---
title: "Exordia · Προοίμια δημηγορικά"
author: "Demosthenes"
translator: "Norman W. DeWitt"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
section: 1 of 3
url: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/1/
cite: "Demosthenes, tr. Norman W. DeWitt, Exordia · Προοίμια δημηγορικά, section 1. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/1/"
---

# Exordia · Προοίμια δημηγορικά

*Demosthenes, tr. Norman W. DeWitt*

Fifty-six openings for speeches to the assembly.

> Greek: ed. William Rennie, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0014.tlg062, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Norman W. DeWitt, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0014.tlg062.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 1. Exordia 1–22

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-exordia/1/#p-N

[¶0] If it had been proposed to discuss some new measure, men of Athens, I should have waited until most of the regular speakers had declared their opinions, and if any of their views had pleased me, I should have held my peace; otherwise, I should then have attempted to say what I myself think. But since you are now considering matters on which these speakers have often spoken before, I feel that, even if the first to rise, I may reasonably appear to be speaking after them.

> Greek: Α εἰ μὲν περὶ καινοῦ τινος πράγματος προὐτίθετʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λέγειν, ἐπισχὼν ἂν ἕως οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν εἰωθότων γνώμην ἀπεφήναντο, εἰ μὲν ἤρεσκέ τί μοι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἦγον, εἰ δὲ μή, τότʼ ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπειρώμην ἃ γιγνώσκω λέγειν· ἐπειδὴ δʼ ὑπὲρ ὧν πολλάκις εἰρήκασιν οὗτοι πρότερον, περὶ τούτων νυνὶ σκοπεῖτε, ἡγοῦμαι καὶ πρῶτος ἀναστὰς εἰκότως ἂν μετὰ τούτους δοκεῖν λέγειν.

[¶1] 1.2. Now, if our interests were prospering, there would be no need to deliberate; but since, as you all observe, they are in straits, I shall try, on that assumption, to advise what I consider best. In the first place, you ought to recognize that none of the policies you pursued while engaged in the war are to be used henceforth, but quite their opposites. For if those policies have brought your fortunes low, it is very likely that their opposites will improve them.

> Greek: 1.2. εἰ μὲν οὖν εἶχεν καλῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει συμβουλεύειν· ἐπειδὴ δʼ ὅσην ἅπαντες ὁρᾶτʼ ἔχει δυσκολίαν, ὡς ἐκ τοιούτων πειράσομαι συμβουλεύειν ἃ κράτιστʼ εἶναι νομίζω. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑμᾶς ἐκεῖνʼ ἐγνωκέναι δεῖ, ὡς οὐδὲν ὧν ἐποιεῖτʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν ὄντες τοῦ λοιποῦ πρακτέον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πάντα τἀναντία· εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα φαῦλα πεποίηκε τὰ πράγματα, τἀναντίʼ εἰκὸς βελτίω ποιῆσαι.

[¶2] 1.3. Next, you must consider that it is not the speaker who places upon you little or no burden who is in the right, for you see that, as a consequence of such optimistic speeches, our present condition has reached the limit of wretchedness, but rather the speaker who, putting aside the thought of pleasing you, shall tell you what ought to be done and by what means we may cease bringing disgrace upon ourselves and incurring losses. For, to speak truthfully, if all that a man passes over in his speech through reluctance to pain you is going to be passed over also by the course of events, it is right to harangue you for your pleasure; but if the charm of words, when unbecoming the occasion, becomes a penalty in action, it is shameful to cheat yourselves, and to do only under the utmost necessity what you should have done voluntarily long before.

> Greek: 1.3. ἔπειτα νομιστέον οὐχ ὃς ἂν ὑμῖν ἢ μηδὲν ἢ μικρὰ προστάττῃ, τοῦτον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ʽὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὡς ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ἐλπίδων καὶ λόγων εἰς πᾶν προελήλυθε μοχθηρίας τὰ παρόντἀ, ἀλλʼ ὃς ἂν τὸ χαρίζεσθαι παρείς, ἃ δεῖ καὶ διʼ ὧν παυσαίμεθʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ αἰσχύνην ὀφλισκάνοντες καὶ ζημιούμενοι, ταῦτα λέγῃ. καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μέν, ὅσʼ ἂν τῷ λόγῳ τις ὑπερβῇ λυπῆσαι μὴ βουλόμενος, καὶ τὰ πράγμαθʼ ὑπερβήσεται, δεῖ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δημηγορεῖν· εἰ δʼ ἡ τῶν λόγων χάρις, ἂν ᾖ μὴ προσήκουσα, ἔργῳ ζημία γίγνεται, αἰσχρόν ἐστιν φενακίζειν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνάγκης πρᾶξαι ταῦθʼ ἃ πάλαι ʼθελοντὰς προσῆκεν ποιεῖν. Β οὐχὶ ταὐτὰ γιγνώσκειν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παρίσταταί μοι, ὅταν τε τὸ τῆς πολιτείας ὄνομʼ ὑμῶν ἀκούσω, καὶ ὅταν τὸν τρόπον ὃν προσφέρονταί τινες ὑμῶν τοῖς ὑπὲρ ταύτης λέγουσιν ἴδω.

[¶3] 2.1. The same thoughts do not present themselves to me, men of Athens, when I hear you refer by name to our form of government and again when I see the manner in which some of you treat those who speak in its defence. As you all know, the name you give to our government is democracy, but I see that some of you listen with more pleasure to those who advocate the opposite to it. I wonder just what their motive may be. Or do you imagine they are making these speeches gratis? Well, the masters of the oligarchies, whose cause these men are pleading, might quietly increase their fees. But honestly, have you assumed that their principles are better than the other kind? So oligarchy, presumably, looks better to you than democracy! Then do you think the men themselves are better? And yet who could reasonably be regarded by you as honest when he speaks in public against the interest of the established government? Therefore it remains to conclude that you are mistaken when you hold this opinion. Consequently, be on your guard against falling into this error, men of Athens, so that you shall not some day give those who are plotting against you an opening, and only then learn that you have made a mistake, when it will no longer be of the least advantage to you.

> Greek: 2.1. τὴν μὲν γὰρ πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἅπαντες ἴστε, ὀνομάζετε, τῶν δὲ τἀναντία ταύτῃ λεγόντων ἐνίους ἥδιον ἀκούοντας ὁρῶ. ὃ καὶ θαυμάζω τίς ποθʼ ἡ πρόφασις. πότερον προῖκα λέγειν ταῦτʼ αὐτοὺς οἴεσθε; ἀλλʼ οἱ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν, ὑπὲρ ὧν οὗτοι λέγουσιν, κύριοι καὶ πλείω σιωπῆς μᾶλλον ἂν δοῖεν. ἀλλὰ βελτίω ταῦτʼ εἶναι τῶν ἑτέρων ὑπειλήφατε; βελτίων ἄρʼ ὑμῖν ὀλιγαρχία δημοκρατίας φαίνεται. ἀλλʼ αὐτοὺς εἶναι βελτίους ἡγεῖσθε; καὶ τίς ἂν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν χρηστὸς νομίζοιτʼ εἰκότως, ἐναντία τῇ καθεστώσῃ πολιτείᾳ δημηγορῶν; οὐκοῦν λοιπὸν ἁμαρτάνειν ὑμᾶς, ὅταν οὕτως ἔχητε τὴν γνώμην. τοῦτο τοίνυν φυλάττεσθε μὴ πάσχειν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅπως μή ποτε τοῖς ἐπιβουλεύουσιν λαβὴν δώσετε, εἶτα τότʼ αἰσθήσεσθʼ ἡμαρτηκότες, ἡνίκʼ οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν ὑμῖν πλέον ἔσται.

