---
title: "Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν"
author: "Epictetus"
translator: "Thomas Wentworth Higginson"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
url: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/
cite: "Epictetus, tr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/"
---

# Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν

*Epictetus, tr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson*

A former slave’s lessons in Stoic freedom, taken down by his pupil Arrian.

> Greek: ed. Heinrich Schenkl, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0557.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Thomas Wentworth Higginson, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0557.tlg001.perseus-eng4). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## Contents

1. [Book XLV](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/1.md)
2. [Book I · chapters 1–6](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/2.md)
3. [Book I · chapters 6–11](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/3.md)
4. [Book I · chapters 11–18](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/4.md)
5. [Book I · chapters 19–26](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/5.md)
6. [Book I · chapters 27–30](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/6.md)
7. [Book II · chapters 1–6](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/7.md)
8. [Book II · chapters 7–11](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/8.md)
9. [Book II · chapters 12–16](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/9.md)
10. [Book II · chapters 16–19](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/10.md)
11. [Book II · chapters 19–22](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/11.md)
12. [Book II · chapters 22–26](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/12.md)
13. [Book III · chapters 1–5](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/13.md)
14. [Book III · chapters 6–12](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/14.md)
15. [Book III · chapters 13–21](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/15.md)
16. [Book III · chapter 22](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/16.md)
17. [Book III · chapters 22–24](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/17.md)
18. [Book III · chapters 24–26](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/18.md)
19. [Book IV · chapter 1](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/19.md)
20. [Book IV · chapters 1–4](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/20.md)
21. [Book IV · chapters 4–6](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/21.md)
22. [Book IV · chapters 7–10](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/22.md)
23. [Book IV · chapters 10–13](https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/23.md)

## 1. Book XLV

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/1/#p-N

[¶0] 0. I neither composed the Discourses of Epictetus in the sense in which things of this nature can properly be said to have been composed, nor did I myself produce them to public view, any more than I composed them. But whatever I heard from his own mouth, that I tried to set down in the very same words, so far as possible, and to preserve as memorials for my own use, of his manner of thinking, and his frank utterance. These Discourses are such as one person would naturally deliver from his own thoughts, ex tempore, to another; not such as he would prepare to be read by others afterwards. Such as they are, I cannot tell how, without either my consent or knowledge, they have fallen into the hands of the public. But it is of little consequence to me if I do not appear an able writer, and of none to Epictetus if any one treats his Discourses with contempt; since it was very evident, even when he uttered them, that he aimed at nothing more than to move the minds of his hearers toward virtue. If they produce that one effect, they have in them what, I think, philosophical discourses ought to have. And should they fail of it, let the readers however be assured, that when Epictetus himself pronounced them, his audience could not help being affected in the very manner he intended they should. If by themselves his Discourses have less efficacy, perhaps it is my fault, or perhaps it is unavoidable. Farewell.

> Greek: 0. οὔτε συνέγραψα ἐγὼ τοὺς Ἐπικτήτου λόγους οὕτως ὅπως ἄν τις συγγράψειε τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε ἐξήνεγκα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αὐτός, ὅς γε οὐδὲ συγγράψαι φημί. ὅσα δὲ ἤκουον αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ταῦτα αὐτὰ ἐπειράθην αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασιν ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν γραψάμενος ὑπομνήματα εἰς ὕστερον ἐμαυτῷ διαφυλάξαι τῆς ἐκείνου διανοίας καὶ παρρησίας. ἔστι δὴ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ὁποῖα ἄν τις αὐτόθεν ὁρμηθεὶς εἴποι πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐχ ὁποῖα ἂν ἐπὶ τῷ ὕστερον ἐντυγχάνειν τινὰς αὐτοῖς συγγράφοι. τοιαῦτα δʼ ὄντα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως οὔτε ἑκόντος ἐμοῦ οὔτε εἰδότος ἐξέπεσεν εἰς ἀνθρώπους. ἀλλʼ ἐμοί γε οὐ πολὺς λόγος, εἰ οὐχ ἱκανὸς φανοῦμαι συγγράφειν, Ἐπικτήτῳ τε οὐδʼ ὀλίγος, εἰ καταφρονήσει τις αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων, ἐπεὶ καὶ λέγων αὐτοὺς οὐδενὸς ἄλλου δῆλος ἦν ἐφιέμενος ὅτι μὴ κινῆσαι τὰς γνώμας τῶν ἀκουόντων πρὸς τὰ βέλτιστα. εἰ μὲν δὴ τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ διαπράττοιντο οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι, ἔχοι⟨εν⟩ ἂν οἶμαι ὅπερ χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγους· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο ἴστωσαν οἱ ἐντυγχάνοντες ὅτι, αὐτὸς ὁπότε ἔλεγεν αὐτούς, ἀνάγκη ἦν τοῦτο πάσχειν τὸν ἀκροώμενον αὐτῶν ὅπερ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν παθεῖν ἠβούλετο. εἰ δʼ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοὶ ἐφʼ αὑτῶν τοῦτο οὐ διαπράττονται, τυχὸν μὲν ἐγὼ αἴτιος, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκη οὕτως ἔχειν. ἔρρωσο.

## 2. Book I · chapters 1–6

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/2/#p-N

[¶0] 1. Of human faculties in general, you will find that each is unable to contemplate itself, and therefore to approve or disapprove itself. How far does the proper sphere of grammar extend? As far as the judging of language. Of music? As far as the judging of melody. Does either of them contemplate itself, then? By no means. Thus, for instance, when you are to write to your friend, grammar will tell you what to write; but whether you are to write to your friend at all, or no, grammar will not tell you. Thus music, with regard to tunes; but whether it be proper or improper, at any particular time, to sing or play, music will not tell you. What will tell, then? That faculty which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is that? The Reasoning Faculty; for that alone is found able to place an estimate upon itself,—what it is, what are its powers, what its value and likewise all the rest. For what is it else that says, gold is beautiful? since the gold itself does not speak. Evidently, that faculty which judges of the appearances of things. What else distinguishes music, grammar, the other faculties, proves their uses, and shows their proper occasions? Nothing but this. As it was fit, then, this most excellent and superior faculty alone, a right use of the appearances of things, the gods have placed in our own power; but all other matters they have not placed in our power. What, was it because they would not? I rather think that, if they could, they had granted us these too; but they certainly could not. For, placed upon earth, and confined to such a body and to such companions, how was it possible that, in these respects, we should not be hindered by things outside of us? But what says Zeus? “Epictetus, if it had been possible, I had made this little body and property of thine free, and not liable to hindrance. But now do not mistake; it is not thy own, but only a finer mixture of clay. Since, then, I could not give thee this, I have given thee a certain portion of myself; this faculty of exerting the powers of pursuit and avoidance, of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the use of the appearances of things. Taking care of this point, and making what is thy own to consist in this, thou wilt never be restrained, never be hindered; thou wilt not groan, wilt not complain, wilt not flatter any one. How, then? Do all these advantages seem small to thee? Heaven forbid! Let them suffice thee, then, and thank the gods.” But now, when it is in our power to take care of one thing, and to apply ourselves to one, we choose rather to take care of many, and to encumber ourselves with many,—body, property, brother, friend, child, and slave,—and, by this multiplicity of encumbrances, we are burdened and weighed down. Thus, when the weather does not happen to be fair for sailing, we sit in distress and gaze out perpetually. Which way is the wind? North. What good will that do us? When will the west blow? When it pleases friend, or when Aeolus pleases; for Zeus has not made you dispenser of the winds, but Aeolus. What, then, is to be done? To make the best of what is in our power, and take the rest as it occurs. And how does it occur? As it pleases God. What, then, must I be the only one to lose my head? Why, would you have all the world, then, lose their heads for your consolation? Why are not you willing to stretch out your neck, like Lateranus, when he was commanded by Nero to be beheaded? For, shrinking a little after receiving a weak blow, he stretched it out again. And before this, when Epaphroditus, the freedman of Nero, interrogated him about the conspiracy, “If I have a mind to say anything,” replied he, “will tell it to your master.” What resource have we, then, upon such occasions? Why, what else but to distinguish between what is ours, and what not ours,—what is right, and what is wrong? I must die, and must I die groaning too? I must be fettered; must I be lamenting too? I must be exiled; and what hinders me, then, but that I may go smiling, and cheerful, and serene? “Betray a secret.” I will not betray it, for this is in my own power. “Then I will fetter you.” What do you say, man? Fetter me? You will fetter my leg, but not Zeus himself can get the better of my free will. “I will throw you into prison; I will behead that paltry body of yours.” Did I ever tell you that I alone had a head not liable to be cut off? These things ought philosophers to study; these ought they daily to write, and in these to exercise themselves. Thraseas used to say, “had rather be killed today than banished to-morrow.” But how did Rufus answer him? “If you prefer it as a heavier misfortune, how foolish a preference! If as a lighter, who has put it in your power? Why do you not study to be contented with what is allotted you?” Well, and what said Agrippinus upon this account? “will not be a hindrance to myself.” Word was brought him, “Your cause is pending in the senate.” “Good luck attend it; but it is eleven o’clock” (the hour when he used to exercise before bathing),—“let us go to our exercise.” This being over, a messenger tells him, “You are condemned.” “To banishment,” says he, “or to death?” “To banishment.” “What of my estate?” “It is not taken away.” “Well, then, let us go as far as Aricia, and dine there.” This it is to have studied what ought to be studied; to have placed our desires and aversions above tyranny and above chance. I must die,—if instantly, I will die instantly; if in a short time, I will dine first, and when the hour comes, then will I die. How? As becomes one who restores what is not his own.

> Greek: 1. τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων οὐδεμίαν εὑρήσετε αὐτὴν αὑτῆς θεωρητικήν, οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ δοκιμαστικὴν ἢ ἀποδοκιμαστικήν. ἡ γραμματικὴ μέχρι τίνος κέκτηται τὸ θεωρητικόν; μέχρι τοῦ διαγνῶναι τὰ γράμματα. ἡ μουσική; μέχρι τοῦ διαγνῶναι τὸ μέλος. αὐτὴ οὖν αὑτὴν θεωρεῖ τις αὐτῶν; οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλʼ ὅτε μέν, ἄν τι γράφῃς τῷ ἑταίρῳ, δεῖ τούτων τῶν γραπτέων, ἡ γραμματικὴ ἐρεῖ· πότερον δὲ γραπτέον τῷ ἑταίρῳ ἢ οὐ γραπτέον, ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐκ ἐρεῖ. καὶ περὶ τῶν μελῶν ὡσαύτως ἡ μουσική· πότερον δʼ ᾀστέον νῦν καὶ κιθαριστέον ἢ οὔτε ᾀστέον οὔτε κιθαριστέον οὐκ ἐρεῖ. τίς οὖν ἐρεῖ; ἡ καὶ αὑτὴν θεωροῦσα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα. αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶ τίς; ἡ δύναμις ἡ λογική· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη καὶ αὑτὴν κατανοήσουσα παρείληπται, τίς τέ ἐστι καὶ τί δύναται καὶ πόσου ἀξία οὖσα ἐλήλυθεν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο τὸ λέγον ὅτι χρυσίον καλόν ἐστιν; αὐτὸ γὰρ οὐ λέγει. δῆλον ὅτι ἡ χρηστικὴ δύναμις ταῖς φαντασίαις. τί ἄλλο τὸ μουσικήν, γραμματικήν, τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις διακρῖνον, δοκιμάζον τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς παραδεικνύον; οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ὥσπερ οὖν ἦν ἄξιον, τὸ κράτιστον ἁπάντων καὶ κυριεῦον οἱ θεοὶ μόνον ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐποίησαν, τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν ὀρθὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν. ἆρά γε ὅτι οὐκ ἤθελον; ἐγὼ μὲν δοκῶ ὅτι, εἰ ἠδύναντο, κἀκεῖνα ἂν ἡμῖν ἐπέτρεψαν· ἀλλὰ πάντως οὐκ ἠδύναντο. ἐπὶ γῆς γὰρ ὄντας καὶ σώματι συνδεδεμένους τοιούτῳ καὶ κοινωνοῖς τοιούτοις πῶς οἷόν τʼ ἦν εἰς ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐμποδίζεσθαι; ἀλλὰ τί λέγει ὁ Ζεύς; Ἐπίκτητε, εἰ οἷόν τε ἦν, καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον ἄν σου καὶ τὸ κτησίδιον ἐποίησα ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστον. νῦν δέ, μή σε λανθανέτω, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν σόν, ἀλλὰ πηλὸς κομψῶς πεφυραμένος. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ ἠδυνάμην, ἐδώκαμέν σοι μέρος τι ἡμέτερον, τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην τὴν ὁρμητικήν τε καὶ ἀφορμητικὴν καὶ ὀρεκτικήν τε καὶ ἐκκλιτικὴν καὶ ἁπλῶς τὴν χρηστικὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἧς ἐπιμελούμενος καὶ ἐν ᾗ τὰ σαυτοῦ τιθέμενος οὐδέποτε κωλυθήσῃ, οὐδέποτʼ ἐμποδισθήσῃ, οὐ στενάξεις, οὐ μέμψῃ, οὐ κολακεύσεις οὐδένα. τί οὖν; μή τι μικρά σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα; μὴ γένοιτο. ἀρκῇ οὖν αὐτοῖς; εὔχομαι δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς. νῦν δʼ ἑνὸς δυνάμενοι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἑνὶ προσηρτηκέναι ἑαυτοὺς μᾶλλον θέλομεν πολλῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ πολλοῖς προσδεδέσθαι καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ κτήσει καὶ ἀδελφῷ καὶ φίλῳ καὶ τέκνῳ καὶ δούλῳ. ἅτε οὖν πολλοῖς προσδεδεμένοι βαρούμεθα ὑπʼ αὐτῶν καὶ καθελκόμεθα. διὰ τοῦτο, ἂν ἄπλοια ᾖ, καθήμεθα σπώμενοι καὶ παρακύπτομεν συνεχῶς· τίς ἄνεμος πνεῖ; βορέας. τί ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτῷ; πότε ὁ ζέφυρος πνεύσει; ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἢ τῷ Αἰόλῳ. σὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ταμίαν τῶν ἀνέμων, ἀλλὰ τὸν Αἴολον. τί οὖν; δεῖ τὰ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν βέλτιστα κατασκευάζειν, τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι ὡς πέφυκεν. πῶς οὖν πέφυκεν; ὡς ἂν ὁ θεὸς θέλῃ. ἐμὲ οὖν νῦν τραχηλοκοπεῖσθαι μόνον; τί οὖν; ἤθελες πάντας τραχηλοκοπηθῆναι, ἵνα σὺ παραμυθίαν ἔχῃς; οὐ θέλεις οὕτως ἐκτεῖναι τὸν τράχηλον, ὡς Λατερανός τις ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ κελευσθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Νέρωνος ἀποκεφαλισθῆναι; ἐκτείνας γὰρ τὸν τράχηλον καὶ πληγεὶς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πληγὴν ἀσθενῆ γενομένην ἐπʼ ὀλίγον συνελκυσθεὶς πάλιν ἐξέτεινεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτι πρότερον προσελθόντι τις Ἐπαφροδίτῳ τῷ κυρίῳ τοῦ Νέρωνος καὶ ἀνακρίνοντι αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ συγκρουσθῆναι ἄν τί θέλω, φησίν, ἐρῶ σου τῷ κυρίῳ. τί οὖν δεῖ πρόχειρον ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ τί ἐμὸν καὶ τί οὐκ ἐμὸν καὶ τί μοι ἔξεστιν καὶ τί μοι οὐκ ἔξεστιν; ἀποθανεῖν με δεῖ· μή τι οὖν καὶ στένοντα; δεθῆναι· μή τι καὶ θρηνοῦντα; φυγαδευθῆναι· μή τις οὖν κωλύει γελῶντα καὶ εὐθυμοῦντα καὶ εὐροοῦντα; εἰπὲ τὰ ἀπόρρητα. οὐ λέγω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπʼ ἐμοί ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δήσω σε. ἄνθρωπε. τί λέγεις; ἐμέ; τὸ σκέλος μου δήσεις, τὴν προαίρεσιν δὲ οὐδʼ ὁ Ζ⟨εὺς νι⟩κῆσαι δύναται. εἰς φυλακήν σε βαλῶ. τὸ ⟨σω⟩μάτιον. ἀποκεφαλίσω σε. πότε οὖν σοὶ εἶπον, ὅτι μόνου ἐμοῦ ὁ τράχηλος ἀναπότμητός ἐστιν; ταῦτα ἔδει μελετᾶν τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας, ταῦτα καθʼ ἡμέραν γράφειν, ἐν τούτοις γυμνάζεσθαι. Θρασέας εἰώθει λέγειν σήμερον ἀναιρεθῆναι θέλω μᾶλλον ἢ αὔριον φυγαδευθῆναι τί οὖν αὐτῷ Ῥοῦφος εἶπεν; εἰ μὲν ὡς βαρύτερον ἐκλέγῃ, τίς ἡ μωρία τῆς ἐκλογῆς; εἰ δʼ ὡς κουφότερον, τίς σοι δέδωκεν; οὐ θέλεις μελετᾶν ἀρκεῖσθαι τῷ δεδομένῳ; διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ Ἀγριππῖνος τί ἔλεγεν; ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐμαυτῷ ἐμπόδιος οὐ γίνομαι. ἀπηγγέλη αὐτῷ ὅτι κρίνῃ ἐν συγκλήτῳ. — ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ. ἀλλὰ ἦλθεν ἡ πέμπτη (ταύτῃ δʼ εἰώθει γυμνασάμενος ψυχρολουτρεῖν)· ἀπέλθωμεν καὶ γυμνασθῶμεν. γυμνασαμένῳ λέγει τις, αὐτῷ ἐλθὼν ὅτι Κατακέκρισαι. — φυγῇ,, φησίν, ἢ θανάτῳ; — φυγῇ. — τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τί; — οὐκ ἀφῃρέθη. — εἰς Ἀρίκειαν οὖν ἀπελθόντες ἀριστήσωμεν. — τοῦτʼ ἔστι μεμελετηκέναι ἃ δεῖ μελετᾶν, ὄρεξιν ἔκκλισιν ἀκώλυτα ἀπερίπτωτα παρεσκευακέναι. ἀποθανεῖν με δεῖ. εἰ ἤδη, ἀποθνῄσκω· κἂν μετʼ ὀλίγον, νῦν ἀριστῶ τῆς ὥρας ἐλθούσης, εἶτα τότε τεθνήξομαι. πῶς; ὡς προσήκει τὸν τὰ ἀλλότρια ἀποδιδόντα.

[¶1] 2. To a reasonable creature, that alone is insupportable which is unreasonable, but everything reasonable may be supported. Stripes are not in themselves insupportable. “How so?” See how the Spartans bear whipping, after they have learned that it is a reasonable thing. Hanging is not insupportable; for, as soon as a man has taken it into his head that it is reasonable, he goes and hangs himself. In short, we shall find by observation that no creature is oppressed so much by anything as by what is unreasonable; nor on the other hand, attracted to anything so strongly, as to what is reasonable. But it happens that different things are reasonable and unreasonable, as well as good and bad, advantageous and disadvantageous, to different persons. On this account, chiefly, we stand in need of a liberal education, to teach us to adapt the preconceptions of reasonable and unreasonable to particular cases, conformably to nature. But to judge of reasonable and unreasonable, we make use not only of a due estimation of things without us, but of what relates to each person’s particular character. Thus, it is reasonable for one man to submit to a menial office, who considers this only, that if he does not submit to it he shall be whipt and lose his dinner, but that if he does, he has nothing hard or disagreeable to suffer; whereas to another it appears insupportable, not only to submit to such an office himself, but to respect any one else who does. If you ask me, then, whether you shall do this menial office or not, I will tell you it is a pleasanter thing to get a dinner than not, and a greater disgrace to be whipt than not to be whipt; so that, if you measure yourself by these things, go and do your office. “Ay, but this is not suitable to my character.” It is you who are to consider that, not I; for it is you who know yourself, what value you set upon yourself, and at what rate you sell yourself; for different people sell themselves at different prices. Hence Agrippinus, when Florus was deliberating whether he should go to Nero’s shows, and perform some part in them himself, bid him go. “But why do not you go, then?” says Florus. “Because,” replied Agrippinus, “do not deliberate about it.” For he who once sets himself about such considerations, and goes to calculating the worth of external things, approaches very near to those who forget their own character. Why, then, do you ask me whether death or life be the more eligible? I answer, life. Pain or pleasure? I answer, pleasure. “But if I do not act a part, I shall lose my head.” Go and act it, then, but I will not. “Why?” Because you esteem yourself only as one thread of many that make up the piece. “What then?” You have nothing to care for, but how to be like the rest of mankind, as one thread desires not to be distinguished from the others. But I would be the purple, that small and brilliant part, which gives a lustre and beauty to the rest. Why, then, do you bid me resemble the multitude? At that rate, how shall I be the purple? This Priscus Helvidius, too, saw, and acted accordingly; for when Vespasian had sent to forbid his going to the Senate, he answered, “It is in your power to prevent my continuing a senator; but while I am one I must go.”—“Well, then, at least be silent there.” “Do not ask my opinion and I will be silent.”—“But I must ask it.” “And I must speak what appears to me to be right.”—“But if you do, I will put you to death.” “When did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You will do your part, and I mine; it is yours to kill, and mine to die intrepid; fours to banish, mine to depart untroubled.” What good, then, did Priscus do, who was but a single person?, Why, what good does the purple do to the garment? What, but to be beautiful in itself, and to set a good example to the rest? Another, perhaps, if in such circumstances Caesar had forbidden his going to the Senate, would have answered, “am obliged to you for excusing me.” But such a one he would not have forbidden to go,—well knowing that he would either sit like a statue, or, if he spoke, would say what he knew to be agreeable to Caesar, and would overdo it by adding still more. Thus acted even a wrestler, who was in danger of death, unless he consented to an ignominious amputation. His brother, who was a philosopher, coming to him, and saying “Well, brother, what do you design to do? Let us cut away this part, and return again to the field.” He refused, and courageously died. When it was asked whether he acted thus as a wrestler, or a philosopher, I answer, as a man, said Epictetus; but as a man who had been proclaimed a champion at the Olympic games; who had been used to such places, and not exercised merely in the school of Bato. Another would have had his very head cut off, if he could have lived without it. This is that regard to character, so powerful with those who are accustomed to introduce it, from their own breasts, into their deliberations. “Come now, Epictetus, take off your beard.” If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not take it off.—“Then I will take off your head.” If that will do you any good, take it. It was asked, How shall each of us perceive what belongs to his character? Whence, replied Epictetus, does a bull, when the lion approaches, alone recognize his own qualifications, and expose himself alone for the whole herd? It is evident that with the qualifications occurs, at the same time, the consciousness of being indued with them. And in the same manner, whoever of us hath such qualifications will not be ignorant of them. But neither is a bull nor a gallant-spirited man formed all at once. We are to exercise, and qualify ourselves, and not to run rashly upon what doth not concern us. Only consider at what price you sell your own free will, O man!—if only that you may not sell it for a trifle. The highest greatness and excellence perhaps seem to belong to others, to such as Socrates. Why, then, as we are born with a like nature, do not all, or the greater number, become such as he? Why, are all horses swift? Are all dogs sagacious? What, then, because my gifts are humble shall I neglect all care of myself? Heaven forbid! Epictetus may not surpass Socrates,—granted; but could I overtake him it might be enough for me. I shall never be Milo, and yet I do not neglect my body; nor Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor should we omit any effort from a despair of arriving at the highest.

> Greek: 2. τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ μόνον ἀφόρητόν ἐστι τὸ ἄλογον, τὸ δʼ εὔλογον φορητόν. πληγαὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀφόρητοι τῇ φύσει. — τίνα τρόπον; — ὅρα πῶς· Λακεδαιμόνιοι μαστιγοῦνται μαθόντες ὅτι εὔλογόν ἐστιν. — τὸ δʼ ἀπάγξα⟨σθαι οὐ⟩κ ἔστιν ἀφόρητον; — ὅταν γοῦν πάθῃ τις ὅτι εὔ⟨λογ⟩ον, ἀπελθὼν ἀπήγξατο. ἁπλῶς ἐὰν προσέχωμεν, ὑπʼ οὐδενὸς οὕτως εὑρήσομεν τὸ ζῷον θλιβόμενον ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ πάλιν ἐπʼ οὐδὲν οὕτως ἑλκόμενον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ εὔλογον. ἄλλῳ δʼ ἄλλο προσπίπτει τὸ εὔλογον καὶ ἄλογον, καθάπερ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ καὶ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον. διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα παιδείας δεόμεθα, ὥστε μαθεῖν τοῦ εὐλόγου καὶ ἀλόγου πρόληψιν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρο⟨υ⟩ς οὐσίαις ἐφαρμόζειν συμφώνως τῇ φύσει. εἰς δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὐλόγου καὶ ἀλόγου κρίσιν οὐ μόνον ταῖς τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξίαις συγχρώμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸ πρόσωπον ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος. τῷ ⟨μὲν⟩ γάρ τινι εὔλογον τὸ ἀμίδα παρακρατεῖν αὐτὸ μόνον βλέποντι, ὅτι μὴ παρακρατήσας μὲν πληγὰς λήψεται καὶ τροφὰς οὐ λήψεται, παρακρατήσας δʼ οὐ πείσεταί τι τραχὺ ἢ ἀνιαρόν· ἄλλῳ δέ τινι οὐ μόνον τὸ αὐτὸν παρακρατῆσαι ἀφόρητον δοκεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἄλλου παρακρατοῦντος ἀνασχέσθαι. ἂν οὖν μου πυνθάνῃ παρακρατήσω τὴν ἀμίδα ἢ μή;, ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι μείζονα ἀξίαν ἔχει τὸ λαβεῖν τροφὰς τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν καὶ μείζονα ἀπαξίαν τὸ δαρῆναι τοῦ μὴ δαρῆναι· ὥστʼ εἰ τούτοις παραμετρεῖς τὰ σαυτοῦ, ἀπελθὼν παρακράτει. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἂν κατʼ ἐμέ. τοῦτο σὲ δεῖ συνεισφέρειν εἰς τὴν σκέψιν, οὐκ ἐμέ. σὺ γὰρ εἶ ὁ σαυτὸν εἰδώς, πόσου ἄξιος εἶ σεαυτῷ καὶ πόσου σεαυτὸν πιπράσκεις· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλων πιπράσκουσιν. διὰ τοῦτο Ἀγριππῖνος Φλώρῳ σκεπτομένῳ, εἰ καταβατέον αὐτῷ ἐστιν εἰς Νέρωνος θεωρίας, ὥστε καὶ αὐτόν τι λειτουργῆσαι, ἔφη κατάβηθι. πυθομένου δʼ αὐτοῦ διὰ τί σὺ οὐ καταβαίνεις; ἔφη ὅτι ἐγὼ οὐδὲ βουλεύομαι. ὁ γὰρ ἅπαξ εἰς τὴν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σκέψιν καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξίας συγκαθεὶς καὶ ψηφίζων ἐγγύς ἐστι τῶν ἐπιλελησμένων τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου. τί γάρ μου πυνθάνῃ; θάνατος αἱρετώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ ζωή; λέγω ζωή. πόνος ἢ ἡδονή; λέγω ἡδονή. ἀλλά, ἂν μὴ τραγῳδήσω, τραχηλοκοπηθήσομαι. ἄπελθε τοίνυν καὶ τραγῴδει, ἐγὼ δʼ οὐ τραγῳδήσω. διὰ τί; ὅτι σὺ σεαυτὸν ἡγῇ μίαν τινὰ εἶναι κρόκην τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χιτῶνος. τί οὖν; σὲ ἔδει φροντίζειν πῶς ἀνόμοιος ᾖς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἡ κρόκη πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας κρόκας θέλει τι ἔχειν ἐξαίρετον. ἐγὼ δὲ πορφύρα εἶναι βούλομαι, τὸ ὀλίγον ἐκεῖνο καὶ στιλπνὸν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον τοῦ εὐπρεπῆ φαίνεσθαι καὶ καλά. τί οὖν μοι λέγεις ὅτι ἐξομοιώθητι τοῖς πολλοῖς; καὶ πῶς ἔτι πορφύρα ἔσομαι; ταῦτα εἶδεν καὶ Πρῖσκος Ἑλουίδιος καὶ ἰδὼν ἐποίησε. προσπέμψαντος αὐτῷ Οὐεσπασιανοῦ, ἵνα μὴ εἰσέλθῃ εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον, ἀπεκρίνατο ἐπὶ σοί ἐστι μὴ ἐᾶσαί με εἶναι συγκλητικόν· μέχρι δὲ ἂν ὦ, δεῖ με εἰσέρχεσθαι. ἄγε ἀλλʼ εἰσελθών, φησίν, σιώπησον. μή μʼ ἐξέταζε καὶ σιωπήσω. ἀλλὰ δεῖ με ἐξετάσαι. κἀμὲ εἰπεῖν τὸ φαινόμενον δίκαιον. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν εἴπῃς, ἀποκτενῶ σε. πότε οὖν σοι εἶπον, ὅτι ἀθάνατός εἰμι; καὶ σὺ τὸ σὸν ποιήσεις κἀγὼ τὸ ἐμόν. σόν ἐστιν ἀποκτεῖναι, ἐμὸν ἀποθανεῖν μὴ τρέμοντα· σὸν φυγαδεῦσαι, ἐμὸν ἐξελθεῖν μὴ λυπούμενον. τί οὖν ὠφέλησε Πρῖσκος εἷς ὤν; τί δʼ ὠφελεῖ ἡ πορφύρα τὸ ἱμάτιον; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ διαπρέπει ἐν αὐτῷ ὡς πορφύρα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ καλὸν παράδειγμα ἔκκειται; ἄλλος δʼ ἂν εἰπόντος αὐτῷ Καίσαρος ἐν τοιαύτῃ περὶ στάσει μὴ ἐλθεῖν εἰς σύγκλητον εἶπεν ἔχω χάριν, ὅτι μου φείδῃ. τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐδʼ ἂν ἐκώλυεν εἰσελθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ᾔδει, ὅτι ἢ καθεδεῖται ὡς κεράμιον ἢ λέγων ἐρεῖ, ἃ οἶδεν ὅτι ὁ Καῖσαρ θέλει, καὶ προσεπισωρεύσει ἔτι πλείονα. τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ἀθλητής τις κινδυνεύων ἀποθανεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἀπεκόπη τὸ αἰδοῖον, ἐπελθόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ (ἦν δʼ ἐκεῖνος φιλόσοφος) καὶ εἰπόντος ἄγε, ἀδελφέ, τί μέλλεις ποιεῖν; ἀποκόπτομεν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος καὶ ἔτι εἰς γυμνάσιον προερχόμεθα; οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν, ἀλλʼ ἐγκαρτερήσας ἀπέθανεν. πυθομένου δέ τινος· πῶς τοῦτο ἐποίησεν; ὡς ἀθλητὴς ἢ ὡς φιλόσοφος; ⟨ὡς⟩ ἀνήρ, ἔφη, ἀνὴρ δʼ Ὀλύμπια κεκηρυγμένος καὶ ἠγωνισμένος, ἐν τοιαύτῃ τινὶ χώρᾳ ἀνεστραμμένος, οὐχὶ παρὰ τῷ Βάτω⟨ν⟩ι ἀλειφόμενος. ἄλλος δὲ κἂν τὸν τράχηλον ἀπετμήθη, εἰ ζῆν ἠδύνατο δίχα τοῦ τραχήλου. τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ κατὰ πρόσωπον· οὕτως ἰσχυρὸν παρὰ τοῖς εἰθισμένοις αὐτὸ συνεισφέρειν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσιν. ἄγε οὖν, Ἐπίκτητε, διαξύρησαι. ἂν ὦ φιλόσοφος, λέγω οὐ διαξυρῶμαι. ἀλλʼ ἀφελῶ σου τὸν τράχηλον. εἰ σοὶ ἄμεινον, ἄφελε. ἐπύθετό τις· πόθεν οὖν αἰσθησόμεθα τοῦ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἕκαστος; — πόθεν δʼ ὁ ταῦρος, ἔφη, λέοντος ἐπελθόντος μόνος αἰσθάνεται τῆς αὑτοῦ παρασκευῆς καὶ προβέβληκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀγέλης πάσης; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι εὐθὺς ἅμα τῷ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἔχειν ἀπαντᾷ καὶ συναίσθησις αὐτῆς; καὶ ἡμῶν τοίνυν ὅστις ἂν ἔχῃ τοιαύτην παρασκευήν, οὐκ ἀγνοήσει αὐτήν. ἄφνω δὲ ταῦρος οὐ γίνεται οὐδὲ γενναῖος ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ χειμασκῆσαι, παρασκευάσασθαι καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ προσπηδᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ μηδὲν προσήκοντα. μόνον σκέψαι, πόσου πωλεῖς τὴν σεαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν. ἄνθρωπε, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, μὴ ὀλίγου αὐτὴν πωλήσῃς. τὸ δὲ μέγα καὶ ἐξαίρετον ἄλλοις τάχα προσήκει, Σωκράτει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. — διὰ τί οὖν, εἰ πρὸς τοῦτο πεφύκαμεν, οὐ πάντες ἢ πολλοὶ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι; — ἵπποι γὰρ ὠκεῖς ἅπαντες γίνονται, κύνες γὰρ ἰχνευτικοὶ πάντες; τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ ἀφυής εἰμι, ἀποστῶ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τούτου ἕνεκα; μὴ γένοιτο. Ἐπίκτητος κρείσσων Σωκράτους οὐκ ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ χείρων, τοῦτό μοι ἱκανόν ἐστιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ Μίλων ἔσομαι καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἀμελῶ τοῦ σώματος· οὐδὲ Κροῖσος καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἀμελῶ τῆς κτήσεως· οὐδʼ ἁπλῶς ἄλλου τινὸς τῆς ἐπιμελείας διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῶν ἄκρων ἀφιστάμεθα.

[¶2] 3. If a person could be persuaded of this principle as he ought, that we are all originally descended from God, and that he is the father of men and gods, I conceive he never would think of himself meanly or ignobly. Suppose Caesar were to adopt you, there would be no bearing your haughty looks; and will you not feel ennobled on knowing yourself to be the son of God? Yet, in fact, we are not ennobled. But having two things united in our composition, a body in common with the brutes, and reason in common with the gods, many incline to this unhappy and mortal kindred, and only some few to that which is happy and divine. And, as of necessity every one must treat each particular thing according to the notions he forms about it, so those few who suppose that they are made for faith and honor and a wise use of things will never think meanly or ignobly concerning themselves. But with the multitude the case is contrary. “For what am I? A poor contemptible man, with this miserable flesh of mine?” Miserable indeed; but you have likewise something better than this poor flesh. Why, then, overlooking that, do you pine away in attention to this? By means of this [animal] kindred some of us, deviating towards it, become like wolves, faithless, and crafty, and mischievous; others, like lions, wild and savage and untamed; but most of us foxes, and disgraceful even among brutes. For what else is a slanderous and ill-natured man but a fox, or something yet more wretched and mean? Watch and take heed, then, that you do not sink thus low.

> Greek: 3. εἴ τις τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθῆσαι κατʼ ἀξίαν δύναιτο, ὅτι γεγόναμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντες προηγουμένως καὶ ὁ θεὸς πατήρ ἐστι τῶν τʼ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν θεῶν, οἶμαι ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀγεννὲς οὐδὲ ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσεται περὶ ἑαυτοῦ. ἀλλʼ ἂν μὲν Καῖσαρ εἰσποιήσηταί σε, οὐδείς σου τὴν ὀφρῦν βαστάσει· ἂν δὲ γνῷς, ὅτι τοῦ Διὸς υἱὸς εἶ, οὐκ ἐπαρθήσῃ; νῦν δʼ οὐ ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ δύο ταῦτα ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἡμῶν ἐγκαταμέμικται, τὸ σῶμα μὲν κοινὸν πρὸς τὰ ζῷα, ὁ λόγος δὲ καὶ ἡ γνώμη κοινὸν πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἄλλοι μὲν ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀποκλίνουσιν τὴν συγγένειαν τὴν ἀτυχῆ καὶ νεκράν, ὀλίγοι δέ τινες ἐπὶ τὴν θείαν καὶ μακαρίαν. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη πάνθʼ ὁντινοῦν οὕτως ἑκάστῳ χρῆσθαι ὡς ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπολάβῃ, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οἱ ὀλίγοι, ὅσοι πρὸς πίστιν οἴονται γεγονέναι καὶ πρὸς αἰδῶ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τῆς χρήσεως τῶν φαντασιῶν, οὐδὲν ταπεινὸν οὐδʼ ἀγε⟨ν⟩νὲς ἐνθυμοῦνται περὶ αὑτῶν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τἀναντία. τί γὰρ εἰμί; ταλαίπωρον ἀνθρωπάριον καὶ τὰ δύστηνά μου σαρκίδια. τῷ μὲν ὄντι δύστηνα, ἀλλὰ ἔχεις τι καὶ κρεῖσσον τῶν σαρκιδίων. τί οὖν ἀφεὶς ἐκεῖνο τούτοις προστέτηκας; διὰ ταύτην τὴν συγγένειαν οἱ μὲν ἀποκλίναντες λύκοις ὅμοιοι γινόμεθα, ἄπιστοι καὶ ἐπίβουλοι καὶ βλαβεροί, οἱ δὲ λέουσιν, ἄγριοι καὶ θηριώδεις καὶ ἀνήμεροι, οἱ πλείους δʼ ἡμῶν ἀλώπεκες καὶ ὡς ἐν ζῴοις ἀτυχήματα. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο λοίδορος καὶ κακοήθης ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἀλώπηξ ἢ τί ἄλλο ἀτυχέστερον καὶ ταπεινότερον; ὁρᾶτε οὖν καὶ προσέχετε, μή τι τούτων ἀποβῆτε τῶν ἀτυχημάτων.

[¶3] 4. He who is entering on a state of progress, having learned from the philosophers that good should be sought and evil shunned, and having learned, too, that prosperity and peace are no otherwise attainable by man than in not missing what he seeks, nor incurring what he shuns,—such a one totally extirpates and banishes all wayward desire, and shuns only those things over which he can have control. For if he should attempt to shun those things over which he has no control, he knows that he must sometimes incur that which he shuns, and be unhappy. Now if virtue promises happiness, prosperity, and peace, then progress in virtue is certainly progress in each of these. For to whatever point the perfection of anything absolutely brings us, progress is always an approach towards it. How happens it, then, that when we confess virtue to be such, yet we seek, and make an ostentatious show of progress in other things! What is the business of virtue? A life truly prosperous. Who is in a state of progress, then? He who has best studied Chrysippus? Why, does virtue consist in having read Chrysippus through? If so, progress is confessedly nothing else than understanding a great deal of Chrysippus; otherwise we confess virtue to consist in one thing, and declare progress, which is an approach to it, to be quite another thing. This person, they say, is already able to understand Chrysippus, by himself. “Certainly, sir, you have made a vast improvement!” What improvement? Why do you delude him? Why do you withdraw him from a sense of his real needs? Why do not you show him the real function of virtue, that he may know where to seek progress? Seek it there, O unfortunate, where your work lies. And where does your work lie? In learning what to seek and what to shun, that you may neither be disappointed of the one nor incur the other; in practising how to pursue and how to avoid, that you may not be liable to fail; in practising intellectual assent and doubt, that you may not be liable to be deceived. These are the first and most necessary things. But if you merely seek, in trembling and lamentation, to keep away all possible ills, what real progress have you made? Show me then your progress in this point. As if I should say to a wrestler, Show me your muscle; and he should answer me, “See my dumb-bells.” Your dumb-bells are your own affair; I desire to see the effect of them. “Take the treatise on the active powers, and see how thoroughly I have perused it.” I do not inquire into this, O slavish man, but how you exert those powers, how you manage your desires and aversions, your intentions and purposes, how you meet events,—whether in accordance with nature’s laws or contrary to them. If in accordance, give me evidence of that, and I will say you improve; if the contrary, you may go your way, and not only comment on these treatises, but write such yourself; and yet what service will it do you? Do not you know that the whole volume is sold for five denarii? Does he who comments upon it, then, value himself at more than that sum? Never make your life to lie in one thing and yet seek progress in another. Where is progress, then? If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will, to train, and perfect, and render it conformable to nature,—noble, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, humble;—if he has learned, too, that whoever desires or shuns things beyond his own power can neither be faithful nor free, but must necessarily take his chance with them, must necessarily too be subject to others, to such as can procure or prevent what he desires or shuns; if, rising in the morning, he observes and keeps to these rules; bathes regularly, eats frugally, and to every subject of action applies the same fixed principles,—if a racer to racing, if an orator to oratory,—this is he who truly makes progress; this is he who has not labored in vain. But if he is wholly intent on reading books, and has labored that point only, and travelled for that, I bid him go home immediately and do his daily duties; since that which he sought is nothing. The only real thing is to study how to rid life of lamentation, and complaint, and Alas! and I am undone, and misfortune, and failure; and to learn what death, what exile, what a prison, what poison is; that he may be able to say in a prison, like Socrates, “My dear Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be;” and not, “Wretched old man, have I kept my gray hairs for this!” [Do you ask] who speaks thus? Do you think I quote some mean and despicable person? Is it not Priam who says it? Is it not Oedipus? Nay, how many kings say it? For what else is tragedy but the dramatized sufferings of men, bewildered by an admiration of externals? If one were to be taught by fictions that things beyond our will are nothing to us, I should rejoice in such a fiction, by which I might live prosperous and serene. But what your own aims are, it is your business to consider. Of what service, then, is Chrysippus to us? To teach you that those things are not false on which true prosperity and peace depend. “Take my books, and you will see how true and conformable to nature those things are which give me peace.” How great a happiness! And how great the benefactor who shows the way! To Triptolemus all men have raised temples and altars, because he gave us a milder kind of food; but to him who has discovered and brought to light and communicated the truth to all,—the means, not merely of living, but of living well,—who among you ever raised an altar or a temple, or dedicated a statue; or who worships God in his name? We offer sacrifices in memory of those who have given us corn and the vine; and shall we not give thanks to God for those who have nurtured such fruit in the human breast,—even the truth which makes us blessed?

> Greek: 4. ὁ προκόπτων μεμαθηκὼς παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὄρεξις ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν, ἡ δʼ ἔκκλισις πρὸς κακά, μεμαθηκὼς δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως τὸ εὔρουν καὶ ἀπαθὲς περιγίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ ἐν ὀρέξει μὲν μὴ ἀποτυγχάνοντι, ἐν ἐκκλίσει ⟨δὲ⟩ μὴ περιπίπτοντι, τὴν μὲν ὄρεξιν ἦρκεν ἐξ αὑτοῦ εἰσάπαν καὶ ὑπερτέθειται, τῇ ἐκκλίσει δὲ πρὸς μόνα χρῆται τὰ προαιρετικά. τῶν γὰρ ἀπροαιρέτων ἄν τι ἐκκλίνῃ, οἶδεν ὅτι περιπεσεῖταί ποτέ τινι παρὰ τὴν ἔκκλισιν τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ δυστυχήσει. εἰ δʼ ἡ ἀρετὴ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν εὐδαιμονίαν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπάθειαν καὶ εὔροιαν, πάντως καὶ ἡ προκοπὴ ⟨ἡ⟩ πρὸς αὐτὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον τούτων ἐστὶ προκοπή. ἀεὶ γὰρ πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἡ τελειότης τινὸς καθάπαξ ἄγῃ, πρὸς αὐτὸ ἡ προκοπὴ συνεγγισμός ἐστιν. πῶς οὖν τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν τοιοῦτόν τι ὁμολογοῦμεν, τὴν προκοπὴν δʼ ἐν ἄλλοις ζητοῦμεν καὶ ἐπιδείκνυμεν; τί ἔργον ἀρετῆς; εὔροια. τίς οὖν προκόπτει; ὁ πολλὰς Χρυσίππου συντάξεις ἀνεγνωκώς; μὴ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦτʼ ἔστι Χρύσιππον νενοηκέναι; εἰ γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ὁμολογουμένως ἡ προκοπὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ πολλὰ τῶν Χρυσίππου νοεῖν. νῦν δʼ ἄλλο μέν τι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιφέρειν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἄλλο[ν] δὲ τὸν συνεγγισμόν, τὴν προκοπὴν ἀποφαίνομεν. οὗτος, φησίν, ἤδη καὶ διʼ αὑτοῦ δύναται Χρύσιππον ἀναγιγνώσκειν. εὖ, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, προκόπτεις, ἄνθρωπε· ποίαν προκοπήν. τί ἐμπαίζεις αὐτῷ; τί δʼ ἀπάγεις αὐτὸν τῆς συναισθήσεως τῶν αὑτοῦ κακῶν; οὐ θέλεις δεῖξαι αὐτῷ τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἵνα μάθῃ ποῦ τὴν προκοπὴν ζητῇ; ἐκεῖ ζήτησον αὐτήν, ταλαίπωρε, ὅπου σου τὸ ἔργον. ποῦ δέ σου τὸ ἔργον; ἐν ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει, ἵνʼ ἀναπότευκτος ᾖς καὶ ἀπερίπτωτος, ἐν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ἀφορμαῖς, ἵνʼ ἀναμάρτητος, ἐν προ⟨ς⟩θέσει καὶ ἐποχῇ, ἵνʼ ἀνεξαπάτητος. πρῶτοι δʼ εἰσὶν οἱ πρῶτοι τόποι καὶ ἀναγκαιότατοι. ἂν δὲ τρέμων καὶ πενθῶν ζητῇς ἀπερίπτωτος εἶναι, ἄρα πῶς προκόπτεις; σὺ οὖν ἐνταῦθά μοι δεῖξόν σου τὴν προκοπήν. καθάπερ εἰ ἀθλητῇ διελεγόμην δεῖξόν μοι τοὺς ὤμους, εἶτα ἔλεγεν ἐκεῖνος ἴδε μου τοὺς ἁλτῆρας. ὄψει σὺ καὶ οἱ ἁλτῆρες, ἐγὼ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τῶν ἁλτήρων ἰδεῖν βούλομαι. λάβε τὴν περὶ ὁρμῆς σύνταξιν καὶ γνῶθι πῶς αὐτὴν ἀνέγνωκα. ἀνδράποδον, οὐ τοῦτο ζητῶ, ἀλλὰ πῶς ὁρμᾷς καὶ ἀφορμᾷς, πῶς ὀρέγῃ καὶ ἐκκλίνεις, πῶς ἐπιβάλλῃ καὶ προ[σ]τίθεσαι καὶ παρασκευάζῃ, πότερα συμφώνως τῇ φύσει ἢ ἀσυμφώνως. εἰ γὰρ συμφώνως, τοῦτό μοι δείκνυε καὶ ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι προκόπτεις· εἰ δʼ ἀσυμφώνως, ἄπελθε καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐξηγοῦ τὰ βιβλία, ἀλλὰ καὶ γράφε αὐτὸς τοιαῦτα. καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος; οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι ὅλον τὸ βιβλίον πέντε δηναρίων ἐστίν; ὁ οὖν ἐξηγούμενος αὐτὸ δοκεῖ ὅτι πλείονος ἄξιός ἐστιν ἢ πέντε δηναρίων; μηδέποτε οὖν ἀλλαχοῦ τὸ ἔργον ζητεῖτε, ἀλλαχοῦ τὴν προκοπήν. ποῦ οὖν προκοπή; εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἀποστὰς τῶν ἐκτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐπέστραπται τὴν αὑτοῦ, ταύτην ἐξεργάζεσθαι καὶ ἐκπονεῖν, ὥστε σύμφωνον ἀποτελέσαι τῇ φύσει, ὑψηλὴν ἐλευθέραν ἀκώλυτον ἀνεμπόδιστον πιστὴν αἰδήμονα· μεμάθηκέν τε, ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ποθῶν ἢ φεύγων οὔτε πιστὸς εἶναι δύναται οὔτʼ ἐλεύθερος, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη μεταπίπτειν καὶ μεταρριπίζεσθαι ἅμα ἐκείνοις καὶ αὐτόν, ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ὑποτεταχέναι ἄλλοις ἑαυτόν, τοῖς ἐκεῖνα περιποιεῖν ἢ κωλύειν δυναμένοις· καὶ λοιπὸν ἕωθεν ἀνιστάμενος ταῦτα τηρεῖ καὶ φυλάσσει, λούεται ὡς πιστός, ὡς αἰδήμων ἐσθίει, ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τῆς ἀεὶ παραπιπτούσης ὕλης τὰ προηγούμενα ἐκπονῶν, ὡς ὁ δρομεὺς δρομικῶς καὶ ὁ φώνασκος φωνασκικῶς· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ προκόπτων ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ ὁ μὴ εἰκῇ ἀποδεδημηκὼς οὗτός ἐστιν. εἰ δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις ἕξιν τέταται καὶ ταύτην ἐκπονεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐκδεδήμηκε, λέγω αὐτῷ αὐτόθεν πορεύεσθαι εἰς οἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀμελεῖν τῶν ἐκεῖ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐφʼ ὃ ἀποδεδήμηκεν οὐδέν ἐστιν· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο, με⟨λε⟩τᾶν ἐξελεῖν τοῦ αὑτοῦ βίου πένθη καὶ οἰμωγὰς καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ οἴμοι καὶ τὸ τάλας ἐγὼ καὶ δυστυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν καὶ μαθεῖν, τί ἐστι θάνατος, τί φυγή, τί δεσμωτήριον, τί [νοσ]κών⟨ε⟩ιον, ἵνα δύνηται λέγειν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ γινέσθω καὶ μὴ ἐκεῖνα τάλας ἐγώ, γέρων ἄνθρωπος, ἐπὶ ταῦτά μου τὰς πολιὰς ἐτήρησα. τίς λέγει ταῦτα; δοκεῖτε ὅτι ὑμῖν ἄδοξόν τινα ἐρῶ καὶ ταπεινόν; Πρίαμος αὐτὰ οὐ λέγει; Οἰδίπους οὐ λέγει; ἀλλʼ ὁπόσοι βασιλεῖς λέγουσιν; τί γάρ εἰσιν ἄλλο τραγῳδίαι ἢ ἀνθρώπων πάθη τεθαυμακότων τὰ ἐκτὸς διὰ μέτρου τοιοῦδʼ ἐπιδεικνύμενα; εἰ γὰρ ἐξαπατηθέντα τινὰ ἔδει μαθεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ ἀπροαιρέτων οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐγὼ μὲν ἤθελον τὴν ἀπάτην ταύτην, ἐξ ἧς ἤμελλον εὐρόως καὶ ἀταράχως βιώσεσθαι, ὑμεῖς δʼ ὄψεσθʼ αὐτοὶ τί θέλετε. τί οὖν ἡμῖν παρέχει Χρύσιππος; ἵνα γνῷς, φησίν, ὅτι οὐ ψευδῆ ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἐξ ὧν ἡ εὔροιά ἐστι καὶ ἀπάθεια ἀπαντᾷ, λάβε μου τὰ βιβλία καὶ γνώσῃ ὡς … τε καὶ σύμφωνά ἐστι τῇ φύσει τὰ ἀπαθῆ με ποιοῦντα. ὦ μεγάλης εὐτυχίας, ὦ μεγάλου εὐεργέτου τοῦ δεικνύοντος τὴν ὁδόν. εἶτα Τριπτολέμῳ μὲν ἱερὰ καὶ βωμοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἀνεστάκασιν, ὅτι τὰς ἡμέρους τροφὰς ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν, τῷ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὑρόντι καὶ φωτίσαντι καὶ εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐξενεγκόντι, οὐ τὴν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν, τίς ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τούτῳ βωμὸν ἱδρύσατο ἢ ναὸν ἢ ἄγαλμα ἀνέθηκεν ἢ τὸν θεὸν ἐπὶ τούτῳ προσκυνεῖ; ἀλλʼ ὅτι μὲν ἄμπελον ἔδωκαν ἢ πυρούς, ἐπιθύομεν τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐξήνεγκαν καρπὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ, διʼ οὗ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας δείξειν ἡμῖν ἤμελλον, τούτου δʼ ἕνεκα οὐκ εὐχαριστήσωμεν τῷ θεῷ;

[¶4] 5. It is said that there are those who will oppose very evident truths, and yet it is not easy to find a reason which may persuade such an one to alter his opinion. This may arise neither from his own strength nor from the weakness of his teacher; but when a man becomes obstinate in error, reason cannot always reach him. Now there are two sorts of obstinacy: the one, of the intellect; the other, of the will. A man may obstinately set himself not to assent to evident truths, nor to quit the defence of contradictions. We all dread a bodily paralysis, and would make use of every contrivance to avoid it; but none of us is troubled about a paralysis of the soul. And yet, indeed, even with regard to the soul, when a person is so affected as not to apprehend or understand anything, we think him in a sad condition; but where the emotions of shame and modesty are under an absolute paralysis, we go so far as even to call this strength of mind! Are you certain that you are awake? “am not,” replies such a person, “for neither am I certain when in dreaming I appear to myself to be awake.” Is there no difference, then, between these appearances? “None.” Shall I argue with this man any longer? For what steel or what caustic can I apply, to make him sensible of his paralysis? If he is sensible of it, and pretends not to be so, he is even worse than dead. He sees not his inconsistency, or, seeing it, holds to the wrong. He moves not, makes no progress; he rather falls back. His sense of shame is gone; his reasoning faculty is not gone, but brutalized. Shall I call this strength of mind? By no means,—unless we allow it to be such in the vilest debauchees publicly to speak and act out their worse impulses.

> Greek: 5. ἄν τις, φησίν, ἐνίστηται πρὸς τὰ ἄγαν ἐκφανῆ, πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εὑ⟨ρεῖν λόγ⟩ον, διʼ οὗ μεταπείσει τις αὐτόν. τοῦτο δʼ οὔτε παρὰ ⟨τὴν ἐκεί⟩νου γίνεται δύναμιν οὔτε παρὰ τὴν τοῦ διδάσκοντος ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἀπαχθεὶς ἀπολιθωθῇ, πῶς ἔτι χρήσηταί τις αὐτῷ διὰ λόγου; Ἀπολιθώσεις δʼ εἰσὶ διτταί· ἡ μὲν τοῦ νοητικοῦ ἀπολίθωσις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐντρεπτικοῦ, ὅταν τις παρατεταγμένος ᾖ μὴ ἐπινεύειν τοῖς ἐναργέσι μηδʼ ἀπὸ τῶν μαχομένων ἀφίστασθαι. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τὴν μὲν σωματικὴν ἀπονέκρωσιν φοβούμεθα καὶ πάντʼ ἂν μηχανησαίμεθα ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ περιπεσεῖν τοιούτῳ τινί, τῆς ψυχῆς δʼ ἀπονεκρουμένης οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει. καὶ νὴ Δία ἐπὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἂν μὲν ᾖ οὕτως διακείμενος, ὥστε μηδενὶ παρακολουθεῖν μηδὲ συνιέναι μηδέν, καὶ τοῦτον κακῶς ἔχειν οἰόμεθα· ἂν δέ τινος τὸ ἐντρεπτικὸν καὶ αἰδῆμον ἀπονεκρωθῇ, τοῦτο ἔτι καὶ δύναμιν καλοῦμεν. Καταλαμβάνεις ὅτι ἐγρήγορας; οὔ, φησίν· οὐδὲ γάρ, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις φαντάζωμαι, ὅτι ἐγρήγορα. οὐδὲν οὖν διαφέρει αὕτη ἡ φαντασία ἐκείνης; οὐδέν. ἔτι τούτῳ διαλέγομαι; καὶ ποῖον αὐτῷ πῦρ ἢ ποῖον σίδηρον προσαγάγω, ἵνʼ αἴσθηται ὅτι νενέκρωται; αἰσθανόμενος οὐ προσποιεῖται· ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ. μάχην οὗτος οὐ συνορᾷ· κακῶς ἔχει. συνορῶν οὗτος οὐ κινεῖται οὐδὲ προκόπτει· ἔτι ἀθλιώτερον ἔχει. ἐκτέτμηται τὸ αἰδῆμον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐντρεπτικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται, ἀλλʼ ἀποτεθηρίωται. ταύτην ἐγὼ δύναμιν εἴπω; μὴ γένοιτο, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν τῶν κιναίδων, καθʼ ἣν πᾶν τὸ ἐπελθὸν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι.

