think, meet with indulgence from all. For in certain other contests to be worsted by one’s adversaries may seem to be not so much a reproach as a misfortune, because luck and the officials in charge and many other factors play a part in the winning or the losing of a contest; but in the event of men having no self-justification to offer worthy of the merits of their case we shall find the reproach of those found in this plight to attach to nothing but their intelligence.

> Greek: 24.1. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις μέν τισιν ἡττᾶσθαι τῶν ἐναντίων οὐχ οὕτως ὄνειδος ὡς ἀτύχημʼ ἂν φανείη· καὶ γὰρ τῇ τύχῃ καὶ τοῖς ἐφεστηκόσι καὶ πολλοῖς μέτεστι τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ ἀγωνίσασθαι· ἐν δὲ τῷ τὰ δίκαιʼ ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν μὴ ἔχειν ἀξίως τῶν ὑπαρχόντων εἰπεῖν αὐτῆς τῆς γνώμης τῆς τῶν τοῦτο παθόντων τὸ ὄνειδος εὑρήσομεν.

[¶4] 24.2. Surely if it had been some other people before whom these speeches about you were being made, I do not think these men would be finding it so easy to lie nor would the hearers have tolerated many of their assertions. But as things now are, I think that in general all and every take advantage of your simplicity and in particular these men have done so on the present occasion; for they have found in you such an audience for charges against yourselves as they would have found in no other people, as I know for a certainty.

> Greek: 24.2. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕτεροί τινες ἦσαν ἐν οἷς ἐγίγνονθʼ οἱ λόγοι περὶ ὑμῶν, οὔτε τούτους ἂν οἶμαι ῥᾳδίως οὕτω ψεύδεσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς ἀκούοντας πολλὰ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνασχέσθαι. νῦν δὲ τἄλλα τʼ οἶμαι τῆς ὑμετέρας πλεονεκτοῦσιν εὐηθείας ἅπαντες, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο νῦν οὗτοι· ἀκροαταῖς γὰρ ἐχρήσαντο καθʼ ὑμῶν ὑμῖν οἵοις οὐδέσιν ἂν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀκριβῶς οἶδα τοῦτʼ ἐγώ.

[¶5] 24.3. And well may you, in my view, men of Athens, for this turn of events be grateful to the gods and detest these men. For the fact that they see the democracy of Rhodes, which used to address you much more presumptuously than these, now become your suppliant, I consider a piece of good fortune for the State; but that these stupid men should neither consider this, though it is so plain to see, nor that you have often gone to the rescue of them one after another, and that you have been put to more trouble rectifying the errors of their rashness and infatuation, whenever they have chosen to make war on their own account, than in managing your own affairs, might well have aroused in you the profoundest wrath, it seems to me.

> Greek: 24.3. ἄξιον δʼ εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ διὰ ταῦτα τοῖς θεοῖς χάριν ὑμᾶς ἔχειν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τούτους μισεῖν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὁρᾶν τούτους τὸν Ῥοδίων δῆμον, τὸν πολὺ τούτων ποτʼ ἀσελγεστέρους λόγους λέγοντα πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἱκέτην ὑμέτερον γεγενημένον εὐτύχημʼ εἶναι νομίζω τῆς πόλεως· τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἀνοήτους τούτους μήτε τοῦτο λογίζεσθαι, παρὸν οὕτως ἐναργὲς ἰδεῖν, μήθʼ ὅτι πολλάκις καθʼ ἕνʼ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὑμεῖς σεσῴκατε, καὶ πλείω πράγματʼ ἐσχήκατε τὴν τούτων θρασύτητα καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν ἐπανορθοῦντες, ἐπειδὰν διʼ ἑαυτοὺς ἀνέλωνται πόλεμον, ἢ τὰ ὑμέτερʼ αὐτῶν πράττοντες, τοῦτο παμπόλλην ὑμῖν ὀργὴν εἰκότως ἂν παραστῆσαί μοι δοκεῖ.

[¶6] 24.4. Perhaps, however, it is the destiny of these people never to be wise when prosperous. Still it is the fitting thing for you, because you are who you are and because of the past performance of the State, to make a point of demonstrating to all men that, as in former times, so now and always we prefer to practise justice, though certain others, wishing to enslave their own fellow-citizens, accuse them falsely before us.

> Greek: 24.4. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἴσως τούτοις μὲν εἵμαρται μηδέποτʼ εὖ πράττουσιν εὖ φρονῆσαι· ἡμῖν δὲ προσήκει καὶ διʼ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ διὰ τἄλλʼ ἃ πέπρακται τῇ πόλει, σπουδάσαι δεῖξαι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὅτι καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν τὰ δίκαια προαιρούμεθα πράττειν, ἕτεροι δέ τινες καταδουλοῦσθαι βουλόμενοι τοὺς αὑτῶν πολίτας διαβάλλουσιν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. ΚΕ εἰ μετὰ τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τούς τε λόγους ἠκούετε τῶν συμβουλευόντων καὶ τὰ πράγματʼ ἐκρίνετε, πάντων ἀσφαλέστατον ἦν ἂν τὸ συμβουλεύειν.

[¶7] 25.1. If you were of the same mind, men of Athens, when listening to the speeches of those who counsel you and when judging the outcome of measures taken, offering advice would be the safest thing in the world. For if you met with good luck and success—because one must always use words of good omen—the credit for these would be common to yourselves and the sponsor. But, as things are, you most enjoy listening to those who say what you wish to hear, yet often you charge them with deceiving you if everything does not turn out the way you would like, not taking this into account, that of the task of studying and calculating the best measures, within human limitations, and of explaining them to you, each man is himself the arbiter, but of their execution and profitableness the control, for the most part, lies in the power of Fortune.

> Greek: 25.1. καὶ γὰρ εὐτυχῶς καὶ ἄλλως πράξασι ʽλέγειν γὰρ εὐφήμως πάντα δεἶ κοίνʼ ἂν ἦν τὰ τῆς αἰτίας ὑμῖν καὶ τῷ πείσαντι. νῦν δʼ ἀκούετε μὲν τῶν ἃ βούλεσθε λεγόντων ἥδιστα, αἰτιᾶσθε δὲ πολλάκις ἐξαπατᾶν ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, ἐὰν μὴ πάνθʼ ὃν ἂν ὑμεῖς τρόπον βούλησθε γένηται, οὐ λογιζόμενοι τοῦθʼ ὅτι τοῦ μὲν ζητῆσαι καὶ λογίσασθαι τὰ βέλτιστα, ὡς ἄνθρωπος, καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν αὐτὸς ἕκαστός ἐστιν κύριος, τοῦ δὲ πραχθῆναι ταῦτα καὶ συνενεγκεῖν ἐν τῇ τύχῃ τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος γίγνεται.

[¶8] 25.2. As a human being it is enough for a man to stand accountable for his own thinking; but to stand accountable also for the play of Fortune is quite impossible.

> Greek: 25.2. ἔστιν δʼ ἄνθρωπον ὄντʼ ἀγαπητὸν τῆς αὑτοῦ διανοίας λόγον ὑπέχειν· τῆς δὲ τύχης πρὸς ὑποσχεῖν ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων.

[¶9] 25.3. Certainly, if a way had been discovered whereby a man might address the people with safety to the State and without hazard to himself, it would be madness to ignore it; but since it is a certainty that one who declares an opinion on actions about to be taken will share in the benefits therefrom accruing and participate in the credit for these benefits, I consider it shameful to speak as a loyal citizen, yet not face the test if some danger shall arise therefrom. So I pray the gods that such measures as are destined to profit both the State and myself may occur to my mind to suggest and to you to adopt. For to seek by any and every means to be on the winning side is either one of two things, I should say, a sign of mental derangement or of one who is bent on selfish gain.

> Greek: 25.3. εἰ μὲν οὖν ηὑρημένον ἦν πῶς ἄν τις ἀσφαλῶς ἄνευ κινδύνου δημηγοροίη, μανία παραλείπειν τοῦτον ⟨ἂν⟩ ἦν τὸν τρόπον· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἀνάγκη τὸν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων πραγμάτων γνώμην ἀποφαινόμενον [κοινωνεῖν τοῖς ἀπʼ αὐτῶν γενομένοις] καὶ μετέχειν τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων αἰτίας, αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι λέγειν μὲν ὡς εὔνους, μὴ ὑπομένειν δέ, εἴ τις ἐκ τούτου κίνδυνος ἔσται. εὔχομαι δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς, ἃ καὶ τῇ πόλει κἀμοὶ συμφέρειν μέλλει, ταῦτʼ ἐμοί τʼ εἰπεῖν ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ νοῦν καὶ ὑμῖν ἑλέσθαι. τὸ γὰρ πάντα τρόπον ζητεῖν νικῆσαι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ μανίας ἢ κέρδους ἕνεκʼ ἐσπουδακότος φήσαιμʼ ἂν εἶναι. ΚϚ εἴη μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ περὶ ὧν νυνὶ τυγχάνετʼ ἐκκλησιάζοντες καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ταὐτὰ καὶ δοκοῦντα βέλτισθʼ ὑμῖν εἶναι καὶ ὄνθʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς.

[¶10] 26.1. If only it might be, men of Athens, that, when assembling to discuss the present questions or any others, the seemingly best for you and the really best might be one and the same! It is your duty, however, when deliberating on matters of supreme importance and of general concern, to be willing to listen to all your counsellors, as it seems to me, thinking it shameful, men of Athens, to create an uproar now when a number of speakers wish to propose some measure, but later to enjoy hearing these same men denouncing what has been done.

> Greek: 26.1. δεῖ μέντοι περὶ πραγμάτων μεγάλων βουλευομένους καὶ κοινῶν, ἁπάντων ἐθέλειν ἀκούειν τῶν συμβουλευόντων, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νῦν μὲν βουλομένων τι παραινεῖν ἐνίων θορυβεῖν, ὕστερον δὲ κατηγορούντων τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων τῶν πεπραγμένων ἡδέως ἀκούειν.

[¶11] 26.2. I myself know, and I think you do too, that just now those please you most who express the same views that you yourselves wish to hear; but if something turns out contrary to what you now expect—and may this not be the case —that you will believe that these men have deceived you, while those whom you cannot now endure you will then think to be right. In reality, it is those who have done most to persuade you of the wisdom of the proposals which you are now considering who have most to gain by the opposition securing an opportunity to speak.

> Greek: 26.2. ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶδα, νομίζω δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς, ὅτι νῦν μὲν ἀρέσκουσι μάλισθʼ ὑμῖν οἱ ταὔθʼ οἷς ὑμεῖς βούλεσθε λέγοντες· ἂν δέ τι συμβῇ παρʼ ἃ νῦν οἴεσθε, ὃ μὴ συμβαίη, τούτους μὲν ἐξηπατηκέναι νομιεῖθʼ ὑμᾶς, ὧν δὲ νῦν οὐκ ἀνέχεσθε, τότʼ ὀρθῶς δόξουσι λέγειν. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς μάλιστα πεπεικόσιν ὑμᾶς ταῦτʼ ἐφʼ ὧν νῦν ἐστε, τούτοις καὶ μάλιστα συμφέρον τὸ λόγου τυχεῖν τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας.

[¶12] 26.3. For if it shall be able to show that the proposals which seem best to these men are not the best, when as yet no mistake has been made, it will by so doing nullify their risks for them; yet if it fails to persuade, they will later, at any rate, have no occasion to find fault, but, having obtained all that it was the duty of men to give, a hearing, they will rightly be content if defeated, and along with all the rest share in the outcome, whatever that maybe.

> Greek: 26.3. ἂν μὲν γὰρ διδάξαι δυνηθῶσιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρισθʼ ἃ τούτοις δοκεῖ, ὅτʼ οὐδὲν ἡμάρτηταί πω, τοῦτο πράξαντες ἀθῴους τοῦ κινδύνου ποιήσουσιν αὐτούς. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ δυνηθῶσιν, οὔκουν ὕστερόν γʼ ἐπιτιμᾶν ἕξουσιν, ἀλλʼ ὅσʼ ἀνθρώπων ἦν ἔργον, ἀκοῦσαι, τούτων τετυχηκότες, ἂν ἡττῶνται δικαίως στέρξουσιν, καὶ μεθʼ ἁπάντων τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, ὁποῖʼ ἄττʼ ἂν ᾖ, κοινωνήσουσιν. ΚΖ οἶμαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, περὶ τηλικούτων βουλευομένους διδόναι παρρησίαν ἑκάστῳ τῶν συμβουλευόντων.

[¶13] 27.1. I think it your duty, men of Athens, when deliberating about such important matters to allow freedom of speech to every one of your counsellors. For my own part, I have never at any time considered it difficult to make you understand what proposals are best—for, to put it simply, I think you all have decided that,—but only difficult to persuade you to act on these proposals. For when a measure has been approved and confirmed by a vote, it is then as far from being put into effect as before it was approved.

> Greek: 27.1. ἐγὼ δʼ οὐδεπώποθʼ ἡγησάμην χαλεπὸν τὸ διδάξαι τὰ βέλτισθʼ ὑμᾶς ʽὡς γὰρ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, πάντες ὑπάρχειν ἐγνωκότες ἔμοιγε δοκεῖτἐ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πεῖσαι πράττειν ταῦτα· ἐπειδὰν γάρ τι δόξῃ καὶ ψηφισθῇ, τότʼ ἴσον τοῦ πραχθῆναι ἀπέχει ὅσονπερ πρὶν δόξαι.

[¶14] 27.2. It certainly is something for which I think you owe gratitude to the gods that those who, through their own arrogance, not long ago made war upon you now repose the hopes of their own deliverance in you alone, and you have good reason to be delighted at the present opportunity. For the effect will be, if you decide about it as you ought, to rid ourselves, by the language of deeds, of the slanders circulated by the traducers of our city, and also to maintain our good repute.

> Greek: 27.2. ἔστιν μὲν οὖν ὧν ἐγὼ νομίζω χάριν ὑμᾶς τοῖς θεοῖς ὀφείλειν, τὸ τοὺς διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ὕβριν ὑμῖν πολεμήσαντας ⟨οὐ⟩ πάλαι, νῦν ἐν ὑμῖν μόνοις τῆς αὑτῶν σωτηρίας ἔχειν τὰς ἐλπίδας. ἄξιον δʼ ἡσθῆναι τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ· συμβήσεται γὰρ ὑμῖν, ἂν ἃ χρὴ βουλεύσησθʼ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, τὰς παρὰ τῶν διαβαλλόντων τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν βλασφημίας ἔργῳ μετὰ δόξης καλῆς ἀπολύσασθαι. ΚΗ αἱ μὲν ἐλπίδες, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μεγάλαι καὶ καλαὶ τῶν προειρημένων, πρὸς ἃς οἴομαι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τι πεπονθέναι.