[¶4] 2.3. Now, the fact that everything is not going as we might wish, men of Athens, either at home or among our allies, is perhaps not astonishing; for in many things the whim of Fortune prevails and there are many plausible reasons why everything does not turn out according to plan, men being but men. Yet for the common people to have no portion at all and their opponents a superabundance is something to astound and alarm intelligent men, as I judge it, men of Athens. This, then, is the starting point of my entire speech.

> Greek: 2.3. β τὸ μὲν [οὖν], ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ πάνθʼ ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλοίμεθʼ ἔχειν μήτε παρʼ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν μήτε παρὰ τοῖς συμμάχοις, ἴσως οὐδέν ἐστι θαυμαστόν· πολλῶν γὰρ τὸ τῆς τύχης αὐτόματον κρατεῖ, καὶ πολλαὶ προφάσεις τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ γνώμην συμβαίνειν ἀνθρώποις οὖσιν. τὸ δὲ μηδʼ ὁτιοῦν μεταλαμβάνειν τὸν δῆμον, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀντιπράττοντας περιεῖναι, τοῦτο καὶ θαυμαστόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ φοβερὸν τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν, ὡς ἐγὼ κρίνω. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ παντός ἐστιν αὕτη μοι τοῦ λόγου. Γ ἀντὶ πολλῶν ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρημάτων τὸ μέλλον συνοίσειν ὑμῖν περὶ ὧν νυνὶ τυγχάνετε σκοποῦντες, οἶμαι πάντας ἂν ὑμᾶς ἑλέσθαι.

[¶5] 3.1. I believe, men of Athens, that in preference to a large sum of money you would choose the plan that will pay you in the matters you are now considering. This being so, it is then your duty to show yourselves willing hearers of your prospective counsellors; for not only in the event of someone having come here with a useful idea thought out, would you, having listened, have the benefit of it, but I also assume it to be part of your good fortune that many timely suggestions would occur to some men on the spur of the moment, so that from the whole number the choice of the advantageous is made easier for you.

> Greek: 3.1. ὅτε τοίνυν τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει, προσήκει παρέχειν ἐθέλοντας ἀκούειν ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς τῶν βουλομένων συμβουλεύειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον εἴ τι χρήσιμον ἐσκεμμένος ἥκει τις, τοῦτʼ ἂν ἀκούσαντες λάβοιτε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας τύχης ὑπολαμβάνω πολλὰ τῶν δεόντων ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμʼ ἐνίοις ἐπελθεῖν ἂν εἰπεῖν, ὥστʼ ἐξ ἁπάντων ῥᾳδίαν τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ὑμῖν αἵρεσιν γενέσθαι. Δ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δίκαιον, ἐπειδὴ ἐφʼ ὑμῖν ἐστιν ἑλέσθαι τῶν ῥηθέντων ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε, ἁπάντων ἀκοῦσαι.

[¶6] 4.1. It is your duty, men of Athens, to listen to every proposal made, since it is your prerogative to adopt whichever of them you choose. For it often happens that the same person is wrong on one point and right on another; and so by shouting him down when displeased you may perhaps deprive yourselves of many useful ideas, whereas by attending with decorum and in silence, you will act on every sound proposal, and if you think someone is making a foolish suggestion, you will ignore it. As for me, I am not accustomed to make long speeches, and even if previously I had been in the habit, I should not have taken this occasion to do so; instead, I shall tell you as briefly as I can what I consider to be in your interests.

> Greek: 4.1. καὶ γὰρ πολλάκις συμβαίνει τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτο μὲν μὴ λέγειν ὀρθῶς, ἕτερον δέ τι· ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦ θορυβεῖν τάχʼ ἂν δυσχεράναντες πολλῶν χρησίμων ἀποστερηθείητε, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μετὰ κόσμου καὶ σιγῆς ἀκοῦσαι καὶ τὰ καλῶς ἔχονθʼ ἅπαντα ποιήσετε, κἂν δοκῇ τις [παρα]ληρεῖν, παραλείψετε. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὔτʼ εἴωθα μακρολογεῖν, οὔτʼ ἄν, εἰ τὸν ἄλλον εἰώθειν χρόνον, νῦν ἐχρησάμην τούτῳ, ἀλλʼ ἃ συμφέρειν ὑμῖν νομίζω, ταῦθʼ ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι διὰ βραχυτάτων ἐρῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς. Ε ὁρῶ μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παντάπασι πρόδηλον ὂν οὕς τʼ ἂν ἀκούσαιτε λόγους ἡδέως καὶ πρὸς οὓς οὐκ οἰκείως ἔχετε·

[¶7] 5.1. I observe, men of Athens, that there is no mistaking what kind of speeches you would like to hear and to what kind you are averse. Yet to say what one thinks will find favour I consider to be the badge of those who wish to work some deception, whereas to endure, when one is speaking for measures he is convinced are advantageous to the State, either your heckling or what else you choose to do, I judge to be the part of a loyal and honest citizen.

> Greek: 5.1. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν λέγειν ἅ τις οἴεται χαριεῖσθαι τῶν παρακρούσασθαί τι βουλομένων εἶναι νομίζω, τὸ δʼ ὑφίστασθαι, περὶ ὧν πέπεικεν ἑαυτὸν συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει, καὶ θορυβηθῆναι κἂν ἄλλο τι βούλησθʼ ὑμεῖς, εὔνου καὶ δικαίου τοῦτο πολίτου κρίνω.

[¶8] 5.2. And I should like to have you bear patiently with the speeches of both sides to this end, if for no other, in order that, if someone shall be found to offer a proposal better than those upon which you are intent, you may avail yourselves of it, but, if he falls short and is unable to make his point, that he may seem to have suffered this repulse through his own fault and not because of your refusing to listen. Furthermore, your experience would not be so disagreeable if you should listen to some fool making a long speech as it would if you prevented a man from speaking who had something timely to propose.

> Greek: 5.2. βουλοίμην δʼ ἂν ὑμᾶς, εἰ καὶ μηδὲ διʼ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, διʼ ἐκεῖνʼ ὑπομεῖναι τοὺς λόγους ἀμφοτέρων, ἵνʼ ἐὰν μὲν ὀρθότερον φανῇ τις λέγων ὧν ὑμεῖς ὡρμήκατε, χρήσησθε τούτῳ, ἂν δʼ ἀπολειφθῇ καὶ μὴ δύνηται διδάξαι, διʼ αὑτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διʼ ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ἀκούειν τοῦτο πεπονθέναι δοκῇ. ἔτι δʼ οὐδὲ πάθοιτʼ ἂν ἀηδὲς οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον, εἰ πολλά τινος ληροῦντος ἀκούσαιτε, ὅσον εἰ τῶν δεόντων τι λέγειν ἔχοντός τινος εἰπεῖν κωλύσαιτε.

[¶9] 5.3. In all matters, of course, the first step toward right judgement is never to imagine you understand before learning, especially knowing as you do that many men before now have often changed their minds. If, then, you on your part are now convinced of these truths, I think that I on my part shall seem justified in speaking briefly in opposition and be found to propose the plans that are best for you.

> Greek: 5.3. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ δοκιμάζειν ὀρθῶς ἅπαντʼ ἐστὶν μηδὲν οἴεσθαι πρότερον γιγνώσκειν πρὶν μαθεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ συνειδότας πολλάκις ἤδη πολλοὺς μετεγνωκότας. ἂν τοίνυν ὑμεῖς ταῦθʼ ὑπάρξητε νῦν πεπεισμένοι, οἴομαι μετὰ βραχέων λόγων καὶ αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγειν εἰκότως δόξειν καὶ ὑμῖν τὰ βέλτιστα φανεῖσθαι λέγων. Ϛ πολλῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λόγων εἰρημένων παρὰ πάντων τῶν συμβεβουλευκότων, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς νῦν ὁρῶ ὄντας ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ τί πρακτέον ηὑρῆσθαι ἢ πρὶν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀναβῆναι.

