---
title: "Lives of the Eminent Philosophers · Βίοι καὶ γνῶμαι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εὐδοκιμησάντων"
author: "Diogenes Laertius"
translator: "R. D. Hicks"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 21 of 34
url: https://scriptura.si/works/diogenes-laertius-lives/21/
cite: "Diogenes Laertius, tr. R. D. Hicks, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers · Βίοι καὶ γνῶμαι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εὐδοκιμησάντων, section 21. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/diogenes-laertius-lives/21/"
---

# Lives of the Eminent Philosophers · Βίοι καὶ γνῶμαι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εὐδοκιμησάντων

*Diogenes Laertius, tr. R. D. Hicks*

Lives, sayings and doctrines of the Greek philosophers, from Thales to Epicurus.

> Greek: ed. R. D. Hicks, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0004.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: R. D. Hicks, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0004.tlg001.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 21. Book VII · chapter 1 · 1.41–1.81

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/diogenes-laertius-lives/21/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/diogenes-laertius-lives/21/#p-N

[¶0] 1.41. Diogenes of Ptolemaïs, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions.

> Greek: 1.41. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πτολεμαεὺς Διογένης ἀπὸ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἄρχεται, ὁ δʼ Ἀπολλόδωρος δεύτερα τὰ ἠθικά, Παναίτιος δὲ καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἄρχονται, καθά φησι Φανίας ὁ Ποσειδωνίου γνώριμος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ποσειδωνείων σχολῶν. ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἓξ μέρη φησί, διαλεκτικόν, ῥητορικόν, ἠθικόν, πολιτικόν, φυσικόν, θεολογικόν. ἄλλοι δʼ οὐ τοῦ λόγου ταῦτα μέρη φασίν, ἀλλʼ αὐτῆς τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὡς Ζήνων ὁ Ταρσεύς. τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος φασὶν ἔνιοι εἰς δύο διαιρεῖσθαι ἐπιστήμας, εἰς ῥητορικὴν καὶ εἰς διαλεκτικήν. τινὲς δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὁρικὸν εἶδος, τὸ περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων· ἔνιοι δὲ τὸ ὁρικὸν περιαιροῦσι.

[¶1] 1.42. Now the part which deals with canons or criteria they admit as a means for the discovery of truth, since in the course of it they explain the different kinds of perceptions that we have. And similarly the part about definitions is accepted as a means of recognizing truth, inasmuch as things are apprehended by means of general notions. Further, by rhetoric they understand the science of speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative, and by dialectic that of correctly discussing subjects by question and answer; hence their alternative definition of it as the science of statements true, false, and neither true nor false. Rhetoric itself, they say, has three divisions: deliberative, forensic, and panegyric. Rhetoric according to them may be divided into invention of arguments, their expression in words, their arrangement, and delivery; and a rhetorical speech into introduction, narrative, replies to opponents, and peroration.

> Greek: 1.42. Τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων παραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὑρεῖν· ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ τὰς τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφορὰς ἀπευθύνουσι. καὶ τὸ ὁρικὸν δὲ ὁμοίως πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας· διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐννοιῶν τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται. τήν τε ῥητορικὴν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ εὖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τοῦ ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει λόγων· ὅθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ὁρίζονται, ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ῥητορικὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγουσι τριμερῆ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς εἶναι συμβουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ δικανικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐγκωμιαστικόν.

[¶2] 1.43. Dialectic (they hold) falls under two heads: subjects of discourse and language. And the subjects fall under the following headings: presentations and the various products to which they give rise, propositions enunciated and their constituent subjects and predicates, and similar terms whether direct or reversed, genera and species, arguments too, moods, syllogisms and fallacies whether due to the subject matter or to the language;

> Greek: 1.43. Εἶναι δʼ αὐτῆς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἴς τε τὴν εὕρεσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν φράσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν τάξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν λόγον εἴς τε τὸ προοίμιον καὶ εἰς τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους καὶ τὸν ἐπίλογον. Τὴν διαλεκτικὴν διαιρεῖσθαι εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον· καὶ τὸν μὲν τῶν σημαινομένων εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεκτῶν ἀξιωμάτων καὶ αὐτοτελῶν καὶ κατηγορημάτων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὀρθῶν καὶ ὑπτίων καὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λόγων καὶ τρόπων καὶ συλλογισμῶν καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὰ πράγματα σοφισμάτων·

[¶3] 1.44. these including both false and true and negative arguments, sorites and the like, whether defective, insoluble, or conclusive, and the fallacies known as the Veiled, or Horned, No man, and The Mowers. The second main head mentioned above as belonging to Dialectic is that of language, wherein are included written language and the parts of speech, with a discussion of errors in syntax and in single words, poetical diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music, and according to some writers chapters on terms, divisions, and style.

> Greek: 1.44. ὧν εἶναι ψευδομένους λόγους καὶ ἀληθεύοντας καὶ ἀποφάσκοντας σωρίτας τε καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τούτοις, ἐλλιπεῖς καὶ ἀπόρους καὶ περαίνοντας καὶ ἐγκεκαλυμμένους κερατίνας τε καὶ οὔτιδας καὶ θερίζοντας. Εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν προειρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ περὶ ὅρων κατά τινας καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων.

[¶4] 1.45. The study of syllogisms they declare to be of the greatest service, as showing us what is capable of yielding demonstration; and this contributes much to the formation of correct judgements, and their arrangement and retention in memory give a scientific character to our conception of things. An argument is in itself a whole containing premisses and conclusion, and an inference (or syllogism) is an inferential argument composed of these. Demonstration is an argument inferring by means of what is better apprehended something less clearly apprehended. A presentation (or mental impression) is an imprint on the soul: the name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax.

> Greek: 1.45. Εὐχρηστοτάτην δέ φασιν εἶναι τὴν περὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν θεωρίαν· τὸ γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὸν ἐμφαίνειν, ὅπερ συμβάλλεσθαι πολὺ πρὸς διόρθωσιν τῶν δογμάτων, καὶ τάξιν καὶ μνήμην τὸ ἐπιστατικὸν κατάλημμα ἐμφαίνειν. Εἶναι δὲ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν σύστημα ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς· τὸν δὲ συλλογισμὸν λόγον συλλογιστικὸν ἐκ τούτων· τὴν δʼ ἀπόδειξιν λόγον διὰ τῶν μᾶλλον καταλαμβανομένων τὸ ἧττον καταλαμβανόμενον περαίνοντα. Τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦ ὀνόματος οἰκείως μετενηνεγμένου ἀπὸ τῶν τύπων 〈τῶν〉 ἐν τῷ κηρῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου γινομένων.

[¶5] 1.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct. Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind’s assent to impressions. By wariness they mean a strong presumption against what at the moment seems probable, so as not to be taken in by it.

> Greek: 1.46. τῆς δὲ φαντασίας τὴν μὲν καταληπτικήν, τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον· καταληπτικὴν μέν, ἣν κριτήριον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων φασί, τὴν γινομένην ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην· ἀκατάληπτον δὲ τὴν μὴ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μέν, μὴ κατʼ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· τὴν μὴ τρανῆ μηδὲ ἔκτυπον. Αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐν εἴδει περιέχουσαν ἀρετάς· τήν τʼ ἀπροπτωσίαν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μή· τὴν δʼ ἀνεικαιότητα ἰσχυρὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε μὴ ἐνδιδόναι αὐτῷ·

[¶6] 1.47. Irrefutability is strength in argument so as not to be brought over by it to the opposite side. Earnestness (or absence of frivolity) is a habit of referring presentations to right reason. Knowledge itself they define either as unerring apprehension or as a habit or state which in reception of presentations cannot be shaken by argument. Without the study of dialectic, they say, the wise man cannot guard himself in argument so as never to fall; for it enables him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to discriminate what is merely plausible and what is ambiguously expressed, and without it he cannot methodically put questions and give answers.