[¶15] 28.1. The hopes aroused by what has been previously said, men of Athens, are great and glorious; I fancy that most of you have been somewhat swayed by them without really thinking. As for myself, I have never been minded to tell you for the sake of your momentary gratification anything that I did not think would also subsequently prove to be of advantage. Naturally it is a trait common to most men to like those who join in applauding them, whatever they do, but to dislike those who find fault with them. Nevertheless, the sensible man should always strive to make reason the master of his feelings.

> Greek: 28.1. ἐγὼ δʼ οὐδεπώποτʼ ἔγνων ἕνεκα τοῦ παραχρῆμʼ ἀρέσαι λέγειν τι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὅ τι ἂν μὴ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα συνοίσειν ἡγῶμαι. ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ κοινὸν ἔθος τῶν πλείστων τοὺς μὲν συνεπαινοῦντας ἑαυτοῖς ὅ τι ἂν πράττωσι φιλεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐπιτιμῶντας ἀηδῶς ἔχειν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸν εὖ φρονοῦντα τὸν λογισμὸν ἀεὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρείττω πειρᾶσθαι ποιεῖν.

[¶16] 28.2. I should have been glad, myself, to see you happy at putting into effect the measures going to profit you, that I might have been found both meeting your wishes and giving good advice. But since I see you about to try the opposite measures, I think I ought to speak against them, even if I shall be hated for it by certain persons. So, if you will not endure to hear even one word from me, you will be thought to be preferring such a course of action, not through an error of judgement, but through your natural propensity to do wrong. However, if you do listen, you may perhaps be won over to the other view, which I think would be most to your advantage. But if you refuse to listen, some will plead ignorance of what was advantageous, while others—well, what a man likes to say he will say.

> Greek: 28.2. ἐγὼ δʼ ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἑώρων, ἃ καὶ συνοίσειν ἔμελλε, ταῦτʼ ἐν ἡδονῇ πράττειν ὄνθʼ ὑμῖν, ἵνα καὶ χαριζόμενος καὶ χρηστὰ λέγων ἐφαινόμην. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τἀναντίʼ ὁρῶ τούτων ἐπιχειροῦντας ὑμᾶς, οἴομαι δεῖν ἀντειπεῖν, εἰ καί τισιν μέλλω ἀπεχθήσεσθαι. ἂν μὲν οὖν μηδʼ ὑπομείνητʼ ἀκοῦσαι μηδὲ ἕν, οὐ τῷ δοκιμάζοντες διαμαρτεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῷ φύσει πονήρʼ ἐπιθυμεῖν πράττειν τοιαῦτα προαιρεῖσθαι δόξετε. ἐὰν δʼ ἀκούσητε, τυχὸν μὲν ἴσως κἂν μεταπεισθείητε, ὃ μάλιστʼ ἐγὼ νομίζω συνενεγκεῖν ἂν ὑμῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, οἱ μὲν ἀγνοεῖν τὸ συμφέρον, οἱ δὲ—ὅ τι ἄν τις βούληται, τοῦτʼ ἐρεῖ. ΚΘ πρῶτον μὲν οὐδέν ἐστιν καινόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς δόξασιν παρʼ ὑμῖν εἶναί τινας οἵτινες ἀντεροῦσιν, ἐπειδὰν πράττειν τι δέῃ.

[¶17] 29.1. In the first place, it is nothing strange, men of Athens, that among you are found some who, when action has to be taken, will speak against measures already voted. Now, if they were doing this after you had given them the floor while still deliberating, it would be the right thing to denounce them for insisting upon speaking a second time to questions on which they had been defeated; as it is, there is nothing unreasonable in their desiring to express views which then you did not submit to hear, and it is you who may well be criticized, men of Athens, because, when you deliberate about something, you do not allow each to say what he thinks, but, if the one side captures you first by their plea, you would hear no one from the other side.

> Greek: 29.1. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀποδόντων ὑμῶν λόγον αὐτοῖς, ὅτʼ ἐβουλεύεσθε, τοῦτʼ ἐποίουν, τούτων ἂν ἦν ἄξιον κατηγορεῖν, εἰ περὶ ὧν ἥττηντʼ ἐβιάζοντο πάλιν λέγειν· νῦν δὲ τούτους μὲν οὐδέν ἐστʼ ἄτοπον εἰπεῖν βουληθῆναι ταῦθʼ ἃ τότʼ οὐχ ὑπεμείνατʼ ἀκοῦσαι, ὑμῖν δʼ ἄν τις εἰκότως ἐπιτιμήσειεν, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι ὁπόταν περί του βουλεύησθε, οὐκ ἐᾶτε λέγειν ἕκαστον ἃ γιγνώσκει, ἀλλʼ ἂν ἕτεροι τῷ λόγῳ προλάβωσιν ὑμᾶς, οὐδὲν ἂν τῶν ἑτέρων ἀκούσαιτε.

[¶18] 29.2. From this arises a situation embarrassing for you, because the men whose advice, before going wrong, you might have followed, you applaud later for denouncing your mistakes.

> Greek: 29.2. ἐκ δὲ τούτου συμβαίνει πρᾶγμʼ ἀηδὲς ὑμῖν. οἷς γὰρ πρὶν ἁμαρτεῖν ὑμῖν ἐξῆν συμβουλεύουσιν πείθεσθαι, τούτους ὕστερον κατηγοροῦντας ἐπαινεῖτε.

[¶19] 29.3. This very thing is about to happen to you again, it seems to me, unless on the present occasion, giving impartial audience to all, and submitting to this tedious duty, you shall choose the best proposals and judge those who find any fault with them to be no loyal citizens. Now I have thought it fair to tell you first of all my views about the questions you are considering, in order that, if these meet with your favour, I may also explain the rest of my ideas, but, if you disapprove, that I may neither bore you nor tire myself out.

> Greek: 29.3. ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτό μοι πάλιν δοκεῖτε πείσεσθαι, εἰ μὴ παρασχόντες ἴσους ἀκροατὰς πάντων ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ παρόντι, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν πόνον ὑπομείναντες, ἑλόμενοι τὰ κράτιστα τοὺς ὁτιοῦν τούτοις ἐπιτιμῶντας φαύλους νομιεῖτε. ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ δίκαιον ὑπείληφα πρῶτον ἁπάντων αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν, τί μοι δοκεῖ περὶ ὧν σκοπεῖσθε, ἵνα, ἂν μὲν ὑμῖν ἀρέσκῃ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διδάσκω, εἰ δὲ μή, μήθʼ ὑμῖν ἐνοχλῶ μήτʼ ἐμαυτὸν κόπτω. Λ ἔδει μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸ τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἐσκέφθαι τίς ὑπάρξει παρασκευὴ τῷ γενησομένῳ πολέμῳ·

[¶20] 30.1. It was your duty, men of Athens, before going to war to have considered what armament would be available for the coming campaign, but if, as a matter of fact, war was not foreseen, it was your duty to have considered also the question of armament on that occasion when you were deliberating for the first time about war after it had become certain. If you shall say that you have commissioned many armies which your commanders have ruined, no one will accept this excuse of you. For the same people cannot both absolve those in charge of their operations and claim that through fault of these men these operations are not succeeding.

> Greek: 30.1. εἰ δʼ ἄρα μὴ πρόδηλος ἦν, ὅτε πρῶτον ἐβουλεύεσθʼ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ φανεροῦ γενομένου, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἐσκέφθαι. εἰ δὲ φήσετε πολλὰς ἐγκεχειρικέναι δυνάμεις, ἃς λελυμάνθαι τοὺς ἐπιστάντας, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται τοῦθʼ ὑμῶν οὐδείς· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῶν αὐτῶν τούς ⟨τʼ⟩ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπολύειν, καὶ λέγειν ὡς διὰ τούτους κακῶς ταῦτʼ ἔχει.

[¶21] 30.2. Since, however, past events cannot be altered and it is necessary to safeguard our interests as present facilities permit, I see no fitting occasion for laying charges but shall try to offer what I think is the best counsel. Now, first of all, you must admit this principle, that it is the duty of every man to apply to the task the same superabundance of eagerness and emulation that he displayed of indifference in times past; because thus there is a bare hope that we may be able, though far behind in the pursuit, to overtake what we have let slip.

> Greek: 30.2. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ μὲν παρεληλυθότʼ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι, δεῖ δʼ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ἐπαμῦναι τοῖς πράγμασιν, τοῦ μὲν κατηγορεῖν οὐδένα καιρὸν ὁρῶ, πειράσομαι δʼ ἃ κράτιστα νομίζω, συμβουλεῦσαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑμᾶς ἐκεῖνʼ ἐγνωκέναι δεῖ, ὅτι τὴν ἴσην ὑπερβολὴν τῆς σπουδῆς καὶ φιλονικίας ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι πάντʼ ἄνδρα παρασχέσθαι δεῖ, ὅσηνπερ ἐκ τῶν ἄνωθεν χρόνων ἀμελείας· μόλις γὰρ οὕτως ἐλπὶς ἐκ πολλοῦ διώκοντας τὰ προειμένʼ ἑλεῖν δυνηθῆναι.

[¶22] 30.3. In the next place, there must be no discouragement over what has happened, because what is worst in the past is the best hope for the future. What, then, do I mean by this, men of Athens? That it is because you do nothing that you ought to do that your affairs are in a bad way; since if you were doing everything you should and your affairs were in this state, there would be not even a hope of improvement.

> Greek: 30.3. ἔπειτʼ οὐκ ἀθυμητέον τοῖς γεγενημένοις· ὃ γάρ ἐστιν τῶν παρεληλυθότων χείριστον, τοῦτο πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα βέλτιστον ὑπάρχει. τί οὖν τοῦτʼ ἔστιν [ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι]; ὅτι οὐδὲν ὑμῶν τῶν δεόντων ποιούντων κακῶς ἔχει τὰ πράγματα· ἐπεὶ εἴ γε πάνθʼ ἃ προσῆκε πραττόντων οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδʼ ἂν ἐλπὶς ἦν αὐτὰ γενέσθαι βελτίω. ΛΑ οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χαλεπώτερον ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔθεσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι τοὺς δημηγοροῦντας.

[¶23] 31.1. Nothing is more mischievous, men of Athens, than that those who address your Assembly should both censure and employ the same practices. For there is no man so unintelligent as to deny that to behave factiously among themselves and to accuse one another when no one is on trial means damage to your interests. I think myself that these men would be better citizens if, when addressing the Assembly, they should turn the contentiousness they feel toward one another against the enemies of the State; and to you I recommend not to take sides with either of these factions or to consider how either one is to gain the mastery, but how you as a body are to prevail over your enemies.

> Greek: 31.1. τὸ γὰρ στασιάζειν πρὸς αὑτοὺς καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἀλλήλων ἄνευ κρίσεως, οὐδείς ἐστιν οὕτως ἀγνώμων ὅστις οὐ φήσειεν ἂν βλάβην εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν. ἐγὼ δʼ οἴομαι τούτους μὲν ἂν εἶναι βελτίους, εἰ τὴν πρὸς αὑτοὺς φιλονικίαν ἐπὶ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἐχθροὺς τρέψαντες ἐδημηγόρουν· ὑμῖν δὲ παραινῶ μὴ συστασιάζειν μηδετέροις τούτων, μηδʼ ὅπως ἅτεροι κρατήσουσι σκοπεῖν, ἀλλʼ ὅπως ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες τῶν ἐχθρῶν περιέσεσθε.

[¶24] 31.2. And I pray to the gods that those who out of contentiousness or spite or any other motive express any other sentiments than those they believe to be advantageous may cease to do so; for to invoke a curse when speaking in council is perhaps unseemly. Therefore, while I should myself lay the blame for this bad state of affairs, men of Athens, upon no one except these men as a class, and although I think you ought to exact an accounting of them when you have the leisure, yet for the present I think you should consider only how the existing situation may be bettered.

> Greek: 31.2. εὔχομαι δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς τοὺς ἢ φιλονικίας ἢ ἐπηρείας ἤ τινος ἄλλης ἕνεκʼ αἰτίας ἄλλο τι, πλὴν ἅ ποθʼ ἡγοῦνται συμφέρειν, λέγοντας παύσασθαι· τὸ γὰρ καταρᾶσθαι συμβουλεύοντʼ ἴσως ἔστʼ ἄτοπον. αἰτιασαίμην μὲν οὖν ἔγωγʼ ἂν οὐδένʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦ κακῶς τὰ πράγματʼ ἔχειν ἀλλʼ ἢ πάντας τούτους· οἴομαι δὲ δεῖν παρὰ μὲν τούτων ἐφʼ ἡσυχίας λόγον ὑμᾶς λαβεῖν, νῦν δʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν παρόντων, ὅπως ἔσται βελτίω, σκοπεῖν. ΛΒ ἐβουλόμην ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ἴσην σπουδὴν ἐνίους τῶν λεγόντων ποιεῖσθαι ὅπως τὰ βέλτιστʼ ἐροῦσιν, ὅσηνπερ ὅπως εὖ δόξουσι λέγειν, ἵνʼ οὗτοι μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ δεινοὶ λέγειν ἐπιεικεῖς ἐνομίζοντʼ εἶναι, τὰ δʼ ὑμέτερα, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν προσῆκον, βέλτιον εἶχεν.

[¶25] 32.1. I should have wished, men of Athens, that some of the speakers had displayed as much eagerness to present the best proposals as they did to be thought good speakers, in order that these men might have been regarded as honest instead of clever at speaking and that your interests, just as is proper, might have been in better shape. As it now is, however, some seem to me to be entirely content with the reputation for speaking, but to be taking no thought for what will subsequently befall you. And certainly I wonder whether speeches of this sort are capable of deceiving the speaker as much as those to whom they are addressed, or whether these men knowingly express before the Assembly opinions directly opposed to what they themselves think best. For if they are unaware that he who is going to do what requires to be done must not have audacity based upon words but power based upon armament, nor yet self-confidence based upon the assumption that our enemies will be weak, but confidence that we shall overmaster them even if they shall be strong, the elegance of their speeches has prevented them, as it seems, from apprehending the most vital facts. Yet if they should not even deny awareness of these facts, and some ulterior motive underlies their predilection for this conduct, how can one help assuming that this motive, whatever it may be, is base?