[¶10] 6.1. Although many speeches have been made, men of Athens, by all your counsellors, I do not see that you are now any nearer to discovering what ought to be done than before you came up to the Assembly. The cause of this, in my opinion, is the same as the cause of the wretched plight of our affairs in general, that the speakers do not offer advice about the business before you, but accuse and revile one another, accustoming you, in my judgement, to hearing, without process of law, all the mischief of which they are the cause, in order that if, after all, they do come to face the test some day, you, thinking you are hearing nothing new, but only the charges over which you have often been angry, may so become more merciful jurors and judges of their misdeeds.

> Greek: 6.1. αἴτιον δὲ τούτου ταὔθʼ ὅπερ οἶμαι τοῦ κακῶς ἔχειν τὰ ὅλα· οὐ γὰρ παραινοῦσιν ὑμῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν παρόντων οἱ λέγοντες, ἀλλʼ ἑαυτῶν κατηγοροῦσι καὶ λοιδοροῦνται, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ κρίνω, συνεθίζοντες ὑμᾶς ἄνευ κρίσεως, ὅσων εἰσὶν αἴτιοι κακῶν, ἀκούειν, ἵνʼ ἄν ποτʼ ἄρʼ εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστῶνται, μηδὲν ἡγούμενοι καινὸν ἀκούειν, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ ὧν ὤργισθε πολλάκις, πραότεροι δικασταὶ καὶ κριταὶ γίγνησθε τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτοῖς.

[¶11] 6.2. Perhaps it would be foolish at the moment to inquire into the exact reason why they do this; but because it harms you, for this reason I censure them. For my own part, I will accuse no one today nor will I sponsor any charge that I shall not make good on the spot, nor, in general, will I do any of the things which these men do; but when I have stated as briefly as I can what I think best for your interests and most profitable for you who deliberate, I will step down.

> Greek: 6.2. τὴν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν διʼ ἣν ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, ἴσως ἀνόητον ἀκριβῶς ζητεῖν [εἴη ἂν] ἐν τῷ παρόντι· ὅτι δʼ ὑμῖν οὐχὶ συμφέρει, διὰ τοῦτʼ ἐπιτιμῶ. ἐγὼ δʼ οὔτε κατηγορήσω τήμερον οὐδενός, οὔθʼ ὑποσχήσομαι τοιοῦτʼ οὐδὲν ὃ μὴ παραχρῆμʼ ἐπιδείξω, οὐδʼ ὅλως τῶν αὐτῶν τούτοις οὐδὲν ποιήσω· ἀλλʼ ἃ βέλτιστα μὲν τοῖς πράγμασιν, συμφέροντα δὲ τοῖς βουλευομένοις ὑμῖν ἡγοῦμαι, ταῦθʼ ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι διὰ βραχυτάτων εἰπὼν καταβήσομαι. Ζ οἱ μὲν ἐπαινοῦντες, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς προγόνους ὑμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν μοι δοκοῦσι προαιρεῖσθαι κεχαρισμένον, οὐ μὴν συμφέροντά γʼ ἐκείνοις οὓς ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ποιεῖν.

[¶12] 7.1. Those who praise your forefathers, men of Athens, in my judgement choose a charming theme upon which to speak, and yet I do not think they do a favour to those whom they extol. For instance, when they undertake to tell of the deeds of those men, to which no speaker could do justice, while winning for themselves a reputation for ability to speak, they cause the valor of those men to seem to their hearers less than had been supposed. As for me, I consider the greatest commendation of those heroes to be the test of time, for although a long interval has gone by, no others have been able to exhibit greater deeds than those performed by them, and I shall myself merely try to tell you after what manner I think you will be best able to make your preparations.

> Greek: 7.1. περὶ γὰρ πραγμάτων ἐγχειροῦντες ⟨λέγειν⟩ ὧν οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς ἀξίως ἐφικέσθαι δύναιτο τῷ λόγῳ, αὐτοὶ μὲν τοῦ δύνασθαι λέγειν δόξαν ἐκφέρονται, τὴν δʼ ἐκείνων ἀρετὴν ἐλάττω τῆς ὑπειλημμένης παρὰ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ δὲ τῆς μὲν ἐκείνων ἀρετῆς μέγιστον ἔπαινον ἡγοῦμαι τὸν χρόνον, οὗ πολλοῦ γεγενημένου μείζω τῶν ὑπʼ ἐκείνων πραχθέντων οὐδένες ἄλλοι παραδείξασθαι δεδύνηνται·

[¶13] 7.2. For this is the situation; though we should all prove ourselves to be clever speakers, I know well that your interests would not be advanced in the slightest, but if just one speaker, no matter who, should come forward and be able to demonstrate convincingly what kind of preparation, and how great, and provided from what funds, would be to the State’s advantage, all our present apprehension is as good as dispelled. This I shall try to do, if, after all, I am able, having first told you briefly how my opinion stands with respect to our relations with the King.

> Greek: 7.2. αὐτὸς δὲ πειράσομαι τὸν τρόπον εἰπεῖν ὃν ἄν μοι δοκεῖτε μάλιστα δύνασθαι παρασκευάσασθαι. καὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει· εἰ μὲν ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες οἱ λέγοντες δεινοὶ φανείημεν, οὐδὲν ἂν τὰ ὑμέτερʼ εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι βέλτιον σχοίη· εἰ δὲ παρελθὼν ⟨εἷς⟩ ὁστισοῦν δύναιτο διδάξαι καὶ πεῖσαι, τίς παρασκευὴ καὶ πόση καὶ πόθεν πορισθεῖσα χρήσιμος ἔσται τῇ πόλει, πᾶς ὁ παρὼν λέλυται φόβος. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο, ἂν ἄρʼ οἷός τʼ ὦ, πειράσομαι ποιῆσαι, μικρὰ προειπὼν ὑμῖν ὡς ἔχω γνώμης περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. Η ἀμφότεροί μοι δοκοῦσιν ἁμαρτάνειν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ οἱ τοῖς Ἀρκάσιν καὶ οἱ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις συνειρηκότες·

[¶14] 8.1. Both parties seem to me to be in the wrong, men of Athens, both those who have supported the Arcadians and those who have supported the Spartans. For, just as if they had come here from one or the other of the two countries and were not of your own citizen body, to which both embassies are appealing, they are denouncing and abusing one another. This, however, was a concern of the visiting envoys, while to discuss the questions in the common interest and to consider your own interest without self-seeking is the duty of those who see fit to offer advice here in Athens.

> Greek: 8.1. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀφʼ ἑκατέρων ἥκοντες, οὐχ ὑμῶν ὄντες, πρὸς οὓς ἀμφότεροι πρεσβεύονται, κατηγοροῦσιν καὶ διαβάλλουσιν ἀλλήλους. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τῶν ἀφιγμένων ἔργον, τὸ δὲ κοινῶς ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων λέγειν καὶ τὰ βέλτισθʼ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν σκοπεῖν ἄνευ φιλονικίας τῶν ἐνθάδε συμβουλεύειν ἀξιούντων.

[¶15] 8.2. Yet as things now are, if one could cancel the fact of their being known and their using the Attic speech, many people, I believe, would think the one group Arcadians and the other Spartans! I know myself how difficult it is to propose the best procedure, for when you have been deceived and some of you want this and others that, if someone undertakes to suggest a compromise and then you do not wait to learn the facts, he will please neither party and will be put in the wrong with both sides.