> Greek: 1.47. τὴν δʼ ἀνελεγξίαν ἰσχὺν ἐν λόγῳ, ὥστε μὴ ἀπάγεσθαι ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον· τὴν δʼ ἀματαιότητα ἕξιν ἀναφέρουσαν τὰς φαντασίας ἐπὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. αὐτήν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἢ ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας τὸν σοφὸν ἄπτωτον ἔσεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ· τό τε γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος διαγινώσκεσθαι ὑπʼ αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν τό τʼ ἀμφιβόλως λεγόμενον διευκρινεῖσθαι· χωρίς τʼ αὐτῆς οὐκ εἶναι ὁδῷ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

[¶7] 1.48. Overhastiness in assertion affects the actual course of events, so that, unless we have our perceptions well trained, we are liable to fall into unseemly conduct and heedlessness; and in no other way will the wise man approve himself acute, nimblewitted, and generally skilful in argument; for it belongs to the same person to converse well and to argue well, to put questions to the purpose and to respond to the questions put; and all these qualifications are qualifications belonging to the skilled dialectician. Such is, summarily stated, the substance of their logical teaching. And in order to give it also in detail, let me now cite as much of it as comes within the scope of their introductory handbook. I will quote verbatim what Diocles the Magnesian says in his Synopsis of Philosophers. These are his words:

> Greek: 1.48. Διατείνειν δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ἀποφάσεσι προπέτειαν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ γινόμενα, ὥστʼ εἰς ἀκοσμίαν καὶ εἰκαιότητα τρέπεσθαι τοὺς ἀγυμνάστους ἔχοντας τὰς φαντασίας. οὐκ ἄλλως τʼ ὀξὺν καὶ ἀγχίνουν καὶ τὸ ὅλον δεινὸν ἐν λόγοις φανήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν· τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ εἶναι ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι καὶ διαλογίζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρός τε τὰ προκείμενα διαλεχθῆναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἅπερ ἐμπείρου διαλεκτικῆς ἀνδρὸς εἶναι. Ἐν οὖν τοῖς λογικοῖς ταῦτʼ αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ κεφαλαιωδῶς. καὶ ἵνα καὶ κατὰ μέρος εἴπωμεν καὶ τὰ ἅπερ αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν εἰσαγωγικὴν τείνει τέχνην, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπὶ λέξεως τίθησι Διοκλῆς ὁ Μάγνης ἐν τῇ Ἐπιδρομῇ τῶν φιλοσόφων, λέγων οὕτως·

[¶8] 1.49. ““The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation.””

> Greek: 1.49. “Ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὸν περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως προτάττειν λόγον, καθότι τὸ κριτήριον, ᾧ ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγμάτων γινώσκεται, κατὰ γένος φαντασία ἐστί, καὶ καθότι ὁ περὶ συγκαταθέσεως καὶ ὁ περὶ καταλήψεως καὶ νοήσεως λόγος, προάγων τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας συνίσταται. προηγεῖται γὰρ ἡ φαντασία, εἶθʼ ἡ διάνοια ἐκλαλητικὴ ὑπάρχουσα, ὃ πάσχει ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας, τοῦτο ἐκφέρει λόγῳ.

[¶9] 1.50. There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise Of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take “impression” in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object.

> Greek: 1.50. Διαφέρει δὲ φαντασία καὶ φάντασμα· φάντασμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι δόκησις διανοίας οἵα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, φαντασία δέ ἐστι τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ, τουτέστιν ἀλλοίωσις, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ Περὶ ψυχῆς ὑφίσταται. οὐ γὰρ δεκτέον τὴν τύπωσιν οἱονεὶ τύπον σφραγιστῆρος, ἐπεὶ ἀνένδεκτόν ἐστι πολλοὺς τύπους κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι. νοεῖται δὲ [ἡ] φαντασία ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατὰ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναποτετυπωμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος.

[¶10] 1.51. According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are not: the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by reason. Of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects. Another division of presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures, the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought, while those which are irrational have no name. Again, some of our impressions are scientific, others unscientific: at all events a statue is viewed in a totally different way by the trained eye of a sculptor and by an ordinary man.

> Greek: 1.51. Τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν κατʼ αὐτοὺς αἱ μέν εἰσιν αἰσθητικαί, αἱ δʼ οὔ· αἰσθητικαὶ μὲν αἱ διʼ αἰσθητηρίου ἢ αἰσθητηρίων λαμβανόμεναι, οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ δʼ αἱ διὰ τῆς διανοίας καθάπερ τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν λόγῳ λαμβανομένων. τῶν δὲ αἰσθητικῶν 〈αἱ μὲν〉 ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων μετʼ εἴξεως καὶ συγκαταθέσεως γίνονται. εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ ἐμφάσεις αἱ ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων γινόμεναι. Ἔτι τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι λογικαί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι· λογικαὶ μὲν αἱ τῶν λογικῶν ζῴων, ἄλογοι δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀλόγων. αἱ μὲν οὖν λογικαὶ νοήσεις εἰσίν, αἱ δʼ ἄλογοι οὐ τετυχήκασιν ὀνόματος. καὶ αἱ μέν εἰσι τεχνικαί, αἱ δὲ ἄτεχνοι· ἄλλως γοῦν θεωρεῖται ὑπὸ τεχνίτου εἰκὼν καὶ ἄλλως ὑπὸ ἀτέχνου.

[¶11] 1.52. The Stoics apply the term sense or sensation (αἴσθησις) to three things: (1) the current passing from the principal part of the soul to the senses, (2) apprehension by means of the senses, (3) the apparatus of the sense-organs, in which some persons are deficient. Moreover, the activity of the sense-organs is itself also called sensation. According to them it is by sense that we apprehend black and white, rough and smooth, whereas it is by reason that we apprehend the conclusions of demonstration, for instance the existence of gods and their providence. General notions, indeed, are gained in the following ways: some by direct contact, some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by composition, and some by contrariety.

> Greek: 1.52. Αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τό τʼ ἀφʼ ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διῆκον καὶ ἡ διʼ αὐτῶν κατάληψις καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθʼ ἥν τινες πηροὶ γίνονται. καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια δὲ αἴσθησις καλεῖται. ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατʼ αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων καὶ τραχέων καὶ λείων, λόγῳ δὲ τῶν διʼ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τοῦ θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους. τῶν γὰρ νοουμένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ περίπτωσιν ἐνοήθη, τὰ δὲ καθʼ ὁμοιότητα, τὰ δὲ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετάθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ σύνθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατʼ ἐναντίωσιν.

[¶12] 1.53. By incidence or direct contact have come our notions of sensible things; by resemblance notions whose origin is something before us, as the notion of Socrates which we get from his bust; while under notions derived from analogy come those which we get (1) by way of enlargement, like that of Tityos or the Cyclops, or (2) by way of diminution, like that of the Pygmy. And thus, too, the centre of the earth was originally conceived on the analogy of smaller spheres. Of notions obtained by transposition creatures with eyes on the chest would be an instance, while the centaur exemplifies those reached by composition, and death those due to contrariety. Furthermore, there are notions which imply a sort of transition to the realm of the imperceptible: such are those of space and of the meaning of terms. The notions of justice and goodness come by nature. Again, privation originates notions; for instance, that of the man without hands. Such are their tenets concerning presentation, sensation, and thought.