> Greek: 32.1. νῦν δʼ ἔνιοί μοι δοκοῦσι παντάπασι τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου δόξαν ἠγαπηκότες τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα συμβησομένων ὑμῖν μηδὲν φροντίζειν. καὶ δῆτα θαυμάζω, πότερά ποθʼ οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι τὸν λέγονθʼ ὁμοίως πεφύκασιν ἐξαπατᾶν ὥσπερ πρὸς οὓς ἂν λέγωνται, ἢ συνιέντες οὗτοι τἀναντία τοῖς δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι βελτίστοις δημηγοροῦσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀγνοοῦσιν ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα πράξειν τὰ δέοντα οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων θρασύν, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι δεῖ, οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς μὴ δυνήσεσθαι θαρρεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τῷ κἂν δύνωνται κρατήσειν, τὰ τῶν λόγων ἀστεῖʼ ὡς ἔοικεν τοῦ τὰ μέγιστʼ αἰσθάνεσθαι κεκώλυκεν αὐτούς. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν μηδʼ ἂν φήσαιεν ἀγνοεῖν, πρόφασις δʼ ἄλλη τις ὕπεστι διʼ ἣν ταῦτα προαιροῦνται, πῶς οὐ χρὴ φαύλην ταύτην ὑπολαμβάνειν, ἥτις ποτʼ ἐστίν;

[¶26] 32.3. As for me, I shall not be deterred from saying what I think, although I see that you have been bewitched; for it would be foolish, because you have wrongly yielded to the spell of oratory, for the man who in his turn is going to offer better proposals and much more to your advantage, to give in to fear. And I ask of you to listen patiently, bearing in mind that you would not have formed your present opinions either unless you had listened to the speeches by which you have been persuaded.

> Greek: 32.3. ἐγὼ δʼ οὐκ ἀποτρέψομαι λέγειν ἃ δοκεῖ μοι, καίπερ ⟨οὕτως⟩ ὁρῶν ἠγμένους ὑμᾶς· καὶ γὰρ εὔηθες, λόγῳ ψυχαγωγηθέντων ὑμῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς, λόγον αὖ τὸν μέλλοντα βελτίω λέγειν καὶ μᾶλλον συμφέρονθʼ ὑμῖν καταδεῖσαι. ἀξιῶ δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς ὑπομεῖναι, ἐνθυμηθέντας ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ νῦν δοκοῦντʼ ἔδοξεν ἂν ὑμῖν, εἰ μὴ τοὺς λόγους ἠκούσατʼ ἐξ ὧν ἐπείσθητε.

[¶27] 32.4. Accordingly, just as you would have thought it necessary to test a coin if you were judging what its worth might be, so I ask of you to scrutinize in the light of what we have to say against it the speech that has been made, and if you find it to your advantage, agree with the speaker, and may good fortune attend you; but if, after all, as you examine each detail, it shall seem alien to your interests, to change your plans before falling into error and to adopt the counsels that are right.

> Greek: 32.4. ὥσπερ ἂν τοίνυν, εἰ νόμισμʼ ἐκρίνεθʼ ὁποῖόν τί ποτʼ ἐστίν, δοκιμάσαι δεῖν ἂν ᾠήθητε, οὕτω καὶ τὸν λόγον ἀξιῶ τὸν εἰρημένον ἐξ ὧν ἀντειπεῖν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν σκεψαμένους, ἐὰν μὲν συμφέρονθʼ εὕρητε, ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ πείθεσθαι, ἂν δʼ ἄρʼ ἕκαστα λογιζομένοις ἀλλοιότερος φανῇ, πρὶν ἁμαρτεῖν μεταβουλευσαμένους, τοῖς ὀρθῶς ἔχουσιν χρήσασθαι. ΛΓ μάλιστα μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βουλοίμην ἂν ὑμᾶς ἃ μέλλω λέγειν πεισθῆναι·

[¶28] 33.1. Most of all I should desire, men of Athens, that you be convinced by the words I am about to utter, but if after all it should turn out otherwise, I should prefer above all else that by me, at least, they had been spoken. It is a difficult thing, as it seems, not only to explain to you what ought to be done, but even to discover it by solitary reflection. Anyone would observe this if he believed you would consider, not his speech, but the business upon which you are engaged, and set more value upon being thought an honest man than upon showing himself to be a clever speaker.

> Greek: 33.1. εἰ δʼ ἄρα τοῦτʼ ἄλλῃ πῃ συμβαίνοι, ἐμαυτῷ γʼ ἂν εἰρῆσθαι πρὸ παντὸς αὐτὰ δεξαίμην. ἔστι δʼ οὐ μόνον, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὸ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν χαλεπὸν τὰ δέοντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθʼ αὑτὸν σκοπούμενον εὑρεῖν. γνοίη δʼ ἄν τις, εἰ μὴ τὸν λόγον ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τὰ πράγματʼ ἐφʼ ὧν ἐστε σκέψεσθαι νομίσαι, καὶ πλείω σπουδὴν τοῦ δοκεῖν ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι ἢ τοῦ δεινὸς εἰπεῖν φανῆναι ποιοῖτο.

[¶29] 33.2. I, at any rate,—so help me Heaven—after it occurred to me to reflect upon our present problems, began to hit upon themes, and no end of them, to which you would have listened not without pleasure. For instance, on the theme “You are the most just of the Greeks,” I observed and now observe many changes to ring, and again, “You are born of the noblest ancestors,” and many such topics. Yet these themes, though affording pleasure so long as they are being aired, after that vanish away;

> Greek: 33.2. ἐγὼ γοῦν ʽοὕτω τί μοι ἀγαθὸν γένοιτὀ ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἐπῄει μοι σκοπεῖν, λόγοις μὲν καὶ μάλʼ ἀφθόνοις, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς ἠκούεθʼ ὑμεῖς, ἐνετύγχανον. καὶ γὰρ ὡς δικαιότατοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐστέ, πόλλʼ ⟨ὄντʼ⟩ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἑώρων καὶ ὁρῶ, καὶ ὡς ἀρίστων προγόνων, καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν τὸν χρόνον ἡσθῆναι ποιήσανθʼ ὅσον ἂν ῥηθῇ, μετὰ ταῦτʼ οἴχεται·

[¶30] 33.3. and it is the duty of the speaker to show himself the adviser of some course of action through which the gain of some real benefit shall also afterwards accrue to you. Such a policy as this I know by now from experience to be rare and hard to discover. Neither is it enough merely to get a vision of such policies unless a man shall also be able to convince you, who jointly are to assume the responsibility. On the contrary, there is an obligation resting upon both alike, upon me to tell you what I have convinced myself is advantageous, upon you to listen, to judge and, if it is your pleasure, to adopt.

> Greek: 33.3. δεῖ δὲ πράξεώς τινος τὸν λέγοντα φανῆναι σύμβουλον, διʼ ἣν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτʼ ἀγαθοῦ τινος ὑμῖν ἔσται παρουσία. τοῦτο δʼ ἤδη καὶ σπάνιον καὶ χαλεπὸν πεπειραμένος οἶδʼ ὂν εὑρεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὔταρκες τὸ ἰδεῖν ἐστι τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἂν μὴ καὶ πεῖσαί τις τοὺς συναρουμένους ὑμᾶς δυνηθῇ. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἐμὸν μὲν ἔργον εἰπεῖν ἴσως ἃ πέπεικʼ ἐμαυτὸν συμφέρειν, ὑμέτερον δʼ ἀκούσαντας κρῖναι, κἂν ἀρέσκῃ, χρῆσθαι. ΛΔ οὐκ ἄδηλον ἦν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρῴην, ὅτε τῶν ἀντιλέγειν βουλομένων οἷς ὁ δεῖνʼ ἔλεγεν οὐκ ᾤεσθʼ ἀκούειν χρῆναι, ὅτι συμβήσεται τοῦθʼ ὃ νυνὶ γίγνεται, ὅτι οἱ τότε κωλυθέντες ἐροῖεν εἰς ἑτέραν ἐκκλησίαν.

[¶31] 34.1. It was not hard to see, men of Athens, the other day when you thought there was no need to hear those who desired to speak in opposition to the views of a certain speaker, that what is now coming to pass would occur—that those who were then prevented from speaking would do so before a subsequent meeting of the Assembly. If, therefore, you shall do the same as before, and refuse to listen to those who wish to support the decisions then approved, these men in turn will take the matter to the next meeting and denounce these decisions.

> Greek: 34.1. ἂν τοίνυν ταὔθʼ ἅπερ πρότερον ποιήσητε, καὶ τῶν τοῖς τότε δόξασι συνειπεῖν βουλομένων μὴ ʼθελήσητʼ ἀκοῦσαι, πάλιν ταῦτʼ εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκλησίαν οὗτοι λαβόντες τούτων κατηγορήσουσιν.

[¶32] 34.2. In no way, men of Athens, could your situation be made worse nor could you show yourselves more absurd than if none of your decisions should seem to be finally settled and, disregarding the policies that pay, you should achieve no forward step, but, like the crowds at shows, side with those who captivate you first. Do not let this happen, men of Athens, but performing this tedious duty and giving impartial audience to both sides, first choose a policy you will also carry out and then assume that whoever opposes measures thus once sanctioned is unprincipled and disloyal to you.

> Greek: 34.2. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε τὰ πράγματα χείρω γένοιτʼ ἄν, οὔθʼ ὑμεῖς ἀτοπώτεροι φανείητε, ἢ εἰ μήτε τῶν δοξάντων ὑμῖν πέρας μηδὲν ἔχειν δοκοίη, μήτʼ ἀφέντες ἃ μὴ συμφέρει, τῶν πρὸ ὁδοῦ τι περαίνοιτε, εἴητε δʼ ὥσπερ τὰ θέατρα τῶν προκαταλαμβανόντων. μηδαμῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὰ πονήσαντες τὸν πόνον τοῦτον καὶ παρασχόντες ἴσους ἀκροατὰς ἀμφοτέροις ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς πρῶτον μὲν ἕλεσθʼ ὅ τι καὶ ποιήσετε, ἔπειθʼ ὑπολαμβάνετε, ἐάν τις ἐναντιῶται τοῖς ἅπαξ οὕτω δοκιμασθεῖσι, πονηρὸν καὶ κακόνουν ὑμῖν.

[¶33] 34.3. For while it is pardonable that a man who has not obtained a hearing should feel convinced that he has himself better plans thought out than those approved by you, yet to go on acting shamelessly after you have given a hearing and decided between alternatives, instead of giving in to the judgement of the majority and retiring, would plainly justify suspicion of some other motive by no means honorable. As for me, although I should have thought it proper to remain silent on this occasion had I observed you abiding by your previous decisions—for I am one of those who are convinced that these are to your advantage—yet, now that certain members seem to have changed their minds because of the speeches made by these men, even though you perhaps know that what they say is neither true nor for your good, I will nevertheless make this clear in case you are unaware of it.

> Greek: 34.3. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λόγου μὴ τυχόντα πεπεῖσθαι βέλτιον τῶν ὑμῖν δοκούντων αὐτὸν ἐντεθυμῆσθαι συγγνώμη· τὸ δʼ ἀκουσάντων ὑμῶν καὶ διακρινάντων ἔτʼ ἀναισχυντεῖν, καὶ μὴ συγχωρεῖν ἐνδόντα τῇ τῶν πλειόνων γνώμῃ, ἄλλην τινʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ ὑποψίαν οὐχὶ δικαίαν ἔχειν φανείη. ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ σιωπᾶν ⟨ἂν⟩ ᾤμην δεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εἰ μένοντας ὑμᾶς ἑώρων ἐφʼ ὧν ἔδοξεν· εἰμὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐκεῖνα πεπεισμένων συμφέρειν ὑμῖν· ἐπειδὴ δʼ ὑπὸ τῶν παρὰ τούτων λόγων μεταβεβλῆσθαί μοί τινες δοκοῦσιν, ὡς οὔτʼ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν οὔθʼ ὑμῖν συμφέροντα, ἴσως μὲν εἰδότας, οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ εἰ καὶ τυγχάνετʼ ἀγνοοῦντες, διδάξω. ΛΕ ἔδει μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ δίκαιον ἦν τότε πείθειν ὑμᾶς ὅ τι ἄριστον ἕκαστος ἡγεῖτο, ὅτʼ ἐβουλεύεσθε τὸ πρῶτον περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μὴ συνέβαινεν ἃ δὴ δύο πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλυσιτελέστατα τῇ πόλει, μήτε πέρας μηδὲν εἶχεν τῶν ὑμῖν δοξάντων, παρανοίας θʼ ὑμεῖς κατεγιγνώσκεθʼ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν μεταβουλευόμενοι.

[¶34] 35.1. It would have been just and proper, men of Athens, for each member then to try to convince you of what he believed to be best when you were considering these matters for the first time, in order that two evils might not be resulting which are above all others damaging to the city—that no decision of yours should be proving final and that you should be convicting yourselves of madness by changing your minds. Since, however, certain men who then kept silence are now finding fault, I wish to address a few words to them. For I am amazed at the political procedure of these men, or rather I consider it vile. For if, though free to recommend measures when you are considering questions, they choose instead to denounce decisions once made, they play the part of doubledealers, not as they claim, of men of goodwill. I should like to ask them—and what I am about to say is not to become the signal for any tirade—just why, since they praise the Spartans in all other respects, they do not imitate the most admirable of all their practices, but rather do the very opposite.

> Greek: 35.1. ἐπειδὴ δὲ σιωπήσαντες τότε νῦν ἐπιτιμῶσί τινες, βούλομαι μικρὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ θαυμάζω τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας τῆς τούτων, μᾶλλον δʼ ἡγοῦμαι φαῦλον. εἰ γὰρ ἐξὸν παραινεῖν ὅταν σκοπῆτε, βεβουλευμένων κατηγορεῖν αἱροῦνται, συκοφαντῶν ἔργον, οὐχ, ὡς φασίν, εὔνων ποιοῦσιν ἀνθρώπων. ἡδέως δʼ ἂν ἐροίμην αὐτούς ʽκαὶ μηδεμιᾶς λοιδορίας ὃ μέλλω λέγειν ἀρχὴ γενέσθὠ τί δὴ τἄλλʼ ἐπαινοῦντες Λακεδαιμονίους, ὃ μάλιστʼ ἄξιόν ἐστιν τῶν παρʼ ἐκείνοις ἄγασθαι, τοῦτʼ οὐ μιμοῦνται, μᾶλλον δʼ αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον ποιοῦσιν;

[¶35] 35.3. For they say, men of Athens, that among them each man airs any opinion he may have until the question is put, but when the decision has been ratified, they all approve it and work together, even those who opposed it. Therefore, though few, they prevail over many and by actions well timed they get what they cannot get by war; nor does any occasion or means of effecting what is to their own advantage escape them; not, by Zeus, as we do who, thanks to these men and their like, in trying to get the better of one another instead of the enemy, have wasted all our time, and if anyone is for making peace in time of war, we hate him, and if anyone talks war in time of peace, we fight him, and if anyone advocates keeping quiet and minding our own business, we claim that he is wrong too, and in general we are overfull of recriminations and empty hopes.