> Greek: 8.2. νῦν δʼ ἔγωγε, εἴ τις αὐτῶν ἀφέλοι τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι καὶ τὸ τῇ φωνῇ λέγειν ἀττικιστί, πολλοὺς ἂν οἶμαι τοὺς μὲν Ἀρκάδας, τοὺς δὲ Λάκωνας αὐτῶν εἶναι νομίσαι. ἐγὼ δʼ οἶδα μὲν ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ τὰ βέλτιστα λέγειν ἐστίν· συνεξηπατημένων γὰρ ὑμῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ταυτί, τῶν δὲ ταυτὶ βουλομένων, ἐὰν τὰ μεταξύ τις ἐγχειρῇ λέγειν κᾆθʼ ὑμεῖς μὴ περιμένητε μαθεῖν, χαριεῖται μὲν οὐδετέροις, διαβεβλήσεται δὲ πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους·

[¶16] 8.3. Nevertheless, I shall choose to be thought to talk nonsense, if that, after all, is to be my fate, rather than to abandon you to certain people to be deceived in violation of what I consider best for you. And so, with your permission, I shall go into other details later, and proceed to explain what I think is best, starting from the premises upon which both sides agree.

> Greek: 8.3. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ αἱρήσομαι μᾶλλον αὐτός, ἐὰν ἄρα τοῦτο πάθω, δοκεῖν φλυαρεῖν ἢ παρʼ ἃ βέλτιστα νομίζω τῇ πόλει, προέσθαι τισὶν ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατῆσαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλʼ ὕστερον, ἐὰν ὑμῖν βουλομένοις ᾖ, λέξω· ἐκ δὲ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ὑφʼ ἁπάντων ἄρξομαι ἃ κράτιστα νομίζω, διδάσκειν. Θ οὐχὶ ταὐτὰ γιγνώσκων ἐνίοις τῶν εἰρηκότων ἀνέστηκʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

[¶17] 9.1. I have taken the floor, men of Athens, because I do not hold the same views as some of those who have spoken. Still I shall not allege that these men out of villainy have expressed sentiments opposed to your best interests, but I say that many, while neglecting to judge events critically, make a practice of considering the words they will use, and if they chance to find an ample supply of these, of haranguing the people without more ado. In this they are wrong nor do they reflect in their own minds that, since it is the experience of all that over a long period many plans have worked out happily and some of them, because of the times, quite contrary to their promise, if some speaker cites the one kind and passes over the other, he will unconsciously be doing the easiest thing in the world, deceiving himself.

> Greek: 9.1. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τούτους αἰτιάσομαι κακίᾳ τἀναντία τοῖς βελτίστοις εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλʼ ὅτι πολλοὶ τοῦ τὰ πράγματα κρίνειν ἀμελήσαντες τοὺς λόγους σκοπεῖν οὓς ἐροῦσιν εἰώθασιν, κἂν τούτοις ἀφθόνοις ἐντύχωσιν, ἑτοίμως δημηγορεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐγνωκότες, οὐδὲ λογιζόμενοι παρʼ ἑαυτοῖς ὅτι πολλῶν πράξεων ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσι πεπραγμένων καὶ διὰ τοὺς καιροὺς ἐνίων ὑπεναντίων αὑταῖς, ἂν τὰς ἑτέρας τις ὑπερβαίνων τὰς ἑτέρας λέγῃ, λήσει τὸ ῥᾷστον τῶν ἔργων ποιῶν, αὑτὸν ἐξαπατῶν.

[¶18] 9.2. Now those who thus use the privilege of advising you seem to me to look upon the reputation for eloquence accruing to them from their speeches as an adequate ambition, but it is my opinion that the man who proposes to advise the State on matters of policy should rather consider how the measures adopted shall prove of benefit, and not how his remarks of the moment may find favour. For those who win esteem by their words ought to add to it the accomplishment of some useful work in order that not only now, but for all time, their utterances may have merit.

> Greek: 9.2. οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτω χρώμενοι τῷ συμβουλεύειν δοκοῦσί μοι τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ῥηθέντων τοῦ δύνασθαι λέγειν δόξαν γιγνομένην αὑτοῖς ἱκανὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἡγεῖσθαι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω χρῆναι τὸν πόλει περὶ πραγμάτων ἐπιχειροῦντα συμβουλεύειν μᾶλλον ὅπως τὰ δόξαντα συνοίσει σκοπεῖν, ἢ πῶς οἱ παραχρῆμα λόγοι χάριν ἕξουσι. δεῖ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων εὐδοκιμοῦσι συμφέροντός τινος ἔργου πρᾶξιν προσεῖναι, ἵνα μὴ νῦν μόνον, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ τὰ ῥηθέντα καλῶς ἔχῃ. Ι εἰ μὲν ἐγνώκατʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τί βέλτιστον ὂν τυγχάνει πρᾶξαι περὶ τῶν παρόντων, ἁμάρτημα τὸ συμβουλεύειν προτιθέναι·

[¶19] 10.1. If you have decided, men of Athens, what it is best to do in the circumstances, it is a mistake to propose debate; for why should you be needlessly bored by listening to what you have yourselves judged to be expedient before hearing it discussed? But if, assuming that you must reach a judgement on the basis of what shall be said, you are exploring and deliberating, it is wrong to stop those who wish to speak, since by so doing you are deprived entirely of whatever practical proposal some speakers have thought up, and you cause other speakers to abandon their own conclusions in favour of what they think you desire to hear.

> Greek: 10.1. ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι δοκιμάζετε συμφέρειν, τί δεῖ ταῦτʼ ἀκούοντας μάτην ἐνοχλεῖσθαι; εἰ δὲ σκοπεῖτε καὶ βουλεύεσθʼ ὡς ἐκ τῶν ῥηθησομένων δοκιμάσαι δέον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ κωλύειν τοὺς βουλομένους λέγειν. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὅλως ἀποστερεῖσθʼ ἐκ τοῦ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, εἴ τι χρήσιμον ἐντεθύμηνται· τοὺς δʼ ἀφέντας ἃ τυγχάνουσιν ἐγνωκότες, ὧν ὑμᾶς ἐπιθυμεῖν οἴονται, ταῦτα ποιεῖτε συμβουλεύειν.

[¶20] 10.2. While to unite in forcing the speaker to express your wishes shows an intention to do wrong, the willingness to deliberate is proved when you listen to his views, scan them and, if any Is good, adopt it. I say this, not as one about to recommend measures opposed to those you are favouring, but as one who knows that, if you refuse to hear the opposition, they will say you have been deceived, while, if you do listen and are not persuaded, they will have been proved on the spot to be offering the worse proposals.

> Greek: 10.2. ἔστιν δʼ ἁμαρτάνειν μὲν βουλομένων τὸ συναναγκάζειν τὸν παριόνθʼ ἃ βούλεσθε λέγειν, βουλευομένων δʼ ἀκούσαντας ἃ γιγνώσκει σκοπεῖν, κἄν τι καλῶς ἔχῃ, χρῆσθαι. λέγω δὲ ταῦτʼ οὐκ ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμῖν ἀρέσκουσιν μέλλων παραινεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνʼ εἰδώς, ὅτι ἂν μὲν μὴ ʼθελήσητε τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων ἀκοῦσαι, ἐξηπατῆσθαι φήσουσιν ὑμᾶς, ἂν δʼ ἀκούσαντες μὴ πεισθῆτε, ἐξεληλεγμένοι παραχρῆμʼ ἔσονται τὰ χείρω παραινοῦντες. ΙΑ οἴομαι πάντας ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, γιγνώσκειν ὅτι οὐ κρινοῦντες ἥκετε τήμερον οὐδένα τῶν ἀδικούντων, ἀλλὰ βουλευσόμενοι περὶ τῶν παρόντων.