> Greek: 1.53. Κατὰ περίπτωσιν μὲν οὖν ἐνοήθη τὰ αἰσθητά· καθʼ ὁμοιότητα δὲ τὰ ἀπό τινος παρακειμένου, ὡς Σωκράτης ἀπὸ τῆς εἰκόνος· κατʼ ἀναλογίαν δὲ αὐξητικῶς μέν, ὡς ὁ Τιτυὸς καὶ Κύκλωψ· μειωτικῶς δέ, ὡς ὁ Πυγμαῖος. καὶ τὸ κέντρον δὲ τῆς γῆς κατʼ ἀναλογίαν ἐνοήθη ἀπὸ τῶν μικροτέρων σφαιρῶν. κατὰ μετάθεσιν δέ, οἷον ὀφθαλμοὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ στήθους· κατὰ σύνθεσιν δὲ ἐνοήθη Ἱπποκένταυρος· καὶ κατʼ ἐναντίωσιν θάνατος. νοεῖται δὲ καὶ κατὰ μετάβασίν τινα, ὡς τὰ λεκτὰ καὶ ὁ τόπος. φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν· καὶ κατὰ στέρησιν, οἷον ἄχειρ. τοιάδε τινὰ καὶ περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοήσεως δογματίζουσι.

[¶13] 1.54. The standard of truth they declare to be the apprehending presentation, i.e. that which comes from a real object—according to Chrysippus in the twelfth book of his Physics and to Antipater and Apollodorus. Boëthus, on the other hand, admits a plurality of standards, namely intelligence, senseperception, appetency, and knowledge; while Chrysippus in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine contradicts himself and declares that sensation and preconception are the only standards, preconception being a general notion which comes by the gift of nature (an innate conception of universals or general concepts). Again, certain others of the older Stoics make Right Reason the standard; so also does Posidonius in his treatise On the Standard.

> Greek: 1.54. Κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τυγχάνειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δυωδεκάτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βόηθος κριτήρια πλείονα ἀπολείπει, νοῦν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ ὄρεξιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην· ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ λόγου κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν· ἔστι δʼ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωικῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ κριτηρίου φησί.

[¶14] 1.55. In their theory of dialectic most of them see fit to take as their starting-point the topic of voice. Now voice is a percussion of the air or the proper object of the sense of hearing, as Diogenes the Babylonian says in his handbook On Voice. While the voice or cry of an animal is just a percussion of air brought about by natural impulse, man’s voice is articulate and, as Diogenes puts it, an utterance of reason, having the quality of coming to maturity at the age of fourteen. Furthermore, voice according to the Stoics is something corporeal: I may cite for this Archedemus in his treatise On Voice, Diogenes, Antipater and Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics.

> Greek: 1.55. Τῆς δὲ διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας συμφώνως δοκεῖ τοῖς πλείστοις ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ φωνῆς ἐνάρχεσθαι τόπου. ἔστι δὲ φωνὴ ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος ἢ τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς, ὥς φησι Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος ἐν τῇ Περὶ φωνῆς τέχνῃ. ζῴου μέν ἐστι φωνὴ ἀὴρ ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένος, ἀνθρώπου δʼ ἔστιν ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, ὡς ὁ Διογένης φησίν, ἥτις ἀπὸ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν τελειοῦται. καὶ σῶμα δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ φωνὴ κατὰ τοὺς Στωικούς, ὥς φησιν Ἀρχέδημός τʼ ἐν τῇ Περὶ φωνῆς καὶ Διογένης καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ τῶν Φυσικῶν.

[¶15] 1.56. For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect. Reduced to writing, what was voice becomes a verbal expression, as “day”; so says Diogenes. A statement or proposition is speech that issues from the mind and signifies something, e.g. “It is day.” Dialect (διάλεκτος ) means a variety of speech which is stamped on one part of the Greek world as distinct from another, or on the Greeks as distinct from other races; or, again, it means a form peculiar to some particular region, that is to say, it has a certain linguistic quality; e.g. in Attic the word for “sea” is not θάλασσα but θάλαττα, and in Ionic “day” is not ἡμέρα but ἡμέρη. Elements of language are the four-and-twenty letters. “Letter,” however, has three meanings: (1) the particular sound or element of speech; (2) its written symbol or character; (3) its name, as Alpha is the name of the sound A.

> Greek: 1.56. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι· ποιεῖ δὲ ἡ φωνὴ προσιοῦσα τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν φωνούντων. λέξις δέ ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Διογένης, φωνὴ ἐγγράμματος, οἷον Ἡμέρα. λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, οἷον Ἡμέρα ἐστί. διάλεκτος δέ ἐστι λέξις κεχαραγμένη ἐθνικῶς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς, ἢ λέξις ποταπή, τουτέστι ποιὰ κατὰ διάλεκτον, οἷον κατὰ μὲν τὴν Ἀτθίδα Θάλαττα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἰάδα Ἡμέρη. Τῆς δὲ λέξεως στοιχεῖά ἐστι τὰ εἰκοσιτέσσαρα γράμματα. τριχῶς δὲ λέγεται τὸ γράμμα, τό τε στοιχεῖον ὅ τε χαρακτὴρ τοῦ στοιχείου καὶ τὸ ὄνομα, οἷον Ἄλφα·

[¶16] 1.57. Seven of the letters are vowels, a, e, ē i, o, u, ō, and six are mutes, b, g, d, k, p, t. There is a difference between voice and speech; because, while voice may include mere noise, speech is always articulate. Speech again differs from a sentence or statement, because the latter always signifies something, whereas a spoken word, as for example βλίτυρι, may be unintelligible— which a sentence never is. And to frame a sentence is more than mere utterance, for while vocal sounds are uttered, things are meant, that is, are matters of discourse. There are, as stated by Diogenes in his treatise on Language and by Chrysippus, five parts of speech: proper name, common noun, verb, conjunction, article. To these Antipater in his work On Words and their Meaning adds another part, the “mean.”

> Greek: 1.57. φωνήεντα δέ ἐστι τῶν στοιχείων ἑπτά, α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω· ἄφωνα δὲ ἕξ, β, γ, δ, κ, π, τ. διαφέρει δὲ φωνὴ καὶ λέξις, ὅτι φωνὴ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἦχός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ τὸ ἔναρθρον μόνον. λέξις δὲ λόγου διαφέρει, ὅτι λόγος ἀεὶ σημαντικός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ καὶ ἄσημος, ὡς ἡ βλίτυρι, λόγος δὲ οὐδαμῶς. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν τοῦ προφέρεσθαι· προφέρονται μὲν γὰρ αἱ φωναί, λέγεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα, ἃ δὴ καὶ λεκτὰ τυγχάνει. Τοῦ δὲ λόγου ἐστὶ μέρη πέντε, ὥς φησι Διογένης τʼ ἐν τῷ Περὶ φωνῆς καὶ Χρύσιππος, ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον· ὁ δʼ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ τὴν μεσότητα τίθησιν ἐν τοῖς Περὶ λέξεως καὶ τῶν λεγομένων.

[¶17] 1.58. A common noun or appellative is defined by Diogenes as part of a sentence signifying a common quality, e.g. man, horse; whereas a name is a part of speech expressing a quality peculiar to an individual, e.g. Diogenes, Socrates. A verb is, according to Diogenes, a part of speech signifying an isolated predicate, or, as others define it, an un-declined part of a sentence, signifying something that can be attached to one or more subjects, e.g. “I write,” “I speak.” A conjunction is an indeclinable part of speech, binding the various parts of a statement together; and an article is a declinable part of speech, distinguishing the genders and numbers of nouns, e.g. ὁ, ἡ, τό, οἱ, αἱ, τά.