> Greek: 35.3. φασὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παρʼ ἐκείνοις μέχρι μὲν τοῦ δόξαι γνώμην, ἣν ἂν ἕκαστος ἔχῃ, λέγειν, ἐπειδὰν δʼ ἐπικυρωθῇ, ταῦθʼ ἅπαντας ἐπαινεῖν καὶ συμπράττειν, καὶ τοὺς ἀντειπόντας. τοιγάρτοι πολλῶν μὲν ὄντες οὐ πολλοὶ περιγίγνονται, λαμβάνουσι δέ, ὅσʼ ἂν μὴ τῷ πολέμῳ δύνωνται, τοῖς καιροῖς, οὐδεὶς δʼ αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει χρόνος οὐδὲ τρόπος τοῦ τὰ συμφέρονθʼ ἑαυτοῖς περαίνειν, οὐ μὰ Δίʼ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς καὶ διὰ τούτους καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τούτοις, ἀλλήλων περιγιγνόμενοι καὶ οὐχὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πάντʼ ἀνηλώκαμεν τὸν χρόνον, κἂν μὲν εἰρήνην τις ἐκ πολέμου ποιήσῃ, τοῦτον μισοῦντες, ἂν δʼ ἐξ εἰρήνης πόλεμόν τις λέγῃ, τούτῳ μαχόμενοι, ἂν δʼ ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν τις παραινῇ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερʼ αὐτῶν πράττειν, οὐδὲ τοῦτον ὀρθῶς λέγειν φάσκοντες, ὅλως δʼ αἰτιῶν καὶ κενῶν ἐλπίδων ὄντες πλήρεις.

[¶36] 35.4. “What then, Sir,” someone may say, “what do you recommend, since you find fault with this conduct?” By Zeus, I will tell you. In the first place, men of Athens, I am not altogether sure that a man would reasonably fear on your account lest your deliberations would be the worse for your refusing to listen to your counsellors. For, to begin with, Fortune—to whom be thanks—arranges much of your business to take care of itself, so well that you would pray for nothing better, because little of it would be in good shape through such foresight as is exercised by those in authority. Next, you know in advance, not only what speeches each man will make, but also with what motives each one harangues you, and if it were not spiteful, I should also have said, for what price.

> Greek: 35.4. τί οὖν, ἄν τις εἴποι, σὺ παραινεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτʼ ἐπιτιμᾷς; ἐγὼ νὴ Δίʼ ἐρῶ. ΛϚ πρῶτον μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τις ἂν εἰκότως περὶ ὑμῶν δεῖσαι, μὴ παρὰ τὸ τῶν συμβουλευόντων οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἀκούειν χεῖρον βουλεύσησθε. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ τύχη, καλῶς ποιοῦσα, πολλὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν αὐτόματα, ὡς ἂν εὔξαισθε, παρίστησιν, ἐπεὶ τῇ γε τῶν προεστηκότων προνοίᾳ βραχέʼ αὐτῶν εἶχεν ἂν καλῶς. ἔπειθʼ ὑμεῖς οὐ μόνον τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἂν ἕκαστος εἴποι πρόϊστε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὧν ἕνεκʼ αὐτῶν ἕκαστος δημηγορεῖ, εἰ δὲ μὴ φιλαπέχθημον ἦν, εἶπον ἂν καὶ πόσου.

[¶37] 36.2. I think you are prudent in reducing to a minimum the time for being cheated. If I were intending to speak in the same vein as the rest, I should not have thought it necessary to bore you by speaking. As it is, I think I have something to say that will be worth your while to hear, and utterly different from what is expected by the majority. It will be short. Listen and examine it, and, if it pleases you, adopt it.

> Greek: 36.2. τὸν δὴ τοῦ φενακίζεσθαι χρόνον ὡς εἰς μικρότατον συνάγοντες σωφρονεῖν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖτε. εἰ μὲν δή τι τῶν αὐτῶν ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐρεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ᾤμην δεῖν λέγων ἐνοχλεῖν. νῦν δὲ συμφέροντα μὲν ὑμῖν ἀκοῦσαι, παντάπασι δʼ ἀφεστηκότα τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν προσδοκωμένων οἴομαι λόγον ἐρεῖν. βραχὺς δʼ ἔσται. σκέψασθε δʼ ἀκούσαντες, κἂν ὑμῖν ἀρέσκῃ, χρήσασθε. ΛΖ καὶ βραχεῖαν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ δικαίαν ποιήσομαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου·

[¶38] 37.1. I shall make the beginning of my speech both short and reasonable, men of Athens, nor shall I deliver the whole of it. For I believe that, while it is the way of a man who intends deception to cast about for a plan whereby he may conceal from you, his hearers, by means of his words the disagreeable aspects of the situation, on the other hand, the first duty of a man who has resolved to deal candidly with you is to declare which side he has come forward to endorse, in order that, if after hearing this statement you are willing to hear the sequel, he may enlighten you and explain what measures seem best to himself, but if you shall reject his views, that he may have done with the matter and neither annoy you nor tire himself out.

> Greek: 37.1. καὶ οὕτω δὲ τὰ πάντʼ ἐρῶ. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ ἐξαπατᾶν μὲν εἶναι βουλομένου σκοπεῖν ὅντινʼ ὑμᾶς τρόπον τοὺς ἀκούοντας τὰ τοῦ πράγματος δυσχερῆ τῷ λόγῳ συγκρύψεται, ἁπλῶς δὲ πεπεικότος αὑτὸν ὑμῖν προσφέρεσθαι τοῦτο πρῶτον εἶναι, εἰπεῖν πότερʼ ἐγνωκὼς παρελήλυθεν, ἵνʼ ἐὰν μὲν ἀκούσαντες τοῦτο τοὺς μετὰ ταῦτα λόγους βούλησθʼ ἀκούειν, καὶ διδάσκῃ καὶ φράζῃ τὰ βέλτισθʼ αὑτῷ δοκοῦντα, ἂν δʼ ἀποδοκιμάσητε, ἀπηλλαγμένος ᾖ καὶ μήθʼ ὑμῖν ἐνοχλῇ μήθʼ αὑτὸν κόπτῃ.

[¶39] 37.2. This, then, will be my first statement: It is my opinion that the democratic party in Mytilene has been wronged and that it is your duty to obtain justice for them. For obtaining this justice I have a plan to propose when once I have demonstrated that they have been wronged and that it is your duty to go to their aid.

> Greek: 37.2. ἐγὼ δὴ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἐρῶ. ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ Μυτιληναίων ὁ δῆμος ἠδικῆσθαι, καὶ δίκην ὑμῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ προσήκειν λαβεῖν. καὶ ὅπως λήψεσθʼ ἔχω λέγειν, ἐπειδὰν ὡς ἠδίκηνται καὶ ὑμῖν προσήκει βοηθεῖν ἐπιδείξω. ΛΗ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πάνυ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ μὴ ῥᾳδίους τοῖς συμβουλεύειν βουλομένοις εἶναι τοὺς λόγους·

[¶40] 38.1. First of all, men of Athens, it is not altogether surprising that those who wish to tender you advice do not readily find the words, because, when the conditions that require consideration are bad, it is inevitable that the recommendations made concerning them should also be disagreeable. Of course, if by your refusing to listen there is hope of this situation becoming better, that is the thing to do, but if everything is going to get worse and nothing better by so doing, why should you, having allowed things to come to the worst, after a longer interval than has now elapsed, and with greater difficulty, try to save the situation, though, starting from present conditions, it is still possible even now to set things to rights and effect a change for the better?

> Greek: 38.1. ὅταν γὰρ τὰ πράγματʼ ἔχῃ φαύλως περὶ ὧν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, δυσχερεῖς ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ τὰς συμβουλίας. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ʼθέλειν ἀκούειν ἐλπὶς ταῦτα γενέσθαι βελτίω, τοῦτο χρὴ πράττειν· εἰ δὲ χείρω μὲν ἅπαντα, βέλτιον δʼ οὐδὲν ἐκ τούτου γενήσεται, τί δεῖ, πρὸς τὸ φαυλότατον ἐλθεῖν ἐάσαντας, ἐκ πλείονος ἢ νῦν καὶ χαλεπωτέρως σῴζειν πειρᾶσθαι, ἐξὸν ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐπανορθώσασθαι καὶ προαγαγεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον;

[¶41] 38.2. Certainly it is reasonable for you to feel angry after these unhappy experiences; but to vent your anger, not upon the parties responsible, but upon everybody in turn, ceases to be either reasonable or right: because those who are in no way responsible for past events but can tell you how an improvement may be effected for the future would rightly meet with gratitude, not hostility, from you. If you treat these men with untimely irritation, you will make them hesitate to rise and speak.

> Greek: 38.2. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλως ὑμᾶς ἔχειν εἰκός ἐστιν ταῦτα πάσχοντας· τὸ δὲ μὴ τοῖς αἰτίοις, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἐφεξῆς ὀργίζεσθαι, τοῦτʼ οὐκέτʼ εἰκὸς οὐδʼ ὀρθῶς ἔχον ἐστίν. οἱ γὰρ μηδενὸς μὲν αἴτιοι τῶν παρεληλυθότων, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πῶς ἔσται βελτίω λέγειν ἔχοντες, χάριν, οὐκ ἀπέχθειαν κομίσαιντʼ ἂν δικαίως παρʼ ὑμῶς· οὕς, ἐὰν ἀκαίρως δυσκολαίνητε, ὀκνεῖν ἀνίστασθαι ποιήσετε.

[¶42] 38.3. And yet I am myself not unaware that often it is the lot, not of those who are guilty, but of persons who get in the way of those who are angry, to suffer unpleasant consequences. In spite of this I have risen to advise you, for I have confidence myself that I shall not be found to be advocating any inferior measure, men of Athens, but have really better proposals to offer you than other speakers.

> Greek: 38.3. καίτοι ἔγωγʼ οὐκ ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι πολλάκις οὐ τοῖς αἰτίοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐμποδὼν οὖσι τοῖς ὀργιζομένοις ἀηδές τι παθεῖν συνέβη· ὅμως δʼ ἀνέστην συμβουλεύσων· πιστεύω γὰρ ἔγωγʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, φλαύρου μὲν μηδενὸς αἴτιος ὢν εὑρεθήσεσθαι, βελτίω δʼ ἑτέρων ὑμῖν ἔχειν συμβουλεῦσαι. ΛΘ τὰ μὲν γεγενημένʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦθʼ οἷα πάντες ἀκηκόατε·

[¶43] 39.1. The events that have occurred, men of Athens, are such as you have all heard, but you must not allow yourselves to be at all dismayed, reflecting that to be discouraged in the face of the present troubles is neither improving the situation nor worthy of yourselves. On the contrary, to consider it incumbent on yourselves to set these things to rights would manifestly be in keeping also with your reputation. Men such as you would profess to be should prove themselves superior to other breeds in times of stress.

> Greek: 39.1. δεῖ δʼ ὑμᾶς μηδὲν ἐκπεπληγμένως διακεῖσθαι, λογιζομένους ὅτι πρὸς μὲν τὰ παρόντʼ ἀθύμως ἔχειν οὔτε τοῖς πράγμασι συμφέρον οὔθʼ ὑμῶν ἄξιόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ταῦτʼ ἐπανορθοῦν αὑτοῖς ἡγεῖσθαι προσῆκον [καὶ] τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης ἄξιον ἂν φανείη. χρὴ δὲ τοὺς ὄντας οἷοι φήσαιτʼ ἂν ὑμεῖς εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ἑτέρων διαφέροντας φαίνεσθαι.

[¶44] 39.2. As for me, I should by no means have wished these calamities to come upon the city nor yet for you to suffer misfortune, but if, after all, this had to happen and was in store as something predestined, I consider it to your profit that these events have occurred just as they have. For the dispensations of Fortune exhibit sharp reversals and impartial visitations to both sides, whereas the events that follow upon the villainy of men make for sure defeat.

> Greek: 39.2. ἐγὼ δʼ οὐδαμῶς μὲν ἂν ἐβουλόμην ταῦτα συμβῆναι τῇ πόλει, οὐδʼ ἀτυχεῖν ὑμᾶς οὐδέν· εἰ δʼ ἄρʼ ἔδει γενέσθαι καί τι δαιμόνιον τοῦτʼ ἀπέκειτο, ὥσπερ πέπρακται τὰ γεγενημένα, λυσιτελεῖν οἴομαι. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς τύχης ὀξείας ἔχει τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ κοινὰς ἀμφοτέροις τὰς παρουσίας· ἃ δʼ ἂν διʼ ἀνδρῶν κακίαν πραχθῇ, βεβαίους ποιεῖ τὰς ἥττας.

## 3. Exordia 39–56

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/3/#p-N

[¶0] 39.3. Now, while I am of the opinion that even those who have gained the upper hand are not unaware that, should you form your resolve and be stung to action by what has happened, it is not yet quite clear whether what has been done is good fortune or the opposite for them, yet if it turns out that the exploit has inspired them to become over-confident, this would already be another point in your favour. For the more they look down upon you, the sooner will they blunder.

> Greek: 39.3. οἴομαι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τοὺς κεκρατηκότας ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι βουληθέντων ὑμῶν καὶ παροξυνθέντων τῷ γεγενημένῳ, οὐ πάνυ πω δῆλον πότερον εὐτύχημʼ ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον αὐτοῖς ἐστιν τὸ πεπραγμένον· εἰ δʼ ἄρʼ ἐπῆρκε τὸ πρᾶγμʼ αὐτοὺς θρασύνεσθαι, κἂν τοῦτο πρὸς ὑμῶν ἤδη γίγνοιτο. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον καταφρονήσωσι, τοσούτῳ θᾶττον ἁμαρτήσονται. Μ οὔ μοι δοκεῖτʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, περὶ ἧς οἴεσθε πόλεως νυνὶ μόνον βουλεύεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ πασῶν τῶν συμμαχίδων.

[¶1] 40.1. I do not believe, men of Athens, that you are deliberating upon this occasion concerning only the city you have in mind, but concerning all the allied cities. For however you decide concerning the city in question, the other cities, looking to this decision, will probably expect to receive the same treatment themselves. Consequently you must, for the sake both of doing what is best and of guarding your own reputation, strive earnestly that you may be clearly seen to be devising measures which are alike expedient and just.

> Greek: 40.1. ὅπως γὰρ ἂν περὶ ταύτης γνῶτε, πρὸς ταῦτʼ εἰκὸς ἀποβλέποντας τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ αὑτοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν τεύξεσθαι νομίζειν. ὥστε δεῖ καὶ τοῦ βελτίστου καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν ἕνεκα δόξης σπουδάσαι, ὅπως ἅμα καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ δίκαια φανήσεσθε βουλευόμενοι.

[¶2] 40.2. Now, the initiative in all such matters is in the hands of the generals. Most of these men, though they sail out under your orders, do not consider it their duty to cultivate those who are friendly to you, people whom they have taken over from their predecessors as men who have shared the same dangers as you throughout all our history, but each and all, having established their own private friendships, expect you to regard their personal flatterers as your friends also. But the facts are exactly the opposite.

> Greek: 40.2. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ τῶν τοιούτων πραγμάτων ἁπάντων ἐστὶν τῶν στρατηγῶν· ὧν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν παρʼ ὑμῶν ἐκπλεόντων οὐ τοὺς ὑμετέρους φίλους, οὓς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου τῶν αὐτῶν κινδύνων μετεσχηκότας παρειλήφασιν, τούτους θεραπεύειν οἴονται δεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἰδίους φίλους ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ κατασκευάσας ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῖ τοὺς αὑτῶν κόλακας καὶ ὑμετέρους ἡγεῖσθαι φίλους· οὗ πᾶν ἐστι τοὐναντίον.

[¶3] 40.3. You could find no more bitter or inevitable enemies than these flatterers. For the more gains they make by deception, the greater is the number of offences for which they think they are due to be punished. And no one could feel goodwill toward those at whose hands he expects to suffer some harm. However, the present is perhaps not the time to denounce them. Instead, I shall give you the advice that I consider in your interests.

> Greek: 40.3. οὔτε γὰρ ἐχθροτέρους οὔτʼ ἀναγκαίους μᾶλλον ἐχθροὺς ἂν τούτων εὕροιτε. ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείω παρακρουόμενοι πλεονεκτοῦσιν, τοσούτῳ πλειόνων ὀφείλειν ἡγοῦνται δίκην δοῦναι· οὐδεὶς δʼ ἂν γένοιτʼ εὔνους τούτοις ὑφʼ ὧν ἄν τι κακὸν πείσεσθαι προσδοκᾷ. τοῦ μὲν οὖν κατηγορεῖν ἴσως οὐχ ὁ παρὼν καιρός· ἃ δʼ ἡγοῦμαι συμφέρειν ὑμῖν, ταῦτα συμβουλεύσω. ΜΑ οὐδένʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν πάντων ὑμῶν οὕτως οἴομαι κακόνουν εἶναι τῇ πόλει ὥστε μὴ χαλεπῶς φέρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι τοῖς γεγενημένοις.

[¶4] 41.1. I no not suppose, men of Athens, that there is one of all your number so disloyal to the city as not to feel distressed and pained by these events. If, then, it were possible by nursing indignation to render undone any of the things that have been done, this is what I should be urging upon you all. But since the facts are unalterable and you must take forethought whereby you may escape the same misfortune in the future, the keenness of your indignation, men of Athens, over what has now taken place ought to set the measure for your determination that the same shall not occur again, nor should you think that any of your advisers has such a wonderful plan to propose as will be capable of redressing the present evils without any of you shouldering a share of the burden. For no speech would be wonderful enough for that, only some divine intervention.

> Greek: 41.1. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἀγανακτοῦντας ἦν ἄπρακτόν τι ποιῆσαι τούτων, τοῦτʼ ἂν ἔγωγε παρῄνουν ὑμῖν ἅπασιν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι, δεῖ δʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν λοιπῶν προνοηθῆναι ὅπως μὴ ταὐτὰ πείσεσθε, ὥσπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νῦν γεγενημένων ἀγανακτεῖτε, οὕτω χρὴ σπουδάσαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ πάλιν ταὐτὰ συμβῆναι, καὶ νομίζειν μηδένʼ ἔχειν λόγον εἰπεῖν τῶν συμβουλευόντων τοιοῦτον, ὃς δυνήσεται σῷσαι τὰ παρόντα μηδενὸς ὑμῶν μηδὲν συναραμένου· οὐ γὰρ ἂν λόγος, ἀλλὰ θεός τις ὁ τοιοῦτος εἴη.

[¶5] 41.2. Now the origin of this present state of affairs hinges upon this fact, that, for the sake of a momentary popularity with you, some of those who speak in this place declared to the Assembly: “There is no need to pay a special war-tax or to do military service, but everything will take care of itself.” To be sure, the absurdity of this ought to have been exposed by some other speaker—the sort of exposure that profits the State: still, even as things now are, it seems to me that Fortune is somehow kinder to you than are those at the head of affairs.

> Greek: 41.2. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐκεῖθεν ἤρτηται, ἐκ τοῦ τῆς παραχρῆμα πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἕνεκα χάριτος ἐνίους τῶν λεγόντων ἐνταυθοῖ δημηγορεῖν, ὡς οὔτʼ εἰσφέρειν οὔτε στρατεύεσθαι δεῖ, πάντα δʼ αὐτόματʼ ἔσται. ἔδει μὲν οὖν ταῦθʼ ὑπʼ ἄλλου τινὸς ἐξελέγχεσθαι μετὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦντος [ἐλέγχου] τῇ πόλει· δοκεῖ δέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ νῦν ἀμείνων ἡ τύχη περὶ ὑμᾶς τῶν ἐφεστηκότων εἶναι.

[¶6] 41.3. For while the occurrence of one loss after another ought to be counted evidence of the villainy of those who are in charge, the fact that all your resources have not been destroyed long ago I, at least, judge to be a benefaction of the Fortune that attends you. In the interval, therefore, while Fortune allows a respite and is holding your foes in check, have a care for what lies in the future. Otherwise take heed lest at one and the same time you shall be bringing to justice those who have been appointed to the several posts, and your power, men of Athens, shall be declining; for it is impossible that this shall continue to stand, barring some miracle, if not one of you puts his hand to the task.

> Greek: 41.3. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστʼ ἀπόλλυσθαι τῆς τῶν ἐπιμελουμένων κακίας σημεῖον προσήκει ποιεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ μὴ πάλαι πάντʼ ἀπολωλέναι τῆς ὑμετέρας τύχης εὐεργέτημʼ ἔγωγε κρίνω. ἐν ᾧ τοίνυν ἡ τύχη διαλείπει καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀνέχει, τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιμελήθητε. εἰ δὲ μή, σκοπεῖθʼ ὅπως μὴ ἅμα τούς τʼ ἐφεστῶτας ἑκάστοις ὑμεῖς κρινεῖτε, καὶ τὰ πράγμαθʼ ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κλινεῖ. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθʼ ὅπως ταῦτʼ ἄνευ μεγάλου τινὸς ⟨κακοῦ⟩ στήσεται, μηδενὸς ἀντιλαμβανομένου. ΜΒ οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτʼ ἄλογον, τοὺς ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν πολιτευομένους καὶ νῦν ταῦτα ποιοῦντας ἐξελέγχεσθαι.

[¶7] 42.1. It is nothing out of the ordinary, men of Athens, that those public men who are always and unceasingly agitating on behalf of the oligarchies should be convicted of doing so upon this occasion also. On the contrary, one might much more reasonably be astonished that you, though aware of the truth, repeatedly prefer to listen to them rather than to those who speak in your own defence. It may very well be that it is difficult to act wisely in all public matters, just as it is in private matters, but certainly it is wrong to take a light view of things of the very greatest importance.

> Greek: 42.1. ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἄν τις εἰκότως θαυμάσαι, τὸ τοὺς εἰδότας ὑμᾶς ταῦτα πολλάκις ἥδιον τούτων ἀκούειν ἢ τῶν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λεγόντων. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἰδίᾳ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἅπαντʼ ὀρθῶς πράττειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ κοινῇ·

[¶8] 42.2. Assuredly all other considerations are of less consequence, and when you listen good-naturedly to speeches on behalf of government efficiency and killings and the overthrow of democracy, how can one help but consider that you too are out of your minds? For all other men profit by the example of their fellows and are themselves rendered much more cautious thereby, but you, even when you hear what is happening to the rest of the Greeks are incapable of taking alarm, but the very thing that you consider men to be witless for awaiting as individuals you seem to me to be calmly awaiting yourselves as a community that is, to learn by bitter experience.

> Greek: 42.2. ἀλλʼ οὐ δὴ τὰ μέγιστά γε χρὴ παρορᾶν. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πάντʼ ἐστὶν ἐλάττω· ὅταν δʼ ὑπὲρ πολιτείας καὶ σφαγῶν καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως εὐχερῶς ἀκούητε, πῶς οὐκ ἔξω χρὴ τοῦ φρονεῖν ὑμᾶς [αὐτοὺς] ἡγεῖσθαι; οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῖς ἑτέρων παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖς αὐτοὶ γίγνονται· ὑμεῖς δʼ οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμβαίνοντʼ ἀκούοντες φοβηθῆναι δύνασθε, ἀλλʼ ἃ τοὺς ἰδίᾳ περιμένοντας ἀβελτέρους νομίζετε, ταῦτʼ αὐτοὶ δημοσίᾳ μοι δοκεῖτʼ ἀναμένειν παθόντες αἰσθέσθαι. ΜΓ οὐδεὶς πώποτʼ ἴσως ὑμῶν ἐζήτησεν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τί δήποθʼ οἱ κακῶς πράττοντες ἄμεινον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν εὖ πραττόντων βουλεύονται.

[¶9] 43.1. Perhaps none of you has ever inquired, men of Athens, just why men in adversity deliberate more wisely over their affairs than do the prosperous. This comes about for no other reason than this, that it is not natural for the prosperous to feel any alarm or to believe that such dangers as someone may report concern themselves; those, however, who are close in time to the mistakes through which they have come to adversity are rendered discreet with reference to future actions and inclined to moderation.

> Greek: 43.1. ἔστι δʼ οὐχ ἑτέρωθέν ποθεν τοῦτο γιγνόμενον, ἀλλʼ ὅτι συμβαίνει τοῖς μὲν μήτε φοβεῖσθαι μηδὲν μήθʼ ἅν τις λέγοι δεινὰ προσήκονθʼ αὑτοῖς ἡγεῖσθαι, τοὺς δὲ πλησίον ὄντας τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ὅταν εἰς τὸ κακῶς πράττειν ἀφίκωνται, σώφρονας πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ καὶ μετρίους ὑπάρχειν.

[¶10] 43.2. It therefore becomes serious-minded men at the very time that they enjoy the presence of Fortune at her best to show the greater eagerness to practise discretion. For no danger is so formidable that men who are on their guard cannot guard against it, and there is none that men who belittle it may not expect to suffer. I say this, not to frighten you needlessly, but in order that, when you hear rumors of danger, you may not despise them because of your present prosperity—they may come true unless you take forethought for your interests— but rather in order that, without waiting to learn by experience, you may forestall trouble, just as becomes men who at least claim to be second to none in point of discretion.

> Greek: 43.2. σπουδαίων τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅταν βελτίστῃ τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ χρῶνται, τότε πλείω τὴν σπουδὴν πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἔχειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὔτε φυλαττομένοις οὕτω δεινὸν ὥστʼ ἀφύλακτον εἶναι, οὔτʼ ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἀπροσδόκητον παθεῖν. λέγω δὲ ταῦτʼ οὐχ ἵνα τὴν ἄλλως ὑμᾶς δεδίττωμαι, ἀλλʼ ἵνα μὴ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν εὐπραξίαν, ἃ γένοιτʼ ἄν, εἰ μὴ προνοήσεσθε τῶν πραγμάτων, δείνʼ ἀκούοντες καταφρονῆτε, ἀλλʼ ἄνευ τοῦ παθεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν προσῆκον φάσκοντάς γε μηδένων ἀπολείπεσθαι τῷ σωφρονεῖν, φυλάξησθε. ΜΔ οὐχὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι καιρὸν ὑπείληφʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦ τε χαρίζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ τὰ δοκοῦντά μοι βέλτιστα παραινεῖν.

[¶11] 44.1. I assume, men of Athens, that the time for humoring you and the time for recommending the measures I regard as best are not the same; for often, I observe, humoring you contrary to one’s own judgement has earned more hatred than opposing at the outset. Now, if you all held the same opinions, I should not have come forward if you seemed to me to prefer the right course, considering it superfluous to speak before people doing the right thing of their own accord, nor again, if the contrary were true, for I should have thought that a lone person like myself was more likely to misapprehend the best measures than all of you.

> Greek: 44.1. πολλάκις γὰρ ὁρῶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαί τι παρὰ γνώμην πλείονʼ ἀπέχθειαν ἐνεγκὸν τοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐναντιωθῆναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες ἐγιγνώσκετε ταὐτά, οὔτʼ ἄν, εἴ μοι τὰ δέοντʼ ἐδοκεῖτε προαιρεῖσθαι, παρῆλθον, περίεργον ἡγούμενος τοῖς ἀφʼ αὑτῶν ἃ χρὴ ποιοῦσι λέγειν, οὔτʼ ἂν εἰ τοὐναντίον· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν ἡγησάμην ἕνʼ ὄντʼ ἐμαυτὸν ἀγνοεῖν τὰ κράτιστʼ ἢ πάντας ὑμᾶς.

[¶12] 44.2. But since I see some of you holding the same views as myself and the opposite to those held by others, I shall try with the support of these to persuade those who differ. Now, if you shall think it right to refuse to listen, you will make a mistake; but if you will listen in silence and bear with me in this, one of two benefits will accrue to you: for either you will be persuaded if we seem to advocate something advantageous, or you will be more firmly convinced of the rightness of your own views; for if the grounds upon which we think you are going somewhat astray shall be proved valueless, with the benefit of argument you will this time have chosen the plans approved before.

