1.76. The principles, then, and causes assumed are the two above mentioned, of which God and matter are the exemplar. Matter is of necessity formless like the other recipients of form. Of all these there is a necessary cause. For it somehow or other receives the ideas and so generates substances, and it moves because its power is not uniform, and, being in motion, it in turn sets in motion those things which are generated from it. And these were at first in irrational and irregular motion, but after they began to frame the universe, under the conditions possible they were made by God symmetrical and regular.
1.76. Ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν εἶναι καὶ αἴτια τὰ λεχθέντα δύο ὧν μὲν παράδειγμα τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὴν ὕλην· ὅπερ ἀνάγκη ἄμορφον εἶναι ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δεκτικῶν. αἴτιον δὲ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι· δεχόμενον γάρ πως τὰς ἰδέας γεννᾶν τὰς οὐσίας, καὶ διʼ ἀνομοιότητα δυνάμεως κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινούμενον τὰ γινόμενα ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀντικινεῖν. ταῦτα δὲ πρὶν μὲν ἀλόγως κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἀτάκτως, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἤρξαντο συνιστάναι τὸν κόσμον, ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ συμμέτρως καὶ τεταγμένως γενέσθαι.
1.77. For the two causes existed even before the world was made, as well as becoming in the third place, but they were not distinct, merely traces of them being found, and in disorder. When the world was made, they too acquired order. And out of all the bodies there are the universe was fashioned. He holds God, like the soul, to be incorporeal. For only thus is he exempt from change and decay. As already stated, he assumes the Ideas to be causes and principles whereby the world of natural objects is what it is.
1.77. τὰς μὲν γὰρ αἰτίας καὶ πρὸ τῆς οὐρανοποιίας δύο εἶναι καὶ τρίτην γένεσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ σαφεῖς, ἴχνη δὲ μόνον καὶ ἀτάκτους· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ κόσμος ἐγένετο, λαβεῖν καὶ ταύτας τάξιν. ἐξ ἁπάντων δὲ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σωμάτων γενέσθαι τὸν οὐρανόν. δοκεῖ δʼ αὐτῷ τὸν θεὸν ὡς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀσώματον εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ μάλιστα φθορᾶς καὶ πάθους ἀνεπίδεκτον ὑπάρχειν. τὰς δὲ ἰδέας ὑφίσταται, καθὰ καὶ προείρηται, αἰτίας τινὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς τοῦ τοιαῦτʼ εἶναι τὰ φύσει συνεστῶτα, οἷάπερ ἐστὶν αὐτά.
1.78. On good and evil he would discourse to this effect. He maintained that the end to aim at is assimilation to God, that virtue is in itself sufficient for happiness, but that it needs in addition, as instruments for use, first, bodily advantages like health and strength, sound senses and the like, and, secondly, external advantages such as wealth, good birth and reputation. But the wise man will be no less happy even if he be without these things. Again, he will take part in public affairs, will marry, and will refrain from breaking the laws which have been made. And as far as circumstances allow he will legislate for his own country, unless in the extreme corruption of the people he sees that the state of affairs completely justifies his abstention.
1.78. Περὶ δὲ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν τοιαῦτα ἔλεγε. τέλος μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐξομοίωσιν τῷ θεῷ. τὴν δʼ ἀρετὴν αὐτάρκη μὲν εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. ὀργάνων δὲ προσδεῖσθαι τῶν περὶ σῶμα πλεονεκτημάτων, ἰσχύος, ὑγιείας, εὐαισθησίας, τῶν ὁμοίων· καὶ τῶν ἐκτός, οἷον πλούτου καὶ εὐγενείας καὶ δόξης. οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, κἂν ταῦτα μὴ παρῇ. πολιτεύσεσθαι αὖ καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους οὐ παραβήσεσθαι· ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ νομοθετήσειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδι, ἐὰν μὴ τέλεον εὐπαραίτητα ὁρᾷ τὰ πράγματα ἐν ὑπερβαλλούσῃ διαφθορᾷ δήμου.
1.79. He thinks that the gods take note of human life and that there are superhuman beings. He was the first to define the notion of good as that which is bound up with whatever is praiseworthy and rational and useful and proper and becoming. And all these are bound up with that which is consistent and in accord with nature. He also discoursed on the propriety of names, and indeed he was the first to frame a science for rightly asking and answering questions, having employed it himself to excess. And in the dialogues he conceived righteousness to be the law of God because it is stronger to incite men to do righteous acts, that malefactors may not be punished after death also.
1.79. οἴεται δὲ καὶ θεοὺς ἐφορᾶν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ δαίμονας εἶναι. ἔννοιάν τε καλοῦ πρῶτος ἀπεφήνατο τὴν ἐχομένην τοῦ ἐπαινετοῦ καὶ λογικοῦ καὶ χρησίμου καὶ πρέποντος καὶ ἁρμόττοντος· ἅπερ πάντα ἔχεσθαι τοῦ ἀκολούθου τῇ φύσει καὶ ὁμολογουμένου. Διελέξατο δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος· ὥστε καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ ἐρωτᾶν πρῶτον αὐτὸν διασυστῆσαι κατακόρως χρησάμενον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς διαλόγοις καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην θεοῦ νόμον ὑπελάμβανεν ὡς ἰσχυροτέραν προτρέψαι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ μετὰ θάνατον δίκας ὑπόσχοιεν ὡς κακοῦργοι.
1.80. Hence to some he appeared too fond of myths. These narratives he intermingles with his works in order to deter men from wickedness, by reminding them how little they know of what awaits them after death. Such, then, are the doctrines he approved. He used also to divide things, according to Aristotle, in the following manner. Goods are in the mind or in the body, or external. For example, justice, prudence, courage, temperance and such like are in the mind; beauty, a good constitution, health and strength in the body; while friends, the welfare of one’s country and riches are amongst external things.
1.80. ὅθεν καὶ μυθικώτερος ἐνίοις ὑπελήφθη τοῖς συγγράμμασιν ἐγκαταμίξας τὰς τοιαύτας διηγήσεις, ὅπως διὰ † τοῦ ἀδήλου τρόπου τοῦ ἔχειν τὰ μετὰ τὸν θάνατον οὕτως ἀπέχωνται τῶν ἀδικημάτων. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν αὐτῷ τὰ ἀρέσκοντα. Διῄρει δέ, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, καὶ τὰ πράγματα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστι τὰ μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ ἐν σώματι, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός· οἷον ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ψυχῇ· τὸ δὲ κάλλος καὶ ἡ εὐεξία καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἡ ἰσχὺς ἐν σώματι· οἱ δὲ φίλοι καὶ ἡ τῆς πατρίδος εὐδαιμονία καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός.
