1.82. There are also certain insoluble arguments: the Veiled Men, the Concealed, Sorites, Horned Folk, the Nobodies. The Veiled is as follows:... “It cannot be that if two is few, three is not so likewise, nor that if two or three are few, four is not so; and so on up to ten. But two is few, therefore so also is ten.”... The Nobody argument is an argument whose major premiss consists of an indefinite and a definite clause, followed by a minor premiss and conclusion; for example, “If anyone is here, he is not in Rhodes; but there is some one here, therefore there is not anyone in Rhodes.”...
1.82. Καὶ ἄποροι δέ τινές εἰσι λόγοι ἐγκεκαλυμμένοι καὶ διαλεληθότες καὶ σωρῖται καὶ κερατίναι καὶ οὔτιδες. ἔστι δὲ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος * * οὐχὶ τὰ μὲν δύο ὀλίγα ἐστίν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τρία, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα μέν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τέσσαρα καὶ οὕτω μέχρι τῶν δέκα· τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα ἐστί· καὶ τὰ δέκα ἄρα. * * οὔτις δέ ἐστι λόγος συνακτικὸς ἐξ ἀορίστου καὶ ὡρισμένου συνεστώς, πρόσληψιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιφορὰν ἔχων, οἷον εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνος ἐν Ῥόδῳ 〈ἀλλὰ μήν ἐστί τις ἐνταῦθα· οὐκ ἄρα τίς ἐστιν ἐν Ῥόδῳ〉. * * Καὶ τοιοῦτοι μὲν ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς οἱ Στωικοί, ἵνα μάλιστα κρατύνωσι διαλεκτικὸν μόνον εἶναι τὸν σοφόν·
1.83. Such, then, is the logic of the Stoics, by which they seek to establish their point that the wise man is the true dialectician. For all things, they say, are discerned by means of logical study, including whatever falls within the province of Physics, and again whatever belongs to that of Ethics. For else, say they, as regards statement and reasoning Physics and Ethics could not tell how to express themselves, or again concerning the proper use of terms, how the laws have defined various actions. Moreover, of the two kinds of common-sense inquiry included under Virtue one considers the nature of each particular thing, the other asks what it is called. Thus much for their logic.
1.83. πάντα γὰρ τὰ πράγματα διὰ τῆς ἐν λόγοις θεωρίας ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅσα τε τοῦ φυσικοῦ τόπου τυγχάνει καὶ αὖ πάλιν ὅσα τοῦ ἠθικοῦ. εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν τί δεῖ λέγειν περί τʼ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος, ὅπως διέταξαν οἱ νόμοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις, οὐκ ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. δυοῖν δʼ οὔσαιν συνηθείαιν ταῖν ὑποπιπτούσαιν τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἡ μὲν τί ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων σκοπεῖ, ἡ δὲ τί καλεῖται. καὶ ὧδε μὲν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὸ λογικόν.
1.84. The ethical branch of philosophy they divide as follows: (1) the topic of impulse; (2) the topic of things good and evil; (3) that of the passions; (4) that of virtue; (5) that of the end; (6) that of primary value and of actions; (7) that of duties or the befitting; and (8) of inducements to act or refrain from acting. The foregoing is the subdivision adopted by Chrysippus, Archedemus, Zeno of Tarsus, Apollodorus, Diogenes, Antipater, and Posidonius, and their disciples. Zeno of Citium and Cleanthes treated the subject somewhat less elaborately, as might be expected in an older generation. They, however, did subdivide Logic and Physics as well as Ethics.
1.84. Τὸ δʼ ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπον καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ παθῶν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ τέλους περί τε τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν. [καὶ] οὕτω δʼ ὑποδιαιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Ταρσέα καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρον καὶ Διογένην καὶ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Ποσειδώνιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης, ὡς ἂν ἀρχαιότεροι, ἀφελέστερον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διέλαβον. οὗτοι δὲ διεῖλον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικόν.
1.85. An animal’s first impulse, say the Stoics, is to selfpreservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, “The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof”; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it.
1.85. Τὴν δὲ πρώτην ὁρμήν φασι τὸ ζῷον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτό, οἰκειούσης αὑτῷ τῆς φύσεως ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τελῶν, πρῶτον οἰκεῖον λέγων εἶναι παντὶ ζῴῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλοτριῶσαι εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτὸ 〈αὑτῷ〉 τὸ ζῷον, οὔτε ποιήσασαν αὐτό, μήτʼ ἀλλοτριῶσαι μήτʼ οἰκειῶσαι. ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν συστησαμένην αὐτὸ οἰκειῶσαι πρὸς ἑαυτό· οὕτω γὰρ τά τε βλάπτοντα διωθεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα προσίεται. Ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζῴοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν.
1.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal’s existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature’s rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically.
1.86. ἐπιγέννημα γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅταν αὐτὴ καθʼ αὑτὴν ἡ φύσις ἐπιζητήσασα τὰ ἐναρμόζοντα τῇ συστάσει ἀπολάβῃ· ὃν τρόπον ἀφιλαρύνεται τὰ ζῷα καὶ θάλλει τὰ φυτά. οὐδέν τε, φασί, διήλλαξεν ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων, ὅτι χωρὶς ὁρμῆς καὶ αἰσθήσεως κἀκεῖνα οἰκονομεῖ καὶ ἐφʼ ἡμῶν τινα φυτοειδῶς γίνεται. ἐκ περιττοῦ δὲ τῆς ὁρμῆς τοῖς ζῴοις ἐπιγενομένης, ᾗ συγχρώμενα πορεύεται πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα, τούτοις μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν διοικεῖσθαι· τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῖς λογικοῖς κατὰ τελειοτέραν προστασίαν δεδοαένου, τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν ὀρθῶς γίνεσθαι 〈τού〉 τοις κατὰ φύσιν· τεχνίτης γὰρ οὗτος ἐπιγίνεται τῆς ὁρμῆς.
1.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end “life in agreement with nature” (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe.
1.87. Διόπερ πρῶτος ὁ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως τέλος εἶπε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατʼ ἀρετὴν ζῆν· ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ Ποσειδώνιος καὶ Ἑκάτων ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τελῶν. πάλιν δʼ ἴσον ἐστὶ τὸ κατʼ ἀρετὴν ζῆν τῷ κατʼ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων ζῆν, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τελῶν· μέρη γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου.
1.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions.
1.88. διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατά τε τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διὶ, καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι· εἶναι δʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρʼ ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Διογένης τέλος φησὶ ῥητῶς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ. Ἀρχέδημος δὲ τὸ πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντα ζῆν.
1.89. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual. And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse.
1.89. Φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐξακούει, ᾗ ἀκολούθως δεῖ ζῆν, τήν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην· ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης τὴν κοινὴν μόνην ἐκδέχεται φύσιν, ᾗ ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους. Τήν τʼ ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην· καὶ αὐτὴν διʼ αὑτὴν εἶναι αἱρετήν, οὐ διά τινα φόβον ἢ ἐλπίδα ἤ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν· ἐν αὐτῇ τʼ εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἅτʼ οὔσῃ ψυχῇ πεποιημένῃ πρὸς τὴν ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου. διαστρέφεσθαι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον, ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὰς τῶν ἔξωθεν πραγματειῶν πιθανότητας, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν κατήχησιν τῶν συνόντων· ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους.