> Greek: 44.2. ἐπειδὴ δʼ ὁρῶ τινὰς ὑμῶν ταὐτὰ μὲν γιγνώσκοντας ἐμοί, τἀναντία δʼ ἄλλοις, πειράσομαι μετὰ τούτων τοὺς ἑτέρους πεῖσαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν οἰήσεσθε δεῖν μὴ ʼθέλειν ἀκούειν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ποιήσετε· ἂν δʼ ἀκούσητε σιωπῇ καὶ τοῦθʼ ὑπομείνητε, δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν θάτερον ὑμῖν ὑπάρξει· ἢ γὰρ πεισθήσεσθε, ἄν τι δοκῶμεν λέγειν συμφέρον, ἢ βεβαιότερον περὶ ὧν ἐγνώκατʼ ἔσεσθε πεπεισμένοι. ἂν γάρ, οἷς τι διαμαρτάνειν οἰόμεθʼ ἡμεῖς ὑμᾶς, ταῦτα μηδενὸς ἄξια φανῇ, μετʼ ἐλέγχου τὰ δεδογμένα νῦν ὑμεῖς ἔσεσθʼ ᾑρημένοι. ΜΕ βουλοίμην ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, περὶ ὧν ηὐδοκίμηκε λέγων παρʼ ὑμῖν ὁ δεῖνα, ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων πραττομένων ἴσον αὐτῷ τὸν ἔπαινον γενέσθαι·

[¶13] 45.1. I could wish, men of Athens, that a certain person, who has won your approval as a speaker on the measures before you, might have deserved equal praise for the feasibility and workableness of his proposal. For I call the gods to witness that I bear the man no ill will and wish that his plan had been a good one for you. But do not forget, men of Athens, that making a good speech and choosing sound policies are miles apart, and that the one is the part of an orator and the other of a man of sense.

> Greek: 45.1. οὔτε γὰρ τούτῳ κακόνους εἰμὶ μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμῖν τʼ ἀγαθὸν ἄν τι γίγνεσθαι βουλοίμην. ἀλλʼ ὁρᾶτʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ κεχωρισμένον ᾖ λόγον εἰπεῖν εὖ καὶ προελέσθαι πράγματα συμφέροντα, καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥήτορος ἔργον ᾖ, τὸ δὲ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου.

[¶14] 45.2. Now, you, the multitude, and especially the oldest among you, while not obliged to speak as well as the cleverest, for this art is for the practised speakers, are yet under obligation to have as much sense as they and even more, for it is long experience and “having seen much” that begets this faculty in us. Do not therefore, men of Athens, show yourselves unaware in this crisis that valorous deeds and bold exploits by word of mouth, unless backed by ready armament and physical force, though pleasant to hear, are hazardous in action.

> Greek: 45.2. ὑμεῖς τοίνυν οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μάλισθʼ οἱ πρεσβύτατοι, λέγειν μὲν οὐκ ὀφείλεθʼ ὁμοίως δύνασθαι τοῖς δεινοτάτοις· τῶν γὰρ εἰθισμένων τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα· νοῦν δʼ ἔχειν ὀφείλεθʼ ὁμοίως καὶ μᾶλλον τούτων· αἱ γὰρ ἐμπειρίαι καὶ τὸ πόλλʼ ἑορακέναι τοῦτʼ ἐμποιοῦσι. μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, φανῆτʼ ἀγνοοῦντες ἐν τῷ παρόντι νῦν ὅτι αἱ διὰ τῶν λόγων ἀνδρεῖαι καὶ θρασύτητες, ἐὰν μὴ μεθʼ ὑπαρχούσης ὦσι παρασκευῆς καὶ ῥώμης, ἀκοῦσαι μέν εἰσιν ἡδεῖαι, πράττειν δʼ ἐπικίνδυνοι.

[¶15] 45.3. For example, “Do not leave a free hand to aggressors”; you see what a fine slogan that is! Do not fail first to take a good look at the actual nature of the task. They must master the foe in battle who are really going to capture the majesty of this saying. For all things are easy to say, men of Athens, but not all are easy to do, for “not so much toil and sweat come before speech as before action.”

> Greek: 45.3. αὐτίκα γὰρ τὸ μὴ ʼπιτρέπειν τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν, ὁρᾶθʼ ὡς καλὸν τὸ ῥῆμα. ἀποβλέψατε δὴ πρῶτον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον αὐτό. δεῖ κρατῆσαι μαχομένους τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοὺς τὴν τοῦ ῥήματος τούτου σεμνότητʼ ἔργῳ ληψομένους. εἰπεῖν μὲν γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάντα πέφυκε ῥᾴδιον, πρᾶξαι δʼ οὐχ ἅπαντα. οὐ γὰρ ἴσος πόνος καὶ ἱδρὼς πρό τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ πράττειν ἐστίν.

[¶16] 45.4. I do not think you are naturally inferior to the Thebans—I should be mad to say that—only less well prepared. What I do say is that now is the time to begin your preparation, since you have been negligent up to now, not the decisive struggle. For I am not speaking against the plan as a whole but I am opposed to your way of going about it.

> Greek: 45.4. ἐγὼ δʼ οὐ χείρους ὑμᾶς ἡγοῦμαι φύσει Θηβαίων ʽκαὶ γὰρ ἂν μαινοίμην̓, ἀλλʼ ἀπαρασκευοτέρους. φημὶ δὴ δεῖν τοῦ παρασκευάζεσθαι νῦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐπειδὴ τέως ἠμελεῖτε, οὐ τοῦ διαγωνίζεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἀντιλέγω τὸ ὅλον, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τρόπου τῆς ἐγχειρήσεως ἐναντιοῦμαι. ΜϚ ὅσην μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεποίηνται σπουδὴν οἱ πρέσβεις κατηγορῆσαι τῆς πόλεως ἡμῶν, ἅπαντες ἑοράκατε·

[¶17] 46.1. You have all seen, men of Athens, with what zest the ambassadors have denounced our city. For, apart from what I cannot imagine, they have attempted to lay all offences at your doors. I admit, if their charges were true, you might reasonably be grateful that they were thus denouncing you to your faces instead of to others;

> Greek: 46.1. πλὴν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω τίνος εἴπω, τἄλλα πάνθʼ ὑμῖν ἀναθεῖναι πεπείρανται. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν αὐτῶν ἀληθεῖς αἱ κατηγορίαι, χάριν γʼ εἴχετʼ εἰκότως ἄν, εἰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς οὕτως ὑμῶν κατηγόρουν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλους.

[¶18] 46.2. but since they have used the privilege of speaking here to distort the truth, failing to mention some things from which you would justly derive great praise, and making charges that are false and inapplicable to you, it is right that you should consider them unprincipled, when once they have been proved guilty of such conduct as this. For if they prefer to be regarded as accomplished rhetoricians rather than truly fair-minded men, it is not likely that even they themselves would claim to be gentlemen.

> Greek: 46.2. ἐπειδὴ δὲ διαστρέψαντες τἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ μὲν παραβαίνοντες, ἀφʼ ὧν ἂν μεγάλους ἐπαίνους κομίσαισθε δικαίως, τὰ δʼ αἰτιασάμενοι ψευδῆ καὶ οὐ προσήκονθʼ ὑμῖν, κέχρηνται τῷ λόγῳ, πονηροὺς δίκαιον αὐτούς, ἐπειδὰν ἐξελεγχθῶσι ταῦτα πεποιηκότες, νομίζειν. εἰ γὰρ ῥήτορες δεινοὶ μᾶλλον εἶναι δοκεῖν ἢ μετʼ ἀληθείας ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνθρωποι νομίζεσθαι προείλοντο, οὐδʼ αὐτοὶ καλοκἀγαθίας ἂν ὡς ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητοῖεν.

[¶19] 46.3. It is, of course, difficult to rise up to speak before you in your own defence, just as it is easy to speak against you. For, by Athena, I do not think that there are any other people in the whole world who would listen so complacently when reminded of their real faults as you do when you are reviled for faults that are not yours. What is more, I do not believe that even these men would lie to you with such effrontery if they were not aware of this, and if it were not clear in advance that of all people you are the most addicted to listening to whatever anyone may say against you.

> Greek: 46.3. ἔστι μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸν τὸ παρʼ ὑμῖν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐροῦντʼ ἀνεστηκέναι, ὥσπερ ῥᾴδιον τὸ καθʼ ὑμῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ μὰ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν οὐδένας ἂν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων οὕτως οἶμαι τὰ προσόνθʼ αὑτοῖς ἀκοῦσαι νουθετουμένους, ὡς ὑμεῖς τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα κακῶς ἀκούοντες. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τούτους θρασέως ἂν οὕτως ἡγοῦμαι ψεύδεσθαι, εἰ μὴ συνῄδεσαν ταῦτα, καὶ πρόδηλον ἦν ὅτι δεινότατοι πάντων ὑμεῖς ἐστʼ ἀκούειν ὅ τι ἄν τις καθʼ ὑμῶν λέγῃ.

[¶20] 46.4. Now, if you must be punished for this fatuousness, to listen to undeserved charges against the State would be that penalty; but if something must, in all fairness, be said on behalf of the truth, it is for this purpose that I have come forward, confident, not that I shall unaided be able to speak with eloquence worthy of your past actions, but that these actions, however one may speak, will be seen to be just.

> Greek: 46.4. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταύτης τῆς εὐηθείας δίκην ὑμᾶς δεῖ διδόναι, λόγους οὐ προσήκοντας κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ἀκούειν τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη. εἰ δʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀληθῶν εἴ τι δίκαιον ῥητέον, ἐπὶ τοῦτʼ ἐγὼ παρελήλυθα, πιστεύων οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀξίως τῶν ὑμῖν πεπραγμένων εἰπεῖν δυνήσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ πράγματα, ὅπως ἄν τις εἴπῃ, δίκαια φανεῖσθαι.

[¶21] 46.5. It would be my wish, men of Athens, that you become equally willing listeners when you are being defended, and not, through having been beguiled, become all too eager to praise the speeches of these men. For no one would go on judging it vice on your part if you have been led astray by some clever speaker, but it would be thought vice on the part of those who devoted their energies to deceiving you.

> Greek: 46.5. βουλοίμην δʼ ἂν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἴσους ἀκροατὰς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν γενέσθαι, καὶ μὴ τῷ προῆχθαι τοὺς λόγους ἐπαινέσαι τοὺς τούτων φιλονικεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑμετέραν κακίαν οὐδεὶς ἔτι κρίναι, εἰ λέγοντός τινος εὖ παρεκρούσθητε, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐπὶ τούτῳ σπουδὴν ποιησαμένων, ὅπως ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσουσιν. ΜΖ οἶμαι πάντας ἂν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, φῆσαι, ἃ βέλτισθʼ ἕκαστος ἡγεῖται τῇ πόλει, βούλεσθαι ταῦτα πραχθῆναι.

[¶22] 47.1. I suppose, men of Athens, you would all say you wish to have put into effect what each one considers best for the city. Quite so, but it happens that the same plan has not been judged the best by all of you; otherwise some of you would not be bidding the speaker “Go on” and others “Sit down.” Now, to those who hold the same measures to be expedient as does the one who is about to speak there is no need of a single word, for they are already convinced; but to those who think that the opposite course is for the best, I wish to speak briefly.

> Greek: 47.1. συμβαίνει δέ γε μὴ κατὰ ταὐτὸ κεκρίσθαι παρὰ πᾶσι τὸ βέλτιστον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ μὲν λέγειν, οἱ δὲ μὴ λέγειν ἐκέλευον. πρὸς μὲν τοίνυν τοὺς ὑπειληφότας ταῦτα συμφέρειν οὐδενὸς δεῖ λόγου τῷ μέλλοντι λέγειν· πεπεισμένοι γὰρ ὑπάρχουσι· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τἀναντία συμφέρειν ἡγουμένους βραχέʼ εἰπεῖν βούλομαι.

[¶23] 47.2. Unless you will listen, it is, of course, absolutely impossible to learn anything, any more than if you keep quiet when no one is speaking. But if you do listen it is impossible to miss one or the other of two benefits for either, being all persuaded and of the same mind, you will be more unanimous in your decision—and nothing better than this could happen for the present emergency—or else, if the speaker be unable to make his point, you will have more confidence in the decisions already reached.

> Greek: 47.2. μὴ ʼθέλουσι μὲν οὖν ἀκούειν οὐκ ἔνι δήπου μαθεῖν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ σιωπῶσιν μηδενὸς λέγοντος· ἀκούσασιν δὲ δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν οὐκ ἔνι θατέρου διαμαρτεῖν. ἢ γὰρ πεισθέντες πάντες καὶ ταὔτʼ ἐγνωκότες κοινότερον βουλεύσεσθε, οὗ μεῖζον εἰς τὰ παρόντʼ οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτʼ ἀγαθόν, ἢ μὴ δυνηθέντος τοῦ λέγοντος διδάξαι βεβαιότερον τοῖς ἐγνωσμένοις πιστεύσετε.

[¶24] 47.3. Apart from these two possibilities, there is a suspicion, and by no means to your credit, that, although you have come to the assembly under obligation to choose the best plan on the basis of what shall be said, instead, you will be found, before reaching a judgement on the basis of the speeches, to have been convinced of something in your own minds, and this so strongly that you are not even willing to hear anything to the contrary.

> Greek: 47.3. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων οὐδὲ καλὴν ὑποψίαν ἔχει ἥκειν μὲν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ῥηθησομένων τὸ κράτιστον ἑλέσθαι δέον, φανῆναι δέ, πρὶν ἐκ τῶν λόγων δοκιμάσαι, παρʼ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς τι πεπεισμένους, καὶ τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἰσχυρὸν ὥστε μηδʼ ἐθέλειν παρὰ ταῦτʼ ἀκούειν. ΜΗ ἴσως ὀχληρός, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τισὶν ὑμῶν εἶναι δοκῶ, πολλάκις λέγων περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεί.

[¶25] 48.1. Perhaps some of you, men of Athens, regard me as a nuisance, speaking on the same subjects time after time. But if you scan things rightly, it is not I who shall justly bear the blame for this, but rather those who do not obey your decrees. For if those men had done at the outset what you enjoined, it would not have been necessary for us to speak a second time or, if they had complied on the second occasion, a third time. As it is, the more often you have voted what your duty demanded, the less those men, it seems to me, have been prepared to act upon it.

> Greek: 48.1. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ὀρθῶς σκοπῆτε, οὐκ ἐγὼ φανήσομαι τούτου δίκαιος ὢν ἔχειν τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλλʼ οἱ μὴ πειθόμενοι τοῖς ὑμετέροις ψηφίσμασιν. εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τὸ πρῶτον ἐποίησαν ἃ ὑμεῖς προσετάξατε, οὐδὲν ἂν τὸ δεύτερον ἡμᾶς ἔδει λέγειν, οὐδʼ εἰ τὸ δεύτερον, αὖθις. νῦν δʼ ὅσῳ πλεονάκις τὰ προσήκονθʼ [ὑμῖν] ὑμεῖς ἐψηφίσασθε, τοσούτῳ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἧττον ἐκεῖνοι παρεσκευάσθαι ποιεῖν.