> Greek: 1.58. Ἔστι δὲ προσηγορία μὲν κατὰ τὸν Διογένην μέρος λόγου σημαῖνον κοινὴν ποιότητα, οἷον Ἄνθρωπος, Ἵππος· ὄνομα δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου δηλοῦν ἰδίαν ποιότητα, οἷον Διογένης, Σωκράτης· ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου σημαῖνον ἀσύνθετον κατηγόρημα, ὡς ὁ Διογένης, ἤ, ὥς τινες, στοιχεῖον λόγου ἄπτωτον, σημαῖνόν τι συντακτὸν περί τινος ἢ τινῶν, οἷον Γράφω, Λέγω· σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου ἄπτωτον, συνδοῦν τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου· ἄρθρον δέ ἐστι στοιχεῖον λόγου πτωτικόν, διορίζον τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, οἷον Ὁ, Ἡ, Τό, Οἱ, Αἱ, Τά.

[¶18] 1.59. There are five excellences of speech—pure Greek, lucidity, conciseness, appropriateness, distinction. By good Greek is meant language faultless in point of grammar and free from careless vulgarity. Lucidity is a style which presents the thought in a way easily understood; conciseness a style that employs no more words than are necessary for setting forth the subject in hand; appropriateness lies in a style akin to the subject; distinction in the avoidance of colloquialism. Among vices of style barbarism is violation of the usage of Greeks of good standing; while there is solecism when the sentence has an incongruous construction.

> Greek: 1.59. Ἀρεταὶ δὲ λόγου εἰσὶ πέντε, Ἑλληνισμός, σαφήνεια, συντομία, πρέπον, κατασκευή. Ἑλληνισμὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστι φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαίᾳ συνηθείᾳ· σαφήνεια δέ ἐστι λέξις γνωρίμως παριστῶσα τὸ νοούμενον· συντομία δέ ἐστι λέξις αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα περιέχουσα πρὸς δήλωσιν τοῦ πράγματος· πρέπον δέ ἐστι λέξις οἰκεία τῷ πράγματι· κατασκευὴ δέ ἐστι λέξις ἐκπεφευγυῖα τὸν ἰδιωτισμόν. ὁ δὲ βαρβαρισμὸς ἐκ τῶν κακιῶν λέξις ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων Ἑλλήνων, σολοικισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἀκαταλλήλως συντεταγμένος.

[¶19] 1.60. Posidonius in his treatise On Style defines a poetical phrase as one that is metrical or rhythmical, thus mechanically avoiding the character of prose; an example of such rhythmical phrase is: “O mightiest earth, O sky, God’s canopy.” And if such poetical phraseology is significant and includes a portrayal or representation of things human and divine, it is poetry. A term is, as stated by Antipater in his first book On Terms, a word which, when a sentence is analysed, is uttered with complete meaning; or, according to Chrysippus in his book On Definitions, is a rendering back one’s own. Delineation is a statement which brings one to a knowledge of the subject in outline, or it may be called a definition which embodies the force of the definition proper in a simpler form. Genus (in logic) is the comprehension in one of a number of inseparable objects of thought: e.g. Animal; for this includes all particular animals.

> Greek: 1.60. Ποίημα δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιός φησιν ἐν τῇ Περὶ λέξεως εἰσαγωγῇ, λέξις ἔμμετρος ἢ ἔνρυθμος μετὰ σκευῆς τὸ λογοειδὲς ἐκβεβηκυῖα· τὸ ἔνρυθμον δʼ εἶναι τό γαῖα μεγίστη καὶ Διὸς αἰθήρ. ποίησις δέ ἐστι σημαντικὸν ποίημα, μίμησιν περιέχον θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπείων. Ὅρος δέ ἐστιν, ὥς φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ὅρων, λόγος κατʼ ἀνάλυσιν ἀπαρτιζόντως ἐκφερόμενος, ἤ, ὡς Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὅρων, ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις. ὑπογραφὴ δέ ἐστι λόγος τυπωδῶς εἰσάγων εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἢ ὅρος ἁπλούστερον τὴν τοῦ ὅρου δύναμιν προσενηνεγμένος. γένος δέ ἐστὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἀναφαιρέτων ἐννοημάτων σύλληψις, οἷον Ζῷον· τοῦτο γὰρ περιείληφε τὰ κατὰ μέρος ζῷα.

[¶20] 1.61. A notion or object of thought is a presentation to the intellect, which though not really substance nor attribute is quasi-substance or quasi-attribute. Thus an image of a horse may rise before the mind, although there is no horse present. Species is that which is comprehended under genus: thus Man is included under Animal. The highest or most universal genus is that which, being itself a genus, has no genus above: namely, reality or the real; and the lowest and most particular species is that which, being itself a species, has no species below it, e.g. Socrates. Division of a genus means dissection of it into its proximate species, thus: Animals are either rational or irrational (dichotomy). Contrary division dissects the genus into species by contrary qualities: for example, by means of negation, as when all things that are are divided into good and not good. Subdivision is division applied to a previous division: for instance, after saying, “Of things that are some are good, some are not good,” we proceed, “and of the not good some are bad, some are neither good nor bad (morally indifferent).”

> Greek: 1.61. Ἐννόημα δέ ἐστι φάντασμα διανοίας, οὔτε τὶ ὂν οὔτε ποιόν, ὡσανεὶ δέ τι ὂν καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιόν, οἷον γίνεται ἀνατύπωμα ἵππου καὶ μὴ παρόντος. Εἶδος δέ ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους περιεχόμενον, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ζῴου ὁ ἄνθρωπος περιέχεται. γενικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὃ γένος ὂν γένος οὐκ ἔχει, οἷον τὸ ὄν· εἰδικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὃ εἶδος ὂν εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει, ὥσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης. Διαίρεσις δέ ἐστι γένους ἡ εἰς τὰ προσεχῆ εἴδη τομή, οἷον Τῶν ζῴων τὰ μέν ἐστι λογικά, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα. ἀντιδιαίρεσις δέ ἐστι γένους εἰς εἶδος τομὴ κατὰ τοὐναντίον, ὡς ἂν κατʼ ἀπόφασιν, οἷον Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δʼ οὐκ ἀγαθά. ὑποδιαίρεσις δέ ἐστι διαίρεσις ἐπὶ διαιρέσει, οἷον Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δʼ οὐκ ἀγαθά, καὶ Τῶν οὐκ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι κακά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα.

[¶21] 1.62. Partition in logic is (according to Crinis) classification or distribution of a genus under heads: for instance, Of goods some are mental, others bodily. Verbal ambiguity arises when a word properly, rightfully, and in accordance with fixed usage denotes two or more different things, so that at one and the same time we may take it in several distinct senses: e.g. in Greek, where by the same verbal expression may be meant in the one case that “A house has three times” fallen, in the other that “a dancing-girl” has fallen. Posidonius defines Dialectic as the science dealing with truth, falsehood, and that which is neither true nor false; whereas Chrysippus takes its subject to be signs and things signified. Such then is the gist of what the Stoics say in their theory of language.

> Greek: 1.62. Μερισμὸς δέ ἐστι γένους εἰς τόπους κατάταξις, ὡς ὁ Κρῖνις· οἷον Τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα. Ἀμφιβολία δέ ἐστι λέξις δύο ἢ καὶ πλείονα πράγματα σημαίνουσα λεκτικῶς καὶ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔθος, ὥσθʼ ἅμα τὰ πλείονα ἐκδέξασθαι κατὰ ταύτην τὴν λέξιν· οἷον Αὐλητρὶς πέπτωκε· δηλοῦνται γὰρ διʼ αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον, Οἰκία τρὶς πέπτωκε, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον, Αὐλήτρια πέπτωκε. Διαλεκτικὴ δέ ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Ποσειδώνιος, ἐπιστήμη ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων· τυγχάνει δʼ αὕτη, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησι, περὶ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ περὶ φωνῆς θεωρίᾳ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τοῖς Στωικοῖς.