1.90. Virtue, in the first place, is in one sense the perfection of anything in general, say of a statue; again, it may be non-intellectual, like health, or intellectual, like prudence. For Hecato says in his first book On the Virtues that some are scientific and based upon theory, namely, those which have a structure of theoretical principles, such as prudence and justice; others are non-intellectual, those that are regarded as co-extensive and parallel with the former, like health and strength. For health is found to attend upon and be co-extensive with the intellectual virtue of temperance, just as strength is a result of the building of an arch.
1.90. Ἀρετὴ δʼ ἡ μέν τις κοινῶς παντὶ τελείωσις, ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντος· καὶ ἡ ἀθεώρητος, ὥσπερ ὑγίεια· καὶ ἡ θεωρηματική, ὡς φρόνησις. φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Ἑκάτων ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ἀρετῶν ἐπιστημονικὰς μὲν εἶναι καὶ θεωρηματικὰς τὰς ἐχούσας τὴν σύστασιν ἐκ θεωρημάτων, ὡς φρόνησιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην· ἀθεωρήτους δὲ τὰς κατὰ παρέκτασιν θεωρουμένας ταῖς ἐκ τῶν θεωρημάτων συνεστηκυίαις, καθάπερ ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχύν. τῇ γὰρ σωφροσύνῃ τεθεωρημένῃ ὑπαρχούσῃ συμβαίνει ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ παρεκτείνεσθαι τὴν ὑγίειαν, καθάπερ τῇ ψαλίδος οἰκοδομίᾳ τὴν ἰσχὺν ἐπιγίνεσθαι.
1.91. These are called non-intellectual, because they do not require the mind’s assent; they supervene and they occur even in bad men: for instance, health, courage. The proof, says Posidonius in the first book of his treatise on Ethics, that virtue really exists is the fact that Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes and their followers made moral progress. And for the existence of vice as a fundamental fact the proof is that it is the opposite of virtue. That it, virtue, can be taught is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his work On the End, by Cleanthes, by Posidonius in his Protreptica, and by Hecato; that it can be taught is clear from the case of bad men becoming good.
1.91. καλοῦνται δʼ ἀθεώρητοι ὅτι μὴ ἔχουσι συγκαταθέσεις, ἀλλʼ ἐπιγίνονται καὶ περὶ φαύλους [γίγνονται], ὡς ὑγίεια, ἀνδρεία. τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ Ἠθικοῦ λόγου τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς περὶ Σωκράτην καὶ Διογένην καὶ Ἀντισθένην. εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴν κακίαν ὑπαρκτὴν διὰ τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ. διδακτήν τʼ εἶναι αὐτήν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τέλους φησὶ καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τοῖς Προτρεπτικοῖς καὶ Ἑκάτων· ὅτι δὲ διδακτή ἐστι, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἀγαθοὺς ἐκ φαύλων.
1.92. Panaetius, however, divides virtue into two kinds, theoretical and practical; others make a threefold division of it into logical, physical, and ethical; while by the school of Posidonius four types are recognized, and more than four by Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, and their followers. Apollophanes for his part counts but one, namely, practical wisdom. Amongst the virtues some are primary, some are subordinate to these. The following are the primary: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance. Particular virtues are magnanimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, good counsel. And wisdom they define as the knowledge of things good and evil and of what is neither good nor evil; courage as knowledge of what we ought to choose, what we ought to beware of, and what is indifferent;
1.92. Παναίτιος μὲν οὖν δύο φησὶν ἀρετάς, θεωρητικὴν καὶ πρακτικήν· ἄλλοι δὲ λογικὴν καὶ φυσικὴν καὶ ἠθικήν· τέτταρας δὲ οἱ περὶ Ποσειδώνιον καὶ πλείονας οἱ περὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀντίπατρον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀπολλοφάνης μίαν λέγει, τὴν φρόνησιν. Τῶν δʼ ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν πρώτας, τὰς δὲ ταύταις ὑποτεταγμένας. πρώτας μὲν τάσδε, φρόνησιν, ἀνδρείαν, δικαιοσύνην, σωφροσύνην· ἐν εἴδει δὲ τούτων μεγαλοψυχίαν, ἐγκράτειαν, καρτερίαν, ἀγχίνοιαν, εὐβουλίαν· καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, τὴν δʼ ἀνδρείαν ἐπιστήμην ὧν αἱρετέον καὶ ὧν εὐλαβητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων·
1.93. justice...; magnanimity as the knowledge or habit of mind which makes one superior to anything that happens, whether good or evil equally; continence as a disposition never overcome in that which concerns right reason, or a habit which no pleasures can get the better of; endurance as a knowledge or habit which suggests what we are to hold fast to, what not, and what is indifferent; presence of mind as a habit prompt to find out what is meet to be done at any moment; good counsel as knowledge by which we see what to do and how to do it if we would consult our own interests. Similarly, of vices some are primary, others subordinate: e.g. folly, cowardice, injustice, profligacy are accounted primary; but incontinence, stupidity, ill-advisedness subordinate. Further, they hold that the vices are forms of ignorance of those things whereof the corresponding virtues are the knowledge.
1.93. τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην * * τὴν δὲ μεγαλοψυχίαν ἐπιστήμην ἢ ἕξιν ὑπεράνω ποιοῦσαν τῶν συμβαινόντων κοινῇ φαύλων τε καὶ σπουδαίων· τὴν δʼ ἐγκράτειαν διάθεσιν ἀνυπέρβατον τῶν κατʼ ὀρθὸν λόγον ἢ ἕξιν ἀήττητον ἡδονῶν. τὴν δὲ καρτερίαν ἐπιστήμην ἢ ἕξιν ὧν ἐμμενετέον καὶ μὴ καὶ οὐδετέρων. τὴν δʼ ἀγχίνοιαν ἕξιν εὑρετικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα· τὴν δʼ εὐβουλίαν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι ποῖα καὶ πῶς πράττοντες πράξομεν συμφερόντως. Ἀνὰ λόγον δὲ καὶ τῶν κακιῶν τὰς μὲν εἶναι πρώτας, τὰς δʼ ὑπὸ ταύτας· οἷον ἀφροσύνην μὲν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν ἐν ταῖς πρώταις, ἀκρασίαν δὲ καὶ βραδύνοιαν καὶ κακοβουλίαν ἐν ταῖς ὑπὸ ταύτας. εἶναι δʼ ἀγνοίας τὰς κακίας, ὧν αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐπιστῆμαι.
1.94. Good in general is that from which some advantage comes, and more particularly what is either identical with or not distinct from benefit. Whence it follows that virtue itself and whatever partakes of virtue is called good in these three senses—viz. as being (1) the source from which benefit results; or (2) that in respect of which benefit results, e.g. the virtuous act; or (3) that by the agency of which benefit results, e.g. the good man who partakes in virtue. Another particular definition of good which they give is “the natural perfection of a rational being qua rational.” To this answers virtue and, as being partakers in virtue, virtuous acts and good men; as also its supervening accessories, joy and gladness and the like.
1.94. Ἀγαθὸν δὲ κοινῶς μὲν τὸ 〈οὗ〉 τι ὄφελος, ἰδίως δʼ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας. ὅθεν αὐτήν τε τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μετέχον αὐτῆς ἀγαθὸν τριχῶς οὕτω λέγεσθαι· οἷον τὸ 〈μὲν〉 ἀγαθὸν ἀφʼ οὗ συμβαίνει 〈ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ καθʼ ὃ συμβαίνει〉, ὡς τὴν πρᾶξιν τὴν κατʼ ἀρετήν· ὑφʼ οὗ δέ, ὡς τὸν σπουδαῖον τὸν μετέχοντα τῆς ἀρετῆς. Ἄλλως δʼ οὕτως ἰδίως ὁρίζονται τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν λογικοῦ ὡς λογικοῦ. τοιοῦτον δʼ εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, ὥς τε μετέχοντα τάς τε πράξεις τὰς κατʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους εἶναι· ἐπιγεννήματα δὲ τήν τε χαρὰν καὶ τὴν εὐφροσύνην καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια.
1.95. So with evils: either they are vices, folly, cowardice, injustice, and the like; or things which partake of vice, including vicious acts and wicked persons as well as their accompaniments, despair, moroseness, and the like. Again, some goods are goods of the mind and others external, while some are neither mental nor external. The former include the virtues and virtuous acts; external goods are such as having a good country or a good friend, and the prosperity of such. Whereas to be good and happy oneself is of the class of goods neither mental nor external.
1.95. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν κακιῶν τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἀφροσύνην, δειλίαν, ἀδικίαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· μετέχοντα δὲ κακίας τάς τε πράξεις τὰς κατὰ κακίαν καὶ τοὺς φαύλους· ἐπιγεννήματα δὲ τήν τε δυσθυμίαν καὶ τὴν δυσφροσύνην καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Ἔτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δʼ ἐκτός, τὰ δʼ οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτʼ ἐκτός. τὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κατὰ ταύτας πράξεις· τὰ δʼ ἐκτὸς τό τε σπουδαίαν ἔχειν πατρίδα καὶ σπουδαῖον φίλον καὶ τὴν τούτων εὐδαιμονίαν· τὰ δʼ οὔτʼ ἐκτὸς οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι σπουδαῖον καὶ εὐδαίμονα.
1.96. Similarly of things evil some are mental evils, namely, vices and vicious actions; others are outward evils, as to have a foolish country or a foolish friend and the unhappiness of such; other evils again are neither mental nor outward, e.g. to be yourself bad and unhappy. Again, goods are either of the nature of ends or they are the means to these ends, or they are at the same time end and means. A friend and the advantages derived from him are means to good, whereas confidence, high - spirit, liberty, delight, gladness, freedom from pain, and every virtuous act are of the nature of ends.
1.96. ἀνάπαλιν δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι, τὰς κακίας καὶ τὰς κατʼ αὐτὰς πράξεις· τὰ δʼ ἐκτὸς τὸ ἄφρονα πατρίδα ἔχειν καὶ ἄφρονα φίλον καὶ τὴν τούτων κακοδαιμονίαν· τὰ δʼ οὔτʼ ἐκτὸς οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι φαῦλον καὶ κακοδαίμονα. Ἔτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τελικά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά, τὰ δὲ τελικὰ καὶ ποιητικά. τὸν μὲν οὖν φίλον καὶ τὰς ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ γινομένας ὠφελείας ποιητικὰ εἶναι ἀγαθά· θάρσος δὲ καὶ φρόνημα καὶ ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ ἀλυπίαν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν κατʼ ἀρετὴν πρᾶξιν τελικά.
1.97. The virtues (they say) are goods of the nature at once of ends and of means. On the one hand, in so far as they cause happiness they are means, and on the other hand, in so far as they make it complete, and so are themselves part of it, they are ends. Similarly of evils some are of the nature of ends and some of means, while others are at once both means and ends. Your enemy and the harm he does you are means; consternation, abasement, slavery, gloom, despair, excess of grief, and every vicious action are of the nature of ends. Vices are evils both as ends and as means, since in so far as they cause misery they are means, but in so far as they make it complete, so that they become part of it, they are ends.
1.97. Ποιητικὰ δὲ καὶ τελικὰ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ 〈τὰς ἀρετάσ〉. καθὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀποτελοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ποιητικά ἐστιν ἀγαθά· καθὸ δὲ συμπληροῦσιν αὐτήν, ὥστε μέρη αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι, τελικά. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τελικά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά, τὰ δʼ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντα. τὸν μὲν ἐχθρὸν καὶ τὰς ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ γινομένας βλάβας ποιητικὰ εἶναι· κατάπληξιν δὲ καὶ ταπεινότητα καὶ δουλείαν καὶ ἀτερπίαν καὶ δυσθυμίαν καὶ περιλυπίαν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν κατὰ κακίαν πρᾶξιν τελικά· ἀμφοτέρως δʼ ἔχοντα 〈τὰς κακίασ〉, ἐπεὶ καθὸ μὲν ἀποτελοῦσι τὴν κακοδαιμονίαν, ποιητικά ἐστι· καθὸ δὲ συμπληροῦσιν αὐτήν, ὥστε μέρη αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι, τελικά.
1.98. Of mental goods some are habits, others are dispositions, while others again are neither the one nor the other. The virtues are dispositions, while accomplishments or avocations are matters of habit, and activities as such or exercise of faculty neither the one nor the other. And in general there are some mixed goods: e.g. to be happy in one’s children or in one’s old age. But knowledge is a pure good. Again, some goods are permanent like the virtues, others transitory like joy and walking-exercise. All good (they say) is expedient, binding, profitable, useful, serviceable, beautiful, beneficial, desirable, and just or right.
1.98. Ἔτι τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν εἰσιν ἕξεις, τὰ δὲ διαθέσεις, τὰ δʼ οὔθʼ ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις. διαθέσεις μὲν αἱ ἀρεταί, ἕξεις δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, οὔτε δʼ ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις αἱ ἐνέργειαι. κοινῶς δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μικτὰ μέν ἐστιν εὐτεκνία καὶ εὐγηρία, ἁπλοῦν δʼ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμη. καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν παρόντα αἱ ἀρεταί, οὐκ ἀεὶ δέ, οἷον χαρά, περιπάτησις. Πᾶν δʼ ἀγαθὸν συμφέρον εἶναι καὶ δέον καὶ λυσιτελὲς καὶ χρήσιμον καὶ εὔχρηστον καὶ καλὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ αἱρετὸν καὶ δίκαιον.
1.99. It is expedient, because it brings about things of such a kind that by their occurrence we are benefited. It is binding, because it causes unity where unity is needed; profitable, because it defrays what is expended on it, so that the return yields a balance of benefit on the transaction. It is useful, because it secures the use of benefit; it is serviceable, because the utility it affords is worthy of all praise. It is beautiful, because the good is proportionate to the use made of it; beneficial, because by its inherent nature it benefits; choiceworthy, because it is such that to choose it is reasonable. It is also just or right, inasmuch as it is in harmony with law and tends to draw men together.
1.99. συμφέρον μὲν ὅτι φέρει τοιαῦτα ὧν συμβαινόντων ὠφελούμεθα· δέον δʼ ὅτι συνέχει ἐν οἷς χρή· λυσιτελὲς δʼ ὅτι λύει τὰ τελούμενα εἰς αὐτό, ὥστε τὴν ἀντικατάλλαξιν τὴν ἐκ τῆς πραγματείας ὑπεραίρειν τῇ ὠφελείᾳ· χρήσιμον δʼ ὅτι χρείαν ὠφελείας παρέχεται· εὔχρηστον δʼ ὅτι τὴν χρείαν ἐπαινετὴν ἀπεργάζεται· καλὸν δʼ ὅτι συμμέτρως ἔχει πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χρείαν· ὠφέλιμον δʼ ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥστε ὠφελεῖν· αἱρετὸν δʼ ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥστε εὐλόγως αὐτὸ αἱρεῖσθαι· δίκαιον δʼ ὅτι νόμῳ ἐστὶ σύμφωνον καὶ κοινωνίας ποιητικόν.
1.100. The reason why they characterize the perfect good as beautiful is that it has in full all the “factors” required by nature or has perfect proportion. Of the beautiful there are (say they) four species, namely, what is just, courageous, orderly and wise; for it is under these forms that fair deeds are accomplished. Similarly there are four species of the base or ugly, namely, what is unjust, cowardly, disorderly, and unwise. By the beautiful is meant properly and in an unique sense that good which renders its possessors praiseworthy, or briefly, good which is worthy of praise; though in another sense it signifies a good aptitude for one’s proper function; while in yet another sense the beautiful is that which lends new grace to anything, as when we say of the wise man that he alone is good and beautiful.
1.100. Καλὸν δὲ λέγουσι τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν παρὰ τὸ πάντας ἀπέχειν τοὺς ἐπιζητουμένους ἀριθμοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἢ τὸ τελέως σύμμετρον. εἴδη δʼ εἶναι τοῦ καλοῦ τέτταρα, δίκαιον, ἀνδρεῖον, κόσμιον, ἐπιστημονικόν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖσδε τὰς καλὰς πράξεις συντελεῖσθαι. ἀνὰ λόγον δὲ καὶ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ εἶναι εἴδη τέτταρα, τό τʼ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δειλὸν καὶ ἄκοσμον καὶ ἄφρον. λέγεσθαι δὲ τὸ καλὸν μοναχῶς μὲν τὸ ἐπαινετοὺς παρεχόμενον τοὺς ἔχοντας 〈ἢ〉 ἀγαθὸν ἐπαίνου ἄξιον· ἑτέρως δὲ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον· ἄλλως δὲ τὸ ἐπικοσμοῦν, ὅταν λέγωμεν μόνον τὸν σοφὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν εἶναι.
1.101. And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods, book iii., and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term “good” has equal force with the term “beautiful,” which comes to the same thing. “Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good.” They hold that all goods are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity. Of things that are, some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor evil (that is, morally indifferent).
1.101. Λέγουσι δὲ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἑκάτων ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ· εἶναι δὲ τοῦτο ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς, ᾧ ἐστιν ἴσον τὸ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἰσοδυναμεῖν τῷ καλῷ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστὶ τούτῳ. ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, καλόν ἐστιν· ἔστι δὲ καλόν· ἀγαθὸν ἄρα ἐστί. δοκεῖ δὲ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἴσα εἶναι καὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπʼ ἄκρον εἶναι αἱρετὸν καὶ μήτʼ ἄνεσιν μήτʼ ἐπίτασιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι. τῶν δʼ ὄντων φασὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δʼ οὐδέτερα.
1.102. Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. This Hecato affirms in his De fine, book vii., and also Apollodorus in his Ethics. and Chrysippus. For, say they, such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under the species or subdivision “things preferred.”
1.102. Ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν τάς τʼ ἀρετάς, φρόνησιν, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, σωφροσύνην καὶ τὰ λοιπά· κακὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, ἀφροσύνην, ἀδικίαν καὶ τὰ λοιπά. οὐδέτερα δὲ ὅσα μήτʼ ὠφελεῖ μήτε βλάπτει, οἷον ζωή, ὑγίεια, ἡδονή, κάλλος, ἰσχύς, πλοῦτος, εὐδοξία, εὐγένεια· καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία, θάνατος, νόσος, πόνος, αἶσχος, ἀσθένεια, πενία, ἀδοξία, δυσγένεια καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια, καθά φησιν Ἑκάτων ἐν ἑβδόμῳ Περὶ τέλους καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ καὶ Χρύσιππος. μὴ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτʼ ἀγαθά, ἀλλʼ ἀδιάφορα κατʼ εἶδος προηγμένα.
1.103. For as the property of hot is to warm, not to cool, so the property of good is to benefit, not to injure; but wealth and health do no more benefit than injury, therefore neither wealth nor health is good. Further, they say that that is not good of which both good and bad use can be made; but of wealth and health both good and bad use can be made; therefore wealth and health are not goods. On the other hand, Posidonius maintains that these things too are among goods. Hecato in the ninth book of his treatise On Goods, and Chrysippus in his work On Pleasure, deny that pleasure is a good either; for some pleasures are disgraceful, and nothing disgraceful is good.
1.103. ὡς γὰρ ἴδιον θερμοῦ τὸ θερμαίνειν, οὐ τὸ ψύχειν, οὕτω καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ὠφελεῖν, οὐ τὸ βλάπτειν· οὐ μᾶλλον δʼ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια· οὐκ ἄρʼ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔθʼ ὑγίεια. ἔτι τέ φασιν, ᾧ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν· πλούτῳ δὲ καὶ ὑγιείᾳ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι· οὐκ ἄρʼ ἀγαθὸν πλοῦτος καὶ ὑγίεια. Ποσειδώνιος μέντοι καὶ ταῦτά φησι τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν φασιν Ἑκάτων τʼ ἐν τῷ ἐνάτῳ Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ἡδονῆς· εἶναι γὰρ καὶ αἰσχρὰς ἡδονάς, μηδὲν δʼ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι ἀγαθόν.
1.104. To benefit is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with virtue; whereas to harm is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with vice. The term “indifferent” has two meanings: in the first it denotes the things which do not contribute either to happiness or to misery, as wealth, fame, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible to be happy without having these, although, if they are used in a certain way, such use of them tends to happiness or misery. In quite another sense those things are said to be indifferent which are without the power of stirring inclination or aversion; e.g. the fact that the number of hairs on one’s head is odd or even or whether you hold out your finger straight or bent. But it was not in this sense that the things mentioned above were termed indifferent, they being quite capable of exciting inclination or aversion.
1.104. ὠφελεῖν δέ ἐστι κινεῖν ἢ ἴσχειν κατʼ ἀρετήν, βλάπτειν δὲ κινεῖν ἢ ἴσχειν κατὰ κακίαν. Διχῶς δὲ λέγεσθαι ἀδιάφορα· ἅπαξ μὲν τὰ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συνεργοῦντα, ὡς ἔχει πλοῦτος, δόξα, ὑγίεια, ἰσχὺς καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ χωρὶς τούτων εὐδαιμονεῖν, τῆς ποιᾶς αὐτῶν χρήσεως εὐδαιμονικῆς οὔσης ἢ κακοδαιμονικῆς. ἄλλως δὲ λέγεται ἀδιάφορα τὰ μήθʼ ὁρμῆς μήτʼ ἀφορμῆς κινητικά, ὡς ἔχει τὸ ἀρτίας ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας ἢ περιττάς, ἢ ἐκτεῖναι τὸν δάκτυλον ἢ συστεῖλαι, τῶν προτέρων ἀδιαφόρων οὐκέθʼ οὕτω λεγομένων· ὁρμῆς γάρ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἀφορμῆς κινητικά.
1.105. Hence of these latter some are taken by preference, others are rejected, whereas indifference in the other sense affords no ground for either choosing or avoiding. Of things indifferent, as they express it, some are “preferred,” others “rejected.” Such as have value, they say, are “preferred,” while such as have negative, instead of positive, value are “rejected.” Value they define as, first, any contribution to harmonious living, such as attaches to every good; secondly, some faculty or use which indirectly contributes to the life according to nature: which is as much as to say “any assistance brought by wealth or health towards living a natural life”; thirdly, value is the full equivalent of an appraiser, as fixed by an expert acquainted with the facts—as when it is said that wheat exchanges for so much barley with a mule thrown in.
1.105. διὸ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκλέγεται, 〈τὰ δὲ ἀπεκλέγεται〉 τῶν ἑτέρων ἐπίσης ἐχόντων πρὸς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγήν. Τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα, τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα· προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν, ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα. ἀξίαν δὲ τὴν μέν τινα λέγουσι σύμβλησιν πρὸς τὸν ὁμολογούμενον βίον, ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ πᾶν ἀγαθόν· τὴν δὲ εἶναι μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρείαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν ἥντινα προσφέρεται πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον πλοῦτος ἢ ὑγίεια· τὴν δʼ εἶναι ἀξίαν ἀμοιβὴν δοκιμαστοῦ, ἣν ἂν ὁ ἔμπειρος τῶν πραγμάτων τάξῃ, ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν ἀμείβεσθαι πυροὺς πρὸς τὰς σὺν ἡμιόνῳ κριθάς.
1.106. Thus things of the preferred class are those which have positive value, e.g. amongst mental qualities, natural ability, skill, moral improvement, and the like; among bodily qualities, life, health, strength, good condition, soundness of organs, beauty, and so forth; and in the sphere of external things, wealth, fame, noble birth, and the like. To the class of things “rejected” belong, of mental qualities, lack of ability, want of skill, and the like; among bodily qualities, death, disease, weakness, being out of condition, mutilation, ugliness, and the like; in the sphere of external things, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and so forth. But again there are things belonging to neither class; such are not preferred, neither are they rejected.
1.106. Προηγμένα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἃ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν εὐφυΐαν, τέχνην, προκοπὴν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ζωήν, ὑγίειαν, ῥώμην, εὐεξίαν, ἀρτιότητα, κάλλος 〈καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια〉· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς πλοῦτον, δόξαν, εὐγένειαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. ἀποπροηγμένα δʼ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἀφυΐαν, ἀτεχνίαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν θάνατον, νόσον, ἀσθένειαν, καχεξίαν, πήρωσιν, αἶσχος καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς πενίαν, ἀδοξίαν, δυσγένειαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· οὔτε δὲ προήχθη οὔτʼ ἀποπροήχθη τὰ οὐδετέρως ἔχοντα.
1.107. Again, of things preferred some are preferred for their own sake, some for the sake of something else, and others again both for their own sake and for the sake of something else. To the first of these classes belong natural ability, moral improvement, and the like; to the second wealth, noble birth, and the like; to the last strength, perfect faculties, soundness of bodily organs. Things are preferred for their own sake because they accord with nature; not for their own sake, but for the sake of something else, because they secure not a few utilities. And similarly with the class of things rejected under the contrary heads. Furthermore, the term Duty is applied to that for which, when done, a reasonable defence can be adduced, e.g. harmony in the tenor of life’s process, which indeed pervades the growth of plants and animals. For even in plants and animals, they hold, you may discern fitness of behaviour.
1.107. Ἔτι τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν διʼ αὑτὰ προῆκται, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ καὶ διʼ αὑτὰ καὶ διʼ ἕτερα. διʼ αὑτὰ μὲν εὐφυΐα, προκοπὴ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· διʼ ἕτερα δὲ πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· διʼ αὑτὰ δὲ καὶ διʼ ἕτερα ἰσχύς, εὐαισθησία, ἀρτιότης. διʼ αὑτὰ μέν, ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστί· διʼ ἕτερα δέ, ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας. ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀποπροηγμένον κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον. Ἔτι δὲ καθῆκόν φασιν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν [τε] ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν, οἷον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῇ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα διατείνει· ὁρᾶσθαι γὰρ κἀπὶ τούτων καθήκοντα.
1.108. Zeno was the first to use this term καθῆκον of conduct. Etymologically it is derived from κατά τινας ἥκειν, i.e. reaching as far as, being up to, or incumbent on so and so. And it is an action in itself adapted to nature’s arrangements. For of the acts done at the prompting of impulse some, they observe, are fit and meet, others the reverse, while there is a third class which is neither the one nor the other. Befitting acts are all those which reason prevails with us to do; and this is the case with honouring one’s parents, brothers and country, and intercourse with friends.
1.108. Κατωνομάσθαι δʼ οὕτως ὑπὸ πρώτου Ζήνωνος τὸ καθῆκον, ἀπὸ τοῦ κατά τινας ἥκειν τῆς προσονομασίας εἰλημμένης. ἐνέργημα δʼ αὐτὸ εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον. τῶν γὰρ καθʼ ὁρμὴν ἐνεργουμένων τὰ μὲν καθήκοντα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, τὰ δʼ οὔτε καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. Καθήκοντα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ὅσα λόγος αἱρεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔχει τὸ γονεῖς τιμᾶν, ἀδελφούς, πατρίδα, συμπεριφέρεσθαι φίλοις· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δέ, ὅσα μὴ αἱρεῖ λόγος, ὡς ἔχει τὰ τοιαῦτα, γονέων ἀμελεῖν, ἀδελφῶν ἀφροντιστεῖν, φίλοις μὴ συνδιατίθεσθαι, πατρίδα ὑπερορᾶν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια·
1.109. Unbefitting, or contrary to duty, are all acts that reason deprecates, e.g. to neglect one’s parents, to be indifferent to one’s brothers, not to agree with friends, to disregard the interests of one’s country, and so forth. Acts which fall under neither of the foregoing classes are those which reason neither urges us to do nor forbids, such as picking up a twig, holding a style or a scraper, and the like. Again, some duties are incumbent unconditionally, others in certain circumstances. Unconditional duties are the following: to take proper care of health and one’s organs of sense, and things of that sort. Duties imposed by circumstances are such as maiming oneself and sacrifice of property. And so likewise with acts which are violations of duty. Another division is into duties which are always incumbent and those which are not. To live in accordance with virtue is always a duty, whereas dialectic by question and answer or walking-exercise and the like are not at all times incumbent. The same may be said of the violations of duty.
1.109. οὔτε δὲ καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, ὅσα οὔθʼ αἱρεῖ λόγος πράττειν οὔτʼ ἀπαγορεύει, οἷον κάρφος ἀνελέσθαι, γραφεῖον κρατεῖν ἢ στλεγγίδα καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις. Καὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι καθήκοντα ἄνευ περιστάσεως, τὰ δὲ περιστατικά. καὶ ἄνευ μὲν περιστάσεως τάδε, ὑγιείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ τὸ πηροῦν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν διαρριπτεῖν. ἀνὰ λόγον δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. ἔτι τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ καθήκει, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἀεί. καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν καθήκει τὸ κατʼ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ περιπατεῖν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον.
1.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them. According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess. The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure.
1.110. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέσοις τι καθῆκον, ὡς τὸ πείθεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας τοῖς παιδαγωγοῖς. Φασὶ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ὀκταμερῆ· μέρη γὰρ αὐτῆς τά τε πέντε αἰσθητήρια καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν μόριον καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἡ διάνοια, καὶ τὸ γεννητικόν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ἐπιγίνεσθαι τὴν διαστροφὴν ἐπὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀφʼ ἧς πολλὰ πάθη βλαστάνειν καὶ ἀκαταστασίας αἴτια. ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. Τῶν δὲ παθῶν τὰ ἀνωτάτω, καθά φησιν Ἑκάτων ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ παθῶν καὶ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ παθῶν, εἶναι γένη τέτταρα, λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, ἡδονήν.
1.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions. And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others’ prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself.
1.111. δοκεῖ δʼ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ παθῶν· ἥ τε γὰρ φιλαργυρία ὑπόληψίς ἐστι τοῦ τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ μέθη δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ὁμοίως καὶ τἄλλα. Καὶ τὴν μὲν λύπην εἶναι συστολὴν ἄλογον· εἴδη δʼ αὐτῆς ἔλεον, φθόνον, ζῆλον, ζηλοτυπίαν, ἄχθος, ἐνόχλησιν, ἀνίαν, ὀδύνην, σύγχυσιν. ἔλεον μὲν οὖν εἶναι λύπην ὡς ἐπʼ ἀναξίως κακοπαθοῦντι, φθόνον δὲ λύπην ἐπʼ ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, ζῆλον δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ παρεῖναι ὧν αὐτὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, ζηλοτυπίαν δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ παρεῖναι ἃ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχει, ἄχθος δὲ λύπην βαρύνουσαν, ἐνόχλησιν λύπην στενοχωροῦσαν καὶ δυσχωρίαν παρασκευάζουσαν, ἀνίαν λύπην ἐκ διαλογισμῶν μένουσαν ἢ ἐπιτεινομένην, ὀδύνην λύπην ἐπίπονον, σύγχυσιν λύπην ἄλογον, ἀποκναίουσαν καὶ κωλύουσαν τὰ παρόντα συνορᾶν.
1.112. Heaviness or vexation is grief which weighs us down, annoyance that which coops us up and straitens us for want of room, distress a pain brought on by anxious thought that lasts and increases, anguish painful grief, distraction irrational grief, rasping and hindering us from viewing the situation as a whole. Fear is an expectation of evil. Under fear are ranged the following emotions: terror, nervous shrinking, shame, consternation, panic, mental agony. Terror is a fear which produces fright; shame is fear of disgrace; nervous shrinking is a fear that one will have to act; consternation is fear due to a presentation of some unusual occurrence;
1.112. Ὁ δὲ φόβος ἐστὶ προσδοκία κακοῦ. εἰς δὲ τὸν φόβον ἀνάγεται καὶ ταῦτα, δεῖμα, ὄκνος, αἰσχύνη, ἔκπληξις, θόρυβος, ἀγωνία. δεῖμα μὲν οὖν ἐστι φόβος δέος ἐμποιῶν, αἰσχύνη δὲ φόβος ἀδοξίας, ὄκνος δὲ φόβος μελλούσης ἐνεργείας, ἔκπληξις δὲ φόβος ἐκ φαντασίας ἀσυνήθους πράγματος, θόρυβος δὲ φόβος μετὰ κατεπείξεως φωνῆς, ἀγωνία δὲ φόβος ἀδήλου πράγματος.
1.113. panic is fear with pressure exercised by sound; mental agony is fear felt when some issue is still in suspense. Desire or craving is irrational appetency, and under it are ranged the following states: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment. Want, then, is a craving when it is baulked and, as it were, cut off from its object, but kept at full stretch and attracted towards it in vain. Hatred is a growing and lasting desire or craving that it should go ill with somebody. Contentiousness is a craving or desire connected with partisanship; anger a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury. The passion of love is a craving from which good men are free; for it is an effort to win affection due to the visible presence of beauty.
1.113. Ἡ δʼ ἐπιθυμία ἐστὶν ἄλογος ὄρεξις, ὑφʼ ἣν τάττεται καὶ ταῦτα, σπάνις, μῖσος, φιλονεικία, ὀργή, ἔρως, μῆνις, θυμός. ἔστι δʼ ἡ μὲν σπάνις ἐπιθυμία τις ἐν ἀποτεύξει καὶ οἷον κεχωρισμένη ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος, τεταμένη δὲ διακενῆς ἐπʼ αὐτὸ καὶ σπωμένη· μῖσος δʼ ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία τις τοῦ κακῶς εἶναί τινι μετὰ προκοπῆς τινος καὶ παρατάσεως· φιλονεικία δʼ ἐπιθυμία τις περὶ αἱρέσεως· ὀργὴ δʼ ἐπιθυμία τιμωρίας τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἠδικηκέναι οὐ προσηκόντως· ἔρως δέ ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία τις οὐχὶ περὶ σπουδαίους· ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον.
1.114. Wrath is anger which has long rankled and has become malicious, waiting for its opportunity, as is illustrated by the lines: “Even though for the one day he swallow his anger, yet doth he still keep his displeasure thereafter in his heart, till he accomplish it.” Resentment is anger in an early stage. Pleasure is an irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy; and under it are ranged ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport. Ravishment is pleasure which charms the ear. Malevolent joy is pleasure at another’s ills. Delight is the mind’s propulsion to weakness, its name in Greek (τέρψις ) being akin to τρέψις or turning. To be in transports of delight is the melting away of virtue.
1.114. μῆνις δέ ἐστιν ὀργή τις πεπαλαιωμένη καὶ ἐπίκοτος, ἐπιτηρητικὴ δέ, ὅπερ ἐμφαίνεται διὰ τῶνδε·εἴ περ γάρ τε χόλον γε καὶ αὐτῆμαρ καταπέψῃ,ἀλλά τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον, ὄφρα τελέσσῃ.ὁ δὲ θυμός ἐστιν ὀργὴ ἀρχομένη. Ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφʼ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν, ὑφʼ ἣν τάττεται κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις, διάχυσις. κήλησις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ διʼ ὤτων κατακηλοῦσα· ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπʼ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς· τέρψις δέ, οἷον τρέψις, προτροπή τις ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνειμένον· διά· χυσις δʼ ἀνάλυσις ἀρετῆς.
1.115. And as there are said to be certain infirmities in the body, as for instance gout and arthritic disorders, so too there is in the soul love of fame, love of pleasure, and the like. By infirmity is meant disease accompanied by weakness; and by disease is meant a fond imagining of something that seems desirable. And as in the body there are tendencies to certain maladies such as colds and diarrhoea, so it is with the soul, there are tendencies like enviousness, pitifulness, quarrelsomeness, and the like.
1.115. Ὡς δὲ λέγεταί τινα ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀρρωστήματα, οἷον ποδάγρα καὶ ἀρθρίτιδες, οὕτω κἀπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς φιλοδοξία καὶ φιληδονία καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. τὸ γὰρ ἀρρώστημά ἐστι νόσημα μετʼ ἀσθενείας, τὸ δὲ νόσημα οἴησις σφόδρα δοκοῦντος αἱρετοῦ. καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος εὐεμπτωσίαι τινὲς λέγονται, οἷον κατάρρους καὶ διάρροια, οὕτω κἀπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσιν εὐκαταφορίαι, οἷον φθονερία, ἐλεημοσύνη, ἔριδες καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια.
1.116. Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness.
1.116. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ εὐπαθείας φασὶ τρεῖς, χαράν, εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν. καὶ τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν [φασὶν] εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ, οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔπαρσιν· τὴν δʼ εὐλάβειαν τῷ φόβῳ, οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔκκλισιν. φοβηθήσεσθαι μὲν γὰρ τὸν σοφὸν οὐδαμῶς, εὐλαβηθήσεσθαι δέ. τῇ δʼ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν, οὖσαν εὔλογον ὄρεξιν. καθάπερ οὖν ὑπὸ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη πίπτει τινά, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς πρώτας εὐπαθείας· καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν βούλησιν εὔνοιαν, εὐμένειαν, ἀσπασμόν, ἀγάπησιν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν εὐλάβειαν αἰδῶ, ἁγνείαν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν χαρὰν τέρψιν, εὐφροσύνην, εὐθυμίαν.
1.117. Now they say that the wise man is passionless, because he is not prone to fall into such infirmity. But they add that in another sense the term apathy is applied to the bad man, when, that is, it means that he is callous and relentless. Further, the wise man is said to be free from vanity; for he is indifferent to good or evil report. However, he is not alone in this, there being another who is also free from vanity, he who is ranged among the rash, and that is the bad man. Again, they tell us that all good men are austere or harsh, because they neither have dealings with pleasure themselves nor tolerate those who have. The term harsh is applied, however, to others as well, and in much the same sense as a wine is said to be harsh when it is employed medicinally and not for drinking at all.
1.117. Φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπτωτον εἶναι· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἀπαθῆ τὸν φαῦλον, ἐν ἴσῳ λεγόμενον τῷ σκληρῷ καὶ ἀτέγκτῳ. ἄτυφόν τʼ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν· ἴσως γὰρ ἔχειν πρός τε τὸ ἔνδοξον καὶ τὸ ἄδοξον. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἄτυφον, κατὰ τὸν εἰκαῖον τεταγμένον, ὅς ἐστι φαῦλος. καὶ αὐστηροὺς δέ φασιν εἶναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους, τῷ μήτʼ αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν μήτε παρʼ ἄλλων τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν προσδέχεσθαι. καὶ ἄλλον δὲ εἶναι αὐστηρόν, παραπλησίως λεγόμενον τῷ αὐστηρῷ οἴνῳ, ᾧ πρὸς μὲν φαρμακοποιίαν χρῶνται, πρὸς δὲ πρόποσιν οὐ πάνυ.
1.118. Again, the good are genuinely in earnest and vigilant for their own improvement, using a manner of life which banishes evil out of sight and makes what good there is in things appear. At the same time they are free from pretence; for they have stripped off all pretence or “make-up” whether in voice or in look. Free too are they from all business cares, declining to do anything which conflicts with duty. They will take wine, but not get drunk. Nay more, they will not be liable to madness either; not but what there will at times occur to the good man strange impressions due to melancholy or delirium, ideas not determined by the principle of what is choiceworthy but contrary to nature. Nor indeed will the wise man ever feel grief; seeing that grief is irrational contraction of the soul, as Apollodorus says in his Ethics.
1.118. Ἀκιβδήλους τοὺς σπουδαίους φυλακτικούς τʼ εἶναι τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον αὑτοὺς παριστάναι, διὰ παρασκευῆς τῆς τὰ φαῦλα μὲν ἀποκρυπτούσης, τὰ δʼ ὑπάρχοντα ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιούσης. ἀπλάστους τε· περιῃρηκέναι γὰρ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τὸ πλάσμα καὶ τῷ εἴδει. ἀπράγμονάς τʼ εἶναι· ἐκκλίνειν γὰρ τὸ πράττειν τι παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. καὶ οἰνωθήσεσθαι μέν, οὐ μεθυσθήσεσθαι δέ. ἔτι δʼ οὐδὲ μανήσεσθαι· προσπεσεῖσθαι μέντοι ποτὲ αὐτῷ φαντασίας ἀλλοκότους διὰ μελαγχολίαν ἢ λήρησιν, οὐ κατὰ τὸν τῶν αἱρετῶν λόγον, ἀλλὰ παρὰ φύσιν. οὐδὲ μὴν λυπηθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, διὰ τὸ τὴν λύπην ἄλογον εἶναι συστολὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρός φησιν ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ.
1.119. They are also, it is declared, godlike; for they have a something divine within them; whereas the bad man is godless. And yet of this word—godless or ungodly—there are two senses, one in which it is the opposite of the term “godly,” the other denoting the man who ignores the divine altogether: in this latter sense, as they note, the term does not apply to every bad man. The good, it is added, are also worshippers of God; for they have acquaintance with the rites of the gods, and piety is the knowledge of how to serve the gods. Further, they will sacrifice to the gods and they keep themselves pure; for they avoid all acts that are offences against the gods, and the gods think highly of them: for they are holy and just in what concerns the gods. The wise too are the only priests; for they have made sacrifices their study, as also the building of temples, purifications, and all the other matters appertaining to the gods.
1.119. Θείους τʼ εἶναι· ἔχειν γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς οἱονεὶ θεόν. τὸν δʼ φαῦλον ἄθεον. διττὸν δὲ εἶναι τὸν ἄθεον, τόν τʼ ἐναντίως τῷ θείῳ λεγόμενον καὶ τὸν ἐξουθενητικὸν τοῦ θείου· ὅπερ οὐκ εἶναι περὶ πάντα φαῦλον. θεοσεβεῖς τε τοὺς σπουδαίους· ἐμπείρους γὰρ εἶναι τῶν περὶ θεοὺς νομίμων· εἶναί τε τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ θύσειν αὐτοὺς θεοῖς ἁγνούς θʼ ὑπάρχειν· ἐκνεύειν γὰρ τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἁμαρτήματα. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἄγασθαι αὐτούς· ὁσίους τε γὰρ εἶναι καὶ δικαίους πρὸς τὸ θεῖον. μόνους θʼ ἱερέας τοὺς σοφούς· ἐπεσκέφθαι γὰρ περὶ θυσιῶν, ἱδρύσεων, καθαρμῶν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς θεοὺς οἰκείων.
1.120. The Stoics approve also of honouring parents and brothers in the second place next after the gods. They further maintain that parental affection for children is natural to the good, but not to the bad. It is one of their tenets that sins are all equal: so Chrysippus in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, as well as Persaeus and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin. For he who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus and he who is only one furlong away are equally not in Canopus, and so too he who commits the greater sin and he who commits the less are equally not in the path of right conduct.
1.120. Δοκεῖ δʼ αὐτοῖς καὶ γονέας σέβεσθαι καὶ ἀδελφοὺς ἐν δευτέρᾳ μοίρᾳ μετὰ θεούς. φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα φιλοστοργίαν φυσικὴν εἶναι αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐν φαύλοις μὴ εἶναι. ἀρέσκει τʼ αὐτοῖς ἴσα ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν ζητημάτων καὶ Περσαῖος καὶ Ζήνων. εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς ἀληθοῦς μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ψεῦδος ψεύδους· οὕτως οὐδʼ ἀπάτη ἀπάτης, οὐδʼ ἁμάρτημα ἁμαρτήματος. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἑκατὸν σταδίους ἀπέχων Κανώβου καὶ ὁ ἕνα ἐπίσης οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν Κανώβῳ· οὕτω καὶ ὁ πλέον καὶ ὁ ἔλαττον ἁμαρτάνων ἐπίσης οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ κατορθοῦν.
1.121. But Heraclides of Tarsus, who was the disciple of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus both assert that sins are not equal. Again, the Stoics say that the wise man will take part in politics, if nothing hinders him—so, for instance, Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Various Types of Life—since thus he will restrain vice and promote virtue. Also (they maintain) he will marry, as Zeno says in his Republic, and beget children. Moreover, they say that the wise man will never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never give assent to anything that is false; that he will also play the Cynic, Cynicism being a short cut to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics; that he will even turn cannibal under stress of circumstances. They declare that he alone is free and bad men are slaves, freedom being power of independent action, whereas slavery is privation of the same;
1.121. Ἡρακλείδης μέντοι ὁ Ταρσεύς, Ἀντιπάτρου τοῦ Ταρσέως γνώριμος, καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος ἄνισά φασι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα. Πολιτεύσεσθαί φασι τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ βίων· καὶ γὰρ κακίαν ἐφέξειν καὶ ἐπʼ ἀρετὴν παρορμήσειν. καὶ γαμήσειν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ, καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι. ἔτι τε μὴ δοξάσειν τὸν σοφόν, τουτέστι ψεύδει μὴ συγκαταθήσεσθαι μηδενί. κυνιεῖν τʼ αὐτόν· εἶναι γὰρ τὸν κυνισμὸν σύντομον ἐπʼ ἀρετὴν ὁδόν, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ. γεύσεσθαί τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων σαρκῶν κατὰ περίστασιν. μόνον τʼ ἐλεύθερον, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους δούλους· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας, τὴν δὲ δουλείαν στέρησιν αὐτοπραγίας.
1.122. though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; and this too is evil. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno’s use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified. Furthermore, the wise are infallible, not being liable to error.
1.122. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην δουλείαν τὴν ἐν ὑποτάξει καὶ τρίτην τὴν ἐν κτήσει τε καὶ ὑποτάξει, ᾗ ἀντιτίθεται ἡ δεσποτεία, φαύλη οὖσα καὶ αὕτη. οὐ μόνον δʼ ἐλευθερους εἶναι τοὺς σοφούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλέας, τῆς βασιλείας οὔσης ἀρχῆς ἀνυπευθύνου, ἥτις περὶ μόνους ἂν τοὺς σοφοὺς συσταίη, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ κυρίως κεχρῆσθαι Ζήνωνα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν· ἐγνωκέναι γάρ φησι δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, μηδένα δὲ τῶν φαύλων ἐπίστασθαι ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀρχικοὺς δικαστικούς τε καὶ ῥητορικοὺς μόνους εἶναι, τῶν δὲ φαύλων οὐδένα. ἔτι καὶ ἀναμαρτήτους, τῷ ἀπεριπτώτους εἶναι ἁμαρτήματι.
1.123. They are also without offence; for they do no hurt to others or to themselves. At the same time they are not pitiful and make no allowance for anyone; they never relax the penalties fixed by the laws, since indulgence and pity and even equitable consideration are marks of a weak mind, which affects kindness in place of chastizing. Nor do they deem punishments too severe. Again, they say that the wise man never wonders at any of the things which appear extraordinary, such as Charon’s mephitic caverns, ebbings of the tide, hot springs or fiery eruptions. Nor yet, they go on to say, will the wise man live in solitude; for he is naturally made for society and action. He will, however, submit to training to augment his powers of bodily endurance.
1.123. ἀβλαβεῖς τʼ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλους βλάπτειν οὔθʼ αὑτούς. ἐλεήμονάς τε μὴ εἶναι συγγνώμην τʼ ἔχειν μηδενί· μὴ γὰρ παριέναι τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιβαλλούσας κολάσεις, ἐπεὶ τό γʼ εἴκειν καὶ ὁ ἔλεος αὐτή θʼ ἡ ἐπιείκεια οὐδένειά ἐστι ψυχῆς πρὸς κολάσεις προσποιουμένης χρηστότητα· μηδʼ οἴεσθαι σκληροτέρας αὐτὰς εἶναι. ἔτι τε τὸν σοφὸν οὐδὲν θαυμάζειν τῶν δοκούντων παραδόξων, οἷον Χαρώνεια καὶ ἀμπώτιδας καὶ πηγὰς θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ πυρὸς ἀναφυσήματα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ, φασί, βιώσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος· κοινωνικὸς γὰρ φύσει καὶ πρακτικός. τὴν μέντοι ἄσκησιν ἀποδέξεται ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ὑπομονῆς.
1.124. And the wise man, they say, will offer prayers, and ask for good things from the gods: so Posidonius in the first book of his treatise On Duties, and Hecato in his third book On Paradoxes. Friendship, they declare, exists only between the wise and good, by reason of their likeness to one another. And by friendship they mean a common use of all that has to do with life, wherein we treat our friends as we should ourselves. They argue that a friend is worth having for his own sake and that it is a good thing to have many friends. But among the bad there is, they hold, no such thing as friendship, and thus no bad man has a friend. Another of their tenets is that the unwise are all mad, inasmuch as they are not wise but do what they do from that madness which is the equivalent of their folly.
1.124. Εὔξεταί τε, φασίν, ὁ σοφός, αἰτούμενος τὰ ἀγαθὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, καθά φησι Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ καθηκόντων καὶ Ἑκάτων ἐν τρίτῳ Περὶ παραδόξων. λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ἐν μονοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις εἶναι, διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα· φασὶ δʼ αὐτὴν κοινωνίαν τινὰ εἶναι τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, χρωμένων ἡμῶν τοῖς φίλοις ὡς ἑαυτοῖς. διʼ αὑτόν θʼ αἱρετὸν τὸν φίλον ἀποφαίνονται καὶ τὴν πολυφιλίαν ἀγαθόν. ἔν τε τοῖς φαύλοις μὴ εἶναι φιλίαν μηδενί τε τῶν φαύλων φίλον εἶναι. πάντας τε τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ φρονίμους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἴσην τῇ ἀφροσύνῃ μανίαν πάντα πράττειν.