1.81. Thus there are three kinds of goods: goods of the mind, goods of the body and external goods. There are three species of friendship: one species is natural, another social, and another hospitable. By natural friendship we mean the affection which parents have for their offspring and kinsmen for each other. And other animals besides man have inherited this form. By the social form of friendship we mean that which arises from intimacy and has nothing to do with kinship; for instance, that of Pylades for Orestes. The friendship of hospitality is that which is extended to strangers owing to an introduction or letters of recommendation. Thus friendship is either natural or social or hospitable. Some add a fourth species, that of love.
1.81. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα τρία εἴδη ἐστί· τὰ μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ ἐν σώματι, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός. τῆς φιλίας τρία εἴδη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστι φυσική, ἡ δὲ ἑταιρική, ἡ δὲ ξενική· φυσικὴν μὲν οὖν ταύτην λέγομεν, ἣν οἱ γονεῖς πρὸς τὰ ἔκγονα ἔχουσι καὶ οἱ συγγενεῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους· ταύτης δὲ κεκλήρωται καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα. ἑταιρικὴν δὲ καλοῦμεν τὴν ἀπὸ συνηθείας γινομένην καὶ μηδὲν προσήκουσαν γένει, ἀλλʼ οἷον ἡ Πυλάδου πρὸς Ὀρέστην. ἡ δὲ ξενικὴ φιλία ἡ ἀπὸ συστάσεως καὶ διὰ γραμμάτων γινομένη πρὸς τοὺς ξένους. τῆς ἄρα φιλίας ἡ μέν ἐστι φυσική, ἡ δὲ ἑταιρική, ἡ δὲ ξενική· προστιθέασι δέ τινες τετάρτην ἐρωτικήν.
1.82. There are five forms of civil government: one form is democratic, another aristocratic, a third oligarchic, a fourth monarchic, a fifth that of a tyrant. The democratic form is that in which the people has control and chooses at its own pleasure both magistrates and laws. The aristocratic form is that in which the rulers are neither the rich nor the poor nor the nobles, but the state is under the guidance of the best. Oligarchy is that form in which there is a property-qualification for the holding of office; for the rich are fewer than the poor. Monarchy is either regulated by law or hereditary. At Carthage the kingship is regulated by law, the office being put up for sale.
1.82. Τῆς πολιτείας ἐστὶν εἴδη πέντε· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστι δημοκρατικόν, ἄλλο δὲ ἀριστοκρατικόν, τρίτον δὲ ὀλιγαρχικόν, τέταρτον βασιλικόν, πέμπτον τυραννικόν. δημοκρατικὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν, ἐν αἷς πόλεσι κρατεῖ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τοὺς νόμους διʼ ἑαυτοῦ αἱρεῖται. ἀριστοκρατία δέ ἐστιν, ἐν ᾗ μήθʼ οἱ πλούσιοι μήθʼ οἱ πένητες μήθʼ οἱ ἔνδοξοι ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλʼ οἱ ἄριστοι τῆς πόλεως προστατοῦσιν. ὀλιγαρχία δέ ἐστιν, ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων αἱ ἀρχαὶ αἱρῶνται· ἐλάττους γάρ εἰσιν οἱ πλούσιοι τῶν πενήτων. τῆς δὲ βασιλείας ἡ μὲν κατὰ νόμον, ἡ δὲ κατὰ γένος ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν Καρχηδόνι κατὰ νόμον· πωλητὴ γάρ ἐστιν.
1.83. But the monarchy in Lacedaemon and in Macedonia is hereditary, for they select the king from a certain family. A tyranny is that form in which the citizens are ruled either through fraud or force by an individual. Thus civil government is either democratic, aristocratic, oligarchic, or a monarchy or a tyranny. There are three species of justice. One is concerned with gods, another with men, and the third with the departed. For those who sacrifice according to the laws and take care of the temples are obviously pious towards the gods. Those again who repay loans and restore what they have received upon trust act justly towards men. Lastly, those who take care of tombs are obviously just towards the departed. Thus one species of justice relates to the gods, another to men, while a third species is concerned with the departed.
1.83. ἡ δὲ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Μακεδονίᾳ κατὰ γένος· ἀπὸ γάρ τινος γένους ποιοῦνται τὴν βασιλείαν. τυραννὶς δέ ἐστιν, ἐν ᾗ παρακρουσθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες ὑπό τινος ἄρχονται. τῆς ἄρα πολιτείας ἡ μέν ἐστι δημοκρατία, ἡ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία, ἡ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία, ἡ δὲ βασιλεία, ἡ δὲ τυραννίς. Τῆς δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστι περὶ θεούς, ἡ δὲ περὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἡ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀποιχομένους. οἱ μὲν γὰρ θύοντες κατὰ νόμους καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι δῆλον ὅτι περὶ θεοὺς εὐσεβοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ δάνεια ἀποδιδόντες καὶ παραθήκας δικαιοπραγοῦσι περὶ ἀνθρώπους· οἱ δὲ τῶν μνημείων ἐπιμελούμενοι δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τοὺς ἀποιχομένους. τῆς ἄρα δικαιοσύνης ἡ μὲν πρὸς θεούς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, ἡ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀποιχομένους.
1.84. There are three species of knowledge or science, one practical, another productive, and a third theoretical. For architecture and shipbuilding are productive arts, since the work produced by them can be seen. Politics and flute-playing, harp-playing and similar arts are practical. For nothing visible is produced by them; yet they do or perform something. In the one case the artist plays the flute or the harp, in the other the politician takes part in politics. Geometry and harmonics and astronomy are theoretical sciences. For they neither perform nor produce anything. But the geometer considers how lines are related to each other, the student of harmony investigates sounds, the astronomer stars and the universe. Thus some sciences are theoretical, others are practical, and others are productive.
1.84. Τῆς ἐπιστήμης εἴδη ἐστὶ τρία· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστι πρακτικόν, τὸ δὲ ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ θεωρητικόν. ἡ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ καὶ ναυπηγικὴ ποιητικαί εἰσιν· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῶν ἰδεῖν ἔργον πεποιημένον. πολιτικὴ δὲ καὶ αὐλητικὴ καὶ κιθαριστικὴ καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται πρακτικαί· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδὲν ἰδεῖν †θετον αὐτῶν πεποιημένον, ἀλλὰ πράττουσί τι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐλεῖ καὶ κιθαρίζει, ὁ δὲ πολιτεύεται. ἡ δὲ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἁρμονικὴ καὶ ἀστρολογικὴ θεωρητικαί· οὔτε γὰρ πράττουσιν οὔτε ποιοῦσιν οὐθέν· ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν γεωμέτρης θεωρεῖ πῶς πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔχουσιν αἱ γραμμαί, ὁ δʼ ἁρμονικὸς τοὺς φθόγγους, ὁ δʼ ἀστρολογικὸς τὰ ἄστρα καὶ τὸν κόσμον. τῶν ἄρα ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι θεωρητικαί, αἱ δὲ πρακτικαί, αἱ δὲ ποιητικαί.