[¶22] 1.63. To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed. By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. Of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. “writes,” for we inquire “Who?” Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as “Socrates writes.” And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries.

> Greek: 1.63. Ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν σημαινομένων τόπῳ τέτακται ὁ περὶ λεκτῶν καὶ αὐτοτελῶν καὶ ἀξιωμάτων καὶ συλλογισμῶν λόγος καὶ ὁ περὶ ἐλλιπῶν τε καὶ κατηγορημάτων καὶ ὀρθῶν καὶ ὑπτίων. Φασὶ δὲ [τὸ] λεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν λέγουσιν εἶναι αὐτοτελῆ οἱ Στωικοί, τὰ δʼ ἐλλιπῆ. ἐλλιπῆ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ ἀναπάρτιστον ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφοράν, οἷον Γράφει· ἐπιζητοῦμεν γάρ, Τίς; αὐτοτελῆ δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπηρτισμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφοράν, οἷον Γράφει Σωκράτης. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἐλλιπέσι λεκτοῖς τέτακται τὰ κατηγορήματα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς αὐτοτελέσι τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ οἱ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐρωτήματα καὶ τὰ πύσματα.

[¶23] 1.64. A predicate is, according to the followers of Apollodorus, what is said of something; in other words, a thing associated with one or more subjects; or, again, it may be defined as a defective expression which has to be joined on to a nominative case in order to yield a judgement. Of predicates some are adjectival [and so have personal subjects], as e.g. “to sail through rocks.” Again, some predicates are direct, some reversed, some neither. Now direct predicates are those that are constructed with one of the oblique cases, as “hears,” “sees,” “converses”; while reversed are those constructed with the passive voice, as “I am heard,” “I am seen.” Neutral are such as correspond to neither of these, as “thinks,” “walks.” Reflexive predicates are those among the passive, which, although in form passive, are yet active operations,:

> Greek: 1.64. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ κατηγόρημα τὸ κατά τινος ἀγορευόμενον ἢ πρᾶγμα συντακτὸν περί τινος ἢ τινῶν, ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἀπολλόδωρόν φασιν, ἢ λεκτὸν ἐλλιπὲς συντακτὸν ὀρθῇ πτώσει πρὸς ἀξιώματος γένεσιν. τῶν δὲ κατηγορημάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι συμβάματα, οἷον τὸ διὰ πέτρας πλεῖν.· καὶ τὰ μέν ἐστι τῶν κατηγορημάτων ὀρθά, ἃ δʼ ὕπτια, ἃ δʼ οὐδέτερα. ὀρθὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ συντασσόμενα μιᾷ τῶν πλαγίων πτώσεων πρὸς κατηγορήματος γένεσιν, οἷον Ἀκούει, Ὁρᾷ, Διαλέγεται· ὕπτια δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ συντασσόμενα τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ, οἷον Ἀκούομαι, Ὁρῶμαι· οὐδέτερα δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ μηδετέρως ἔχοντα, οἷον Φρονεῖ, Περιπατεῖ. ἀντιπεπονθότα δέ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς ὑπτίοις, ἃ ὕπτια ὄντα ἐνεργήματα [δέ] ἐστιν, οἷον Κείρεται·

[¶24] 1.65. for here the agent includes himself in the sphere of his action. The oblique cases are genitive, dative, and accusative. A judgement is that which is either true or false, or a thing complete in itself, capable of being denied in and by itself, as Chrysippus says in his Dialectical Definitions: “A judgement is that which in and by itself can be denied or affirmed, e.g. ‘It is day,’ ‘Dion is walking.’” The Greek word for judgement (ἀξίωμα ) is derived from the verb ἀξιοῦν, as signifying acceptance or rejection; for when you say “It is day,” you seem to accept the fact that it is day. Now, if it really is day, the judgement before us is true, but if not, it is false.

> Greek: 1.65. ἐμπεριέχει γὰρ ἑαυτὸν ὁ κειρόμενος. πλάγιαι δὲ πτώσεις εἰσὶ γενικὴ καὶ δοτικὴ καὶ αἰτιατική. Ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος· ἢ πρᾶγμα αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφʼ ἑαυτῷ, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησιν ἐν τοῖς Διαλεκτικοῖς ὅροις ἀξίωμά ἐστι τὸ ἀποφαντὸν ἢ καταφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφʼ ἑαυτῷ, οἷον Ἡμέρα ἐστί, Δίων περιπατεῖ. ὠνόμασται δὲ τὸ ἀξίωμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀξιοῦσθαι ἢ ἀθετεῖσθαι· ὁ γὰρ λέγων Ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ἀξιοῦν δοκεῖ τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι. οὔσης μὲν οὖν ἡμέρας, ἀληθὲς γίνεται τὸ προκείμενον ἀξίωμα· μὴ οὔσης δέ, ψεῦδος.

[¶25] 1.66. There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true: an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. “Is it day?” and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus “It is day” is a judgement; “Is it day?” an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation; but you must express the answer in words, “He lives in this or that place.”

> Greek: 1.66. διαφέρει δʼ ἀξίωμα καὶ ἐρώτημα καὶ πύσμα 〈καὶ〉 προστακτικὸν καὶ ὁρκικὸν καὶ ἀρατικὸν καὶ ὑποθετικὸν καὶ προσαγορευτικὸν καὶ πρᾶγμα ὅμοιον ἀξιώματι. ἀξίωμα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὃ λέγοντες ἀποφαινόμεθα, ὅπερ ἢ ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ ψεῦδος. ἐρώτημα δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα αὐτοτελὲς μέν, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα, αἰτητικὸν δὲ ἀποκρίσεως, οἷον ἆρά γʼ ἡμέρα ἐστί; τοῦτο δʼ οὔτε ἀληθές ἐστιν οὔτε ψεῦδος, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἡμέρα ἐστίν ἀξίωμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἆρά γʼ ἡμέρα ἐστίν; ἐρώτημα. πύσμα δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα πρὸς ὃ συμβολικῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐρωτήματος, Ναί, ἀλλὰ δεῖ εἰπεῖν οἰκεῖ ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ.

[¶26] 1.67. An imperative is something which conveys a command: e.g. “Go thou to the waters of Inachus.” An adjurative utterance is something... A vocative utterance is something the use of which implies that you are addressing some one; for instance: “Most glorious son of Atreus, Agamemnon, lord of men.” A quasi-proposition is that which, having the enunciation of a judgement, yet in consequence of the intensified tone or emotion of one of its parts falls outside the class of judgements proper, e.g.
Yea, fair indeed the Parthenon!
How like to Priam’s sons the cowherd is!

> Greek: 1.67. Προστακτικὸν δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα ὃ λέγοντες προστάσσομεν, οἷον, σὺ μὲν βάδιζε τὰς ἐπʼ Ἰνάχου ῥοάς. ὁρκικὸν δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα * * 〈προσαγορευτικὸν〉 δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα ὃ εἰ λέγοι τις, προσαγορεύοι ἄν, οἷον, Ἀτρείδη κύδιστε, ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον. ὅμοιον δʼ ἐστὶν ἀξιώματι ὃ τὴν ἐκφορὰν ἔχον ἀξιωματικὴν παρά τινος μορίου πλεονασμὸν ἢ πάθος ἔξω πίπτει τοῦ γένους τῶν ἀξιωμάτων, οἷον, καλός γʼ ὁ παρθενών. ὡς Πριαμίδῃσιν ἐμφερὴς ὁ βουκόλος.