[¶21] 11.1. I think you all know, men of Athens, that you have not come here today to put any of the wrongdoers on trial but to deliberate about the present state of affairs. So it is our duty to defer all accusations and only when we put someone on trial should this or that man speak before you against another who, he has convinced himself, is an offender. But if anyone has something practical or profitable to say, now is the time to declare it. For accusation is for those who have fault to find with past actions, but in deliberative session the discussion is solely about present and future actions. Therefore the present is no occasion for abuse or blame but for taking counsel together, it seems to me. For this reason I shall try to guard against falling myself into the error which I condemn in these men and to offer the advice that I think best in the present state of affairs.

> Greek: 11.1. δεῖ τοίνυν τὰς μὲν κατηγορίας ὑπερθέσθαι πάσας, καὶ τότʼ ἐν ὑμῖν λέγειν καθʼ ὅτου πέπεικεν ἕκαστος ἑαυτόν, ὅταν τινὰ κρίνωμεν· εἰ δέ τίς τι χρήσιμον ἢ συμφέρον εἰπεῖν ἔχει, τοῦτο νῦν ἀποφαίνεσθαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατηγορεῖν τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἐγκαλούντων ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ συμβουλεύειν περὶ τῶν παρόντων καὶ γενησομένων προτίθεται. οὐκοῦν οὐ λοιδορίας οὐδὲ μέμψεως ὁ παρὼν καιρός, ἀλλὰ συμβουλῆς εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ. διὸ πειράσομαι μὲν φυλάξασθαι, ὃ τούτοις ἐπιτιμῶ, μὴ παθεῖν αὐτός, συμβουλεύσαι δʼ ἃ κράτιστα νομίζω περὶ τῶν παρόντων. ΙΒ οὐδένʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀντειπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίζω, ὡς οὐ κακοῦ πολίτου καὶ φαύλου τὴν γνώμην ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὕτω τινὰ μισεῖν ἢ φιλεῖν τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ προσιόντων ὥστε τοῦ τῇ πόλει βελτίστου μηδὲν φροντίζειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸς ἐπήρειαν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν δημηγορεῖν·

[¶22] 12.1. I think that no man will deny, men of Athens, that it is the mark of a disloyal citizen and a low-minded man so to hate or favour anyone who enters into public life that he takes no thought for the State’s best interests, but shapes his public utterances sometimes to vent his malice and sometimes to prove his friendship, as a number of those are doing who come forward here to speak. To these I would say no more than this: that in my opinion, if they have done something of the kind, their greatest offence is not this, but rather that they show themselves unprepared ever to stop doing it!

> Greek: 12.1. ἃ ποιοῦσιν ἔνιοι τῶν δευρὶ παριόντων. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις μὲν τοσοῦτον ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι μοι δοκοῦσιν οὐδʼ εἴ τι πεποιήκασιν τοιοῦτον μέγισθʼ ἡμαρτηκέναι, ἀλλʼ ὅτι δηλοῦσιν οὐδέποτʼ οὐδὲ παύσασθαι παρεσκευασμένοι.

[¶23] 12.2. As for yourselves, I give you this advice: do not be guilty of self-ruin and think it enough if you punish these men when you see fit; but, while holding them in check so far as lies in your power, you must yourselves, as becomes men deliberating on behalf of the State, put aside your own private feuds and aim at what is most to the common good, reflecting that the punishment of no individual, nor even of all the politicians in a body, can square the account if once the laws should be destroyed on which your very life depends.

> Greek: 12.2. ὑμῖν δὲ παραινῶ μὴ προϊεμένους ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἱκανὸν τοῦτο νομίζειν, δίκην, ὅταν ὑμῖν δόξῃ, παρὰ τούτων λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτους, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν ὑμῖν, κωλύειν, καὶ αὐτούς, ὥσπερ ὑπὲρ πόλεως προσήκει βουλευομένους, τὰς ἰδίας ἀνελόντας φιλονικίας τὸ κοινῇ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι οὐδείς, οὐδʼ ἅμα πάντες οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, τῶν νόμων, ἐφʼ οἷς ὑμεῖς ἐστε, ἀξιόχρεῴ εἰσι διαφθαρέντων δίκην δοῦναι. ΙΓ ἴσως ἐπίφθονον ἄν τισιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δόξειεν εἶναι, εἴ τις ὢν ἰδιώτης καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ὑμῶν εἷς, ἑτέρων συμβεβουλευκότων, οἳ καὶ τῷ πάλαι πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ παρʼ ὑμῖν δόξαν ἔχειν προέχουσιν, παρελθὼν εἴποι, ὅτι οὐ μόνον αὑτῷ δοκοῦσιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἐγγὺς εἶναι τοῦ τὰ δέοντα γιγνώσκειν.

[¶24] 13.1. Perhaps it might seem offensive to certain persons, men of Athens, if someone, an ordinary citizen and one of the common people like yourselves, should come forward after others who are eminent for both long political experience and reputation among you have already stated their opinions, and say that he thinks the others are not only wrong but not even near to discerning what ought to be done. Nevertheless, I feel so confident that I am going to give more profitable counsel than theirs that I shall not hesitate to declare all they have said to be worthless. I think that you too would be doing well if you kept in view, not the speaker, but the advice being offered. For the right thing, men of Athens, is to extend your goodwill, not to certain persons as though by hereditary privilege, but to those who from time to time offer the best counsel.

> Greek: 13.1. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἔγωγʼ οὕτω σφόδρʼ οἶμαι μᾶλλον ὑμῖν συμφέροντʼ ἐρεῖν τούτων, ὥστʼ οὐκ ὀκνήσω πάνθʼ ἃ τυγχάνουσιν εἰρηκότες, ἄξια μηδενὸς εἶναι φῆσαι. νομίζω δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς ὀρθῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ τὸν λέγοντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβουλευόμενα σκοποῖτε. δεῖ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν παρʼ ὑμῶν εὔνοιαν μή τισιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ γένους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τὰ βέλτιστʼ ἀεὶ λέγουσιν ὑπάρχειν. ΙΔ βουλοίμην ἂν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, προσέχοντας, ἃ μέλλω λέγειν, ἀκοῦσαι·

[¶25] 14.1. I should like you to listen attentively to what I am going to say, men of Athens; it is not unimportant. I wonder just why it is that, before we come up to the Assembly, any one of you whom a person may chance to meet is prepared to say readily by what means the present state of affairs may be improved; and then again, the minute you leave the Assembly, each man will be just as ready to say what we ought to do. But when we are met together and dealing with these problems, you hear anything rather than this from certain speakers.

> Greek: 14.1. καὶ γάρ ἐστιν οὐ μικρά. ἐγὼ θαυμάζω τί δή ποτε, πρὶν μὲν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀναβῆναι, ὅτῳ τις ἂν ὑμῶν ἐντύχῃ, οὗτος εὐπόρως εἰπεῖν ἔχει διʼ ὧν ἂν τὰ παρόντα πράγματα βελτίω γένοιτο· καὶ πάλιν αὐτίκα δὴ μάλʼ ἐὰν ἀπέλθητε, ὁμοίως ἕκαστος ἐρεῖ τὰ δέοντα· ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ τούτων σκοπεῖν ὄντες καὶ συνειλεγμένοι πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ ταῦτα λεγόντων τινῶν ἀκούετε.