1.85. There are five species of medicine: the first is pharmacy, the second is surgery, the third deals with diet and regimen, the fourth with diagnosis, the fifth with remedies. Pharmacy cures sickness by drugs, surgery heals by the use of knife and cautery, the species concerned with diet prescribes a regimen for the removal of disease, that concerned with diagnosis proceeds by determining the nature of the ailment, that concerned with remedies by prescribing for the immediate removal of the pain. The species of medicine, then, are pharmacy, surgery, diet and regimen, diagnosis, prescription of remedies.
1.85. Τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἐστιν εἴδη πέντε· ἡ μὲν φαρμακευτική, ἡ δὲ χειρουργική, ἡ δὲ διαιτητική, ἡ δὲ νοσογνωμονική, ἡ δὲ βοηθητική. ἡ μὲν φαρμακευτικὴ διὰ φαρμάκων ἰᾶται τὰς ἀρρωστίας, ἡ δὲ χειρουργικὴ διὰ τοῦ τέμνειν καὶ καίειν ὑγιάζει, ἡ δὲ διαιτητικὴ διὰ τοῦ διαιτᾶν ἀπαλλάττει τὰς ἀρρωστίας, ἡ δὲ νοσογνωμονικὴ διὰ τοῦ γνῶναι τὸ ἀρρώστημα, ἡ δὲ βοηθητικὴ διὰ τοῦ βοηθῆσαι εἰς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀπαλλάττει τῆς ἀλγηδόνος. τῆς ἄρα ἰατρικῆς ἡ μέν ἐστι φαρμακευτική, ἡ δὲ χειρουργική, ἡ δὲ διαιτητική, ἡ δὲ βονθητική, ἡ δὲ νοσογνωμονική.
1.86. There are two divisions of law, the one written and the other unwritten. Written law is that under which we live in different cities, but that which has arisen out of custom is called unwritten law; for instance, not to appear in the market-place undressed or in women’s attire. There is no statute forbidding this, but nevertheless we abstain from such conduct because it is prohibited by an unwritten law. Thus law is either written or unwritten. There are five kinds of speech, of which one is that which politicians employ in the assemblies; this is called political speech.
1.86. Νόμου διαιρέσεις δύο· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένος, ὁ δὲ ἄγραφος. ᾧ μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πολιτευόμεθα, γεγραμμένος ἐστίν. ὁ δὲ κατὰ ἔθη γινόμενος οὗτος ἄγραφος καλεῖται· οἷον τὸ μὴ γυμνὸν πορεύεσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν μηδὲ γυναικεῖον ἱμάτιον περιβάλλεσθαι. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐθεὶς νόμος κωλύει, ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὐ πράττομεν διὰ τὸ ἀγράφῳ νόμῳ κωλύεσθαι. τοῦ ἄρα νόμου ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν γεγραμμένος, ὁ δὲ ἄγραφος. Ὁ λόγος διαιρεῖται εἰς πέντε, ὧν εἷς μέν ἐστιν, ὃν οἱ πολιτευόμενοι λέγουσιν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ὃς καλεῖται πολιτικός.
1.87. The second division is that which the rhetors employ in written compositions, whether composed for display or praise or blame, or for accusation. Hence this division is termed rhetorical. The third division of speech is that of private persons conversing with one another; this is called the mode of speech of ordinary life. Another division of speech is the language of those who converse by means of short questions and answers; this kind is called dialectical. The fifth division is the speech of craftsmen conversing about their own subjects; this is called technical language. Thus speech is either political, or rhetorical, or that of ordinary conversation, or dialectical, or technical.
1.87. ἑτέρα δὲ διαίρεσις λόγου, ὃν οἱ ῥήτορες γράφουσιν † εἰς ἐπίδειξιν προφέρουσιν εἰς ἐγκώμια καὶ ψόγους καὶ κατηγορίας· τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον εἶδός ἐστι ῥητορικόν. τρίτη δὲ διαίρεσις λόγου, ὃν οἱ ἰδιῶται διαλέγονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους· οὗτος δὴ ὁ τρόπος προσαγορεύεται ἰδιωτικός. ἑτέρα δὲ διαίρεσις λόγου, ὃν οἱ κατὰ βραχὺ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν διαλέγονται· οὗτος δὲ καλεῖται ὁ λόγος διαλεκτικός. πέμπτη δὲ διαίρεσις λόγου, ὃν οἱ τεχνῖται περὶ τῆς ἑαυτῶν διαλέγονται τέχνης· ὃς δὴ καλεῖται τεχνικός. τοῦ λόγου ἄρα τὸ μέν ἐστι πολιτικόν, τὸ δὲ ῥητορικόν, τὸ δὲ ἰδιωτικόν, τὸ δὲ διαλεκτικόν, τὸ δὲ τεχνικόν.
1.88. Music has three divisions. One employs the mouth alone, like singing. The second employs both the mouth and the hands, as is the case with the harper singing to his own accompaniment. The third division employs the hands alone; for instance, the music of the harp. Thus music employs either the mouth alone, or the mouth and the hands, or the hands alone. Nobility has four divisions. First, when the ancestors are gentle and handsome and also just, their descendants are said to be noble. Secondly, when the ancestors have been princes or magistrates, their descendants are said to be noble. The third kind arises when the ancestors have been illustrious; for instance, through having held military command or through success in the national games. For then we call the descendants noble.
1.88. Ἡ μουσικὴ εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μὲν διὰ τοῦ στόματος μόνον, οἷον ἡ ᾠδή· δεύτερον δὲ διὰ τοῦ στόματος καὶ τῶν χειρῶν, οἷον ἡ κιθαρῳδία· τρίτον ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν μόνον, οἷον κιθαριστική. τῆς ἄρα μουσικῆς ἐστι τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος μόνον, τὸ δʼ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος καὶ τῶν χειρῶν, τὸ δʼ ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν. Διαιρεῖται δὲ ἡ εὐγένεια εἰς εἴδη τέτταρα. ἓν μέν, ἐὰν ὦσιν οἱ πρόγονοι καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι, τοὺς ἐκ τούτων γεγεννημένους εὐγενεῖς φασιν εἶναι. ἄλλο δέ, ἂν ὦσιν οἱ πρόγονοι δεδυναστευκότες καὶ ἄρχοντες γεγενημένοι, τοὺς ἐκ τούτων εὐγενεῖς φασιν εἶναι. ἄλλο δέ, ἂν ὦσιν οἱ πρόγονοι ὀνομαστοί, οἷον ἀπὸ στρατηγίας, ἀπὸ στεφανιτῶν ἀγώνων· καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἐκ τούτων γεγεννημένους εὐγενεῖς προσαγορεύομεν.