[¶5] 6. For every event that happens in the world it is easy to give thanks to Providence, if a person has but these two qualities in himself: a habit of closely considering what happens to each individual, and a grateful temper.

> Greek: 6. ἀφʼ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἐγκωμιάσαι τὴν πρόνοιαν, ἂν δύο ἔχῃ τις ταῦτα ἐν ἑαυτῷ, δύναμίν τε συνορατικὴν τῶν γεγονότων ἑκάστῳ καὶ τὸ εὐχάριστον.

[¶6] Without the first, he will not perceive the usefulness of things which happen;

> Greek: εἰ δὲ μή, ὁ μὲν οὐκ ὄψεται τὴν εὐχρηστίαν τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δʼ οὐκ εὐχαριστήσει ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς οὐδʼ ἂν ἴδῃ.

[¶7] and without the other, he will not be thankful for them. If God had made colors, and had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use?

> Greek: χρώματα ὁ θεὸς εἰ πεποιήκει, δύναμιν δὲ θεατικὴν αὐτῶν μὴ πεποιήκει, τί ἂν ἦν ὄφελος;

[¶8] None. On the other hand, if he had made the faculty of observation, without objects to observe, what would have been the use of that?

> Greek: — οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν. — ἀλλʼ ἀνάπαλιν εἰ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν πεποιήκει, τὰ ὄντα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα οἷα ὑποπίπτειν τῇ δυνάμει τῇ ὁρατικῇ, καὶ οὕτως τί ὄφελος;

[¶9] None.

> Greek: — οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν.

[¶10] Again, if he had formed both the faculty and the objects, but had not made the light of day? Neither in that case would they have been of any use. Who is it, then, that has fitted each of these to the other? Who is it that has fitted the sword to the scabbard, and the scabbard to the sword?

> Greek: — τί δʼ, εἰ καὶ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα πεποιήκει, φῶς δὲ μὴ πεποιήκει; — οὐδʼ οὕτως τι ὄφελος. — τίς οὖν ὁ ἁρμόσας τοῦτο πρὸς ἐκεῖνο κἀκεῖνο πρὸς τοῦτο; τίς δʼ ὁ ἁρμόσας τὴν μάχαιραν πρὸς τὸ κολεὸν καὶ τὸ κολεὸν πρὸς τὴν μάχαιραν;

[¶11] Is there no such Being? From the very construction of a complete work, we are used to declare positively that it must be the operation of some artificer, and not the effect of mere chance.

> Greek: οὐδείς; καὶ μὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς κατασκευῆς τῶν ἐπιτετελεσμένων ἀποφαίνεσθαι εἰώθαμεν, ὅτι τεχνίτου τινὸς πάντως τὸ ἔργον, οὐχὶ δʼ εἰκῇ κατεσκευασμένον.

[¶12] Does every such work, then, demonstrate an artificer, and do not visible objects, and the sense of seeing, and light, demonstrate one?

> Greek: ἆρʼ οὖν τούτων μὲν ἕκαστον ἐμφαίνει τὸν τεχνίτην, τὰ δʼ ὁρατὰ καὶ ὅρας[ε]ις καὶ φῶς οὐκ ἐμφαίνει;

[¶13] Do not the difference of the sexes, and their inclination to each other, and the use of their several powers,—do not these things demonstrate an artificer?

> Greek: τὸ δʼ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ ἡ προθυμία ἡ πρὸς τὴν συνουσίαν ἑκατέρου καὶ δύναμις ἡ χρηστικὴ τοῖς μορίοις τοῖς κατεσκευασμένοις οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐμφαίνει τὸν τεχνίτην;

[¶14] Most certainly they do. But further; this constitution of understanding, by which we are not simply impressed by sensible objects, but take and subtract and add and combine, and pass from point to point by inference,—is not all this sufficient to prevail on some men, and make them ashamed of leaving an artificer out of their scheme?

> Greek: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν· ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη τῆς διανοίας κατασκευή, καθʼ ἣν οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὑποπίπτοντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τυπούμεθα ὑπʼ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκλαμβάνομέν τι καὶ ἀφαιροῦμεν καὶ προστίθεμεν καὶ συντίθεμεν τάδε τινὰ διʼ αὐτῶν καὶ νὴ Δία μεταβαίνομεν ἀπʼ ἄλλων ἐπʼ ἄλλα τινὰ οὕτω πως παρακείμενα, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ κινῆσαί τινας καὶ διατρέψαι πρὸς τὸ ἀπολιπεῖν τὸν τεχνίτην;

[¶15] If not, let them explain to us what the power is that effects each of these, and how it is possible that chance should produce things so wonderful, and which carry such marks of design. What, then, do these things belong to us alone?

> Greek: ἢ ἐξηγησάσθωσαν ἡμῖν τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τούτων ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε τὰ οὕτω θαυμαστὰ καὶ τεχνικὰ εἰκῇ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίνεσθαι.

[¶16] Many, indeed,—such as are peculiarly necessary for a reasonable creature; but you will find many which are common to us with mere animals.

> Greek: τί οὖν; ἐφʼ ἡμῶν μόνων γίνεται ταῦτα; πολλὰ μὲν ἐπὶ μόνων, ὧν ἐξαιρέτως χρείαν εἶχεν τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον, πολλὰ δὲ κοινὰ εὑρήσεις ἡμῖν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα.

[¶17] Then, do they too understand what happens? Not at all; for use is one affair, and understanding another. But God had need of animals to make use of things, and of us to understand that use.

> Greek: ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ παρακολουθεῖ τοῖς γινομένοις ἐκεῖνα; οὐδαμῶς. ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι χρῆσις καὶ ἄλλο παρακολούθησις. ἐκείνων χρείαν εἶχεν ὁ θεὸς χρωμένων ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἡμῶν δὲ παρακολουθούντων τῇ χρήσει.

[¶18] It is sufficient, therefore, for them to eat, and drink, and sleep, and continue their species, and perform other such offices as belong to each of them; but to us, to whom He has given likewise a faculty of understanding, these offices are not sufficient.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο ἐκείνοις μὲν ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ὀχεύειν καὶ τἆλλʼ ὅσα ἐπιτελεῖ τῶν αὑτῶν ἕκαστον, ἡμῖν δʼ, οἷς καὶ τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκεν,

[¶19] For if we do not proceed in a wise and systematic manner, and suitably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our end.

> Greek: οὐκέτι ταῦτʼ ἀπαρκεῖ, ἀλλʼ ἂν μὴ κατὰ τρόπον καὶ τεταγμένως καὶ ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑκάστου φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ πράττωμεν, οὐκέτι τοῦ τέλους τευξόμεθα τοῦ ἑαυτῶν.

[¶20] For where the constitution of beings is different, their offices and ends are different likewise.

> Greek: ὧν γὰρ αἱ κατασκευαὶ διάφοροι, τούτων καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ τέλη.

[¶21] Thus where the constitution is adapted only to use, there use is alone sufficient; but where understanding is added to use, unless that too be duly exercised the end of such a being will never be attained.

> Greek: οὗ τοίνυν ἡ κατασκευὴ μόνον χρηστική, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι ὁπωσοῦν ἀπαρκεῖ· οὗ δὲ καὶ παρακολουθητικὴ τῇ χρήσει, τούτῳ τὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν μὴ προσῇ οὐδέποτε τεύξεται τοῦ τέλους.

[¶22] Well, then, each of the animals is constituted either for food, or husbandry, to produce milk, or for some other like use; and for these purposes what need is there of understanding things, and being able to discriminate concerning them? But God has introduced man, as a spectator of Himself and of his works;

> Greek: τί οὖν; ἐκείνων ἕκαστον κατασκευάζει τὸ μὲν ὥστʼ ἐσθίεσθαι, τὸ δʼ ὥστε ὑπηρετεῖν εἰς γεωργίαν, τὸ δʼ ὥστε τυρὸν φέρειν, τὸ δʼ ἄλλο ἐπʼ ἄλλῃ χρείᾳ παραπλησίῳ, πρὸς ἃ τίς χρεία τοῦ παρακολουθεῖν ταῖς φαντασίαις καὶ ταύτας διακρίνειν δύνασθαι;

[¶23] and not only as a spectator, but an interpreter of them. It is therefore shameful that man should begin and end where irrational creatures do.

> Greek: τὸν δʼ ἄνθρωπον θεατὴν εἰσήγαγεν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον θεατήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν.

[¶24] He is indeed to begin there, but to end where nature itself has fixed our end; and that is, in contemplation and understanding, and in a scheme of life conformable to nature.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο αἰσχρόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ καταλήγειν ὅπου καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔνθεν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, καταλήγειν δὲ ἐφʼ ὃ κατέληξεν ἐφʼ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ φύσις.

[¶25] Take care, then, not to die without the contemplation of these things.

> Greek: κατέληξεν δʼ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν καὶ παρακολούθησιν καὶ σύμφωνον διεξαγωγὴν τῇ φύσει.
ὁρᾶτε οὖν, μὴ ἀθέατοι τούτων ἀποθάνητε.

[¶26] You take a journey to Olympia to behold the work of Phidias, and each of you thinks it a misfortune to die without a knowledge of such things;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν μὲν ἀποδημεῖτε, ἵνʼ [ε]ἴδητε τὸ ἔργον τοῦ Φειδίου, καὶ ἀτύχημα ἕκαστος ὑμῶν οἴεται τὸ ἀνιστόρητος τούτων ἀποθανεῖν·

[¶27] and will you have no inclination to see and understand those works for which there is no need to take a journey, but which are ready and at hand even to those who bestow no pains!

> Greek: ὅπου δʼ οὐδʼ ἀποδημῆσαι χρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ ἐστὲ ἤδη καὶ πάρεστε τοῖς ἔργοις, ταῦτα δὲ θεάσασθαι καὶ κατανοῆσαι οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσετε;

[¶28] Will you never perceive what you are, or for what you were born, or for what purpose you are admitted to behold this spectacle? “But there are in life some things unpleasant and difficult.”

> Greek: οὐκ αἰσθήσεσθε τοίνυν, οὔτε τίνες ἐστὲ οὔτʼ ἐπὶ τί γεγόνατε οὔτε [ἐπὶ] τί τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐφʼ οὗ τὴν θέαν παρείληφθε;

[¶29] And are there none at Olympia? Are you not heated? Are you not crowded? Are you not without good conveniences for bathing? Are you not wet through when it happens to rain? Do you not have uproar, and noise, and other disagreeable circumstances?

> Greek: — ἀλλὰ γίνεταί τινα ἀηδῆ καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ. — ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ δʼ οὐ γίνεται; οὐ καυματίζεσθε; οὐ στενοχωρεῖσθε; οὐ κακῶς λούεσθε; οὐ καταβρέχεσθε, ὅταν βρέχῃ; θορύβου δὲ καὶ βοῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χαλεπῶν οὐκ ἀπολαύετε;

[¶30] But, I suppose, by comparing all these with the merit of the spectacle, you support and endure them.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ οἶμαι ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα ἀντιτιθέντες πρὸς τὸ ἀξιόλογον τῆς θέας φέρετε καὶ ἀνέχεσθε.

[¶31] Well, and have you not received faculties by which you may support every event [of life]? Have you not received greatness of soul?

> Greek: ἄγε δυνάμεις δʼ οὐκ εἰλήφατε, καθʼ ἃς οἴσετε πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον; μεγαλοψυχίαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε; ἀνδρείαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε;

[¶32] Have you not received a manly spirit? Have you not received patience? What signifies to me anything that happens, while my soul is above it? What shall disconcert or trouble or appear grievous to me? Shall I neglect to use my powers to that purpose for which I received them;

> Greek: καρτερίαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε; καὶ τί ἔτι μοι μέλει μεγαλοψύχῳ ὄντι τῶν ἀποβῆναι δυναμένων; τί μʼ ἐκστήσει ἢ ταράξει ἢ τί ὀδυνηρὸν φανεῖται; οὐ χρήσομαι τῇ δυνάμει πρὸς ἃ εἴληφα αὐτήν, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀποβαίνουσιν πενθήσω καὶ στενάξω;

[¶33] and shall I lament and groan at every casualty? “True, no doubt; but I have such a disagreeable catarrh!”

> Greek: ναί· ἀλλʼ αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσιν. τίνος οὖν ἕνεκα χεῖρας ἔχεις, ἀνδράποδον; οὐχ ἵνα καὶ ἀπομύσσῃς σεαυτόν;

## 3. Book I · chapters 6–11

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/3/#p-N

[¶0] Attend to your diseases, then, as best you can.

> Greek: — τοῦτο οὖν εὔλογον μύξας γίνεσθαι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ;

[¶1] Do you say it is unreasonable that there should be such a discomfort in the world? And how much better is it that you should have a catarrh than complain? Pray, what figure do you think Hercules would have made if there had not been a lion, and a hydra, and a stag, and unjust and brutal men, whom he expelled and cleared away?

> Greek: — καὶ πόσῳ κρεῖττον ἀπομύξασθαί σε ἢ ἐγκαλεῖν; ἢ τί οἴει ὅτι ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἂν ἀπέβη, εἰ μὴ λέων τοιοῦτος ἐγένετο καὶ ὕδρα καὶ ἔλαφ[ρ]ος καὶ σῦς καὶ ἄδικοί τινες ἄνθρωποι καὶ θηριώδεις, οὓς ἐκεῖνος ἐξήλαυνεν καὶ ἐκάθαιρεν;

[¶2] And what would he have done if none of these had existed? Is it not plain that he must have wrapped himself up and slept? In the first place, then, he would never have become a Hercules by slumbering away his whole life in such delicacy and ease;

> Greek: καὶ τί ἂν ἐποίει μηδενὸς τοιούτου γεγονότος; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐντετυλιγμένος ἂν ἐκάθευδεν; οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο Ἡρακλῆς ἐν τρυφῇ τοιαύτῃ καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ νυστάζων ὅλον τὸν βίον· εἰ δʼ ἄρα καὶ ἐγένετο, τί ὄφελος αὐτοῦ;

[¶3] or if he had, what good would it have done?

> Greek: τίς δὲ χρῆσις τῶν βραχιόνων τῶν ἐκείνου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀλκῆς καὶ καρτερίας καὶ γενναιότητος, εἰ μὴ τοιαῦταί τινες αὐτὸν περιστάσεις καὶ ὗλαι διέσεισαν καὶ ἐγύμνασαν;

[¶4] What would have been the use of his arm and his strength, of his patience and greatness of mind, if such circumstances and subjects of action had not roused and exercised him? What, then, must we provide these things for ourselves;

> Greek: τί οὖν; αὑτῷ ταύτας ἔδει κατασκευάζειν καὶ ζητεῖν ποθεν λέοντα εἰσαγαγεῖν εἰς τὴν χώραν τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ σῦν καὶ ὕδραν;

[¶5] and introduce a boar and a lion and a hydra into our country? This would be madness and folly.

> Greek: μωρία τοῦτο καὶ μανία. γενόμενα δὲ καὶ εὑρεθέντα εὔχρηστα ἦν πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι καὶ γυμνάσαι τὸν Ἡρακλέα.

[¶6] But as they were in being, and to be met with, they were proper subjects to call out and exercise Hercules. Do you therefore likewise, being sensible of this, consider the faculties you have, and after taking a view of them say, “Bring on me now, O Zeus, what difficulty thou wilt, for I have faculties granted me by thee, and powers by which I may win honor from every event”?

> Greek: ἄγε οὖν καὶ σὺ τούτων αἰσθόμενος ἀπόβλεψον εἰς τὰς δυνάμεις ἃς ἔχεις καὶ ἀπιδὼν εἰπὲ φέρε νῦν, ὦ Ζεῦ, ἣν θέλεις περίστασιν· ἔχω γὰρ παρασκευὴν ἐκ σοῦ μοι δεδομένην καὶ ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὸ κοσμῆσαι διὰ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐμαυτόν

[¶7] No;

> Greek: οὔ· ἀλλὰ κάθησθε τὰ μὲν μὴ συμβῇ τρέμοντες, τῶν δὲ συμβαινόντων ὀδυρόμενοι καὶ πενθοῦντες καὶ στένοντες· εἶτα τοῖς θεοῖς ἐγκαλεῖτε.

[¶8] but you sit trembling, for fear this or that should happen, and lamenting and mourning and groaning at what doth happen;

> Greek: τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο ἀκόλουθον τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀγεννείᾳ ἢ καὶ ἀσέβεια;

[¶9] and then you accuse the gods! In what does such baseness end but in impiety? And yet God has not only granted these faculties by which we may bear every event without being depressed or broken by it, but, like a good prince and a true father, has placed their exercise above restraint, compulsion, or hindrance, and wholly within our own control; nor has he reserved a power, even to himself, of hindering or restraining them.

> Greek: καίτοι ὅ γε θεὸς οὐ μόνον ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας, καθʼ ἃς οἴσομεν πᾶν τὸ ἀποβαῖνον μὴ ταπεινούμενοι μηδὲ συγκλώμενοι ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλʼ ὃ ἦν ἀγαθοῦ βασιλέως καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις πατρός, ἀκώλυτον τοῦτο ἔδωκεν, ἀνανάγκαστον, ἀπαραπόδιστον, ὅλον αὐτὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐποίησεν οὐδʼ αὑτῷ τινα πρὸς τοῦτο ἰσχὺν ἀπολιπών, ὥστε κωλῦσαι ἢ ἐμποδίσαι.

[¶10] Having these things free, and your own, will you not use them, nor consider what you have received, nor from whom?

> Greek: ταῦτα ἔχοντες ἐλεύθερα καὶ ὑμέτερα μὴ χρῆσθε αὐτοῖς μηδʼ αἰσθάνεσθε τίνα εἰλήφατε καὶ παρὰ τίνος,

[¶11] But you sit groaning and lamenting, some of you, blind to him who gave them, and not acknowledging your benefactor; while others basely turn themselves to complaints and accusations against God!

> Greek: ἀλλὰ κάθησθε πενθοῦντες καὶ στένοντες οἱ μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν δόντα ἀποτετυφλωμένοι μηδʼ ἐπιγινώσκοντες τὸν εὐεργέτην, οἱ δʼ ὑπʼ ἀγεννείας εἰς μέμψεις καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα τῷ θεῷ ἐκτρεπόμενοι.

[¶12] I undertake to show you that you have means and faculties to exhibit greatness of soul, and a manly spirit; but what occasion you have to find fault and complain, do you show me if you can.

> Greek: καίτοι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν μὲν καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἐγὼ σοὶ δείξω ὅτι ἀφορμὰς καὶ παρασκευὴν ἔχεις, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέμφεσθαι καὶ ἐγκαλεῖν ποίας ἀφορμὰς ἔχεις σὺ δʼ ἐμοὶ δείκνυε.

[¶13] 7. It is not understood by most persons that the proper use of inferences and hypotheses and interrogations, and logical forms generally, has any relation to the duties of life. In every matter of action the question is, how a wise and good man may come honestly and consistently out of it. We must admit, therefore, either that the wise man will not engage in difficult problems or that, if he does, he will not think it worth his care to deal with them thoroughly; or if we allow neither of these alternatives, it is necessary to confess that some examination ought to be made of those points on which the solution of these problems chiefly depends. For what is reasoning? To lay down true positions, to reject false ones, and to suspend the judgment in doubtful ones. Is it enough, then, to have learned merely this? It is enough, say you. Is it enough, then, for him who would not commit any mistake in the use of money, merely to have heard that we are to receive the good pieces, and to reject the bad? This is not enough. What must be added besides? That skill which tries and distinguishes what pieces are good, what bad. Therefore, in reasoning too, the definition just given is not enough; but it is necessary that we should be able to prove and distinguish between the true and the false and the doubtful. This is clear. And what further is attempted in reasoning? To admit the logical consequence of whatever you have properly granted. Well, and is it enough merely to know this necessity? It is not; but we must learn how it happens that such a thing is the consequence of such another, and when one thing follows from one premise, and when from many premises. Is it not moreover necessary that he who would acquit himself skilfully in reasoning should both himself demonstrate whatever he asserts and be able to comprehend the demonstrations of others, and not be deceived by such as use sophistry as if they were reasoning fairly? Hence arises the use and practice of logical forms; and it appears to be indispensable. But it may possibly happen that from the premises which we have honestly granted there arises some consequence which, though false in itself, is nevertheless a fair inference. What then ought I to do? To admit a falsehood? Impossible. To take back my concessions? But this will not be allowed. Or assert that the consequence does not fairly follow from the premises? Nor is even this practicable. What then, is to be done in the case? Is it not this? As the having once borrowed money is not enough to make a person a debtor, unless he still continues to owe money and has not paid it, so the having granted the premises is not enough to make it necessary to grant the inference, unless we continue our concessions. If the premises continue to the end such as they were when the concessions were made, it is absolutely necessary to continue the concessions, and to admit what follows from them. But if the premises do not continue such as they were when the concession was made, it is absolutely necessary to revoke the concession, and refuse to accept the inference. For this inference is no consequence of ours, nor belongs to us, when we have revoked the concession of the premises. We ought then thoroughly to consider our premises and their different aspects, on which any one, by laying hold,—either on the question itself or on the answer, or on the inference, or elsewhere,—may embarrass the unthinking who did not foresee the result. So that in this way we may not be led into any unbecoming or confused position. The same thing is to be observed in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments. For it is sometimes necessary to require some hypothesis to be granted, as a kind of step to the rest of the argument. Is every given hypothesis, then, to be granted, or not every one? and if not every one, which? And is he who has granted an hypothesis forever to abide by it! Or is he sometimes to revoke it, and admit only consequences, but not to admit contradictions? Ay, but a person may say, on your admitting a possible hypothesis, “will drive you upon an impossibility.” With such a one as this, shall the wise man never engage, but avoid all argument and conversation with him? And yet who beside the wise man is capable of treating an argument, or who beside is sagacious in reasoning, and incapable of being deceived and imposed on by sophistry? Or will he indeed engage, but without regarding whether he behaves rashly and heedlessly in the argument? Yet how, then, can he be wise, as we are supposing him? and without some such exercise and preparation, how can he hold his own? If this could be shown, then indeed all these forms of reasoning would be superfluous and absurd, and unconnected with our idea of the virtuous man. Why, then, are we still indolent, and slothful, and sluggish, seeking pretences of avoiding labor? Shall we not be watchful to render reason itself accurate? “But suppose, after all, I should make a mistake in these points,—it is not as if I had killed my father.” O slavish man, in this case you had no father to kill. but the only fault that you could commit in this instance, you have committed. This very thing I myself said to Rufus when he reproved me for not finding the weak point in some syllogism. “Why,” said I, “have I burnt the capitol then?” “Slave!” answered he, “was the thing here involved the capitol? Or are there no other faults but burning the capitol, or killing a father?” And is it no fault to treat rashly, and vainly, and heedlessly, the things which pass before our eyes,—not to comprehend a reason, nor a demonstration, nor a sophism; nor, in short, to see what is strong in reasoning and what is weak? Is there nothing wrong in this?

> Greek: 7. ἡ περὶ τοὺς μεταπίπτοντας καὶ ὑποθετικούς, ἔτι δὲ ἠρωτῆσθαι περαίνοντας καὶ πάντας ἁπλῶς τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους πραγματεία λανθάνει τοὺς πολλοὺς περὶ καθήκοντος οὖσα. ζητοῦμεν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάσης ὕλης πῶς ἂν εὕρ[ο]οι ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν διέξοδον καὶ ἀναστροφὴν τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ καθήκουσαν. οὐκοῦν ἢ τοῦτο λεγέτωσαν, ὅτι οὐ συγκαθήσει εἰς ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἢ ὅτι συγκαθεὶς οὐκ ἐπιμελήσεται τοῦ μὴ εἰκῇ μηδʼ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει ἀναστρέφεσθαι, [μ]ἢ τούτων μηδέτερον προσδεχομένοις ἀναγκαῖον ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι ἐπίσκεψίν τινα ποιητέον τῶν τόπων τούτων, περὶ οὓς μάλιστα στρέφεται ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις. τί γὰρ ἐπαγγέλλεται ἐν λόγῳ; τἀληθῆ τιθέναι, τὰ ψευδῆ αἴρειν, πρὸς τὰ ἄδηλα ἐπέχειν. ἆρʼ οὖν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο μόνον μαθεῖν; — ἀρκεῖ, φησίν. — οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ἐν χρήσει νομίσματος μὴ διαπίπτειν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο ἀκοῦσαι, διὰ τί τὰς μὲν δοκίμους δραχμὰς παραδέχῃ, τὰς δʼ ἀδοκίμους ἀποδοκιμάζεις; — οὐκ ἀρκεῖ. — τί οὖν δεῖ τούτῳ προσλαβεῖν; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ δύναμιν δοκιμαστικήν τε καὶ διακριτικὴν τῶν δοκίμων τε καὶ ἀδοκίμων δραχμῶν; οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπὶ λόγου οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ λεχθέν, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη δοκιμαστικὸν γενέσθαι καὶ διακριτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ τοῦ ἀδήλου; — ἀνάγκη. — ἐπὶ τούτοις τί παραγγέλλεται ἐν λόγῳ; τὸ ἀκόλουθον τοῖς δοθεῖσιν ὑπὸ σοῦ καλῶς παραδέχου. ἄγε ἀρκεῖ οὖν κἀνταῦθα γνῶναι τοῦτο; οὐκ ἀρκεῖ, δεῖ δὲ μαθεῖν πῶς τί τισιν ἀκόλουθον γίνεται καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἓν ἑνὶ ἀκολουθεῖ, ποτὲ δὲ πλείοσιν κοινῇ. μή ποτε οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη προσλαβεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐν λόγῳ συνετῶς ἀναστραφήσεσθαι καὶ αὐτόν τʼ ἀποδείξειν ἕκαστα ἀποδόντα καὶ τοῖς ἀποδεικνύουσι παρακολουθήσειν μηδʼ ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιζομένων διαπλανηθήσεσθαι ὡς ἀποδεικνυόντων; οὐκοῦν ἐλήλυθεν ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν συναγόντων λόγων καὶ τρόπων πραγματεία καὶ γυμνασία καὶ ἀναγκαία πέφηνεν. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἔστιν ἐφʼ ὧν δεδώκαμεν ὑγιῶς τὰ λήμματα καὶ συμβαίνει τουτὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν· ψεῦδος δὲ ὂν οὐδὲν ἧττον συμβαίνει. τί οὖν μοι καθήκει ποιεῖν; προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τʼ; ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιῶς παρεχώρησα τὰ ὡμολογημένα; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο δίδοται. ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν παρακεχωρημένων; ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τοῦτο δίδοται. τί οὖν ἐπὶ τούτων ποιητέον; ἢ μή ποτε ὡς οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ δανείσασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἔτι ὀφείλειν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προσεῖναι καὶ τὸ ἐπιμένειν ἐπὶ τοῦ δανείου καὶ μὴ διαλελύσθαι αὐτό, οὕτως οὐκ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ δεῖν παραχωρεῖν τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον τὸ δεδωκέναι τὰ λήμματα, δεῖ δʼ ἐπιμένειν ἐπὶ τῆς παραχωρήσεως αὐτῶν. καὶ δὴ μενόντων μὲν αὐτῶν εἰς τέλος ὁποῖα παρεχωρήθη πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τῆς παραχωρήσεως ἐπιμένειν καὶ τὸ ἀκόλουθον αὐτοῖς προσδέχεσθαι … οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι οὐδὲ καθʼ ἡμᾶς συμβαίνει τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς συγχωρήσεως τῶν λημμάτων ἀπέστημεν. δεῖ οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν λημμάτων ἱστορῆσαι καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολήν τε καὶ μετάπτωσιν αὐτῶν, καθʼ ἣν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἐρωτήσει ἢ τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἢ τῷ συλλελογίσθαι ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ λαμβάνοντα τὰς μεταπτώσεις ἀφορμὴν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνοήτοις τοῦ ταράσσεσθαι μὴ βλέπουσι τὸ ἀκόλουθον. τίνος ἕνεκα; ἵνʼ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τούτῳ μὴ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον μηδʼ εἰκῇ μηδὲ συγκεχυμένως ἀναστρεφώμεθα. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπί τε τῶν ὑποθέσεων καὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν λόγων. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτʼ αἰτῆσαί τινα ὑπόθεσιν ὥσπερ ἐπιβάθραν τῷ ἑξῆς λόγῳ. πᾶσαν οὖν τὴν δοθεῖσαν παραχωρητέον ἢ οὐ πᾶσαν; καὶ εἰ οὐ πᾶσαν, τίνα; [περὶ τίνος ἡ σκέψις; περὶ καθήκοντος.] παραχωρήσαντι δὲ μενετέον εἰς ἅπαν ἐπὶ τῆς τηρήσεως ἢ ἔστιν ὅτε ἀποστατέον, τὰ δʼ ἀκόλουθα προσδεκτέον καὶ τὰ μαχόμενα οὐ προσδεκτέον; — ναί. — ἀλλὰ λέγει τις ὅτι ποιήσω σε δυνατοῦ δεξάμενον ὑπόθεσιν ἐπʼ ἀδύνατον ἀπαχθῆναι. πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ συγκαθήσει ὁ φρόνιμος, ἀλλὰ φεύξεται ἐξέτασιν καὶ κοινολογίαν; καὶ τίς ἔτι ἄλλος ἐστὶ λόγῳ χρηστικὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει καὶ νὴ Δία ἀνεξαπάτητός τε καὶ ἀσόφιστος; ἀλλὰ συγκαθήσει μέν, οὐκ ἐπιστραφήσεται δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἀναστρέφεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ; καὶ πῶς ἔτι ἔσται τοιοῦτος οἷον αὐτὸν ἐπινοοῦμεν; ἀλλʼ ἄνευ τινὸς τοιαύτης γυμνασίας καὶ παρασκευῆς φυλάττειν οἷός τʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἑξῆς; τοῦτο δεικνύτωσαν καὶ παρέλκει τὰ θεωρήματα ταῦτα πάντα, ἄτοπα ἦν καὶ ἀνακόλουθα τῇ προλήψει τοῦ σπουδαίου. τί ἔτι ἀργοὶ καὶ ῥᾴθυμοι καὶ νωθροί ἐσμεν καὶ προφάσεις ζητοῦμεν, καθʼ ἃς οὐ πονήσομεν οὐδʼ ἀγρυπνήσομεν ἐξεργαζόμενοι τὸν αὑτῶν λόγον; — ἂν οὖν ἐν τούτοις πλανηθῶ, μή τι τὸν πατέρα ἀπέκτεινα; — ἀνδράποδον, ποῦ γὰρ ἐνθάδε πατὴρ ἦν, ἵνʼ αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνῃς; τί οὖν ἐποίησας; ὃ μόνον ἦν κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἁμάρτημα, τοῦτο ἡμάρτηκας. ἐπεί τοι τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγὼ Ῥούφῳ εἶπον ἐπιτιμῶντί μοι ὅτι τὸ παραλειπόμενον ἓν ἐν συλλογισμῷ τινι οὐχ εὕρισκον. οὐχ οἷον μέν, φημί, εἰ τὸ Καπιτώλιον κατέκαυσα, ὁ δʼ ἀνδράποδον, ἔφη, ἐνθάδε τὸ παραλειπόμενον Καπιτώλιόν ἐστιν. ἢ ταῦτα μόνα ἁμαρτήματά ἐστι τὸ Καπιτώλιον ἐμπρῆσαι καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἀποκτεῖναι, τὸ δʼ εἰκῇ καὶ μάτην καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν χρῆσθαι ταῖς φαντασίαις ταῖς αὑτοῦ καὶ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν λόγῳ μηδʼ ἀποδείξει μηδὲ σοφίσματι μηδʼ ἁπλῶς βλέπειν τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸν καὶ οὐ καθʼ αὑτὸν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει, τούτων δʼ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἁμάρτημα;

[¶14] 8. In as many ways as equivalent syllogisms may be varied, in so many may the technical forms be varied likewise. As, for instance: “If you had borrowed and not paid, you owe me money; but you have not borrowed and not paid; therefore you do not owe me money.” To perform these processes skilfully, is held to be the peculiar mark of a philosopher. For if an enthymema be an imperfect syllogism, he who is versed in the perfect syllogism must be equally ready to detect an imperfect one. “Why, then, do not we exercise ourselves and others after this manner?” Because, even now, though we are not wholly absorbed in these things, nor diverted, by me at least, from the study of morality, yet we make no eminent advances in virtue. What is to be expected, then, if we should add this avocation too? Especially as it would not only withdraw us from more necessary studies, but likewise afford a capital occasion of conceit and insolence. For the faculty of arguing and of persuasive reasoning is great; and particularly, if it is constantly practised, and receives an additional ornament from rhetoric. In general, every such faculty is dangerous to weak and uninstructed persons, as being apt to render them arrogant and elated. For by what method can one persuade a young man who excels in these kinds of study that he ought not to be an appendage to these accomplishments, but they to him? Will he not trample upon all such advice, and walk about elated and puffed up, not bearing that any one should touch him, to put him in mind where he is wanting, and in what he goes wrong? “What, then, was not Plato a philosopher?” Well, and was not Hippocrates a physician? Yet you see how he expresses himself. But what has his style to do with his professional qualities? Why do you confound things accidentally united in the same men? If Plato was handsome and well made, must I too set myself to becoming handsome and well made,—as if this was necessary to philosophy, because a certain person happened to be at once handsome and a philosopher? Why will you not perceive and distinguish what are the things that make men philosophers, and what belong to them on other accounts? Pray, if I were a philosopher, would it be necessary that you should be lame too [like me]? What then? Do I reject these special faculties? By no means; neither do I reject the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me what is the good of man, I know not where it lies save in dealing wisely with the phenomena of existence.

> Greek: 8. καθʼ ὅσους τρόπους μεταλαμβάνειν ἔστι τὰ ἰσοδυναμοῦντα ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ τοσούτους καὶ τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων τε καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐκποιεῖ μεταλαμβάνειν. οἷον φέρε τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· εἰ ἐδανείσω καὶ μὴ ἀπέδωκας, ὀφείλεις μοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐχὶ ἐδανείσω μὲν καὶ οὐκ ἀπέδωκας· οὐ μὴν ὀφείλεις μοι τὸ ἀργύριον. καὶ τοῦτο οὐδενὶ μᾶλλον προσήκει ἢ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἐμπείρως ποιεῖν. εἴπερ γὰρ ἀτελὴς συλλογισμός ἐστι τὸ ἐνθύμημα, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ περὶ τὸν τέλειον συλλογισμὸν γεγυμνασμένος οὗτος ἂν ἱκανὸς εἴη καὶ περὶ τὸν ἀτελῆ οὐδὲν ἧττον. τί ποτʼ οὖν οὐ γυμνάζομεν αὑτούς τε καὶ ἀλλήλους τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον; ὅτι νῦν καίτοι μὴ γυμναζόμενοι περὶ ταῦτα μηδʼ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τοῦ ἤθους ὑπό γε ἐμοῦ περισπώμενοι ὅμως οὐδὲν ἐπιδίδομεν εἰς καλοκἀγαθίαν. τί οὖν χρὴ προσδοκᾶν, εἰ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀσχολίαν προσλάβοιμεν; καὶ μάλισθʼ, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἀσχολία τις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτέρων αὐτὴ προσγένοιτʼ ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰήσεως ἀφορμὴ καὶ τύφου οὐχ ἡ τυχοῦσα. μεγάλη γάρ ἐστι δύναμις ἡ ἐπιχειρητικὴ καὶ πιθανολογική, καὶ μάλιστʼ εἰ τύχοι γυμνασίας ἐπιπλέον καί τινα καὶ εὐπρέπειαν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων προσλάβοι. ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ καθόλου πᾶσα δύναμις ἐπισφαλὴς τοῖς ἀπαιδεύτοις καὶ ἀσθενέσι προσγενομένη πρὸς τὸ ἐπᾶραι καὶ χαυνῶσαι ἐπʼ αὐτῇ. ποίᾳ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔτι μηχανῇ πείσαι τὸν νέον τὸν ἐν τούτοις διαφέροντα, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ προσθήκην αὐτὸν ἐκείνων γενέσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνα αὐτῷ προσθεῖναι; οὐχὶ δὲ πάντας τοὺς λόγους τούτους καταπατήσας ἐπηρμένος ἡμῖν καὶ πεφυσημένος περιπατεῖ μηδʼ ἀνεχόμενος, ἄν τις ἅπτηται [τι] αὐτοῦ ὑπομιμνῄσκων, τίνος ἀπολελειμμένος ποῦ ἀποκέκλικεν; τί οὖν; Πλάτων φιλόσοφος οὐκ ἦν; — Ἱπποκράτης γὰρ ἰατρὸς οὐκ ἦν; ἀλλʼ ὁρᾷς πῶς φράζει Ἱπποκράτης. μή τι οὖν Ἱπποκράτης οὕτω φράζει, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστιν; τί οὖν μιγνύεις πράγματα ἄλλως ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων συνδραμόντα; εἰ δὲ καλὸς ἦν Πλάτων καὶ ἰσχυρός, ἔδει κἀμὲ καθήμενον ἐκπονεῖν, ἵνα καλὸς γένωμαι ἢ ἵνα ἰσχυρός, ὡς τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, ἐπεί τις φιλόσοφος ἅμα καὶ καλὸς ἦν καὶ φιλόσοφος; οὐ θέλεις αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διακρῖναι κατὰ τί οἱ ἄνθρωποι γίνονται φιλόσοφοι καὶ τίνα ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν; ἄγε εἰ δʼ ἐγὼ φιλόσοφος ἤμην, ἔδει ὑμᾶς καὶ χωλοὺς γενέσθαι; τί οὖν; αἴρω τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας; μὴ γένοιτο· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ὁρατικήν. ὅμως δʼ, ἄν μου πυνθάνῃ τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἔχω σοι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν ἢ ὅτι ποιὰ προαίρεσις [φαντασιῶν].

[¶15] 9. If what philosophers say of the kinship between God and men be true, what has any one to do but, like Socrates, when he is Asked what countryman he is, never to say that he is a citizen of Athens, or of Corinth, but of the universe?

> Greek: 9. εἰ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ τὰ περὶ τῆς συγγενείας τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων, τί ἄλλο ἀπολείπεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, μηδέποτε πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον ποδαπός ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ἀθηναῖος ἢ Κορίνθιος, ἀλλʼ ὅτι κόσμιος;

[¶16] For why, if you limit yourself to Athens, do you not farther limit yourself to that mere corner of Athens where your body was brought forth?

> Greek: διὰ τί γὰρ λέγεις Ἀθηναῖον εἶναι σεαυτόν, οὐχὶ δʼ ἐξ ἐκείνης μόνον τῆς γωνίας, εἰς ἣν ἐρρίφη γεννηθέν σου τὸ σωμάτιον;

[¶17] Is it not, evidently, from some larger local tie, which comprehends, not only that comer and your whole house, but the whole country of your fathers, that you call yourself an Athenian, or a Corinthian?

> Greek: ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ κυριωτέρου καὶ περιέχοντος οὐ μόνον αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν γωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλην σου τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅθεν σου τὸ γένος τῶν προγόνων εἰς σὲ κατελήλυθεν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν καλεῖς σεαυτὸν Ἀθηναῖον καὶ Κορίνθιον;

[¶18] He, then, who understands the administration of the universe, and has learned that the principal and greatest and most comprehensive of all things is this vast system, extending from men to God: and that from Him the seeds of being are descended not only to one’s father or grandfather, but to all things that are produced and born on earth;

> Greek: ὁ τοίνυν τῇ διοικήσει τοῦ κόσμου παρηκολουθηκὼς καὶ μεμαθηκώς, ὅτι τὸ μέγιστον καὶ κυριώτατον καὶ περιεκτικώτατον πάντων τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σύστημα τὸ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεοῦ, ἀπʼ ἐκείνου δὲ τὰ σπέρματα καταπέπτωκεν οὐκ εἰς τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐμὸν μόνον οὐδʼ εἰς τὸν πάππον, ἀλλʼ εἰς ἅπαντα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς γεννώμενά τε καὶ φυόμενα, προηγουμένως δʼ εἰς τὰ λογικά,

[¶19] and especially to rational natures, since they alone are qualified to partake of a communication with the Deity, being connected with him by reason,—why may not such a one call himself a citizen of the universe!

> Greek: ὅτι κοινωνεῖν μόνον ταῦτα πέφυκεν τῷ θεῷ τῆς συναναστροφῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐπι πεπλεγμένα,

[¶20] Why not a son of God? And why shall he fear any thing that happens among men?

> Greek: διὰ τί μὴ εἴπῃ [τις] αὑτὸν κόσμιον; διὰ τί μὴ υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ; διὰ τί δὲ φοβηθήσεταί τι τῶν γιγνομένων ἐν ἀνθρώποις;

[¶21] Shall kinship to Caesar, or any other of the great at Rome, enable a man to live secure, above contempt, and void of all fear whatever; and shall not the having God for our maker, and father, and guardian, free us from griefs and alarms? “But wherewithal shall I be fed? For I have nothing.”

> Greek: ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὸν Καίσαρα ἡ συγγένεια ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν μέγα δυναμένων ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἱκανὴ παρέχειν ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ διάγοντας καὶ ἀκαταφρονήτους καὶ δεδοικότας μηδʼ ὁτιοῦν, τὸ δὲ τὸν θεὸν ποιητὴν ἔχειν καὶ πατέρα καὶ κηδεμόνα οὐκέτι ἡμᾶς ἐξαιρήσεται λυπῶν καὶ φόβων;

[¶22] To what do fugitive slaves trust when they run away from their masters? Is it to their estates,—their servants,—their plate? To nothing but themselves. Yet they do not fail to obtain the necessaries of life. And must a philosopher, think you, leave his own abode to rest and rely upon others, and not take care of himself?

> Greek: — καὶ πόθεν φάγω, φησίν, μηδὲν ἔχων; — καὶ πῶς οἱ δοῦλοι, πῶς οἱ δραπέται, τίνι πεποιθότες ἐκεῖνοι ἀπαλλάττονται τῶν δεσποτῶν; τοῖς ἀγροῖς. ἢ τοῖς οἰκέταις ἢ τοῖς ἀργυρώμασιν; οὐδενί, ἀλλʼ ἑαυτοῖς· καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἐπιλείπουσιν αὐτοὺς τροφαί.

[¶23] Must he be more helpless and anxious than the brute beasts?—each of which is self-sufficient, and wants neither proper food nor any suitable and natural provision.

> Greek: τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον ἡμῖν δεήσει ἄλλοις θαρροῦντα καὶ ἐπαναπαυόμενον ἀποδημεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν θηρίων τῶν ἀλόγων εἶναι χείρονα καὶ δειλότερον, ὧν ἕκαστον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀρκούμενον οὔτε τροφῆς ἀπορεῖ τῆς οἰκείας οὔτε διεξαγωγῆς τῆς καταλλήλου[ς] καὶ κατὰ φύσιν;

[¶24] One would think that you would need an instructor, not to guard you from thinking too meanly or ignobly of yourselves, but that his business would be to rear up young men of such a spirit that, knowing their affinity to the gods, and that we are as it were fettered by the body and its possessions, and by so many other things as are thus made needful for the daily pursuits of life, they should resolve to throw them all off, as both troublesome and useless, and depart to their divine kindred.

> Greek: ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὅτι ἔδει καθῆσθαι τὸν πρεσβύτερον ἐνταῦθα οὐ τοῦτο μηχανώμενον, ὅπως μὴ ταπεινοφρονήσητε μηδὲ ταπεινοὺς μηδʼ ἀγεννεῖς τινας διαλογισμοὺς διαλογιεῖσθε αὐτοὶ περὶ ἑαυτῶν,

[¶25] This is the work, if any, that ought to employ your master and preceptor if you had one, that you should come to him and say: “Epictetus, we can no longer bear being tied down to this poor body,—feeding, and resting, and cleaning it, and vexed with so many low cares on its account.

> Greek: ἀλλὰ μή τινες ἐμπίπτωσιν τοιοῦτοι νέοι, οἳ ἐπιγνόντες τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς συγγένειαν καὶ ὅτι δεσμά τινα ταῦτα προσηρτήμεθα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἕνεκα ἀναγκαῖα ἡμῖν γίνεται εἰς οἰκονομίαν καὶ ἀναστροφὴν τὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ὡς βάρη τινὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα ἀπορρῖψαι θέλωσιν καὶ ἀπελθεῖν πρὸς τοὺς συγγενεῖς.

[¶26] Are not these things indifferent, and nothing to us, and death no evil? Are we not of kindred to God; and did we not come from him? Suffer us to go back thither from whence we came.

> Greek: καὶ τοῦτον ἔδει τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀγωνίζεσθαι τὸν διδάσκαλον ὑμῶν καὶ παιδευτήν, εἴ τις ἄρα ἦν· ὑμᾶς μὲν ἔρχεσθαι λέγοντας Ἐπίκτητε, οὐκέτι ἀνεχόμεθα μετὰ τοῦ σωματίου τούτου δεδεμένοι καὶ τοῦτο τρέφοντες καὶ ποτίζοντες καὶ ἀναπαύοντες καὶ καθαίροντες, εἶτα διʼ αὐτὸ συμπεριφερόμενοι τοῖσδε καὶ τοῖσδε.

[¶27] Suffer us at length to be delivered from these fetters that bind and weigh us down. Here thieves and robbers, courts and tyrants, claim power over us, through the body and its possessions.

> Greek: οὐκ ἀδιάφορα ταῦτα καὶ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ ὁ θάνατος οὐ κακόν; καὶ συγγενεῖς τινες τοῦ θεοῦ ἐσμεν κἀκεῖθεν ἐληλύθαμεν;

[¶28] Suffer us to show them that they have no power.”

> Greek: ἄφες ἡμᾶς ἀπελθεῖν ὅθεν ἐληλύθαμεν, ἄφες λυθῆναί ποτε τῶν δεσμῶν τούτων τῶν ἐξηρτημένων καὶ βαρούντων.

[¶29] And in this case it would be my part to answer: “My friends, wait for God, till he shall give the signal and dismiss you from this service; then return to him. For the present, be content to remain at this post where he has placed you.

> Greek: ἐνταῦθα λῃσταὶ καὶ κλέπται καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ οἱ καλούμενοι τύραννοι δοκοῦντες ἔχειν τινὰ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐξουσίαν διὰ τὸ σωμάτιον καὶ τὰ τούτου κτήματα. ἄφες δείξωμεν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν·

[¶30] The time of your abode here is short and easy to such as are disposed like you; for what tyrant, what robber, what thief, or what court can be formidable to those who thus count for nothing the body and its possessions. Stay, nor foolishly depart.”

> Greek: ἐμὲ δʼ ἐν τῷδε λέγειν ὅτι ἄνθρωποι, ἐκδέξασθε τὸν θεόν. ὅταν ἐκεῖνος σημήνῃ καὶ ἀπολύσῃ ὑμᾶς ταύτης τῆς ὑπηρεσίας, τότʼ ἀπολύεσθε πρὸς αὐτόν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος ἀνάσχεσθε ἐνοικοῦντες ταύτην τὴν χώραν, εἰς ἣν ἐκεῖνος ὑμᾶς ἔταξεν.

[¶31] Thus ought the case to stand between a preceptor and ingenuous young men. But how stands it now? The preceptor has no life in him, and you have none. When you have had enough to-day, you sit weeping about to-morrow, in regard to how you shall get food.

> Greek: ὀλίγος ἄρα χρόνος οὗτος ὁ τῆς οἰκήσεως καὶ ῥᾴδιος τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις. ποῖος γὰρ ἔτι τύραννος ἢ ποῖος κλέπτης ἢ ποῖα δικαστήρια φοβερὰ τοῖς οὕτως παρʼ οὐδὲν πεποιημένοις τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου κτήματα; μείνατε, μὴ ἀλογίστως ἀπέλθητε.

[¶32] Why, if you have it, slave, you will have it; if not, you will go out of life.

> Greek: τοιοῦτόν τι ἔδει γίνεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ παιδευτοῦ πρὸς τοὺς εὐφυεῖς τῶν νέων.

[¶33] The door is open, why do you lament; what room remains for tears; what occasion for flattery? Why should any one person envy another?

> Greek: νῦν δὲ τί γίνεται; νεκρὸς μὲν ὁ παιδευτής, νεκροὶ δʼ ὑμεῖς. ὅταν χορτασθῆτε σήμερον, κάθησθε κλάοντες περὶ τῆς αὔριον, πόθεν φάγητε.

[¶34] Why should he be impressed with awe by those who have great possessions, or are placed in high rank,—especially, if they are powerful and passionate? For what can they do to us? The things which they can do, we do not regard; the things about which we are concerned, they cannot reach.

> Greek: ἀνδράποδον, ἂν σχῇς, ἕξεις· ἂν μὴ σχῇς, ἐξελεύσῃ· ἤνοικται ἡ θύρα. τί πενθεῖς; ποῦ ἔτι τόπος δακρύοις; τίς ἔτι κολακείας ἀφορμή; διὰ τί ἄλλος ἄλλῳ φθονήσει; διὰ τί πολλὰ κεκτημένους θαυμάσει ἢ τοὺς ἐν δυνάμει τεταγμένους, μάλιστʼ ἂν καὶ ἰσχυροὶ ὦσιν καὶ ὀργίλοι;

[¶35] Who, then, after all, shall hold sway over a person thus disposed? How behaved Socrates in regard to these things? As it became one conscious of kinship with the gods.

> Greek: τί γὰρ ἡμῖν ποιήσουσιν; ἃ δύνανται ποιῆσαι, τούτων οὐκ ἐπιστρεψόμεθα· ὧν ἡμῖν μέλει, ταῦτα οὐ δύνανται. τίς οὖν ἔτι ἄρξει τοῦ οὕτως διακειμένου;
πῶς Σωκράτης εἶχεν πρὸς ταῦτα; πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως ἢ ὡς ἔδει τὸν πεπεισμένον ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν θεῶν συγγενής;

[¶36] He said to his judges:— If you should tell me, “We will acquit you upon condition that you shall no longer discourse in the manner you have hitherto done, nor make any disturbance among either our young or our old people,” I would answer: “You are ridiculous in thinking that if your general had placed me in any post I ought to maintain and defend it, and choose to die a thousand times, rather than desert it, but that if God has assigned me any station or method of life, I ought to desert that for you.”

> Greek: ἄν μοι λέγητε, φησίν, νῦν ὅτι ἀφίεμέν σε ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὅπως μηκέτι διαλέξῃ τούτους τοὺς λόγους οὓς μέχρι νῦν διελέγου μηδὲ παρενοχλήσεις ἡμῶν τοῖς νέοις μηδὲ τοῖς γέρουσιν,

[¶37] This it is for a man to truly recognize his relationship with God, But we habitually think of ourselves as [made up of] mere stomach and intestines and bodily parts.

> Greek: ἀποκρινοῦμαι ὅτι γελοῖοί ἐστε, οἵτινες ἀξιοῦτε, εἰ μέν με ὁ στρατηγὸς ὁ ὑμέτερος ἔταξεν εἴς τινα τάξιν, ὅτι ἔδει με τηρεῖν αὐτὴν καὶ φυλάττειν καὶ μυριάκις πρότερον αἱρεῖσθαι ἀποθνῄσκειν ἢ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν αὐτήν, εἰ δʼ ὁ θεὸς ἔν τινι χώρᾳ καὶ ἀναστροφῇ κατατέταχεν, ταύτην δʼ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν δεῖ ἡμᾶς.
τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ταῖς ἀληθείαις συγγενὴς τῶν θεῶν.

[¶38] Because we fear, because we desire, we flatter those who can help us in these matters; we dread them too. A person desired me once to write for him to Rome.

> Greek: ἡμεῖς οὖν ὡς κοιλίαι, ὡς ἔντερα, ὡς αἰδοῖα, οὕτω περὶ αὑτῶν διανοούμεθα, ὅτι φοβούμεθα, ὅτι ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα συνεργεῖν δυναμένους κολακεύομεν, τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους δεδοίκαμεν.

[¶39] He was one vulgarly esteemed unfortunate, as he had been formerly illustrious and rich, and was afterwards stripped of all his possessions, and reduced to live here. I wrote for him in a submissive style;

> Greek: ἐμέ τις ἠξίωκεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γράψαι εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ὡς ἐδόκει τοῖς πολλοῖς ἠτυχηκὼς καὶ πρότερον μὲν ἐπιφανὴς ὢν καὶ πλούσιος, ὕστερον δʼ ἐκπεπτωκὼς ἁπάντων καὶ διάγων ἐνταῦθα.

[¶40] but after reading my letter he returned it to me and said: “wanted your assistance, not your pity; for no evil has befallen me.” Thus Rufus, to try me, used to say, “This or that you will have from your master.”

> Greek: κἀγὼ ἔγραψα ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ταπεινῶς. ὁ δʼ ἀναγνοὺς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπέδωκέν μοι αὐτὴν καὶ ἔφη ὅτι ἐγὼ βοηθηθῆναί τι ὑπὸ σοῦ ἤθελον, οὐχὶ ἐλεηθῆναι· κακὸν δέ μοι οὐθέν ἐστιν.

[¶41] When I answered him, “These are mere human affairs,” “Why, then,” says he, “should I intercede with him, when you can receive from yourself things more important?”

> Greek: οὕτως καὶ Ῥοῦφος πειράζων μʼ εἰώθει λέγειν συμβήσεταί σοι τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου.

[¶42] For what one has of his own, it is superfluous and vain to receive from another.

> Greek: κἀμοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκριναμένου ὅτι ἀνθρώπινα τί οὖν ἔτι ἐκεῖνον παρακαλῶ παρὰ σοῦ αὐτὰ λαβεῖν δυνάμενος;
τῷ γὰρ ὄντι, ὃ ἐξ αὑτοῦ τις ἔχει, περισσὸς καὶ μάταιος παρʼ ἄλλου λαμβάνων.

[¶43] Shall I, then, who can receive nobleness and a manly spirit from myself, receive an estate, or a sum of money, or a place, from you? Heaven forbid! I will not be so insensible of my own possessions.

> Greek: ἐγὼ οὖν ἔχων ἐξ ἐμαυτοῦ λαβεῖν τὸ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ γενναῖον, ἀγρὸν παρὰ σοῦ λάβω καὶ ἀργύριον ἢ ἀρχήν τινα; μὴ γένοιτο. οὐχ οὕτως ἀναίσθητος ἔσομαι τῶν ἐμῶν κτημάτων.

[¶44] But if a person is fearful and abject, what else is necessary but to apply for permission to bury him as if he were dead? “Please forward to us the corpse of such a one.”

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ὅταν τις ᾖ δειλὸς καὶ ταπεινός, ὑπὲρ τούτου τί ἄλλο ἢ ἀνάγκη γράφειν ἐπιστολὰς ὡς ὑπὲρ νεκροῦ τὸ πτῶμα ἡμῖν χάρισαι τοῦ δεῖνος καὶ ξέστην αἱματίου;

[¶45] For, in fact, such a one is that, and nothing more. If he were anything more, he would be sensible that man is not to be made miserable at the will of his fellow-man.

> Greek: τῷ γὰρ ὄντι πτῶμα ὁ τοιοῦτός ἐστι καὶ ξέστης αἱματίου, πλέον δʼ οὐδέν. εἰ δʼ ἦν πλέον τι, ᾐσθάνετʼ ἄν, ὅτι ἄλλος διʼ ἄλλον οὐ δυστυχεῖ.