[¶26] 14.2. Then has each one of you, men of Athens, the gift of deciding what ought to be done, and does each know how to state the duties of the rest, while he is reluctant himself to do his own, and then again, does each man as an individual, as if to give the impression of being one who would of course promptly do what is best, find fault with everyone else, but as a body are you committed to fighting shy of voting such measures as will ensure that you will one and all become engaged in performing some duty to the State?

> Greek: 14.2. ἆρά γʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, γνῶναι μὲν ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ τὰ δέονθʼ ὑμῶν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰπεῖν ἐπίσταται, ποιῶν δʼ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος οὐ χαίρει, εἶτʼ ἰδίᾳ μέν, ὡς ἄρʼ αὐτὸς ἑτοίμως τὰ βέλτιστʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ πράττειν δόξων, τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμᾷ, κοινῇ δʼ εὐλαβεῖσθε τὰ τοιαῦτα ψηφίζεσθαι διʼ ὧν ἐν τῷ λῃτουργεῖν τι τῶν καθηκόντων ἅπαντες ἔσεσθε;

[¶27] 14.3. Well then, if you really think that no crisis will arrive to make a breach in this fence of evasiveness, it would be grand to carry on after this fashion. But if you see your troubles drawing nearer, you must plan that you shall not have to grapple with them at close range when it is possible to forestall them from a distance, and that you shall not have those whom you now disregard exulting later on at your discomfiture As for the problems now confronting the State, men of Athens, even though things are not as they should be, I do not consider it altogether difficult to discover by what action one may effect an improvement.

> Greek: 14.3. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν μηδένα καιρὸν οἴεσθʼ ἥξειν ὃς εἴσω τῆς εἰρωνείας ἀφίξεται ταύτης, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διάγειν· εἰ δὲ τὰ πράγμαθʼ ὁρᾶτʼ ἐγγυτέρω προσάγοντα, δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι ὅπως μὴ πλησίον αὐτοῖς μαχεῖσθε, ἃ πόρρωθεν ἔξεστι φυλάξασθαι, καὶ τοὺς νῦν περιοφθέντας ἐφηδομένους ὕστερον ἕξεθʼ οἷς ἂν πάσχητε. ΙΕ περὶ μὲν τῶν παρόντων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πραγμάτων τῇ πόλει, καίπερ οὐκ ἐχόντων ὡς δεῖ, οὐ πάνυ μοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν χαλεπῶν εἶναι ζητῆσαι τί ἄν τις πράξας βελτίω ποιήσειεν.

[¶28] 15.1. I judge, on the other hand, that the manner in which I must speak to you about them means very grave irritation; not because you will fail to understand what a person will say but because you seem to me to have become so accustomed to hearing many untruths and anything rather than what best meets your needs, that I fear it may be the lot of the man who now makes the best proposal to earn for his reward at your hands the hostility which would properly have been the due of those who have deceived you.

> Greek: 15.1. ὅντινα μέντοι χρὴ τρόπον πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, τοῦτο παμπόλλην δυσκολίαν ἔχειν νομίζω, οὐχ ὡς οὐ συνησόντων ὅ τι ἄν τις λέγῃ, ἀλλʼ οὕτω πολλὰ καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ βέλτιστα τοῖς πράγμασιν συνειθίσθαι μοι δοκεῖτʼ ἀκούειν, ὥστε δέδοικα μὴ τῷ νῦν τὰ βέλτιστʼ εἰπόντι, ἣν τοῖς ἐξηπατηκόσιν προσῆκεν ἀπέχθειαν ὑπάρχειν παρʼ ὑμῶν, ταύτην ἀπενέγκασθαι συμβῇ.

[¶29] 15.2. For I observe that often you hate, not those who are to blame for your troubles, but those who have most recently made mention of them to you. Nevertheless, although I am so precisely measuring this hazard, I still think that I must put all other subjects aside and confine myself to saying what I think is the best advice about the present situation.

> Greek: 15.2. ὁρῶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς πολλάκις οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν πραγμάτων μισοῦντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὑστάτους περὶ αὐτῶν εἰπόντας τι πρὸς ὑμᾶς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ οὕτως ἀκριβῶς ταῦτα λογιζόμενος, ὅμως οἶμαι δεῖν πάντα παρεὶς τἄλλα περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν παρόντων ἃ κράτιστα νομίζω λέγειν. ΙϚ ἐβουλόμην ἂν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ᾗ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας εἰώθατε προσφέρεσθαι φιλανθρωπίᾳ, ταύτῃ καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς χρῆσθαι·

[¶30] 16.1. I should have wished, men of Athens, that you treat yourselves with that benevolence which you are accustomed to practise toward all other peoples. As it now is, you are better at rectifying the woes of others than you are at taking to heart the troubles which befall yourselves. Someone may perhaps say, of course, that this is exactly what brings the greatest glory to the State—to have deliberately chosen to assume many risks for the sake of sheer justice with no thought of selfish advantage. Now, while I for one believe this reputation which prevails concerning the State to be true and desire it to be, yet I assume it also to be an obligation of prudent men to exercise as much foresight in their domestic affairs as in those of strangers, so that you may show yourselves to be not only men of goodwill but sensible also.

> Greek: 16.1. νυνὶ δʼ ἀμείνους ἐστὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων δείνʼ ἐπανορθοῦν ἢ τῶν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς συμβαινόντων φροντίζειν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ τοῦτό τις ἂν φήσειε μέγιστον ἔπαινον φέρειν τῇ πόλει, τὸ μηδενὸς ἕνεκα κέρδους ἰδίου πολλοὺς κινδύνους ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δικαίου προῃρῆσθαι. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην τʼ ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι νομίζω κατὰ τῆς πόλεως καὶ βούλομαι, κἀκεῖνο δʼ ὑπολαμβάνω σωφρόνων ἀνθρώπων ἔργον εἶναι, ἴσην πρόνοιαν τῶν αὑτοῖς οἰκείων ὅσηνπερ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα μὴ φιλάνθρωποι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντες φαίνησθε. ΙΖ ἴσως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, προσήκει τῷ βουλομένῳ τι παραινεῖν ὑμῖν οὕτω πειρᾶσθαι λέγειν ὡς καὶ δυνήσεσθʼ ὑπομεῖναι·

[¶31] 17.1. Perhaps it really is the duty, men of Athens, of one who wishes to recommend some measure to you to attempt to speak in such a way that you will find it possible to hear him to the end; but otherwise his duty is to leave aside all other themes and discuss only those matters you are considering, and these as briefly as possible. For I do not think it due to any lack of speeches that now once more you observe all your affairs to be in a muddle, but the reason is that some are orating and playing politics for their own gain, and others, who have so far not given evidence of this offence, are more concerned to be thought good speakers than that some concrete good may be effected by what they say. As for me, that I may not unwittingly do the opposite of what I myself say is right, and say more about other matters than about those of which I have risen to speak, I shall disregard all other topics and endeavor to tell you forthwith what I recommend.

> Greek: 17.1. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀφέντα τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας λόγους, περὶ αὐτῶν ὧν σκοπεῖτε συμβουλεύειν, καὶ ταῦθʼ ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. οὐ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ μοι δοκεῖτε λόγων οὐδὲ νῦν ὁρᾶν τὰ πράγματα πάντα λελυμασμένα, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοὺς μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα δημηγορεῖν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ μήπω τούτου δεδωκότας πεῖραν μᾶλλον ὅπως εὖ δόξουσι λέγειν σπουδάζειν, ἢ πῶς ἔργον ἐξ ὧν λέγουσί τι συμφέρον πραχθήσεται. ἐγὼ δʼ ἵνα μὴ λάθω τοὐναντίον οὗ φημὶ δεῖν αὐτὸς ποιῶν, καὶ πλείω περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ περὶ ὧν ἀνέστην λέγων, ἀφεὶς τἄλλα πάντα, ἃ παραινῶ καὶ δὴ πειράσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν. ΙΗ δοκεῖτέ μοι δικαίως ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, εἴ τις ὑπόσχοιθʼ ὑμῖν ταὐτὰ δίκαια καὶ συμφέροντα δείξειν ὄνθʼ ὑπὲρ ὧν βουλευόμεθα.