1.89. The last division includes the man who is himself of a generous and high-minded spirit. He too is said to be noble. And this indeed is the highest form of nobility. Thus, of nobility, one kind depends on excellent ancestors, another on princely ancestors, a third on illustrious ancestors, while the fourth is due to the individual’s own beauty and worth. Beauty has three divisions. The first is the object of praise, as of form fair to see. Another is serviceable; thus an instrument, a house and the like are beautiful for use. Other things again which relate to customs and pursuits and the like are beautiful because beneficial. Of beauty, then, one kind is matter for praise, another is for use, and another for the benefit it procures.
1.89. ἄλλο εἶδος, ἐὰν αὐτός τις ᾖ γεννάδας τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος· καὶ τοῦτον εὐγενῆ φασι· καὶ τῆς γε εὐγενείας αὕτη κρατίστη. τῆς ἄρα εὐγενείας τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ προγόνων ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ δυναστῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐνδόξων, τὸ δʼ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ καλοκαγαθίας. Τὸ κάλλος διαιρεῖται εἰς τρία· ἓν μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἐπαινετόν, οἷον ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως εὐμορφία· ἄλλο δὲ χρηστικόν, οἷον ὄργανον καὶ οἰκία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς χρῆσίν ἐστι καλά· τὸ δὲ πρὸς νόμους καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, 〈ἃ〉 πρὸς ὠφέλειάν ἐστι καλά. τοῦ ἄρα κάλλους τὸ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἔπαινον, τὸ δὲ πρὸς χρῆσιν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ὠφέλειαν.
1.90. The soul has three divisions. One part of it is rational, another appetitive, and a third irascible. Of these the rational part is the cause of purpose, reflection, understanding and the like. The appetitive part of the soul is the cause of desire of eating, sexual indulgence and the like, while the irascible part is the cause of courage, of pleasure and pain, and of anger. Thus one part of the soul is rational, another appetitive, and a third irascible. Of perfect virtue there are four species: prudence, justice, bravery and temperance.
1.90. Ἡ ψυχὴ διαιρεῖται εἰς τρία· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστι λογιστικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ δὲ θυμικόν. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν λογιστικόν ἐστιν αἴτιον τοῦ βουλεύεσθαί τε καὶ λογίζεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· τὸ δʼ ἐπιθυμητικὸν μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς αἴτιον τοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖν φαγεῖν καὶ τοῦ πλησιάσαι καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντων. τὸ δὲ θυμικὸν μέρος αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ θαρρεῖν καὶ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι. τῆς ἄρα ψυχῆς ἐστι τὸ μὲν λογιστικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ δὲ θυμικόν. Τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς εἴδη τέτταρα· ἓν μὲν φρόνησις, ἓν δὲ δικαιοσύνη, ἄλλο δʼ ἀνδρεία, τέταρτον σωφροσύνη.
1.91. Of these prudence is the cause of right conduct, justice of just dealing in partnerships and commercial transactions. Bravery is the cause which makes a man not give way but stand his ground in alarms and perils. Temperance causes mastery over desires, so that we are never enslaved by any pleasure, but lead an orderly life. Thus virtue includes first prudence, next justice, thirdly bravery, and lastly temperance. Rule has five divisions, one that which is according to law, another according to nature, another according to custom, a fourth by birth, a fifth by force.
1.91. τούτων ἡ μὲν φρόνησις αἰτία τοῦ πράττειν ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα· ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις καὶ τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία τοῦ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις καὶ φοβεροῖς μὴ ἐξίστασθαι ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ μένειν· ἡ δὲ σωφροσύνη τοῦ κρατεῖν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ὑπὸ μηδεμιᾶς ἡδονῆς δουλοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ κοσμίως ζῆν. τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄρα τὸ μέν ἐστι φρόνησις, ἄλλο δικαιοσύνη, τρίτον ἀνδρεία, τέταρτον σωφροσύνη. Ἡ ἀρχὴ διαιρεῖται εἰς μέρη πέντε· ἓν μὲν εἰς τὸ κατὰ νόμον, ἓν δὲ εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ἓν δὲ εἰς τὸ κατὰ ἔθος, τέταρτον εἰς τὸ κατὰ γένος, πέμπτον δὲ κατὰ βίαν.
1.92. Now the magistrates in cities when elected by their fellow-citizens rule according to law. The natural rulers are the males, not only among men, but also among the other animals; for the males everywhere exert wide-reaching rule over the females. Rule according to custom is such authority as attendants exercise over children and teachers over their pupils. Hereditary rule is exemplified by that of the Lacedaemonian kings, for the office of king is confined to a certain family. And the same system is in force for the kingdom of Macedonia; for there too the office of king goes by birth. Others have acquired power by force or fraud, and govern the citizens against their will; this kind of rule is called forcible. Thus rule is either by law, or by nature, or by custom, or by birth, or by force.
1.92. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντες ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπὰν αἱρεθῶσι, κατὰ νόμον ἄρχουσιν· οἱ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, οἱ ἄρρενες, οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις· ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὰ ἄρρενα τῶν θηλειῶν ἄρχει. ἡ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ ἔθος ἀρχὴ τοιαύτη ἐστίν, οἵαν οἱ παιδαγωγοὶ τῶν παίδων ἄρχουσι καὶ οἱ διδάσκαλοι τῶν φοιτώντων. κατὰ γένος δὲ ἀρχὴ τοιαύτη τις λέγεται, οἵαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι βασιλεῖς ἄρχουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ γένους τινὸς ἡ βασιλεία. καὶ ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἄρχουσι· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀπὸ γένους ἡ βασιλεία καθίσταται. οἱ δὲ βιασάμενοι ἢ παρακρουσάμενοι ἄρχουσιν ἀκόντων τῶν πολιτῶν· ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ κατὰ βίαν λέγεται εἶναι. τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν κατὰ νόμον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ἔθος, τὸ δὲ κατὰ γένος, τὸ δὲ κατὰ βίαν.
1.93. There are six kinds of rhetoric. For when the speakers urge war or alliance with a neighbouring state, that species of rhetoric is called persuasion. But when they speak against making war or alliance, and urge their hearers to remain at peace, this kind of rhetoric is called dissuasion. A third kind is employed when a speaker asserts that he is wronged by some one whom he makes out to have caused him much mischief; accusation is the name applied to the kind here defined. The fourth kind of rhetoric is termed defence; here the speaker shows that he has done no wrong and that his conduct is in no respect abnormal; defence is the term applied in such a case.