[¶26] 48.2. Previously, I confess by the gods, I did not know what was the point of the saying: “Responsibility reveals the man.” But now I think I could even tell another what it means. For the officials, or some of them— to avoid saying all—feel not even the slightest regard for your decrees but consider how they shall make some gain. Certainly, if it had been feasible for me to make a payment, I might have been justly rebuked for this very reason, if I chose to annoy you through balking at a paltry expenditure. But as things are, it is not feasible, as these men themselves have not failed to observe.

> Greek: 48.2. πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ᾔδειν πρὸς τί ποτʼ εἴη τοῦτʼ εἰρημένον ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείκνυσιν· νῦν δὲ κἂν ἄλλον μοι δοκῶ διδάξαι. οἱ γὰρ ἄρχοντες ἢ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ πάντας λέγω, τῶν μὲν ὑμετέρων ψηφισμάτων ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τὸ μικρότατον φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ λήψονται. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐνῆν δοῦναι, δικαίως ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτό μοί τις ἐπέπληξεν, εἰ διὰ μικρὸν ἀνάλωμʼ ἐνοχλεῖν ὑμῖν ᾑρούμην· νῦν δʼ οὐκ ἔνι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τούτους λέληθεν.

[¶27] 48.3. What is more, if, in the case of a service due to you they think I am going to leave it to themselves to decide, they are fools. And, perhaps, they both wish and expect it; this I will not do, but if they will allow me, I shall launch the ship and do my duty; otherwise, I shall reveal to you the names of those responsible.

> Greek: 48.3. εἰ δʼ ὑπὲρ ὧν ὑμῖν λῃτουργεῖν δεῖ, προσθήσειν αὑτοῖς οἴονταί με, ληροῦσιν. καὶ ταῦτʼ ἴσως βούλονται καὶ προσδοκῶσιν· ἐγὼ δʼ οὐ ποιήσω ταῦτα, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν μὲν δῶσι, καθέλξω τὴν ναῦν καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα ποιήσω, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὺς αἰτίους ὑμῖν ἀποφανῶ. ΜΘ οὐδένʼ ἂν εὖ φρονοῦντʼ ἀντειπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίζω, ὡς οὐχ ἁπάντων ἄριστόν ἐστιν τῇ πόλει μάλιστα μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς μηδὲν ἀσύμφορον πράττειν, εἰ δὲ μή, παρεῖναι εὐθὺς τοὺς ἐναντιωσομένους.

[¶28] 49.1. In my opinion, men of Athens, no intelligent citizen would deny that it is best of all for the city, preferably at the outset not to do anything inexpedient, but otherwise, that those should be on hand who will object at once. To this must be added, however, that you shall be willing to listen and learn; for nothing is gained by having a man who will give the best counsel unless he shall have people who will listen to him. Neither would the following suggestion prove unprofitable as the next step, that whatever deceptions anyone shall practise upon you through some well-timed maneuver, or the late hour of the day or by any other opening, that there should be someone who will scrutinize the measures a second time, when you, being arbiters of your own conduct, are willing to listen, so that of the measures should prove to be such as those assert who then persuaded you, you may put them into effect more wholeheartedly as having passed the test: but if, after all, they are found to be otherwise, that you may halt before going farther. For it would be a shocking thing that those who had failed to choose the best plan should be forced to put the worst into effect, and not have a chance to reconsider and choose from among other alternatives the plan that had stood second.

> Greek: 49.1. δεῖ μέντοι τούτῳ προσεῖναι ἐθέλοντας ἀκούειν ὑμᾶς καὶ διδάσκεσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον εἶναι τὸν ἐροῦντα τὰ βέλτιστα, ἂν μὴ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους ἔχῃ. οὐ μὴν οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνʼ ἀλυσιτελὲς μετὰ ταῦτʼ ἂν φανείη, ὅσʼ ἄν τις ὑμᾶς ἢ διὰ καιρὸν ἢ διʼ ὥραν ἡμέρας ἢ διʼ ἄλλην τινʼ αἰτίαν παρακρούσηται, ταῦθʼ ὅταν ποτὲ βούλησθʼ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ἀκούειν, εἶναι τὸν ἐξετάσοντα πάλιν, ἵνʼ ἐὰν μὲν οἷά φασιν οἱ τότε πείσαντες φανῇ, προθυμότερον πράττηθʼ ὡς ἔλεγχον δεδωκότα, ἐὰν δʼ ἄρα μὴ τοιαῦθʼ εὑρεθῇ, πρὶν πορρωτέρω προελθεῖν ἐπίσχητε. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη, εἰ τοῖς τοῦ κρατίστου διαμαρτοῦσι τὸ χείριστον ἀνάγκη πράττειν εἴη, καὶ μή, τὸ δεύτερον ἐκ τῶν λόγων, ἐξείη μεταβουλεύσασθαι.

[¶29] 49.3. Now while all other men, I observe, stand ready to submit to an accounting at any time, whenever they are confident that some measure of theirs has been honestly put through, yet these men, on the contrary, resent it if you desire now to reverse your action in matters wherein you have made a mistake, thinking their deception ought to prevail rather than spend time on an inquiry. So, even if the majority of you are perhaps not unaware of pressure on the part of these men, it is still one’s duty, once he has been given the floor, to declare what action he thinks best under the circumstances.

> Greek: 49.3. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλους ἅπαντας ἔγωγʼ ὁρῶ τὴν ἀειλογίαν προτεινομένους, ὅταν τι πιστεύωσι δικαίως αὑτοῖς πεπρᾶχθαι· οὗτοι δʼ αὖ τοὐναντίον ἐγκαλοῦσιν, εἰ περὶ ὧν ἡμάρτετε νῦν ἀναθέσθαι βούλεσθε, τὴν ἀπάτην κυριωτέραν οἰόμενοι δεῖν εἶναι τῆς μετὰ τοῦ χρόνου βασάνου. τὴν μὲν οὖν τούτων σπουδὴν οὐδʼ ὑμῶν ἴσως ἀγνοοῦσιν οἱ πολλοί· δεῖ δʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπειδήπερ γέγονε λόγου τυχεῖν, ἅ τις ἡγεῖται κράτιστα, λέγειν. Ν ὅ τι μὲν μέλλει συνοίσειν πάσῃ τῇ πόλει, τοῦτο καὶ λέγειν εὔχομαι πάντας, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ὑμᾶς ἑλέσθαι.

[¶30] 50.1. Whatever measure is going to benefit the whole State, men of Athens, I pray that all speakers will propose and you will adopt. I, at any rate, shall say what I have persuaded myself is most to your advantage, asking only this of you—that you neither consider those who urge you to take the field to be for this reason brave, nor those who undertake to oppose them to be for this reason cowards; for the test of speech and the test of action, men of Athens, are not the same; rather we must now show ourselves to have been wise in counsel and later, if in the end this proposal is adopted, display the deeds of courage.

> Greek: 50.1. ἐγὼ δʼ οὖν, ἃ πεπεικὼς ἐμαυτὸν τυγχάνω μάλιστα συμφέρειν ὑμῖν, ταῦτʼ ἐρῶ, δεηθεὶς ὑμῶν τοσοῦτον, μήτε τοὺς ἐξιέναι κελεύοντας ὑμᾶς διὰ τοῦτο νομίζειν ἀνδρείους, μήτε τοὺς ἀντιλέγειν ἐπιχειροῦντας διὰ τοῦτο κακούς. οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἔλεγχος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν τε λόγων καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ νῦν εὖ βεβουλευμένους ἡμᾶς φανῆναι, τότε δέ, ἂν ἄρα ταῦτα δοκῇ, τὰ τῆς ἀνδρείας ἀποδείξασθαι.

[¶31] 50.2. Your enthusiasm, I allow, is worthy of all praise and such as a man of goodwill toward the State might pray for; but the more intense your enthusiasm the more foresighted you should now be to employ it as you ought. For you know that no choice of a course of action justifies itself unless the end it achieves be beneficial and honorable. I am sure I once heard here in your presence, men of Athens, a man who was thought to be lacking neither in sense nor in experience of war.

> Greek: 50.2. ἡ μὲν οὖν ὑμετέρα προθυμία παντὸς ἀξία καὶ τοιαύτη πάρεστιν οἵαν ἄν τις εὔξαιτʼ εὔνους ὢν τῇ πόλει· νῦν δʼ ὅσῳ τυγχάνει σπουδαιοτέρα, τοσούτῳ δεῖ μᾶλλον προϊδεῖν ὅπως εἰς δέον καταχρήσεσθʼ αὐτῇ. οὐδενὸς γὰρ εὐδοκιμεῖ πράγματος ἡ προαίρεσις, ἂν μὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος συμφέρον καὶ καλὸν λάβῃ. ἐγὼ δʼ οἶδά ποτʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παρʼ ὑμῖν ἀκούσας ἀνδρὸς οὔτʼ ἀνοήτου δοκοῦντος εἶναι οὔτʼ ἀπείρου πολέμου, Ἰφικράτους λέγω, ὃς ἔφη δεῖν οὕτω προαιρεῖσθαι κινδυνεύειν τὸν στρατηγὸν ὅπως μὴ τὰ ἢ τὰ γενήσεται, ἀλλʼ ὅπως τά·

[¶32] 50.3. I refer to Iphicrates, who said, “A general must so choose to risk a battle, that not this or that may result but just this,” for such were his exact words. The meaning of this was obvious, for he meant “that he might come off victorious.” So, when you take the field, whoever is leader is master of you, but now each one of yourselves is a general. Thus it is your duty to show yourselves to have made such decisions as will inevitably be good for the State and that you shall not, for the sake of mere hopes of future goods, bring about something not so good as the prosperity you at present enjoy.

> Greek: 50.3. οὕτως γὰρ εἶπε τῷ ῥήματι. ἦν δὴ τοῦτο γνώριμον, ὅτι ὅπως καλῶς ἀγωνιεῖται ἔλεγεν. ἐπειδὰν μὲν τοίνυν ἐξέλθητε, ὃς ἂν ἡγῆται, κύριος ὑμῶν ἐστι· νῦν δʼ ἕκαστος ὑμῶν αὐτῶν στρατηγεῖ. δεῖ δὴ τοιαῦτα φανῆναι βεβουλευμένους διʼ ὧν πανταχῶς συνοίσει τῇ πόλει καὶ μὴ μελλουσῶν ἕνεκʼ ἐλπίδων τῆς παρούσης εὐδαιμονίας χεῖρόν τι ποιήσετε. ΝΑ οὐδένʼ ἂν ᾠόμην, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πιστεύοντα τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἐγκαλέσαι τοῖς καθιστᾶσιν εἰς λόγον ταῦτα·

[¶33] 51.1. I should have thought, men of Athens, that no one who has a clean conscience about the measures taken would prefer a complaint against those who move to bring these matters to an accounting; for the more often one examines into them, the more the authors of them are bound to grow in esteem. These men themselves, however, seem to me to render it manifest that they have not acted with the State’s interests in view. At any rate, just as if they were bound to be found guilty if they should come again to an accounting, they assume the defensive and say we are acting outrageously. And yet when you accuse of outrageous conduct those who wish to investigate, what are we citizens to say of those who in that very transaction have perpetrated a fraud against our own selves?

> Greek: 51.1. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλεονάκις ἐξετάζῃ τις αὐτά, ἀνάγκη τοὺς τούτων αἰτίους εὐδοκιμεῖν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ φανερὸν καθιστάναι οὐκ ἐπί ⟨τῳ⟩ τῶν τῇ πόλει συμφερόντων πράξαντες. ὡς γοῦν ἐξελέγχεσθαι μέλλοντες, ἂν πάλιν εἰς λόγον ἔλθωσιν, φεύγουσι καὶ δεινὰ ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς φασιν. καίτοι ὅταν τοὺς ἐξελέγχειν βουλομένους δεινὰ ποιεῖν αἰτιᾶσθε, τί ἡμεῖς τοὺς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξηπατηκότας τηνικαῦτα λέγωμεν; ΝΒ ἦν μὲν δίκαιον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ἴσην ὑπάρχειν παρʼ ὑμῶν ὀργὴν τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσιν ὅσηνπερ τοῖς δυνηθεῖσιν ἐξαπατῆσαι.

[¶34] 52.1. It would be the righteous thing, men of Athens, for you to feel the same anger toward those who attempt to deceive you as toward those who have been able to do so. For what it was in the power of these men to do has been done, and they led you along. That these designs have fallen short of success, credit is due to Fortune and to the fact that you are now wiser than when you were misled by these men. Yet the State, I believe, is so far from being able to exact justice of the wrongdoers, that it seems to me you must content yourselves if you shall be able to avoid sustaining loss; so formidable are the trickeries and chicaneries and, not to particularize, certain salaried public services that have been organized against you. To denounce the villainy of these men, however, would not at this juncture be most opportune: but I do wish to say what I deem advantageous with reference to the matters I have risen to discuss.

> Greek: 52.1. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἐπὶ τούτοις, πεποίηται καὶ προήγαγον ὑμᾶς· τοῦ δὲ μὴ τέλος ταῦτʼ ἔχειν ἡ τύχη καὶ τὸ βέλτιον νῦν ὑμᾶς φρονεῖν ἢ ὅτʼ ἐξήχθηθʼ ὑπὸ τούτων, γέγονεν αἴτια. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἔγωγʼ οὕτω πόρρω νομίζω τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τοῦ δίκην παρὰ τῶν ἀδικούντων λαμβάνειν ὥστʼ ἀγαπητὸν εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ, ἂν ὅπως μὴ πείσεσθε κακῶς δύνησθε φυλάττεσθαι· τοσαῦται τέχναι καὶ γοητεῖαι καὶ ὅλως ὑπηρεσίαι τινές εἰσιν ἐφʼ ὑμᾶς κατεσκευασμέναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν τούτων κακίας οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τις ἐν δέοντι μάλιστα κατηγορήσειεν· βούλομαι δʼ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀνέστην, ἃ νομίζω συμφέροντʼ εἰπεῖν. ΝΓ ἡ μὲν εἰωθυῖα πάντα τὸν χρόνον βλάπτειν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν πόλιν λοιδορία καὶ ταραχὴ καὶ νυνὶ γέγονε παρὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὧνπερ ἀεί.

[¶35] 53.1. The bickering and disorder, men of Athens, that are accustomed to injure the State all the time, have proceeded on this occasion from the same men as always. But the thing to do is not so much to blame these men—for perhaps they do it out of spite and quarrelsomeness and, what is the chief reason, because it pays them to do so—as to blame yourselves, men of Athens, if, after assembling on matters of common interest and prime importance, you sit and listen to private bickerings and cannot figure out for yourselves that the tirades directed against one another by all the speakers, when no one is on trial, cause you to pay the penalties for the offences of which they convict one another.