[¶27] 1.68. There is also, differing from a proposition or judgement, what may be called a timid suggestion, the expression of which leaves one at a loss, e.g. “Can it be that pain and life are in some sort akin?” Interrogations, inquiries and the like are neither true nor false, whereas judgements (or propositions) are always either true or false. The followers of Chrysippus, Archedemus, Athenodorus, Antipater and Crinis divide propositions into simple and not simple. Simple are those that consist of one or more propositions which are not ambiguous, as “It is day.” Not simple are those that consist of one or more ambiguous propositions.

> Greek: 1.68. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπαπορητικόν τι πρᾶγμα διενηνοχὸς ἀξιώματος, ὃ εἰ λέγοι τις, ἀποροίη ἄν· ἆρʼ ἔστι συγγενές τι λύπη καὶ βίος; οὔτε δʼ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν οὔτε ψευδῆ τὰ ἐρωτήματα καὶ τὰ πύσματα καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια, τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ἢ ἀληθῶν ἢ ψευδῶν ὄντων. Τῶν ἀξιωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἁπλᾶ, τὰ δʼ οὐχ ἁπλᾶ, ὥς φασιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Κρῖνιν. ἁπλᾶ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ συνεστῶτα ἐξ ἀξιώματος μὴ διαφορουμένου [ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων], οἷον τὸ ἡμέρα ἐστίν· οὐχ ἁπλᾶ δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ συνεστῶτʼ ἐξ ἀξιώματος διαφορουμένου ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων ἐξ ἀξιώματος μὲν διαφορουμένου, οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, 〈ἡμέρα ἐστίν〉·

[¶28] 1.69. They may, that is, consist either of a single ambiguous proposition, e.g. “If it is day, it is day,” or of more than one proposition, e.g. “If it is day, it is light.” With simple propositions are classed those of negation, denial, privation, affirmation, the definitive and the indefinitive; with those that are not simple the hypothetical, the inferential, the coupled or complex, the disjunctive, the causal, and that which indicates more or less. An example of a negative proposition is “It is not day.” Of the negative proposition one species is the double negative. By double negative is meant the negation of a negation, e.g. “It is not not-day.” Now this presupposes that it is day.

> Greek: 1.69. ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων δέ, οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἁπλοῖς ἀξιώμασίν ἐστι τὸ ἀποφατικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀρνητικὸν καὶ τὸ στερητικὸν καὶ τὸ κατηγορικὸν καὶ τὸ καταγορευτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐχ ἁπλοῖς 〈ἀξιώμασι〉 τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὸ παρασυνημμένον καὶ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον καὶ τὸ διεζευγμένον καὶ τὸ αἰτιῶδες καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. * * καὶ ἀποφατικὸν μὲν οἷον οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἐστίν. εἶδος δὲ τούτου τὸ ὑπεραποφατικόν. ὑπεραποφατικὸν δʼ ἐστὶν ἀποφατικὸν ἀποφατικοῦ, οἷον οὐχὶ ἡμέρα οὐκ ἔστι· τίθησι δὲ τὸ ἡμέρα ἐστίν.

[¶29] 1.70. A denial contains a negative part or particle and a predication: such as this, “No one is walking.” A privative proposition is one that contains a privative particle reversing the effect of a judgement, as, for example, “This man is unkind.” An affirmative or assertory proposition is one that consists of a noun in the nominative case and a predicate, as “Dion is walking.” A definitive proposition is one that consists of a demonstrative in the nominative case and a predicate, as “This man is walking.” An indefinitive proposition is one that consists of an indefinite word or words and a predicate, e.g. “Some one is walking,” or “There’s some one walking”; “He is in motion.”

> Greek: 1.70. Ἀρνητικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐξ ἀρνητικοῦ μορίου καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον οὐδεὶς περιπατεῖ· στερητικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ στερητικοῦ μορίου καὶ ἀξιώματος κατὰ δύναμιν, οἷον ἀφιλάνθρωπός ἐστιν οὗτος· κατηγορικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ πτώσεως ὀρθῆς καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον Δίων περιπατει· καταγορευτικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ πτώσεως ὀρθῆς δεικτικῆς καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον οὗτος περιπατεῖ· ἀόριστον δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐξ ἀορίστου μορίου ἢ ἀορίστων μορίων καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον τὶς περιπατεῖ, ἐκεῖνος κινεῖται.

[¶30] 1.71. Of propositions that are not simple the hypothetical, according to Chrysippus in his Dialectics and Diogenes in his Art of Dialectic, is one that is formed by means of the conditional conjunction “If.” Now this conjunction promises that the second of two things follows consequentially upon the first, as, for instance, “If it is day, it is light.” An inferential proposition according to Crinis in his Art of Dialectic is one which is introduced by the conjunction “Since” and consists of an initial proposition and a conclusion; for example, “Since it is day-time, it is light.” This conjunction guarantees both that the second thing follows from the first and that the first is really a fact.

> Greek: 1.71. Τῶν δʼ οὐχ ἁπλῶν ἀξιωμάτων συνημμένον μέν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν ταῖς Διαλεκτικαῖς φησι καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ, τὸ συνεστὸς διὰ τοῦ εἰ συναπτικοῦ συνδέσμου. ἐπαγγέλλεται δʼ ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πρώτῳ, οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι. παρασυνημμένον δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ Κρῖνίς φησιν ἐν τῇ Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ, ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπεί συνδέσμου παρασυνῆπται ἀρχόμενον ἀπʼ ἀξιώματος καὶ λῆγον εἰς ἀξίωμα, οἷον ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν. ἐπαγγέλλεται δʼ ὁ σύνδεσμος ἀκολουθεῖν τε τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὑφεστάναι.

[¶31] 1.72. A coupled proposition is one which is put together by certain coupling conjunctions, e.g. “It is day-time and it is light.” A disjunctive proposition is one which is constituted such by the disjunctive conjunction “Either,” as e.g. “Either it is day or it is night.” This conjunction guarantees that one or other of the alternatives is false. A causal proposition is constructed by means of the conjunction “Because,” e.g. “Because it is day, it is light.” For the first clause is, as it were, the cause of the second. A proposition which indicates more or less is one that is formed by the word signifying “rather” and the word “than” in between the clauses, as, for example, “It is rather day-time than night.”

> Greek: 1.72. συμπεπλεγμένον δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπό τινων συμπλεκτικῶν συνδέσμων συμπέπλεκται, οἷον καὶ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ φῶς ἐστι. διεζευγμένον δέ ἐστιν ὃ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἤτοι διαζευκτικοῦ συνδέσμου διέζευκται, οἷον ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστιν. ἐπαγγέλλεται δʼ ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ψεῦδος εἶναι. αἰτιῶδες δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ συντασσόμενον διὰ τοῦ διότι, οἷον διότι ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν· οἱονεὶ γὰρ αἴτιόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δευτέρου. διασαφοῦν δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀξίωμά ἐστι τὸ συνταττόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ διασαφοῦντος τὸ μᾶλλον συνδέσμου καὶ τοῦ 〈ἢ〉 μέσου τῶν ἀξιωμάτων τασσομένου, οἷον μᾶλλον ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστι.