1.93. Τῆς ῥητορείας εἴδη ἐστὶν ἕξ. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ κελεύωσι πολεμεῖν ἢ συμμαχεῖν πρός τινα, καλεῖται τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος προτροπή. ὅταν δʼ ἀξιῶσι μὴ πολεμεῖν 〈ἢ〉 μὴ συμμαχεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδός ἐστιν ἀποτροπή. τρίτον εἶδος τῆς ῥητορείας, ὅταν τις φάσκῃ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπό τινος καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν αἴτιον ἀποφαίνῃ· τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον εἶδος κατηγορία ὀνομάζεται. τέταρτον εἶδος τῆς ῥητορείας [ἀπολογία καλεῖται], ὅταν ἀποφαίνῃ αὑτὸν μηθὲν ἀδικοῦντα μήτε ἄλλο ἄτοπον μηθὲν πράττοντα· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀπολογίαν καλοῦσι.
1.94. A fifth kind of rhetoric is employed when a speaker speaks well of some one and proves him to be worthy and honourable; encomium is the name given to this kind. A sixth kind is that employed when the speaker shows some one to be unworthy; the name given to this is invective. Under rhetoric, then, are included encomium, invective, persuasion, dissuasion, accusation and defence. Successful speaking has four divisions. The first consists in speaking to the purpose, the next to the requisite length, the third before the proper audience, and the fourth at the proper moment. The things to the purpose are those which are likely to be expedient for speaker and hearer. The requisite length is that which is neither more nor less than enough.
1.94. πέμπτον εἶδος ῥητορείας, ὅταν τις εὖ λέγῃ καὶ ἀποφαίνῃ καλὸν κἀγαθόν· τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον εἶδος καλεῖται ἐγκώμιον. ἕκτον εἶδος, ὅταν τις ἀποφαίνῃ φαῦλον· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εἶδος καλεῖται ψόγος. τῆς ἄρα ῥητορείας ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἐγκώμιον, τὸ δὲ ψόγος, τὸ δὲ προτροπή, τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή, τὸ δὲ κατηγορία, τὸ δὲ ἀπολογία. Τὸ ὀρθῶς λέγειν διαιρεῖται εἰς τέτταρα· ἓν μὲν ἃ δεῖ λέγειν, ἓν δὲ ὅσα δεῖ λέγειν, τρίτον πρὸς οὓς δεῖ λέγειν, τέταρτον δὲ πηνίκα λέγειν δεῖ. ἃ μὲν οὖν δεῖ λέγειν, ἃ μέλλει συμφέρειν τῷ λέγοντι καὶ τῷ ἀκούοντι· τὸ δὲ ὅσα δεῖ λέγειν, μὴ πλείω μηδὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν.
1.95. To speak to the proper audience means this: in addressing persons older than yourself, the discourse must be made suitable to the audience as being elderly men; whereas in addressing juniors the discourse must be suitable to young men. The proper time of speaking is neither too soon nor too late; otherwise you will miss the mark and not speak with success. Of conferring benefits there are four divisions. For it takes place either by pecuniary aid or by personal service, by means of knowledge or of speech. Pecuniary aid is given when one assists a man in need, so that he is relieved from all anxiety on the score of money. Personal service is given when men come up to those who are being beaten and rescue them.
1.95. τὸ δὲ πρὸς οὓς δεῖ λέγειν, ἄν τε πρὸς πρεσβυτέρους [ἁμαρτάνοντας] διαλέγῃ, ἁρμόττοντας δεῖ τοὺς λόγους διαλέγεσθαι ὡς πρεσβυτέροις· ἄν τε πρὸς νεωτέρους, ἁρμόττοντας δεῖ λέγεσθαι ὡς νεωτέροις. πηνίκα δὲ λέγειν ἐστί, μήτε προτέρω μήτε ὑστέρω· εἰ δὲ μή, διαμαρτήσεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐρεῖν. Ἡ εὐεργεσία διαιρεῖται εἰς τέτταρα· ἢ γὰρ χρήμασιν ἢ σώμασιν ἢ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ἢ τοῖς λόγοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν χρήμασιν, ὅταν δεομένῳ παραβοηθήσῃ τις εἰς χρημάτων λόγον εὐπορῆσαι· τοῖς δὲ σώμασιν εὖ ποιοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, ὅταν παραγενόμενοι τυπτομένοις παραβοηθῶσιν·
1.96. Those who train or heal, or who teach something valuable, confer benefit by means of knowledge. But when men enter a law-court and one appears as advocate for another and delivers an effective speech on his behalf, he is benefiting him by speech. Thus benefits are conferred by means either of money or of personal service, or of knowledge, or of speech. There are four ways in which things are completed and brought to an end. The first is by legal enactment, when a decree is passed and this decree is confirmed by law. The second is in the course of nature, as the day, the year and the seasons are completed. The third is by the rules of art, say the builder’s art, for so a house is completed; and so it is with shipbuilding, whereby vessels are completed.
1.96. οἱ δὲ παιδεύοντες καὶ ἰατρεύοντες καὶ διδάσκοντες ἀγαθόν τι, οὗτοι δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις εὐεργετοῦσιν· ὅταν δʼ εἰσέλθωσιν εἰς δικαστήριον ἄλλος ὑπὲρ ἄλλου βοηθὸς καὶ λόγον τινὰ ἐπιεικῆ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ εἴπῃ, οὗτος δὴ λόγῳ εὐεργετεῖ. τῆς ἄρα εὐεργεσίας ἡ μέν ἐστι διὰ χρημάτων, ἡ δὲ διὰ σωμάτων, ἡ δὲ διὰ ἐπιστημῶν, τετάρτη διὰ λόγων. Διαιρεῖται τὸ τέλος τῶν πραγμάτων εἰς τέτταρα εἴδη· ἓν μὲν κατὰ νόμον τέλος τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνει, ὅταν ψήφισμα γένηται καὶ τοῦθʼ ὁ νόμος τελέσῃ· κατὰ φύσιν δὲ τέλος τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνει, ἥ τε ἡμέρα καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς καὶ αἱ ὧραι. κατὰ τέχνην δὲ τέλος τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνει, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική· οἰκίαν γάρ τις ἐπιτελεῖ· καὶ ἡ ναυπηγική· πλοῖα γάρ.
1.97. Fourthly, matters are brought to an end by chance or accident, when they turn out otherwise than is expected. Thus the completion of things is due either to law, or to nature, or to art, or to chance. Of power or ability there are four divisions. First, whatever we can do with the mind, namely calculate or anticipate; next, whatever we can effect with the body, for instance, marching, giving, taking and the like. Thirdly, whatever we can do by a multitude of soldiers or a plentiful supply of money; hence a king is said to have great power. The fourth division of power or influence is doing, or being done by, well or ill; thus we can become ill or be educated, be restored to health and the like. Power, then, is either in the mind, or the body, or in armies and resources, or in acting and being acted upon.