[¶46] 10. If we all applied ourselves as heartily to our proper business as the old politicians at Rome to their schemes, perhaps we too might accomplish something. I know a man older than I am, who is now a commissary at Rome. When he passed through this place, on his return from exile, what an account did he give me of his former life; and how did he promise that for the future, when he had returned he would apply himself to nothing but how to spend the remainder of his days in repose and tranquillity. “For how few have I now remaining!” he said. “You will not do it,” said I. “When you are once within reach of Rome you will forget all this; and if you can but once gain admittance to court, you will be rejoiced and thank God.” “It you ever find me, Epictetus,” said he, “putting one foot into the court, think of me whatever you please.” Yet, after all, how did he act? Before he entered the city he was met by a letter from Caesar. On receiving it he forgot all his former resolutions; and has ever since been accumulating affairs upon himself. I should be glad now to have an opportunity of putting him in mind of his discourse upon the road, and of pointing out by how much I was the truer prophet. What, then, do I say? that man is made for an inactive life? No, surely. But why is not this life of ours fill of action? For my own part, I wake at dawn with my head full of my lessons for the coming day, and then say to myself, quickly, What is it to me how such a one recites? My present business is to sleep. What comparison can be made between their kind of activity and ours? If you consider what it is they do, you will see; for about what are they employed the whole day but in calculating, contriving, consulting,—about provisions, about an estate, or other interests like these? Is there any likeness, then, between reading a petition, “entreat you to give me a permission to export corn,” and this, “entreat you to learn from Chrysippus what the administration of the universe is, and what place a reasonable creature holds in it; learn, too, what you yourself are, and wherein your good and evil consist”? Are these things at all alike? Do they require an equal degree of application? And is it no more shameful to neglect the one than the other? Well, then, are we older men the only idle dreamers? No, but you young men are so in a greater degree. And as we old folks, when we see young ones trifling, are tempted to trifle with them; so, much more, if I were to see you earnest and ardent, I should be excited to labor with you.

> Greek: 10. εἰ οὕτως σφοδρῶς συνετετά[γ]μεθα περὶ τὸ ἔργον τὸ ἑαυτῶν ὡς οἱ ἐν Ῥώμῃ γέροντες περὶ ἃ ἐσπουδάκασιν, τάχα ἄν τι ἠνύομεν καὶ αὐτοί. οἶδα ἐγὼ πρεσβύτερον ἄνθρωπον ἐμοῦ τὸν νῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ σίτου ὄντα ἐν Ῥώμῃ, ὅτε ταύτῃ παρῆγεν ἀπὸ τῆς φυγῆς ἀναστρέφων, οἷα εἶπέν μοι, κατατρέχων τοῦ προτέρου ἑαυτοῦ βίου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἑξῆς ἐπαγγελλόμενος, ὅτι ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἀναβὰς σπουδάσει ἢ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ ἀταραξίᾳ διεξαγαγεῖν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ βίου· πόσον γὰρ ἔτι ἐστὶν ἐμοὶ τὸ λοιπόν; — κἀγὼ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐ ποιήσεις, ἀλλʼ ὀσφρανθεὶς μόνον τῆς Ῥώμης ἁπάντων τούτων ἐπιλήσῃ. ἂν δὲ καὶ εἰς αὐλὴν πάροδός τις δίδωται, ὅτι χαίρων καὶ τῷ θεῷ εὐχαριστῶν ὤσεται. — ἄν μʼ εὕρῃς, ἔφη, Ἐπίκτητε, τὸν ἕτερον πόδα εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν τιθέντα, ὃ βούλει ὑπολάμβανε. νῦν οὖν τί ἐποίησεν; πρὶν ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἀπήντησαν αὐτῷ παρὰ Καίσαρος πινακίδες· ὁ δὲ λαβὼν πάντων ἐκείνων ἐξελάθετο καὶ λοιπὸν ἓν ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπισεσώρευκεν. ἤθελον αὐτὸν νῦν παραστὰς ὑπομνῆσαι τῶν λόγων, οὓς ἔλεγεν παρερχόμενος, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι πόσῳ σοῦ ἐγὼ κομψότερος μάντις εἰμί. τί οὖν; ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι ἄπρακτόν ἐστι τὸ ζῷον; μὴ γένοιτο. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμὲν πρακτικοί; εὐθὺς ἐγὼ πρῶτος, ὅταν ἡμέρα γένηται, μικρὰ ὑπομιμνῄσκομαι, τίνα ἐπαναγνῶναί με δεῖ. εἶτα εὐθὺς ἐμαυτῷ· τί δέ μοι καὶ μέλει πῶς ὁ δεῖνα ἀναγνῷ; πρῶτόν ἐστιν, ἵνα ἐγὼ κοιμηθῶ. καίτοι τί ὅμοια τὰ ἐκείνων πράγματα τοῖς ἡμετέροις; ἂν ἐπιστῆτε, τί ἐκεῖνοι ποιοῦσιν, αἰσθήσεσθε. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν ψηφίζουσιν, συζητοῦσι, συμβουλεύουσι περὶ σιταρίου, περὶ ἀγριδίου, περί τινων προκοπῶν τοιούτων; ὅμοιον οὖν ἐστιν ἐντευξίδιον παρά τινος λαβόντα ἀναγιγνώσκειν παρακαλῶ σε ἐπιτρέψαι μοι σιτάριον ἐξαγαγεῖν ἢ παρακαλῶ σε παρὰ Χρυσίππου ἐπισκέψασθαι τίς ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις καὶ ποίαν τινὰ χώραν ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχει τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον· ἐπίσκεψαι δὲ καὶ τίς εἶ σὺ καὶ ποῖόν τι σοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὅμοιά ἐστιν; ἀλλʼ ὁμοίας σπουδῆς χρείαν ἔχοντα; ἀλλʼ ὡσαύτως ἀμελεῖν αἰσχρὸν τούτων κἀκείνων; τί οὖν; ἡμεῖς μόνοι ῥᾳθυμοῦμεν καὶ νυστάζομεν; οὔ· ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρότερον ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι. ἐπεί τοι καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ γέροντες, ὅταν παίζοντας ὁρῶμεν νέους, συμπροθυμούμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ συμπαίζειν. πολὺ δὲ πλέον, εἰ ἑώρων διεγηγερμένους καὶ συμπροθυμουμένους, προεθυμούμην ἂν συσπουδάζειν καὶ αὐτός.

[¶47] 11. When an important personage once came to visit him, Epictetus, having inquired into the particulars of his affairs, asked him whether he had a wife and children. The other replying that he had, Epictetus likewise inquired, In what manner do you live with them? “Very miserably,” says he. How so? For men do not marry, and have children, in order to be miserable, but rather to make themselves happy. “But I am so very miserable about my children that the other day, when my daughter was sick and appeared to be in danger, I could not bear even to be with her, but ran away, till it was told me that she was recovered.” And pray do you think this was acting right? “It was acting naturally,” said he. Well, do but convince me that it was acting naturally, and I can as well convince you that everything natural is right. “All, or most of us fathers, are affected in the same way.” I do not deny the fact; but the question between us is, whether it is right. For by this way of reasoning it must be said that diseases happen for the good of the body, because they do happen; and even that vices are natural, because all, or most of us, are guilty of them. Do you show me, then, how such a behavior as yours appears to be natural.

> Greek: 11. ἀφικομένου δέ τινος πρὸς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐν τέλει πυθόμενος παρʼ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους ἠρώτησεν, εἰ καὶ τέκνα εἴη αὐτῷ καὶ γυνή. τοῦ δʼ ὁμολογήσαντος προσεπύθετο· πῶς τι οὖν χρῇ τῷ πράγματι; — ἀθλίως, ἔφη. — καὶ ὅς· τίνα τρόπον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τούτου γʼ ἕνεκα γαμοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι καὶ παιδοποιοῦνται, ὅπως ἄθλιοι ὦσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅπως εὐδαίμονες. — ἀλλʼ ἐγώ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἀθλίως ἔχω περὶ τὰ παιδάρια, ὥστε πρῴην νοσοῦντός μου τοῦ θυγατρίου καὶ δόξαντος κινδυνεύειν οὐχ ὑπέμεινα οὐδὲ παρεῖναι αὐτῷ νοσοῦντι, φυγὼν δʼ ᾠχόμην, μέχρις οὗ προσήγγειλέ τις μοι ὅτι ἔχει καλῶς. — τί οὖν; ὀρθῶς φαίνει σαυτῷ ταῦτα πεποιηκέναι; — φυσικῶς, ἔφη. — ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό με πεῖσον, ἔφη, σύ, διότι φυσικῶς, καὶ ἐγώ σε πείσω, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν γινόμενον ὀρθῶς γίνεται. — τοῦτο, ἔφη, πάντες ἢ οἵ γε πλεῖστοι πατέρες πάσχομεν. — οὐδʼ ἐγώ σοι ἀντιλέγω, ἔφη, ὅτι οὐ γίνεται, τὸ δʼ ἀμφισβητούμενον ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, εἰ ὀρθῶς. ἐπεὶ τούτου γʼ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ φύματα δεῖ λέγειν ἐπʼ ἀγαθῷ γίνεσθαι τοῦ σώματος, ὅτι γίνεται, καὶ ἁπλῶς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν, ὅτι πάντες σχεδὸν ἢ οἵ γε πλεῖστοι ἁμαρτάνομεν.

[¶48] “I cannot undertake that; but do you rather show me that it is neither natural nor right.”

> Greek: δεῖξον οὖν μοι σύ, πῶς κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν. — οὐ δύναμαι, ἔφη·

[¶49] If we were disputing about black and white, what criterion must we call in, to distinguish them?

> Greek: ἀλλὰ σύ μοι μᾶλλον δεῖξον, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν οὐδʼ ὀρθῶς γίνεται. — καὶ ὅς·

[¶50] “The sight.” If about hot and cold, or hard and soft, what? “The touch.”

> Greek: ἀλλʼ εἰ ἐζητοῦμεν, ἔφη, περὶ λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων, ποῖον ἂν κριτήριον παρεκαλοῦμεν πρὸς διάγνωσιν αὐτῶν;

[¶51] Well, then, when we are debating about natural and unnatural and right and wrong what criterion are we to take?

> Greek: — τὴν ὅρασιν, ἔφη. — τί δʼ εἰ περὶ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν, ποῖόν τι;

[¶52] “I cannot tell.”

> Greek: — τὴν ἁφήν.

[¶53] And yet to be ignorant of a criterion of colors, or of smells, or tastes, might perhaps be no very great loss; but do you think that he suffers only a small loss who is ignorant of what is good and evil, and natural and unnatural to man? “No,—the very greatest.”

> Greek: — οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς γινομένων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν, ποῖον θέλεις κριτήριον παραλάβωμεν; — οὐκ οἶδʼ, ἔφη.

[¶54] Well, tell me; are all things which are judged good and proper by some rightly judged to be so? Thus, is it possible that the several opinions of Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans, concerning food should all be right? “How can it be possible?”

> Greek: — καὶ μὴν τὸ μὲν τῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὀσμῶν, ἔτι δὲ χυλῶν κριτήριον ἀγνοεῖν τυχὸν οὐ μεγάλη ζημία, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δοκεῖ σοι μικρὰ ζημία εἶναι τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι; — ἡ μεγίστη μὲν οὖν. — φέρε, εἰπέ μοι, πάντα ἃ δοκεῖ τισιν εἶναι καλὰ καὶ προσήκοντα, ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ;

[¶55] I suppose, then, it is absolutely necessary that, if the opinions of the Egyptians be right, the others must be wrong; if those of the Jews be good, all the rest must be bad. “How can it be otherwise?”

> Greek: καὶ νῦν Ἰουδαίοις καὶ Σύροις καὶ Αἰγυπτίοις καὶ Ῥωμαίοις οἷόν τε πάντα τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τροφῆς ὀρθῶς δοκεῖν; — καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε;

[¶56] And where ignorance is, there likewise is want of wisdom and instruction in the most necessary points. “It is granted.”

> Greek: — ἀλλʼ οἶμαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, εἰ ὀρθά ἐστι τὰ Αἰγυπτίων, μὴ ὀρθὰ εἶναι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ καλῶς ἔχει τὰ Ἰουδαίων, μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. — πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶57] Then, as you are sensible of this, you will for the future apply yourself to nothing, and think of nothing else, but how to learn the criterion of what is agreeable to nature; and to use that in judging of each particular case. At present the assistance I have to give you towards what you desire is this: Does affection seem to you to be a right and a natural thing? “How should it be otherwise?”

> Greek: — ὅπου δʼ ἄγνοια, ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀμαθία καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἀπαιδευσία. — συνεχώρει. — σὺ οὖν, ἔφη, τούτων αἰσθόμενος οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ λοιποῦ σπουδάσεις οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄλλῳ τινὶ τὴν γνώμην. ἕξεις ἢ ὅπως τὸ κριτήριον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καταμαθὼν τούτῳ προσχρώμενος διακρινεῖς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἕκαστον. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος τὰ τοσαῦτα ἔχω σοι πρὸς ὃ βούλει βοηθῆσαι.

[¶58] Well, and is affection natural and right, and reason not so?

> Greek: τὸ φιλόστοργον δοκεῖ σοι κατὰ φύσιν τʼ εἶναι καὶ καλόν;

[¶59] “By no means.”

> Greek: — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — τί δέ;

[¶60] Is there any opposition, then, between reason and affection? “I think not.”

> Greek: τὸ μὲν φιλόστοργον κατὰ φύσιν τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ καλόν, τὸ δʼ εὐλόγιστον οὐ καλόν;

[¶61] Suppose there were; if one of two opposites be natural, the other must necessarily be unnatural, must it not? “It must.”

> Greek: — οὐδαμῶς. — μὴ τοίνυν μάχην ἔχει τῷ φιλοστόργῳ τὸ εὐλόγιστον; — οὐ δοκεῖ μοι.

[¶62] What we find, then, to accord at once with love and reason, that we may safely pronounce to be right and good. “Agreed.”

> Greek: — εἰ δὲ μή, τῶν μαχομένων ἀνάγκη θατέρου κατὰ φύσιν ὄντος θάτερον εἶναι παρὰ φύσιν; ἢ γὰρ οὔ; — οὕτως, ἔφη.

[¶63] Well, then; you will not dispute this, that to run away, and leave a sick child, is contrary to reason. It remains for us to consider whether it be consistent with affection. “Let us consider it.”

> Greek: — οὐκοῦν ὅ τι ἂν εὑρίσκωμεν ὁμοῦ μὲν φιλόστοργον ὁμοῦ δʼ εὐλόγιστον, τοῦτο θαρροῦντες ἀποφαινόμεθα ὀρθόν τε εἶναι καὶ καλόν; — ἔστω, ἔφη. — τί οὖν;

[¶64] Did you, then, from an affection to your child, do right in running away and leaving her? Has her mother no affection for the child? “Yes, surely she has.”

> Greek: ἀφεῖναι νοσοῦν τὸ παιδίον καὶ ἀφέντα ἀπελθεῖν ὅτι μὲν οὐκ εὐλόγιστον οὐκ οἶμαί σʼ ἀντερεῖν. ὑπολείπεται δʼ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖν εἰ φιλόστοργον. — σκοπῶμεν δή.

[¶65] Would it have been right, then, that her mother too should leave her, or would it not? “It would not.”

> Greek: — ἆρʼ οὖν σὺ μὲν ἐπειδὴ φιλοστόργως διέκεισο πρὸς τὸ παιδίον, ὀρθῶς ἐποίεις φεύγων καὶ ἀπολείπων αὐτό;

[¶66] And does not her nurse love her? “She does.”

> Greek: ἡ μήτηρ δʼ οὐ φιλοστοργεῖ τὸ παιδίον;

[¶67] Then ought she likewise to leave her? “By no means.”

> Greek: — Φιλοστοργεῖ μὲν οὖν.

[¶68] And does not her preceptor love her?

> Greek: — οὐκοῦν ἔδει καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἀφεῖναι αὐτὸ ἢ οὐκ ἔδει;

[¶69] “He does.”

> Greek: — οὐκ ἔδει.

[¶70] Then ought he also to have run away and left her,—the child being thus left alone and unassisted, from the great affection of her parents and her friends, or left to die among people who neither loved her nor took care of her? “Heaven forbid!”

> Greek: — τί δʼ ἡ τιτθή; στέργει αὐτό; — στέργει, ἔφη. — ἔδει οὖν κἀκείνην ἀφεῖναι αὐτό; — οὐδαμῶς. — τί δʼ ὁ παιδαγωγός; οὐ στέργει αὐτό; — στέργει.

[¶71] But is it not unreasonable and unjust that what you think right in yourself, on account of your affection, should not be allowed to others, who have the very same affection with you “It is absurd.”

> Greek: — ἔδει οὖν κἀκεῖνον ἀφέντα ἀπελθεῖν, εἶθʼ οὕτως ἔρημον καὶ ἀβοήθητον ἀπολειφθῆναι τὸ παιδίον διὰ τὴν πολλὴν φιλοστοργίαν τῶν γονέων ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ ἢ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν τῶν οὔτε στεργόντων οὔτε κηδομένων ἀποθανεῖν; — μὴ γένοιτο.

[¶72] Pray, if you were ill yourself should you be willing to have your family, and even your wife and children, so very affectionate as to leave you helpless and alone? “By no means.”

> Greek: — καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γε ἄνισον καὶ ἄγνωμον, ὅ τις αὑτῷ προσῆκον οἴεται διὰ τὸ φιλόστοργος εἶναι, τοῦτο τοῖς ὁμοίως φιλοστοργοῦσιν μὴ ἐφιέναι; — ἄτοπον.

[¶73] Or would you wish to be so loved by your friends as from their excessive affection always to be left alone when you were ill? Or would you not rejoice, if it were possible, to have such a kind of affection from your enemies, as to make them thus let you alone? If so, it remains, that your behavior was by no means affectionate. But now, was there no other motive that induced you to desert your child? “How is that possible?”

> Greek: — ἄγε, σὺ δʼ ἂν νοσῶν ἠβούλου φιλοστόργους οὕτως ἔχειν τοὺς προσήκοντας τούς τʼ ἄλλους καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα, ὥστʼ ἀφεθῆναι μόνος ὑπʼ αὐτῶν καὶ ἔρημος; — οὐδαμῶς. — εὔξαιο δʼ ἂν οὕτως στερχθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν σαυτοῦ, ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν αὐτῶν φιλοστοργίαν ἀεὶ μόνος ἀπολείπεσθαι ἐν ταῖς νόσοις, ἢ τούτου γʼ ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ δυνατὸν ἦν, φιλοστοργεῖσθαι ηὔχου, ὥστʼ ἀπολείπεσθαι ὑπʼ αὐτῶν;

[¶74] I mean some such motive as induced a person at Rome to hide his face while a horse was running to which he earnestly wished success; and when, beyond his expectation, it won the race he was obliged himself to be sponged, to recover from his faintness. “And what was this motive?”

> Greek: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ὑπολείπεται μηδαμῶς ἔτι φιλόστοργον εἶναι τὸ πραχθέν. τί οὖν; οὐδὲν ἦν τὸ κινῆσάν σε καὶ ἐξορμῆσαν πρὸς τὸ ἀφεῖναι τὸ παιδίον; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε;

[¶75] At present, perhaps, it cannot be made clear to you. It is sufficient to be convinced, if what philosophers say be true, that we are not to seek any motive merely from without; but that there is the same [unseen] motive in all cases, which moves us to do or forbear any action; to speak or not to speak; to be elated or depressed; to avoid or pursue,—that very impulse which hath now moved us two; you, to come, and sit and hear me; and me, to speak as I do. “And what is that?” Is it anything else than that it seemed right to us to do so? “Nothing else.”

> Greek: ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτόν τι ἄν, οἷον καὶ ἐν Ῥώμῃ τινὰ ἦν τὸ κινοῦν, ὥστʼ ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι τοῦ ἵππου τρέχοντος ᾧ ἐσπουδάκει, εἶτα νικήσαντός ποτε παραλόγως σπόγγων δεῆσαι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀναληφθῆναι λιποψυχοῦντα. τί οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν; τὸ μὲν ἀκριβὲς οὐ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ τυχόν· ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἀπαρκεῖ πεισθῆναι, εἴπερ ὑγιές ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων λεγόμενον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω που δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτό, ἀλλʼ ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ποιεῖν τι ἡμᾶς ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν, τοῦ λέγειν τινὰ ἢ μὴ λέγειν, τοῦ ἐπαίρεσθαι ἢ συστέλλεσθαι ἢ φεύγειν τινὰ ἢ διώκειν, τοῦθʼ ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ γέγονεν αἴτιον, σοὶ μὲν τοῦ ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ καθῆσθαι νῦν ἀκούοντα, ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν ταῦτα.

## 4. Book I · chapters 11–18

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/4/#p-N

[¶0] And if it had seemed otherwise to us. what else should we have done than what we thought right? This, and not the death of Patroclus, was the real source of the lamentation of Achilles,—for every man is not thus affected by the death of a friend,—that it seemed right to him. This too was the cause of your running away from your child, that it then seemed right; and if hereafter you should stay with her, it will be because that seems right. You are now returning to Rome because it seems right to you; but if you should alter your opinion you will not return. In a word, neither death, nor exile, nor pain, nor anything of this kind, is the real cause of our doing or not doing any action, but our inward opinions and principles. Do I convince you of this, or not? “You do.”

> Greek: τί δʼ ἐστὶ τοῦτο; ἆρά γε ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν; — οὐδέν. — εἰ δʼ ἄλλως ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, τί ἂν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ δόξαν ἐπράττομεν; οὐκ οὖν καὶ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ τοῦτο αἴτιον τοῦ πενθεῖν, οὐχ ὁ τοῦ Πατρόκλου θάνατος (ἄλλος γάρ τις οὐ πάσχει ταῦτα τοῦ ἑταίρου ἀποθανόντος), ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ. καὶ σοὶ τότε φεύγειν τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὅτι ἔδοξέν σοι· καὶ πάλιν, ἐὰν μείνῃς, ὅτι ἔδοξέν σοι. καὶ νῦν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἀνέρχῃ, ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι· κἂν μεταδόξῃ, οὐκ ἂν ἀπελεύσῃ. καὶ ἁπλῶς οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε φυγὴ οὔτε πόνος οὔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ πράττειν τι ἢ μὴ πράττειν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλʼ ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα.

[¶1] Well, then, such as the cause is, such will be the effect. From this day forward, then, whenever we do anything wrong, we will impute it to the wrong principle from which we act; and we will endeavor to remove and extirpate that, with greater care than we would remove wens and tumors from the body. In like manner, we will ascribe what we do right to the same cause; and we will accuse neither servant, nor neighbor, nor wife, nor children, as the cause of any evil to us,—persuaded that if we had not accepted certain principles, we should not carry them to such consequences. The control of these principles lies in us, and not in any outward things. Of these principles we ourselves, and not things outward, are the masters. “Agreed.”

> Greek: τοῦτό σε πείθω ἢ οὐχί; — Πεί[σ]θεις, ἔφη. — οἷα δὴ τὰ αἴτια ἐφʼ ἑκάστου, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἀποτελούμενα. οὐκοῦν ὅταν μὴ ὀρθῶς τι πράττωμεν, ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἰτιασόμεθα ἢ τὸ δόγμα, ἀφʼ οὗ αὐτὸ ἐπράξαμεν, κἀκεῖνο ἐξαίρειν καὶ ἐκτέμνειν πειρασόμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ φύματα καὶ τὰ ἀποστήματα ἐκ τοῦ σώματος. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρθῶς πραττομένων ταὐτὸν τοῦτο αἴτιον ἀποφανοῦμεν. καὶ οὔτʼ οἰκέτην ἔτι αἰτιασόμεθα οὔτε γείτονα οὔτε γυναῖκα οὔτε τέκνα ὡς αἴτιά τινων κακῶν ἡμῖν γινόμενα πεπεισμένοι ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἡμῖν δόξῃ τοιαῦτά τινα εἶναι, οὐ πράττομεν τὰ ἀκόλουθα· τοῦ δόξαι δὲ ἢ μὴ δόξαι, ἡμεῖς κύριοι καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐκτός. — οὕτως, ἔφη.

[¶2] From this day, then, we will not so closely inquire as to any external conditions,—estate or slaves, or horses, or dogs,—but only make sure of our own principles.

> Greek: — ἀπὸ τῆς σήμερον τοίνυν ἡμέρας οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπισκοπήσομεν οὐδʼ ἐξετάσομεν, ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ πῶς ἔχει, οὔτε τὸν ἀγρὸν οὔτε τὰ ἀνδράποδα οὔτε τοὺς ἵππους ἢ κύνας, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόγματα.

[¶3] “Such is my desire,” said the visitor.

> Greek: — εὔχομαι, ἔφη.

[¶4] You see, then, that it is necessary for you to become a student, that being whom every one laughs at, if you really desire to make an examination of your own principles; but this, as you should know, is not the work of an hour or a day.

> Greek: — ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὅτι σχολαστικόν σε δεῖ γενέσθαι, τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον οὗ πάντες καταγελῶσιν, εἴπερ ἄρα θέλεις ἐπίσκεψιν τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων ποιεῖσθαι. τοῦτο δʼ ὅτι μιᾶς ὥρας ἢ ἡμέρας οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπινοεῖς καὶ αὐτός.

[¶5] 12. Concerning the gods, some affirm that there is no deity; others, that he indeed exists, but is slothful, negligent, and without providential care; a third class admits both his being and his providence, but only in respect to great and heavenly objects, not earthly; a fourth recognizes him both in heaven and earth, but only in general, not individual matters; a fifth, like Odysseus and Socrates, says, “cannot be hid from thee in any of my motions.” It is, before all things, necessary to examine each of these opinions; which is, and which is not rightly spoken. Now, if there are no gods, wherefore serve them? If there are, but they take no care of anything, how is the case bettered? Or, if they both are, and take care; yet, if there is nothing communicated from them to men, and therefore certainly nothing to me, how much better is it? A wise and good man, after examining these things, submits his mind to Him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the laws of the commonwealth. He, then, who comes to be instructed, ought to come with this aim: “How may I in everything follow the gods? How may I acquiesce in the divine administration? And how may I be free?” For he is free to whom all happens agreeably to his desire, and whom no one can unduly restrain. “What, then, is freedom mere license?” By no means; for madness and freedom are incompatible. “But I would have that happen which appears to me desirable, however it comes to appear so.” You are mad; you have lost your senses. Do not you know that freedom is a very beautiful and valuable thing? But for me to choose at random, and for things to happen agreeably to such a choice, may be so far from a beautiful thing, as to be of all things the most undesirable. For how do we proceed in writing? Do I choose to write the name of Dion (for instance) as I will? No, but I am taught to be willing to write it as it ought to be written. And what is the case in music? The same. And what in every other art or science? Otherwise, it would be of no purpose to learn anything if it were to be adapted to each one’s particular humor. Is it, then, only in the greatest and principal matter, that of freedom, permitted me to desire at random? By no means; but true instruction is this,—learning to desire that things should happen as they do. And how do they happen? As the appointer of them hath appointed. He hath appointed that there should be summer and winter, plenty and dearth, virtue and vice, and all such contrarieties, for the harmony of the whole. To each of us he has given a body and its parts, and our several possessions and companions. Mindful of this appointment, we should enter upon a course of education and instruction, not in order to change the constitution of things,—a gift neither practicable nor desirable,—but that, things being as they are with regard to us, we may have our minds accommodated to the facts. Can we, for instance, flee from mankind? How is that possible? Can we, by conversing with them, transform them? Who has given us such a power? What, then, remains, or what method is there to be found, for such a commerce with them that, while they act according to the appearances in their own minds, we may nevertheless be affected conformably to nature? But you are wretched and discontented. If you are alone, you term it a desert; and if with men, you call them cheats and robbers. You find fault too with your parents, and children, and brothers, and neighbors. Whereas you ought, if you live alone, to call that repose and freedom, and to esteem yourself as resembling the gods; and when you are in company, not to call it a crowd, and a tumult, and a trouble, but an assembly, and a festival,—and thus to take all things contentedly. What, then, is the punishment of those who do not so accept them? To be as they are. Is any one discontented with being alone? Let him remain in his desert. Discontented with his parents? Let him be a bad son; and let him mourn, Discontented with his children? Let him be a bad father. Shall we throw him into prison? What prison? Where he already is; for he is in a situation against his will, and wherever any one is against his will, that is to him a prison,—just as Socrates was not truly in prison, for he was willingly there. “What, then, must my leg be lame?” And is it for one paltry leg, wretch, that you accuse the universe? Can you not forego that, in consider tion of the whole? Can you not give up something? Can you not gladly yield it to him who gave it? And will you be angry and discontented with the decrees of Zeus,—which he, with the Fates, who spun in his presence the thread of your birth, ordained and appointed? Do not you know how very small a part you are of the whole?—that is, as to body; for, as to reason, you are neither worse nor less than divine. For reason is not measured by size or height, but by principles. Will you not, therefore, place your good there where you share with the gods? “But how wretched am I, in such a father and mother!” What, then, was it granted you to come beforehand, and make your own terms, and say, “Let such and such persons, at this hour, be the authors of my birth”? It was not granted; for it was necessary that your parents should exist before you, and so you be born afterwards. Of whom? Of just such as they were. What, then, since they are such, is there no remedy afforded you? Surely, you would be wretched and miserable if you knew not the use of sight, and shut your eyes in presence of colors; and are not you more wretched and miserable in being ignorant that you have within you the needful nobleness and manhood wherewith to meet these accidents? Events proportioned to your reason are brought before you; but you turn your mind away, at the very time when you ought to have it the most open and discerning. Why do not you rather thank the gods that they have made you superior to those events which they have not placed within your own control, and have rendered you accountable for that only which is within your own control? They discharge you from all responsibility for your parents, for your brothers, for your body, possessions, death, life. For what, then, have they made you responsible? For that which is alone in your own power,—a right use of things as they appear. Why, then, should you draw those cares upon yourself for which you are not accountable? This is giving one’s self vexation without need.

> Greek: 12. περὶ θεῶν οἱ μέν τινές εἰσιν οἱ λέγοντες μηδʼ εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, οἱ δʼ εἶναι μέν, ἀργὸν δὲ καὶ ἀμελὲς καὶ μὴ προνοεῖν μηδενός· τρίτοι δʼ οἱ καὶ εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγάλων καὶ οὐρανίων, τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ γῆς μηδενός· τέταρτοι δʼ οἱ καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, εἰς κοινὸν δὲ μόνον καὶ οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ κατʼ ἰδίαν ἑκάστου· πέμπτοι δʼ, ὧν ἦν καὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς καὶ Σωκράτης, οἱ λέγοντες ὅτι οὐδέ σε λήθω κινύμενος. πολὺ πρότερον οὖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων ἐπεσκέφθαι, πότερα ὑγιῶς ἢ οὐχ ὑγιῶς λεγόμενόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἰσὶν θεοί, πῶς ἐστι τέλος ἕπεσθαι θεοῖς; εἰ δʼ εἰσὶν μέν, μηδενὸς δʼ ἐπιμελούμενοι, καὶ οὕτως πῶς ὑγιὲς ἔσται; ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ὄντων καὶ ἐπιμελομένων εἰ μηδεμία διάδοσις εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐστὶν ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ νὴ Δία γε καὶ εἰς ἐμέ, πῶς ἔτι καὶ οὕτως ὑγιές ἐστιν; πάντα οὖν ταῦτα ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἐπεσκεμμένος τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην ὑποτέταχεν τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα καθάπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται τῷ νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως. ὁ δὲ παιδευόμενος ταύτην ὀφείλει τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἔχων ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πῶς ἂν ἑποίμην ἐγὼ ἐν παντὶ τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ πῶς ἂν εὐαρεστοίην τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει καὶ πῶς ἂν γενοίμην ἐλεύθερος; ἐλεύθερος γάρ ἐστιν, ᾧ γίνεται πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ὃν οὐδεὶς δύναται κωλῦσαι. τί οὖν; ἀπόνοιά ἐστιν ἡ ἐλευθερία; μὴ γένοιτο. μανία γὰρ καὶ ἐλευθερία εἰς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἔρχεται. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ θέλω πᾶν τὸ δοκοῦν μοι ἀποβαίνειν, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν δοκῇ. μαινόμενος εἶ, παραφρονεῖς. οὐκ οἶδας, ὅτι καλόν τι ἐλευθερία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀξιόλογον; τὸ δʼ ὡς ἔτυχέν με βούλεσθαι τὰ [δʼ] ὡς ἔτυχεν δόξαντα γίνεσθαι, τοῦτο κινδυνεύει οὐ μόνον οὐκ εἶναι καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων αἴσχιστον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ ἐπὶ γραμματικῶν ποιοῦμεν; βούλομαι γράφειν ὡς θέλω τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα; οὔ· ἀλλὰ διδάσκομαι θέλειν, ὡς δεῖ γράφεσθαι. τί ἐπὶ μουσικῶν; ὡσαύτως. τί ἐν τῷ καθόλου, ὅπου τέχνη τις ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν; εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδενὸς ἦν ἄξιον τὸ ἐπίστασθαί τι, εἰ ταῖς ἑκάστων βουλήσεσι προσηρμόζετο. ἐνταῦθα οὖν μόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγίστου καὶ κυριωτάτου, τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐφεῖταί μοι θέλειν; οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι τοῦτʼ ἔστι μανθάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θέλειν ὡς γίνεται. πῶς δὲ γίνεται; ὡς διέταξεν αὐτὰ ὁ διατάσσων. διέταξε δὲ θέρος εἶναι καὶ χειμῶνα καὶ φορὰν καὶ ἀφορίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν καὶ πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἐναντιότητας ὑπὲρ συμφωνίας τῶν ὅλων ἡμῶν θʼ ἑκάστῳ σῶμα καὶ μέρη τοῦ σώματος καὶ κτῆσιν καὶ κοινωνοὺς ἔδωκεν. ταύτης οὖν τῆς διατάξεως μεμνημένους ἔρχεσθαι δεῖ ἐπὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, οὐχ ἵνʼ ἀλλάξωμεν τὰς ὑποθέσεις (οὔτε γὰρ δίδοται ἡμῖν οὔτʼ ἄμεινον), ἀλλʼ ἵνα οὕτως ἐχόντων τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς ὡς ἔχει καὶ πέφυκεν αὐτοὶ τὴν γνώμην τὴν αὑτῶν συνηρμοσμένην τοῖς γινομένοις ἔχωμεν. τί γάρ; ἐνδέχεται φυγεῖν ἀνθρώπους; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε; ἀλλὰ συνόντας αὐτοῖς ἐκείνους ἀλλάξαι; καὶ τίς ἡμῖν δίδωσιν; τί οὖν ἀπολείπεται ἢ τίς εὑρίσκεται μηχανὴ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν; τοιαύτη, διʼ ἧς ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ποιήσουσι τὰ φαινόμενα αὐτοῖς, ἡμεῖς δʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατὰ φύσιν ἕξομεν. σὺ δʼ ἀταλαίπωρος εἶ καὶ δυσάρεστος κἂν μὲν μόνος ᾖς, ἐρημίαν καλεῖς τοῦτο, ἂν δὲ μετὰ ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιβούλους λέγεις καὶ λῃστάς, μέμφῃ δὲ καὶ γονεῖς τοὺς σεαυτοῦ καὶ τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ γείτονας. ἔδει δὲ μόνον μένοντα ἡσυχίαν καλεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ ἐλευθερίαν καὶ ὅμοιον τοῖς θεοῖς ἡγεῖσθαι αὑτόν, μετὰ πολλῶν δʼ ὄντα μὴ ὄχλον καλεῖν μηδὲ θόρυβον μηδʼ ἀηδίαν, ἀλλʼ ἑορτὴν καὶ πανήγυριν καὶ οὕτως πάντα εὐαρέστως δέχεσθαι. τίς οὖν ἡ κόλασις τοῖς οὐ προσδεχομένοις; τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἔχουσιν. δυσαρεστεῖ τις τῷ μόνος εἶναι; ἔστω ἐν ἐρημίᾳ. δυσαρεστεῖ τις τοῖς γονεῦσιν; ἔστω κακὸς υἱὸς καὶ πενθείτω. δυσαρεστεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις; ἔστω κακὸς πατήρ. βάλε αὐτὸν εἰς φυλακήν. ποίαν φυλακήν; ὅπου νῦν ἐστιν. ἄκων γάρ ἐστιν· ὅπου δέ τις ἄκων ἐστίν, ἐκεῖνο φυλακὴ αὐτῷ ἐστιν. καθὸ καὶ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἦν ἐν φυλακῇ, ἑκὼν γὰρ ἦν. σκέλος οὖν μοι γενέσθαι πεπηρωμένον. ἀνδράποδον, εἶτα διʼ ἓν σκελύδριον τῷ κόσμῳ ἐγκαλεῖς; οὐκ ἐπιδώσεις αὐτὸ τοῖς ὅλοις; οὐκ ἀποστήσῃ; οὐ χαίρων παραχωρήσεις τῷ δεδωκότι; ἀγανακτήσεις δὲ καὶ δυσαρεστήσεις τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς διατεταγμένοις, ἃ ἐκεῖνος μετὰ τῶν Μοιρῶν παρουσῶν καὶ ἐπικλωθουσῶν σου τὴν γένεσιν ὥρισεν καὶ διέταξεν; οὐκ οἶσθα[ς], ἡλίκον μέρος πρὸς τὰ ὅλα; τοῦτο δὲ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ὡς κατά γε τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν χείρων τῶν θεῶν οὐδὲ μικρότερος· λόγου γὰρ μέγεθος οὐ μήκει οὐδʼ ὕψει κρίνεται, ἀλλὰ δόγμασιν. οὐ θέλεις οὖν, καθʼ ἃ ἴσος εἶ τοῖς θεοῖς, ἐκεῖ που τίθεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθόν; τάλας ἐγώ, τὸν πατέρα ἔχω τοιοῦτον καὶ τὴν μητέρα. τί οὖν; ἐδίδοτό σοι προελθόντι ἐκλέξασθαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὁ δεῖνα τῇ δεῖνι συνελθέτω τῇδε τῇ ὥρᾳ, ἵνα ἐγὼ γένωμαι; οὐκ ἐδίδοτο. ἀλλʼ ἔδει προυποστῆναί σου τοὺς γονεῖς, εἶτα οὕτως γεννηθῆναι. ἐκ ποίων τινῶν; ἐκ τοιούτων, ὁποῖοι ἦσαν. τί οὖν; τοιούτων αὐτῶν ὄντων οὐδεμία σοι δίδοται μηχανή; εἶτʼ εἰ μὲν τὴν ὁρατικὴν δύναμιν ἠγνόεις πρὸς τί κέκτησαι, δυστυχὴς ἂν ἦς καὶ ἄθλιος, εἰ κατέμυες, προσαγόντων σοι τῶν χρωμάτων· ὅτι δὲ μεγαλοψυχίαν ἔχων καὶ γενναιότητα πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων ἀγνοεῖς, οὐ δυστυχέστερος εἶ καὶ ἀθλιώτερος; προσάγεταί σοι τὰ κατάλληλα τῇ δυνάμει ἣν ἔχεις· σὺ δʼ αὐτὴν τότε μάλιστα ἀποστρέφεις, ὁπότε ἠνοιγμένην καὶ βλέπουσαν ἔχειν ἔδει. οὐ μᾶλλον εὐχαριστεῖς τοῖς θεοῖς, ὅτι σε ἐπάνω τούτων ἀφῆκαν ὅσα μηδʼ ἐποίησαν ἐπὶ σοί, μόνον δʼ ὑπεύθυνον ἀπέφηναν τῶν ἐπὶ σοί; γονέων ἕνεκα ἀνυπεύθυνον ἀφῆκαν· ἀδελφῶν ἕνεκα ἀφῆκαν, σώματος ἕνεκα ἀφῆκαν, κτήσεως, θανάτου, ζωῆς. τίνος οὖν ὑπεύθυνόν σε ἐποίησαν; τοῦ μόνου ὄντος ἐπὶ σοί, χρήσεως οἵας δεῖ φαντασιῶν. τί οὖν ἐπισπᾷς σεαυτῷ ταῦτα ὧν ἀνυπεύθυνος εἶ; τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑαυτῷ παρέχειν πράγματα.

[¶6] 13. When a person inquired how any one might eat to the divine acceptance, If he eats with justice, said Epictetus, and with gratitude, and fairly, and temperately, and decently, must he not also eat to the divine acceptance? And if you call for hot water, and your servant does not hear you, or, if he does, brings it only warm, or perhaps is not to be found at home, then to abstain from anger or petulance, is not this to the divine acceptance? “But how is it possible to bear such things?” O slavish man! will you not bear with your own brother, who has God for his Father, as being a son from the same stock, and of the same high descent? But if you chance to be placed in some superior station, will you presently set yourself up for a tyrant? Will you not remember what you are, and over whom you bear rule,—that they are by nature your relations, your brothers; that they are the offspring of God? “But I have them by right of purchase, and not they me.” Do you see what it is you regard? Your regards look downward towards the earth, and what is lower than earth, and towards the unjust laws of men long dead; but up towards the divine laws you never turn your eyes.

> Greek: 13. πυθομένου δέ τινος, πῶς ἔστιν ἐσθίειν ἀρεστῶς θεοῖς, Εἰ δικαίως ἔστιν, ἔφη, καὶ εὐγνωμόνως καὶ ἴσως ἐγκρατῶς καὶ κοσμίως, οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἀρεστῶς τοῖς θεοῖς; ὅταν δὲ θερμὸν αἰτήσαντός σου μὴ ὑπακούσῃ ὁ παῖς ἢ ὑπακούσας χλιαρώτερον ἐνέγκῃ ἢ μηδʼ εὑρεθῇ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ, τὸ μὴ χαλεπαίνειν μηδὲ ῥήγνυσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρεστὸν τοῖς θεοῖς; — πῶς οὖν τις ἀνάσχηται τῶν τοιούτων; — ἀνδράποδον, οὐκ ἀνέξῃ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ σαυτοῦ, ὃς ἔχει τὸν Δία πρόγονον, ὥσπερ υἱὸς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σπερμάτων γέγονεν καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἄνωθεν καταβολῆς, ἀλλʼ εἰ ἔν τινι τοιαύτῃ χώρᾳ κατετάγης ὑπερεχούσῃ, εὐθὺς τύραννον καταστήσεις σεαυτόν; οὐ μεμνήσῃ τί εἶ καὶ τίνων ἄρχεις; ὅτι συγγενῶν, ὅτι ἀδελφῶν φύσει, ὅτι τοῦ Διὸς ἀπογόνων; — ἀλλʼ ὠνὴν αὐτῶν ἔχω, ἐκεῖνοι δʼ ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. — ὁρᾷς ποῦ βλέπεις; ὅτι εἰς τὴν γῆν, ὅτι εἰς τὸ βάραθρον, ὅτι εἰς τοὺς ταλαιπώρους τούτους νόμους τοὺς τῶν νεκρῶν, εἰς δὲ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν οὐ βλέπεις;

[¶7] 14. When a person asked him, how any one might be convinced that his every act is under the supervision of God? Do not you think, said Epictetus, that all things are mutually connected and united? “I do.” Well; and do not you think that things on earth feel the influence of the heavenly powers? “Yes.” Else how is it that in their season, as if by express command, God bids the plants to blossom and they blossom, to bud and they bud, to bear fruit and they bear it, to ripen it and they ripen; and when again he bids them drop their leaves, and withdrawing into themselves to rest and wait, they rest and wait? Whence again are there seen, on the increase and decrease of the moon, and the approach and departure of the sun, so great changes and transformations in earthly things? Have, then, the very leaves, and our own bodies, this connection and sympathy with the whole, and have not our souls much more? But our souls are thus connected and intimately joined to God, as being indeed members and distinct portions of his essence; and must he not be sensible of every movement of them, as belonging and connatural to himself? Can even you think of the divine administration, and every other divine subject, and together with these of human affairs also; can you at once receive impressions on your senses and your understanding from a thousand objects; at once assent to some things, deny or suspend your judgment concerning others, and preserve in your mind impressions from so many and various objects, by whose aid you can revert to ideas similar to those which first impressed you? Can you retain a variety of arts and the memorials of ten thousand things? And is not God capable of surveying all things, and being present with all, and in communication with all? Is the sun capable of illuminating so great a portion of the universe, and of leaving only that small part of it unilluminated, which is covered by the shadow of the earth, and cannot He who made and moves the sun, a small part of himself, if compared with the whole,—cannot he perceive all things? “But I cannot,” say you, “attend to all things at once.” Who asserts that you have equal power with Zeus? Nevertheless, he has assigned to each man a director, his own good genius, and committed him to that guardianship,—a director sleepless and not to be deceived. To what better and more careful guardian could he have committed each one of us? So that when you have shut your doors, and darkened your room, remember never to say that you are alone; for you are not alone, but God is within, and your genius is within; and what need have they of light to see what you are doing? To this God you likewise ought to swear such an oath as the soldiers do to Caesar. For they, in order to receive their pay, swear to prefer before all things the safety of Caesar; and will you not swear, who have received so many and so great favors; or, if you have sworn, will you not fulfil the oath? And what must you swear? Never to distrust, nor accuse, nor murmur at any of the things appointed by him; nor to shrink from doing or enduring that which is inevitable. Is this oath like the former In the first oath persons swear never to dishonor Caesar: by the last. never to dishonor themselves.

> Greek: 14. πυθομένου δέ τινος, πῶς ἄν τις πεισθείη, ὅτι ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ πραττομένων ἐφορᾶται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, Οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡνῶσθαι τὰ πάντα; — δοκεῖ, ἔφη. — τί δέ; συμπαθεῖν τὰ ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; — δοκεῖ, ἔφη. — πόθεν γὰρ οὕτω τεταγμένως καθάπερ ἐκ προστάγματος τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος εἴπῃ τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀνθεῖν, ἀνθεῖ, ὅταν εἴπῃ βλαστάνειν, βλαστάνει, ὅταν ἐκφέρειν τὸν καρπόν, ἐκφέρει, ὅταν πεπαίνειν, πεπαίνει, ὅταν πάλιν ἀποβάλλειν καὶ φυλλορροεῖν καὶ αὐτὰ εἰς αὑτὰ συνειλούμενα ἐφʼ ἡσυχίας μένειν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι, μένει καὶ ἀναπαύεται; πόθεν δὲ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ μείωσιν τῆς σελήνης καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πρόσοδον καὶ ἄφοδον τοσαύτη παραλλαγὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβολὴ τῶν ἐπιγείων θεωρεῖται; ἀλλὰ τὰ φυτὰ μὲν καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα οὕτως ἐνδέδεται τοῖς ὅλοις καὶ συμπέπονθεν, αἱ ψυχαὶ δʼ αἱ ἡμέτεραι οὐ πολὺ πλέον; ἀλλʼ αἱ ψυχαὶ μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα, οὐ παντὸς δʼ αὐτῶν κινήματος ἅτε οἰκείου καὶ συμφυοῦς ὁ θεὸς αἰσθάνεται; ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν περὶ τῆς θείας διοικήσεως καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν θείων, ὁμοῦ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δύνασαι καὶ ἅμα μὲν αἰσθητικῶς ἀπὸ μυρίων πραγμάτων κινεῖσθαι, ἅμα δὲ διανοητικῶς, ἅμα δὲ συγκαταθετικῶς, τοῖς δʼ ἀνανευστικῶς ἢ ἐφεκτικῶς, τύπους δὲ τοσούτους ἀφʼ οὕτω πολλῶν καὶ ποικίλων πραγμάτων ἐν τῇ σαυτοῦ ψυχῇ φυλάττεις καὶ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν κινούμενος εἰς ἐπινοίας ὁμοειδεῖς ἐμπίπτεις τοῖς πρώτως τετυπωκόσι τέχνας τʼ ἄλλην ἐπʼ ἄλλῃ καὶ μνήμας ἀπὸ μυρίων πραγμάτων διασῴζεις· ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἐστὶ πάντα ἐφορᾶν καὶ πᾶσιν συμπαρεῖναι καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων τινὰ ἴσχειν διάδοσιν; ἀλλὰ φωτίζειν οἷός τʼ ἐστὶν ὁ ἥλιος τηλικοῦτον μέρος τοῦ παντός, ὀλίγον δὲ τὸ ἀφώτιστον ἀπολιπεῖν ὅσον οἷόν τʼ ἐπέχεσθαι ὑπὸ σκιᾶς, ἣν ἡ γῆ ποιεῖ· ὁ δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν πεποιηκὼς καὶ περιάγων μέρος ὄντʼ αὐτοῦ μικρὸν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, οὗτος δʼ οὐ δύναται πάντων αἰσθάνεσθαι; ἀλλʼ ἐγώ, φησίν, οὐ δύναμαι πᾶσιν ἅμα τούτοις παρακολουθεῖν. — τοῦτο δέ σοι καὶ λέγει τις, ὅτι ἴσην ἔχεις δύναμιν τῷ Διί; ἀλλʼ οὖν οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐπίτροπον ἑκάστῳ παρέστησεν τὸν ἑκάστου δαίμονα καὶ παρέδωκεν φυλάσσειν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτον ἀκοίμητον καὶ ἀπαραλόγιστον. τίνι γὰρ ἄλλῳ κρείττονι καὶ ἐπιμελεστέρῳ φύλακι παρέδωκεν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον; ὥσθʼ, ὅταν κλείσητε τὰς θύρας καὶ σκότος ἔνδον ποιήσητε, μέμνησθε μηδέποτε λέγειν ὅτι μόνοι ἐστέ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστέ, ἀλλʼ ὁ θεὸς ἔνδον ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ὑμέτερος δαίμων ἐστίν. καὶ τίς τούτοις χρεία φωτὸς εἰς τὸ βλέπειν τί ποιεῖτε; τούτῳ τῷ θεῷ ἔδει καὶ ὑμᾶς ὀμνύειν ὅρκον, οἷον οἱ στρατιῶται τῷ Καίσαρι. ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τὴν μισθοφορίαν λαμβάνοντες ὀμνύουσιν πάντων προτιμήσειν τὴν τοῦ Καίσαρος σωτηρίαν, ὑμεῖς δὲ δε τοσούτων καὶ τηλικούτων ἠξιωμένοι οὐκ ὀμόσετε ἢ ὀμόσαντες οὐκ ἐμμενεῖτε; καὶ τί ὀμόσετε; μὴ ἀπειθήσειν μηδέποτε μηδʼ ἐγκαλέσειν μηδὲ μέμψεσθαί τινι τῶν ὑπʼ ἐκείνου δεδομένων μηδʼ ἄκοντες ποιήσειν τι ἢ πείσεσθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ὅμοιός γε ὅρκος οὗτος ἐκείνῳ; ἐκεῖ μὲν ὀμνύουσιν αὐτοῦ μὴ προτιμήσειν ἕτερον, ἐνταῦθα δʼ αὑτοὺς ἁπάντων.

[¶8] 15. When one consulted him, how he might persuade his brother to forbear treating him ill, Philosophy, answered Epictetus, does not promise to procure any outward good for man; otherwise it would include something beyond its proper theme. For as the material of a carpenter is wood; of a statuary, brass; so of the art of living, the material is each man’s own life. “What, then, is my brother’s life?” That, again, is matter for his own art, but is external to you; like property, health, or reputation. Philosophy undertakes none of these. In every circumstance I will keep my will in harmony with nature. To whom belongs that will? To Him in whom I exist. “But how, then, is my brother’s unkindness to be cured?” Bring him to me, and I will tell him; but I have nothing to say to you about his unkindness. But the inquirer still further asking for a rule for self-government, if he should not be reconciled, Epictetus answered thus,— No great thing is created suddenly, any more than a bunch of grapes or a fig. If you tell me that you desire a fig, I answer you, that there must be time. Let it first blossom, then bear fruit, then ripen. Since, then, the fruit of a fig-tree is not brought to perfection suddenly, or in one hour, do you think to possess instantaneously and easily the fruit of the human mind? I warn you, expect it not.

> Greek: 15. συμβουλευομένου τινός, πῶς τὸν ἀδελφὸν πείσῃ μηκέτι χαλεπῶς αὐτῷ ἔχειν, οὐκ ἐπαγγέλλεται, ἔφη, φιλοσοφία τῶν ἐκτός τι περιποιήσειν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τι τῆς ἰδίας ὕλης ἀναδέξεται. ὡς γὰρ τέκτονος ὕλη τὰ ξύλα, ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ ὁ χαλκός, οὕτως τῆς περὶ βίον τέχνης ὕλη ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου. — τί οὖν ὁ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ; — πάλιν τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τέχνης ἐστίν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν σὴν τῶν ἐκτός ἐστιν, ὅμοιον ἀγρῷ, ὅμοιον ὑγείᾳ, ὅμοιον εὐδοξίᾳ. τούτων δʼ οὐδὲν ἐπαγγέλλεται· φιλοσοφία. ἐν πάσῃ περιστάσει τηρήσω τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον. — τὸ τίνος; — τὸ ἐκείνου, ἐν ᾧ εἰμί. — πῶς οὖν ἐκεῖνός μοι μὴ ὀργίζηται; — φέρε μοι ἐκεῖνον κἀκείνῳ ἐρῶ, σοὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ὀργῆς οὐδὲν ἔχω λέγειν. εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ συμβουλευομένου ὅτι Τοῦτο ζητῶ, πῶς ἂν ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ διαλλασσομένου κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοιμι, οὐδέν, ἔφη, τῶν μεγάλων ἄφνω γίνεται, ὅπου γε οὐδʼ ὁ βότρυς οὐδὲ σῦκον. ἄν μοι νῦν λέγῃς ὅτι θέλω σῦκον, ἀποκρινοῦμαί σοι ὅτι χρόνου δεῖ. ἄφες ἀνθήσῃ πρῶτον, εἶτα προβάλῃ τὸν καρπόν, εἶτα πεπανθῇ. εἶτα συκῆς μὲν καρπὸς ἄφνω καὶ μιᾷ ὥρᾳ οὐ τελειοῦται, γνώμης δʼ ἀνθρώπου καρπὸν θέλεις οὕτως διʼ ὀλίγου καὶ εὐκόλως κτήσασθαι; μηδʼ ἂν ἐγώ σοι λέγω, προσδόκα.

[¶9] 16. Be not surprised if other animals have all things necessary to the body ready provided for them, not only meat and drink, but lodging; if they want neither shoes nor bedding nor clothes, while we stand in need of all these. For they not being made for themselves, but for service, it was not fit that they should be so formed as to be waited on by others. For consider what it would be for us to take care, not only for ourselves, but for sheep and asses too,—how they should be clothed, how shod, and how they should eat and drink. But as soldiers are furnished ready for their commander, shod, clothed, and armed,—for it would be a grievous thing for a colonel to be obliged to go through his regiment to put on their clothes,—so nature has furnished these useful animals, ready provided, and standing in need of no further care; so that one little boy, with only a crook, drives a flock. But we, instead of being thankful for this, complain of God that there is not the same kind of care taken of us likewise; and yet, good Heaven! any one thing in the creation is sufficient to demonstrate a Providence, to a humble and grateful mind. Not to instance great things, the mere possibility of producing milk from grass, cheese from milk, and wool from skins,—who formed and planned this? No one, say you. O surprising irreverence and dulness! But come, let us omit the primary works of nature; let us contemplate her merely incidental traits. What is more useless than the hairs upon one’s chin? And yet has she not made use even of these, in the most becoming manner possible? Has she not by these distinguished the sexes? Does not nature in each of us call out, even at a distance, I am a man; approach and address me as such; inquire no further; see the characteristic? On the other hand, with regard to women, as she has mixed something softer in their voice, so she has deprived them of a beard. But no; [some think] this living being should have been left undistinguished, and each of us should be obliged to proclaim, “I am a man!” But why is not this characteristic beautiful and becoming and venerable? How much more beautiful than the comb of cocks; how much more noble than the mane of lions! Therefore we ought to preserve the characteristics made by the Creator; we ought not to reject them, nor confound, as much as in us lies, the distinct sexes. Are these the only works of Providence with regard to us? And what speech can fitly celebrate their praise? For, if we had any understanding, ought we not, both in public and in private, incessantly to sing and praise the Deity, and rehearse his benefits? Ought we not, whether we dig or plough or eat, to sing this hymn to God,—Great is God, who has supplied us with these instruments to till the ground; great is God, who has given us hands and organs of digestion; who has given us to grow insensibly, to breathe in sleep? These things we ought forever to celebrate; and to make it the theme of the greatest and divinest hymn, that he has given us the power to appreciate these gifts, and to use them well. But because the most of you are blind and insensible, there must be some one to fill this station, and lead, in behalf of all men, the hymn to God; for what else can I do, a lame old man, but sing hymns to God? Were I a nightingale, I would act the part of a nightingale were I a swan, the part of a swan; but since I am a reasonable creature, it is my duty to praise God. This is my business; I do it; nor will I ever desert this post, so long as it is permitted me; and I call on you to join in the same song.