[¶32] 18.1. I think that you would rightly pay attention, men of Athens, if any man should promise to demonstrate that in the matters you are considering justice and expediency coincide. Now I believe that I shall do this without difficulty if you on your part will comply with a very slight request of mine. Let none of you, according as one or another has an opinion about the present situation, be positive that he is right in all his conclusions; but, if it turns out that something be said against these, let him consider it, listening to all the points patiently, and then, if some suggestion seems to have been rightly made, adopt it. For the measure that succeeds will belong no less to you who adopted it than to him who proposed it to you. Surely the first step toward sound deliberation is not to have reached a decision before you have heard the discussions upon which you should base your decision. For the occasion and the method of ratifying your resolutions and of deciding in the first instance what seems expedient are not the same.

> Greek: 18.1. ἐγὼ τοίνυν οἴομαι τοῦτο ποιήσειν οὐ χαλεπῶς, ἂν ὑμεῖς βραχύ τί μοι πεισθῆτε πάνυ. μὴ πάντα, ὡς ἕκαστος ἔχει γνώμης ὑμῶν περὶ τῶν παρόντων, ὀρθῶς ἐγνωκέναι πεπείσθω, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν παρὰ ταῦτά τι συμβαίνῃ λέγεσθαι, σκοπείτω πάνθʼ ὑπομείνας ἀκοῦσαι, εἶτʼ ἂν ὀρθῶς εἰρῆσθαί τι δοκῇ, χρήσθω. οὐ γὰρ ἧττον ὑμέτερον ἔσται τῶν χρησαμένων τὸ κατορθωθὲν ⟨ἢ⟩ τοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπόντος. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ σκοπεῖν ὀρθῶς ἐστιν μὴ βεβουλεῦσθαι πρὶν ἐξ ὧν δεῖ βουλεύσασθαι ἀκοῦσαι. οὐ γὰρ αὑτὸς οὔτε καιρὸς οὔτε τρόπος τοῦ τʼ ἐπικυρῶσαι τὰ δοκοῦντα καὶ τοῦ σκέψασθαι τί πρῶτον δοκεῖ συμφέρειν. ΙΘ μεθʼ ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παρελήλυθα βουλευσόμενος, πότερον χρή με λέγειν ἢ μή.

[¶33] 19.1. I have come forward, men of Athens, to consult with you whether I should speak or not, and I shall explain to you for what reason I am at a loss how to decide this by myself. It is obligatory, in my opinion, that one who seeks to gratify neither himself nor certain people, but wishes to say on your behalf what he is convinced is most expedient, should both support good measures proposed by either side, and, conversely, oppose all unfair proposals which either side thinks fit to urge. Accordingly, if you should submit to hear both these lines of argument briefly, you would deliberate much better on the remaining questions; but, if you should desert me before learning my views, it would be my lot to be put in the wrong with both sides without being guilty of injustice to either. Now, I do not deserve to be in this plight. Therefore, if you bid me, I am prepared to speak; otherwise it is well for me to keep silence.

> Greek: 19.1. διὸ δʼ αὐτὸς τοῦτʼ ἀπορῶ κρῖναι, φράσω πρὸς ὑμᾶς. ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ τῷ μήθʼ αὑτῷ μήτε τισὶν χαρίσασθαι βουλομένῳ, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν εἰπεῖν ἃ πέπεικεν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα συμφέρειν, καὶ συνειπεῖν ἃ καλῶς λέγουσιν ἀμφότεροι, καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀντειπεῖν ὅσα μὴ δίκαιʼ ἀξιοῦσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὑμεῖς ὑπομείναιτʼ ἀκοῦσαι ταῦτʼ ἀμφότερα διὰ βραχέων, πολλῷ βέλτιον ἂν περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν βουλεύσαισθε· εἰ δὲ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἀποσταίητε, γένοιτʼ ἂν ἐμοὶ μηδετέρους ἀδικοῦντι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους διαβεβλῆσθαι. τοῦτο δʼ οὐχὶ δίκαιός εἰμι παθεῖν. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν κελεύητε, ἕτοιμός εἰμι λέγειν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ σιωπᾶν ἔχει μοι καλῶς. Κ καὶ δίκαιον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ συμφέρον ὑμῖν ἡγοῦμαι τὰς μὲν αἰτίας καὶ τὰς κατηγορίας, ὅταν βουλεύεσθαι δέῃ, παραλείπειν, περὶ τῶν παρόντων δὲ λέγειν ὅ τι βέλτιστον ἕκαστος ἡγεῖται.

[¶34] 20.1. I consider it both just and profitable, men of Athens, for you to lay aside charges and accusations when we are to deliberate, and for each one to say what he thinks is best concerning the matters before you. For while we all understand that through the fault of certain men our affairs are in a bad way, it is the task of your counsellor to suggest by what means they may be improved.

> Greek: 20.1. ὅτι μὲν γάρ τινων αἰτίων ὄντων κακῶς τὰ πράγματʼ ἔχει, πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα· ἐξ ὅτου δὲ τρόπου βελτίω δύναιτʼ ἂν γενέσθαι, τοῦτο τοῦ συμβουλεύοντος ἔργον εἰπεῖν.

[¶35] 20.2. Moreover, I for my part regard as stern accusers of the wrongdoers, not those who scrutinize their past actions on such occasions as this, when they will pay no penalty, but those who prove able to offer such advice as may effect some amelioration of our present situation; for with the help of these men it would also be possible at your leisure to bring those guilty men to justice.

> Greek: 20.2. ἔπειτʼ ἔγωγε νομίζω καὶ κατηγόρους εἶναι τῶν ἀδικούντων χαλεποὺς οὐ τοὺς ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς ἐξετάζοντας τὰ πεπραγμένα, ὅτʼ οὐδεμίαν δώσουσι δίκην, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοιοῦτό τι συμβουλεῦσαι δυνηθέντας ἀφʼ οὗ βελτίω τὰ παρόντα γένοιτʼ ἄν· διὰ γὰρ τούτους ἐφʼ ἡσυχίας καὶ παρʼ ἐκείνων ἐγγένοιτʼ ἂν ὑμῖν δίκην λαβεῖν.

[¶36] 20.3. Accordingly, I consider all other topics to be out of place but shall attempt to tell you what I think would be expedient in the matters you are now considering, making this request only: if after all I do make mention of any of those things done in the past, do not think that I am speaking by way of accusation, but in order that, having shown you wherein you then erred, I may now avert your suffering the same misfortune again.

> Greek: 20.3. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλους λόγους πάντας περιέργους ἡγοῦμαι, ἃ δʼ ἂν οἶμαι συνενεγκεῖν περὶ ὧν νυνὶ σκοπεῖτε, ταῦτʼ εἰπεῖν πειράσομαι, τοσοῦτον ἀξιώσας μόνον· ἂν ἄρα του μεμνῶμαι τῶν πεπραγμένων, μὴ κατηγορίας μʼ ἕνεχʼ ἡγεῖσθε λέγειν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα δείξας ἃ τόθʼ ἡμάρτετε, νῦν ἀποτρέψω ταὐτὰ παθεῖν. ΚΑ εἰ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μηδενὶ συμπολιτευόμενοι τοσαύτην ἤγομεν ἡσυχίαν ὅσηνπερ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, οὔτε τὰ νῦν ἂν γεγενημένα συμβῆναι νομίζω, τῶν τʼ ἄλλων οἶμαι πολλὰ βέλτιον ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχειν.