1.97. κατὰ τύχην δὲ γίνεται τοῖς πράγμασι τέλος, ὅταν ἄλλως καὶ μὴ ὡς ὑπολαμβάνει τις ἀποβαίνῃ. τοῦ τέλους ἄρα τῶν πραγμάτων τὸ μὲν κατὰ νόμον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τέχνην, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τύχην ἐστίν. Ἡ δύναμις διαιρεῖται εἰς τέτταρα εἴδη· ἓν μὲν ὃ δυνάμεθα τῇ διανοίᾳ, λογίζεσθαι καὶ ὑπονοεῖν· ἕτερον δὲ τῷ σώματι, οἷον πορεύεσθαι καὶ διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· τρίτον ὃ δυνάμεθα πλήθει στρατιωτῶν καὶ χρημάτων, ὅθεν καλεῖται πολλὴν δύναμιν ἔχων βασιλεύς· τετάρτη δὲ διαίρεσις δυνάμεως πάσχειν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ κακῶς· οἷον ἀρρωστεῖν καὶ παιδεύεσθαι δυνάμεθα καὶ ὑγιεῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. τῆς ἄρα δυνάμεως ἡ μέν ἐστιν ἐν διανοίᾳ, ἡ δʼ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἡ δʼ ἐν στρατοπέδῳ καὶ χρήμασιν, ἡ δʼ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν.
1.98. Philanthropy is of three kinds. One is by way of salutations, as when certain people address every one they meet and, stretching out their hand, give him a hearty greeting; another mode is seen when one is given to assisting every one in distress; another mode of philanthropy is that which makes certain people fond of giving dinners. Thus philanthropy is shown either by a courteous address, or by conferring benefits, or by hospitality and the promotion of social intercourse. Welfare or happiness includes five parts. One part of it is good counsel, a second soundness of the senses and bodily health, a third success in one’s undertakings, a fourth a reputation with one’s fellow-men, a fifth ample means in money and in whatever else subserves the end of life.
1.98. Τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία· ἓν μὲν διὰ τῆς προσηγορίας γινόμενον, οἷον ἐν οἷς τινες τὸν ἐντυχόντα πάντα προσαγορεύουσι καὶ τὴν δεξιὰν ἐμβάλλοντες χαιρετίζουσιν. ἄλλο εἶδος, ὅταν τις βοηθητικὸς ᾖ παντὶ τῷ ἀτυχοῦντι. ἕτερον εἶδός ἐστι τῆς φιλανθρωπίας, ἐν ᾧ τινες φιλοδειπνισταί εἰσι. τῆς ἄρα φιλανθρωπίας τὸ μέν ἐστι διὰ τοῦ προσαγορεύειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἑστιᾶν καὶ φιλοσυνουσιάζειν. Ἡ εὐδαιμονία διαιρεῖται εἰς πέντε μέρη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστιν εὐβουλία, ἕτερον δὲ εὐαισθησία καὶ ὑγίεια τοῦ σώματος, τρίτον εὐτυχία ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τέταρτον εὐδοξία παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, πέμπτον εὐπορία χρημάτων καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον χρησίμων.
1.99. Now deliberating well is a result of education and of having experience of many things. Soundness of the senses depends upon the bodily organs: I mean, if one sees with his eyes, hears with his ears, and perceives with his nostrils and his mouth the appropriate objects, then such a condition is soundness of the senses. Success is attained when a man does what he aims at in the right way, as becomes a good man. A man has a good reputation when he is well spoken of. A man has ample means when he is so equipped for the needs of life that he can afford to benefit his friends and discharge his public services with lavish display. If a man has all these things, he is completely happy. Thus of welfare or happiness one part is good counsel, another soundness of senses and bodily health, a third success, a fourth a good reputation, a fifth ample means.
1.99. ἡ μὲν εὐβουλία γίνεται ἐκ παιδείας καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πολλῶν ἔμπειρον γενέσθαι· ἡ δὲ εὐαισθησία ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν, οἷον ἐάν τις ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρᾷ καὶ τοῖς ὠσὶν ἀκούῃ καὶ τῇ ῥινὶ καὶ τῷ στόματι αἰσθάνηται ὧν δεῖ αἰσθάνεσθαι· τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον εὐαισθησία. ἡ δὲ εὐτυχία, ὅταν ἐφʼ ἃ σκοπεῖ πράξῃ κατʼ ὀρθὸν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν τὸν σπουδαῖον. εὐδοξία δʼ ἐστὶν ὅταν τις εὖ ἀκούῃ· εὐπορία δʼ ἐστὶν ὅταν τις πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ χρήσεις οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥστε καὶ φίλους εὖ ποιῆσαι καὶ φιλοτίμως καὶ εὐπόρως ἀπολειτουργῆσαι. ᾧ δὲ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα πάντα, οὗτός ἐστιν εὐδαίμων τελέως. τῆς ἄρα εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν εὐβουλία, τὸ δὲ εὐαισθησία καὶ ὑγίεια τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δὲ εὐτυχία, τὸ δὲ εὐδοξία, τὸ δὲ εὐπορία.
1.100. There are three divisions of the arts and crafts. The first division consists of mining and forestry, which are productive arts. The second includes the smith’s and carpenter’s arts which transform material; for the smith makes weapons out of iron, and the carpenter transforms timber into flutes and lyres. The third division is that which uses what is thus made, as horsemanship employs bridles, the art of war employs weapons, and music flutes and the lyre. Thus of art there are three several species, those above-mentioned in the first, second and third place.
1.100. Αἱ τέχναι εἰς τρία διαιροῦνται· ἡ μὲν πρώτη, ἡ δὲ δευτέρα, ἡ δὲ τρίτη. πρώτη μὲν οὖν ἡ μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ ὑλοτομική· παρασκευαστικαὶ γάρ εἰσιν. ἡ δὲ χαλκευτικὴ καὶ ἡ τεκτονικὴ μετασχηματιστικαί εἰσιν· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σιδήρου ἡ χαλκευτικὴ ὅπλα ποιεῖ, ἡ δὲ τεκτονικὴ ἐκ τῶν ξύλων αὐλοὺς καὶ λύρας. ἡ δὲ χρηστική, οἷον ἱππικὴ τοῖς χαλινοῖς χρῆται, ἡ πολεμικὴ τοῖς ὅπλοις, ἡ μουσικὴ τοῖς αὐλοῖς καὶ τῇ λύρᾳ. τῆς τέχνης ἄρα τρία εἴδη ἐστί· τὸ μέν τι πρῶτον, τὸ δέ τι δεύτερον, τὸ δέ τι τρίτον.
1.101. Good is divided into four kinds. One is the possessor of virtue, whom we affirm to be individually good. Another is virtue itself and justice; these we affirm to be good. A third includes such things as food, suitable exercises and drugs. The fourth kind which we affirm to be good includes the arts of flute-playing, acting and the like. Thus there are four kinds of good: the possession of virtue; virtue itself; thirdly, food and beneficial exercises; lastly, flute-playing, acting, and the poetic art.