[¶32] 1.73. Opposite in character to the foregoing is a proposition which declares what is less the fact, as e.g. “It is less or not so much night as day.” Further, among propositions there are some which in respect of truth and falsehood stand opposed to one another, of which the one is the negative of the other, as e.g. the propositions “It is day” and “It is not day.” A hypothetical proposition is therefore true, if the contradictory of its conclusion is incompatible with its premiss, e.g. “If it is day, it is light.” This is true. For the statement “It is not light,” contradicting the conclusion, is incompatible with the premiss “It is day.” On the other hand, a hypothetical proposition is false, if the contradictory of its conclusion does not conflict with the premiss, e.g. “If it is day, Dion is walking.” For the statement “Dion is not walking” does not conflict with the premiss “It is day.”

> Greek: 1.73. διασαφοῦν δὲ τὸ ἧττον ἀξίωμά ἐστι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ προκειμένῳ, οἷον ἧττον νύξ ἐστιν ἢ ἡμέρα ἐστίν. ἔτι τῶν ἀξιωμάτων κατά τʼ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ψεῦδος ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ὧν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐστὶν ἀποφατικόν, οἷον τὸ ἡμέρα ἐστί καὶ τὸ οὐχ ἡμέρα ἐστί. συνημμένον οὖν ἀληθές ἐστιν οὗ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λήγοντος μάχεται τῷ ἡγουμένῳ, οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι. τοῦτʼ ἀληθές ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ οὐχὶ φῶς, ἀντικείμενον τῷ λήγοντι, μάχεται τῷ ἡμέρα ἐστί. συνημμένον δὲ ψεῦδός ἐστιν οὗ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λήγοντος οὐ μάχεται τῷ ἡγουμένῳ, οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, Δίων περιπατεῖ· τὸ γὰρ οὐχὶ Δίων περιπατεῖ οὐ μάχεται τῷ ἡμέρα ἐστί.

[¶33] 1.74. An inferential proposition is true if starting from a true premiss it also has a consequent conclusion, as e.g. “Since it is day, the sun is above the horizon.” But it is false if it starts from a false premiss or has an inconsequent conclusion, as e.g. “Since it is night, Dion is walking,” if this be said in day-time. A causal proposition is true if its conclusion really follows from a premiss itself true, though the premiss does not follow conversely from the conclusion, as e.g. “Because it is day, it is light,” where from the “it is day” the “it is light” duly follows, though from the statement “it is light” it would not follow that “it is day.” But a causal proposition is false if it either starts from a false premiss or has an inconsequent conclusion or has a premiss that does not correspond with the conclusion, as e.g. “Because it is night, Dion is walking.”

> Greek: 1.74. Παρασυνημμένον δʼ ἀληθὲς μέν ἐστιν ὃ ἀρχόμενον ἀπʼ ἀληθοῦς εἰς ἀκόλουθον λήγει, οἷον ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ἥλιός ἐστιν ὑπὲρ γῆς. ψεῦδος δʼ 〈ὃ〉 ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἄρχεται ἢ μὴ εἰς ἀκόλουθον λήγει, οἷον ἐπεὶ νύξ ἐστι, Δίων περιπατεῖ, ἂν ἡμέρας οὔσης λέγηται. αἰτιῶδες δʼ ἀληθὲς μέν ἐστιν ὃ ἀρχόμενον ἀπʼ ἀληθοῦς εἰς ἀκόλουθον λήγει, οὐ μὴν ἔχει τῷ λήγοντι τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἀκόλουθον, οἷον διότι ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρα ἐστίν ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ φῶς ἐστι, τῷ δὲ φῶς ἐστιν οὐχ ἕπεται τὸ ἡμέρα ἐστίν. αἰτιῶδες δὲ ψεῦδός ἐστιν ὃ ἤτοι ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἄρχεται ἢ μὴ εἰς ἀκόλουθον λήγει ἢ ἔχει τῷ λήγοντι τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἀνακόλουθον, οἷον διότι νύξ ἐστι, Δίων περιπατεῖ.

[¶34] 1.75. A probable judgement is one which induces to assent, e.g. “Whoever gave birth to anything, is that thing’s mother.” This, however, is not necessarily true; for the hen is not mother of an egg. Again, some things are possible, others impossible; and some things are necessary, others are not necessary. A proposition is possible which admits of being true, there being nothing in external circumstances to prevent it being true, e.g. “Diocles is alive.” Impossible is one which does not admit of being true, as e.g. “The earth flies.” That is necessary which besides being true does not admit of being false or, while it may admit of being false, is prevented from being false by circumstances external to itself, as “Virtue is beneficial.” Not necessary is that which, while true, yet is capable of being false if there are no external conditions to prevent, e.g. “Dion is walking.”

> Greek: 1.75. πιθανὸν δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ ἄγον εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, οἷον εἴ τίς τι ἔτεκεν, ἐκείνη ἐκείνου μήτηρ ἐστί. ψεῦδος δὲ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὄρνις ᾠοῦ ἐστι μήτηρ. Ἔτι τε τὰ μέν ἐστι δυνατά, τὰ δʼ ἀδύνατα· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα, τὰ δʼ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα. δυνατὸν μὲν τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐναντιουμένων πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, οἷον ζῇ Διοκλῆς· ἀδύνατον δὲ ὃ μή ἐστιν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, οἷον ἡ γῆ ἵπταται. ἀναγκαῖον δέ ἐστιν ὅπερ ἀληθὲς ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ψεῦδος εἶναι, ἢ ἐπιδεκτικὸν μέν ἐστι, τὰ δʼ ἐκτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντιοῦται πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος εἶναι, οἷον ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ. οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δέ ἐστιν ὃ καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν καὶ ψεῦδος οἷόν τε εἶναι, τῶν ἐκτὸς μηδὲν ἐναντιουμένων, οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖ Δίων.

[¶35] 1.76. A reasonable proposition is one which has to start with more chances of being true than not, e.g. “I shall be alive to-morrow.” And there are other shades of difference in propositions and grades of transition from true to false— and conversions of their terms—which we now go on to describe broadly. An argument, according to the followers of Crinis, consists of a major premiss, a minor premiss, and a conclusion, such as for example this: “If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore it is light.” Here the sentence “If it is day, it is light” is the major premiss, the clause “it is day” is the minor premiss, and “therefore it is light” is the conclusion. A mood is a sort of outline of an argument, like the following: “If the first, then the second; but the first is, therefore the second is.”

> Greek: 1.76. εὔλογον δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ πλείονας ἀφορμὰς ἔχον εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, οἷον βιώσομαι αὔριον. Καὶ ἄλλαι δέ εἰσι διαφοραὶ ἀξιωμάτων καὶ μεταπτώσεις αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀληθῶν εἰς ψεύδη καὶ ἀντιστροφαί, περὶ ὧν ἐν τῷ πλάτει λέγομεν. Λόγος δέ ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Κρῖνίν φασι, τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐκ λήμματος καὶ προσλήψεως καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος, εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστι· φῶς ἄρα ἐστί. λῆμμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστι, φῶς ἐστι· πρόσληψις τὸ ἡμέρα δέ ἐστιν· ἐπιφορὰ δὲ τὸ φῶς ἄρα ἐστί. τρόπος δέ ἐστιν οἱονεὶ σχῆμα λόγου, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον.

[¶36] 1.77. Symbolical argument is a combination of full argument and mood; e.g. “If Plato is alive, he breathes; but the first is true, therefore the second is true.” This mode of argument was introduced in order that when dealing with long complex arguments we should not have to repeat the minor premiss, if it be long, and then state the conclusion, but may arrive at the conclusion as concisely as possible: if A, then B. Of arguments some are conclusive, others inconclusive. Inconclusive are such that the contradictory of the conclusion is not incompatible with combination of the premisses, as in the following: “If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore Dion walks.”