> Greek: 53.1. ἄξιον δʼ οὐχ οὕτω τούτοις ἐπιτιμῆσαι (ἴσως γὰρ ὀργῇ καὶ φιλονικίᾳ ταῦτα πράττουσι, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἁπάντων, ὅτι συμφέρει ταῦτα ποιεῖν αὐτοῖς) ἀλλʼ ὑμῖν, εἰ περὶ κοινῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πραγμάτων καὶ μεγάλων συνειλεγμένοι τὰς ἰδίας λοιδορίας ἀκροώμενοι κάθησθε, καὶ οὐ δύνασθε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς λογίσασθαι τοῦθʼ, ὅτι αἱ τῶν ῥητόρων ἁπάντων ἄνευ κρίσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους λοιδορίαι, ὧν ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐξελέγξωσιν, ὑμᾶς τὰς εὐθύνας διδόναι ποιοῦσιν.

[¶36] 53.2. For outside of a few perhaps, to avoid saying all, not one of them abuses another that any of your interests may be forwarded; very far from it, but in order that he may himself with the greater immunity succeed in doing what he says, if so-and-so did it, would be the most outrageous conduct imaginable.

> Greek: 53.2. πλὴν γὰρ ὀλίγων ἴσως, ἵνα μὴ πάντας εἴπω, οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἅτερος θατέρῳ λοιδορεῖται, ἵνα βέλτιόν τι τῶν ὑμετέρων γίγνηται ʽπολλοῦ γε καὶ δεἶ, ἀλλʼ ἵνα, ἃ τὸν δεῖνά φησι ποιοῦντα [ἂν δέῃ] δεινότατʼ ἀνθρώπων ποιεῖν, ταῦτʼ αὐτὸς μετὰ πλείονος ἡσυχίας διαπράττηται.

[¶37] 53.3. Do not take my word for it that this is so but consider for a little. Has anyone ever stood up before you and said, “I have come forward, men of Athens, desiring to get my hands on something of yours, not for your sakes”? Certainly not a single one. Instead, they say “for your sakes” and “on your account” and cite these plausible motives. Come now, men of Athens, consider why in the world you, “for whose sakes” they all speak, are on the whole no better off now than before, while these, who all say “for your sakes,” without a single one having ever said “for our own sakes,” have turned from beggars into rich men. It Is because, though they say they love you, men of Athens, they love not you but themselves.

> Greek: 53.3. ὅτι δʼ οὕτω ταῦτʼ ἔχει, μὴ ἐμοὶ πιστεύσητε, ἀλλʼ ἐν βραχεῖ λογίσασθε. ἔστιν ὅπου τις ἀναστὰς εἶπεν παρʼ ὑμῖν πώποτε βουλόμενός τι λαβεῖν τῶν ὑμετέρων παρελήλυθʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν; οὐδεὶς δήπου, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ διʼ ὑμᾶς, καὶ τοιαύτας προφάσεις λέγουσιν. φέρε δὴ σκέψασθε, τί δή ποτʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἅπαντες λέγουσιν, οὐδὲν βέλτιον τοῖς ὅλοις νῦν ἢ πρότερον πράττετε, οὗτοι δʼ οἱ πάνθʼ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν δʼ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν πώποτʼ εἰρηκώς, ἐκ πτωχῶν πλούσιοι γεγόνασιν; ὅτι φασὶν μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς, φιλοῦσι δʼ οὐχ ὑμᾶς ἀλλʼ αὑτούς.

[¶38] 53.4. The portion they allow you is to have a laugh and to raise a hubbub and now and then to have a hope, but they would not want you to get or acquire for the State any benefit in the proper sense of the word. Yes, and on the day when you are freed of this lamentable weakness you will be unable to endure even the sight of them. At present with their drachma and gallon measure and four obols they regulate the populace like a sick man, giving you, men of Athens, doles very similar to the diets of the physicians. For these diets neither put strength into the patient nor allow him to die, and these doles neither allow you to cry quits and engage in some different and better business, nor can they alone suffice.

> Greek: 53.4. καὶ γελάσαι καὶ θορυβῆσαι καί ποτʼ ἐλπίσαι μετέδωκαν ὑμῖν, λαβεῖν δʼ ἢ κτήσασθαι τῇ πόλει κυρίως ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἂν βούλοιντο. ᾗ γὰρ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ τῆς λίαν ἀρρωστίας ἀπαλλαγῆτε, ταύτῃ τούτους οὐδʼ ὁρῶντες ἀνέξεσθε. νῦν δὲ δραχμῇ καὶ χοῒ καὶ τέτταρσιν ὀβολοῖς ὥσπερ ἀσθενοῦντα τὸν δῆμον διάγουσιν, ὁμοιότατʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν σιτίοις διδόντες ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνʼ οὔτʼ ἰσχὺν ἐντίθησιν οὔτʼ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐᾷ, καὶ ταῦτʼ οὔτʼ ἀπογνόντας ἄλλο τι μεῖζον πράττειν ἐᾷ, οὔτʼ αὔτʼ ἐξαρκεῖν δύναται. ΝΔ καὶ δίκαιον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ καλὸν καὶ σπουδαῖον, ὅπερ ὑμεῖς εἰώθατε, καὶ ἡμᾶς προνοεῖν, ὅπως τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβῶς ἕξει.

[¶39] 54.1. It is just and right and important, men of Athens, that we too should exercise care, as you are accustomed, that our relations with the gods shall be piously maintained. Therefore our commission has been duly discharged for you, for we have sacrificed to Zeus the Saviour and to Athena and to Victory, and these sacrifices have been auspicious and salutary for you. We have also sacrificed to Persuasion and to the Mother of the Gods and to Apollo, and here also we had favorable omens. And the sacrifices made to the other gods portended for you security and stability and prosperity and safety. Do you, therefore, accept the blessings which the gods bestow. There was, as it seems, a time in your history, men of Athens, when the democracy compelled any man whom it observed to be prudent and honest to perform public service and to hold office, not through lack of those who wished to do so—for, while deeming the city to be fortunate in all other respects, in this one particular I consider it has never been fortunate, that the supply of those who wish to reap a harvest from the public business never fails it—but the democracy used to make out of this a fine showing for itself, creditable and profitable to the State, men of Athens.

> Greek: 54.1. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἡμετέρα γέγονεν ἐπιμέλειʼ ὑμῖν εἰς δέον· καὶ γὰρ ἐθύσαμεν τῷ Διὶ τῷ σωτῆρι καὶ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ καὶ τῇ Νίκῃ, καὶ γέγονεν καλὰ καὶ σωτήρια ταῦθʼ ὑμῖν τὰ ἱερά. ἐθύσαμεν δὲ καὶ τῇ Πειθοῖ καὶ τῇ Μητρὶ τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι, καὶ ἐκαλλιεροῦμεν καὶ ταῦτα. ἦν δʼ ὑμῖν καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς τυθένθʼ ἱέρʼ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ βέβαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ σωτήρια. δέχεσθʼ οὖν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν διδόντων τἀγαθά. ΝΕ ἦν τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, χρόνος παρʼ ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτʼ ἐπηνάγκαζεν ὁ δῆμος, ὃν ἄνθρωπον ἴδοι σώφρονα καὶ χρηστόν, πράττειν τὰ κοινὰ καὶ ἄρχειν, οὐ σπάνει τῶν τοῦτο βουλομένων ποιεῖν (πάντα γὰρ τἄλλʼ εὐτυχῆ τὴν πόλιν κρίνων, ἓν οὐδέποτʼ εὐτυχῆσαι τοῦτο νομίζω, ἐπιλείπειν αὐτὴν τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ καρποῦσθαι βουλομένους), ἀλλʼ ὅραμα τοῦτʼ ἐποιεῖθʼ ὁ δῆμος αὑτοῦ καλόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ λυσιτελὲς τῇ πόλει.

[¶40] 55.2. For on the one hand, these men, the kind who hold office year after year, when earnest and upright men from a different class were given them as yokemates, used to show themselves more circumspect; and on the other hand, the kind of men among you who are honest and upright in office, but not at all of the sort to push their way and appeal for support, were not shut out of the posts of trust. But now, men of Athens, you appoint your magistrates in exactly the same manner as you appoint your priests. Then you are amazed when this one is prosperous and that one, to your dismay, is year after year taking a rich spoil, while the rest of you go around envying these men their blessings!

> Greek: 55.2. οἵ τε γὰρ συνεχεῖς οἵδε παραζευγνυμένων σφίσιν ἐξ ἰδιωτῶν σπουδαίων καὶ δικαίων ἀνδρῶν, εὐλαβεστέρους αὑτοὺς παρεῖχον, οἵ τε χρηστοὶ μὲν ὑμῶν καὶ δικαίως ⟨ἂν⟩ ἄρχοντες, μὴ πάνυ δʼ οἷοί τʼ ἐνοχλεῖν καὶ παραγγέλλειν, οὐκ ἀπηλαύνοντο τῶν τιμῶν. νῦν δὲ παντάπασι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅνπερ τοὺς ἱερεῖς, οὕτως καθίστατε καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας. εἶτα θαυμάζετε, ἐπειδὰν ὁ δεῖνʼ εὐδαίμων καὶ ὁ δεῖνʼ ὑμῖν ᾖ συνεχῶς πολλὰ λαμβάνων, οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι περιίητε τὰ τούτων ἀγαθὰ ζηλοῦντες.

[¶41] 55.3. For you are the worst people for taking away the offices that fall to your class, and for enacting laws about them if someone serves twice as commissioner of police or something of the sort, but you allow the same men to be generals all the time. There is perhaps some excuse for allowing those engaged in the active services to continue, but to allow the others, who, though doing nothing, have an endless tenure of office and are themselves endlessly benefited is folly. Instead, you ought to bring in some of your own number, and there are not a few of you. For if you set up a standard, as it were, anyone who is worth anything will thereafter come forward of his own accord.

> Greek: 55.3. δεινότατοι γάρ ἐστʼ ἀφελέσθαι μὲν ὅσʼ ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει, καὶ νόμους περὶ τούτων θεῖναι, ἄν τις ἀστυνομήσῃ δὶς ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα, στρατηγεῖν δʼ ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐᾶν. καὶ τὸ μὲν τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων ὄντας ἴσως ἔχει πρόφασιν· τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ ποιοῦσι μὲν οὐδέν, χώραν δʼ ἀτέλεστον ἔχουσιν αὐτοὶ τετελεσμένοι, μωρία. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ʽεἰσὶ δʼ οὐκ ὀλίγοἰ προσάγειν χρή. ἂν γὰρ ὡσπερεὶ ζυγῷ ἱστῆτε, πρόεισιν ὃς ἂν ἄξιος ᾖ του μετὰ ταῦτʼ αὐτός. ΝϚ τὸ μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπεικόθʼ ἑαυτὸν ἔχειν τι συμφέρον εἰπεῖν ἀνίστασθαι καὶ καλὸν καὶ προσῆκον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ βουλομένους ἀκούειν βιάζεσθαι παντελῶς ἔγωγʼ αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι [εἶναι].

[¶42] 56.1. It seems to me a fine and seemly thing, men of Athens, for a man who has convinced himself he has something profitable to say to take the floor, but I consider it altogether shameful to force people to listen against their will. And I think, if you will but take my advice today, you will be better able both to choose the best measures and to shorten the speeches of those who come to the platform.

> Greek: 56.1. οἴομαι δέ, ἐὰν ἐθελήσητέ μοι πείθεσθαι τήμερον, καὶ τὰ βέλτιστα μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς ἑλέσθαι δυνήσεσθαι καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἀναβαινόντων λόγους βραχεῖς ποιήσειν.

[¶43] 56.2. What, then, do I advise? First of all, men of Athens, to require the man who comes forward to confine himself to the matters you are considering. For otherwise someone may embrace many other topics in his speech and say many witty things, especially those who are smart at it, as some of these are. Well, if you have come here to listen to fine phrases, the thing to do is to make them and listen to them, but if you have come to deliberate about a choice of measures, I urge you to judge the measures strictly by themselves, eliminating all passages of a nature to mislead.

> Greek: 56.2. τί οὖν συμβουλεύω; πρῶτον μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, περὶ αὐτῶν ὧν σκοπεῖτε τὸν παριόντα λέγειν ἀξιοῦν. πολλὰ γὰρ ἄλλα τις ἂν περιέλθοι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πόλλʼ ἂν ἀστεῖʼ εἴποι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὥσπερ τούτων ἔνιοι δεινῶν ὄντων. ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν ῥημάτων ἥκετʼ ἀκουσόμενοι, ταῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν χρή· εἰ δʼ ὑπὲρ πραγμάτων αἱρέσεως βουλευσόμενοι, αὐτὰ καθʼ ἑαυτὰ παραινῶ τὰ πράγμαθʼ ὡς μάλιστα κρίνειν, ἀφελόντας ὅσοι λόγοι πεφύκασιν ἐξαπατᾶν.

[¶44] 56.3. This, then, is my first point. My second, which to some of you will perhaps be inconsistent with cutting the speeches shorter, is that you listen in silence. For on the question whether this or that is expedient and which choice the State might more rightly prefer, there are few arguments to be presented, unless by such persons as wish to prattle aimlessly, nor would anyone have occasion to state them a second time. As for the claim that it is only fair to listen to the heckling, and to give an answer and to make speech after speech, there is no one who could not do that. Thus by heckling you do not get rid of speeches; instead you are forced in addition to hear speeches that are totally irrelevant. Accordingly my judgement concerning the matter before you now begins.

> Greek: 56.3. ἓν μὲν οὖν τοῦτο λέγω, δεύτερον δέ, ὅ τισιν ἴσως παράδοξον ἔσται πρὸς τὸ τοὺς λόγους ἐλάττους εἶναι, σιωπῶντας ἀκούειν. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ταῦτʼ ἢ ʼκεῖνα συμφέρειν, καὶ πότερʼ ἂν δικαιότερον προέλοιθʼ ἡ πόλις, οὔτʼ εἰσὶ λόγοι πολλοὶ μὴ βουλομένοις μάτην ἀδολεσχεῖν, οὔτε πᾶς τις ἂν αὐτοὺς εἰπεῖν ἔχοι· ὡς δὲ καὶ δίκαιον ἀκούειν καὶ πρὸς τὸν θόρυβον ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ λόγον ἐκ λόγου λέγειν, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐχὶ δύναιτʼ ἄν. ἐκ δὴ τοῦ θορυβεῖν οὐκ ἀπαλλάττεσθε λόγων, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν οὐδὲν εἰς χρείαν ἐπαναγκάζεσθʼ ἀκούειν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐμὴ γνώμη περὶ ὧν βουλεύεσθε, ἥδʼ ἐστίν.