1.101. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς τέτταρα γένη διαιρεῖται· ὧν ἓν μὲν λέγομεν εἶναι τὸν τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντα ἰδίᾳ ἀγαθόν· ἄλλο δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην λέγομεν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· τρίτον δέ, οἷον σιτία καὶ γυμνάσια τὰ πρόσφορα καὶ φάρμακα· τέταρτον δέ φαμεν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οἷον αὐλητικὴν καὶ ὑποκριτικὴν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα τέτταρα εἴδη ἐστί· τὸ μὲν τὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχειν, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀρετή, τρίτον δὲ σιτία καὶ γυμνάσια τὰ ὠφέλιμα· τέταρτον δὲ αὐλητικὴν καὶ ὑποκριτικὴν καὶ ποιητικὴν ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν εἶναι.
1.102. Whatever is is either evil or good or indifferent. We call that evil which is capable of invariably doing harm; for instance, bad judgement and folly and injustice and the like. The contraries of these things are good. But the things which can sometimes benefit and sometimes harm, such as walking and sitting and eating, or which can neither do any benefit nor harm at all, these are things indifferent, neither good nor evil. Thus all things whatever are either good, or evil, or neither good nor evil.
1.102. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι κακά, τὰ δὲ ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ οὐδέτερα. τούτων κακὰ μὲν ταῦτα λέγομεν, τὰ δυνάμενα βλάπτειν ἀεί, οἷον ἀκρισίαν καὶ ἀφροσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· τὰ δὲ τούτοις ἐναντία ἀγαθά ἐστι. τὰ δὲ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὠφελεῖν, ἐνίοτε δὲ βλάπτειν—οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖν καὶ τὸ καθῆσθαι καὶ ἐσθίειν—〈ἢ〉 ὅλως μήτε ὠφελῆσαι μήτε βλάψαι δυνάμενα, ταῦτα γοῦν οὔτε ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακά ἐστι. τῶν ἄρα ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δʼ οὐδέτερα τούτων.
1.103. Good order in the state falls under three heads. First, if the laws are good, we say that there is good government. Secondly, if the citizens obey the established laws, we also call this good government. Thirdly, if, without the aid of laws, the people manage their affairs well under the guidance of customs and institutions, we call this again good government. Thus three forms of good government may exist, (1) when the laws are good, (2) when the existing laws are obeyed, (3) when the people live under salutary customs and institutions. Disorder in a state has three forms. The first arises when the laws affecting citizens and strangers are alike bad, the second when the existing laws are not obeyed, and the third when there is no law at all.
1.103. Εὐνομία διαιρεῖται εἰς τρία· ἓν μέν, ἐὰν ὦσιν οἱ νόμοι σπουδαῖοι, εὐνομίαν φαμὲν εἶναι· ἕτερον δέ, ἐὰν τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις ἐμμένωσιν οἱ πολῖται, καὶ τοῦτό φαμεν εὐνομίαν εἶναι· τρίτον δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ὄντων τῶν νόμων κατὰ ἔθη καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα χρηστῶς πολιτεύωνται, καὶ τοῦτο εὐνομίαν προσαγορεύομεν· τῆς εὐνομίας ἄρα ἓν μέν ἐστι νόμους σπουδαίους εἶναι· ἄλλο δέ, ἐὰν τοῖς οὖσι νόμοις ἐμμένωσι· τρίτον δέ, ἐὰν ἔθεσι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύμασι χρηστοῖς πολιτεύωνται. Διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀνομία εἰς τρία· ὧν ἓν μέν ἐστιν, ἐὰν ὦσιν οἱ νόμοι μοχθηροὶ καὶ πρὸς ξένους καὶ πρὸς πολίτας·
1.104. Thus the state is badly governed when the laws are bad or not obeyed, or lastly, when there is no law. Contraries are divided into three species. For instance, we say that goods are contrary to evils, as justice to injustice, wisdom to folly, and the like. Again, evils are contrary to evils, prodigality is contrary to niggardliness, and to be unjustly tortured is the contrary of being justly tortured, and so with similar evils. Again, heavy is the contrary of light, quick of slow, black of white, and these pairs are contraries, while they are neither good nor evil.
1.104. ἕτερον δέ, ἐὰν τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι μὴ πείθωνται· ἄλλο δέ, ἐὰν ὅλως μηδεὶς ᾖ νόμος. τῆς ἄρα ἀνομίας ἓν μέν ἐστι τὸ μοχθηροὺς εἶναι τοὺς νόμους· ἄλλο δέ, ἐὰν τοῖς οὖσι μὴ πείθωνται· τρίτον δέ, ἐὰν μηδεὶς ᾖ νόμος. Τὰ ἐναντία διαιρεῖται εἰς τρία· οἷον ἀγαθὰ κακοῖς ἐναντία φαμὲν εἶναι, ὡς τὴν δικαιοσύνην τῇ ἀδικίᾳ καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν τῇ ἀφροσύνῃ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. κακὰ δὲ κακοῖς ἐναντία ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ ἀσωτία τῇ ἀνελευθερίᾳ καὶ τὸ ἀδίκως στρεβλοῦσθαι τῷ δικαίως στρεβλοῦσθαι· καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κακὰ κακοῖς ἐναντία ἐστί. τὸ δὲ βαρὺ τῷ κούφῳ καὶ τὸ ταχὺ τῷ βραδεῖ καὶ τὸ μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ ὡς οὐδέτερα οὐδετέροις ἐναντία ἐστίν.
1.105. Thus, of contraries, some are opposed as goods to evils, others as evils to evils, and others, as things which are neither good nor evil, are opposed to one another. There are three kinds of goods, those which can be exclusively possessed, those which can be shared with others, and those which simply exist. To the first division, namely, those which can be exclusively possessed, belong such things as justice and health. To the next belong all those which, though they cannot be exclusively possessed, can be shared with others. Thus we cannot possess the absolute good, but we can participate in it. The third division includes those goods the existence of which is necessary, though we can neither possess them exclusively nor participate in them. The mere existence of worth and justice is a good; and these things cannot be shared or had in exclusive possession, but must simply exist. Of goods, then, some are possessed exclusively, some shared, and others merely subsist.
1.105. τῶν ἐναντίων ἄρα τὰ μὲν ὡς ἀγαθὰ κακοῖς ἐναντία ἐστί· τὰ δὲ ὡς κακὰ κακοῖς· τὰ δὲ ὡς οὐδετέροις οὐδέτερα. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν γένη ἐστὶ τρία· τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἑκτά, τὰ δὲ μεθεκτά, τὰ δὲ ὑπαρκτά. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἑκτά ἐστιν, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν, οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια· μεθεκτὰ δέ, ὅσα ἔχειν μὲν μὴ ἐνδέχεται, μετασχεῖν δὲ αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεται· οἷον αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, μετασχεῖν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐνδέχεται. ὑπαρκτὰ δέ, ὅσα μήτε μετασχεῖν μήτε σχεῖν ἐνδέχεται, ὑπάρχειν δὲ δεῖ· οἷον τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι 〈καὶ〉 τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστι· καὶ ταῦτα οὔτε σχεῖν οὔτε μετασχεῖν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ [σπουδαῖον εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι]. τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἑκτά, τὰ δὲ μεθεκτά, τὰ δὲ ὑπαρκτά.
1.106. Counsel is divided under three heads. One is taken from past time, one from the future, and the third from the present. That from past time consists of examples; for instance, what the Lacedaemonians suffered through trusting others. Counsel drawn from the present is to show, for instance, that the walls are weak, the men cowards, and the supplies running short. Counsel from the future is. for instance, to urge that we should not wrong the embassies by suspicions, lest the fair fame of Hellas be stained. Thus counsel is derived from the past, the present and the future.
1.106. Ἡ συμβουλία διαιρεῖται εἰς τρία· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῆς ἓν μὲν ἐκ τῶν παροιχομένων χρόνων λαμβανόμενον, ἓν δὲ ἐκ τῶν μελλόντων, ἓν δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεστώτων. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν παροιχομένων παραδείγματα, οἷον τί ἔπαθον Λακεδαιμόνιοι πιστεύσαντες· τὰ δʼ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, οἷον ἀποφαίνειν τείχη ἀσθενῆ, δειλοὺς ἀνθρώπους, σῖτον ὀλίγον· τὰ δʼ ἐκ τῶν μελλόντων, οἷον ταῖς ὑπονοίαις μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὰς πρεσβείας, ὅπως μὴ ἄδοξος ἡ Ἑλλὰς γένηται. τῆς ἄρα συμβουλίας τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν παροιχομένων, τὰ δʼ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, τὰ δʼ ἐκ τῶν μελλόντων.
1.107. Vocal sound falls into two divisions according as it is animate or inanimate. The voice of living things is animate sound; notes of instruments and noises are inanimate. And of the animate voice part is articulate, part inarticulate, that of men being articulate speech, that of the animals inarticulate. Thus vocal sound is either animate or inanimate. Whatever exists is either divisible or indivisible. Of divisible things some are divisible into similar and others into dissimilar parts. Those things are indivisible which cannot be divided and are not compounded of elements, for example, the unit, the point and the musical note; whereas those which have constituent parts, for instance, syllables, concords in music, animals, water, gold, are divisible.
1.107. Ἡ φωνὴ διαιρεῖται εἰς δύο· ἓν μὲν αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἔμψυχον, ἓν δὲ ἄψυχον. ἔμψυχον μὲν ἡ τῶν ζῴων φωνή, ἄψυχον δὲ φθόγγοι καὶ ἦχοι. τῆς τοῦ ἐμψύχου φωνῆς ἡ μέν ἐστιν ἐγγράμματος, ἡ δὲ ἀγράμματος. ἐγγράμματος μὲν ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀγράμματος δὲ ἡ τῶν ζῴων. τῆς ἄρα φωνῆς ἡ μὲν ἔμψυχος, ἡ δὲ ἄψυχος. Τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν μεριστά, τὰ δὲ ἀμέριστα. τούτων δὲ τῶν μεριστῶν τὰ μὲν ὁμοιομερῆ, τὰ δὲ ἀνομοιομερῆ. ἀμερῆ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὅσα μὴ ἔχει διαίρεσιν μηδὲ ἔκ τινος σύγκειται, οἷον ἥ τε μονὰς καὶ ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ ὁ φθόγγος· μεριστὰ δὲ ὅσα ἔκ τινος σύγκειται, οἷον αἵ τε συλλαβαὶ καὶ συμφωνίαι καὶ ζῷα καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ χρυσός.
1.108. If they are composed of similar parts, so that the whole does not differ from the part except in bulk, as water, gold and all that is fusible, and the like, then they are termed homogeneous. But whatever is composed of dissimilar parts, as a house and the like, is termed heterogeneous. Thus all things whatever are either divisible or indivisible, and of those which are divisible some are homogeneous, others heterogeneous in their parts. Of existing things some are absolute and some are called relative. Things said to exist absolutely are those which need nothing else to explain them, as man, horse, and all other animals.
1.108. ὁμοιομερῆ ὅσα ἐξ ὁμοίων σύγκειται καὶ μηδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους εἰ μὴ τῷ πλήθει, οἷον τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ τὸ χρυσίον καὶ πᾶν τὸ χυτὸν καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον. ἀνομοιομερῆ δὲ ὅσα ἐξ ἀνομοίων μερῶν σύγκειται, οἷον οἰκία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. τῶν ὄντων ἄρα τὰ μέν ἐστι μεριστά, τὰ δὲ ἀμερῆ· τῶν δὲ μεριστῶν τὰ μὲν ὁμοιομερῆ, τὰ δὲ ἀνομοιομερῆ. Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι καθʼ ἑαυτά, τὰ δὲ πρός τι λέγεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν καθʼ ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐν τῇ ἑρμηνείᾳ μηδενὸς προσδεῖται· ταῦτα δʼ ἂν εἴη οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα.
1.109. For none of these gains by explanation. To those which are called relative belong all which stand in need of some explanation, as that which is greater than something or quicker than something, or more beautiful and the like. For the greater implies a less, and the quicker is quicker than something. Thus existing things are either absolute or relative. And in this way, according to Aristotle, Plato used to divide the primary conceptions also. There was also another man named Plato, a philosopher of Rhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, as is stated by Seleucus the grammarian in his first book On Philosophy; another a Peripatetic and pupil of Aristotle; and another who was a pupil of Praxiphanes; and lastly, there was Plato, the poet of the Old Comedy.
1.109. τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν διʼ ἑρμηνείας χωρεῖ. τῶν δὲ πρός τι λεγομένων ὅσα προσδεῖταί τινος ἑρμηνείας, οἷον τὸ μεῖζόν τινος καὶ τὸ θᾶττόν τινος καὶ τὸ κάλλιον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· τό τε γὰρ μεῖζον ἐλάττονός ἐστι μεῖζον καὶ τὸ θᾶττόν τινός ἐστι 〈θᾶττον〉. τῶν ὄντων ἄρα τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθʼ αὑτὰ λέγεται, τὰ δὲ πρός τι. ὧδε καὶ τὰ πρῶτα διῄρει κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην. Γέγονε δὲ καὶ ἄλλος Πλάτων φιλόσοφος Ῥόδιος, μαθητὴς Παναιτίου, καθά φησι Σέλευκος ὁ γραμματικὸς ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ φιλοσοφίας· καὶ ἄλλος, περιπατητικός, μαθητὴς Ἀριστοτέλους· καὶ ἕτερος Πραξιφάνους· καὶ ὁ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας ποιητής.