[¶37] 21.1. If all along, men of Athens, we had been as peaceful as at this moment, playing into the hands of no politician, I believe that the events which now have happened would never have taken place and that in many other respects we should be in better shape. But of late, because of the high-handedness of some men, it is impossible either to come forward or speak, or in general to get in a word. The consequences of this are numerous and perhaps not to our liking. Accordingly, if what you wish is to be all the time getting this kind of news, to be considering what you ought to do, and to be in such a plight as at present, you will vote the same measures as for years past—to launch triremes, to embark, to pay a special war-tax and all that sort of thing, forthwith. Then in three or five days, if rumors of hostile movements cease and our enemies become inactive, you will once more assume that there is no longer need to act. This is just what happened when we heard that Philip was in the Hellespont and again when the pirate triremes put in at Marathon.

> Greek: 21.1. νῦν δʼ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνίων ἀσελγείας οὔτε παρελθεῖν οὔτʼ εἰπεῖν οὔθʼ ὅλως λόγου τυχεῖν ἔστιν. ὅθεν συμβαίνει πολλὰ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιτήδειʼ ἴσως. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀεὶ ταὐτά, πυνθάνεσθαι, καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιῆσαι, καὶ πάσχειν οἷάπερ νυνὶ βούλεσθε, ψηφιεῖσθʼ ἅπερ ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων χρόνων, καθέλκειν τριήρεις, ἐμβαίνειν, εἰσφέρειν, πάντα ταῦτʼ ἤδη· ἃ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἢ πέντε, ἂν σιωπηθῇ τὰ παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ σχῶσιν ἡσυχίαν ἐκεῖνοι, πάλιν οὐκέτι καιρὸν εἶναι πράττειν ὑπολήψεσθε. ὅπερ, ἡνίκʼ ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ Φίλιππον ἠκούσαμεν, συνέβη, καὶ πάλιν ἡνίκʼ εἰς Μαραθῶνα τριήρεις αἱ λῃστρίδες προσέσχον.

[¶38] 21.3. For just as a man would properly employ a force in arms, men of Athens, you are accustomed to handle your deliberations, with dispatch. What you ought to do, however, is to deliberate at leisure but put your decisions into effect with speed, and to make up your minds to this, that unless you shall provide an adequate food-supply and place some general of good sense in charge of the war, and be willing to abide by the decisions so taken, you will have to your credit just a lot of decrees, and while you will have squandered all that you have spent, your interests will be not a whit advanced and in angry mood you will put on trial whomever it pleases you. For my part, I wish you to be seen repelling your enemies before sitting in judgement on your fellow-citizens; for it is a crime for us to make war upon one another rather than upon them.

> Greek: 21.3. ὡς γὰρ ἂν χρήσαιτό τις, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καλῶς δυνάμει παρεσκευασμένῃ, οὕτως ὑμεῖς εἰώθατε τῷ βουλεύεσθαι χρῆσθαι, ὀξέως. δεῖ δὲ βουλεύεσθαι μὲν ἐφʼ ἡσυχίας, ποιεῖν δὲ τὰ δόξαντα μετὰ σπουδῆς, καὶ λογίσασθαι τοῦθʼ ὅτι εἰ μὴ καὶ τροφὴν ἱκανὴν ποριεῖτε καὶ στρατηγόν τινα τοῦ πολέμου νοῦν ἔχοντα προστήσεσθε καὶ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν οὕτω δοξάντων ἐθελήσετε, ψηφίσμαθʼ ὑμῖν περιέσται, καὶ παραναλώσετε μὲν πάνθʼ ὅσʼ ἂν δαπανήσητε, βελτίω δʼ οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν τὰ πράγματʼ ἔσται, κρινεῖτε δʼ ὃν ἂν βούλησθʼ ὀργισθέντες. ἐγὼ δὲ βούλομαι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμᾶς ἀμυνομένους ὀφθῆναι πρότερον ἢ τοὺς πολίτας κρίνοντας· οὐ γὰρ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ʼκείνοις ἐσμὲν δίκαιοι.

[¶39] 21.4. In order, therefore, that I may not censure only— the easiest of all things shall explain how I think you may accomplish this, requesting you not to make an uproar or get the idea that I am merely procrastinating and interposing delay. For it is not those who say “At once” and “Today” who speak most to the point, for we could not prevent by the present reinforcement what has already happened; but it will be the man who shows what armament, once furnished, will be able to hold out until we either get the upper hand of our enemies or by accepting terms bring the war to an end. For in this way we should no longer suffer aggression in time to come.

> Greek: 21.4. ἵνʼ οὖν μή, τὸ ῥᾷστον ἁπάντων, ἐπιτιμήσω μόνον, ὃν τρόπον ἄν μοι δοκεῖτε ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διδάξω, δεηθεὶς ὑμῶν μὴ θορυβῆσαι μηδʼ ἀναβάλλειν νομίσαι με καὶ χρόνον ἐμποιεῖν. οὐ γὰρ οἱ ταχὺ καὶ τήμερον εἰπόντες μάλιστʼ εἰς [τὸ] δέον λέγουσιν ʽοὐ γὰρ ἂν τά γʼ ἤδη γεγενημένα κωλῦσαι δυνηθείημεν τῇ νυνὶ βοηθείᾀ, ἀλλʼ ὃς ἂν δείξῃ τίς πορισθεῖσα παρασκευὴ διαμεῖναι δυνήσεται, τέως ἂν ἢ περιγενώμεθα τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ πεισθέντες διαλυσώμεθα τὸν πόλεμον· οὕτω γὰρ οὐκέτι τοῦ λοιποῦ πάσχοιμεν ἂν κακῶς. ΚΒ οἶμαι πάντας ἂν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὁμολογῆσαι, ὅτι δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν, ὅταν μὲν περὶ τῶν ἰδίων τινὸς τῶν αὑτῆς βουλεύηται, ἴσην πρόνοιαν ἔχειν τοῦ συμφέροντος ὅσηνπερ τοῦ δικαίου, ὅταν δʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν συμμαχικῶν ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, οἷον καὶ τὸ νυνὶ παρόν, μηδενὸς οὕτως ὡς τοῦ δικαίου φροντίζειν.

[¶40] 22.1. I believe that all of you, men of Athens, would agree that our city, when deliberating about any of her domestic affairs, should have as much concern for advantage as for justice, but when the question has to do with our allies or the general interests of Greece, as in the present instance, she ought to be mindful of nothing so scrupulously as of justice. Because in the former matters, expediency suffices, but in such as the latter, honor as well ought to play a part. For, of the actions themselves they become arbiters to whom the decisions belong; of the opinion formed of them, however, no man is so powerful as to be the arbiter; but whatever opinion shall attach to the actions, such is that which the multitude spreads abroad concerning the actors. Therefore you must look to it diligently that your actions shall be manifestly just.

> Greek: 22.1. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνοις τὸ λυσιτελὲς ἐξαρκεῖ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τὸ καλὸν προσεῖναι δεῖ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων, εἰς οὓς ἂν ἥκωσι, κύριοι καθίστανται· τῆς δʼ ὑπὲρ τούτων δόξης οὐδεὶς τηλικοῦτός ἐσθʼ ὅστις ἔσται κύριος, ἀλλʼ ὁποίαν τινʼ ἂν τὰ πραχθέντʼ ἔχῃ δόξαν, τοιαύτην οἱ πολλοὶ περὶ τῶν πραξάντων διήγγειλαν. διὸ δεῖ σκοπεῖν καὶ προσέχειν ὅπως δίκαια φανεῖται.