> Greek: 1.77. Λογότροπος δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων σύνθετον, οἷον εἰ ζῇ Πλάτων, ἀναπνεῖ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. παρεισήχθη δὲ ὁ λογότροπος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς μακροτέραις συντάξεσι τῶν λόγων μηκέτι τὴν πρόσληψιν μακρὰν οὖσαν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ συντόμως ἐπενεγκεῖν, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. Τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ μέν εἰσιν ἀπέραντοι, οἱ δὲ περαντικοί. ἀπέραντοι μὲν ὧν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς οὐ μάχεται τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῇ, οἷον οἱ τοιοῦτοι, εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστι· περιπατεῖ ἄρα Δίων.

[¶37] 1.78. Of conclusive some are denoted by the common name of the whole class, “conclusive proper,” others are called syllogistic. The syllogistic are such as either do not admit of, or are reducible to such as do not admit of, immediate proof in respect of one or more of the premisses; e.g. “If Dion walks, then Dion is in motion; but Dion is walking, therefore Dion is in motion.” Conclusive specifically are those which draw conclusions, but not by syllogism; e.g. the statement “It is both day and night” is false: “now it is day; therefore it is not night.” Arguments not syllogistic are those which plausibly resemble syllogistic arguments, but are not cogent proof; e.g. “If Dion is a horse, he is an animal; but Dion is not a horse, therefore he is not an animal.”

> Greek: 1.78. Τῶν δὲ περαντικῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν ὁμωνύμως τῷ γένει λέγονται περαντικοί· οἱ δὲ συλλογιστικοί. συλλογιστικοὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν οἱ ἤτοι ἀναπόδεικτοι ὄντες ἢ ἀναγόμενοι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους κατά τι τῶν θεμάτων ἤ τινα, οἷον οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἰ περιπατεῖ Δίων, 〈κινεῖται Δίων· ἀλλὰ μὴν περιπατεῖ Δίων〉· κινεῖται ἄρα Δίων. περαντικοὶ δέ εἰσιν εἰδικῶς οἱ συνάγοντες μὴ συλλογιστικῶς, οἷον οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ νύξ ἐστι· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστιν· οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἐστιν. ἀσυλλόγιστοι δʼ εἰσὶν οἱ παρακείμενοι μὲν πιθανῶς τοῖς συλλογιστικοῖς, οὐ συνάγοντες δέ, οἷον εἰ ἵππος ἐστὶ Δίων, ζῷόν ἐστι Δίων· 〈ἀλλὰ μὴν ἵππος οὐκ ἔστι Δίων〉· οὐκ ἄρα ζῷόν ἐστι Δίων.

[¶38] 1.79. Further, arguments may be divided into true and false. The former draw their conclusions by means of true premisses; e.g. “If virtue does good, vice does harm; but virtue does good, therefore vice does harm.” Those are false which have error in the premisses or are inconclusive; e.g. “If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore Dion is alive.” Arguments may also be divided into possible and impossible, necessary and not necessary. Further, there are statements which are indemonstrable because they do not need demonstration; they are employed in the construction of every argument. As to the number of these, authorities differ; Chrysippus makes them five. These are assumed alike in reasoning specifically conclusive and in syllogisms both categorical and hypothetical.

> Greek: 1.79. Ἔτι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς. ἀληθεῖς μὲν οὖν εἰσι λόγοι οἱ διʼ ἀληθῶν συνάγοντες, οἷον εἰ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ, ἡ κακία βλάπτει· 〈ἀλλὰ μὴν ὠφελεῖ ἡ ἀρετή· ἡ κακία ἄρα βλάπτει〉. ψευδεῖς δέ εἰσιν οἱ τῶν λημμάτων ἔχοντές τι ψεῦδος ἢ ἀπέραντοι ὄντες, οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστι· ζῇ ἄρα Δίων. καὶ δυνατοὶ δʼ εἰσὶ λόγοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καὶ ἀναγκαῖοι καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖοι· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἀναπόδεικτοί τινες, τῷ μὴ χρῄζειν ἀποδείξεως, ἄλλοι μὲν παρʼ ἄλλοις, παρὰ δὲ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ πέντε, διʼ ὧν πᾶς λόγος πλέκεται· οἵτινες λαμβάνονται ἐπὶ τῶν περαντικῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τροπικῶν.

[¶39] 1.80. The first kind of indemonstrable statement is that in which the whole argument is constructed of a hypothetical proposition and the clause with which the hypothetical proposition begins, while the final clause is the conclusion; as e.g. “If the first, then the second; but the first is, therefore the second is.” The second is that which employs a hypothetical proposition and the contradictory of the consequent, while the conclusion is the contradictory of the antecedent; e.g. “If it is day, it is light; but it is night, therefore it is not day.” Here the minor premiss is the contradictory of the consequent; the conclusion the contradictory of the antecedent. The third kind of indemonstrable employs a conjunction of negative propositions for major premiss and one of the conjoined propositions for minor premiss, concluding thence the contradictory of the remaining proposition; e.g. “It is not the case that Plato is both dead and alive; but he is dead, therefore Plato is not alive.”

> Greek: 1.80. πρῶτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ἐν ᾧ πᾶς λόγος συντάσσεται ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου, ἀφʼ οὗ ἄρχεται τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὸ λῆγον ἐπιφέρει, οἷον εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. δεύτερος δʼ ἐστὶν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ διὰ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου ἔχων συμπέρασμα, οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἐστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἐστίν. ἡ γὰρ πρόσληψις γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ λήγοντι καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ ἡγουμένῳ. τρίτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ διʼ ἀποφατικῆς συμπλοκῆς καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ ἐπιφέρων τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ, οἷον οὐχὶ τέθνηκε Πλάτων καὶ ζῇ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τέθνηκε Πλάτων· οὐκ ἄρα ζῇ Πλάτων.

[¶40] 1.81. The fourth kind employs a disjunctive proposition and one of the two alternatives in the disjunction as premisses, and its conclusion is the contradictory of the other alternative; e.g. “Either A or B; but A is, therefore B is not.” The fifth kind is that in which the argument as a whole is constructed of a disjunctive proposition and the contradictory of one of the alternatives in the disjunction, its conclusion being the other alternative; e.g. “Either it is day or it is night; but it is not night, therefore it is day.” From a truth a truth follows, according to the Stoics, as e.g. “It is light” from “It is day”; and from a falsehood a falsehood, as “It is dark” from “It is night,” if this latter be untrue. Also a truth may follow from a falsehood; e.g. from “The earth flies” will follow “The earth exists”; whereas from a truth no falsehood will follow, for from the existence of the earth it does not follow that the earth flies aloft.

> Greek: 1.81. τέταρτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ διὰ διεζευγμένου καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν ἐν τῷ διεζευγμένῳ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ ἔχων συμπέρασμα, οἷον ἤτοι τὸ πρῶτον ἢ τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον. πέμπτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ἐν ᾧ πᾶς λόγος συντάσσεται ἐκ διεζευγμένου καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν ἐν τῷ διεζευγμένῳ ἀντικειμένων καὶ ἐπιφέρει τὸ λοιπόν, οἷον ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ νύξ ἐστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἐστίν. Ἐπʼ ἀληθεῖδʼ ἀληθὲς ἕπεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικούς, ὡς τῷ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ τὸ φῶς ἐστι· καὶ ψεύδει ψεῦδος, ὡς τῷ νύξ ἐστι ψεύδει τὸ σκότος ἐστί· καὶ ψεύδει ἀληθές, ὡς τῷ ἵπτασθαι τὴν γῆν τὸ εἶναι τὴν γῆν. ἀληθεῖ μέντοι ψεῦδος οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ· τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὴν γῆν τὸ πέτεσθαι τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ.