--- title: "On the Peace · Περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης" author: "Demosthenes" translator: "James Herbert Vince" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Classical Greek" url: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-on-the-peace/ cite: "Demosthenes, tr. James Herbert Vince, On the Peace · Περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-on-the-peace/" --- # On the Peace · Περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης *Demosthenes, tr. James Herbert Vince* After the Peace of Philocrates, why Athens must keep a bad peace for now. > Greek: ed. Samuel Henry Butcher, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0014.tlg005, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: James Herbert Vince, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0014.tlg005.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## Contents 1. [Sections 1–25](https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-on-the-peace/1.md) ## 1. Sections 1–25 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-on-the-peace/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/demosthenes-on-the-peace/1/#p-N [¶0] 1. I perceive, men of Athens, that the present outlook gives rise to much vexation and perplexity, because not only have we suffered serious losses, which cannot be mended by fine speeches, but there is also complete divergence of opinion about the preservation of what is left of our empire, one favoring this policy, another that. > Greek: 1. ὁρῶ μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ παρόντα πράγματα πολλὴν δυσκολίαν ἔχοντα καὶ ταραχὴν οὐ μόνον τῷ πολλὰ προεῖσθαι καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι προὔργου περὶ αὐτῶν εὖ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑπολοίπων κατὰ ταὐτὰ μηδὲ καθʼ ἓν τὸ συμφέρον πάντας ἡγεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ὡδί, τοῖς δʼ ἑτέρως δοκεῖν. [¶1] 2. While deliberation is naturally a vexatious and difficult task, you, Athenians, have enhanced its difficulties; for all other people deliberate before the event, but you after the event. And the result is that, as long as I can remember, the man who attacks any mistakes you have made gains your applause as an able speaker, but meanwhile the events and the real object of your deliberation wholly escape you. > Greek: 2. δυσκόλου δʼ ὄντος φύσει καὶ χαλεποῦ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, ἔτι πολλῷ χαλεπώτερον ὑμεῖς αὐτὸ πεποιήκατʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰώθασι χρῆσθαι τῷ βουλεύεσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ μετὰ τὰ πράγματα. ἐκ δὲ τούτου συμβαίνει παρὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ὃν οἶδʼ ἐγώ, τὸν μὲν οἷς ἂν ἁμάρτητʼ ἐπιτιμῶντα εὐδοκιμεῖν καὶ δοκεῖν εὖ λέγειν, τὰ δὲ πράγματα καὶ περὶ ὧν βουλεύεσθʼ ἐκφεύγειν ὑμᾶς. [¶2] 3. Nevertheless, although this is so, I have come forward in the belief and confidence that, if you will consent to still the noise of faction and listen with the attention that befits men who are debating the most important interests of the state, I shall be able to offer you advice which will ameliorate our present condition and redeem our past losses. > Greek: 3. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων οἴομαι καὶ πεπεικὼς ἐμαυτὸν ἀνέστηκα, ἂν ἐθελήσητε τοῦ θορυβεῖν καὶ φιλονικεῖν ἀποστάντες ἀκούειν, ὡς ὑπὲρ πόλεως βουλευομένοις καὶ τηλικούτων πραγμάτων προσήκει, ἕξειν καὶ λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν διʼ ὧν καὶ τὰ παρόντʼ ἔσται βελτίω καὶ τὰ προειμένα σωθήσεται. [¶3] 4. While I am well aware, Athenians, that to talk in this assembly about oneself and one’s own speeches is a very profitable practice, if one has the necessary effrontery, I feel that it is so vulgar and so offensive that, though I see the necessity, I shrink from it. I believe, however, that you will form a better judgement of what I am going to propose, if I remind you of a few things that I have said on former occasions. > Greek: 4. ἀκριβῶς δʼ εἰδώς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ λέγειν περὶ ὧν αὐτὸς εἶπέ τις καὶ περὶ αὑτοῦ παρʼ ὑμῖν ἀεὶ τῶν πάνυ λυσιτελούντων τοῖς τολμῶσιν ὄν, οὕτως ἡγοῦμαι φορτικὸν καὶ ἐπαχθὲς ὥστε ἀνάγκην οὖσαν ὁρῶν ὅμως ἀποκνῶ. νομίζω δʼ ἄμεινον ἂν ὑμᾶς περὶ ὧν νῦν ἐρῶ κρῖναι, μικρὰ τῶν πρότερόν ποτε ῥηθέντων ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ μνημονεύσαντες. [¶4] 5. For in the first place, Athenians, when it was proposed to take advantage of the unrest in Euboea and side with Plutarchus in a war that would bring us more expense than glory, I was the first and indeed the only speaker to oppose it, and I narrowly escaped being torn to pieces by those who induced you for trifling gains to commit many serious errors. It was not long before you incurred disgrace and suffered indignities such as no men have ever received from those whom they have helped, and so you realized the baseness of those to whom you then gave ear and the wisdom of the advice you received from me. > Greek: 5. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρῶτον μέν, ἡνίκʼ ἔπειθόν τινες ὑμᾶς, τῶν ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ πραγμάτων ταραττομένων, βοηθεῖν Πλουτάρχῳ καὶ πόλεμον ἄδοξον καὶ δαπανηρὸν ἄρασθαι, πρῶτος καὶ μόνος παρελθὼν ἀντεῖπον, καὶ μόνον οὐ διεσπάσθην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ μικροῖς λήμμασιν πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλʼ ὑμᾶς ἁμαρτάνειν πεισάντων· καὶ χρόνου βραχέος διελθόντος, μετὰ τοῦ προσοφλεῖν αἰσχύνην καὶ παθεῖν οἷα τῶν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων οὐδένες πώποτε πεπόνθασʼ ὑπὸ τούτων οἷς ἐβοήθησαν, πάντες ὑμεῖς ἔγνωτε τήν τε τῶν τότε ταῦτα πεισάντων κακίαν καὶ τὰ βέλτιστʼ εἰρηκότʼ ἐμέ. [¶5] 6. Again, men of Athens, when I saw that Neoptolemus, the actor, enjoying safe conduct under cover of his profession, was doing his best to injure our city and was Philip’s agent and representative at Athens, I once more came forward and addressed you, not out of private animosity or love of informing, as indeed my subsequent conduct has proved. > Greek: 6. πάλιν τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατιδὼν Νεοπτόλεμον τὸν ὑποκριτὴν τῷ μὲν τῆς τέχνης προσχήματι τυγχάνοντʼ ἀδείας, κακὰ δʼ ἐργαζόμενον τὰ μέγιστα τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ παρʼ ὑμῶν διοικοῦντα Φιλίππῳ καὶ πρυτανεύοντα, παρελθὼν εἶπον εἰς ὑμᾶς, οὐδεμιᾶς ἰδίας οὔτʼ ἔχθρας οὔτε συκοφαντίας ἕνεκα, ὡς ἐκ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτʼ ἔργων γέγονεν δῆλον. [¶6] 7. And I shall not in this case, as in the former one, find fault with those who spoke in defence of Neoptolemus, for not a man defended him, but with yourselves. For if it had been a tragedy in the theater of Dionysus that you were watching and not a debate on the very existence of your state, you could not have shown more partiality to him and more ill-will against me. > Greek: 7. καὶ οὐκέτʼ ἐν τούτοις αἰτιάσομαι τοὺς ὑπὲρ Νεοπτολέμου λέγοντας (οὐδὲ εἷς γὰρ ἦν), ἀλλʼ αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς· εἰ γὰρ ἐν Διονύσου τραγῳδοὺς ἐθεᾶσθε, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ σωτηρίας καὶ κοινῶν πραγμάτων ἦν ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως οὔτʼ ἐκείνου πρὸς χάριν οὔτʼ ἐμοῦ πρὸς ἀπέχθειαν ἠκούσατε. [¶7] 8. Yet I suppose that by this time you have all observed that after visiting the enemy, in order, as he alleged, to collect sums owing to him there which he might spend on public services here, and after making copious use of the argument that it was too bad to arraign men who were transferring wealth from Macedonia to Athens, he secured a safe conduct owing to the peace, converted into cash all the real property that he held here, and has absconded to Philip. > Greek: 8. καίτοι τοῦτό γʼ ὑμᾶς οἶμαι νῦν ἅπαντας ᾐσθῆσθαι, ὅτι τὴν τότʼ ἄφιξιν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ποιησάμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ τἀκεῖ χρήματʼ ὀφειλόμενʼ, ὡς ἔφη, κομίσας δεῦρο λῃτουργεῖν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ πλείστῳ χρησάμενος, ὡς δεινὸν εἴ τις ἐγκαλεῖ τοῖς ἐκεῖθεν ἐνθάδε τὰς εὐπορίας ἄγουσιν, ἐπειδὴ διὰ τὴν εἰρήνην ἀδείας ἔτυχεν, ἣν ἐνθάδʼ ἐκέκτητʼ οὐσίαν φανεράν, ταύτην ἐξαργυρίσας πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀπάγων οἴχεται. [¶8] 9. There, then, you have two of my warnings, bearing testimony to the value of my earlier speeches, and uttered by me honestly and in strict conformity with the facts. Thirdly, men of Athens—and when I have given just this one further instance, I will at once pass on to some topics that I have omitted—when we ambassadors returned from administering the oaths for the peace, at that time there were some who assured us that Thespiae and Plataea would be rebuilt, that Philip, if he gained the mastery, would protect the Phocians and break up Thebes into villages, and that you would retain Oropus and receive Euboea in exchange for Amphipolis. Led on by these false hopes and cajoleries, you abandoned the Phocians against your own interests and against justice and honor. But you will find that I neither took part in this deception, nor passed it over in silence, but spoke out boldly, as I am sure you remember, saying that I had neither knowledge nor expectation of such results and that all such talk was nonsense. > Greek: 9. δύο μὲν δὴ ταῦθʼ ὧν προεῖπον ἐγὼ μαρτυρεῖ τοῖς γεγενημένοις λόγοις ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως, οἷά περ ἦν, ἀποφανθένθʼ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ· τὸ τρίτον δʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, (καὶ μόνον ἓν τοῦτʼ εἰπὼν ἔτι καὶ δὴ περὶ ὧν παρελήλυθʼ ἐρῶ,) ἡνίκα τοὺς ὅρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ἀπειληφότες ἥκομεν οἱ πρέσβεις, τότε Θεσπιάς τινων καὶ Πλαταιὰς ὑπισχνουμένων οἰκισθήσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Φωκέας τὸν Φίλιππον, ἂν γένηται κύριος, σώσειν, τὴν δὲ Θηβαίων πόλιν διοικιεῖν, καὶ τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ὑμῖν ὑπάρξειν, καὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἀντʼ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀποδοθήσεσθαι, καὶ τοιαύτας ἐλπίδας καὶ φενακισμούς, οἷς ὑπαχθέντες ὑμεῖς οὔτε συμφόρως οὔτʼ ἴσως καλῶς προεῖσθε Φωκέας, οὐδὲν τούτων οὔτʼ ἐξαπατήσας οὔτε σιγήσας ἐγὼ φανήσομαι, ἀλλὰ προειπὼν ὑμῖν, ὡς οἶδʼ ὅτι μνημονεύετε, ὅτι ταῦτʼ οὔτʼ οἶδα οὔτε προσδοκῶ, νομίζω δὲ τὸν λέγοντα ληρεῖν. [¶9] 11. Now all these instances, where I appear to have had a clearer foresight than the rest, I shall not refer to a single cause, men of Athens—my real or pretended cleverness; nor will I claim that my knowledge and discernment were due to anything else than two things, which I will mention. One, men of Athens, was good luck, which my experience tells me is worth all the cleverness and wisdom in the world. > Greek: 11. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἅπανθʼ, ὅσα φαίνομαι βέλτιον τῶν ἄλλων προορῶν, οὐδʼ εἰς μίαν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε δεινότητʼ οὔτʼ ἀλαζονείαν ἐπανοίσω, οὐδὲ προσποιήσομαι διʼ οὐδὲν ἄλλο γιγνώσκειν καὶ προαισθάνεσθαι πλὴν διʼ ἃν ὑμῖν εἴπω, δύο· ἓν μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, διʼ εὐτυχίαν, ἣν συμπάσης ἐγὼ τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὔσης δεινότητος καὶ σοφίας ὁρῶ κρατοῦσαν· [¶10] 12. The second is this: on public questions my estimates and decisions are disinterested, and no one can show that my policy and my speeches have been in any way bound up with my private gain. Hence I always see accurately the advantageous course as suggested by actual circumstances. But the instant you throw money into one scale, its weight bears down the judgement with it; and for him that has once done this, accurate and sound calculation becomes utterly impossible. > Greek: 12. ἕτερον δέ, προῖκα τὰ πράγματα κρίνω καὶ λογίζομαι, καὶ οὐδὲν λῆμμʼ ἂν οὐδεὶς ἔχοι πρὸς οἷς ἐγὼ πεπολίτευμαι καὶ λέγω δεῖξαι προσηρτημένον. ὀρθὸν οὖν, ὅ τι ἄν ποτʼ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ὑπάρχῃ τῶν πραγμάτων, τὸ συμφέρον φαίνεταί μοι. ὅταν δʼ ἐπὶ θάτερʼ ὥσπερ εἰς τρυτάνην ἀργύριον προσενέγκῃς, οἴχεται φέρον καὶ καθείλκυκε τὸν λογισμὸν ἐφʼ αὑτό, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτʼ ὀρθῶς οὐδʼ ὑγιῶς ὁ τοῦτο ποιήσας περὶ οὐδενὸς λογίσαιτο. [¶11] 13. Now there is one precaution which I think essential. If anyone proposes to negotiate for our city an alliance or a joint contribution or anything of the sort, it must be done without detriment to the existing peace. I do not mean that the peace is a glorious one or even creditable to you, but, whatever we may think of it, it would better suit our purpose never to have made it than to violate it when made, because we have now sacrificed many advantages which would have made war safer and easier for us then than now. > Greek: 13. ἓν μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε πρῶτον ὑπάρχειν φημὶ δεῖν, ὅπως, εἴτε συμμάχους εἴτε σύνταξιν εἴτʼ ἄλλο τι βούλεταί τις κατασκευάζειν τῇ πόλει, τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν εἰρήνην μὴ λύων τοῦτο ποιήσει, οὐχ ὡς θαυμαστὴν οὐδʼ ὡς ἀξίαν οὖσαν ὑμῶν· ἀλλʼ ὁποία τίς ποτʼ ἐστὶν αὕτη, μὴ γενέσθαι μᾶλλον εἶχε τοῖς πράγμασι καιρὸν ἢ γεγενημένη νῦν διʼ ἡμᾶς λυθῆναι· πολλὰ γὰρ προείμεθα, ὧν ὑπαρχόντων τότʼ ἂν ἢ νῦν ἀσφαλέστερος καὶ ῥᾴων ἦν ἡμῖν ὁ πόλεμος. [¶12] 14. The second precaution, men of Athens, is to avoid giving the self-styled Amphictyons now assembled any call or excuse for a crusade against us. For if we should hereafter come to blows with Philip, about Amphipolis or in any private quarrel not shared by the Thessalians or the Argives or the Thebans, I do not believe for a moment that any of the latter would be dragged into the war, least of all— hear me before you shout me down—least of all the Thebans. > Greek: 14. δεύτερον δʼ, ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ προαξόμεθʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς συνεληλυθότας τούτους καὶ φάσκοντας Ἀμφικτύονας νῦν εἶναι εἰς ἀνάγκην καὶ πρόφασιν κοινοῦ πολέμου πρὸς ἡμᾶς. ἐγὼ γάρ, εἰ γένοιθʼ ἡμῖν πρὸς Φίλιππον πάλιν πόλεμος διʼ Ἀμφίπολιν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἔγκλημʼ ἴδιον, οὗ μὴ μετέχουσι Θετταλοὶ μηδʼ Ἀργεῖοι μηδὲ Θηβαῖοι, οὐκ ἂν ἡμῖν οἴομαι τούτων οὐδένας πολεμῆσαι, καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα (καί μοι μὴ θορυβήσῃ μηδεὶς πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι) Θηβαίους, οὐχ ὡς ἡδέως ἔχουσιν ἡμῖν, οὐδʼ ὡς οὐκ ἂν χαρίζοιντο Φιλίππῳ, ἀλλʼ ἴσασιν ἀκριβῶς, εἰ καὶ πάνυ φησί τις αὐτοὺς ἀναισθήτους εἶναι, ὅτι, εἰ γενήσεται πόλεμος πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοῖς, τὰ μὲν κακὰ πάνθʼ ἕξουσιν αὐτοί, τοῖς δʼ ἀγαθοῖς ἐφεδρεύων ἕτερος καθεδεῖται. [¶13] 15. I do not mean that they regard us with favor or that they would not readily oblige Philip, but they do realize quite clearly, for all the stolidity that people attribute to them, that if they ever fight you, they will have to take all the hard knocks themselves, and someone else will sit quietly by, waiting for the spoils. Therefore they would never make such a sacrifice unless the war had a common cause and origin. If we went to war again with the Thebans about Oropus or for some other private reason, I do not think we should suffer, for both their allies and ours would, of course, offer support, if their own territory were invaded, but would not join either side in aggression. That is the way with every alliance worth considering, and such is the natural result. > Greek: 15. οὔκουν προοῖντʼ ἂν αὑτοὺς εἰς τοῦτο, μὴ κοινῆς τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς αἰτίας οὔσης τοῦ πολέμου. οὐδέ γʼ εἰ πάλιν πρὸς τοὺς Θηβαίους πολεμήσαιμεν διʼ Ὠρωπὸν ἤ τι τῶν ἰδίων, οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμᾶς παθεῖν ἡγοῦμαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν κἀκείνοις τοὺς βοηθοῦντας ἂν οἶμαι, εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν εἴ τις ἐμβάλοι, βοηθεῖν, οὐ συνεπιστρατεύσειν οὐδετέροις. καὶ γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι τοῦτον ἔχουσι τὸν τρόπον, ὧν καὶ φροντίσειεν ἄν τις, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα φύσει τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· [¶14] 17. No individual ally is so fond either of us or of the Thebans as to regard our security and our supremacy in the same light. Secure they would all have us, for their own sakes; that either nation should gain supremacy and be their master would suit none of them. What, then, is the danger that I think we must guard against? Lest the inevitable war should afford all states a common pretext and a common ground of complaint. > Greek: 17. οὐκ ἄχρι τῆς ἴσης ἕκαστός ἐστιν εὔνους οὔθʼ ἡμῖν οὔτε Θηβαίοις, σῶς τʼ εἶναι καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ σῶς μὲν εἶναι πάντες ἂν βούλοινθʼ ἕνεχʼ αὑτῶν, κρατήσαντας δὲ τοὺς ἑτέρους δεσπότας ὑπάρχειν αὑτῶν οὐδὲ εἷς. τί οὖν ἡγοῦμαι φοβερὸν καὶ τί φυλάξασθαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς; μὴ κοινὴν πρόφασιν καὶ κοινὸν ἔγκλημʼ ὁ μέλλων πόλεμος πρὸς ἅπαντας λάβῃ. [¶15] 18. For if the Argives and Messenians and Megalopolitans, and other Peloponnesians who side with them, quarrel with us because of our embassy to Sparta and because they think that we have some interest in Lacedaemonian policy; and if the Thebans are, as people admit, hostile and likely to be even more so, because we offer an asylum to their exiles and make no disguise of our hostility to them in every way; and if the Thessalians dislike us because we protect the Phocian fugitives, and Philip because we are trying to exclude him from the Amphictyonic Council; then I am afraid that these separate powers, having each a private grudge, may make common cause against us on the strength of the Amphictyonic decrees, and may then be tempted to go beyond what their several interests require, as they were in the case of the Phocians. > Greek: 18. εἰ γὰρ Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Μεγαλοπολῖται καί τινες τῶν λοιπῶν Πελοποννησίων, ὅσοι ταὐτὰ τούτοις φρονοῦσι, διὰ τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἡμῖν ἐπικηρυκείαν ἐχθρῶς σχήσουσι καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν ἐκδέχεσθαί τι τῶν ἐκείνοις πεπραγμένων, Θηβαῖοι δʼ ἔχουσι μέν, ὡς λέγουσιν, ἀπεχθῶς, ἔτι δʼ ἐχθροτέρως σχήσουσιν, ὅτι τοὺς παρʼ ἐκείνων φεύγοντας σῴζομεν καὶ πάντα τρόπον τὴν δυσμένειαν ἐνδεικνύμεθʼ αὐτοῖς, Θετταλοὶ δʼ, ὅτι τοὺς Φωκέων φυγάδας σῴζομεν, Φίλιππος δʼ, ὅτι κωλύομεν αὐτὸν κοινωνεῖν τῆς ἀμφικτυονίας, φοβοῦμαι μὴ πάντες περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἕκαστος ὀργιζόμενος κοινὸν ἐφʼ ἡμᾶς ἀγάγωσι τὸν πόλεμον, τὰ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων δόγματα προστησάμενοι, εἶτʼ ἐπισπασθῶσιν ἕκαστοι πέρα τοῦ συμφέροντος ἑαυτοῖς [ἡμῖν πολεμῆσαι], ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ Φωκέας. [¶16] 20. For of course you realize that in the present case the Thebans and Philip and the Thessalians have acted in complete unison, though with widely different aims. The Thebans, for instance, were powerless to prevent Philip from pressing on and seizing the passes, or from coming in at the finish and usurping the credit of their previous exertions. > Greek: 20. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθʼ ὅτι νῦν Θηβαῖοι καὶ Φίλιππος καὶ Θετταλοί, οὐχὶ ταὔθʼ ἕκαστοι μάλιστʼ ἐσπουδακότες, ταὐτὰ πάντες ἔπραξαν· οἷον Θηβαῖοι τὸν μὲν Φίλιππον παρελθεῖν καὶ λαβεῖν τὰς παρόδους οὐκ ἐδύναντο κωλῦσαι, οὐδέ γε τῶν αὑτοῖς πεπονημένων ὕστατον ἐλθόντα τὴν δόξαν ἔχειν· [¶17] 21. Hence today the Thebans have been partially successful in recovering territory, but have failed lamentably to win honor and glory; for they would presumably have gained nothing if Philip had not passed Thermopylae. That was not what they wanted, but they put up with it all because they had the will, though not the power, to grasp Orchomenus and Coronea. > Greek: 21. νυνὶ γὰρ Θηβαίοις πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὴν χώραν κεκομίσθαι πέπρακταί τι, πρὸς δὲ τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν αἴσχιστα· εἰ γὰρ μὴ παρῆλθε Φίλιππος, οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτοῖς κέρδος εἶναι. ταῦτα δʼ οὐκ ἐβούλοντο, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸν Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ τὴν Κορώνειαν λαβεῖν ἐπιθυμεῖν, μὴ δύνασθαι δέ, πάντα ταῦθʼ ὑπέμειναν. [¶18] 22. Now some people actually go so far as to say that Philip was compelled, against his real wishes, to hand over Orchomenus and Coronea to the Thebans. For my part I wish them joy of their opinion. I only know this, that Philip was less interested in those towns than desirous to secure the pass, to win for himself the credit of finishing off the Sacred War, and to preside at the Pythian games. That was the summit of his ambition. > Greek: 22. Φίλιππον τοίνυν τινὲς μὲν δήπου τολμῶσι λέγειν ὡς οὐδʼ ἐβούλετο Θηβαίοις Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ Κορώνειαν παραδοῦναι, ἀλλʼ ἠναγκάσθη· ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις μὲν ἐρρῶσθαι λέγω, ἐκεῖνο δʼ οἶδʼ, ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλόν γε ταῦτʼ ἔμελʼ αὐτῷ ἢ τὰς παρόδους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο καὶ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ δοκεῖν διʼ αὑτὸν κρίσιν εἰληφέναι, καὶ τὰ Πύθια θεῖναι διʼ αὑτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτʼ ἦν ὧν μάλιστʼ ἐγλίχετο. [¶19] 23. But the Thessalians aimed at the aggrandizement neither of Thebes nor of Philip, because they felt that all that would tell against them; but they were anxious to control the council at Thermopylae and the Delphian temple —two clear gains for them; and it was this ambition that led them to join in the war. So you will find that each of these powers was induced for private reasons to do much that it did not wish. That, however, is emphatically what we must avoid. > Greek: 23. Θετταλοὶ δέ γʼ οὐδέτερʼ ἐβούλοντο τούτων, οὔτε Θηβαίους οὔτε τὸν Φίλιππον μέγαν γίγνεσθαι (ταῦτα γὰρ πάντʼ ἐφʼ ἑαυτοὺς ἡγοῦντο), τῆς πυλαίας δʼ ἐπεθύμουν καὶ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς, πλεονεκτημάτων δυοῖν, κύριοι γενέσθαι· τῷ δὲ τούτων γλίχεσθαι τάδε συγκατέπραξαν. τῶν τοίνυν ἰδίων ἕνεχʼ εὑρήσεθʼ ἕκαστον πολλὰ προηγμένον ὧν οὐδὲν ἐβούλετο πρᾶξαι. τοῦτο μέντοι, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν φυλακτέον ἡμῖν. [¶20] 24. “Must we then,” you ask, “do as we are told for fear of the consequences? Do you of all men advise that?” Far from it. No, I think we ought so to act as to do nothing unworthy of Athens and yet avoid war; we ought to show to all men our good sense and the justice of our claims. To those who think we ought boldly to risk everything, and who do not foresee the inevitable hostilities, I suggest the following consideration. We are allowing the Thebans to keep Oropus; and if anyone should ask us to tell him candidly why we do so, we should have to answer, “In order to avoid war.” > Greek: 24. τὰ κελευόμενʼ ἡμᾶς ἄρα δεῖ ποιεῖν ταῦτα φοβουμένους; καὶ σὺ ταῦτα κελεύεις; πολλοῦ γε καὶ δέω. ἀλλʼ ὡς οὔτε πράξομεν οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οὔτʼ ἔσται πόλεμος, νοῦν δὲ δόξομεν πᾶσιν ἔχειν καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγειν, τοῦτʼ οἶμαι δεῖν ποιεῖν. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς θρασέως ὁτιοῦν οἰομένους ὑπομεῖναι δεῖν καὶ μὴ προορωμένους τὸν πόλεμον, ἐκεῖνα βούλομαι λογίσασθαι. ἡμεῖς Θηβαίους ἐῶμεν ἔχειν Ὠρωπόν· καὶ εἴ τις ἔροιθʼ ἡμᾶς, κελεύσας εἰπεῖν τἀληθῆ, διὰ τί; ἵνα μὴ πολεμῶμεν, φαῖμεν ἄν. [¶21] 25. In the same way by agreement with Philip we have waived our claim to Amphipolis, and we are permitting Cardia to be excepted from the rest of the Chersonese, the Carian to occupy the islands of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, and the Byzantines to detain our ships in harbor, obviously because we think that the respite which the peace affords is more productive of advantages than wrangling and coming to blows over these points. Therefore it is sheer folly and perversity, after dealing with the powers one by one on matters of vital concern to ourselves, to challenge them all together to fight about this phantom at Delphi. > Greek: 25. καὶ Φιλίππῳ νυνὶ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας Ἀμφιπόλεως παρακεχωρήκαμεν, καὶ Καρδιανοὺς ἐῶμεν ἔξω Χερρονησιτῶν τῶν ἄλλων τετάχθαι, καὶ τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, καὶ Βυζαντίους κατάγειν τὰ πλοῖα, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς εἰρήνης ἡσυχίαν πλειόνων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι νομίζοντες ἢ τὸ προσκρούειν καὶ φιλονικεῖν περὶ τούτων. οὐκοῦν εὔηθες καὶ κομιδῇ σχέτλιον, πρὸς ἑκάστους καθʼ ἕνʼ οὕτω προσενηνεγμένους περὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτων, πρὸς πάντας περὶ τῆς ἐν Δελφοῖς σκιᾶς νυνὶ πολεμῆσαι.