> Greek: 16. μὴ θαυμάζετʼ εἰ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ζῴοις τὰ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἕτοιμα γέγονεν, οὐ μόνον τροφαὶ καὶ πόμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κοίτη καὶ τὸ μὴ δεῖσθαι ὑποδημάτων, μὴ ὑποστρωμάτων, μὴ ἐσθῆτος, ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντων τούτων προσδεόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ οὐκ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὑπηρεσίαν γεγονότα οὐκ ἐλυσιτέλει προσδεόμενα ἄλλων πεποιηκέναι. ἐπεὶ ὅρα οἷον ἦν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν μὴ περὶ αὑτῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν προβάτων καὶ τῶν ὄνων, πῶς ἐνδύσηται καὶ πῶς ὑποδήσηται, πῶς φάγῃ, πῶς πίῃ. ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ οἱ στρατιῶται ἕτοιμοί εἰσι τῷ στρατηγῷ ὑποδεδεμένοι ἐνδεδυμένοι ὡπλισμένοι, εἰ δʼ ἔδει περιερχόμενον τὸν χιλίαρχον ὑποδεῖν ἢ ἐνδύειν τοὺς χιλίους, δεινὸν ἂν ἦν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φύσις πεποίηκε τὰ πρὸς ὑπηρεσίαν γεγονότα ἕτοιμα παρεσκευασμένα μηδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελείας ἔτι προσδεόμενα. οὕτως ἓν παιδίον μικρὸν καὶ ῥάβδῳ ἐλαύνει τὰ πρόβατα. νῦν δʼ ἡμεῖς ἀφέντες ἐπὶ τούτοις εὐχαριστεῖν, ὅτι μὴ καὶ αὐτῶν τὴν ἴσην ἐπιμέλειαν ἐπιμελούμεθα, ἐφʼ αὑτοῖς ἐγκαλοῦμεν τῷ θεῷ. καίτοι νὴ τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἓν τῶν γεγονότων ἀπήρκει πρὸς τὸ αἰσθέσθαι τῆς προνοίας τῷ γε αἰδήμονι καὶ εὐχαρίστῳ. καὶ μή μοι νῦν τὰ μεγάλα· αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἐκ π[τ]όας γάλα γεννᾶσθαι καὶ ἐκ γάλακτος τυρὸν καὶ ἐκ δέρματος ἔρια τίς ἐστιν ὁ πεποιηκὼς ταῦτα ἢ ἐπινενοηκώς; οὐδὲ εἷς φησίν. ὦ μεγάλης ἀναισθησίας καὶ ἀναισχυντίας. ἄγε ἀφῶμεν τὰ ἔργα τῆς φύσεως, τὰ πάρεργα αὐτῆς θεασώμεθα. μή τι ἀχρηστότερον τριχῶν τῶν ἐπὶ γενείου; τί οὖν; οὐ συνεχρήσατο καὶ ταύταις ὡς μάλιστα πρεπόντως ἐδύνατο; οὐ διέκρινεν διʼ αὐτῶν τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ; οὐκ εὐθὺς μακρόθεν κέκραγεν ἡμῶν ἑκάστου ἡ φύσις ἀνήρ εἰμι· οὕτω μοι προσέρχου, οὕτω μοι λάλει, ἄλλο μηδὲν ζήτει· ἰδοὺ τὰ σύμβολα; πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν γυναικῶν ὥσπερ ἐν φωνῇ τι ἐγκατέμιξεν ἁπαλώτερον, οὕτως καὶ τὰς τρίχας ἀφεῖλεν. οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἀδιάκριτον ἔδει τὸ ζῷον ἀπολειφθῆναι καὶ κηρύσσειν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ὅτι ἀνήρ εἰμι. πῶς δὲ καλὸν τὸ σύμβολον καὶ εὐπρεπὲς καὶ σεμνόν, πόσῳ κάλλιον τοῦ τῶν ἀλεκτρυόνων λόφου, πόσῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον τῆς χαίτης τῶν λεόντων. διὰ τοῦτο ἔδει σῴζειν τὰ σύμβολα τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔδει αὐτὰ μὴ καταπροίεσθαι, μὴ συγχεῖν ὅσον ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῖς τὰ γένη τὰ διῃρημένα. ταῦτα μόνα ἐστὶν ἔργα ἐφʼ ἡμῶν τῆς προνοίας; καὶ τίς ἐξαρκεῖ λόγος ὁμοίως αὐτὰ ἐπαινέσαι ἢ παραστῆσαι; εἰ γὰρ νοῦν εἴχομεν, ἄλλο τι ἔδει ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἢ ὑμνεῖν τὸ θεῖον καὶ εὐφημεῖν καὶ ἐπεξέρχεσθαι τὰς χάριτας; οὐκ ἔδει καὶ σκάπτοντας καὶ ἀροῦντας καὶ ἐσθίοντας ᾁδειν τὸν ὕμνον τὸν εἰς τὸν θεόν; μέγας ὁ θεὸς, ὅτι ἡμῖν παρέσχεν ὄργανα ταῦτα διʼ ὧν τὴν γῆν ἐργασόμεθα· μέγας ὁ θεός, ὅτι χεῖρας δέδωκεν, ὅτι κατάποσιν, ὅτι κοιλίαν, ὅτι αὔξεσθαι λεληθότως, ὅτι καθεύδοντας ἀναπνεῖν. ταῦτα ἐφʼ ἑκάστου ἐφυμνεῖν ἔδει καὶ τὸν μέγιστον καὶ θειότατον ὕμνον ἐφυμνεῖν, ὅτι τὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκεν τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν τούτοις καὶ ὁδῷ χρηστικήν. τί οὖν; ἐπεὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποτετύφλωσθε, οὐκ ἔδει τινὰ εἶναι τὸν ταύτην ἐκπληροῦντα τὴν χώραν καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων ᾁδοντα τὸν ὕμνον τὸν εἰς τὸν θεόν; τί γὰρ ἄλλο δύναμαι γέρων χωλὸς εἰ μὴ ὑμνεῖν τὸν θεόν; εἰ γοῦν ἀηδὼν ἤμην, ἐποίουν τὰ τῆς ἀηδόνος, εἰ κύκνος, τὰ τοῦ κύκνου. νῦν δὲ λογικός εἰμι· ὑμνεῖν με δεῖ τὸν θεόν. τοῦτό μου τὸ ἔργον ἐστίν, ποιῶ αὐτὸ οὐδʼ ἐγκαταλείψω τὴν τάξιν ταύτην, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἂν διδῶται, καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ᾠδὴν παρακαλῶ.

[¶10] 17. Since it is Reason which shapes and regulates all other things, it ought not itself to be left in disorder; but by what shall it be regulated? Evidently, either by itself, or by something else. Well, either that too is Reason, or something else superior to Reason, which is impossible; and if it be Reason, what again shall regulate that? For if this Reason can regulate itself, so can the former; and if we still require any further agent, the series will be infinite and without end. “But,” say you, “the essential thing is to prescribe for qualities of character.” Would you hear about these, therefore? Well, hear. But then, if you say to me that you cannot tell whether my arguments are true or false, and if I happen to express myself ambiguously, and you bid me make it clearer, I will then at once show you that this is the first essential. Therefore, I suppose, they first establish the art of reasoning,—just as before the measuring of corn, we settle the measure; for, unless we first determine the measure and the weight, how shall we be able to measure or weigh? Thus, in the present case, unless we have first learned and fixed that which is the criterion of other things, and by which other things are learned, how shall we be able accurately to learn anything else? How is it possible? Well, a bushel-measure is only wood, a thing of no value, but it measures corn; and logic is of no value in itself. That we will consider hereafter, but grant it now; it is enough that it distinguishes and examines, and, as one may say, measures and weighs all other things. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? Does not Antisthenes say it? And who is it, then, who has written that the beginning of a right education is the examination of words? Does not Socrates say it? Of whom, then, does Xenophon write, that he began by the examination of words, what each signified? Is this, then, the great and admirable thing, to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says that it is? But what, then, is the admirable thing? To understand the will of nature. Well, then; do you conform to it yourself? In that case, what need have you for any one else? For if it be true that men err but unwillingly, and if you have learnt the truth, you must needs act rightly. But, indeed, I do not conform to the will of nature. Who, then, shall interpret that? They say, Chrysippus. I go and inquire what this interpreter of nature says. Soon I cannot understand his meaning; I seek one to interpret that. I call on him to explain everything as clearly as if it were in Latin. Yet what right has this last interpreter to boast? Nor has Chrysippus himself, so long as he only interprets the will of nature, and does not follow it; and much less has his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus on his own account; but that, by his means, we may apprehend the will of nature; just as no one values a diviner on his own account, but that, by his assistance, men hope to understand future events and heavenly indications; nor the auguries, on their own account, but on account of what is signified by them; neither is it the raven, or the crow, that is admired, but the divine purposes displayed through their means. Thus I come to the diviner and interpreter of these higher things, and say, “Inspect the auguries for me: what is signified for me?” Having taken, and inspected them, he thus interprets them: You have a free will, O man! incapable of being restrained or compelled. This is written here in the auguries. I will show you this, first, in the faculty of assent. Can any one restrain you from assenting to truth? No one. Can any one compel you to admit a falsehood? No one. You see, then, that you have here a free will, incapable of being restrained, or compelled, or hindered. Well, is it otherwise with regard to pursuit and desire? What can displace one pursuit. Another pursuit. What [can displace] desire and aversion? Another desire and another aversion. “If you offer death as an alternative,” say you, you compel me. No, not the alternative does it, but your conviction that it is better to do such a thing than to die. Here, again, you see that it is your own conviction which compels you,—that is, choice compels choice; for if God had constituted that portion which he has separated from his own essence, and given to us, capable of being restrained or compelled, either by himself, or by any other, he would not have been God, nor have fitly cared for us. These things, says the diviner, I find in the auguries. These things are announced to you. If you please, you are free. If you please, you will have no one to complain of, no one to accuse. All will be equally according to your own mind, and to the mind of God. For the sake of this oracle, I go to this diviner and philosopher; admiring not alone him for his interpretation, but also the things which he interprets.

> Greek: 17. ἐπειδὴ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ διαρθρῶν καὶ ἐξεργαζόμενος τὰ λοιπά, ἔδει δʼ αὐτὸν μὴ ἀδιάρθρωτον εἶναι, ὑπὸ τίνος διαρθρωθῇ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἢ ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ ἢ ὑπʼ ἄλλου. ἤ τοι λόγος ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος ἢ ἄλλο τι κρεῖσσον ἔσται τοῦ λόγου, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. εἰ λόγος, ἐκεῖνον πάλιν τίς διαρθρώσει; εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, δύναται καὶ οὗτος. εἰ ἄλλου δεησόμεθα, ἄπειρον ἔσται τοῦτο καὶ ἀκατάληκτον. [εἰ]ναί, ἀλλʼ ἐπείγει μᾶλλον θεραπεύειν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. θέλεις οὖν περὶ ἐκείνων ἀκούειν; ἄκουε. ἀλλʼ ἄν μοι λέγῃς ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα πότερον ἀληθῶς ἢ ψευδῶς διαλέγῃ, κἄν τι κατʼ ἀμφίβολον φωνὴν εἴπω καὶ λέγῃς μοι διάστιξον, οὐκ ἔτι ἀνέξομαί σου, ἀλλʼ ἐρῶ σοι· ἀλλʼ ἐπείγει μᾶλλον. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι προ[σ]τάσσουσιν τὰ λογικά, καθάπερ τῆς μετρήσεως τοῦ σίτου προτάσσομεν τὴν τοῦ μέτρου ἐπίσκεψιν. ἂν δὲ μὴ διαλάβωμεν πρῶτον τί ἐστι μόδιος μηδὲ διαλάβωμεν πρῶτον τί ἐστι ζυγός, πῶς ἔτι μετρῆσαί τι ἢ στῆσαι δυνησόμεθα; ἐνταῦθα οὖν τὸ τῶν ἄλλων κριτήριον καὶ διʼ οὗ τἆλλα καταμανθάνεται μὴ καταμεμαθηκότες μηδʼ ἠκριβωκότες δυνησόμεθά τι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκριβῶσαι καὶ καταμαθεῖν; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε; ναί· ἀλλʼ ὁ μόδιος ξύλον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄκαρπον. ἀλλὰ μετρητικὸν σίτου. καὶ τὰ λογικὰ ἄκαρπά ἐστι. καὶ περὶ τούτου μὲν ὀψόμεθα. εἰ δʼ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο δοίη τις, ἐκεῖνο ἀπαρκεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ διακριτικὰ καὶ ἐπισκεπτικὰ καὶ ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι μετρητικὰ καὶ στατικά. τίς λέγει ταῦτα; μόνος Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθης; Ἀντισθένης δʼ οὐ λέγει; καὶ τίς ἐστιν ὁ γεγραφὼς ὅτι ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις; Σωκράτης δʼ οὐ λέγει; καὶ περὶ τίνος γράφει Ξενοφῶν, ὅτι ἤρχετο ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπισκέψεως, τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον; ἆρʼ οὖν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ θαυμαστὸν νοῆσαι Χρύσιππον ἢ ἐξηγήσασθαι; καὶ τίς λέγει τοῦτο; τί οὖν τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν; νοῆσαι τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως. τί οὖν; αὐτὸς διὰ σεαυτοῦ παρακολουθεῖς; καὶ τίνος ἔτι χρείαν ἔχεις; εἰ γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ πάντας ἄκοντας ἁμαρτάνειν, σὺ δὲ καταμεμάθηκας τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀνάγκη σε ἤδη κατορθοῦν. ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία οὐ παρακολουθῶ τῷ βουλήματι τῆς φύσεως. τίς οὖν ἐξηγεῖται αὐτό; λέγουσιν ὅτι Χρύσιππος. ἔρχομαι καὶ ἐπιζητῶ τί λέγει οὗτος ὁ ἐξηγητὴς τῆς φύσεως. ἄρχομαι μὴ νοεῖν τί λέγει, ζητῶ τὸν ἐξηγούμενον. ἴδε ἐπίσκεψαι, πῶς τοῦτο λέγεται, καθάπερ εἰ Ῥωμαϊστί. ποία οὖν ἐνθάδʼ ὀφρὺς τοῦ ἐξηγουμένου; οὐδʼ αὐτοῦ Χρυσίππου δικαίως, εἰ μόνον ἐξηγεῖται τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως, αὐτὸς δʼ οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ· πόσῳ πλέον τοῦ ἐκεῖνον ἐξηγουμένου; οὐδὲ γὰρ Χρυσίππου χρείαν ἔχομεν διʼ αὐτόν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα παρακολουθήσωμεν τῇ φύσει. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ θύτου διʼ αὐτόν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι διʼ ἐκείνου κατανοήσειν οἰόμεθα τὰ μέλλοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, οὐδὲ τῶν σπλάγχνων διʼ αὐτά, ἀλλʼ ὅτι διʼ ἐκείνων σημαίνεται, οὐδὲ τὸν κόρακα θαυμάζομεν ἢ τὴν κορώνην, ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν σημαίνοντα διὰ τούτων. ἔρχομαι τοίνυν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐξηγητὴν τοῦτον καὶ θύτην καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐπίσκεψαί μοι τὰ σπλάγχνα, τί μοι σημαίνεται. λαβὼν καὶ ἀναπτύξας ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγεῖται ὅτι ἄνθρωπε, προαίρεσιν ἔχεις ἀκώλυτον φύσει καὶ ἀνανάγκαστον. τοῦτο ἐνταῦθα ἐν τοῖς σπλάγχνοις γέγραπται. δείξω σοι αὐτὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶ τοῦ συγκαταθετικοῦ τόπου. μή τίς σε κωλῦσαι δύναται ἐπινεῦσαι ἀληθεῖ; οὐδὲ εἷς. μή τίς σε ἀναγκάσαι δύναται παραδέξασθαι τὸ ψεῦδος; οὐδὲ εἷς. ὁρᾷς ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ τὸ προαιρετικὸν ἔχεις ἀκώλυτον ἀνανάγκαστον ἀπαραπόδιστον; ἄγε ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ καὶ ὁρμητικοῦ ἄλλως ἔχει; καὶ τίς ὁρμὴν νικῆσαι δύναται ἢ ἄλλη ὁρμή; τίς δʼ ὄρεξιν καὶ ἔκκλισιν ἢ ἄλλη ὄρεξις καὶ ἔκκλισις; ἄν μοι, φησί, προσάγῃ θανάτου φόβον, ἀναγκάζει με. οὐ τὸ προσαγόμενον, ἀλλʼ ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ποιῆσαί τι τούτων ἢ ἀποθανεῖν. πάλιν οὖν τὸ σὸν δόγμα σε ἠνάγκασεν, τοῦτʼ ἔστι προαίρεσιν προαίρεσις. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον μέρος, ὃ ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν ἀποσπάσας ὁ θεός, ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπʼ ἄλλου τινὸς κωλυτὸν ἢ ἀναγκαστὸν κατεσκευάκει, οὐκέτι ἂν ἦν θεὸς οὐδʼ ἐπεμελεῖτο ἡμῶν ὃν δεῖ τρόπον. ταῦτα εὑρίσκω, φησίν, ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς. ταῦτά σοι σημαίνεται. ἐὰν θέλῃς, ἐλεύθερος εἶ· ἐὰν θέλῃς, μέμψῃ οὐδένα, ἐγκαλέσεις οὐδενί, πάντα κατὰ γνώμην ἔσται ἅμα τὴν σὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ. διὰ ταύτην τὴν μαντείαν ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν θύτην τοῦτον καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον, οὐκ αὐτὸν θαυμάσας ἕνεκά γε τῆς ἐξηγήσεως, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ἐξηγεῖται.

[¶11] 18. If what the philosophers say be true, that all men’s actions proceed from one source; that as they assent from a persuasion that a thing is so, and dissent from a persuasion that it is not, and suspend their judgment from a persuasion that it is uncertain; so, likewise, they seek a thing from a persuasion that it is for their advantage,—and it is impossible to esteem one thing advantageous, and yet desire another; to esteem one thing a duty, and yet pursue another, why, after all, should we be angry at the multitude? “They are thieves and robbers.” What do you mean by thieves and robbers? They are in an error concerning good and evil. Ought you, then, to be angry, or rather to pity them? Do but show them their error, and you will see that they will amend their faults; but if they do not see the error, they will rise no higher than their convictions. “What, then; ought not this thief and this adulterer to be destroyed?” Nay, call him rather one who errs and is deceived in things of the greatest importance; blinded, not in the vision, that distinguishes white from black, but in the reason, that discerns good from evil. By stating your question thus, you would see how inhuman it is, and just as if you should say, “Ought not this blind or that deaf man to be destroyed?” For, if the greatest hurt be a deprivation of the most valuable things, and the most valuable thing to every one be rectitude of will; when any one is deprived of this, why, after all, are you angry? You ought not to be affected, O man! contrary to nature, by the evil deeds of another. Pity him rather. Yield not to hatred and anger; nor say, as many do, “What! shall these execrable and odious wretches dare to act thus?” Whence have you so suddenly learnt wisdom? Why are we thus enraged? Because we make idols of those things which such people take from us. Make not an idol of your clothes, and you will not be enraged with the thief. Make not an idol of a woman’s beauty, and you will not be enraged with an adulterer. Know, that thief and adulterer cannot reach the things that are properly your own; but those only which belong to others, and are not within your power. If you can give up these things, and look upon them as not essential, with whom will you any longer be enraged? But while you idolize them, be angry with yourself, rather than with others. Consider the case: you have a fine suit of clothes, your neighbor has not. You have a casement; you want to air them. He knows not in what the good of man consists, but imagines it is in a fine suit of clothes, just as you imagine. Shall he not come and take them away? When you show a cake to greedy people, and are devouring it all yourself, would you not have them snatch it from you? Do not tempt them. Do not have a casement. Do not expose your clothes. I, too, the other day, had an iron lamp burning before my household deities. Hearing a noise at the window, I ran. I found my lamp was stolen. I considered that he who took it away did nothing unaccountable. What then? I said, to-morrow you shall find an earthen one, for a man loses only what he has. “I have lost my coat.” Ay, because you had a coat. “I have a pain in my head.” You certainly can have none in your horns. Why, then, are you out of humor? For loss and pain can be only of such things as are possessed. But the tyrant will chain—what? A leg. He will take away—what? A head. What is there, then, chat he.can neither chain nor take away? The free will. Hence the advice of the ancients,—Know thyself. “What, then, ought we to do?” Practise yourself, for Heaven’s sake, in little things, and thence proceed to greater. “I have a pain in my head.” Do not lament. “I have a pain in my ear.” Do not lament. I do not say you may never groan, but do not groan in spirit; or if your servant be a long while in bringing you something to bind your head, do not croak and go into hysterics, and say, “( Everybody hates me.” For who would not hate such a one? Relying for the future on these principles, walk erect and free, not trusting to bulk of body, like a wrestler; for one should not be unconquerable in the sense that an ass is. Who, then, is unconquerable? He whom the inevitable cannot overcome. For such a person I imagine every trial, and watch him as an athlete in each. He has been victorious in the first encounter. What will he do in the second? What, if he should be exhausted by the heat? What, if the field be Olympia? And so in other trials. If you throw money in his way, he will despise it. Is he proof against the seductions of women? What if he be tested by fame. by calumny, by praise, by death? He is able to overcome them all. If he can bear sunshine and storm, discouragement and fatigue, I pronounce him an athlete unconquered indeed.

> Greek: 18. εἰ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων λεγόμενον ὅτι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις μία ἀρχὴ καθάπερ τοῦ συγκαταθέσθαι τὸ παθεῖν ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῦ ἀνανεῦσαι τὸ παθεῖν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει καὶ νὴ Δία τοῦ ἐπισχεῖν τὸ παθεῖν ὅτι ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ ὁρμῆσαι ἐπί τι τὸ παθεῖν ὅτι ἐμοὶ συμφέρει, ἀμήχανον δʼ ἄλλο μὲν κρίνειν τὸ συμφέρον, ἄλλου δʼ ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ ἄλλο μὲν κρίνειν καθῆκον, ἐπʼ ἄλλο δὲ ὁρμᾶν, τί ἔτι τοῖς πολλοῖς χαλεπαίνομεν; — κλέπται, φησίν, εἰσὶ καὶ λωποδύται. — τί ἐστι τὸ κλέπται καὶ λωποδύται; πεπλάνηνται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. χαλεπαίνειν οὖν δεῖ αὐτοῖς ἢ ἐλεεῖν αὐτούς; ἀλλὰ δεῖξον τὴν πλάνην καὶ ὄψει πῶς ἀφίστανται τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. ἂν δὲ μὴ βλέπωσιν, οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν ἀνώτερον τοῦ δοκοῦντος αὐτοῖς. τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λῃστὴν καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μοιχὸν οὐκ ἔδει ἀπολωλέναι; — μηδαμῶς, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον τοῦτον τὸν πεπλανημένον καὶ ἐξηπατημένον περὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ ἀποτετυφλωμένον οὐ τὴν ὄψιν τὴν διακριτικὴν τῶν λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων, ἀλλὰ τὴν γνώμην τὴν διακριτικὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν μὴ ἀπολλύναι; κἂν οὕτως λέγῃς, γνώσῃ πῶς ἀπάνθρωπόν ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις καὶ ὅτι ἐκείνῳ ὅμοιον τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τυφλὸν μὴ ἀπολλύναι καὶ τὸν κωφόν; εἰ γὰρ μεγίστη βλάβη ἡ τῶν μεγίστων ἀπώλειά ἐστιν, μέγιστον δʼ ἐν ἑκάστῳ προαίρεσις οἵα δεῖ καὶ τούτου στέρεταί τις, τί ἔτι χαλεπαίνεις αὐτῷ; ἄνθρωπε, εἰ σὲ δεῖ παρὰ φύσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς διατίθεσθαι, ἐλέει αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ μίσει· ἄφες τοῦτο τὸ προσκοπτικὸν καὶ μισητικόν· μὴ ἐ̣ … π̣ῃς τὰς φωνὰς ταύτας ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν φ … των τούτους οὖν τοὺς καταράτους καὶ μιαροὺς … ἔστω· σὺ πῶς ποτʼ ἀπεσοφώθης ἄφνω … ν̣. ἀ̣λ̣λ̣ω̣ς̣ χαλεπὸς εἶ. διὰ τί οὖν χαλεπαίνομεν; ὅτι τὰς ὕλας θαυμάζομεν, ὧν ἡμᾶς ἀφαιροῦνται. ἐπεί τοι μὴ θαύμαζέ σου τὰ ἱμάτια καὶ τῷ κλέπτῃ οὐ χαλεπαίνεις· μὴ θαύμαζε τὸ κάλλος τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ τῷ μοιχῷ οὐ χαλεπαίνεις. γνῶθι ὅτι κλέπτης καὶ μοιχὸς ἐν τοῖς σοῖς τόπον οὐκ ἔχει, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις καὶ τοῖς οὐκ ἐπὶ σοί. ταῦτα ἂν ἀφῇς καὶ παρὰ μηδὲν ἡγήσῃ, τίνι ἔτι χαλεπαίνεις; μέχρι δʼ ἂν ταῦτα θαυμάζῃς, σεαυτῷ χαλέπαινε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνοις. σκόπει γάρ· ἔχεις καλὰ ἱμάτια, ὁ γείτων σου οὐκ ἔχει· θυρίδα ἔχεις, θέλεις αὐτὰ ψῦξαι. οὐκ οἶδεν ἐκεῖνος τί τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ φαντάζεται ὅτι τὸ ἔχειν καλὰ ἱμάτια, τοῦτο ὃ καὶ σὺ φαντάζῃ. εἶτα μὴ ἔλθῃ καὶ ἄρῃ αὐτά; ἀλλὰ σὺ πλακοῦντα δεικνύων ἀνθρώποις λίχνοις καὶ μόνος αὐτὸν καταπίνων οὐ θέλεις ἵνα αὐτὸν ἁρπάσωσι; μὴ ἐρέθιζε αὐτούς, θυρίδα μὴ ἔχε, μὴ ψῦχέ σου τὰ ἱμάτια. κἀγὼ πρῴην σιδηροῦν λύχνον ἔχων παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀκούσας ψόφον τῆς θυρίδος κατέδραμον. εὗρον ἡρπασμένον τὸν λύχνον. ἐπελογισάμην, ὅτι ἔπαθέν τι ὁ ἄρας οὐκ ἀπίθανον. τί οὖν; αὔριον, φημί, ὀστράκινον εὑρήσεις. ἐκεῖνα γὰρ ἀπολλύει, ἃ ἔχει. ἀπώλεσά μου τὸ ἱμάτιον. εἶχες γὰρ ἱμάτιον. ἀλγῶ τὴν κεφαλήν. μή τι κέρατα ἀλγεῖς; τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς; τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀπώλειαι, τούτων οἱ πόνοι, ὧν καὶ αἱ κτήσεις. ἀλλʼ ὁ τύραννος δήσει. τί; τὸ σκέλος. ἀλλʼ ἀφελεῖ. τί; τὸν τράχηλον. τί οὖν οὐ δήσει οὐδʼ ἀφελεῖ; τὴν προαίρεσιν. διὰ τοῦτο παρήγγελλον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτόν. τί οὖν; ἔδει νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς μελετᾶν ἐπὶ τῶν μικρῶν καὶ ἀπʼ ἐκείνων ἀρχομένους διαβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω. κεφαλὴν ἀλγῶ. οἴμοι μὴ λέγε. ὠτίον ἀλγῶ. οἴμοι μὴ λέγε. καὶ οὐ λέγω ὅτι οὐ δέδοται στενάξαι, ἀλλὰ ἔσωθεν μὴ στενάξῃς. μηδʼ ἂν βραδέως τὸν ἐπίδεσμον ὁ παῖς φέρῃ, κραύγαζε καὶ σπῶ καὶ λέγε πάντες με μισοῦσιν. τίς γὰρ μὴ μισήσῃ τὸν τοιοῦτον; τούτοις τὸ λοιπὸν πεποιθὼς τοῖς δόγμασιν ὀρθὸς περιπάτει, ἐλεύθερος, οὐχὶ τῷ μεγέθει πεποιθὼς τοῦ σώματος ὥσπερ ἀθλητής· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ὄνον ἀήττητον εἶναι. τίς οὖν ὁ ἀήττητος; ὃν οὐκ ἐξίστησιν οὐδὲν τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων. εἶτα λοιπὸν ἑκάστην τῶν περιστάσεων ἐπερχόμενος καταμανθάνω ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀθλητοῦ. οὗτος ἐξεβίασε τὸν πρῶτον κλῆρον. τί οὖν τὸν δεύτερον; τί δʼ ἂν καῦμα ᾖ; τί δʼ ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ; καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὡσαύτως. ἂν ἀργυρίδιον προβάλῃς, καταφρονήσει. τί οὖν ἂν κορασίδιον; τί οὖν ἂν ἐν σκότῳ; τί οὖν ἂν δοξάριον; τί οὖν ἂν λοιδορίαν; τί οὖν ἂν ἔπαινον; τί δʼ ἂν θάνατον; δύναται ταῦτα πάντα νικῆσαι. τί οὖν ἂν καῦμα ᾖ, τοῦτό ἐστι· τί, ἂν οἰνωμένος ᾖ; τί ἂν μελαγχολῶν; τί ἐν ὕπνοις; οὗτός μοί ἐστιν ὁ ἀνίκητος ἀθλητής.

## 5. Book I · chapters 19–26

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/5/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/5/#p-N

[¶0] 19. When a person is possessed of some personal advantage, either real or imaginary, he will necessarily be puffed up with it, unless he has been well instructed. A tyrant openly says, “am supreme over all.” And what can you bestow on me? Can you exempt my desires from disappointment? How should you? For do you never incur what you shun? Are your own aims infallible? Whence came you by that privilege? Pray, on shipboard, do you trust to yourself, or to the pilot In a chariot, to whom but the driver? And to whom in all other arts? Just the same. In what, then, does your power consist? “All men pay regard to me.” So do I to my desk. I wash it and wipe it, and drive a nail for my oil-flask. “What, then; are these things to be valued beyond me?” No; but they are of some use to me, and therefore I pay regard to them. Why, do I not pay regard to an ass? Do I not wash his feet? Do I not clean him? Do not you know that every one pays such regard even to himself; and that he does it to you, just as he does to an ass? For who pays regard to you as a man? Show that. Who would wish to be like you? Who would desire to imitate you, as he would Socrates? “But I can take off your head.” You say rightly. I had forgot that one is to pay regard to you as to a fever, or the cholera; and that there should be an altar erected to you, as there is to the goddess Fever at Rome. What is it, then, that disturbs and terrifies the multitude,—the tyrant and his guards? By no means. What is by nature free cannot be disturbed or restrained by anything but itself; but its own convictions disturb it. Thus, when the tyrant says to any one, “will chain your leg,” he who chiefly values his leg cries out for pity; while he who chiefly values his own free will says, “If you imagine it for your interest, chain it.” “What! do you not care?” No, I do not care. “I will show you that I am master.” You? How should you? Zeus has set me free. What! do you think he would suffer his own son to be enslaved? You are master of my carcass; take it. “So that, when you come into my presence, you pay no regard to me?” No, but to myself; or, if you will have me recognize you also, I will do it as if you were a piece o; furniture. This is not selfish vanity; for every animal is so constituted as to do everything for itself. Even the sun does all for himself, and for that matter so does even Zeus himself; but when he would be styled the dispenser of rain and plenty, and the father of gods and men, you see that he cannot attain these offices and titles unless he contributes to the common good. And he has universally so constituted the nature of every reasonable creature, that no one can attain its own good without contributing something for the good of all. And thus it becomes not selfish to do everything for one’s self; for do you expect that a man should desert himself and his own concerns, when all beings have one and the same original instinct, self-preservation? What follows then? That where we recognize those absurd convictions, which treat things outward as if they were the true good or evil of life, there must necessarily be a regard paid to tyrants; and I wish it were to tyrants only, and not to the very officers of their bed-chamber too. For how wise a man grows on a sudden, when Caesar has made him his flunkey? How immediately we say, “Felicio talked very sensibly to me!” I wish he were turned out of office, that he might once more appear to you the fool he is. Epaphroditus owned a shoemaker, whom, because he was good for nothing, he sold. This very fellow being, by some strange luck, bought by a courtier, became shoemaker to Caesar. Then, you might have seen how Epaphroditus honored him. “How is good Felicio, pray?” And, if any one of us asked what the great man himself was about, it was answered, “He is consulting about affairs with Felicio.” Did he not sell him previously as good for nothing? Who, then, has all on a sudden made a wise man of him? This it is to reverence externals. Is any one exalted to the office of tribune? All who meet him congratulate him. One kisses his eyes, another his neck, and the slaves his hands. He goes to his house; finds it illuminated. He ascends the capitol; offers a sacrifice. Now, who ever offered a sacrifice for having good desires; for conforming his aims to nature? Yet we thank the gods for that wherein we place our good. A person was talking with me to-day about applying for the priesthood in the temple of Augustus. I said to him, Let the thing alone, friend; you will be at great expense for nothing. “But my name,” said he, “will be written in the annals.” Will you stand by, then, and tell those who read them, “am the person whose name is written there”? And even if you could tell every one so now, what will you do when you are dead? “My name will remain.” Write it upon a stone, and it will remain just as well. And, pray, what remembrance will there be of you out of Nicopolis? “But I shall wear a crown of gold.” If your heart is quite set upon a crown, make and put on one of roses; for it will make the prettier appearance.

> Greek: 19. ὅτι ἄν τινι προσῇ τι πλεονέκτημα ἢ δοκῇ γε προσεῖναι μὴ προσόν, τοῦτον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἐὰν ἀπαίδευτος ᾖ, πεφυσῆσθαι διʼ αὐτό. εὐθὺς ὁ τύραννος λέγει ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ πάντων κράτιστος. καὶ τί μοι δύνασαι παρασχεῖν; ὄρεξίν μοι δύνασαι περιποιῆσαι ἀκώλυτον; πόθεν σοι; σὺ γὰρ ἔχεις; ἔκκλισιν ἀπερίπτωτον; σὺ γὰρ ἔχεις; ὁρμὴν ἀναμάρτητον; καὶ ποῦ σοι μέτεστιν; ἄγε, ἐν νηὶ δὲ σαυτῷ θαρρεῖς ἢ τῷ εἰδότι; ἐπὶ δʼ ἅρματος τίνι ἢ τῷ εἰδότι; τί δʼ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις; ὡσαύτως. τί οὖν δύνασαι; πάντες με θεραπεύουσιν. καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ πινάκιον θεραπεύω καὶ πλύνω αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκμάσσω καὶ τῆς ληκύθου ἕνεκα πάσσαλον πήσσω. τί οὖν; ταῦτά μου κρείττονά ἐστιν; οὔ· ἀλλὰ χρείαν μοι παρέχει τινά. ταύτης οὖν ἕνεκα θεραπεύω αὐτά. τί δέ; τὸν ὄνον οὐ θεραπεύω; οὐ νίπτω αὐτοῦ τοὺς πόδας; οὐ περικαθαίρω; οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτὸν θεραπεύει, σὲ δʼ οὕτως ὡς τὸν ὄνον; ἐπεὶ τίς σε θεραπεύει ὡς ἄνθρωπον; δείκνυε. τίς σοι θέλει ὅμοιος γενέσθαι, τίς σου ζηλωτὴς γίνεται ὡς Σωκράτους; ἀλλὰ δύναμαί σε τραχηλοκοπῆσαι. καλῶς λέγεις. ἐξελαθόμην ὅτι σε δεῖ θεραπεύειν καὶ ὡς πυρετὸν καὶ ὡς χολέραν καὶ βωμὸν στῆσαι, ὡς ἐν Ῥώμῃ Πυρετοῦ βωμός ἐστιν. τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ταράσσον καὶ καταπλῆττον τοὺς πολλούς; ὁ τύραννος καὶ οἱ δορυφόροι; πόθεν; μὴ γένοιτο· οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ φύσει ἐλεύθερον ὑπʼ ἄλλου τινὸς ταραχθῆναι ἢ κωλυθῆναι πλὴν ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ. ἀλλὰ τὰ δόγματα αὐτὸν ταράσσει. ὅταν γὰρ ὁ τύραννος εἴπῃ τινὶ δήσω σου τὸ σκέλος, ὁ μὲν τὸ σκέλος τετιμηκὼς λέγει μή· ἐλέησον, ὁ δὲ τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ λέγει εἴ σοι λυσιτελέστερον φαίνεται, δῆσον. οὐκ ἐπιστρέφῃ; οὐκ ἐπιστρέφομαι. ἐγώ σοι δείξω ὅτι κύριός εἰμι. πόθεν σύ; ἐμὲ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐλεύθερον ἀφῆκεν. ἢ δοκεῖς ὅτι ἔμελλεν τὸν ἴδιον υἱὸν ἐᾶν καταδουλοῦσθαι; τοῦ νεκροῦ δέ μου κύριος εἶ, λάβε αὐτόν. ὥσθʼ ὅταν μοι προσίῃς, ἐμὲ οὐ θεραπεύεις; οὐ· ἀλλʼ ἐμαυτόν. εἰ δὲ θέλεις με λέγειν ὅτι καὶ σέ, λέγω σοι οὕτως ὡς τὴν χύτραν. τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν φίλαυτον· γέγονε γὰρ οὕτως τὸ ζῷον· αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα ποιεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεύς. ἀλλʼ ὅταν θέλῃ εἶναι Ὑέτιος καὶ Ἐπικάρπιος καὶ πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, ὁρᾷς ὅτι τούτων τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν προσηγοριῶν οὐ δύναται τυχεῖν, ἂν μὴ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμος ᾖ. καθόλου τε τοιαύτην τὴν φύσιν τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου κατεσκεύασεν, ἵνα μηδενὸς τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν δύνηται τυγχάνειν, ἂν μή τι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμον προσφέρηται. οὕτως οὐκέτι ἀκοινώνητον γίνεται τὸ πάντα αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ τί ἐκδέχῃ; ἵνα τις ἀποστῇ αὑτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου συμφέροντος; καὶ πῶς ἔτι μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρχὴ πᾶσιν ἔσται ἡ πρὸς αὐτὰ οἰκείωσις; τί οὖν; ὅταν ὑπῇ δόγματα ἀλλόκοτα περὶ τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων [π]ὡς ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη θεραπεύειν τοὺς τυράννους. ὤφελον γὰρ τοὺς τυράννους μόνον, τοὺς κοιτωνίτας δʼ οὔ. πῶς δὲ καὶ φρόνιμος γίνεται ἐξαίφνης ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὅταν Καῖσαρ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ λασάνου ποιήσῃ· πῶς εὐθὺς λέγομεν φρονίμως μοι λελάληκεν Φηλικίων. ἤθελον αὐτὸν ἀποβληθῆναι τοῦ κοπρῶνος, ἵνα πάλιν ἄφρων σοι δοκῇ. εἶχέν τινα Ἐπαφρόδιτος σκυτέα, ὃν διὰ τὸ ἄχρηστον εἶναι ἐπώλησεν. εἶτα ἐκεῖνος κατά τινα δαίμονα ἀγορασθεὶς ὑπό τινος τῶν Καισαριανῶν τοῦ Καίσαρος σκυτεὺς ἐγένετο. εἶδες ἂν πῶς αὐτὸν ἐτίμα ὁ Ἐπαφρόδιτος· τί πράσσει Φηλικίων ὁ ἀγαθός; φιλῶ σε. εἶτα εἴ τις ἡμῶν ἐπύθετο τί ποιεῖ αὐτός; ἐλέγετο ὅτι μετὰ Φηλικίωνος βουλεύεται περί τινος. οὐχὶ γὰρ πεπράκει αὐτὸν ὡς ἄχρηστον; τίς οὖν αὐτὸν ἄφνω φρόνιμον ἐποίησεν; τοῦτʼ ἔστι τὸ τιμᾶν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ προαιρετικά. ἠξίωται δημαρχίας. πάντες οἱ ἀπαντῶντες συνήδονται· ἄλλος τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καταφιλεῖ, ἄλλος τὸν τράχηλον, οἱ δοῦλοι τὰς χεῖρας. ἔρχεται εἰς οἶκον, εὑρίσκει λύχνους ἁπτομένους. ἀναβαίνει εἰς τὸ Καπιτώλιον, ἐπιθύει. τίς οὖν πώποτε ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀρεχθῆναι καλῶς ἔθυσεν; ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὁρμῆσαι κατὰ φύσιν; ἐκεῖ γὰρ καὶ θεοῖς εὐχαριστοῦμεν, ὅπου τὸ ἀγαθὸν τιθέμεθα. σήμερόν τις ὑπὲρ ἱερωσύνης ἐλάλει μοι τοῦ Αὐγούστου. λέγω αὐτῷ ἄνθρωπε, ἄφες τὸ πρᾶγμα· δαπανήσεις πολλὰ εἰς οὐδέν. — ἀλλʼ οἱ τὰς [φ]ὠνάς, φησί, γράφοντες γράψουσι τὸ ἐμὸν ὄνομα. — μή τι οὖν σὺ τοῖς ἀναγιγνώσκουσι λέγεις παρών· ἐμὲ γεγράφασιν; εἰ δὲ καὶ νῦν δύνασαι παρεῖναι πᾶσιν, ἐὰν ἀποθάνῃς, τί ποιήσεις; — μενεῖ μου τὸ ὄνομα. — γράψον αὐτὸ εἰς λίθον καὶ μενεῖ. ἄγε ἔξω δὲ Νικοπόλεως τίς σου μνεία; — ἀλλὰ χρυσοῦν στέφανον φορήσω. — εἰ ἅπαξ ἐπιθυμεῖς στεφάνου, ῥόδινον λαβὼν περίθου· ὄψει γὰρ κομψότερον.

[¶1] 20. Every art, and every faculty, contemplates certain things as its principal objects. Whenever, therefore, it is of the same nature with the objects of its contemplation, it necessarily contemplates itself too; but where it is of a different nature, it cannot contemplate itself. The art of shoemaking, for instance, is exercised upon leather, but is itself entirely distinct from the materials it works upon; therefore it does not contemplate itself. Again, grammar is exercised on articulate speech. Is the art of grammar itself, then, articulate speech? By no means. Therefore, it cannot contemplate itself. To what purpose, then, is reason appointed by nature? To a proper use of the phenomena of existence. And what is reason? The art of systematizing these phenomena. Thus, by its nature, it becomes contemplative of itself too. Again, what subjects of contemplation belong to prudence? Good and evil, and that which is indifferent. What, then, is prudence itself? Good. What imprudence? Evil. You see, then, that it necessarily contemplates both itself and its contrary. Therefore, the first and greatest work of a philosopher is to try to distinguish the phenomena of existence, and to admit none untried. Even in money, where our interest seems to be concerned, you see what an art we have invented, and how many ways an assayer uses to try its value,—by the sight, the touch, the smell, and, lastly, the hearing. He throws the piece down, and attends to the jingle; and is not contented with its jingling only once, but, by frequent attention to it, trains his ear for sound. So, when we think it of consequence whether we are deceived or not, we use the utmost attention to discern those things which may deceive us. But, yawning and slumbering over our poor neglected reason, we are imposed upon by every appearance, nor know the mischief done. Would you know, then, how very languidly you are affected by good and evil, and how vehemently by things indifferent, consider how you feel with regard to bodily blindness, and how with regard to being deceived; and you will find that you are far from being moved, as you ought, in relation to good and evil. “But trained powers and much labor and learning are here needed.” What then? Do you expect the greatest of arts to be acquired by slight endeavors? And yet the principal doctrine of the philosophers is in itself short. If you have a mind to know it, read Zeno, and you will see. It is not a long story to say, “Our end is to serve the gods,” and “The essence of good consists in the proper use of the phenomena of existence.” If you say, what then is God; what are phenomena; what is particular, what universal nature,—here the long story comes in. And so, if Epicurus should come and say that good lies in the body, here, too, it will be a long story; and it will be necessary to hear what is the principal, and substantial, and essential part in us. It is unlikely that the good of a snail should be placed in the shell; and is it likely that the good of a man should? You yourself, Epicurus, have in you something superior to this. What is that in you which deliberates, which examines, which recognizes the body as the principal part? Why light your lamp, and labor for us, and write so many books? That we may not be ignorant of the truth? But what are we? What are we to you? Thus the doctrine becomes a long story.

> Greek: 20. πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ δύναμις προηγουμένων τινῶν ἐστι θεωρητική. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ὁμοειδὴς τοῖς θεωρουμένοις καὶ αὐτή, ἀναγκαίως καὶ αὑτῆς γίνεται θεωρητική· ὅταν δʼ ἀνομογενής, οὐ δύναται θεωρεῖν ἑαυτήν. οἷον σκυτικὴ περὶ δέρματα ἀναστρέφεται, αὐτὴ δὲ παντελῶς ἀπήλλακται τῆς ὕλης τῶν δερμάτων· διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν αὑτῆς θεωρητική. γραμματικὴ πάλιν περὶ τὴν ἐγγράμματον φωνήν· μή τι οὖν ἐστι καὶ αὐτὴ ἐγγράμματος φωνή; οὐδαμῶς. διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δύναται θεωρεῖν ἑαυτήν. ὁ οὖν λόγος πρὸς τί ποτε ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως παρείληπται; πρὸς χρῆσιν φαντασιῶν οἵαν δεῖ. αὐτὸς οὖν τί ἐστιν; σύστημα ἐκ ποιῶν φαντασιῶν. οὕτως γίνεται φύσει καὶ αὑτοῦ θεωρητικός. πάλιν ἡ φρόνησις τίνα θεωρήσουσα παρελήλυθεν; ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ οὐδέτερα. αὐτὴ οὖν τί ἐστιν; ἀγαθόν. ἡ δʼ ἀφροσύνη τί ἐστιν; κακόν. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι ἀναγκαίως καὶ αὑτῆς γίνεται καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας θεωρητική; διὰ τοῦτο ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσόφου τὸ μέγιστον καὶ πρῶτον δοκιμάζειν τὰς φαντασίας καὶ διακρίνειν καὶ μηδεμίαν ἀδοκίμαστον προσφέρεσθαι. ὁρᾶτε ἐπὶ τοῦ νομίσματος, ὅπου δοκεῖ τι εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, πῶς καὶ τέχνην ἐξευρήκαμεν καὶ ὅσοις ὁ ἀργυρογνώμων προσχρῆται πρὸς δοκιμασίαν τοῦ νομίσματος, τῇ ὄψει, τῇ ἁφῇ, τῇ ὀσφρασίᾳ, τὰ τελευταῖα τῇ ἀκοῇ· ῥήξας τὸ δηνάριον τῷ ψόφῳ προσέχει καὶ οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀρκεῖται ψοφήσαντος, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τῆς πολλῆς προσοχῆς μουσικὸς γίνεται. οὕτως ὅπου διαφέρειν οἰόμεθα τὸ πλανᾶσθαι τοῦ μὴ πλανᾶσθαι, ἐνταῦθα πολλὴν προσοχὴν εἰσφέρομεν εἰς διάκρισιν τῶν διαπλανᾶν δυναμένων, ἐπὶ δὲ ταλαιπώρου ἡγεμονικοῦ χάσκοντες καὶ καθεύδοντες, πᾶσαν φαντασίαν παραπροσδεχόμεθα· ἡ γὰρ ζημία οὐ προσπίπτει. ὅταν οὖν θέλῃς γνῶναι, πῶς ἔχεις περὶ μὲν τἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ ἀνειμένως, περὶ τἀδιάφορα δʼ ἐσπευσμένως, ἐπίστησον πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἐκτυφλωθῆναι καὶ πῶς πρὸς τὸ ἐξαπατηθῆναι καὶ γνώσῃ ὅτι μακρὰν εἶ τοῦ ὡς δεῖ πεπονθέναι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ἀλλὰ πολλῆς ἔχει χρείαν παρασκευῆς καὶ πόνου πολλοῦ καὶ μαθημάτων. τί οὖν; ἐλπίζεις ὅτι τὴν μεγίστην τέχνην ἀπὸ ὀλίγων ἔστιν ἀναλαβεῖν; καίτοι αὐτὸς μὲν ὁ προηγούμενος λόγος τῶν φιλοσόφων λίαν ἐστὶν ὀλίγος. εἰ θέλεις γνῶναι, ἀνάγνωθι τὰ Ζήνωνος καὶ ὄψει. τί γὰρ ἔχει μακρὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ἕπεσθαι θεοῖς, οὐσία δʼ ἀγαθοῦ χρῆσις οἵα δεῖ φαντασιῶν; λέγε τί οὖν ἐστι θεὸς καὶ τί φαντασία; καὶ τί ἐστι φύσις ἡ ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ τί ἐστι φύσις ἡ τῶν ὅλων; ἤδη μακρόν. ἂν οὖν ἐλθὼν Ἐπίκουρος εἴπῃ, ὅτι ἐν σαρκὶ δεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, πάλιν μακρὸν γίνεται καὶ ἀνάγκη ἀκοῦσαι τί τὸ προηγούμενόν ἐστιν ἐφʼ ἡμῶν, τί τὸ ὑποστατικὸν καὶ οὐσιῶδες. ὅτι τὸ κοχλίου ἀγαθὸν οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἐν τῷ κελύφει, τὸ οὖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰκός; σὺ δʼ αὐτὸς τί κυριώτερον ἔχεις, Ἐπίκουρε; τί ἐστιν ἐν σοὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον, τὸ ἐπισκεπτόμενον ἕκαστα, τὸ περὶ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτῆς ὅτι τὸ προηγούμενόν ἐστιν [τὸ] ἐπικρῖνον; τί δὲ καὶ λύχνον ἅπτεις καὶ πονεῖς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καὶ τηλικαῦτα βιβλία γράφεις; ἵνα μὴ ἀγνοήσωμεν ἡμεῖς τὴν ἀλήθειαν; τίνες ἡμεῖς; τί πρὸς σὲ ὄντες; οὕτω μακρὸς ὁ λόγος γίνεται.

[¶2] 21. When one maintains his proper attitude in life, he does not long after externals. What would you have, O man? “I am contented, if my desires and aversions are conformable to nature; if I seek and shun that which I ought, and thus regulate my purposes, my efforts, and my opinions.” Why, then, do you walk as if you had swallowed a spit? “Because I could wish moreover to have all who meet me admire me, and all who follow me cry out, What a great philosopher!” Who are those by whom you would be admired? Are they not the very people who you used to say were mad? What, then, would you be admired by madmen?

> Greek: 21. ὅταν τις ἣν δεῖ στάσιν ἔχῃ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἔξω οὐ κέχηνεν. ἄνθρωπε, τί θέλεις σοι γενέσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν ἀρκοῦμαι, ἂν ὀρέγωμαι καὶ ἐκκλίνω κατὰ φύσιν, ἂν ὁρμῇ καὶ ἀφορμῇ χρῶμαι ὡς πέφυκα, ἂν προ[σ]θέσει, ἂν ἐπιβολῇ, ἂν συγκαταθέσει. τί οὖν ἡμῖν ὀβελίσκον καταπιὼν περιπατεῖς; ἤθελον, ἵνα με καὶ οἱ ἀπαντῶντες θαυμάζωσιν καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦντες ἐπικραυγάζωσιν· ὦ μεγάλου φιλοσόφου. τίνες εἰσὶν οὗτοι, ὑφʼ ὧν θαυμάζεσθαι θέλεις; οὐχ οὗτοί εἰσι, περὶ ὧν εἴωθας λέγειν ὅτι μαίνονται; τί οὖν; ὑπὸ τῶν μαινομένων θαυμάζεσθαι θέλεις;

[¶3] 22. The same general principles are common to all men, nor does one such principle contradict another; for which of us does not admit that good is advantageous and eligible, and in all cases to be pursued and followed? Who does not admit that justice is fair and becoming? Where, then, arises the dispute? In adapting these principles to particular cases; as when one cries, “Such a person has acted well,—he is a gallant man;” and another, “No, he has acted like a fool.” Hence arise disputes among men. This is the dispute between Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans,—not whether the right be preferable to all things, and in every instance to be sought; but whether the eating swine’s flesh be consistent with right, or not. This, too, you will find to have been the dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon; for call them forth. What say you, Agamemnon,—ought not that to be done which is fit and right? “Yes, surely.” Achilles, what say you,—is it not agreeable to you, that what is right should be done? “Yes; I desire it beyond everything.” Apply your principles then. Here begins the dispute. One says, “It is not fit that I should restore Chryseis to her father.” The other says, “Yes; but it is.” One or the other of them, certainly, makes a wrong conception of the principle of fitness. Again, the one says, “If it be fit that I should give up Chryseis, it is fit, too, that I should take some of your prizes.” The other answers, “What, that you should take my mistress?” “Ay; yours.” “What, mine only? Must I only, then, lose my prize?” What, then, is it to be properly educated? To learn how to apply the principles of natural right to particular cases, and, for the rest, to distinguish that some things are in our power, while others are not. In our own power are the will, and all voluntary actions; out of our power, the body and its parts, property, parents, brothers, children, country, and, in short, all our fellow-beings. Where, then, shall we place good? In what shall we define it to consist? In things within our own power. “But are not health and strength and life good? And are not children, parents, country? You talk unreasonably.” Let us, then, try another point of view. Can he who suffers evil, and is disappointed of good, be happy? He cannot. And can he preserve a right behavior with regard to society? How is it possible that he should? I am naturally led to seek my own highest good. If, therefore, it is my highest good to have an estate, it is for my good likewise to take it away from my neighbor. If it is my highest good to have a suit of clothes, it is for my good likewise to steal it wherever I find it. Hence wars, seditions, tyranny, unjust invasions. How shall I, if this be the case, be able any longer to do my duty towards Zeus? If I suffer evil, and am disappointed, he takes no care of me. And what is he to me if he cannot help me; or. again, what is he to me if he chooses I should be in the condition that I am? Then I begin to hate him. What, then, do we build temples, do we raise statues, to Zeus. as to evil demons, as to the goddess Fever? How, then, is he the preserver, and how the dispenser of rain and plenty? If we place the essence of good on any such ground, all this will follow. What, then, shall we do? This is the inquiry which interests him who philosophizes in earnest, and to some result. Do I not now see what is good, and what is evil, or am I mad? Suppose I place good only in things dependent on my own will? Why, every one will laugh at me. Some gray-headed old fellow will come, with his fingers covered with gold rings, and will shake his head, and say, “Hark ye, child, it is fit you should learn philosophy; but it is fit, too, you should have common-sense. All this is nonsense. You learn syllogisms from philosophers; but how you are to act, you know better than they.” Then what displeases you if I do know? What can I say to this unfortunate? If I make no answer, he will burst; so I must answer thus: “Bear with me, as with lovers. Granted; I am not myself. I have lost my senses.”

> Greek: 22. προλήψεις κοιναὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εἰσίν· καὶ πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται. τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐ τίθησιν, ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν συμφέρον ἐστὶ ἐστι καὶ αἱρετὸν καὶ ἐκ πάσης αὐτὸ περιστάσεως δεῖ μετιέναι καὶ διώκειν; τίς δʼ ἡμῶν οὐ τίθησιν, ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον καλόν ἐστι καὶ πρέπον; πότʼ οὖν ἡ μάχη γίνεται; περὶ τὴν ἐφαρμογὴν τῶν προλήψεων ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις, ὅταν ὁ μὲν εἴπῃ καλῶς ἐποίησεν, ἀνδρεῖός ἐστιν· οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἀπονενοημένος. ἔνθεν ἡ μάχη γίνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ Ἰουδαίων καὶ Σύρων καὶ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Ῥωμαίων μάχη, οὐ περὶ τοῦ ὅτι τὸ ὅσιον πάντων προτιμητέον καὶ ἐν παντὶ μεταδιωκτέον, ἀλλὰ πότερόν ἐστιν ὅσιον τοῦτο τὸ χοιρείου φαγεῖν ἢ ἀνόσιον. ταύτην τὴν μάχην εὑρήσετε καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονος καὶ Ἀχιλλέως. κάλει γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ μέσον. τί λέγεις σύ, ὦ Ἀγάμεμνον; οὐ δεῖ γενέσθαι τὰ δέοντα καὶ τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα; δεῖ μὲν οὖν. σὺ δὲ τί λέγεις, ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ; οὐκ ἀρέσκει σοι γίνεσθαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα; ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν πάντων μάλιστα ἀρέσκει. ἐφαρμόσατε οὖν τὰς προλήψεις. ἐντεῦθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ μάχης. ὁ μὲν λέγει οὐ χρὴ ἀποδιδόναι με τὴν Χρυσηίδα τῷ πατρί, ὁ δὲ λέγει δεῖ μὲν οὖν. πάντως ὁ ἕτερος αὐτῶν κακῶς ἐφαρμόζει τὴν πρόληψιν τοῦ δέοντος. πάλιν ὁ μὲν λέγει οὐκοῦν, εἴ με δεῖ ἀποδοῦναι τὴν Χρυσηίδα, δεῖ με λαβεῖν ὑμῶν τινος τὸ γέρας, ὁ δέ τὴν ἐμὴν οὖν λάβῃς ἐρωμένην;. τὴν σήν φησίν. ἐγὼ οὖν μόνος — ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ μόνος μὴ ἔχω; οὕτως μάχη γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ παιδεύεσθαι; μανθάνειν τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει καὶ λοιπὸν διελεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν· ἐφʼ ἡμῖν μὲν προαίρεσις καὶ πάντα τὰ προαιρετικὰ ἔργα, οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ σῶμα, τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, κτήσεις, γονεῖς, ἀδελφοὶ, τέκνα, πατρίς, ἁπλῶς οἱ κοινωνοί. ποῦ οὖν θῶμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν; ποίᾳ οὐσίᾳ αὐτὸ ἐφαρμόσομεν; τῇ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν; — εἶτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρτιότης καὶ ζωή, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τέκνα οὐδὲ γονεῖς οὐδὲ πατρίς; — καὶ τίς σου ἀνέξεται; μεταθῶμεν οὖν αὐτὸ πάλιν ἐνθάδε. ἐνδέχεται οὖν βλαπτόμενον καὶ ἀποτυγχάνοντα τῶν ἀγαθῶν εὐδαιμονεῖν; — οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. — καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς κοινωνοὺς οἵαν δεῖ … ἀναστροφήν; καὶ πῶς ἐνδέχεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ πέφυκα πρὸς τὸ ἐμὸν συμφέρον. εἰ συμφέρει μοι ἀγρὸν ἔχειν, συμφέρει μοι καὶ ἀφελέσθαι αὐτὸν τοῦ πλησίον· εἰ συμφέρει μοι ἱμάτιον ἔχειν, συμφέρει μοι καὶ κλέψαι αὐτὸ ἐκ βαλανείου. ἔνθεν πόλεμοι, στάσεις, τυραννίδες, ἐπιβουλαί. πῶς δʼ ἔτι δυνήσομαι τὸ πρὸς τὸν Δία καθῆκον; εἰ γὰρ βλάπτομαι καὶ ἀτυχῶ, οὐκ ἐπιστρέφεταί μου. καὶ τί μοι καὶ αὐτῷ, εἰ οὐ δύναταί μοι βοηθῆσαι; καὶ πάλιν τί μοι καὶ αὐτῷ, εἰ θέλει μʼ ἐν τοιούτοις εἶναι ἐν οἷς εἰμι; ἄρχομαι λοιπὸν μισεῖν αὐτόν. τί οὖν ναοὺς ποιοῦμεν, τί οὖν ἀγάλματα, ὡς κακοῖς δαίμοσιν, ὡς πυρετῷ τῷ Διί; καὶ πῶς ἔτι Σωτὴρ καὶ πῶς Ὑέτιος καὶ πῶς Ἐπικάρπιος; καὶ μήν, ἂν ἐνταῦθά που θῶμεν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πάντα ταῦτα ἐξακολουθεῖ. τί οὖν ποιήσωμεν;— αὕτη ἐστὶ ζήτησις τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος τῷ ὄντι καὶ ὠδίνοντος· νῦν ἐγὼ οὐχ ὁρῶ τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν· οὐ μαίνομαι; ναί· ἀλλʼ ἂν ἐνταῦθά που θῶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς, πάντες μου καταγελάσονται. ἥξει τις γέρων πολιὸς χρυσοῦς δακτυλίους ἔχων πολλούς, εἶτα ἐπισείσας τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐρεῖ ἄκουσόν μου, τέκνον· δεῖ μὲν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν, δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐγκέφαλον ἔχειν· ταῦτα μωρά ἐστιν. σὺ παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων μανθάνεις συλλογισμόν, τί δέ σοι ποιητέον ἐστίν, σὺ κάλλιον οἶδας ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι. ἄνθρωπε, τί οὖν μοι ἐπιτιμᾷς, εἰ οἶδα; τούτῳ τῷ ἀνδραπόδῳ τί εἴπω; ἂν σιωπῶ, ῥήγνυται ἐκεῖνος. ὡς δεῖ λέγειν ὅτι σύγγνωθί μοι ὡς τοῖς ἐρῶσιν· οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, μαίνομαι.

[¶4] 23. Even Epicurus is sensible that we are by nature sociable beings; but having once placed our good in the mere outward shell, he can say nothing afterwards inconsistent with that; for again, he strenuously maintains that we ought not to admire or accept anything separated from the nature of good, and he is in the right to maintain it. But how, then, arise any affectionate anxieties, unless there be such a thing as natural affection towards our offspring? Then why do you, Epicurus, dissuade a wise man from bringing up children? Why are you afraid that upon their account he may fall into anxieties? Does he fall into any for a mouse, that feeds within his house? What is it to him, if a little mouse bewails itself there? But Epicurus knew that, if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love and be solicitous for it. On the same grounds he says that a wise man will not engage himself in public business, knowing very well what must follow. If men are only so many flies, why should he not engage in it? And does he, who knows all this, dare to forbid us to bring up children? Not even a sheep, or a wolf, deserts its offspring; and shall man? What would you have, that we should be as silly as sheep? Yet even these do not desert their offspring. Or as savage as wolves? Neither do these desert them. Pray, who would mind you, if he saw his child fallen upon the ground and crying? For my part, I am of opinion that your father and another, even if they could have foreseen that you would have been the author of such doctrines, would not have thrown you away.

> Greek: 23. ἐπινοεῖ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὅτι φύσει ἐσμὲν κοινωνικοί, ἀλλʼ ἅπαξ ἐν τῷ κελύφει θεὶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν οὐκέτι δύναται ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν. πάλιν γὰρ ἐκείνου λίαν κρατεῖ, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπεσπασμένον οὐδὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐσίας οὔτε θαυμάζειν οὔτʼ ἀποδέχεσθαι· καὶ καλῶς αὐτοῦ κρατεῖ. πῶς οὖν ὑπονοητικοί ἐσμεν, οἷς μὴ φυσικὴ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα φιλοστοργία; διὰ τί ἀποσυμβουλεύεις τῷ σοφῷ τεκνοτροφεῖν; τί φοβῇ μὴ διὰ ταῦτα εἰς λύπας ἐμπέσῃ; διὰ γὰρ τὸν μῦν τὸν ἔσω τρεφόμενον ἐμπίπτει; τί οὖν αὐτῷ μέλει, ἂν μυίδιον μικρὸν ἔσω κατακλαίῃ αὐτοῦ; ἀλλʼ οἶδεν, ὅτι, ἂν ἅπαξ γένηται παιδίον, οὐκέτι ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστι μὴ στέργειν μηδὲ φροντίζειν ἐπʼ αὐτῷ. διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα· οἶδεν γὰρ τίνα δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν πολιτευόμενον· ἐπείτοι εἰ ὡς ἐν μυίαις μέλλεις ἀναστρέφεσθαι, τί κωλύει; ἀλλʼ ὅμως εἰδὼς ταῦτα τολμᾷ λέγειν ὅτι μὴ ἀναιρώμεθα τέκνα. ἀλλὰ πρόβατον μὲν οὐκ ἀπολείπει τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔγγονον οὐδὲ λύκος, ἄνθρωπος δʼ ἀπολείπει; τί θέλεις; μωροὺς ἡμᾶς εἶναι ὡς τὰ πρόβατα; οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνα ἀπολείπει. θηριώδεις ὡς τοὺς λύκους; οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνοι ἀπολείπουσιν. ἄγε, τίς δέ σοι πείθεται ἰδὼν παιδίον αὐτοῦ κλαῖον ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πεπτωκός; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐμαντεύσατο ἡ μήτηρ σου καὶ ὁ πατήρ, ὅτι μέλλεις ταῦτα λέγειν, οὐκ ἄν σε ἔρριψαν.

[¶5] 24. Difficulties are things that show what men are. For the future, in case of any difficulty, remember that God, like a gymnastic trainer, has pitted you against a rough antagonist. For what end? That you may be an Olympic conqueror; and this cannot be without toil. No man, in my opinion, has a more profitable difficulty on his hands than you have, provided you will but use it, as an athletic champion uses his antagonist. Suppose we were to send you as a scout to Rome. But no one ever sends a timorous scout, who, when he only hears a noise, or sees a shadow, runs back frightened, and says, “The enemy is at hand.” So now, if you should come and tell us, “Things are in a fearful way at Rome; death is terrible, banishment terrible, calumny terrible, poverty terrible; run, good people, the enemy is at hand;” we will answer, Get you gone, and prophesy for yourself; our only fault is that we have sent such a scout. Diogenes was sent as a scout before you, but he told us other tidings. He says that death is no evil, for it is nothing base; that calumny is only the noise of madmen. And what account did this spy give us of pain, of pleasure, of poverty? He says that to be naked is better than a purple robe; to sleep upon the bare ground, the softest bed; and gives a proof of all he says by his own courage, tranquillity, and freedom, and, moreover, by a healthy and robust body. “There is no enemy near,” he says; “all is profound peace.” How so, Diogenes? “Look upon me,” he says. “Am I hurt? Am I wounded? Have I run away from any one?” This is a scout worth having. But you come, and tell us one tale after another. Go back and look more carefully, and without fear. “What shall I do, then?” What do you do when you land from a ship? Do you take away with you the rudder, or the oars? What do you take, then? Your own, your bundle and your flask. So, in the present case, if you will but remember what is your own, you will not covet what belongs to others. If some tyrant bids you put off your consular robe,—“Well, I am in my equestrian robe.” Put off that too. “I have only my coat.” Put off that too. “Well, I am naked.” I am not yet satisfied. “Then e’en take my whole body. If I can throw off a paltry body, am I any longer afraid of a tyrant?” “But such a one will not leave me his heir.” What, then, have I forgotten, that such possessions are never really mine? How, then, do we call them ours? It is as with a bed in an inn. If the landlord, when he dies. leaves you the bed. well and good; but if to another, it will be his, and you will seek one elsewhere; and consequently, if you do not find one, you will sleep upon the ground; only sleep fearlessly and profoundly, and remember that tragedies find their theme among the rich and kings and tyrants. No poor man fills any other place in one than as part of the chorus; whereas, kings begin indeed with prosperity: “Crown the palace;” but continue about the third and fourth act: “Alas, Citheron! why didst thou receive me!” Where are thy crowns, wretch; where is thy diadem? Cannot thy guards help thee? Whenever you are brought into any such society, think then that you meet a tragic actor, or, rather, not an actor, but Oedipus himself. “But such a one is happy; he walks with a numerous train.” Well, I too walk with a numerous train. But remember the principal thing,—that the door is open. Do not be more fearful than children; but as they, when the play dues not please them, say, “will play no longer,” so do you, in the same case, say, “will play no longer,” and go; but, if you stay, do not complain.

> Greek: 24. αἱ περιστάσεις εἰσὶν αἱ τοὺς ἄνδρας δεικνύουσαι. λοιπὸν ὅταν ἐμπέσῃ περίστασις, μέμνησο ὅτι ὁ θεός σε ὡς ἀλείπτης τραχεῖ νεανίσκῳ συμβέβληκεν. — ἵνα τί; φησίν. — ἵνα Ὀλυμπιονίκης γένῃ· δίχα δʼ ἱδρῶτος οὐ γίγνεται. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐδεὶς δοκεῖ κρείσσονα ἐσχηκέναι περίστασιν ἧς σὺ ἔσχηκας, ἂν θέλῃς ὡς ἀθλητὴς νεανίσκῳ χρῆσθαι. καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς γε εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην κατάσκοπον πέμπομεν. οὐδεὶς δὲ δειλὸν κατάσκοπον πέμπει, ἵνʼ, ἂν μόνον ἀκούσῃ ψόφου καὶ σκιάν ποθεν ἴδῃ, τρέχων ἔλθῃ τεταραγμένος καὶ λέγων ἤδη παρεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους. οὕτως νῦν καὶ σὺ ἂν ἐλθὼν ἡμῖν εἴπῃς φοβερὰ τὰ ἐν Ῥώμῃ πράγματα, δεινόν ἐστι θάνατος, δεινόν ἐστι φυγή, δεινὸν λοιδορία, δεινὸν πενία· φεύγετε ἄνδρες, πάρεισιν οἱ πολέμιοι, ἐροῦμέν σοι ἄπελθε, σεαυτῷ μαντεύου· ἡμεῖς τοῦτο μόνον ἡμάρτομεν, ὅτι τοιοῦτον κατάσκοπον ἐπέμπομεν. πρὸ σοῦ κατάσκοπος ἀποσταλεὶς Διογένης ἄλλα ἡμῖν ἀπήγγελκεν. λέγει ὅτι ὁ θάνατος οὐκ ἔστι κακόν, οὐδὲ γὰρ αἰσχρόν· λέγει ὅτι ἀδοξία ψόφος ἐστὶ μαινομένων ἀνθρώπων. οἷα δὲ περὶ πόνου, οἷα δὲ περὶ ἡδονῆς, οἷα περὶ πενίας εἴρηκεν οὗτος ὁ κατάσκοπος. τὸ δὲ γυμν[ασι]ὸν εἶναι λέγει ὅτι κρεῖσσόν ἐστι πάσης περιπορφύρου· τὸ δʼ ἐπʼ ἀστρώτῳ πέδῳ καθεύδειν λέγει ὅτι μαλακωτάτη κοίτη ἐστίν. καὶ ἀπόδειξιν φέρει περὶ ἑκάστου τὸ θάρσος τὸ αὑτοῦ, τὴν ἀταραξίαν, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, εἶτα καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον στίλβον καὶ συνεστραμμένον. οὐδείς, φησίν, πολέμιος ἐγγύς ἐστιν· πάντα εἰρήνης γέμει. πῶς, ὦ Διόγενες; ἰδού, φησίν, μή τι βέβλημαι, μή τι τέτρωμαι, μή τινα πέφευγα; τοῦτʼ ἔστιν οἷος δεῖ κατάσκοπος, σὺ δʼ ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἄλλα ἐξ ἄλλων λέγεις. οὐκ ἀπελεύσῃ πάλιν καὶ ὄψει ἀκριβέστερον δίχα τῆς δειλίας; τί οὖν ποιήσω;— τί ποιεῖς, ἐκ πλοίου ὅταν ἐξίῃς; μή τι τὸ πηδάλιον αἴρεις, μή τι τὰς κώπας; τί οὖν αἴρεις; τὰ σά, τὴν λήκυθον, τὴν πήραν. καὶ νῦν ἂν ᾖς μεμνημένος τῶν σῶν, οὐδέποτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀντιποιήσῃ. λέγει σοι θὲς τὴν πλατύσημον· ἰδοὺ στενόσημος. θὲς καὶ ταύτην· ἰδοὺ ἱμάτιον μόνον. θὲς τὸ ἱμάτιον· ἰδοὺ γυμνός. ἀλλὰ φθόνον μοι κινεῖς. λάβε τοίνυν ὅλον τὸ σωμάτιον. ᾧ δύναμαι ῥῖψαι τὸ σωμάτιον, ἔτι τοῦτον φοβοῦμαι; ἀλλὰ κληρονόμον μʼ οὐκ ἀπολείψει. τί οὖν; ἐπελαθόμην ὅτι τούτων οὐδὲν ἐμὸν ἦν; πῶς οὖν ἐμὰ αὐτὰ λέγομεν; ὡς τὸν κράβαττον ἐν τῷ πανδοκείῳ. ἂν οὖν ὁ πανδοκεὺς ἀποθανὼν ἀπολίπῃ σοι τοὺς κραβάττους· ἂν δʼ ἄλλῳ, ἐκεῖνος ἕξει, σὺ δʼ ἄλλον ζητήσεις· ἂν οὖν μὴ εὕρῃς, χαμαὶ κοιμήσῃ μόνον θαρρῶν καὶ ῥέγκων καὶ μεμνημένος ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πλουσίοις καὶ βασιλεῦσι καὶ τυράννοις αἱ τραγῳδίαι τόπον ἔχουσιν, οὐδεὶς δὲ πένης τραγῳδίαν συμπληροῖ εἰ μὴ ὡς χορευτής. οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς ἄρχονται μὲν ἀπʼ ἀγαθῶν· στέψατε δώματα· εἶτα περὶ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον μέρος· ἰὼ Κιθαιρών, τί μʼ ἐδέχου; ἀνδράποδον, ποῦ οἱ στέφανοι, ποῦ τὸ διάδημα; οὐδέν σε ὠφελοῦσιν οἱ δορυφόροι; ὅταν οὖν ἐκείνων τινὶ προσίῃς, τούτων μέμνησο, ὅτι τραγῳδῷ προσέρχῃ, οὐ τῷ ὑποκριτῇ, ἀλλʼ αὐτῷ τῷ Οἰδίποδι. ἀλλὰ μακάριος ὁ δεῖνα· μετὰ πολλῶν γὰρ περιπατεῖ. κἀγὼ συγκατατάττω ἐμαυτὸν σὺν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν περιπατῶ. τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον· μέμνησο ὅτι ἡ θύρα ἤνοικται. μὴ γίνου τῶν παιδίων δειλότερος, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐκεῖνα, ὅταν αὐτοῖς μὴ ἀρέσκῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα, λέγει οὐκέτι παίξω, καὶ σύ, ὅταν σοι φαίνηταί τινα εἶναι τοιαῦτα, εἰπὼν οὐκέτι παίξω ἀπαλλάσσου, μένων δὲ μὴ θρήνει.

[¶6] 25. If these things are true; and if we are not stupid or insincere when we say that the good or ill of man lies within his own will, and that all beside is nothing to us, why are we still troubled? Why do we still fear? What truly concerns us is in no one’s power; what is in the power of others concerns not us. What embarrassment have we left? “But you must direct me.” Why should I direct you? Has not Zeus directed you? Has he not given you what is your own. incapable of restraint or hindrance; and what is not your own, liable to both? What directions, then, what orders, have you brought from him? “By all means guard what is your own; what belongs to others do not covet. Honesty is your own; a sense of virtuous shame is your own. Who, then, can deprive you of these? Who can restrain you from making use of them, but yourself? And how do you do it? When you make that your concern which is not truly your own, you lose that which is.” Having such precepts and directions from Zeus, what sort do you still want from me? Am I better than He, or more worthy of credit? If you observe these precepts, what others do you need? Are not these His? Apply the. recognized principles; apply the demonstrations of philosophers; apply what you have often heard, and what you have said yourself; what you have read, and what you have carefully studied. How long is it right to devote one’s self to these things and not break up the game? As long as it goes on well. A king is chosen at the Saturnalian Festival, supposing it to be agreed to play at that game; he orders: “Do you drink; you mix the wine; you sing: you go; you come.” I obey, that the game may not be broken up by my fault. [Then he orders] “bid you think yourself to be unhappy.” I do not think so; and who shall compel me to think so? Again, suppose we agree to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed for Agamemnon says to me, “Go to Achilles, and force away Briseis.” I go. “Come.” I come. We should deal with life as with these imaginary orders. “Suppose it to be night.” Well, suppose it. “Is it day then?” No; for I admitted the hypothesis, that it was night. “Suppose that you think it to be night.” Well, suppose it. “But you must really think that it is night.” That by no means follows from the hypothesis. Thus it is in the case illustrated. Suppose you have ill luck? Suppose it. “Are you then unlucky?” Yes. “Are you thoroughly unfortunate?” Yes. “Well; but you must really regard yourself as miserable.” But this is no part of the assumption, and there is a power who forbids me [to admit that]. How far, then, are we to carry such analogies? As far as is useful; that is, till we go farther than is reasonable and fit. Moreover, some are peevish and fastidious, and say, I cannot dine with such a fellow, to be obliged to hear him all day recounting how he fought in Mysia. “I told you, my friend, how I gained the eminence.” There I begin to suffer another siege. But another says, “had rather get a dinner, and hear him prate as much as he pleases.” Do you decide between these opinions; but do not let it be with depression and anxiety, and the assumption that you are miserable, for no one compels you to that. Is there smoke in my house? If it be moderate, I will stay; if very great, I will go out. For you must always remember, and hold to this, that the door is open. “You are forbidden to live at Nicopolis.” Then I will not live there. “Nor at Athens.” Well, nor at Athens. “Nor at Rome.” Nor at Rome. “But you shall live at Gyaros.” I will live there. But suppose that living at Gyaros seems to me like living in a great smoke. I can then retire where no one can forbid me to live, for it is an abode open to all, and put off my last garment, this poor body of mine; beyond this, no one has any power over me. Thus Demetrius said to Nero: “You sentence me to death; and Nature you.” If I prize my body first, I have surrendered myself as a slave; if my estate, the same; for I at once betray where I am vulnerable. Just as when a reptile pulls in his head, I bid you strike that part of him which he guards; and be you assured, that wherever you show a desire to guard yourself. there your master will attack you. Remember but this, and whom will you any longer flatter or fear? “But I want to sit where the senators do.” Do not you see, that by this you incommode and torment yourself? “Why, how else shall I see the show in the Amphitheatre advantageously?” Do not insist on seeing it, O man! and you will not be incommoded. Why do you vex yourself? Or wait a little while; and when the show is over, go sit in the senators’ places and sun yourself. For remember, that this holds universally,—we incommode and torment ourselves; that is, our own preconceived notions do it for us. What is it to be reviled, for instance? Stand by a stone and revile it, and what will you get by it? If you, therefore, would listen only as a stone, what would your reviler gain? But if the reviler has the weakness of the reviled for a vantage-ground, then he carries his point. “Strip him” [bids the tyrant]. What mean you by him? Take my clothes, strip them, at your pleasure. “I meant only to insult you.” Much good may it do you. These things were the study of Socrates; and by these means he always preserved the same countenance. Yet we had rather exercise and study anything, than how to become unrestrained and free. “But the philosophers talk paradoxes.” And are there not paradoxes in other arts? What is more paradoxical than to prick any one’s eye, that he may see? Should one tell this to one ignorant of surgery, would not he laugh at him? What wonder then, if in philosophy also many truths appear paradoxes to the ignorant?

> Greek: 25. εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ἐστι καὶ μὴ βλακεύομεν μηδʼ ὑποκρινόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν προαιρέσει καὶ τὸ κακόν, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα πάντα οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τί ἔτι ταρασσόμεθα, τί ἔτι φοβούμεθα; περὶ ἃ ἐσπουδάκαμεν, τούτων ἐξουσίαν οὐδεὶς ἔχει· ὧν ἐξουσίαν οἱ ἄλλοι ἔχουσιν, τούτων οὐκ ἐπιστρεφόμεθα. ποῖον ἔτι πρᾶγμα ἔχομεν; — ἀλλὰ ἔντειλαί μοι. — τί σοι ἐντείλωμαι; ὁ Ζεύς σοι οὐκ ἐντέταλται; οὐ δέδωκέν σοι τὰ μὲν σὰ ἀκώλυ[σ]τα καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστα, τὰ δὲ μὴ σὰ κωλυτὰ καὶ παραποδιστά; τίνα οὖν ἐντολὴν ἔχων ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθας, ποῖον διάταγμα; τὰ σὰ τήρει ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου, τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἐφίεσο. τὸ πιστὸν σόν …· τίς οὖν ἀφελέσθαι δύναταί σου ταῦτα; τίς κωλύσει χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς ἄλλος εἰ μὴ σύ; σὺ δὲ πῶς; ὅταν περὶ τὰ μὴ σαυτοῦ σπουδάσῃς, τὰ σαυτοῦ ἀπώλεσας. τοιαύτας ἔχων ὑποθήκας καὶ ἐντολὰς παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς ποίας ἔτι παρʼ ἐμοῦ θέλεις; κρείσσων εἰμὶ ἐκείνου, ἀξιοπιστότερος; ἀλλὰ ταύτας τηρῶν ἄλλων τινῶν προσδέῃ; ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐντέταλται ταῦτα; φέρε τὰς προλήψεις, φέρε τὰς ἀποδείξεις τὰς τῶν φιλοσόφων, φέρε ἃ πολλάκις ἤκουσας, φέρε δʼ ἃ εἶπας αὐτός, φέρε ἃ ἀνέγνως, φέρε ἃ ἐμελέτησας. μέχρις οὖ ν τίνος ταῦτα τηρεῖν καλῶς ἔχει[ς] καὶ τὴν παιδιὰν μὴ λύειν; μέχρις ἂν κομψῶς διεξάγηται. ἐν Σατορναλίοις λέλογχεν βασιλεύς· ἔδοξε γὰρ παῖξαι ταύτην τὴν παιδιάν. προστάσσει σὺ πίε, σὺ κέρασον, σὺ ᾆσον, σὺ ἄπελθε, σὺ ἐλθέ. ὑπακούω, ἵνα μὴ παρʼ ἐμὲ λύηται ἡ παιδιά. ἀλλὰ σὺ ὑπολάμβανε ὅτι ἐν κακοῖς εἶ. οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνω· καὶ τίς μʼ ἀναγκάσει ὑπολαμβάνειν; πάλιν συνεθέμεθα παῖξαι τὰ περὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα καὶ Ἀχιλλέα. καταταγεὶς Ἀγαμέμνων λέγει μοι πορεύου πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα καὶ ἀπόσπασον τὴν Βρισηίδα. πορεύομαι. ἔρχου. ἔρχομαι. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν λόγων ἀναστρεφόμεθα, οὕτως δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου. ἔστω νύξ. ἔστω. τί οὖν; ἡμέρα ἐστίν; οὔ· ἔλαβον γὰρ ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ νύκτα εἶναι. ἔστω σε ὑπολαμβάνειν ὅτι νύξ ἐστιν. ἔστω. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπόλαβε ὅτι νύξ ἐστιν. οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ὑποθέσει. οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθα. ἔστω σε εἶναι δυστυχῆ. ἔστω. ἆρʼ οὖν ἀτυχὴς εἶ; ναί. τί οὖν; κακοδαιμονεῖς; ναί. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπόλαβε ὅτι ἐν κακοῖς εἶ. οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ὑποθέσει· καὶ ἄλλος με κωλύει. μέχρι πόσου οὖν ὑπακουστέον τοῖς τοιούτοις; μέχρις ἂν οὗ λυσιτελῇ, τοῦτο δʼ ἔστιν μέχρις ἂν οὗ σῴζω τὸ πρέπον καὶ κατάλληλον. λοιπὸν οἱ μέν εἰσι κακαύστηροι καὶ κακοστόμαχοι καὶ λέγουσιν ἐγὼ οὐ δύναμαι παρὰ τούτῳ δειπνεῖν, ἵνʼ αὐτοῦ ἀνέχομαι καθʼ ἡμέραν διηγουμένου, πῶς ἐν Μυσίᾳ ἐπολέμησεν· διηγησάμην σοι, ἀδελφέ, πῶς ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον ἀνέβην· πάλιν ἄρχομαι πολιορκεῖσθαι. ἄλλος λέγει ἐγὼ δειπνῆσαι θέλω μᾶλλον καὶ ἀκούειν αὐτοῦ ὅσα θέλει ἀδολεσχοῦντος. καὶ σὺ σύγκρινε ταύτας τὰς ἀξίας· μόνον μηδὲν βαρούμενος ποίει, μὴ θλιβόμενος μηδʼ ὑπολαμβάνων ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδείς σε ἀναγκάζει. καπνὸν πεποίηκεν ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι; ἂν μέτριον, μενῶ· ἂν λίαν πολύν, ἐξέρχομαι. τούτου γὰρ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν, ὅτι ἡ θύρα ἤνοικται. ἀλλὰ μὴ οἴκει ἐν Νικοπόλει. οὐκ οἰκῶ. μηδʼ ἐν Ἀθήναις. οὐδʼ ἐν Ἀθήναις. μηδʼ ἐν Ῥώμῃ. οὐδʼ ἐν Ῥώμῃ. ἐν Γυάροις οἴκει. οἰκῶ. ἀλλὰ πολύς μοι καπνὸς φαίνεται τὸ ἐν Γυάροις οἰκεῖν. ἀποχωρῶ, ὅπου μʼ οὐδεὶς κωλύσει οἰκεῖν· ἐκείνη γὰρ ἡ οἴκησις παντὶ ἤνοικται. καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον χιτωνάριον, τοῦτʼ ἔστι τὸ σωμάτιον, τούτου ἀνωτέρω οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν εἰς ἐμὲ ἔξεστιν. διὰ τοῦτο ὁ Δημήτριος εἶπεν τῷ Νέρωνι ἀπειλεῖς μοι θάνατον, σοὶ δʼ ἡ φύσις. ἂν δὲ τὸ σωμάτιον θαυμάσω, δοῦλον ἐμαυτὸν παραδέδωκα· ἂν τὸ κτησείδιον, δοῦλον. εὐθὺς γὰρ [ἐμ]αὐτὸς κατʼ ἐμαυτοῦ δηλῶ, τίνι ἁλωτός εἰμι. ὡς ὁ ὄφις ἐὰν συσπᾷ τὴν κεφαλήν, λέγω ἐκεῖνο αὐτοῦ τύπτε ὃ φυλάσσει. καὶ σὺ γίγνωσκε, ὅτι ὃ ἂν φυλάσσειν ἐθέλῃς, κατʼ ἐκεῖνο ἐπιβήσεταί σοι ὁ κύριος. τούτων μεμνημένος τίνα ἔτι κολακεύσεις ἢ φοβήσῃ; ἀλλὰ θέλω καθῆσθαι ὅπου οἱ συγκλητικοί.— ὁρᾷς ὅτι σὺ σαυτῷ στενοχωρίαν παρέχεις, σὺ σαυτὸν θλίβεις; — πῶς οὖν ἄλλως θεωρήσω καλῶς ἐν τῷ ἀμφιθεάτρῳ; — ἄνθρωπε, καὶ μὴ θεώρει καὶ οὐ μὴ θλιβῇς. τί πράγματα ἔχεις; ἢ μικρὸν ἔκδεξαι καὶ ἀχθείσης τῆς θεωρίας κάθισον εἰς τοὺς τῶν συγκλητικῶν τόπους καὶ ἡλιάζου. καθόλου γὰρ ἐκείνου μέμνησο, ὅτι ἑαυτοὺς θλίβομεν, ἑαυτοὺς στενοχωροῦμεν, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν τὰ δόγματα ἡμᾶς θλίβει καὶ στενοχωρεῖ. ἐπεὶ τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ λοιδορεῖσθαι; παραστὰς λίθον λοιδόρει· καὶ τί ποιήσεις; ἂν οὖν τις ὡς λίθος ἀκούῃ, τί ὄφελος τῷ λοιδοροῦντι; ἂν δʼ ἔχῃ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ λοιδορουμένου ὁ λοιδορῶν ἐπιβάθραν, τότε ἀνύει τι. περίσχισον αὐτόν. τί λέγεις αὐτόν; τὸ ἱμάτιον λάβε, περίσχισον. ὕβριν σοι πεποίηκα. καλῶς σοι γένοιτο. ταῦτα ἐμελέτα Σωκράτης, διὰ τοῦτο ἓν ἔχων πρόσωπον ἀεὶ διετέλει. ἡμεῖς δὲ θέλομεν πάντα μᾶλλον ἀσκεῖν καὶ μελετᾶν ἢ ὅπως ἀπαραπόδιστοι καὶ ἐλεύθεροι ἐσόμεθα. παράδοξα λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐκ ἔστι παράδοξα; καὶ τί παραδοξότερόν ἐστιν ἢ κεντεῖν τινος τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἵνα ἴδῃ; εἴ τις ἀπείρῳ τῶν ἰατρικῶν τοῦτο εἶπεν, οὐκ ἂν κατεγέλα τοῦ λέγοντος; τί οὖν θαυμαστὸν εἰ καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ πολλὰ τῶν ἀληθῶν παράδοξα φαίνεται τοῖς ἀπείροις;

[¶7] 26. S some one was reading hypothetical propositions, Epictetus remarked that it was a rule in these to admit whatever was in accordance with the hypothesis, but much more a rule in life to do what was in accordance with nature. For, if we desire in every matter and on every occasion to conform to nature, we must on every occasion evidently make it our aim, neither to omit anything thus conformabley nor to admit anything inconsistent. Philosophers, therefore, first exercise us in theory, which is the more easy task, and then lead us to the more difficult; for in theory there is nothing to hinder our following what we are taught, but in life there are many things to draw us aside. It is ridiculous, then, to say we must begin with these applications, for it is not easy to begin with the most difficult; and this excuse children should make to those parents who dislike that they should study philosophy. “Am I to blame then, sir, and ignorant of my duty, and of what is incumbent on me? If this is neither to be learned, nor taught, why do you find fault with me? If it is to be taught, pray teach me yourself; or, if you cannot, let me learn it from those who profess to understand it. For what think you; that I voluntarily fall into evil, and miss good? Heaven forbid! What, then, is the cause of my faults? Ignorance. Are you not willing, then, that I should get rid of my ignorance? Who was ever taught the art of music, or navigation, by anger? Do you expect, then, that your anger should teach me the art of living?” This, however, can properly be said only by one who is really in earnest. But he who reads these things, and applies to the philosophers, merely for the sake of showing, at some entertainment, that he understands hypothetical reasonings, what aim has he but to be admired by some senator, who happens to sit near him? Great possessions may be won by such aims as that, but what we hold as wealth passes there for folly. It is hard, therefore, to overcome by appearances, where vain things thus pass for great. I once saw a person weeping and embracing the Knees of Epaphroditus, and deploring his hard fortune, that he had not more than 150,000 drachmae left. What said Epaphroditus then? Did he laugh at him, as we should do? No; but cried out with astonishment: “Poor man! How could you be silent under it? How could you bear it?” The first step, therefore, towards becoming a philosopher is to be sensible in what state the ruling faculty of the mind is; for on knowing it to be weak, no person will immediately employ it in great attempts. But, for want of this, some who can scarce digest a crumb will yet buy and swallow whole treatises; and so they throw them up again, or cannot digest them; and then come colics, fluxes, and fevers. Such persons ought to consider what they can bear. Indeed, it is easy to convince an ignorant person, so far as concerns theory; but in matters relating to life, no one offers himself to conviction, and we hate those who have convinced us. Socrates used to say, that we ought not to live a life unexamined.

> Greek: 26. ἀναγιγνώσκοντος δὲ τοὺς ὑποθετικοὺς ἔφη Νόμος ὑποθετικός ἐστι καὶ οὗτος τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῇ ὑποθέσει παραδέχεσθαι. πολὺ πρότερον δὲ νόμος βιωτικός ἐστιν οὗτος τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῇ φύσει πράττειν. εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ πάσης ὕλης καὶ περιστάσεως βουλόμεθα τηρῆσαι τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, δῆλον ὅτι ἐν παντὶ στοχαστέον τοῦ μήτε τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἡμᾶς ἐκφυγεῖν μήτε παραδέξασθαι τὸ μαχόμενον. πρῶτον οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας γυμνάζουσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ φιλόσοφοι ὅπου ῥᾷον, εἶτα οὕτως ἐπὶ τὰ χαλεπώτερα ἄγουσιν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ ἀνθέλκον ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀκολουθῆσαι τοῖς διδασκομένοις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν βιωτικῶν πολλὰ τὰ περισπῶντα. γελοῖος οὖν ὁ λέγων πρῶτον βούλεσθαι ἐπʼ ἐκείνων· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον ἄρχεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν χαλεπωτέρων. καὶ τοῦτον ἀπολογισμὸν ἔδει φέρειν πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς τοὺς ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν τὰ τέκνα. οὐκοῦν ἁμαρτάνω, πάτερ, καὶ οὐκ οἶδα τὸ ἐπιβάλλον ἐμαυτῷ καὶ προσῆκον· εἰ μὲν οὐδὲ μαθητόν ἐστιν οὐδὲ διδακτόν, τί μοι ἐγκαλεῖς; εἰ δὲ διδακτόν, δίδασκε· εἰ δὲ σὺ μὴ δύνασαι, ἄφες με μαθεῖν παρὰ τῶν λεγόντων εἰδέναι. ἐπεὶ τί δοκεῖς; ὅτι θέλων περιπίπτω κακῷ καὶ ἀποτυγχάνω τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; μὴ γένοιτο. τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν με; ἡ ἄγνοια. οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἀποθῶμαι τὴν ἄγνοιαν; τίνα πώποτε ὀργὴ[ν] ἐδίδαξε τὰ κυβερνητικά, τὰ μουσικά; τὰ βιωτικὰ οὖν διὰ τὴν ὀργήν σου δοκεῖς ὅτι μαθήσομαι; ταῦτα ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ λέγειν ἔξεστι τῷ τοιαύτην ἐπιβολὴν ἐνηνοχότι. εἰ δέ τις μόνον ἐπιδείκνυσθαι θέλων ἐν συμποσίῳ ὅτι οἶδεν τοὺς ὑποθετικοὺς ἀναγιγνώσκει ταῦτα καὶ προσέρχεται τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, οὗτος ἄλλο τι πράσσει ἵνα αὐτὸν συγκλητικὸς παρακατακείμενος θαυμάσει; ἐκεῖ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι αἱ μεγάλαι ὗλαί εἰσι καὶ οἱ ἐνθάδε πλοῦτοι ἐκεῖ παίγνια δοκοῦσιν. διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεῖ δύσκολον κρατῆσαι τῶν αὑτοῦ φαντασιῶν, ὅπου τὰ ἐκ σείοντα μεγάλα. ἐγώ τινα οἶδα κλαίοντα Ἐπαφροδίτου τῶν γονάτων ἁπτόμενον καὶ λέγοντα ταλαιπωρεῖν· ἀπολελεῖφθαι γὰρ αὐτῷ μηδέν, εἰ μὴ ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα μυριάδας. τί οὖν ὁ Ἐπαφρόδιτος; κατεγέλασεν ὡς ὑμεῖς; οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἐπιθαυμάσας λέγει τάλας, πῶς οὖν ἐσιώπας, πῶς ἐκαρτέρεις; ταράξας δὲ τὸν ἀναγιγνώσκοντα τοὺς ὑποθετικοὺς καὶ γελάσαντος τοῦ ὑποθεμένου αὐτῷ τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν Σεαυτοῦ, ἔφη, καταγελᾷς· οὐ προεγύμνασας τὸν νεανίσκον οὐδʼ ἔγνως εἰ δύναται τούτοις παρακολουθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀναγνώστῃ αὐτῷ χρῇ. τί οὖν, ἔφη, μὴ δυναμένῃ διανοίᾳ συμπεπλεγμένου ἐπικρίσει παρακολουθεῖν ἔπαινον πιστεύομεν, ψόγον πιστεύομεν, ἐπίκρισιν περὶ τῶν καλῶς ἢ κακῶς γινομένων; κἄν τινα κακῶς λέγῃ, οὗτος ἐπιστρέφεται, κἂν ἐπαινῇ τινα, ἐπαίρεται; ἐν τοῖς οὕτως μικροῖς μὴ εὑρίσκων τὸ ἑξῆς; αὕτη οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν, αἴσθησις τοῦ ἰδίου ἡγεμονικοῦ πῶς ἔχει· μετὰ γὰρ τὸ γνῶναι ὅτι ἀσθενῶς οὐκ ἔτι θελήσει χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ μεγάλα. νῦν δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοί τινες τὸν ψωμὸν καταπίνειν σύνταξιν ἀγοράσαντες ἐπιβάλλονται ἐσθίειν. διὰ τοῦτο ἐμοῦσιν ἢ ἀπεπτοῦσιν· εἶτα στρόφοι καὶ κατάρροιαι καὶ πυρετοί. ἔδει δʼ ἐφιστάνειν, εἰ δύνανται. ἀλλʼ ἐν μὲν θεωρίᾳ ῥᾴδιον ἐξελέγξαι τὸν οὐκ εἰδότα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον οὔτε παρέχει ἑαυτόν τις ἐλέγχῳ τόν τʼ ἐξελέγξαντα μισοῦμεν. ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν ἀνεξέταστον βίον μὴ ζῆν.

## 6. Book I · chapters 27–30

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/6/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/6/#p-N

[¶0] 27. Appearances to the mind are of four kinds. Things either are what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Rightly to aim, in all these cases, is the wise man’s task. Whatever unduly constrains us, to that a remedy must be applied. If the sophistries of Pyrrhonism, or the Academy, constrain us, the remedy must be applied there; if specious appearances, by which things seem to be good which are not so, let us seek for a remedy there. If it be custom which constrains us, we must endeavor to find a remedy against that. “What remedy is to be found against custom?” Establish a contrary custom. You hear the vulgar say, “Such a one, poor soul! is dead.” Well, his father died; his mother died. “Ay, but he was cut off in the flower of his age, and in a foreign land.” Observe these contrary ways of speaking; and abandon such expressions. Oppose to one custom a contrary custom; to sophistry the art of reasoning, and the frequent use and exercise of it. Against specious appearances we must set clear convictions, bright and ready for use. When death appears as an evil, we ought immediately to remember that evils are things to be avoided, but death is inevitable. For what can I do, or where can I fly from it? Let me suppose myself to be Sarpedon, the son of Jove, that I may speak as nobly. “I go either to excel, or to give another the occasion to excel.” If I can achieve nothing myself, I will not grudge another his achievement. But suppose this to be a strain too high for us; do not these following thoughts befit us? Whither shall I fly from death? Show me the place, show me the people, to whom I may have recourse, whom death does not overtake. Show me the charm to avoid it. If there be none, what would you have me do? I cannot escape death; but cannot I escape the dread of it? Must I die trembling and lamenting? For the very origin of the disease lies in wishing for something that is not obtained. Under the influence of this, if I can make outward things conform to my own inclination, I do it; if not, I feel inclined to tear out the eyes of whoever hinders me. For it is the nature of man not to endure the being deprived of good; not to endure the falling into evil. And so, at last, when I can neither control events, nor tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down, and groan, and revile him whom I can,—Zeus, and the rest of the gods; for what are they to me, if they take no care of me? “Oh! but then you will be impious.” What then? Can I be in a worse condition than I am now? In general, remember this, that unless we make our religion and our treasure to consist in the same thing, religion will always be sacrificed. Have these things no weight? Let a Pyrrhonist, or an Academic, come and oppose them. For my part, I have neither leisure nor ability to stand up as an advocate for common-sense. Even if the business were concerning an estate, I should call in another advocate. To what advocate, then, shall I now appeal? I will leave it to any one who may be upon the spot. Thus, I may not be able to explain how sensation takes place, whether it be diffused universally, or reside in a particular part; for I find perplexities in either case; but that you and I are not the same person, I very exactly know. “How so?” Why, I never, when I have a mind to swallow anything, carry it to your mouth, but my own. I never, when I wanted bread, seized a broom instead, but went directly to the bread as I needed it. You who deny all evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise? Which of you, when he wished to go into a bath, ever went into a mill? “Why, then, must not we, to the utmost, defend these points; stand by common-sense; be fortified against everything that opposes it?” Who denies that? But it must be done by him who has ability and leisure to spare; but he who is full of trembling and perturbation and inward disorders of heart must first employ his time about something else.

> Greek: 27. τετραχῶς αἱ φαντασίαι γίνονται ἡμῖν· ἢ γὰρ ἔστι τινὰ καὶ οὕτως φαίνεται ἢ οὐκ ὄντα οὐδὲ φαίνεται ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ ἔστι καὶ οὐ φαίνεται ἢ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. λοιπὸν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις εὐστοχεῖν ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου. ὅ τι δʼ ἂν ᾖ τὸ θλῖβον, ἐκείνῳ δεῖ προσάγειν τὴν βοήθειαν. εἰ σοφίσματα ἡμᾶς Πυρρώνεια καὶ Ἀκαδημαικὰ τὰ θλίβοντά ἐστιν, ἐκείνοις προσάγωμεν τὴν βοήθειαν· εἰ αἱ τῶν πραγμάτων πιθανότητες, καθʼ ἃς φαίνεταί τινα ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ὄντα, ἐκεῖ τὴν βοήθειαν ζητῶμεν· εἰ ἔθος ἐστὶ τὸ θλῖβον, πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὴν βοήθειαν ἀνευρίσκειν πειρατέον. τί οὖν πρὸς ἔθος ἔστιν εὑρίσκειν βοήθημα; τὸ ἐναντίον ἔθος. ἀκούεις τῶν ἰδιωτῶν λεγόντων τάλας ἐκεῖνος, ἀπέθανεν· ἀπώλετο ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἡ μήτηρ· ἐξεκόπη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄωρος καὶ ἐπὶ ξένης. ἄκουσον τῶν ἐναντίων λόγων, ἀπόσπασον σεαυτὸν τούτων τῶν φωνῶν, ἀντίθες τῷ ἔθει τὸ ἐναντίον ἔθος. πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστικοὺς λόγους τὰ λογικὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις γυμνασίαν καὶ τριβήν, πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων πιθανότητας τὰς προλήψεις ἐναργεῖς ἐσμηγμένας καὶ προχείρους ἔχειν δεῖ. ὅταν θάνατος φαίνηται κακόν, πρόχειρον ἔχειν ὅτι τὰ κακὰ ἐκκλίνειν καθήκει καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ὁ θάνατος. τί γὰρ ποιήσω; ποῦ γὰρ αὐτὸν φύγω; ἔστω ἐμὲ εἶναι Σαρπηδόνα τὸν τοῦ Διός, ἵνʼ οὕτως γενναίως εἴπω ἀπελθὼν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀριστεῦσαι θέλω ἢ ἄλλῳ παρασχεῖν ἀφορμὴν τοῦ ἀριστεῦσαι· εἰ μὴ δύναμαι κατορθῶσαί τι αὐτός, οὐ φθονήσω ἄλλῳ τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι γενναῖον· ἔστω ταῦτα ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, ἐκεῖνο οὐ πίπτει εἰς ἡμᾶς; καὶ ποῦ φύγω τὸν θάνατον; μηνύσατέ μοι τὴν χώραν, μηνύσατε ἀνθρώπους, εἰς οὓς ἀπέλθω, εἰς οὓς οὐ παραβάλλει, μηνύσατε ἐπαοιδήν· εἰ μὴ ἔχω, τί με θέλετε ποιεῖν; οὐ δύναμαι τὸν θάνατον ἀποφυγεῖν· τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὸν μὴ ἀποφύγω, ἀλλʼ ἀποθάνω πενθῶν καὶ τρέμων; αὕτη γὰρ γένεσις πάθους θέλειν τι καὶ μὴ γίνεσθαι. ἔνθεν ἂν μὲν δύνωμαι τὰ ἐκτὸς μετατιθέναι πρὸς τὴν βούλησιν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ, μετατίθημι· εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν ἐμποδίζοντα ἐκτυφλῶσαι θέλω. πέφυκε γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος μὴ ὑπομένειν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, μὴ ὑπομένειν περιπίπτειν τῷ κακῷ. εἶτα τὸ τελευταῖον, ὅταν μήτε τὰ πράγματα μεταθεῖναι δυνηθῶ μήτε τὸν ἐμποδίζοντα ἐκτυφλῶσαι, κάθημαι καὶ στένω καὶ ὃν δύναμαι λοιδορῶ, τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς ἄλλους· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιστρέφονταί μου, τί ἐμοὶ καὶ αὐτοῖς; ναί· ἀλλʼ ἀσεβὴς ἔσῃ. τί οὖν μοι χεῖρον ἔσται, ὧν ἔστι μοι νῦν; τὸ σύνολον ἐκείνου μεμνῆσθαι, ὅτι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ᾖ τὸ εὐσεβὲς καὶ συμφέρον, οὐ δύναται σωθῆναι τὸ εὐσεβὲς ἔν τινι. ταῦτα οὐ δοκεῖ ἐπείγοντα; ἐρχέσθω καὶ ἀπαντάτω Πυρρώνειος καὶ Ἀκαδημαικός. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος οὐκ ἄγω σχολὴν πρὸς ταῦτα οὐδὲ δύναμαι συνηγορῆσαι τῇ συνηθείᾳ. εἰ καὶ περὶ ἀγριδίου πραγμάτιον εἶχον, ἄλλον ἂν παρεκάλεσα τὸν συνηγορήσοντα· τίνι οὖν ἀρκοῦμαι κατὰ τὸν τόπον; πῶς μὲν αἴσθησις γίνεται, π[ρ]ότερον διʼ ὅλων ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους, ἴσως οὐκ οἶδα ἀπολογίσασθαι, ταράσσει δέ με ἀμφότερα. ὅτι δʼ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ οὐκ ἐσμὲν οἱ αὐτοί, λίαν ἀκριβῶς οἶδα. πόθεν τοῦτο; οὐδέποτε καταπίνειν τι θέλων ἐκεῖ φέρω τὸν ψωμόν, ἀλλʼ ὧδε· οὐδέποτʼ ἄρτον θέλων λαβεῖν τὸ σάρον ἔλαβον, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄρτον ἔρχομαι ὡς πρὸς σκοπόν. ὑμεῖς δʼ αὐτοὶ οἱ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀναιροῦντες ἄλλο τι ποιεῖτε; τίς ὑμῶν εἰς βαλανεῖον ἀπελθεῖν θέλων εἰς μυλῶνα ἀπῆλθεν; — τί οὖν; οὐ δεῖ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τούτων ἀντέχεσθαι, τοῦ τηρῆσαι τὴν συνήθειαν, τοῦ πεφράχθαι πρὸς τὰ κατʼ αὐτῆς; — καὶ τίς ἀντιλέγει; ἀλλὰ τὸν δυνάμενον, τὸν σχολάζοντα· τὸν δὲ τρέμοντα καὶ ταρασσόμενον καὶ ῥηγνύμενον ἔσωθεν τὴν καρδίαν ἄλλῳ τινὶ δεῖ προσευκαιρεῖν.

[¶1] 28. What is the basis of assent to anything? Its appearing to be true. It is not possible, therefore, to assent to what appears to be not true. Why? Because it is the very nature of the understanding to agree to truth, to be dissatisfied with falsehood, and to suspend its belief in doubtful cases. “What is the proof of this?” Persuade yourself, if you can, that it is now night. Impossible. Dissuade yourself from the belief that it 1 This seems to be said by one of the hearers, who wanted to have the absurdities of the sceptics confuted and guarded against by regular argument. Epictetus allows this to be right, for such as have abilities and leisure; but recommends in others the more necessary task of curing their own moral disorders, and insinuates that the mere common occurences of life are sufficient to overthrow the notions of the Pyrrhonists.—C. is day. Impossible. Persuade yourself that the number of the stars is even or odd. Impossible. When any one, then, assents to what is false, be assured that he does not wilfully assent to it as false,—for, as Plato affirms, the soul is unwillingly deprived of truth, —but what is false appears to him to be true. Well, then; have we, in actions, anything correspondent to this distinction between true and false? There are right and wrong; advantageous and disadvantageous; desirable and undesirable, and the like. “A person, then, cannot think a thing truly advantageous to him, and not choose it?” He cannot. But how says Medea?—
I know what evils wait upon my purpose;
But wrath is stronger than this will of mine. Was it that she thought the very indulgence of her rage, and the punishing her husband, more advantageous than the preservation of her children? Yes; but she is deceived. Show clearly to her that she is deceived, and she will forbear; but, till you have shown it, what has she to follow but what appears to herself? Nothing. Why, then, are you angry with her, that the unhappy woman is deceived in the most important points, and instead of a human creature, becomes a viper? Why do you not rather, as we pity the blind and lame, so likewise pity those who are blinded.and lamed in their superior faculties? Whoever, therefore, duly remembers, that the appearance of things to the mind is the standard of every action to man,—that this is either right or wrong, and if right, he is without fault; if wrong, he himself suffers punishment; for that one man cannot be the person deceived, and another the only sufferer,—such a person will not be outrageous and angry at any one; will not revile, or reproach, or hate, or quarrel with any one. “So, then, have all the great and dreadful deeds that have been done in the world no other origin than semblances?” Absolutely no other. The Iliad consists of nothing but such semblances and their results. It seemed to Paris that he should carry off the wife of Menelaus. It seemed to Helen that she should follow him. If, then, it had seemed to Menelaus that it was an advantage to be robbed of such a wife, what could have happened? Not only the Iliad had been lost, but the Odyssey too. “Do such great events, then, depend on so small a cause?” What events, then, call you great? “Wars and seditions, the destruction of numbers of men, and the overthrow of cities.” And what in all this is great? Nothing. What is great in the death of numbers of oxen, numbers of sheep, or in the burning or pulling down numbers of nests of storks or swallows? “Are these things then similar?” They are. The bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of sheep and oxen. The houses of men are burnt, and the nests of storks. What is there so great or fearful in all this? Pray, show me what difference there is between the house of a man and the nest of a stork, considered as a habitation, except that houses are built with beams and tiles and bricks, and nests with sticks and clay? “What, then; are a stork and a man similar? What do you mean?” Similar in body. “Is there no difference, then, between a man and a stork?” Yes, surely; but not in these things. “In what, then?” Inquire; and you will find, that the difference lies in something else. See whether it be not in rationality of action, in social instincts, fidelity, honor, providence, judgment. “Where, then, is the real good or evil of man?” Just where this difference lies. If this distinguishing trait is preserved, and remains well fortified, and neither honor, fidelity, nor judgment is destroyed, then he himself is likewise saved; but when any one of these is lost or demolished, he himself is lost also. In this do all great events consist. Paris, they say, was undone, because the Greeks invaded Troy, and laid it waste, and his family were slain in battle. By no means; for no one is undone by an action not his own. All that was only like laying waste the nests of storks. But his true undoing was when he lost modesty, faith, honor, virtue. When was Achilles undone,—when Patroclus died? By no means. But when he gave himself up to rage; when he wept over a girl; when he forgot that he came there, not to win mistresses, but to fight. This is human undoing; this is the siege, this the overthrow, when right principles are ruined and destroyed. “But when wives and children are led away captives, and the men themselves killed, are not these evils?” Whence do you conclude them such? Pray inform me, in my turn. “Nay; but whence do you affirm that they are not evils?” Recur to the rules. Apply your principles. One cannot sufficiently wonder at what happens among men. When we would judge of light and heavy, we do not judge by guess, nor when we judge of straight and crooked; and, in general, when it concerns us to know the truth on any special point, no one of us will do anything by guess. But where the first and principal source of right or wrong action is concerned, of being prosperous or unprosperous, happy or unhappy,—there only do we act rashly, and by guess. Nowhere anything like a balance; nowhere anything like a rule; but something seems thus or so to me, and I at once act accordingly. For am I better than Agamemnon or Achilles; that they, by following what seemed best to them, should do and suffer so many things, and yet that seeming should not suffice me? And what tragedy hath any other origin? The Atreus of Euripides, what is it? Seeming. The Oedipus of Sophocles? Seeming. The Phoenix? The Hippolytus? All seeming. Who then, think you, can escape this influence? What are they called who follow every seeming? Madmen. Yet do we, then, behave otherwise?

> Greek: 28. τί ἐστιν αἴτιον τοῦ συγκατατίθεσθαί τινι; τὸ φαίνεσθαι ὅτι ὑπάρχει. τῷ οὖν φαινομένῳ ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει συγκατατίθεσθαι οὐχ οἷόν τε. διὰ τί; ὅτι ἡ φύσις αὕτη ἐστὶ τῆς διανοίας τοῖς μὲν ἀληθέσιν ἐπινεύειν, τοῖς δὲ ψευδέσι δυσαρεστεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἄδηλα ἐπέχειν. τίς τούτου πίστις; πάθε, εἰ δύνασαι, νῦν ὅτι νύξ ἐστιν. οὐχ οἷόν τε. ἀπόπαθε ὅτι ἡμέρα ἐστίν. οὐχ οἷόν τε. πάθε ἢ ἀπόπαθε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας. οὐχ οἷόν τε. ὅταν οὖν τις συγκατατίθηται τῷ ψεύδει, ἴσθι ὅτι οὐκ ἤθελεν ψεύδει συγκαταθέσθαι· πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ ἄκουσα στέρεται τῆς ἀληθείας, ὡς λέγει Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀληθές. ἄγε ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων τί ἔχομεν τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐνθάδε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ ψεῦδος; τὸ καθῆκον καὶ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀσύμφορον, τὸ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ οὐ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὅμοια. οὐ δύναται οὖν τις δοκεῖν μέν, ὅτι συμφέρει αὐτῷ, μὴ αἱρεῖσθαι δʼ αὐτό; οὐ δύναται. πῶς ἡ λέγουσα καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων; ὅτι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τῷ θυμῷ χαρίσασθαι καὶ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἄνδρα, συμφορώτερον ἡγεῖται τοῦ σῶσαι τὰ τέκνα. ναί· ἀλλʼ ἐξηπάτηται. δεῖξον αὐτῇ ἐναργῶς ὅτι ἐξηπάτηται καὶ οὐ ποιήσει· μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ μὴ δεικνύῃς, τίνι ἔχει ἀκολουθῆσαι ἢ τῷ φαινομένῳ; οὐδενί. τί οὖν χαλεπαίνεις αὐτῇ, ὅτι πεπλάνηται ἡ ταλαίπωρος περὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ ἔχις ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου γέγονεν; οὐχὶ δʼ, εἴπερ ἄρα, μᾶλλον ἐλεεῖς, ὡς τοὺς τυφλοὺς ἐλεοῦμεν, ὡς τοὺς χωλούς, οὕτως τοὺς τὰ κυριώτατα τετυφλωμένους καὶ ἀποκεχωλωμένους; ὅστις οὖν τούτου μέμνηται καθαρῶς ὅτι ἀνθρώπῳ μέτρον πάσης πράξεως τὸ φαινόμενον (λοιπὸν ἢ καλῶς φαίνεται ἢ κακῶς· εἰ καλῶς, ἀνέγκλητός ἐστιν· εἰ κακῶς, αὐτὸς ἐζημίωται· οὐ δύναται γὰρ ἄλλος μὲν εἶναι ὁ πεπλανημένος, ἄλλος δʼ ὁ βλαπτόμενος), οὐδενὶ ὀργισθήσεται, οὐδενὶ χαλεπανεῖ, οὐδένα λοιδορήσει, οὐδένα μέμψεται, οὐ μισήσει, οὐ προσκόψει οὐδενί. ὥστε καὶ τὰ οὕτω μεγάλα καὶ δεινὰ ἔργα ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν, τὸ φαινόμενον; ταύτην οὐδʼ ἄλλην. ἡ Ἰλιὰς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἢ φαντασία καὶ χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. ἐφάνη τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἀπάγειν τοῦ Μενελάου τὴν γυναῖκα, ἐφάνη τῇ Ἑλένῃ ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῷ. εἰ οὖν ἐφάνη τῷ Μενελάῳ παθεῖν ὅτι κέρδος ἐστὶ τοιαύτης γυναικὸς στερηθῆναι, τί ἂν ἐγένετο; ἀπολώλει ἡ Ἰλιὰς οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια. — ἐκ τοιούτου οὖν μικροῦ πράγματος ἤρτηται τὰ τηλικαῦτα; — τίνα δὲ καὶ λέγεις τὰ τηλικαῦτα; πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ ἀπωλείας πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατασκαφὰς πόλεων; καὶ τί μέγα ἔχει ταῦτα; — οὐδέν; — τί δʼ ἔχει μέγα πολλοὺς βοῦς ἀποθανεῖν καὶ πολλὰ πρόβατα καὶ πολλὰς καλιὰς χελιδόνων ἢ πελαργῶν ἐμπρησθῆναι καὶ κατασκαφῆναι; — ὅμοια οὖν ἐστι ταῦτα ἐκείνοις; — ὁμοιότατα. σώματα ἀπώλετο ἀνθρώπων· καὶ βοῶν καὶ προβάτων. οἰκημάτια ἐνεπρήσθη ἀνθρώπων· καὶ πελαργῶν νεοσσιαί. τί μέγα ἢ δεινόν; ἢ δεῖξόν μοι τί διαφέρει οἰκία ἀνθρώπου καὶ νεοσσιὰ πελαργοῦ ὡς οἴκησις. — ὅμοιον οὖν ἐστι πελαργὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος; — τί λέγεις; κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ὁμοιότατον. [πλὴν ὅτι μὲν ἐκ δοκῶν καὶ κεραμίδων καὶ πλίνθων οἰκοδομεῖται τὰ οἰκίδια, ἡ δʼ ἐκ ῥάβδων καὶ πηλοῦ.] οὐδενὶ οὖν διαφέρει ἄνθρωπος πελαργοῦ;— μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ τούτοις οὐ διαφέρει. — τίνι οὖν διαφέρει; — ζήτει καὶ εὑρήσεις, ὅτι ἄλλῳ διαφέρει. ὅρα μὴ τῷ παρακολουθεῖν οἷς ποιεῖ, ὅρα μὴ τῷ κοινωνικῷ, μὴ τῷ πιστῷ, τῷ αἰδήμονι, τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, τῷ συνετῷ. ποῦ οὖν τὸ μέγα ἐν ἀνθρώποις κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν; ὅπου ἡ διαφορά. ἂν σῴζηται τοῦτο καὶ περιτετειχισμένον μένῃ καὶ μὴ διαφθείρηται τὸ αἰδῆμον μηδὲ τὸ πιστὸν μηδὲ τὸ συνετόν, τότε σῴζεται καὶ αὐτός· ἂν δʼ ἀπολλύηταί τι τούτων καὶ ἐκπολιορκῆται, τότε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόλλυται. καὶ τὰ μεγάλα πράγματα ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν. ἔπταισεν μεγάλα ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, ὅτʼ ἐπῆλθον φασιν οἱ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὅτε ἐπόρθουν τὴν Τροίαν καὶ ὅτε οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ ἀπώλλυντο; οὐδαμῶς· διʼ ἀλλότριον γὰρ ἔργον πταίει οὐδείς· ἀλλὰ τότε πελαργῶν νεοσσιαὶ ἐπορθοῦντο. πταῖσμα δʼ ἦν, ὅτε ἀπώλεσε τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν πιστόν, τὸν φιλόξενον, τὸν κόσμιον. πότʼ ἔπταισεν ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς; ὅτε ἀπέθανεν ὁ Πάτροκλος; μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλʼ ὅτε ὠργίζετο, ὅτε κορασίδιον ἔκλαεν, ὅτʼ ἐπελάθετο ὅτι πάρεστιν οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐρωμένας κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τὸ πολεμεῖν. ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀνθρωπικὰ πταίσματα, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ πολιορκία, τοῦτό ἐστι κατασκαφή, ὅταν τὰ δόγματα τὰ ὀρθὰ καθαιρῆται, ὅταν ἐκεῖνα διαφθείρηται. — ὅταν οὖν γυναῖκες ἄγωνται καὶ παιδία αἰχμαλωτίζηται καὶ ὅταν αὐτοὶ κατασφάζωνται, ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι κακά; — πόθεν τοῦτο προσδοξάζεις; κἀμὲ δίδαξον. — οὔ· ἀλλὰ πόθεν σὺ λέγεις ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κακά; — ἔλθωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς κανόνας, φέρε τὰς προλήψεις. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἱκανῶς θαυμάσαι τὸ γινόμενον. ὅπου βάρη κρῖναι θέλομεν, οὐκ εἰκῇ κρίνομεν· ὅπου τὰ εὐθέα καὶ στρεβλά, οὐκ εἰκῇ· ἁπλῶς ὅπου διαφέρει ἡμῖν γνῶναι τὸ κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἀληθές, οὐδέποθʼ ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν εἰκῇ ποιήσει. ὅπου δὲ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ μόνον αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ κατορθοῦν ἢ ἁμαρτάνειν, τοῦ εὐροεῖν ἢ δυσροεῖν, τοῦ ἀτυχεῖν ἢ εὐτυχεῖν, ἐνθάδε μόνον εἰκαῖοι καὶ προπετεῖς. οὐδαμοῦ ὅμοιόν τι ζυγῷ, οὐδαμοῦ ὅμοιόν τι κανόνι, ἀλλά τι ἐφάνη καὶ εὐθὺς ποιῶ τὸ φανέν. κρείσσων γάρ εἰμι τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἢ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, ἵνʼ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθῆσαι τοῖς φαινομένοις τοιαῦτα κακὰ ποιήσωσι καὶ πάθωσιν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ ἀρκῇ τὸ φαινόμενον; καὶ ποία τραγῳδία ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἔχει; Ἀτρεὺς Εὐριπίδου τί ἐστιν; τὸ φαινόμενον. Οἰδίπους Σοφοκλέους τί ἐστιν; τὸ φαινόμενον. Φοῖνιξ; τὸ φαινόμενον. Ἱππόλυτος; τὸ φαινόμενον. τούτου οὖν μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι τίνος ὑμῖν δοκεῖ; τίνες δὲ λέγονται οἱ παντὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀκολουθοῦντες; — μαινόμενοι. — ἡμεῖς οὖν ἄλλο τι ποιοῦμεν;

[¶2] 29. The essence of good and evil is a certain disposition of the will.

> Greek: 29. οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ προαίρεσις ποιά, τοῦ κακοῦ προαίρεσις ποιά.

[¶3] What are things outward, then? Materials on which the will may act, in attaining its own good or evil. How, then, will it attain good?

> Greek: τί οὖν τὰ ἐκτός; ὗλαι τῇ προαιρέσει, περὶ ἃς ἀναστρεφομένη τεύξεται τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ. πῶς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τεύξεται;

[¶4] If it be not dazzled by its own materials; for right principles concerning these materials keep the will in a good state; but perverse and distorted principles, in a bad one.

> Greek: ἂν τὰς ὕλας μὴ θαυμάσῃ. τὰ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὑλῶν δόγματα ὀρθὰ μὲν ὄντα ἀγαθὴν ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν, στρεβλὰ δὲ καὶ διεστραμμένα κακήν.

[¶5] This law hath God ordained, who says, “If you wish for good, receive it from yourself.” You say, No; but from another. “Nay; but from yourself.”

> Greek: τοῦτον τὸν νόμον ὁ θεὸς τέθεικεν καὶ φησίν εἰ τι ἀγαθὸν θέλεις, παρὰ σεαυτοῦ λάβε. σὺ λέγεις οὔ· ἀλλὰ παρʼ ἄλλου. μή, ἀλλὰ παρὰ σεαυτοῦ.

[¶6] Accordingly, when a tyrant threatens, and sends for me, I say, Against what is your threatening pointed? If he says, “will chain you,” I answer, It is my hands and feet that you threaten.

> Greek: λοιπὸν ὅταν ἀπειλῇ ὁ τύραννος καὶ μὴ καλῇ, λέγω τίνι ἀπειλεῖ; ἂν λέγῃ δήσω σε, φημὶ ὅτι ταῖς χερσὶν ἀπειλεῖ καὶ τοῖς ποσίν.

[¶7] If he says, “will cut off your head,” I answer, It is my head that you threaten. If he says, “will throw you into prison,” I answer, It is the whole of this paltry body that you threaten;

> Greek: ἂν λέγῃ τραχηλοκοπήσω σε, λέγω τῷ τραχήλῳ ἀπειλεῖ. ἂν λέγῃ εἰς φυλακήν σε βαλῶ, ὅλῳ τῷ σαρκιδίῳ· κἂν ἐξορισμὸν ἀπειλῇ, τὸ αὐτό.

[¶8] and if he threatens banishment, just the same. “Does he not threaten you, then?”

> Greek: — σοὶ οὖν οὐδὲν ἀπειλεῖ; — εἰ πέπονθα ὅτι ταῦτα οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἐμέ, οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ φοβοῦμαί τι τούτων, ἐμοὶ ἀπειλεῖ.

[¶9] If I am persuaded that these things are nothing to me, he does not; but if I fear any of them, it is me that he threatens. Who is it, after all, that I fear?

> Greek: τίνα λοιπὸν δέδοικα; τὸν τίνων ὄντα κύριον; τῶν ἐπʼ ἐμοί; οὐδὲ εἷς ἐστιν. τῶν οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐμοί; καὶ τί μοι αὐτῶν μέλει;

[¶10] The master of what? Of things in my own power? Of these no one is the master. Of things not in my power? And what are these to me? “What, then! do you philosophers teach us a contempt of kings?”

> Greek: ὑμεῖς οὖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι διδάσκετε καταφρονεῖν τῶν βασιλέων; — μὴ γένοιτο. τίς ἡμῶν διδάσκει ἀντιποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν;

[¶11] By no means. Which of us teaches any one to contend with them about things of which they have the command? Take my body; take my possessions;

> Greek: τὸ σωμάτιον λάβε, τὴν κτῆσιν λάβε, τὴν φήμην λάβε, τοὺς περὶ ἐμὲ λάβε. ἄν τινας τούτων ἀναπείθω ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, τῷ ὄντι ἐγκαλείτω μοι.

[¶12] take my reputation; take away even my friends. If I persuade any one to claim these things as his own, you may justly accuse me.

> Greek: ναί· ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δογμάτων ἄρχειν θέλω. καὶ τίς σοι ταύτην τὴν ἐξουσίαν δέδωκεν;

[¶13] “Ay; but I would command your principles too.” And who hath given you that power? How can you conquer the principle of another? “By applying terror, I will conquer it.” Do not you see that what conquers itself.is not conquered by another?

> Greek: ποῦ δύνασαι νικῆσαι δόγμα ἀλλότριον; προσάγων, φησίν, αὐτῷ φόβον νικήσω. ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸ αὑτὸ ἐνίκησεν, οὐχ ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἐνικήθη· προαίρεσιν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο νικῆσαι δύναται, πλὴν αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν.

[¶14] And nothing but itself can conquer the will.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ νόμος κράτιστός ἐστι καὶ δικαιότατος· τὸ κρεῖσσον ἀεὶ περιγινέσθω τοῦ χείρονος.

[¶15] Hence, too, the most excellent and equitable law of God, that the better should always prevail over the worse. Ten are better than one. “For what purpose?” For chaining, killing, dragging where they please; for taking away an estate. Thus ten conquer one, in the cases wherein they are better.

> Greek: κρείττονές εἰσιν οἱ δέκα τοῦ ἑνός. πρὸς τί; πρὸς τὸ δῆσαι, πρὸς τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι, πρὸς τὸ ἀπαγαγεῖν ὅπου θέλουσιν, πρὸς τὸ ἀφελέσθαι τὰ ὄντα. νικῶσιν τοίνυν οἱ δέκα τὸν ἕνα ἐν τούτῳ, ἐν ᾧ κρείσσονές εἰσιν.

[¶16] “In what, then, are they worse?” When the one has right principles, and the others have not. For can they conquer in this case? How should they? If we were weighed in a scale, must not the heavier outweigh?

> Greek: ἐν τίνι οὖν χείρονές εἰσιν; ἂν ὁ μὲν ἔχῃ δόγματα ὀρθά, οἱ δὲ μή. τί οὖν; ἐν τούτῳ δύνανται νικῆσαι; πόθεν; εἰ δʼ ἱστάμεθα ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ, οὐκ ἔδει τὸν βαρύτερον καθελκύσαι;

[¶17] “How then came Socrates to suffer such things from the Athenians?” O foolish man! what mean you by Socrates? Express the fact as it is. Are you surprised that the mere body of Socrates should be carried away, and dragged to prison, by such as were stronger; that it should be poisoned by hemlock and die?

> Greek: Σωκράτης οὖν ἵνα πάθῃ ταῦτα ὑπʼ Ἀθηναίων;— ἀνδράποδον, τί λέγεις τὸ Σωκράτης; ὡς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγε· ἵνʼ οὖν τὸ Σωκράτους σωμάτιον ἀπαχθῇ καὶ συρῇ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων εἰς δεσμωτήριον καὶ κώνειόν τις δῷ τῷ σωματίῳ τῷ Σωκράτους κἀκεῖνο ἀποψυγῇ;

[¶18] Do these things appear wonderful to you; these things unjust? Is it for such things as these that you accuse God? Had Socrates, then, no compensation for them?

> Greek: ταῦτά σοι φαίνεται θαυμαστά, ταῦτα ἄδικα, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγκαλεῖς τῷ θεῷ; οὐδὲν οὖν εἶχε Σωκράτης ἀντὶ τούτων; ποῦ ἦν ἡ οὐσία αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ;

[¶19] In what, then, to him, did the essence of good consist? Whom shall we regard, you or him? And what says he? “Anytus and Melitus may indeed kill; but hurt me they cannot.” And again, “If it so pleases God, so let it be.”

> Greek: τίνι προσσχῶμεν; σοὶ ἢ αὐτῷ; καὶ τί λέγει ἐκεῖνος; ἐμὲ δʼ Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύνανται, βλάψαι δʼ οὔ. καὶ πάλιν εἰ ταύτῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ γινέσθω.

[¶20] But show me that he who has the worse principles can get the advantage over him who has the better. You never will show it, nor anything like it; for the Law of Nature and of God is this,—let the better always prevail over the worse. “In what?”

> Greek: ἀλλὰ δεῖξον ὅτι χείρονα ἔχων δόγματα κρατεῖ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐν δόγμασιν. οὐ δείξεις· οὐδʼ ἐγγύς. νόμος γὰρ τῆς φύσεως. καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ οὗτος τὸ κρεῖσσον ἀεὶ περιγινέσθω τοῦ χείρονος. ἐν τίνι; ἐν ᾧ κρεῖσσόν ἐστιν.

[¶21] In that wherein it is better. One body may be stronger than another; many, than one;

> Greek: σῶμα σώματος ἰσχυρότερον, οἱ πλείονες τοῦ ἑνός, ὁ κλέπτης τοῦ μὴ κλέπτου.

[¶22] and a thief, than one who is not a thief. Thus I, for instance, lost my lamp, because the thief was better at keeping awake than I. But for that lamp he paid the price of becoming a thief; for that lamp he lost his virtue and became like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain;

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο κἀγὼ τὸν λύχνον ἀπώλεσα, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγρυπνεῖν μου κρείσσων ἦν ὁ κλέπτης. ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνος τοσούτου ὠνήσατο λύχνον· ἀντὶ λύχνου κλέπτης ἐγένετο, ἀντὶ λύχνου ἄπιστος, ἀντὶ λύχνου θηριώδης. τοῦτο ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ λυσιτελεῖν.

[¶23] and so let it be! But some one takes me by the collar, and drags me to the forum; and then all the rest cry out, “Philosopher, what good do your principles do you? See, you are being dragged to prison; see, you are going to lose your head!”

> Greek: ἔστω· ἀλλʼ εἴληπταί μού τις τοῦ ἱματίου καὶ ἕλκει μʼ εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν, εἶτα ἐπικραυγάζουσιν ἄλλοι φιλόσοφε, τί σε ὠφέληκε τὰ δόγματα; ἰδοὺ σύρῃ εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον, ἰδοὺ μέλλεις τραχηλοκοπεῖσθαι.

[¶24] And, pray, what rule of philosophy could I contrive, that when a stronger than myself lays hold on my collar, I should not be dragged; or that, when ten men pull me at once, and throw me into prison, I should not be thrown there?

> Greek: καὶ ποίαν ἔπραξα ἂν εἰσαγωγήν, ἵνʼ, ἂν ἰσχυρότερος ἐπιλάβηταί μου τοῦ ἱματίου, μὴ σύρωμαι; ἵνα, ἄν με δέκα περισπάσαντες εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐμβάλωσιν, μὴ ἐμβληθῶ;

[¶25] But have I learned nothing, then? I have learned to know, whatever happens, that if it concerns not my will, it is nothing to me.

> Greek: ἄλλο οὖν οὐδὲν ἔμαθον; ἔμαθον, ἵνα· πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἴδω ὅτι, ἂν ἀπροαίρετον ᾖ, οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἐμέ.

[¶26] Have my principles, then, done me no good? What then;

> Greek: πρὸς τοῦτο οὖν οὐκ ὠφέλησαι; τί οὖν ἐν ἄλλῳ ζητεῖς τὴν ὠφέλειαν ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἔμαθες;

[¶27] do I seek for anything else to do me good, but what I have learned? Afterwards, as I sit in prison, I say, He who has made all this disturbance neither recognizes any guidance, nor heeds any teaching, nor is it any concern to him to know what philosophers say or do.

> Greek: καθήμενος λοιπὸν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ λέγω οὗτος ὁ ταῦτα κραυγάζων οὔτε τοῦ σημαινομένου ἀκούει οὔτε τῷ λεγομένῳ παρακολουθεῖ οὔτε ὅλως μεμέληκεν αὐτῷ εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τί λέγουσιν ἢ τί ποιοῦσιν. ἄφες αὐτόν.

[¶28] Let him alone. “Come forth again from prison.” If you have no further need for me in prison, I will come out; if you want me again, I will return.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἔξελθε πάλιν ἀπὸ τῆς φυλακῆς. εἰ μηκέτι χρείαν ἔχητέ μου ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ, ἐξέρχομαι· ἂν πάλιν σχῆτε, εἰσελεύσομαι.

[¶29] “For how long?” Just so long as reason requires I should continue in this body; when that is over, take it, and fare ye well.

> Greek: μέχρι τίνος; μέχρις ἂν οὗ λόγος αἱρῇ συνεῖναί με τῷ σωματίῳ· ὅταν δὲ μὴ αἱρῇ, λάβετε αὐτὸ καὶ ὑγιαίνετε.

[¶30] Only let us not act inconsiderately, nor from cowardice, nor on slight grounds, since that would be contrary to the will of God; for he hath need of such a world, and such beings to live on earth. But, if he sounds a retreat, as he did to Socrates, we are to obey him when he sounds it, as our General.

> Greek: μόνον μὴ ἀλογίστως, μόνον μὴ μαλακῶς, μὴ ἐκ τῆς τυχούσης προφάσεως. πάλιν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐ βούλεται· χρείαν γὰρ ἔχει κόσμου τοιούτου, τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἀναστρεφομένων τοιούτων. ἐὰν δὲ σημήνῃ τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν ὡς τῷ Σωκράτει, πείθεσθαι δεῖ τῷ σημαίνοντι ὡς στρατηγῷ.

[¶31] “Well; but can these things be explained to the multitude?”

> Greek: τί οὖν; λέγειν δεῖ ταῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς; — ἵνα τί;

[¶32] To what purpose? Is it not sufficient to be convinced one’s self? When children come to us clapping their hands, and saying, “To-morrow is the good feast of Saturn;” do we tell them that good doth not consist in such things?

> Greek: οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ τὸ αὐτὸν πείθεσθαι; τοῖς γὰρ παιδίοις, ὅταν προσελθόντα κροτῇ καὶ λέγῃ σήμερον Σατορνάλια ἀγαθά, λέγομεν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα; οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπικροτοῦμεν.

[¶33] By no means; but we clap our hands also. Thus, when you are unable to convince any one, consider hint as a child, and clap your hands with him;

> Greek: καὶ σὺ τοίνυν, ὅταν μεταπεῖσαί τινα μὴ δύνῃ, γίγνωσκε ὅτι παιδίον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπικρότει αὐτῷ· ἂν δὲ μὴ τοῦτο θέλῃς, σιώπα λοιπόν.

[¶34] or, ii you will not do that, at least hold your tongue. These things we ought to remember; and when we are called to any trial, to know that an opportunity is come of showing whether we have been well taught.

> Greek: τούτων δεῖ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ κληθέντα εἴς τινα τοιαύτην περίστασιν εἰδέναι, ὅτι ἐλήλυθεν ὁ καιρὸς τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι, εἰ πεπαιδεύμεθα.

[¶35] For he who goes from a philosophical lecture to a difficult point of practice is like a young man who has been studying to solve syllogisms. If you propose an easy one, he says, “Give me rather a fine intricate one, that I may try my strength.”

> Greek: νέος γὰρ ἀπὸ σχολῆς ἀπιὼν εἰς περίστασιν ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ μεμελετηκότι συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν, κἄν τις εὔλυτον αὐτῷ προτείνῃ, λέγει μᾶλλόν μοι πεπλεγμένον κομψῶς προτείνατε, ἵνα γυμνασθῶ. καὶ οἱ ἀθληταὶ τοῖς κούφοις νεανίσκοις δυσαρεστοῦσιν·

[¶36] Thus athletic champions are displeased with a slight antagonist. “He cannot lift me,” says one. Is this a youth of spirit? No; for when the occasion calls upon him, he may begin crying, and say, “wanted to learn a little longer first.”

> Greek: οὐ βαστάζει με, φησίν. οὗτός ἐστιν εὐφυὴς νέος. οὔ· ἀλλὰ καλέσαντος τοῦ καιροῦ κλάειν δεῖ καὶ λέγειν ἤθελον ἔτι μανθάνειν. τίνα; εἰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔμαθες [οὐχ] ὥστʼ ἔργῳ δεῖξαι, πρὸς τί αὐτὰ ἔμαθες;

[¶37] Learn what? If you did not learn these things to show them in practice, why did you learn them? I trust there must be some one among you, sitting here, who feels secret pangs of impatience, and says, “When will such a trial come to my share, as hath now fallen to his? Must I sit wasting my life in a corner, when I might be crowned at Olympia?

> Greek: ἐγώ τινα οἶμαι τῶν καθημένων ἐνταῦθα ὠδίνειν αὐτὸν ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ λέγειν ἐμοὶ νῦν περίστασιν μὴ ἔρχεσθαι τοιαύτην, ὁποία τούτῳ ἐλήλυθεν; ἐμὲ νῦν κατατριβῆναι καθήμενον ἐν γωνίᾳ δυνάμενον στεφανωθῆναι Ὀλύμπια; πότε τις ἐμοὶ καταγγελεῖ τοιοῦτον ἀγῶνα; οὕτως ἔχειν ἔδει πάντας ὑμᾶς.

[¶38] When will any one bring the news of such a combat for me?” Such should be the disposition of you all. Even among the gladiators of Caesar, there are some who bear it very ill that they are not brought upon the stage and matched; and who offer vows to God, and address the officers, begging to fight.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἐν μὲν τοῖς Καίσαρος μονομάχοις εἰσί τινες οἱ ἀγανακτοῦντες ὅτι οὐδεὶς αὐτοὺς προάγει οὐδὲ ζευγνύει καὶ εὔχονται τῷ θεῷ καὶ προσέρχονται τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις δεόμενοι μονομαχῆσαι, ἐξ ὑμῶν δʼ οὐδεὶς φανήσεται τοιοῦτος;

[¶39] And will none among you appear such? I would willingly take a voyage on purpose to see how a champion of mine acts;

> Greek: ἤθελον πλεῦσαι ἐπʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδεῖν, τί μου ποιεῖ ὁ ἀθλητής, πῶς μελετᾷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

[¶40] how he meets his occasion. This is not the contest I would choose, say you. Is it in your power, then, to make the selection? Such a body is given you, such parents, such brothers, such a country, and such a rank in it; and then you come to me, to change the conditions!

> Greek: οὐ θέλω, φησίν, τοιαύτην. ἐπὶ σοὶ γάρ ἐστι λαβεῖν ἣν θέλεις ὑπόθεσιν; δέδοταί σοι σῶμα τοιοῦτον, γονεῖς τοιοῦτοι, ἀδελφοὶ τοιοῦτοι, πατρὶς τοιαύτη, τάξις ἐν αὐτῇ τοιαύτη· εἶτά μοι λέγεις ἐλθὼν ἄλλαξόν μοι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. εἶτα οὐκ ἔχεις ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὸ χρήσασθαι τοῖς δοθεῖσιν;

[¶41] Have you not abilities to manage that which is given you You should say to me, “It is your business to propose; mine, to treat the subject well.” No; but you say, “Do not meet me with such a perplexity, but such a one;

> Greek: σόν ἐστι προτεῖναι, ἐμὸν μελετῆσαι καλῶς. οὔ· ἀλλὰ μὴ τοιοῦτό μοι προβάλῃς τροπικόν, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον· μὴ τοιαύτην ἐπενέγκῃς τὴν ἐπιφοράν, ἀλλὰ τοιαύτην.

[¶42] do not offer such an obstacle to me, but such a one.” There will be a time, I suppose, when tragedians will fancy themselves to be mere masks, and buskins, and long train.

> Greek: ἔσται χρόνος τάχα, ἐν ᾧ οἱ τραγῳδοὶ οἰήσονται ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι προσωπεῖα καὶ ἐμβάδας καὶ τὸ σύρμα. ἄνθρωπε, ταῦτα ὕλην ἔχεις καὶ ὑπόθεσιν.

[¶43] These things are your materials, man, and your stage-properties. Speak something;

> Greek: φθέγξαι τι, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν πότερον τραγῳδὸς εἶ ἢ γελωτοποιός· κοινὰ γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ ἄλλα ἀμφότεροι.

[¶44] that we may know whether you are a tragedian or a buffoon; for both have all the rest in common. Suppose any one should take away his buskins and his mask, and bring him upon the stage in his common dress, is the tragedian lost, or does he remain?

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο ἂν ἀφέλῃ τις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐμβάδας καὶ τὸ προσωπεῖον καὶ ἐν εἰδώλῳ αὐτὸν προαγάγῃ, ἀπώλετο ὁ τραγῳδὸς ἢ μένει; ἂν φωνὴν ἔχῃ, μένει.

[¶45] If he has a voice, he remains. “Here, this instant, take upon you the command.”

> Greek: καὶ ἐνθάδε. λάβε ἡγεμονίαν. λαμβάνω καὶ λαβὼν δεικνύω, πῶς ἄνθρωπος ἀναστρέφεται πεπαιδευμένος.

[¶46] I take it; and taking it, I show how a skilful man performs the part. “Now lay aside your robe; put on rags, and come upon the stage in that character.”

> Greek: θὲς τὴν πλατύσημον καὶ ἀναλαβὼν ῥάκη πρόσελθε ἐν προσώπῳ τοιούτῳ. τί οὖν; οὐ δέδοταί μοι καλὴν φωνὴν εἰσενεγκεῖν;

[¶47] What then? Is it not in my power to express the character by a suitable voice?

> Greek: πῶς οὖν ἀναβαίνεις νῦν; ὡς μάρτυς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κεκλημένος.

[¶48] “In what character do you now appear?” As a witness summoned by God. “Come you, then, and bear witness for me; for you are a fit witness to be produced by me. Is anything which is inevitable to be classed as either good or evil?

> Greek: ἔρχου σὺ καὶ μαρτύρησόν μοι· σὺ γὰρ ἄξιος εἶ προαχθῆναι μάρτυς. ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ. μή τι τῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς προαιρέσεως ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ κακόν; μή τινα βλάπτω; μή τι ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ τὴν ὠφέλειαν ἐποίησα τὴν ἑκάστου ἢ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ;

[¶49] Do I hurt any one? Have I made the good of each individual to rest on any one but himself? What evidence do you give for God?” “I am in a miserable condition, O Lord;

> Greek: τίνα μαρτυρίαν δίδως τῷ θεῷ; ἐν δεινοῖς εἰμι, κύριε, καὶ δυστυχῶ, οὐδείς μου ἐπιστρέφεται, οὐδείς μοι δίδωσιν οὐδέν, πάντες ψέγουσιν, κακολογοῦσιν.

[¶50] I am undone: no mortal cares for me; no mortal gives me anything; all blame me; all speak ill of me.” Is this the evidence you are to give?

> Greek: ταῦτα μέλλεις μαρτυρεῖν καὶ καταισχύνειν τὴν κλῆσιν ἣν κέκληκεν, ὅτι σε ἐτίμησεν ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν καὶ ἄξιον ἡγήσατο προσαγαγεῖν εἰς μαρτυρίαν τηλικαύτην;

[¶51] And will you bring disgrace upon his summons, who hath conferred such an honor upon you, and thought you worthy of being produced as a witness in such a cause? But some one in authority has given a sentence.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἀπεφήνατο ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἐξουσίαν κρίνω σε ἀσεβῆ καὶ ἀνόσιον εἶναι. τί σοι γέγονεν; ἐκρίθην ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἀνόσιος εἶναι.

[¶52] “I judge you to be impious and profane.” What has befallen you?—I have been judged to be impious and profane.—Anything else?—Nothing.—Suppose he had passed his judgment upon any process of reasoning, and had questioned the conclusion that, if it be day, it is light;

> Greek: ἄλλο οὐδέν; οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ περὶ συνημμένου τινὸς ἐπικεκρίκει καὶ ἐδεδώκει ἀπόφασιν τὸ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἐστιν κρίνω ψεῦδος εἶναι, τί ἐγεγόνει τῷ συνημμένῳ; τίς ἐνθάδε κρίνεται, τίς κατακέκριται; τὸ συνημμένον ἢ ὁ ἐξαπατηθεὶς περὶ αὐτοῦ;

[¶53] what would have befallen the proposition? In this case, who is judged, who is condemned,—the proposition, or he who cannot understand it? Does he know, who claims the power of ruling in your case, what pious or impious means?

> Greek: οὗτος οὖν τίς ποτε ὁ ἔχων ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ἀποφήνασθαί τι περὶ σοῦ; οἶδεν τί ἐστι τὸ εὐσεβὲς ἢ τὸ ἀσεβές; μεμελέτηκεν αὐτό; μεμάθηκεν; ποῦ; παρὰ τίνι;

[¶54] Has he made it his study or learned it? Where? From whom? A musician would not regard him, if he pronounced bass to be treble; nor a mathematician, if he passed sentence, that lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are not equal.

> Greek: εἶτα μουσικὸς μὲν οὐκ ἐπιστρέφεται αὐτοῦ ἀποφαινομένου περὶ τῆς νήτης ὅτι ἐστὶν ὑπάτη οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός, ἂν ἐπικρίνῃ τὰς ἀπὸ κέντρου πρὸς τὸν κύκλον προσπιπτούσας μὴ εἶναι ἴσας·

[¶55] And shall he who is instructed in the truth respect an ignorant man, when he pronounces upon pious and impious, just and unjust? “Oh, the persecutions to which the wise are exposed!”

> Greek: ὁ δὲ ταῖς ἀληθείαις πεπαιδευμένος ἀνθρώπου ἀπαιδεύτου ἐπιστραφήσεται ἐπικρίνοντός τι περὶ ὁσίου καὶ ἀνοσίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ δικαίου; ὦ πολλῆς ἀδικίας τῶν πεπαιδευμένων. ταῦτα οὖν ἔμαθες ἐνταῦθα;

[¶56] Is it here that you have learned this talk? Why do not you leave such pitiful discourse to idle, pitiful fellows; and let them sit in a corner, and receive some little mean pay, or grumble that nobody gives them anything? But do you come, and make some use of what you have learned.

> Greek: οὐ θέλεις τὰ μὲν λογάρια τὰ περὶ τούτων ἄλλοις ἀφεῖναι, ἀταλαιπώροις ἀνθρωπαρίοις, ἵνʼ ἐν γωνίᾳ καθεζόμενοι μισθάρια λαμβάνωσιν ἢ γογγ[ρ]ύζωσιν, ὅτι οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς παρέχει οὐδέν, σὺ δὲ χρῆσθαι παρελθὼν οἷς ἔμαθες;

[¶57] It is not reasonings that are wanted now, for there are books stuffed full of stoical reasonings. “What is wanted, then?” The man who shall apply them;

> Greek: οὐ γὰρ λογάριά ἐστι τὰ λείποντα νῦν, ἀλλὰ γέμει τὰ βιβλία τῶν Στωικῶν λογαρίων. τί οὖν τὸ λεῖπόν ἐστιν; ὁ χρησόμενος, ὁ ἔργῳ μαρτυρήσων τοῖς λόγοις.

[¶58] whose actions may bear testimony to his doctrines. Assume this character for me, that we may no longer make use in the schools of the examples of the ancients, but may have some examples of our own.

> Greek: τοῦτό μοι τὸ πρόσωπον ἀνάλαβε, ἵνα μηκέτι παλαιοῖς ἐν τῇ σχολῇ παραδείγμασι χρώμεθα, ἀλλὰ ἔχωμέν τι καὶ καθʼ ἡμᾶς παράδειγμα.

[¶59] “To whom, then, does the contemplation of these abstractions belong?”

> Greek: ταῦτα οὖν τίνος ἐστὶ θεωρεῖν; τοῦ σχολάζοντος. ἔστι γὰρ φιλοθέωρόν τι ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

[¶60] To any one who has leisure for them; for man is a being fond of contemplation. But it is shameful to take only such view of things as truant slaves take of a play. We ought to sit calmly, and listen, whether to the actor or to the musician; and not do like those poor fellows, who come in and admire the actor, constantly glancing about them, and then, if any one happens to mention their master, run frightened away.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ αἰσχρόν ἐστι θεωρεῖν ταῦτα οὕτως ὡς οἱ δραπέται· ἀλλʼ ἀπερισπάστως καθῆσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν νῦν μὲν τραγῳδοῦ νῦν δὲ κιθαρῳδοῦ, οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖνοι ποιοῦσιν. ἅμα μὲν ἐπέστη καὶ ἐπῄνεσεν τὸν τραγῳδόν, ἅμα δὲ περιεβλέψατο· εἶτα ἄν τις φθέγξηται κύριον, εὐθὺς σεσόβηνται, ταράσσονται.

[¶61] It is shameful for a philosopher thus to contemplate the works of nature. What, in this parallel case, stands for the master?

> Greek: αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οὕτως καὶ τοὺς φιλοσόφους θεωρεῖν τὰ ἔργα τῆς φύσεως. τί γάρ ἐστι κύριος; ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου κύριος οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ θάνατος καὶ ζωὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ πόνος.

[¶62] Man is not the master of man; but death is, and life, and pleasure, and pain; for without these, bring even Caesar to me, and you will see how intrepid I shall be.

> Greek: ἐπεὶ χωρὶς τούτων ἄγαγέ μοι τὸν Καίσαρα καὶ ὄψει πῶς εὐσταθῶ. ὅταν δὲ μετὰ τούτων ἔλθῃ βροντῶν καὶ ἀστράπτων, ἐγὼ δὲ ταῦτα φοβῶμαι, τί ἄλλο ἢ ἐπέγνωκα τὸν κύριον ὡς ὁ δραπέτης;

[¶63] But, if he comes thundering and lightening with these, and these are the objects of my terror, what do I else but, like the truant slave, acknowledge my master? While I have any respite from these, as the truant comes into the theatre, so I bathe, drink, sing;

> Greek: μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ τινα ἀνοχὴν ἀπὸ τούτων ἔχω, ὡς δραπέτης ἐφίσταται θεάτρῳ οὕτως κἀγώ· λούομαι, πίνω, ᾁδω, πάντα δὲ μετὰ φόβου καὶ ταλαιπωρίας.

[¶64] but all with terror and anxiety. But if I free myself from my masters, that is, from such things as render a master terrible, what trouble, what master have I remaining?

> Greek: ἐὰν δʼ ἐμαυτὸν ἀπολύσω τῶν δεσποτῶν, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἐκείνων, διʼ ἃ οἱ δεσπόται εἰσὶ φοβεροί, ποῖον ἔτι πρᾶγμα ἔχω, ποῖον ἔτι κύριον;

[¶65] “Shall we then insist upon these things with all men?” No. But make allowance for the ignorant, and say, This poor man. advises me to what he thinks good for himself.

> Greek: τί οὖν; κηρύσσειν δεῖ ταῦτα πρὸς πάντας; — οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰδιώταις συμπεριφέρεσθαι καὶ λέγειν οὗτος ὃ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν οἴεται τοῦτο κἀμοὶ συμβουλεύει· συγγιγνώσκω αὐτῷ.

[¶66] I excuse him; for Socrates, too, excused the jailer, who wept when he was to drink the poison, and said, “How heartily he sheds tears for us!”

> Greek: καὶ γὰρ Σωκράτης συνεγίγνωσκεν τῷ ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς κλάοντι, ὅτι ἔμελλεν πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον, καὶ λέγει ὡς γενναίως ἡμᾶς ἀποδεδάκρυκεν.

[¶67] Was it to him that Socrates said, “For this reason we sent the women out of the way”? No, but to his friends,—to such as were capable of hearing it; while he humored the other, as a child.

> Greek: μή τι οὖν ἐκείνῳ λέγει ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπελύσαμεν; ἀλλὰ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, τοῖς δυναμένοις αὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι· ἐκείνῳ δὲ συμπεριφέρεται ὡς παιδίῳ.

[¶68] 30. When you are going before any of the great, remember that there is another who sees from above what passes, and whom you ought to please, rather than man. He therefore asks you,— “In the schools, what did you use to call exile, and prison, and chains, and death, and calumny?” I? Indifferent things. “What, then, do you call them now? Are they at all changed?” No. “Are you changed, then?” No. “Tell me, then, what things are indifferent.” Things not dependent on our own will. “What is the inference?” Things not dependent on my own will are nothing to me. “Tell me, likewise, what appeared to be the good of man.” Rectitude of will, and to understand the appearances of things. “What his end?” To follow Thee. “Do you say the same things now, too?” Yes. I do say the same things, even now. Well, go in then boldly, and mindful of these things; and you will show the difference between the instructed and the ignorant. I protest, I think you will then have such thoughts as these: “Why do we provide so many and great resources for nothing? Is the power, the antechamber, the attendants, the guards, no more than this? Is it for these that I have listened to so many dissertations? These are nothing; and yet I had qualified myself as for some great encounter.”

> Greek: 30. ὅταν εἰσίῃς πρός τινα τῶν ὑπερεχόντων, μέμνησο ὅτι καὶ ἄλλος ἄνωθεν βλέπει τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ὅτι ἐκείνῳ σε δεῖ μᾶλλον ἀρέσκειν ἢ τούτῳ. ἐκεῖνος οὖν σου πυνθάνεται φυγὴν καὶ φυλακὴν καὶ δεσμὰ καὶ θάνατον καὶ ἀδοξίαν τί ἔλεγες ἐν τῇ σχολῇ; ἐγὼ ἀδιάφορα. νῦν οὖν τίνα αὐτὰ λέγεις; μή τι ἐκεῖνα ἠλλάγη; οὔ. σὺ οὖν ἠλλάγης; οὔ. λέγε οὖν τίνα ἐστὶν ἀδιάφορα. τὰ ἀπροαίρετα. λέγε καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. ἀπροαίρετα οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ. λέγε καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τίνα ὑμῖν ἐδόκει; προαίρεσις οἵα δεῖ καὶ χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. τέλος δὲ τί; τὸ σοὶ ἀκολουθεῖν. ταῦτα καὶ νῦν λέγεις; ταὐτὰ καὶ νῦν λέγω. ἄπ[ε]ιθι λοιπὸν ἔσω θαρρῶν καὶ μεμνημένος τούτων καὶ ὄψει τί ἐστι νέος μεμελετηκὼς ἃ δεῖ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀμελετήτοις. ἐγὼ μὲν νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς φαντάζομαι ὅτι πείσῃ τὸ τοιοῦτον τί οὕτως μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ παρασκευαζόμεθα πρὸς τὸ μηδέν; τοῦτο ἦν ἡ ἐξουσία; τοῦτο τὰ πρόθυρα, οἱ κοιτωνῖται, οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς μαχαίρας; τούτων ἕνεκα τοὺς πολλοὺς λόγους ἤκουον; ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἦν, ἐγὼ δʼ ὡς μεγάλα παρεσκευαζόμην.

## 7. Book II · chapters 1–6

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/7/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/7/#p-N

[¶0] 1. There is an assertion of the philosophers which may perhaps appear a paradox to many; yet let us fairly examine whether it be true,—that it is possible, in all things, to act at once with caution and courage.

> Greek: 1. παράδοξον μὲν τυχὸν φαίνεταί τισιν τὸ ἀξιούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὅμως δὲ σκεψώμεθα κατὰ δύναμιν, εἰ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ δεῖν ἅμα μὲν εὐλαβῶς ἅμα δὲ θαρρούντως πάντα ποιεῖν.

[¶1] For caution seems, in some measure, contrary to courage; and contraries are by no means consistent.

> Greek: ἐναντίον γάρ πως δοκεῖ τῷ θαρραλέῳ τὸ εὐλαβές, τὰ δʼ ἐναντία οὐδαμῶς συνυπάρχει.

[¶2] The appearance of a paradox in the present case seems to me to arise as follows. If indeed we assert that courage and caution are to be used in the same instances, we might justly be accused of uniting contradictions;

> Greek: τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον πολλοῖς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ παράδοξον δοκεῖ μοι τοιούτου τινὸς ἔχεσθαι· εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ταὐτὰ ἠξιοῦμεν χρῆσθαι τῇ τʼ εὐλαβείᾳ καὶ τῷ θάρσει, δικαίως ἂν ἡμᾶς ᾐτιῶντο ὡς τὰ ἀσύνακτα συνάγοντας.

[¶3] but in the way that we affirm it, where is the absurdity? For if what has been so often said, and so often demonstrated, be certain, that the essence of good and evil consists in the use of things as they appear, and that things inevitable are not to be classed either as good or evil, what paradox do the philosophers assert, if they say, “Where events are inevitable, meet them with courage, but otherwise with caution”?

> Greek: νῦν δὲ τί δεινὸν ἔχει τὸ λεγόμενον; εἰ γὰρ ὑγιῆ ταῦτʼ ἐστι τὰ πολλάκις μὲν εἰρημένα, πολλάκις δʼ ἀποδεδειγμένα, ὅτι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐν χρήσει φαντασιῶν καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὡσαύτως, τὰ δʼ ἀπροαίρετα οὔτε τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ δέχεται φύσιν οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
τί παράδοξον ἀξιοῦσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, εἰ λέγουσιν ὅπου μὲν τὰ ἀπροαίρετα, ἐκεῖ τὸ θάρσος ἔστω σοι, ὅπου δὲ τὰ προαιρετικά, ἐκεῖ ἡ εὐλάβεια;

[¶4] For in these last cases only, if evil lies in a perverted will, is caution to be used; and if things inevitable and uncontrollable are nothing to us, in these we are to make use of courage.

> Greek: εἰ γὰρ ἐν κακῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κακόν, πρὸς μόνα ταῦτα χρῆσθαι ἄξιον εὐλαβείᾳ· εἰ δὲ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα καὶ μὴ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, πρὸς ταῦτα τῷ θάρσει χρηστέον.

[¶5] Thus we shall be at once cautious and courageous, and, indeed, courageous on account of this very caution; for by using caution with regard to things really evil, we shall gain courage with regard to what are not so.

> Greek: καὶ οὕτως ἅμα μὲν εὐλαβεῖς ἅμα δὲ θαρραλέοι ἐσόμεθα καὶ νὴ Δία διὰ τὴν εὐλάβειαν θαρραλέοι. διὰ γὰρ τὸ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντως κακὰ συμβήσεται θαρρεῖν ἡμῖν πρὸς τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα.

[¶6] But we are in the same condition with deer; when these in a fright fly from the plumes [which hunters wave], whither do they turn, and to what do they retire for safety? To the nets. And thus they are undone, by inverting the objects of fear and confidence.

> Greek: λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς τὸ τῶν ἐλάφων πάσχομεν· ὅτε φοβοῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν αἱ ἔλαφοι τὰ πτερά, ποῦ τρέπονται καὶ πρὸς τίνα ἀναχωροῦσιν ὡς ἀσφαλῆ; πρὸς τὰ δίκτυα· καὶ οὕτως ἀπόλλυνται ἐναλλάξασαι τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα.

[¶7] Thus we, too. When do we yield to fear? About things inevitable. When, on the other hand, do we behave with courage, as if there were nothing to be dreaded?

> Greek: οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ποῦ χρώμεθα τῷ φόβῳ; πρὸς τὰ ἀπροαίρετα. ἐν τίσιν πάλιν θαρροῦντες ἀναστρεφόμεθα ὡς οὐδενὸς ὄντος δεινοῦ; ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς.

[¶8] About things that might be controlled by will. To be deceived, then, or to act rashly or imprudently, or to indulge a scandalous desire, we treat as of no importance, in our effort to bring about things which we cannot, after all, control.

> Greek: ἐξαπατηθῆναι ἢ προπεσεῖν ἢ ἀναίσχυντόν τι ποιῆσαι ἢ μετʼ ἐπιθυμίας αἰσχρᾶς ὀρεχθῆναί τινος οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἡμῖν, ἂν μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀπροαιρέτ[ικ]οις εὐστοχῶμεν. ὅπου δὲ θάνατος ἢ φυγὴ ἢ πόνος ἢ ἀδοξία, ἐκεῖ τὸ ἀναχωρητικόν, ἐκεῖ τὸ σεσοβημένον.

[¶9] But where death, or exile, or pain, or ignominy, is concerned, then comes the retreat, the flutter, and the fright. Hence, as it must be with those who err in matters of the greatest importance, we turn what should be courage into rashness, desperation, recklessness, effrontery;

> Greek: τοιγαροῦν ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς περὶ τὰ μέγιστα διαμαρτάνοντας τὸ μὲν φύσει θαρραλέον θρασὺ κατασκευάζομεν, ἀπονενοημένον, ἰταμόν, ἀναίσχυντον, τὸ δʼ εὐλαβὲς φύσει καὶ αἰδῆμον δειλὸν καὶ ταπεινόν, φόβων καὶ ταραχῶν μεστόν.

[¶10] and what should be caution becomes timid, base, and full of fears and perturbations. Let one apply his spirit of caution to things within the reach of his own will, then he will have the subject of avoidance within his own control; but if he transfers it to that which is inevitable, trying to shun that which he cannot control and others can, then he must needs fear, be harassed, and be disturbed.

> Greek: ἂν γάρ τις ἐκεῖ μεταθῇ τὸ εὐλαβές, ὅπου προαίρεσις καὶ ἔργα προαιρέσεως, εὐθὺς ἅμα τῷ θέλειν εὐλαβεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ κειμένην ἕξει τὴν ἔκκλισιν· ἂν δʼ ὅπου τὰ μὴ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ ἀπροαίρετα, πρὸς τὰ ἐπʼ ἄλλοις ὄντα τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἔχων ἀναγκαίως φοβήσεται, ἀκαταστατήσει, ταραχθήσεται.

[¶11] For it is not death or pain that is to be dreaded, but the fear of pain or death.

> Greek: οὐ γὰρ θάνατος ἢ πόνος φοβερόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι πόνον ἢ θάνατον. διὰ τοῦτο ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν εἰπόντα ὅτι οὐ κατθανεῖν γὰρ δεινόν, ἀλλʼ αἰσχρῶς θανεῖν.

[¶12] Hence we commend him who says:
Death is no ill, but shamefully to die. Courage, then, ought to be opposed to death, and caution to the fear of death; whereas we, on the contrary, oppose to death, flight; and to these our false convictions concerning it, recklessness, and desperation, and assumed indifference.

> Greek: ἔδει οὖν πρὸς μὲν τὸν θάνατον τὸ θάρσος ἐστράφθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φόβον τοῦ θανάτου τὴν εὐλάβειαν· νῦν δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον πρὸς μὲν τὸν θάνατον τὴν φυγήν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ δόγμα τὴν ἀνεπιστρεψίαν καὶ τὸ ἀφειδὲς καὶ τὸ ἀδιαφορητικόν.

[¶13] Socrates used, very properly, to call these things masks; for as masks appear shocking and formidable to children from their inexperience, so we are thus affected with regard to things for no other reason. For what constitutes a child?

> Greek: ταῦτα δʼ ὁ Σωκράτης καλῶς ποιῶν μορμολύκεια ἐκάλει. ὡς γὰρ τοῖς παιδίοις τὰ προσωπεῖα φαίνεται δεινὰ καὶ φοβερὰ διʼ ἀπειρίαν, τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἡμεῖς πάσχομεν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα διʼ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ παιδία πρὸς τὰς μορμολυκείας.

[¶14] Ignorance. What constitutes a child? Want of instruction; for they are our equals, so far as their degree of knowledge permits.

> Greek: τί γάρ ἐστι παιδίον; ἄγνοια. τί ἐστι παιδίον; ἀμαθία. ἐπεὶ ὅπου οἶδεν, κἀκεῖνα οὐδὲν ἡμῶν ἔλαττον ἔχει.

[¶15] What is death? A mask. Turn it on the other side and be convinced. See, it doth not bite. This little body and spirit must be again, as once, separated, either now or hereafter; why, then, are you displeased if it be now?

> Greek: θάνατος τί ἐστιν; μορμολύκειον. στρέψας αὐτὸ κατάμαθε· ἰδοῦ, πῶς οὐ δάκνει. τὸ σωμάτιον δεῖ χωρισθῆναι τοῦ πνευματίου, ὡς πρότερον ἐκεχώριστο, ἢ νῦν ἢ ὕστερον. τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς, εἰ νῦν; εἰ γὰρ μὴ νῦν, ὕστερον.

[¶16] For if not now it will be hereafter. Why? To fulfil the course of the universe; for that hath need of some things present, others to come, and others already completed.

> Greek: διὰ τί; ἵνα ἡ περίοδος ἀνύηται τοῦ κόσμου· χρείαν γὰρ ἔχει τῶν μὲν ἐνισταμένων, τῶν δὲ μελλόντων, τῶν δʼ ἠνυσμένων.

[¶17] What is pain? A mask. Turn it and be convinced. This weak flesh is sometimes affected by harsh, sometimes by smooth impressions. If suffering be beyond endurance, the door is open;

> Greek: πόνος τί ἐστιν; μορμολύκειον. στρέψον αὐτὸ καὶ κατάμαθε. τραχέως κινεῖται τὸ σαρκίδιον, εἶτα πάλιν λείως. ἄν σοι μὴ λυσιτελῇ, ἡ θύρα ἤνοικται· ἂν λυσιτελῇ, φέρε.

[¶18] till then, bear it.

> Greek: πρὸς πάντα γὰρ ἠνοῖχθαι δεῖ τὴν θύραν· καὶ πρᾶγμα οὐκ ἔχομεν.

[¶19] It is fit that the final door should be open against all accidents, since thus we escape all trouble. What, then, is the fruit of these principles? What it ought to be;

> Greek: τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν δογμάτων καρπός; ὅνπερ δεῖ κάλλιστόν τʼ εἶναι καὶ πρεπωδέστατον τοῖς τῷ ὄντι παιδευομένοις, ἀταραξία ἀφοβία ἐλευθερία.

[¶20] the most noble, and the most suitable to the wise,—tranquillity, security, freedom. For in this case we are not to give credit to the many, who say that none ought to be educated but the free;

> Greek: οὐ γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ τούτων πιστευτέον, οἳ λέγουσιν μόνοις ἐξεῖναι παιδεύεσθαι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις μᾶλλον, οἳ λέγουσι μόνους τοὺς παιδευθέντας ἐλευθέρους εἶναι.

[¶21] but rather to the philosophers, who say that the wise alone are free. “How so?” Thus: is freedom anything else than the power of living as we like? “Nothing else.” Well; tell me then, do you like to live in error? “We do not. No one who lives in error is free.”

> Greek: — πῶς τοῦτο; — οὕτως· νῦν ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐλευθερία ἢ τὸ ἐξεῖναι ὡς βουλόμεθα διεξάγειν; οὐδέν. λέγετε δή μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, βούλεσθε ζῆν ἁμαρτάνοντες; οὐ βουλόμεθα. οὐδεὶς τοίνυν ἁμαρτάνων ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν.

[¶22] Do you like to live in fear? Do you like to live in sorrow? Do you like to live in perturbation? “By no means.” No one, therefore, in a state of fear, or sorrow, or perturbation, is free; but whoever is delivered from sorrow, fear, and perturbation, by the same means is delivered likewise from slavery.

> Greek: βούλεσθε ζῆν φοβούμενοι, βούλεσθε λυπούμενοι, βούλεσθε ταρασσόμενοι; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδεὶς ἄρα οὔτε φοβούμενος οὔτε λυπούμενος οὔτε ταρασσόμενος ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν, ὅστις δʼ ἀπήλλακται λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ ταραχῶν, οὗτος τῇ αὐτῇ ὁδῷ καὶ τοῦ δουλεύειν ἀπήλλακται.

[¶23] How shall we believe you, then, good legislators, when you say, “We allow none to be educated but the free”? For the philosophers say, “We allow none to be free but the wise;” that is, God doth not allow it. “What, then;

> Greek: πῶς οὖν ἔτι ὑμῖν πιστεύσομεν, ὦ φίλτατοι νομοθέται; οὐκ ἐπιτρέπομεν παιδεύεσθαι, εἰ μὴ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις; οἱ φιλόσοφοι γὰρ λέγουσιν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιτρέπομεν ἐλευθέροις εἶναι εἰ μὴ τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις, τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει.

[¶24] when any person hath turned his slave about before the consul, has he done nothing?” Yes, he has. “What?” He has turned his slave about before the consul. “Nothing more?” Yes. He pays a fine for him. “Well, then;

> Greek: — ὅταν οὖν στρέψῃ τις ἐπὶ στρατηγοῦ τὸν αὑτοῦ δοῦλον, οὐδὲν ἐποίησεν; — ἐποίησεν. — τί; — ἔστρεψεν τὸν αὑτοῦ δοῦλον ἐπὶ στρατηγοῦ. — ἄλλο οὐδέν; — ναί· καὶ εἰκοστὴν αὐτοῦ δοῦναι ὀφείλει.

[¶25] is not the man who has gone through this ceremony rendered free?” Only so far as he is emancipated from perturbation.

> Greek: — τί οὖν; ὁ ταῦτα παθὼν οὐ γέγονεν ἐλεύθερος; — οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀτάραχος.

[¶26] Pray, have you, who are able to give this freedom to others, no master of your own? Are you not a slave to money; to a girl; to a boy; to a tyrant; to some friend of a tyrant? Else why do you tremble when any one of these is in question?

> Greek: ἐπεὶ σὺ ὁ ἄλλους στρέφειν δυνάμενος οὐδένα ἔχεις κύριον; οὐκ ἀργύριον, οὐ κοράσιον, οὐ παιδάριον, οὐ τὸν τύραννον, οὐ φίλον τινὰ τοῦ τυράννου; τί οὖν τρέμεις ἐπί τινα τοιαύτην ἀπιὼν περίστασιν;

[¶27] Therefore, I so often repeat to you, let this be your study and constant pursuit, to learn in what it is necessary to be courageous, and in what cautious;

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο λέγω πολλάκις· ταῦτα μελετᾶτε καὶ ταῦτα πρόχειρα ἔχετε, πρὸς τίνα δεῖ τεθαρρηκέναι καὶ πρὸς τίνα εὐλαβῶς διακεῖσθαι, ὅτι πρὸς τὰ ἀπροαίρετα θαρρεῖν, εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὰ προαιρετικά.

[¶28] courageous against the inevitable, cautious so far as your will can control.

> Greek: — ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνέγνων σοι οὐδʼ ἔγνως τί ποιῶ.

[¶29] “But have I not read my essay to you? Do not you know what I am doing?” In what? “In my essays.” Show me in what state you are as to desires and aversions; whether you do not fail of what you wish, and incur what you would avoid;

> Greek: — ἐν τίνι; ἐν λεξειδίοις. ἔχε σου τὰ λεξείδια· δεῖξον, πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ὄρεξιν καὶ ἔκκλισιν, εἰ μὴ ἀποτυγχάνεις ὧν θέλεις, εἰ μὴ περιπίπτεις οἷς οὐ θέλεις. ἐκεῖνα δὲ τὰ περιόδια, ἂν νοῦν ἔχῃς, ἄρας πού ποτε ἀπαλείψεις.

[¶30] but, as to these commonplace essays, if you are wise, you will take them, and destroy them. “Why? Did not Socrates write?” Yes; who so much? But how? As he had not always one at hand to argue against his principles, or be argued against in his turn, he argued with and examined himself, and always made practical application of some one great principle at least.

> Greek: — τί οὖν; Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔγραφεν; — καὶ τίς τοσαῦτα; ἀλλὰ πῶς; ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐδύνατο ἔχειν ἀεὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα αὐτοῦ τὰ δόγματα ἢ ἐλεγχθησόμενον ἐν τῷ μέρει, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἤλεγχεν καὶ ἐξήταζεν καὶ ἀεὶ μίαν γέ τινα πρόληψιν ἐγύμναζεν χρηστικῶς.

[¶31] These are the things which a philosopher writes; but such commonplaces as those of which I speak he leaves to the foolish, or to the happy creatures whom idleness furnishes with leisure, or to such as are too weak to regard consequences.

> Greek: ταῦτα γράφει φιλόσοφος· λεξείδια δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁδός, ἣν λέγω, ἄλλοις ἀφίησι, τοῖς ἀναισθήτοις ἢ τοῖς μακαρίοις, τοῖς σχολὴν ἄγουσιν ὑπὸ ἀταραξίας ἢ τοῖς μηδὲν τῶν ἑξῆς ὑπολογιζομένοις διὰ μωρίαν.
καὶ νῦν καιροῦ καλοῦντος ἐκεῖνα δείξεις ἀπελθὼν καὶ ἀναγνώσῃ καὶ ἐμπερπερεύσῃ; ἰδοῦ, πῶς διαλόγους συντίθημι.

[¶32] And yet will you, when opportunity offers, come forward to exhibit and read aloud such things, and take a pride in them? “Pray, see how I compose dialogues.” Talk not of that, man, but rather be able to say, See how I accomplish my purposes;

> Greek: μή, ἄνθρωπε, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον ἰδοῦ, πῶς ὀρεγόμενος οὐκ ἀποτυγχάνω. ἰδοῦ, πῶς ἐκκλίνων οὐ περιπίπτω. φέρε θάνατον καὶ γνώσῃ· φέρε πόνους, φέρε δεσμωτήριον, φέρε ἀδοξίαν, φέρε καταδίκην.

[¶33] see how I avert what I wish to shun. Set death before me; set pain, a prison, disgrace, doom, and you will know me? This should be the pride of a young man come out from the schools. Leave the rest to others.

> Greek: αὕτη ἐπίδειξις νέου ἐκ σχολῆς ἐληλυθότος. τἆλλα δʼ ἄλλοις ἄφες, μηδὲ φωνήν τις ἀκούσῃ σου περὶ αὐτῶν ποτε μηδʼ, ἂν ἐπαινέσῃ τις ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς, ἀνέχου, δόξον δὲ μηδεὶς εἶναι καὶ εἰδέναι μηδέν.

[¶34] Let no one ever hear you waste a word upon them, nor suffer it, if any one commends you for them;

> Greek: μόνον τοῦτο εἰδὼς φαίνου, πῶς μήτʼ ἀποτύχῃς ποτὲ μήτε περιπέσῃς.

[¶35] but admit that you are nobody, and that you know nothing. Appear to know only this, never to fail nor fall.

> Greek: ἄλλοι μελετάτωσαν δίκας, ἄλλοι προβλήματα, ἄλλοι συλλογισμούς· σὺ ἀποθνῄσκειν, σὺ δεδέσθαι, σὺ στρεβλοῦσθαι, σὺ ἐξορίζεσθαι.

[¶36] Let others study cases, problems, and syllogisms. Do you rather contemplate death, change, torture, exile; and all these with courage, and reliance upon Him who hath called you to them, and judged you worthy a post in which you may show what reason can do when it encounters the inevitable.

> Greek: πάντα ταῦτα θαρρούντως, πεποιθότως τῷ κεκληκότι σε ἐπʼ αὐτά, τῷ ἄξιον τῆς χώρας ταύτης κεκρικότι, ἐν ᾗ καταταχθεὶς ἐπιδείξεις, τίνα δύναται λογικὸν ἡγεμονικὸν πρὸς τὰς ἀπροαιρέτους δυνάμεις ἀντιταξάμενον.

[¶37] And thus this paradox ceases to be a paradox, that we must be at once cautious and courageous; courageous against the inevitable, and cautious when events are within our own control.

> Greek: καὶ οὕτως τὸ παράδοξον ἐκεῖνο οὐκέτι οὔτʼ ἀδύνατον φανεῖται οὔτε παράδοξον, ὅτι ἅμα μὲν εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ ἅμα δὲ θαρρεῖν, πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀπροαίρετα θαρρεῖν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς εὐλαβεῖσθαι.

[¶38] 2. Consider, you who are going to take your trial, what you wish to preserve, and in what to succeed. For if you wish to preserve a mind in harmony with nature, you are entirely safe; everything goes well; you have no trouble on your hands. While you wish to preserve that freedom which belongs to you, and are contented with that, for what have you longer to be anxious? For who is the master of things like these? Who can take them away? If you wish to be a man of modesty and fidelity, who shall prevent you? If you wish not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desires contrary to your principles; to aversions contrary to your opinion? The judge, perhaps, will pass a sentence against you, which he thinks formidable; but can he likewise make you receive it with shrinking? Since, then, desire and aversion are in your own power, for what have you to be anxious? Let this be your introduction; this your narration; this your proof; this your conclusion; this your victory; and this your applause. Thus said Socrates to one who put him in mind to prepare himself for his trial: “Do you not think that I have been preparing myself for this very thing my whole life long?” By what kind of preparation? “have attended to my own work.” What mean you? “have done nothing unjust, either in public or in private life.” But if you wish to retain possession of outward things too, your body, your estate, your dignity, I advise you immediately to prepare yourself by every possible preparation; and besides, to consider the disposition of your judge and of your adversary. If it be necessary to embrace his knees, do so; if to weep, weep; if to groan, groan For when you have once made yourself a slave to externals, be a slave wholly; do not struggle, and be alternately willing and unwilling, but be simply and thoroughly the one or the other, _ —free, or a slave; instructed, or ignorant; a game-cock, or a craven; either bear to be beaten till you die, or give out at once; and do not be soundly beaten first, and then give out at last. If both alternatives be shameful, learn immediately to distinguish where good and evil lie. They lie where truth likewise lies. Where truth and nature dictate, there exercise caution or courage. Why, do you think that if Socrates had concerned himself about externals, he would have said, when he appeared at his trial, “Anytus and Melitus may indeed kill me, but hurt me they cannot”? Was he so foolish as not to see that this way did not lead to safety, but the contrary? What, then, is the reason that he not only disregarded, but defied, his judges? Thus my friend Heraclitus, in a trifling suit about a little estate at Rhodes, after having proved to the judges that his cause was good, when he came to the conclusion of his speech, “will not entreat you,” said he; “nor be anxious as to what judgment you give; for it is rather you who are to be judged, than I.” And thus he lost his suit. What need was there of this? Be content not to entreat; yet do not proclaim that you will not entreat; unless it be a proper time to provoke the judges designedly, as in the case of Socrates. But if you too are preparing such a speech as his, what do you wait for? Why do you consent to be tried? For if you wish to be hanged, have patience, and the gibbet will come. But if you choose rather to consent, and make your defence as well as you can, all the rest is to be. ordered accordingly, with a due regard, however, to the preservation of your own proper character. For this reason it is absurd to call upon me for specific advice. How should I know what to advise you? Ask me rather to teach you to accommodate yourself to whatever may be the event. The former is just as if an illiterate person should say; “Tell me how to write down some name that is proposed to me;” and I show him how to write the name of Dion; and then another comes, and asks him to write the name, not of Dion, but of Theon. What will be the consequence? What will he write? Whereas, if you make writing your study, you are ready prepared for whatever word may occur; if not, how can I advise you? For if the actual case should suggest something else, what will you say, or how will you act? Remember, then, the general rule, and you will need no special suggestions; but if you are absorbed in externals, you must necessarily be tossed up and down, according to the inclination of your master. Who is your master? Whosoever controls those things which you seek or shun.

> Greek: 2. ὅρα σὺ ὁ ἀπιὼν ἐπὶ τὴν δίκην, τί θέλεις τηρῆσαι καὶ ποῦ θέλεις ἀνύσαι. εἰ γὰρ προαίρεσιν θέλεις τηρῆσαι κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν, πᾶσά σοι ἀσφάλεια, πᾶσά σοι εὐμάρεια, πρᾶγμα οὐκ ἔχεις. τὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ σοὶ αὐτεξούσια καὶ φύσει ἐλεύθερα θέλων τηρῆσαι καὶ τούτοις ἀρκούμενος τίνος ἔτι ἐπιστρέφῃ; τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν κύριος, τίς αὐτὰ δύναται ἀφελέσθαι; εἰ θέλεις αἰδήμων εἶναι καὶ πιστός, τίς οὐκ ἐάσει σε; εἰ θέλεις μὴ κωλύεσθαι μηδʼ ἀναγκάζεσθαι, τίς σε ἀναγκάσει ὀρέγεσθαι ὧν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, τίς ἐκκλίνειν ἃ μὴ φαίνεταί σοι; ἀλλὰ τί; πράξει μέν σοί τινα ἃ δοκεῖ φοβερὰ εἶναι· ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἐκκλίνων αὐτὰ πάθῃς, πῶς δύναται ποιῆσαι; ὅταν οὖν ἐπὶ σοὶ ᾖ τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκκλίνειν, τίνος ἔτι ἐπιστρέφῃ; τοῦτό σοι προοίμιον, τοῦτο διήγησις, τοῦτο πίστις, τοῦτο νίκη, τοῦτο ἐπίλογος, τοῦτο εὐδοκίμησις. διὰ τοῦτο ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸν ὑπομιμνῄσκοντα, ἵνα παρασκευάζηται πρὸς τὴν δίκην, ἔφη οὐ δοκῶ οὖν σοι ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ πρὸς τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι; — ποίαν παρασκευήν; — τετήρηκα, φησίν, τὸ ἐπʼ ἐμοί. — πῶς οὖν; — οὐδὲν οὐδέποτʼ ἄδικον οὔτʼ ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ ἔπραξα. εἰ δὲ θέλεις καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς τηρῆσαι, τὸ σωμάτιον καὶ τὸ οὐσίδιον καὶ τὸ ἀξιωμάτιον, λέγω σοι· ἤδη αὐτόθεν παρασκευάζου τὴν δυνατὴν παρασκευὴν πᾶσαν καὶ λοιπὸν σκέπτου καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ δικαστοῦ καὶ τὸν ἀντίδικον. εἰ γονάτων ἅψασθαι δεῖ, γονάτων ἅψαι· εἰ κλαῦσαι, κλαῦσον· εἰ οἰμῶξαι, οἴμωξον. ὅταν γὰρ ὑποθῇς τὰ σὰ τοῖς ἐκτός, δούλευε τὸ λοιπὸν καὶ μὴ ἀντισπῶ καὶ ποτὲ μὲν θέλε δουλεύειν, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ θέλε, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς διανοίας ἢ ταῦτα ἢ ἐκεῖνα· ἢ ἐλεύθερος ἢ δοῦλος, ἢ πεπαιδευμένος ἢ ἀπαίδευτος, ἢ γενναῖος ἀλεκτρυὼν ἢ ἀγεννής, ἢ ὑπόμενε τυπτόμενος, μέχρις ἂν ἀποθάνῃς, ἢ ἀπαγόρευσον εὐθύς. μή σοι γένοιτο πληγὰς πολλὰς λαβεῖν καὶ ὕστερον ἀπαγορεῦσαι. εἰ δʼ αἰσχρὰ ταῦτα, αὐτόθεν ἤδη δίελε ποῦ φύσις κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν; οὗ καὶ ἀλήθεια. ὅπου ἀλήθεια καὶ οὗ φύσις, ἐκεῖ τὸ εὐλαβές· ὅπου ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἐκεῖ τὸ θαρραλέον, ὅπου ἡ φύσις. ἐπεί τ οι δοκεῖς, ὅτι τὰ ἐκτὸς τηρῆσαι θέλων Σωκράτης παρελθὼν ἂν ἔλεγε ἐμὲ δʼ Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύνανται, βλάψαι δʼ οὔ; οὕτω μωρὸς ἦν, ἵνα μὴ ἴδῃ ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ὁδὸς ἐνταῦθα οὐ φέρει, ἀλλʼ ἄλλῃ; τί οὖν ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον καὶ προσερεθίζει; ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς Ἡράκλειτος περὶ ἀγριδίου πραγμάτιον ἔχων ἐν Ῥόδῳ καὶ ἀποδείξας τοῖς δικασταῖς ὅτι δίκαια λέγει ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐπίλογον ἔφη ὅτι ἀλλʼ οὔτε δεήσομαι ὑμῶν οὔτʼ ἐπιστρέφομαι, τί μέλλετε κρίνειν· ὑμεῖς τε μᾶλλον οἱ κρινόμενοί ἐστε ἢ ἐγώ. καὶ οὕτως κατέστρεψε τὸ πραγμάτιον. τίς χρεία; μόνον μὴ δέου, μὴ προστίθει δʼ ὅτι καὶ οὐ δέομαι. εἰ μή τι καιρός ἐστιν ἐπίτηδες ἐρεθίσαι τοὺς δικαστὰς ὡς Σωκράτει. καὶ σὺ εἰ τοιοῦτον ἐπίλογον παρασκευάζῃ, τί ἀναβαίνεις, τί ὑπακούεις; εἰ γὰρ σταυρωθῆναι θέλεις, ἔκδεξαι καὶ ἥξει ὁ σταυρός· εἰ δʼ ὑπακοῦσαι λόγος αἱρεῖ καὶ πεῖσαι τό γε παρʼ αὐτόν, τὰ ἑξῆς τούτῳ ποιητέον τηροῦντι μέντοι τὰ ἴδια. ταύτῃ καὶ γελοῖόν ἐστι τὸ λέγειν ὑπόθου μοι. τί σοι ὑποθῶμαι; ἀλλὰ ποίησόν μου τὴν διάνοιαν ὅ τι ἂν ἀποβαίνῃ πρὸς τοῦτο ἁρμόσασθαι. ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνό γε ὅμοιόν ἐστιν οἷον εἰ ἀγράμματος λέγοι εἰπέ μοι τί γράψω, ὅταν μοι προβληθῇ τι ὄνομα. ἂν γὰρ εἴπω ὅτι Δίων, εἶτα παρελθὼν ἐκεῖνος αὐτῷ προβάλῃ μὴ τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ Θέωνος, τί γένηται; τί γράψῃ; ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν μεμελέτηκας γράφειν, ἔχεις καὶ παρασκευάσασθαι πρὸς πάντα τὰ ὑπαγορευόμενα· εἰ δὲ μή, τί σοι ἐγὼ νῦν ὑποθῶμαι; ἂν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ὑπαγορεύῃ τὰ πράγματα, τί ἐρεῖς ἢ τί πράξεις; τούτου οὖν τοῦ καθολικοῦ μέμνησο καὶ ὑποθήκης οὐκ ἀπορήσεις. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἔξω χάσκῃς, ἀνάγκη σε ἄνω καὶ κάτω κυλίεσθαι πρὸς τὸ βούλημα τοῦ κυρίου. τίς δʼ ἐστὶ κύριος; ὁ τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τινος σπουδαζομένων ἢ ἐκκλινομένων ἔχων ἐξουσίαν.

[¶39] 3. Diogenes rightly answered one who desired letters of recommendation from him: “At first sight he will know you to be a man; and whether you are a good or a bad man, if he has any skill in distinguishing, he will know likewise; and if he has not, he will never know it, though I should write a thousand times.” Just as if you were a piece of coin, and should desire to be recommended to any person as good, in order to be tried; if it be to an assayer, he will know your value, for you will recommend yourself. We ought, therefore, in life also to have something analogous to this skill in gold; that one may be able to say, like the assayer, Bring me whatever piece you will, and I will find out its value; or, as I would say with regard to syllogisms, Bring me whomsoever you will, and I will distinguish for you whether he knows how to solve syllogisms, or not. Why? Because I can do that myself, and have that faculty which is necessary for one who can discern persons skilled in such solutions. But how do I act in life? I sometimes call a thing good, at other times bad. What is the cause of this? Something contrary to whit occurs to me in syllogisms,—ignorance and inexperience.

> Greek: 3. καλῶς ὁ Διογένης πρὸς τὸν ἀξιοῦντα γράμματα παρʼ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν συστατικὰ ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος, φησίν, εἶ, καὶ ἰδὼν γνώσεται· εἰ δʼ ἀγαθὸς ἢ κακός, εἰ μὲν ἔμπειρός ἐστι διαγνῶναι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ κακούς, γνώσεται, εἰ δʼ ἄπειρος, οὐδʼ ἂν μυριάκις γράψω αὐτῷ. ὅμοιον γὰρ ὥσπερ εἰ δραχμὴ συσταθῆναί τινι ἠξίου, ἵνα δοκιμασθῇ. εἰ ἀργυρογνωμονικός ἐστιν, σὺ σαυτὴν συστήσεις. ἔδει οὖν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐν τῷ βίῳ οἷον ἐπʼ ἀργυρίου, ἵνʼ εἰπεῖν δύνωμαι καθάπερ ὁ ἀργυρογνώμων λέγει φέρε ἣν θέλεις δραχμὴν καὶ διαγνώσομαι. ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ συλλογισμῶν φέρε ὃν θέλεις καὶ διακρινῶ σοι τὸν ἀναλυτικόν τε καὶ μή. διὰ τί; οἶδα γὰρ ἀναλύειν συλλογισμούς· ἔχω τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν ἐπιγνωστικὸν τῶν περὶ συλλογισμοὺς κατορθούντων. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ βίου τί ποιῶ; νῦν μὲν λέγω ἀγαθόν, νῦν δὲ κακόν. τί τὸ αἴτιον; τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἀμαθία καὶ ἀπειρία.

[¶40] 4. Just as he was once saying that man is made for fidelity, and that whoever subverts this subverts the peculiar property of man, there entered one of the so-called literary men, who had been found guilty of adultery in that city. But, continued Epictetus, if, laying aside that fidelity for which we were born, we form designs against the wife of our neighbor, what do we? What else but destroy and ruin—what? Fidelity, honor, and sanctity of manners. Only these? And do not we ruin neighborhood, friendship, our country? In what rank do we then place ourselves? How am I to consider you, sir,—as a neighbor; a friend? What sort of one? As a citizen? How shall I trust you? Indeed, if you were some potsherd, so noisome that no use could be made of you, you might be thrown on a dunghill, and no mortal would take the trouble to pick you up; but if, being a man, you cannot fill any one place in human society, what shall we do with you? For, suppose you cannot hold the place of a friend, can you hold even that of a slave? And who will trust you? Why, then, should not you also be contented to be thrown upon some dunghill, as a useless vessel, and indeed as worse than that? Will you say, after this, Has no one any regard for me, a man of letters? Why, you are wicked, and fit for no use. Just as if wasps should take it ill that no one has any regard for them, but all shun, and whoever can, beats them down. You have such a sting that whoever you strike with it is thrown into troubles and sorrows. What would you have us do with you? There is nowhere to place you. “What, then; are not women made by nature accessible to all?” I admit it; and so is food at table accessible to those who are invited. But, after it is distributed, will you go and snatch away the share of him who sits next you; or slyly steal it, or stretch out your hand, and taste; and if you cannot tear away any of the meat, dip your fingers and lick them? A fine companion! A Socratic guest indeed! Again, is not the theatre common to all the citizens? Therefore come, when all are seated, if you dare, and turn any one of them out of his place. In this sense only are women accessible by nature; but when the laws, like a good host, have distributed them, cannot you, like the rest of the company, be contented with your own share, but must you pilfer, and taste what belongs to another? “But I am a man of letters, and understand Archedemus.” With all your understanding of Archedemus, then, you will be an adulterer and a rogue; and instead of a man, a wolf or an ape. For where is the difference?

> Greek: 4. λέγοντος αὐτοῦ ὅτι Ὁ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς πίστιν γέγονεν καὶ τοῦτο ὁ ἀνατρέπων ἀνατρέπει τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπεισῆλθέν τις τῶν δοκούντων φιλολόγων, ὃς κατείληπτό ποτε μοιχὸς ἐν τῇ πόλει. ὁ δʼ Ἀλλʼ ἄν, φησίν, ἀφέντες τοῦτο τὸ πιστόν, πρὸς ὃ πεφύκαμεν, ἐπιβουλεύωμεν τῇ γυναικὶ τοῦ γείτονος, τί ποιοῦμεν; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ ἀπόλλυμεν καὶ ἀναιροῦμεν; τίνα; τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν ὅσιον. ταῦτα μόνα; γειτνίασιν δʼ οὐκ ἀναιροῦμεν, φιλίαν δʼ οὔ, πόλιν δʼ οὔ; εἰς τίνα δὲ χώραν αὑτοὺς κατατάσσομεν; ὡς τίνι σοι χρῶμαι, ἄνθρωπε; ὡς γείτονι, ὡς φίλῳ; ποίῳ τινί; ὡς πολίτῃ; τί σοι πιστεύσω; εἶτα σκευάριον μὲν εἰ ἦς οὕτως σαπρόν, ὥστε σοι πρὸς μηδὲν δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι, ἔξω ἂν ἐπὶ τὰς κοπρίας ἐρρίπτου καὶ οὐδʼ ἐκεῖθεν ἄν τίς σε ἀνῃρεῖτο· εἰ δʼ ἄνθρωπος ὢν οὐδεμίαν χώραν δύνασαι ἀποπληρῶσαι ἀνθρωπικήν, τί σε ποιήσομεν; ἔστω γάρ, φίλου οὐ δύνασαι τόπον ἔχειν· δούλου δύνασαι; καὶ τίς σοι πιστεύσει; οὐ θέλεις οὖν ῥιφῆναί που καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ κοπρίαν ὡς σκεῦος ἄχρηστον, ὡς κόπριον; εἶτα ἐρεῖς οὐδείς μου ἐπιστρέφεται, ἀνθρώπου φιλολόγου; κακὸς γὰρ εἶ καὶ ἄχρηστος. οἷον εἰ οἱ σφῆκες ἠγανάκτουν, ὅτι οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἐπιστρέφεται, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσι πάντες κἄν τις δύνηται, πλήξας κατέβαλεν. σὺ κέντρον ἔχεις τοιοῦτον, ὥστε ὃν ἂν πλήξῃς εἰς πράγματα καὶ ὀδύνας ἐμβάλλειν. τί σε θέλεις ποιήσωμεν; οὐκ ἔχεις ποῦ τεθῇς. τί οὖν; οὐκ εἰσὶν αἱ γυναῖκες κοιναὶ φύσει; κἀγὼ λέγω. καὶ γὰρ τὸ χοιρίδιον κοινὸν τῶν κεκλημένων· ἀλλʼ ὅταν μέρη γένηται, ἄν σοι φανῇ, ἀνάρπασον ἀπελθὼν τὸ τοῦ παρακατακειμένου μέρος, λάθρᾳ κλέψον ἢ παρακαθεὶς τὴν χεῖρα λίχνευε, κἂν μὴ δύνῃ τοῦ κρέως ἀποσπάσαι, λίπαινε τοὺς δακτύλους καὶ περίλειχε. καλὸς συμπότης καὶ σύνδειπνος Σωκρατικός. ἄγε, τὸ δὲ θέατρον οὐκ ἔστι κοινὸν τῶν πολιτῶν; ὅταν οὖν καθίσωσιν, ἐλθών, ἄν σοι φανῇ, ἔκβαλέ τινα αὐτῶν. οὕτως καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες φύσει κοιναί. ὅταν δʼ ὁ νομοθέτης ὡς ἑστιάτωρ διέλῃ αὐτάς, οὐ θέλεις καὶ αὐτὸς ἴδιον μέρος ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀλλότριον ὑφαρπάζεις καὶ λιχνεύεις; ἀλλὰ φιλόλογός εἰμι καὶ Ἀρχέδημον νοῶ. Ἀρχέδημον τοίνυν νοῶν μοιχὸς ἴσθι καὶ ἄπιστος καὶ ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου λύκος ἢ πίθηκος. τί γὰρ κωλύει;

[¶41] 5. The materials of action are variable, but the use we make of them should be constant. How, then, shall one combine composure and tranquillity with energy; doing nothing rashly, nothing carelessly? By imitating those who play at games. The dice are variable; the pieces are variable. How do I know what will fall out? But it is my business to manage carefully and dexterously, whatever happens. Thus in life too, this is the chief business, to consider and discriminate things, and say, “Externals are not in my power; choice is. Where shall I seek good and evil? Within; in what is my own.” But in what is controlled by others, count nothing good or evil, profitable or hurtful, or any such thing. What, then; are we to treat these in a careless way? By no means; for this, on the other hand, would be a perversion of the will, and so contrary to nature. But we are to act with care, because the use of our materials is not indifferent; and at the same time with calmness and tranquillity, because the materials themselves are uncertain. For where a thing is not uncertain, there no one can restrain or compel me. Where I am capable of being restrained or compelled, the acquisition does not depend upon me; nor is it either good or evil. The use of it, indeed, is either good or evil; but that does depend upon me. It is difficult, I own, to blend and unite tranquillity in accepting, and energy in using, the facts of life; but it is not impossible; if it be, it is impossible to be happy. How do we act in a voyage? What is in my power? To choose the pilot, the sailors, the day, the hour. Afterwards comes a storm. What have I to care for? My part is performed. This matter belongs to another, to the pilot. But the ship is sinking; what then have I to do? That which alone I can do; I submit to being drowned, without fear, without clamor, or accusing God; but as one who knows that what is born must likewise die. For I am not eternity, but a man,—a part of the whole, as an hour is of the day. I must come like an hour, and like an hour must pass away. What signifies it whether by drowning or by a fever? For, in some way or other, pass I must. This you may see to be the practice of those who play skilfully at ball. No one strives for the ball itself, as either a good or an evil; but how he may throw and catch it again. Here lies the address, here the art, the nimbleness, the skill; lest I fail to catch it, even when I open my breast for it, while another catches it whenever I throw it. But if we catch or throw it in fear and trembling, what kind of play will this be? How shall we keep ourselves steady, or how see the order of the game? One will say, throw; another, do not throw; a third, you have thrown once already. This is a mere quarrel, not a play. Therefore Socrates well understood playing at ball. “What do you mean?” When he joked at his trial. “Tell me,” said he, “Anytus, how can you say that I do not believe in a God? What do you think demons are? Are they not either the offspring of the gods, or compounded of gods and men?” Yes. “Do you think, then, that one can believe there are mules, and not believe that there are asses?” This was just as if he had been playing at ball. And what was the ball he had to play with? Life, chains, exile, a draught of poison, separation from a wife, and leaving his children orphans. These were what he had to play with; and yet he did play, and threw the ball with address. Thus we should be careful as to the play, but indifferent as to the ball. We are by all means to manage our materials with art,—not taking them for the best, but showing our art about them, whatever they may happen to be. Thus a weaver does not make the wool, but employs his art upon what is given him. It is another who gives you food and property, and may take them away, and your paltry body too. Do you, however, work upon the materials you have received; and then, if you come off unhurt, others, no doubt, who meet you, will congratulate you on your escape. But he who has a clearer insight into such things will praise and congratulate you if he sees you to have done well; but if you owe your escape to any unbecoming action, he will do the contrary. For where there is a reasonable cause for rejoicing, there is cause likewise for congratulation. How, then, are some external circumstances said to be according to nature; others contrary to it? Only when we are viewed as isolated individuals. I will allow that it is natural for the foot (for instance) to be clean. But if you take it as a foot, and not as a mere isolated thing, it will be fit that it should walk in the dirt, and tread upon thorns; and sometimes that it should even be cut off, for the good of the whole; otherwise it is no longer a foot. We should reason in some such manner concerning ourselves. Who are you? A man. If then, indeed, you consider yourself isolatedly, it is natural that you should live to old age, should be prosperous and healthy; but if you consider yourself as a man, and as a part of the whole, it will be fit, in view of that whole, that you should at one time be sick; at another, take a voyage, and be exposed to danger; sometimes be in want; and possibly die before your time. Why, then, are you displeased? Do not you know that otherwise, just as the other ceases to be a foot, so you are no longer a man? For what is a man? A part of a commonwealth; first and chiefly of that which includes both gods and men; and next, of that to which you immediately belong, which is a miniature of the universal city. What, then; must I, at one time, go before a tribunal; must another, at another time, be scorched by a fever; another be exposed to the sea; another die; another be condemned? Yes; for it is impossible, in such a body, in such a world, and among such companions, but that some one or other of us must meet with such circumstances. Your business, then, is simply to say what you ought, to order things as the case requires. After this comes some one and says, “pronounce that you have acted unjustly.” Much good may it do you; I have done my part. You are to look to it, whether you have done yours; for you may as well understand that there is some danger in that quarter also.

> Greek: 5. αἱ ὗλαι ἀδιάφοροι, ἡ δὲ χρῆσις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀδιάφορος. πῶς οὖν τηρήσῃ τις ἅμα μὲν τὸ εὐσταθὲς καὶ ἀτάραχον, ἅμα δὲ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς καὶ μὴ εἰκαῖον μηδʼ ἐπισεσυρμένον; ἂν μιμῆται τοὺς κυβεύοντας. αἱ ψῆφοι ἀδιάφοροι, οἱ κύβοι ἀδιάφοροι· πόθεν οἶδα, τί μέλλει πίπτειν; τῷ πεσόντι δʼ ἐπιμελῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτο ἤδη ἐμὸν ἔργον ἐστίν. οὕτως τοίνυν τὸ μὲν προηγούμενον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου ἔργον ἐκεῖνο· δίελε τὰ πράγματα καὶ διάστησον καὶ εἰπὲ τὰ ἔξω οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐμοί· προαίρεσις ἐπʼ ἐμοί. ποῦ ζητήσω τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; ἔσω ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις μηδέποτε μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν ὀνομάσῃς μήτε κακὸν μήτʼ ὠφέλειαν μήτε βλάβην μήτʼ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. τί οὖν; ἀμελῶς τούτοις χρηστέον; οὐδαμῶς. τοῦτο γὰρ πάλιν τῇ προαιρέσει κακόν ἐστι καὶ ταύτῃ [τὴν] παρὰ φύσιν. ἀλλʼ ἅμα μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις οὐκ ἀδιάφορον, ἅμα δʼ εὐσταθῶς καὶ ἀταράχως, ὅτι ἡ ὕλη οὐ διαφέρουσα. ὅπου γὰρ τὸ διαφέρον, ἐκεῖ οὔτε κωλῦσαί μέ τις δύναται οὔτʼ ἀναγκάσαι. ὅπου κωλυτὸς καὶ ἀναγκαστός εἰμι, ἐκείνων ἡ μὲν τεῦξις οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ οὐδʼ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἡ χρῆσις δʼ ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἐμοί. δύσκολον δὲ μῖξαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν ταῦτα, ἐπιμέλειαν τοῦ προσπεπονθότος ταῖς ὕλαις καὶ εὐστάθειαν τοῦ ἀνεπιστρεπτοῦντος, πλὴν οὐκ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον τὸ εὐδαιμονῆσαι. ἀλλʼ οἷόν τι ἐπὶ τοῦ πλοῦ ποιοῦμεν. τί μοι δύναται; τὸ ἐκλέξασθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, τοὺς ναύτας, τὴν ἡμέραν, τὸν καιρόν. εἶτα χειμὼν ἐμπέπτωκεν. τί οὖν ἔτι μοι μέλει; τὰ γὰρ ἐμὰ ἐκπεπλήρωται. ἄλλου ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, τοῦ κυβερνήτου. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ναῦς καταδύεται. τί οὖν ἔχω ποιῆσαι; ὃ δύναμαι, τοῦτο μόνον ποιῶ· μὴ φοβούμενος ἀποπνίγομαι οὐδὲ κεκραγὼς οὐδʼ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλʼ εἰδώς, ὅτι τὸ γενόμενον καὶ φθαρῆναι δεῖ. οὐ γάρ εἰμι αἰών, ἀλλʼ ἄνθρωπος, μέρος τῶν πάντων ὡς ὥρα ἡμέρας. ἐνστῆναί με δεῖ ὡς τὴν ὥραν καὶ παρελθεῖν ὡς ὥραν. τί οὖν μοι διαφέρει πῶς παρέλθω, πότερον πνιγεὶς ἢ πυρέξας; διὰ γὰρ τοιούτου τινὸς δεῖ παρελθεῖν με. τοῦτο ὄψει ποιοῦντας καὶ τοὺς σφαιρίζοντας ἐμπείρως. οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν διαφέρεται περὶ τοῦ ἁρπαστοῦ ὡς περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ βάλλειν καὶ δέχεσθαι. λοιπὸν ἐν τούτῳ ἡ εὐρυθμία, ἐν τούτῳ ἡ τέχνη, τὸ τάχος, ἡ εὐγνωμοσύνη, ἵνʼ ἐγώ, μηδʼ ἂν τὸν κόλπον ἐκτείνω, δύναμαι λαβεῖν αὐτό, ὁ δέ, ἂν βάλω, λαμβάνει. ἂν δὲ μετὰ ταραχῆς καὶ φόβου δεχώμεθα ἢ βάλλωμεν αὐτό, ποία ἔτι παιδιά, ποῦ δέ τις εὐσταθήσει, ποῦ δέ τις τὸ ἑξῆς ὄψεται ἐν αὐτῇ; ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν ἐρεῖ βάλε, ὁ δὲ μὴ βάλῃς, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀνέβαλες. τοῦτο δὴ μάχη ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ παιδιά. τοιγαροῦν Σωκράτης ᾔδει σφαιρίζειν. πῶς; παίζειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. λέγε μοι, φησίν, Ἄνυτε, πῶς με φῂς θεὸν οὐ νομίζειν; οἱ δαίμονές σοι τίνες εἶναι δοκοῦσιν; οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεῶν παῖδές εἰσιν ἢ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν μεμιγμένοι τινές; ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ τίς οὖν σοι δοκεῖ δύνασθαι ἡμιόνους μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι, ὄνους δὲ μή; ὡς ἁρπαστίῳ παίζων. καὶ τί ἐκεῖ ἐν μέσῳ ἁρπάστιον τότʼ ἦν; τὸ δεδέσθαι, τὸ φυγαδευθῆναι, τὸ πιεῖν φάρμακον, τὸ γυναικὸς ἀφαιρεθῆναι, τὸ τέκνα ὀρφανὰ καταλιπεῖν. ταῦτα ἦν ἐν μέσῳ οἷς ἔπαιζεν, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔπαιζεν καὶ ἐσφαίριζεν εὐρύθμως. οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς τὴν μὲν ἐπιμέλειαν σφαιριστικωτάτην, τὴν δʼ ἀδιαφορίαν ὡς ὑπὲρ ἁρπαστίου. δεῖ γὰρ πάντως περί τινα τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑλῶν φιλοτεχνεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκείνην ἀποδεχόμενον, ἀλλʼ οἵα ἂν ᾖ ἐκείνη, τὴν περὶ αὐτὴν φιλοτεχνίαν ἐπιδεικνύοντα. οὕτως καὶ ὁ ὑφάντης οὐκ ἔρια ποιεῖ, ἀλλʼ οἷα ἂν παραλάβῃ περὶ αὐτὰ φιλοτεχνεῖ. ἄλλος σοι δίδωσι τροφὰς καὶ κτῆσιν καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δύναται ἀφελέσθαι καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον αὐτό. σὺ λοιπὸν παραλαβὼν τὴν ὕλην ἐργάζου. εἶτα ἂν ἐξέλθῃς μηδὲν παθών, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἀπαντῶντές σοι συγχαρήσονται ὅτι ἐσώθης, ὁ δʼ εἰδὼς βλέπειν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἂν μὲν ἴδῃ ὅτι εὐσχημόνως ἀνεστράφης ἐν τούτῳ, ἐπαινέσει καὶ συνησθήσεται· ἂν δὲ διʼ ἀσχημοσύνην τινὰ διασεσωσμένον, τὰ ἐναντία. ὅπου γὰρ τὸ χαίρειν εὐλόγως, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν. πῶς οὖν λέγεται τῶν ἐκτός τινα κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἀπόλυτοι ἦμεν. τῷ γὰρ ποδὶ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι ἐρῶ τὸ καθαρῷ εἶναι, ἀλλʼ, ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς πόδα λάβῃς καὶ ὡς μὴ ἀπόλυτον, καθήξει αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς πηλὸν ἐμβαίνειν καὶ ἀκάνθας πατῆσαι καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε ἀποκοπῆναι ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὅλου· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκέτι ἔσται πούς. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐφʼ ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν δεῖ. τί εἶ; ἄνθρωπος. εἰ μὲν ὡς ἀπόλυτον σκοπεῖς, κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ ζῆσαι μέχρι γήρως, πλουτεῖν, ὑγιαίνειν. εἰ δʼ ὡς ἄνθρωπον σκοπεῖς καὶ μέρος ὅλου τινός, διʼ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὅλον νῦν μέν σοι νοσῆσαι καθήκει, νῦν δὲ πλεῦσαι καὶ κινδυνεῦσαι, νῦν δʼ ἀπορηθῆναι, πρὸ ὥρας δʼ ἔστιν ὅτʼ ἀποθανεῖν. τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς; οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι ὡς ἐκεῖνος οὐκέτι ἔσται πούς, οὕτως οὐδὲ σὺ ἄνθρωπος; τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; μέρος πόλεως, πρώτης μὲν τῆς ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τῆς ὡς ἔγγιστα λεγομένης, ἥ τί ἐστι μικρὸν τῆς ὅλης μίμημα. νῦν οὖν ἐμὲ κρίνεσθαι; νῦν οὖν ἄλλον πυρέσσειν, ἄλλον πλεῖν, ἄλλον ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἄλλον κατακεκρίσθαι; ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐν τοιούτῳ σώματι, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ περιέχοντι, τούτοις τοῖς συζῶσιν μὴ συμπίπτειν ἄλλοις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. σὸν οὖν ἔργον ἐλθόντα εἰπεῖν ἃ δεῖ, διαθέσθαι ταῦτα ὡς ἐπιβάλλει. εἶτα ἐκεῖνος λέγει κρίνω σε ἀδικεῖν. εὖ σοι γένοιτο. ἐποίησα ἐγὼ τὸ ἐμόν, εἰ δὲ καὶ σὺ τὸ σὸν ἐποίησας, ὄψει αὐτός. ἔστι γάρ τις κἀκείνου κίνδυνος, μή σε λανθανέτω.

[¶42] 6. A process of reasoning may be an indifferent thing; but our judgment concerning it is not indifferent; for it is either knowledge, or opinion, or mistake. So the events of life occur indifferently, but the use of it is not indifferent. When you are told, therefore, that these things are indifferent, do not, on that account, ever be careless; nor yet, when you are governed by prudence, be abject, and dazzled by externals. It is good to know your own qualifications and powers; that, where you are not qualified, you may be quiet, and not angry that others have there the advantage of you. For you too will think it reasonable, that you should have the advantage in the art of reasoning; and, if others should be angry at it, you will tell them, by way of consolation, “This I have learned, and you have not.” Thus too, wherever practice is necessary, do not pretend to what can only be attained by practice; but leave the matter to those who are practised, and do you be contented in your own serenity. “Go, for instance, and pay your court to such a person.” How? I will not do it abjectly. So I find myself shut out; for I have not learned to get in at the window, and finding the door shut, I must necessarily either go back, or get in at the window. “But speak to him at least.” I am willing. “In what manner?” Not basely at any rate. “Well, you have failed.” This is not your business, but his. Why do you claim what belongs to another? Always remember what is your own, and what is another’s, and you will never be disturbed. Hence Chrysippus rightly says: While consequences are uncertain, I will keep to those things which will bring me most in harmony with nature; for God himself hath formed me to choose this. If I knew that it was inevitable for me to be sick, I would conform my inclinations that way; for even the foot, if it had understanding, would be inclined to get into the dirt. For why are ears of corn produced, if it be not to ripen? And why do they ripen, if not to be reaped? For they are not isolated, individual things. If they were capable of sense, do you think they would wish never to be reaped? It would be a curse upon ears of corn not to be reaped, and we ought to know that it would be a curse upon man not to die; like that of not ripening, and not being reaped. Since, then, it is necessary for us to be reaped, and we have at the same time understanding to know it, are we angry at it? This is only because we neither know what we are, nor have we studied what belongs to man, as jockeys do what belongs to horses. Yet Chrysantas, when he was about to strike an enemy, on hearing the trumpet sound a retreat, drew back his hand; for he thought it more eligible to obey the command of his general, than his own inclination. But not one of us, even when necessity calls, is ready and willing to obey it; but we weep and groan over painful events, calling them our “circumstances.” What circumstances, man? For if you call what surrounds you circumstances, everything is a circumstance; but if by this you mean hardships, where is the hardship, that whatever is born must die? The instrument is either a sword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant; and what does it signify to you by what way you descend to Hades? All are equal; but, if you would hear the truth, the shortest is that by which a tyrant sends you. No tyrant was ever six months in cutting any man’s throat; but a fever often takes a year. All these things are mere sound, and the tumor of empty names. “My life is in danger from Caesar.” And am I not in danger, who dwell at Nicopolis, where there are so many earthquakes? And when you yourself recross the Adriatic, what is then in danger? Is it not your life? “Ay, and my convictions also.” What, your own? How so? Can any one compel you to have any convictions contrary to your own inclination? “But the convictions of others too.” And what danger is it of yours, if others have false convictions? “But I am in danger of being banished.” What is it to be banished? Only to be somewhere else than at Rome. “Yes; but what if I should be sent to Gyaros?” If it be thought best for you, you will go; if not, there is another place than Gyaros whither you are sure to go,—where he who now sends you to Gyaros must go likewise, whether he will or not. Why, then, do you come to these, as to great trials? They are not equal to your powers. So that an ingenuous young man would say, it was not worth while for this to have read and written so much, and to have sat so long listening to this old man. Only remember the distinction between what is your own and what is not your own, and you will never claim what belongs to others. Judicial bench or dungeon, each is but a place,—one high, the other low; but your will is equal to either condition, and if you have a mind to keep it so, it may be so kept. We shall then become imitators of Socrates, when, even in a prison, we are able to write hymns of praise; but as we now are, consider whether we could even bear to have another say to us in prison, “Shall I read you a hymn of praise?” “Why do you trouble me; do you not know my sad situation? In such circumstances, am I able to hear hymns?” What circumstances? “I am going to die.” And are all other men to be immortal?

> Greek: 6. τὸ συνημμένον ἀδιάφορον· ἡ κρίσις ἡ περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀδιάφορος, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ ἀπάτη. οὕτως τὸ ζῆν ἀδιάφορον, ἡ χρῆσις οὐκ ἀδιάφορος. μή ποτʼ οὖν, ὅταν εἴπῃ τις ὑμῖν ἀδιαφορεῖν καὶ ταῦτα, ἀμελεῖς γίνεσθε, μήθʼ ὅταν εἰς ἐπιμέλειάν τις ὑμᾶς παρακαλῇ, ταπεινοὶ καὶ τᾶς ὕλας τεθαυμακότες. καλὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν αὑτοῦ παρασκευὴν καὶ δύναμιν, ἵνʼ ἐν οἷς μὴ παρεσκεύασαι, ἡσυχίαν ἄγῃς μηδʼ ἀγανακτῇς, εἴ τινες ἄλλοι πλεῖόν σου ἔχουσιν ἐν ἐκείνοις. καὶ γὰρ σὺ ἐν συλλογισμοῖς πλεῖον ἀξιώσεις σεαυτὸν ἔχειν κἂν ἀγανακτῶσιν ἐπὶ τούτῳ, παραμυθήσῃ αὐτούς· ἐγὼ ἔμαθον, ὑμεῖς δʼ οὔ. οὕτως καί, ὅπου τινὸς χρεία τριβῆς, μὴ ζήτει τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς χρείας περιγινόμενον, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνου μὲν παραχώρει τοῖς περιτετριμμένοις, σοὶ δʼ ἀρκείτω τὸ εὐσταθεῖν. ἄπελθε καὶ ἄσπασαι τὸν δεῖνα. ἀσπάζομαι. πῶς; οὐ ταπεινῶς. ἀλλʼ ἐξεκλείσθης. διὰ θυρίδος γὰρ οὐκ ἔμαθον εἰσέρχεσθαι. ὅταν δὲ κεκλειμένην εὕρω τὴν θύραν, ἀνάγκη μʼ ἢ ἀποχωρῆσαι ἢ διὰ τῆς θυρίδος εἰσελθεῖν. ἀλλὰ καὶ λάλησον αὐτῷ. λαλῶ. τίνα τρόπον; οὐ ταπεινῶς. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐπέτυχες. μὴ γὰρ σὸν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ἦν; ἀλλʼ ἐκείνου. τί οὖν ἀντιποιῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου; ἀεὶ μεμνημένος ὅ τι σὸν καὶ τί ἀλλότριον [καὶ] οὐ ταραχθήσῃ. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὁ Χρύσιππος λέγει ὅτι μέχρις ἂν ἄδηλά μοι ᾖ τὰ ἑξῆς, ἀεὶ τῶν εὐφυεστέρων ἔχομαι πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· αὐτὸς γάρ μʼ ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν τούτων ἐκλεκτικόν. εἰ δέ γε ᾔδειν ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι καθείμαρται νῦν, καὶ ὥρμων ἂν ἐπʼ αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πούς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὥρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλοῦσθαι. ἐπεί τοι τίνος ἕνεκα γίνονται στάχυες; οὐχ ἵνα καὶ ξηρανθῶσιν; ἀλλὰ ξηραίνονται μέν, οὐχ ἵνα δὲ καὶ θερισθῶσιν; οὐ γὰρ ἀπόλυτοι γίνονται. εἰ οὖν αἴσθησιν εἶχον, εὔχεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἔδει, ἵνα μὴ θερισθῶσιν μηδέποτε; τοῦτο δὲ κατάρα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ σταχύων τὸ μηδέποτε θερισθῆναι. οὕτως ἴστε ὅτι καὶ ἐπʼ ἀνθρώπων κατάρα ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν· ὅμοιον τῷ μὴ πεπανθῆναι, μὴ θερισθῆναι. ἡμεῖς δʼ ἐπειδὴ οἱ αὐτοί ἐσμεν, ἅμα μὲν οὓς δεῖ θερισθῆναι, ἅμα δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ παρακολουθοῦντες ὅτι θεριζόμεθα, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγανακτοῦμεν. οὔτε γὰρ ἴσμεν τίνες ἐσμὲν οὔτε μεμελετήκαμεν τὰ ἀνθρωπικὰ ὡς ἱππικοὶ τὰ ἱππικά. ἀλλὰ Χρυσάντας μὲν παίειν μέλλων τὸν πολέμιον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς σάλπιγγος ἤκουσεν ἀνακαλούσης, ἀνέσχεν· οὕτως προυργιαίτερον ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ τὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πρόσταγμα ἢ τὸ ἴδιον ποιεῖν· ἡμῶν δʼ οὐδεὶς θέλει οὐδὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης καλούσης εὐλύτως ὑπακοῦσαι αὐτῇ, ἀλλὰ κλάοντες καὶ στένοντες πάσχομεν ἃ πάσχομεν καὶ περιστάσεις αὐτὰ καλοῦντες. ποίας περιστάσεις, ἄνθρωπε; εἰ περιστάσεις λέγεις τὰ περιεστηκότα, πάντα περιστάσεις εἰσίν· εἰ δʼ ὡς δύσκολα καλεῖς, ποίαν δυσκολίαν ἔχει τὸ γενόμενον φθαρῆναι; τὸ δὲ φθεῖρον ἢ μάχαιρά ἐστιν ἢ τροχὸς ἢ θάλασσα ἢ κεραμὶς ἢ τύραννος. τί σοι μέλει, ποίᾳ ὁδῷ καταβῇς εἰς Ἅιδου; ἴσαι πᾶσαί εἰσιν. εἰ δὲ θέλεις ἀκοῦσαι τἀληθῆ, συντομωτέρα ἣν πέμπει ὁ τύραννος. οὐδέποτʼ οὐδεὶς τύραννος ἓξ μησίν τινα ἔσφαξεν, πυρετὸς δὲ καὶ ἐνιαυτῷ πολλάκις. ψόφος ἐστὶ πάντα ταῦτα καὶ κόμπος κενῶν ὀνομάτων. τῇ κεφαλῇ κινδυνεύω ἐπὶ Καίσαρος. ἐγὼ δʼ οὐ κινδυνεύω, ὃς οἰκῶ ἐν Νικοπόλει, ὅπου σεισμοὶ τοσοῦτοι; σὺ δʼ αὐτὸς ὅταν διαπλέῃς τὸν Ἀδρίαν, τί κινδυνεύεις; οὐ τῇ κεφαλῇ; ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ὑπολήψει κινδυνεύω. τῇ σῇ; πῶς; τίς γάρ σε ἀναγκάσαι δύναται ὑπολαβεῖν τι ὧν οὐ θέλεις; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ; καὶ ποῖός ἐστι κίνδυνος σὸς ἄλλους τὰ ψεύδη ὑπολαβεῖν; ἀλλʼ ἐξορισθῆναι κινδυνεύω. τί ἐστιν ἐξορισθῆναι; ἀλλαχοῦ εἶναι ἢ ἐν Ῥώμῃ; ναί. τί οὖν; ἂν εἰς Γύαρα πεμφθῶ; ἄν σοι ποιῇ, ἀπελεύσῃ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔχεις ποῦ ἀντὶ Γυάρων ἀπέλθῃς, ὅπου κἀκεῖνος ἐλεύσεται, ἄν τε θέλῃ ἄν τε μή, ὁ πέμπων σε εἰς Γύαρα. τί λοιπὸν ὡς ἐπὶ μεγάλα ἀνέρχῃ; μικρότερά ἐστι τῆς παρασκευῆς, ἵνʼ εἴπῃ νέος εὐφυὴς ὅτι οὐκ ἦν τοσούτου τοσούτων μὲν ἀκηκοέναι, τοσαῦτα δὲ γεγραφέναι, τοσούτῳ δὲ χρόνῳ παρακεκαθικέναι γεροντίῳ οὐ πολλοῦ ἀξίῳ. μόνον ἐκείνης τῆς διαιρέσεως μέμνησο, καθʼ ἣν διορίζεται τὰ σὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ σά. μή ποτʼ ἀντιποιήσῃ τινὸς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. βῆμα καὶ φυλακὴ τόπος ἐστὶν ἑκάτερον, ὁ μὲν ὑψηλός, ὁ δὲ ταπεινός· ἡ προαίρεσις δʼ ἴση, ἂν ἴσην αὐτὴν ἐν ἑκατέρῳ φυλάξαι θέλῃς, δύναται φυλαχθῆναι. καὶ τότʼ ἐσόμεθα ζηλωταὶ Σωκράτους, ὅταν ἐν φυλακῇ δυνώμεθα παιᾶνας γράφειν. μέχρι δὲ νῦν ὡς ἔχομεν, ὅρα εἰ ἠνεσχόμεθʼ ἂν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ ἄλλου τινὸς ἡμῖν λέγοντος θέλεις ἀναγνῶ σοι παιᾶνας; τί μοι πράγματα παρέχεις; οὐκ οἶδας τὰ ἔχοντά με κακά; ἐν τούτοις γάρ μοι ἔστιν — ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἀποθνῄσκειν μέλλω. ἄνθρωποι δʼ ἄλλοι ἀθάνατοι ἔσονται;

## 8. Book II · chapters 7–11

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/8/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/8/#p-N

[¶0] 7. From an unseasonable regard to divination, we omit many duties; for what can the diviner contemplate besides death, danger, sickness, and such matters? When it is necessary, then, to expose one’s self to danger for a friend, or even a duty to die for him, what occasion have I for divination? Have not I a diviner within, who has told me the essence of good and evil, and who explains to me the indications of both? What further need, then, have I of signs or auguries? Can I tolerate the other diviner, when he says, “This is for your interest”? For does he know what is for my interest? Does he know what good is? Has he learned the indications of good and evil, as he has those of the victims? If so, he knows the indications likewise of fair and base, just and unjust. You may predict to me, sir, what is to befall me,—life or death, riches or poverty. But whether these things are for my interest or not, I shall not inquire of you. “Why?” Because you cannot even give an opinion about points of grammar; and do you give it here, in things about which all men differ and dispute? Therefore the lady who was going to send a month’s provision to Gratilla, in *her banishment, made a right answer to one who told her that Domitian would seize it. “I had rather,” said she, “that he should seize it, than I not send it.” What, then, is it that leads us so often to divination? Cowardice; the dread of events. Hence we flatter the diviners. “Pray, sir, shall I inherit my father’s estate?” “Let us see; let us sacrifice upon the occasion.” “Nay, sir, just as fortune pleases.” Then if he predicts that we shall inherit it, we give him thanks, as if we received the inheritance from him. The consequence of this is, that they impose upon us. What, then, is to be done? We should come without previous desire or aversion; as a traveller inquires the road of the person he meets, without any desire for that which turns to the right hand, more than for that to the left; for he wishes for neither of these, but only for that road which leads him properly. Thus we should come to God as to a guide,—just as we make use of our eyes; not persuading them to show us one object rather than another, but receiving such as they present to us. But now we conduct the augury with fear and trembling, and in our invocations to God, entreat him: “Lord, have mercy upon me, suffer me to come off safe.” Foolish man! would you have anything then but what is best? And what is best but what pleases God? Why would you then, so far as in you lies, corrupt your judge and seduce your adviser?

> Greek: 7. διὰ τὸ ἀκαίρως μαντεύεσθαι πολλοὶ καθήκοντα πολλὰ παραλείπομεν. τί γὰρ ὁ μάντις δύναται πλέον ἰδεῖν θανάτου ἢ κινδύνου ἢ νόσου ἢ ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων; ἂν οὖν δέῃ κινδυνεῦσαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ φίλου, ἂν δὲ καὶ ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καθήκῃ, ποῦ μοι καιρὸς ἔτι μαντεύεσθαι; οὐκ ἔχω τὸν μάντιν ἔσω τὸν εἰρηκότα μοι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, τὸν ἐξηγημένον τὰ σημεῖα ἀμφοτέρων; τί οὖν ἔτι χρείαν ἔχω τῶν σπλάγχνων ἢ τῶν οἰωνῶν; ἀλλʼ ἀνέχομαι λέγοντος ἐκείνου συμφέρει σοι; τί γάρ ἐστι συμφέρον οἶδεν; τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν οἶδεν; μεμάθηκεν ὥσπερ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν σπλάγχνων οὕτως σημεῖα τίνα ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν; εἰ γὰρ τούτων οἶδεν σημεῖα, καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν οἶδεν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων. ἄνθρωπε, σύ μοι λέγε τί σημαίνεται, ζωὴ ἢ θάνατος, πενία ἢ πλοῦτος· πότερον δὲ συμφέρει ταῦτα ἢ ἀσύμφορά ἐστιν, σοῦ μέλλω πυνθάνεσθαι; διὰ τί ἐν γραμματικοῖς οὐ λέγεις; ἐνθάδʼ οὖν, ὅπου πάντες ἄνθρωποι πλανώμεθα καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μαχόμεθα; διὰ τοῦτο ἡ γυνὴ καλῶς εἶπεν ἡ πέμψαι θέλουσα τῇ Γρατίλλῃ ἐξωρισμένῃ τὸ πλοῖον τῶν ἐπιμηνίων κατὰ τὸν εἰπόντα ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται αὐτὰ Δομιτιανὸς μᾶλλον θέλω, φησίν, ἵνʼ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὰ ἀφέληται ἢ ἵνʼ ἐγὼ μὴ πέμψω. τί οὖν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ οὕτω συνεχῶς μαντεύεσθαι ἄγει; ἡ δειλία, τὸ φοβεῖσθαι τὰς ἐκβάσεις. διὰ τοῦτο κολακεύομεν τοὺς μάντεις· κληρονομήσω, κύριε, τὸν πατέρα; ἴδωμεν· ἐπεκθυσώμεθα. ναί, κύριε, ὡς ἡ τύχη θέλει. εἶτʼ ἂν εἴπῃ κληρονομήσεις, ὡς παρʼ αὐτοῦ τὴν κληρονομίαν εἰληφότες εὐχαριστοῦμεν αὐτῷ. διὰ τοῦτο κἀκεῖνοι λοιπὸν ἐμπαίζουσιν ἡμῖν. τί οὖν; δεῖ δίχα ὀρέξεως ἔρχεσθαι καὶ ἐκκλίσεως, ὡς ὁ ὁδοιπόρος πυνθάνεται παρὰ τοῦ ἀπαντήσαντος, ποτέρα[ν] τῶν ὁδῶν φέρει, οὐκ ἔχων ὄρεξιν πρὸς τὸ τὴν δεξιὰν μᾶλλον φέρειν ἢ τὴν ἀριστεράν· οὐ γὰρ τούτων τινὰ ἀπελθεῖν θέλει, ἀλλὰ τὴν φέρουσαν. οὕτως ἔδει καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν ἔρχεσθαι ὡς ὁδηγόν, ὡς τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς χρώμεθα, οὐ παρακαλοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἵνα τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον ἡμῖν δεικνύωσιν, ἀλλʼ οἷα ἐνδείκνυνται τούτων τὰς φαντασίας δεχόμενοι. νῦν δὲ τρέμοντες τὸ ὀρνιθάριον κρατοῦμεν καὶ τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενοι δεόμεθα αὐτοῦ· κύριε, ἐλέησον· ἐπίτρεψόν μοι ἐξελθεῖν. ἀνδράποδον, ἄλλο γάρ τι θέλεις ἢ τὸ ἄμεινον; ἄλλο οὖν τι ἄμεινον ἢ τὸ τῷ θεῷ δοκοῦν; τί τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ σοὶ διαφθείρεις τὸν κριτήν, παράγεις τὸν σύμβουλον;

[¶1] 8. God is beneficial. Good is also beneficial. It should seem, then, that where the essence of God is, there too is the essence of good. What then is the essence of God,—flesh? By no means. An estate? Fame? By no means. Intelligence? Knowledge? Right reason? Certainly. Here, then, without more ado, seek the essence of good. For do you seek that quality in a plant? No. Or in a brute? No. If, then, you seek it only in a rational subject, why do you seek it anywhere but in what distinguishes that from things irrational? Plants make no voluntary use of things, and therefore you do not apply the term of good to them. Good, then, implies such use. And nothing else? If so, you may say that good and-happiness and unhappiness belong to mere animals. But this you do not say, and you are right; for, how much soever they have the use of things, they have not the intelligent use, and with good reason; for they are made to be subservient to others, and not of primary importance. Why was an ass made? Was it as being of primary importance? No; but because we had need of a back able to carry burdens. We had need too that he should be capable of locomotion; therefore he had the voluntary use of things added, otherwise he could not have moved. But here his endowments end; for, if an understanding of that use had been likewise added, he would not, in reason, have been subject to us, nor have done us these services, but would have been like and equal to ourselves. Why will you not, therefore, seek the essence of good in that without which you cannot say that there is good in anything? What then? Are not all these likewise the works of the gods? They are; but not primary existences, nor parts of the gods. But you are a primary existence. You are a distinct portion of the essence of God, and contain a certain part of him in yourself. Why then are you ignorant of your noble birth? Why do not you consider whence you came? Why do not you remember, when you are eating, who you are who eat, and whom you feed? When you are in the company of women, when you are conversing, when you are exercising, when you are disputing, do not you know that it is the Divine you feed, the Divine you exercise? You carry a God about with you, poor wretch, and know nothing of it. Do you suppose I mean some god without you of gold or silver? It is within yourself that you carry him; and you do not observe that you profane him by impure thoughts and unclean actions. If the mere external image of God were present, you would not dare to act as you do; and when God himself is within you, and hears and sees all, are not you ashamed to think and act thus,—insensible of your own nature, and at enmity with God? Why, then, are we afraid, when we send a young man from the school into active life, that he should behave indecently, eat indecently, converse indecently with women; that he should either debase himself by slovenliness, or clothe himself too finely? Knows he not the God within him? Knows he not in what company he goes? It is provoking to hear him say [to his instructor], “wish to have you with me.” Have you not God? Do you seek any other, while you have him? Or will He tell you any other things than these? If you were a statue of Phidias. as Zeus or Athena, you would remember both yourself and the artist; and if you had any sense, you would endeavor to be in no way unworthy of him who formed you, nor of yourself; nor to appear in an unbecoming manner to spectators. And are you now careless how you appear when you are the workmanship of Zeus himself? And yet, what comparison is there, either between the artists, or the things they have formed? What work of any artist has conveyed into its structure those very faculties which are shown in shaping it? Is it anything but marble, or brass, or gold, or ivory? And the Athena of Phidias, when its hand is once extended, and a Victory placed in it, remains in that attitude forever. But the works of God are endowed with motion, breath, the powers of use and judgment. Being, then, the work of such an artist, will you dishonor him, especially when he hath not only formed you, but given your guardianship to yourself? Will you not only be forgetful of this, but, moreover, dishonor the trust? If God had committed some orphan to your charge, would you have been thus careless of him? He has delivered yourself to your care; and says, “had no one fitter to be trusted than you; preserve this person for me, such as he is by nature,—modest, faithful, noble, unterrified, dispassionate, tranquil.” And will you not preserve him? But it will be said: “What need of this lofty look, and dignity of face?” I answer, that I have not yet so much dignity as the case demands; for I do not yet trust to what I have learned, and accepted. I still fear my own weakness. Let me but take courage a little, and then you shall see such a look, and such an appearance, as I ought to have. Then I will show you the statue when it is finished, when it is polished. Do you think I will show you a supercilious countenance? Heaven forbid! For Olympian Zeus doth not haughtily lift his brow, but keeps a steady countenance, as becomes him who is about to say,—
My promise is irrevocable, sure. Such will I show myself to you; faithful, modest, noble, tranquil. “What, and immortal too, and exempt from age and sickness?” No. But sickening and dying as becomes the divine within me. This is in my power; this I can do. The other is not in my power, nor can I do it. Shall I show you the muscular training of a philosopher? “What muscles are those?” A will undisappointed, evils avoided, powers duly exerted, careful resolutions, unerring decisions. These you shall see.

> Greek: 8. ὁ θεὸς ὠφέλιμος· ἀλλὰ καὶ τἀγαθὸν ὠφέλιμον. εἰκὸς οὖν, ὅπου ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. τίς οὖν οὐσία θεοῦ; σάρξ; μὴ γένοιτο. ἀγρός; μὴ γένοιτο. φήμη; μὴ γένοιτο. νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, λόγος ὀρθός. ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν ἁπλῶς ζήτει τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπεί τοι μή τι αὐτὴν ἐν φυτῷ ζητεῖς; οὔ. μή τι ἐν ἀλόγῳ; οὔ. ἐν λογικῷ οὖν ζητῶν τί ἔτι ἀλλαχοῦ ζητεῖς ἢ ἐν τῇ παραλλαγῇ τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα; τὰ φυτὰ οὐδὲ φαντασίαις χρηστικά ἐστιν· διὰ τοῦτο οὐ λέγεις ἐπʼ αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν. δεῖται οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν χρήσεως φαντασιῶν. ἆρά γε μόνης; εἰ γὰρ μόνης, λέγε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν. νῦν δʼ οὐ λέγεις καὶ καλῶς ποιεῖς· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα χρῆσιν φαντασιῶν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ παρακολούθησίν γε τῇ χρήσει τῶν φαντασιῶν οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰκότως. ὑπηρετικὰ γὰρ γέγονεν ἄλλοις, οὐκ αὐτὰ προηγούμενα. ὁ ὄνος ἐπεὶ γέγονεν μή τι προηγουμένως; οὔ· ἀλλʼ ὅτι νώτου χρείαν. εἴχομεν βαστάζειν τι δυναμένου. ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία καὶ περιπατοῦντος αὐτοῦ χρείαν εἴχομεν· διὰ τοῦτο προσείληφε καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι φαντασίαις· ἄλλως γὰρ περιπατεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο. καὶ λοιπὸν αὐτοῦ που πέπαυται. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτός που προσειλήφει παρακολούθησιν τῇ χρήσει τῶν φαντασιῶν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ λόγον οὐκέτʼ ἂν ἡμῖν ὑπετέτακτο οὐδὲ τὰς χρείας ταύτας παρεῖχεν, ἀλλʼ ἦν ἂν ἴσος ἡμῖν καὶ ὅμοιος. οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἐκεῖ ζητεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὗ μὴ παρόντος ἐπʼ οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων θέλεις λέγειν τὸ ἀγαθόν; τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστι θεῶν ἔργα κἀκεῖνα; ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ προηγούμενα οὐδὲ μέρη θεῶν. σὺ δὲ προηγούμενον εἶ, σὺ ἀπόσπασμα εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ· ἔχεις τι ἐν σεαυτῷ μέρος ἐκείνου. τί οὖν ἀγνοεῖς σου τὴν συγγένειαν; τί οὐκ οἶδας, πόθεν ἐλήλυθας; οὐ θέλεις μεμνῆσθαι, ὅταν ἐσθίῃς, τίς ὢν ἐσθίεις καὶ τίνα τρέφεις; ὅταν συνουσίᾳ χρῇ, τίς ὢν χρῇ; ὅταν ὁμιλίᾳ; ὅταν γυμνάζῃ, ὅταν διαλέγῃ, οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι θεὸν τρέφεις, θεὸν γυμνάζεις; θεὸν περιφέρεις, τάλας, καὶ ἀγνοεῖς. δοκεῖς με λέγειν ἀργυροῦν τινα ἢ χρυσοῦν ἔξωθεν; ἐν σαυτῷ φέρεις αὐτὸν καὶ μολύνων οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ἀκαθάρτοις μὲν διανοήμασι, ῥυπαραῖς δὲ πράξεσι. καὶ ἀγάλματος μὲν τοῦ θεοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἂν τολμήσαις τι τούτων ποιεῖν ὧν ποιεῖς. αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ παρόντος ἔσωθεν καὶ ἐφορῶντος πάντα καὶ ἐπακούοντος οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ταῦτα ἐνθυμούμενος καὶ ποιῶν, ἀναίσθητε τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως καὶ θεοχόλωτε; λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς τί φοβούμεθα ἐκπέμποντες νέον ἐπί τινας πράξεις ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς, μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσῃ τι, μὴ ἄλλως φάγῃ, μὴ ἄλλως συνουσιάσῃ, μὴ ταπεινώσῃ αὐτὸν ῥάκη περιτεθέντα, μὴ ἐπάρῃ κομψὰ ἱμάτια; οὗτος οὐκ οἶδεν αὑτοῦ θεόν, οὗτος οὐκ οἶδεν, μετὰ τίνος ἀπέρχεται. ἀλλʼ ἀνεχόμεθα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ σὲ ἤθελον ἔχειν; ἐκεῖ τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἔχεις; εἶτʼ ἄλλον τινὰ ζητεῖς ἐκεῖνον ἔχων; ἢ ἄλλα σοι ἐρεῖ ἐκεῖνος ἢ ταῦτα; ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν τὸ ἄγαλμα ἦς τὸ Φειδίου, ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ ἢ ὁ Ζεύς, ἐμέμνησο ἂν καὶ σαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ τεχνίτου καὶ εἴ τινα αἴσθησιν εἶχες, ἐπειρῶ ἂν μηδὲν [ἂν] ἀνάξιον ποιεῖν τοῦ κατασκευάσαντος μηδὲ σεαυτοῦ μηδʼ ἐν ἀπρεπεῖ σχήματι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ὁρῶσι· νῦν δέ σε ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς πεποίηκεν, διὰ τοῦτο ἀμελεῖς οἷόν τινα δείξεις σεαυτόν; καὶ τί ὁ τεχνίτης τῷ τεχνίτῃ ὅμοιος ἢ τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῷ κατασκευάσματι; καὶ ποῖον ἔργον τεχνίτου εὐθὺς ἔχει τὰς δυνάμεις ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἃς ἐμφαίνει διὰ τῆς κατασκευῆς; οὐχὶ λίθος ἐστὶν ἢ χαλκὸς ἢ χρυσὸς ἢ ἐλέφας; καὶ ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ ἡ Φειδίου ἅπαξ ἐκτείνασα τὴν χεῖρα καὶ τὴν Νίκην ἐπʼ αὐτῆς δεξαμένη ἕστηκεν οὕτως ὅλῳ τῷ αἰῶνι, τὰ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ κινούμενα, ἔμπνοα, χρηστικὰ φαντασιῶν, δοκιμαστικά. τούτου τοῦ δημιουργοῦ κατασκεύασμα ὢν καταισχύνεις αὐτό; τί δʼ; ὅτι οὐ μόνον σε κατεσκεύασεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοὶ μόνῳ ἐπίστευσεν καὶ παρακατέθετο, οὐδὲ τούτου μεμνήσῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταισχυνεῖς τὴν ἐπιτροπήν; εἰ δέ σοι ὀρφανόν τινα ὁ θεὸς παρέθετο, οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἠμέλεις; παραδέδωκέ σοι σεαυτὸν καὶ λέγει οὐκ εἶχον ἄλλον πιστότερόν σου· τοῦτόν μοι φύλασσε τοιοῦτον οἷος πέφυκεν, αἰδήμονα, πιστόν, ὑψηλόν, ἀκατάπληκτον, ἀπαθῆ, ἀτάραχον. εἶτα σὺ οὐ φυλάσσεις; ἀλλʼ ἐροῦσιν· πόθεν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὀφρῦν ἐνήνοχεν καὶ σεμνοπροσωπεῖ; οὔπω κατʼ ἀξίαν. ἔτι γὰρ οὐ θαρρῶ οἷς ἔμαθον καὶ συγκατεθέμην· ἔτι τὴν ἀσθένειαν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ φοβοῦμαι. ἐπεί τοι ἄφετέ με θαρρῆσαι καὶ τότε ὄψεσθε βλέμμα οἷον δεῖ καὶ σχῆμα οἷον δεῖ, τότε ὑμῖν δείξω τὸ ἄγαλμα, ὅταν τελειωθῇ, ὅταν στιλπνωθῇ. τί δοκεῖτε; ὀφρῦν; μὴ γένοιτο. μὴ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ ὀφρῦν ἀνέσπακεν; ἀλλὰ πέπηγεν αὐτοῦ τὸ βλέμμα, οἷον δεῖ εἶναι τοῦ ἐροῦντος οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν παλινάγρετον οὐδʼ ἀπατηλόν. τοιοῦτον ὑμῖν δείξω ἐμαυτόν, πιστόν, αἰδήμονα, γενναῖον, ἀτάραχον. μή τι οὖν ἀθάνατον ἀγήρων, μή τι ἄνοσον; ἀλλʼ ἀποθνῄσκοντα θείως, νοσοῦντα θείως. ταῦτα ἔχω, ταῦτα δύναμαι· τὰ δʼ ἄλλα οὔτʼ ἔχω οὔτε δύναμαι. δείξω ὑμῖν νεῦρα φιλοσόφου. ποῖα νεῦρα; ὄρεξιν ἀναπότευκτον, ἔκκλισιν ἀπερίπτωτον, ὁρμὴν καθήκουσαν, πρόθεσιν ἐπιμελῆ, συγκατάθεσιν ἀπρόπτωτον. ταῦτα ὄψεσθε.

[¶2] 9. It were no slight attainment, could we merely fulfil what the nature of man implies. For what is man? A rational and mortal being. Well; from what are we distinguished by reason? From wild beasts. From what else? From sheep, and the like. Take care, then, to do nothing like a wild beast; otherwise you have destroyed the man; you have not fulfilled what your nature promises. Take care too, to do nothing like cattle; for thus likewise the man is destroyed. In what do we act like cattle? When we act gluttonously, lewdly, rashly, sordidly, inconsiderately, into what are we sunk? Into cattle. What have we destroyed? The rational being. When we behave contentiously, injuriously, passionately, and violently, into what have we sunk? Into wild beasts. And further, some of us are wild beasts of a larger size; others little mischievous vermin, such as suggest the proverb, Let me rather be eaten by a lion. By all these means, that is destroyed which the nature of man implies. For when is a conjunctive proposition sustained? When it fulfils what its nature implies. So then the sustaining of such a proposition consists in this, that its several parts remain a series of truths. When is a disjunctive proposition sustained? When it fulfils what its nature implies. When is a flute, a harp, a horse, or a dog, preserved in existence? While each fulfils what its nature implies. Where is the wonder, then, that manhood should be preserved or destroyed in the same manner? All things are preserved and improved by exercising their proper functions; as a carpenter, by building; a grammarian, by grammar; but if he permit himself to write ungrammatically, his art will necessarily be spoiled and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest ones destroy him; faithful actions preserve the faithful man, and the contrary destroy him. On the other hand, the contrary actions heighten the contrary characters. Thus the practice of immodesty develops an immodest character; knavery, a knavish one; slander, a slanderous one; anger, an angry one; and fraud, a covetous one. For this reason, philosophers advise us not to be contented with mere learning, but to add meditation likewise, and then practice. For we have been long accustomed to perverse actions, and have practised upon wrong opinions. If, therefore, we do not likewise habituate ourselves to practise upon right opinions, we shall be nothing more than expositors of the abstract doctrines of others. For who among us is not already able to discourse, according to the rules of art, upon good and evil?—“That some things are good, some evil, and others indifferent; the good include the virtues and all things appertaining; the evil comprise the contrary; and the indifferent include riches, health, reputation;” and then, if while we are saying all this, there should happen some more than ordinary noise, or one of the by-standers should laugh at us, we are disconcerted. Philosopher, what is become of what you were saying? Whence did it proceed,—merely from your lips? Why, then, do you confound the remedies which might be useful to others? Why do you trifle on the most important subjects? It is one thing to hoard up provision in a storehouse, and another to eat it. What is eaten is assimilated, digested, and becomes nerves, flesh, bones, blood, color, breath. Whatever is hoarded is ready indeed, whenever you desire to show it; but is of no further use to you than in the mere knowledge that you have it. For what difference does it make whether you discourse on these doctrines, or those of the heterodox? Sit down and comment skilfully on Epicurus, for instance; perhaps you may comment more profitable than himself. Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do you act like a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do not you see on what terms each is called a Jew, a Syrian, an Egyptian? And when we see any one wavering, we are wont to say, This is not a Jew, but only acts like one. But, when he assumes the sentiments of one who has been baptized and circumcised, then he both really is, and is called, a Jew. Thus we, falsifying our profession, may be Jews in name, but are in reality something else. We are inconsistent with our own discourse; we are far from practising what we teach, and what we pride ourselves on knowing. Thus, while we are unable to fulfil what the character of a man implies, we are ready to assume besides so vast a weight as that of a philosopher. As if a person, incapable of lifting ten pounds, should endeavor to heave the same stone with Ajax.

> Greek: 9. οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τυχὸν αὐτὸ μόνον ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελίαν πληρῶσαι. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; — ζῷον, φησί, λογικὸν θνητόν. — εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ λογικῷ τίνων χωριζόμεθα; — τῶν θηρίων. — καὶ τίνων ἄλλων; — τῶν προβάτων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. — ὅρα οὖν μή τί πως ὡς θηρίον ποιήσῃς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπώλεσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ ἐπλήρωσας τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν. ὅρα μή τι ὡς πρόβατον· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ οὕτως ἀπώλετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος. τίνα οὖν ποιοῦμεν ὡς πρόβατα; ὅταν τῆς γαστρὸς ἕνεκα, ὅταν τῶν αἰδοίων, ὅταν εἰκῇ, ὅταν ῥυπαρῶς, ὅταν ἀνεπιστρέπτως, ποῦ ἀπεκλίναμεν; ἐπὶ τὰ πρόβατα. τί ἀπωλέσαμεν; τὸ λογικόν. ὅταν μαχίμως καὶ βλαβερῶς καὶ θυμικῶς καὶ ὠστικῶς, ποῦ ἀπεκλίναμεν; ἐπὶ τὰ θηρία. λοιπὸν οἱ μὲν ἡμῶν μεγάλα θηρία εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ θηρίδια κακοήθη καὶ μικρά, ἀφʼ ὧν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν λέων με καὶ φαγέτω. διὰ πάντων δὲ τούτων ἀπόλλυται ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελία. πότε γὰρ σῴζεται συμπεπλεγμένον; ὅταν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν πληρώσῃ, ὥστε σωτηρία συμπεπλεγμένου ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀληθῶν συμπεπλέχθαι. πότε διεζευγμένον; ὅταν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν πληρώσῃ. πότε αὐλοί, πότε λύρα, πότε ἵππος, πότε κύων; τί οὖν θαυμαστόν, εἰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὡσαύτως μὲν σῴζεται, ὡσαύτως δʼ ἀπόλλυται; αὔξει δʼ ἕκαστον καὶ σῴζει τὰ κατάλληλα ἔργα· τὸν τέκτονα τὰ τεκτονικά, τὸν γραμματικὸν τὰ γραμματικά. ἂν δʼ ἐθίσῃ γράφειν ἀγραμμάτως, ἀνάγκη καταφθείρεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὴν τέχνην. οὕτως τὸν μὲν αἰδήμονα σῴζει τὰ αἰδήμονα ἔργα, ἀπολλύει δὲ τὰ ἀναιδῆ· τὸν δὲ πιστὸν τὰ πιστὰ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἀπολλύει. καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους πάλιν ἐπαύξει τὰ ἐναντία· τὸν ἀναίσχυντον ἀναισχυντία, τὸν ἄπιστον ἀπιστία, τὸν λοίδορον λοιδορία, τὸν ὀργίλον ὀργή, τὸν φιλάργυρον αἱ ἀκατάλληλοι λήψεις καὶ δόσεις. διὰ τοῦτο παραγγέλλουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι μὴ ἀρκεῖσθαι μόνῳ τῷ μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μελέτην προσλαμβάνειν, εἶτα ἄσκησιν. πολλῷ γὰρ χρόνῳ τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖν εἰθίσμεθα καὶ τὰς ὑπολήψεις τὰς ἐναντίας ταῖς ὀρθαῖς χρηστικὰς ἔχομεν. ἂν οὖν μὴ καὶ τὰς ὀρθὰς χρηστικὰς ποιήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐξηγηταὶ ἐσόμεθα ἀλλοτρίων δογμάτων. ἄρτι γὰρ τίς ἡμῶν οὐ δύναται τεχνολογῆσαι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν; ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δʼ ἀδιάφορα· ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα τῶν ἀρετῶν· κακὰ τὰ δʼ ἐναντία· ἀδιάφορα δὲ πλοῦτος, ὑγεία, δόξα. εἶτʼ ἂν μεταξὺ λεγόντων ἡμῶν ψόφος μείζων γένηται ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις καταγελάσῃ ἡμῶν, ἐξεπλάγημεν. ποῦ ἐστιν, φιλόσοφε, ἐκεῖνα ἃ ἔλεγες; πόθεν αὐτὰ προφερόμενος ἔλεγες; ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν αὐτόθεν. τί οὖν ἀλλότρια βοηθήματα μολύνεις; τί κυβεύεις περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; ἄλλο γάρ ἐστιν ὡς εἰς ταμιεῖον ἀποθέσθαι ἄρτους καὶ οἶνον, ἄλλο ἐστὶ φαγεῖν. τὸ βρωθὲν ἐπέφθη, ἀνεδόθη, νεῦρα ἐγένετο, σάρκες, ὀστέα, αἷμα, εὔχροια, εὔπνοια. τὰ ἀποκείμενα ὅταν μὲν θελήσῃς ἐκ προχείρου λαβὼν δεῖξαι δύνασαι, ἀπʼ αὐτῶν δέ σοι ὄφελος οὐδὲν εἰ μὴ μέχρι τοῦ δοκεῖν ὅτι ἔχεις. τί γὰρ διαφέρει ταῦτα ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων; τεχνολόγει νῦν καθίσας τὰ Ἐπικούρου καὶ τάχα ἐκείνου χρηστικώτερον τεχνολογήσεις. τί οὖν Στωικὸν λέγεις σεαυτόν, τί ἐξαπατᾷς τοὺς πολλούς, τί ὑποκρίνῃ Ἰουδαῖον ὢν Ἕλλην; οὐχ ὁρᾷς, πῶς ἕκαστος λέγεται Ἰουδαῖος, πῶς Σύρος, πῶς Αἰγύπτιος; καὶ ὅταν τινὰ ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα ἴδωμεν, εἰώθαμεν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν Ἰουδαῖος, ἀλλʼ ὑποκρίνεται. ὅταν δʼ ἀναλάβῃ τὸ πάθος τὸ τοῦ βεβαμμένου καὶ ᾑρημένου, τότε καὶ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ καλεῖται Ἰουδαῖος. οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς παραβαπτισταί, λόγῳ μὲν Ἰουδαῖοι, ἔργῳ δʼ ἄλλο τι, ἀσυμπαθεῖς πρὸς τὸν λόγον, μακρὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἃ λέγομεν, ἐφʼ οἷς ὡς εἰδότες αὐτὰ ἐπαιρόμεθα. οὕτως οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελίαν πληρῶσαι δυνάμενοι προσλαμβάνομεν τὴν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τηλικοῦτο φορτίον οἷον εἴ τις δέκα λίτρας ἆραι μὴ δυνάμενος τὸν τοῦ Αἴαντος λίθον βαστάζειν ἤθελεν.

[¶3] 10. Consider who you are. In the first place, a man; that is, one who recognizes nothing superior to the faculty of free will, but all things as subject to this; and this itself as not to be enslaved or subjected to anything. Consider, then, from what you are distinguished by reason. You are distinguished from wild beasts; you are distinguished from cattle. Besides, you are a citizen of the universe, and a part of it; not a subordinate, but a principal part. You are capable of comprehending the Divine economy, and of considering the connections of things. What then does the character of a citizen imply? To hold no private interest; to deliberate of nothing as a separate individual, but rather like the hand or the foot, which, if they had reason, and comprehended the constitution of nature, would never pursue, or desire, but with a reference to the whole. Hence the philosophers rightly say, that, if it were possible for a wise and good man to foresee what was to happen, he might co-operate in bringing on himself sickness, and death, and mutilation, being sensible that these things are appointed in the order of the universe; and that the whole is superior to a part. and the city to the citizen. But, since we do not foreknow what is to happen, it becomes our duty to hold to what is more agreeable to our choice, for this too is a part of our birthright. Remember next, that perhaps you are a son, and what does this character imply? To esteem everything that is his, as belonging to his father; in every instance to obey him; not to revile him to any one; not to say or do anything injurious to him; to give way and yield in everything, co-operating with him to the utmost of his power. After this, know likewise, that you are a brother too; and that to this character it belongs to make concessions, to be easily persuaded, to use gentle language, never to claim for yourself any non-essential thing, but cheerfully to give up these to be repaid by a larger share of things essential. For consider what it is, instead of a lettuce, for instance, or a chair, to procure for yourself a good temper. How great an advantage gained! If, beside this, you are a senator of any city, demean yourself as a senator; if a youth, as a youth; if an old man, as an old man. For each of these names, if it comes to be considered, always points out the proper duties; but, if you go and revile your brother, I tell you that you have forgotten who you are, and what is your name. If you were a smith, and made an ill use of the hammer, you would have forgotten the smith; and if you have forgotten the brother, and are become, instead of a brother, an enemy, do you imagine you have made no change of one thing for another, in that case? If, instead of a man,—a gentle, social creature,—you have become a wild beast, mischievous, insidious, biting, have you lost nothing? Is it only the loss of money which is reckoned damage; and is there no other thing, the loss of which damages a man? If you were to part with your skill in grammar or in music, would you think the loss of these a damage; and yet, if you part with honor, decency, and gentleness, do you think that no matter Yet the first may be lost by some cause external and inevitable; but the last only by our own fault. There is no shame in not having or in losing the one; but either not to have or to lose the other is equally shameful and reproachful and unhappy. What does the debauchee lose? Manhood. What does he lose who made him such? Many things, but manhood also. What does an adulterer lose? The modest, the chaste character; the good neighbor. What does an angry person lose? A coward? Each loses his portion. No one is wicked without some loss or damage. Now if, after all, you treat the loss of money as the only damage, all these are unhurt and uninjured. Nay, they may be even gainers; as, by such practices, their money may possibly be increased. But consider; if you refer everything to money, then a man who loses his nose is not hurt. Yes, say you; he is maimed in his body. Well, but does he who loses his sense of smell itself lose nothing? Is there, then, no faculty of the soul which benefits the possessor, and which it is an injury to lose? “Of what sort do you mean?” Have we not a natural sense of honor? “We have.” Does he who loses this suffer no damage? Is he deprived of nothing? Does he part with nothing that belongs to him? Have we no natural fidelity; no natural affection; no natural disposition to mutual usefulness, to mutual forbearance? Is he, then, who carelessly suffers himself to be damaged in these respects still safe and uninjured? “What, then; shall not I injure him who has injured me?” Consider first what injury is; and remember what you have heard from the philosophers. For, if both good and evil lie in the will, see whether what you say does not amount to this: “Since he has hurt himself by injuring me, shall I not hurt myself by injuring him?” Why do we not make to ourselves some such representation as this? Are we hurt when any detriment happens to our bodily possessions, and are we not at all hurt when our will is depraved? He who has erred, or injured another, has indeed no pain in his head; nor loses an eye, nor a leg, nor an estate; and we wish for nothing beyond these. Whether our will be habitually humble and faithful, or shameless and unfaithful, we regard as a thing indifferent, except only in the discussions of the schools. In that case, all the improvement we make reaches only to words; and beyond them is absolutely nothing.

> Greek: 10. σκέψαι τίς εἶ. τὸ πρῶτον ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο δʼ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔχων κυριώτερον προαιρέσεως, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ τὰ ἄλλα ὑποτεταγμένα, αὐτὴν δʼ ἀδούλευτον καὶ ἀνυπότακτον. σκόπει οὖν, τίνων κεχώρισαι κατὰ λόγον. κεχώρισαι θηρίων, κεχώρισαι προβάτων. ἐπὶ τούτοις πολίτης εἶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἓν τῶν ὑπηρετικῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν προηγουμένων· παρακολουθητικὸς γὰρ εἶ τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει καὶ τοῦ ἑξῆς ἐπιλογιστικός. τίς οὖν ἐπαγγελία πολίτου; μηδὲν ἔχειν ἰδίᾳ συμφέρον, περὶ μηδενὸς βουλεύεσθαι ὡς ἀπόλυτον, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἄν, εἰ ἡ χεὶρ ἢ ὁ ποὺς λογισμὸν εἶχον καὶ παρηκολούθουν τῇ φυσικῇ κατασκευῇ, οὐδέποτʼ ἂν ἄλλως ὥρμησαν ἢ ὠρέχθησαν ἢ ἐπανενεγκόντες ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι ὅτι εἰ προῄδει ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὰ ἐσόμενα, συνήργει ἂν καὶ τῷ νοσεῖν καὶ τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ τῷ πηροῦσθαι, αἰσθανόμενός γε, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὅλων διατάξεως τοῦτο ἀπονέμεται, κυριώτερον δὲ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους καὶ ἡ πόλις τοῦ πολίτου. νῦν δʼ ὅτι οὐ προγιγνώσκομεν, καθήκει τῶν πρὸς ἐκλογὴν εὐφυεστέρων ἔχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο γεγόναμεν. μετὰ τοῦτο μέμνησο, ὅτι υ ἱὸς εἶ. τίς τούτου τοῦ προσώπου ἐπαγγελία; πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ πατρός, πάντα ὑπακούειν, μηδέποτε ψέξαι πρός τινα μηδὲ βλαβερόν τι αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι, ἐξίστασθαι ἐν πᾶσιν καὶ παραχωρεῖν συνεργοῦντα κατὰ δύναμιν. μετὰ τοῦτο ἴσθι ὅτι καὶ ἀδελφὸς εἶ. καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον ὀφείλεται παραχώρησις, εὐπείθεια, εὐφημία, μηδέποτʼ ἀντιποιήσασθαί τινος πρὸς [ἑ]αὐτὸν τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, ἀλλʼ ἡδέως ἐκεῖνα προίεσθαι, ἵνʼ ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς πλέον ἔχῃς. ὅρα γὰρ οἷόν ἐστιν ἀντὶ θίδρακος, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ καθέδρας αὐτὸν εὐγνωμοσύνην κτήσασθαι, ὅση ἡ πλεονεξία. μετὰ ταῦτα εἰ βουλευτὴς πόλεώς τινος, ὅτι βουλευτής· εἰ νέος, ὅτι νέος· εἰ πρεσβύτης, ὅτι πρεσβύτης· εἰ πατήρ, ὅτι πατήρ. ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν ἐρχόμενον ὑπογράφει τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα. ἐὰν δʼ ἀπελθὼν ψέγῃς σου τὸν ἀδελφόν, λέγω σοι ἐπελάθου, τίς εἶ καὶ τί σοι ὄνομα. εἶτα εἰ μὲν χαλκεὺς ὢν ἐχρῶ τῇ σφύρᾳ ἄλλως, ἐπιλελησμένος ἂν ἦς τοῦ χαλκέως· εἰ δὲ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐπελάθου καὶ ἀντὶ ἀδελφοῦ ἐχθρὸς ἐγένου, οὐδὲν ἀντʼ οὐδενὸς ἠλλάχθαι φανεῖ σεαυτῷ; εἰ δʼ ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου, ἡμέρου ζῴου καὶ κοινωνικοῦ, θηρίον γέγονας βλαβερόν, ἐπίβουλον, δηκτικόν, οὐδὲν ἀπολώλεκας; ἀλλὰ δεῖ σε κέρμα ἀπολέσαι, ἵνα ζημιωθῆς, ἄλλου δʼ οὐδενὸς ἀπώλεια ζημιοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον; εἶτα γραμματικὴν μὲν ἀποβαλὼν ἢ μουσικὴν ζημίαν ἂν ἡγοῦ τὴν ἀπώλειαν αὐτῆς· εἰ δʼ αἰδῶ καὶ καταστολὴν καὶ ἡμερότητα ἀποβαλεῖς, οὐδὲν ἡγῇ τὸ πρᾶγμα; καίτοι ἐκεῖνα μὲν παρʼ ἔξωθέν τινα καὶ ἀπροαίρετον αἰτίαν ἀπόλλυται, ταῦτα δὲ παρʼ ἡμᾶς· καὶ ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὔτʼ ἔχειν καλόν ἐστιν οὔτʼ ἀπολλύειν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, ταῦτα δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχειν καὶ ἀπολλύειν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐπονείδιστον καὶ ἀτύχημα. τί ἀπολλύει ὁ τὰ τοῦ κιναίδου πάσχων; τὸν ἄνδρα. ὁ δὲ διατιθείς; πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα καὶ αὐτὸς δʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸν ἄνδρα. τί ἀπολλύει ὁ μοιχεύων; τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν ἐγκρατῆ, τὸν κόσμιον, τὸν πολίτην, τὸν γείτονα. τί ἀπολλύει ὁ ὀργιζόμενος; ἄλλο τι. ὁ φοβούμενος; ἄλλο τι. οὐδεὶς δίχα ἀπωλείας καὶ ζημίας κακός ἐστιν. λοιπὸν εἰ τὴν ζημίαν ζητεῖς ἐν κέρματι, πάντες οὗτοι ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀζήμιοι, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ὠφελούμενοι καὶ κερδαίνοντες, ὅταν διά τινος τούτων τῶν ἔργων κέρμα αὐτοῖς προσγένηται. ὅρα δʼ εἰ ἐπὶ κερμάτιον πάντα ἀνάγεις, ὅτι οὐδʼ ὁ τὴν ῥῖνά σοι ἀπολλύων ἔσται βεβλαμμένος. — ναί, φησίν, κεκολόβωται γὰρ τὸ σῶμα. — ἄγε, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀσφρασίαν αὐτὴν ἀπολωλεκὼς οὐδὲν ἀπολλύει; ψυχῆς οὖν δύναμις οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία, ἣν ὁ μὲν κτησάμενος ὠφελεῖται, ὁ δʼ ἀποβαλὼν ζημιοῦται; — ποίαν καὶ λέγεις; — οὐδὲν ἔχομεν αἰδῆμον φύσει; — ἔχομεν. — ὁ τοῦτο ἀπολλύων οὐ ζημιοῦται, οὐδενὸς στερίσκεται, οὐδὲν ἀποβάλλει τῶν πρὸς αὑτόν; οὐκ ἔχομεν φύσει τι πιστόν, φύσει στερκτικόν, φύσει ὠφελητικόν, ἀλλήλων φύσει ἀνεκτικόν; ὅστις οὖν εἰς ταῦτα περιορᾷ ζημιούμενον ἑαυτόν, οὗτος ᾖ ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀζήμιος; τί οὖν; μὴ βλάψω τὸν βλάψαντα; — πρῶτον μὲν ἰδού, τί ἐστι βλάβη καὶ μνήσθητι ὧν ἤκουσας παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν προαιρέσει καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὡσαύτως ἐν προαιρέσει, βλέπε μὴ τοιοῦτʼ ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἑαυτὸν ἔβλαψεν πρὸς ἐμέ τι ἄδικον ποιήσας, ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν μὴ βλάψω πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἄδικόν τι ποιήσας; τί οὖν οὐ τοιοῦτόν τι φανταζόμεθα, ἀλλʼ ὅπου τι σωματικὸν ἐλάττωμα ἢ εἰς κτῆσιν, ἐκεῖ ἡ βλάβη, ὅπου εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν, οὐδεμία βλάβη; οὔτε γὰρ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀλγεῖ ὁ ἐξαπατηθεὶς ἢ ἀδικήσας οὔτε τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν οὔτε τὸ ἰσχίον οὔτε τὸν ἀγρὸν ἀπολλύει. ἡμεῖς δʼ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐθέλομεν ἢ ταῦτα· τὴν προαίρεσιν δὲ π[ρ]ότερον αἰδήμονα καὶ πιστὴν ἕξομεν ἢ ἀναίσχυντον καὶ ἄπιστον, οὐδʼ ἐγγὺς διαφερόμεθα πλὴν μόνον ἐν τῇ σχολῇ μέχρι τῶν λογαρίων. τοιγαροῦν μέχρι τῶν λογαρίων προκόπτομεν, ἔξω δʼ αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐλάχιστον.

[¶4] 11. The beginning of philosophy, at least to such as enter upon it in a proper way, and by the door, is a consciousness of our own weakness and inability in necessary things. For we came into the world without any natural idea of a right-angled triangle; of a diesis, or a semitone, in music; but we learn each of these things by some artistic instruction. Hence, they who do not understand them do not assume to understand them. But who ever came into the world without an innate idea of good and evil, fair and base, becoming and unbecoming, happiness and misery, proper and improper; what ought to be done, and what not to be done? Hence, we all make use of the terms, and endeavor to apply our impressions to particular cases. “Such a one hath acted well, not. well; right, not right; is unhappy, is happy; is just, is unjust.” Which of us refrains from these terms? Who defers the use of them till he has learnt it, as those do who are ignorant of lines and sounds? The reason of this is, that we come instructed in some degree by nature upon these subjects; and from this beginning, we go on to add self-conceit. “For why,” say you, “should I not know what fair or base is? Have I not the idea of it?” You have. “Do I not apply this idea to the particular instance?” You do. “Do I not apply it rightly, then?” Here lies the whole question; and here arises the self-conceit. Beginning from these acknowledged points, men proceed, by applying them improperly, to reach the very position most questionable. For, if they knew how to apply them also, they would be all but perfect. If you think that you know how to apply your general principles to particular cases, tell me on what you base this application. “Upon its seeming so to me.” But it does not seem so to another; and does not ne too think that he makes a right application? “He does.” Is it possible, then, that each of you should rightly apply your principles, on the very subjects about which your opinions conflict? “It is not.” Have you anything to show us, then, for this application, beyond the fact of its seeming so to you? And does a madman act any otherwise than seems to him right? Is this, then, a sufficient criterion for him too? “It is not.” Come, therefore, to some stronger ground than seeming. “What is that?” The beginning of philosophy is this: the being sensible of the disagreement of men with each other; an inquiry into the cause of this disagreement; and a disapprobation and distrust of what merely seems; a careful examination into what seems, whether it seem rightly; and the discovery of some rule which shall serve like a balance, for the determination of weights; like a square, for distinguishing straight and crooked. This is the beginning of philosophy. Is it possible that all things which seem right to all persons are so? Can things contradictory be right? We say not all things; but all that seem so to us. And why more to you than to the Syrians or Egyptians; than to me, or to any other man? Not at all more. Therefore, what seems to each man is not sufficient to determine the reality of a thing; for even in weights and measures we are not satisfied with the bare appearance, but for everything we find some rule. And is there, then, in the present case no rule preferable to what seems? Is it possible that what is of the greatest necessity in human life should be left incapable of determination and discovery? There must be some rule. And why do we not seek and discover it, and, when we have discovered, ever after make use of it, without fail, so as not even to move a finger without it? For this, I conceive, is what, when found, will cure those of their madness who make use of no other measure but their own perverted way of thinking. Afterwards, beginning from certain known and determinate points, we may make use of general principles, properly applied to particulars. Thus, what is the subject that falls under our inquiry? Pleasure. Bring it to the rule. Throw it into the scale. Must good be something in which it is fit to confide, and to which we may trust? Yes. Is it fit to trust to anything unstable? No. Is pleasure, then, a stable thing? No. Take it, then, and throw it out of the scale, and drive it far distant from the place of good things. But, if you are not quick-sighted, and one balance is insufficient, bring another. Is it fit to be elated by good? Yes. Is it fit, then, to be elated by a present pleasure? See that you do not say it is; otherwise I shall not think you so much as worthy to use a scale. Thus are things judged and weighed, when we have the rules ready. This is the part of philosophy, to examine, and fix the rules; and to make use of them, when they are known, is the business of a wise and good man.

> Greek: 11. ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας παρά γε τοῖς ὡς δεῖ καὶ κατὰ θύραν ἁπτομένοις αὐτῆς συναίσθησις τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀσθενείας καὶ ἀδυναμίας περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. ὀρθογωνίου μὲν γὰρ τριγώνου ἢ διέσεως ἡμιτονίου οὐδεμίαν φύσει ἔννοιαν ἥκομεν ἔχοντες, ἀλλʼ ἔκ τινος τεχνικῆς παραλήψεως διδασκόμεθα ἕκαστον αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὴ εἰδότες αὐτὰ οὐδʼ οἴονται εἰδέναι. ἀγαθοῦ δὲ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ καὶ πρέποντος καὶ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ προσήκοντος καὶ ἐπιβάλλοντος καὶ ὅ τι δεῖ ποιῆσαι καὶ ὅ τι οὐ δεῖ ποιῆσαι τίς οὐκ ἔχων ἔμφυτον ἔννοιαν ἐλήλυθεν; διὰ τοῦτο πάντες χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν καὶ ἐφαρμόζειν πειρώμεθα τὰς προλήψεις ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις. καλῶς ἐποίησεν, δεόντως, οὐ δεόντως· ἠτύχησεν, εὐτύχησεν· ἄδικός ἐστιν, δίκαιός ἐστιν. τίς ἡμῶν φείδεται τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων; τίς ἡμῶν ἀναβάλλεται τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν μέχρι μάθῃ καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὰς γραμμὰς ἢ τοὺς φθόγγους οἱ οὐκ εἰδότες; τούτου δʼ αἴτιον τὸ ἥκειν ἤδη τινὰ ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως κατὰ τὸν τόπον ὥσπερ δεδιδαγμένους, ἀφʼ ὧν ὁρμώμενοι καὶ τὴν οἴησιν προσειλήφαμεν. —διὰ γάρ, φησίν, οὐκ οἶδα ἐγὼ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν; οὐκ ἔχω ἔννοιαν αὐτοῦ; — ἔχεις. — οὐκ ἐφαρμόζω τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους; — ἐφαρμόζεις. — οὐ καλῶς οὖν ἐφαρμόζω; — ἐνταῦθά ἐστι τὸ ζήτημα πᾶν καὶ οἴησις ἐνταῦθα προσγίνεται. ἀφʼ ὁμολογουμένων γὰρ ὁρμώμενοι τούτων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμφισβητούμενον προάγουσιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀκαταλλήλου ἐφαρμογῆς. ὡς εἴ γε καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι πρὸς ἐκείνοις ἐκέκτηντο, τί ἐκώλυεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι τελείους; νῦν δʼ ἐπεὶ δοκεῖς ὅτι καὶ καταλλήλως ἐφαρμόζεις τὰς προλήψεις τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους, εἰπέ μοι, πόθεν τοῦτο λαμβάνεις; — ὅτι δοκεῖ μοι. — τουτὶ οὖν ᾧτινι οὐ δοκεῖ, καὶ οἴεται καὶ αὐτὸς ἐφαρμόζειν καλῶς· ἢ οὐκ οἴεται; — οἴεται. — δύνασθε οὖν περὶ ὧν τὰ μαχόμενα δοξάζετε ἀμφότεροι καταλλήλως ἐφαρμόζειν τὰς προλήψεις; — οὐ δυνάμεθα. — ἔχεις οὖν δεῖξαί τι ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὰς ἐφαρμόζειν ἄμεινον ἀνωτέρω τοῦ δοκεῖν σοι; ὁ δὲ μαινόμενος ἄλλα τινὰ ποιεῖ ἢ τὰ δοκοῦντά οἱ καλά; κἀκείνῳ οὖν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο τὸ κριτήριον; — οὐκ ἀρκεῖ. — ἐλθὼν οὖν ἐπί τι ἀνωτέρω τοῦ δοκεῖν τί τοῦτό ἐστιν ἴδʼ ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας· αἴσθησις μάχης τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ζήτησις τοῦ παρʼ ὃ γίνεται ἡ μάχη καὶ κατάγνωσις καὶ ἀπιστία πρὸς τὸ ψιλῶς δοκοῦν, ἔρευνα δέ τις περὶ τὸ δοκοῦν εἰ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ καὶ εὕρεσις κανόνος τινός, οἷον ἐπὶ βαρῶν τὸν ζυγὸν εὕρομεν, οἷον ἐπὶ εὐθέων καὶ στρεβλῶν τὴν στάθμην. — τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας; πάντα καλῶς ἔχει τὰ δοκοῦντα ἅπασι; — καὶ πῶς δυνατὸν τὰ μαχόμενα καλῶς ἔχειν; οὐκοῦν οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἡμῖν δοκοῦντα. τί μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ Σύροις, τί μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ Αἰγυπτίοις, τί μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα ἢ τὰ τῷ δεῖνι; — οὐδὲν μᾶλλον. — οὐκ ἄρα ἀρκεῖ τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ βαρῶν ἢ μέτρων ψιλῇ τῇ ἐμφάσει ἀρκούμεθα, ἀλλὰ κανόνα τινὰ ἐφʼ ἑκάστου εὕρομεν. ἐνταῦθʼ οὖν οὐδεὶς κανὼν ἀνωτέρω τοῦ δοκεῖν; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε ἀτέκμαρτα εἶναι καὶ ἀνεύρετα τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα ἐν ἀνθρώποις; — ἔστιν οὖν. — καὶ διὰ τί οὐ ζητοῦμεν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀνευρίσκομεν καὶ ἀνευρόντες λοιπὸν ἀπαραβάτως χρώμεθα δίχα αὐτοῦ μηδὲ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκτείνοντες; τοῦτο γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐστὶν ὃ εὑρεθὲν ἀπαλλάσσει μανίας τοὺς μόνῳ τῷ δοκεῖν μέτρῳ πάντων χρωμένους, ἵνα λοιπὸν ἀπό τινων γνωρίμων καὶ διευκρινημένων ὁρμώμενοι χρώμεθα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους διηρθρωμέναις ταῖς προλήψεσι. τίς ὑποπέπτωκεν οὐσία περὶ ἧς ζητοῦμεν;— ἡδονή. — ὕπαγε αὐτὴν τῷ κανόνι, βάλε εἰς τὸν ζυγόν. τὸ ἀγαθὸν δεῖ εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ἐφʼ ᾧ θαρρεῖν ἄξιον καὶ ᾧ πεποιθέναι; — δεῖ. — ἀβεβαίῳ οὖν τινι θαρρεῖν ἄξιον; — οὔ. — μή τι οὖν βέβαιον ἡ ἡδονή; — οὔ. — ἆρον οὖν καὶ βάλε ἔξω ἐκ τοῦ ζυγοῦ καὶ ἀπέλασον τῆς χώρας τῶν ἀγαθῶν μακράν. εἰ δʼ οὐκ ὀξυβλεπτεῖς καὶ ἕν σοι ζυγὸν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ, φέρε ἄλλο. ἐπὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἄξιον ἐπαίρεσθαι; — ναί. — ἐφʼ ἡδονῇ οὖν παρούσῃ ἄξιον ἐπαίρεσθαι; βλέπε μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι ἄξιον· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκέτι σε οὐδὲ τοῦ ζυγοῦ ἄξιον ἡγήσομαι. οὕτως κρίνεται τὰ πράγματα καὶ ἵσταται τῶν κανόνων ἡτοιμασμένων· καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐπισκέπτεσθαι καὶ βεβαιοῦν τοὺς κανόνας, τὸ δʼ ἤδη χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἐγνωσμένοις τοῦτο τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν.

## 9. Book II · chapters 12–16

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/9/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/9/#p-N

[¶0] 12. What things are to be learned, in order to the right use of reason; the philosophers of our sect have accurately taught; but we are altogether unpractised in the due application of them. Only give to any one of us whom you will some illiterate person for an antagonist, and he will not find out how to treat him. But when he has a little moved the man, if he happens to answer at cross purposes, the questioner knows not how to deal with him any further, but either reviles or laughs at him, and says: “He is an illiterate fellow; there is no making anything of him.” Yet a guide, when he perceives his charge going out of the way, does not revile and ridicule and then leave him, but leads him into the right path. Do you also show your antagonist the truth, and you will see that he will follow. But till you show it, do not ridicule him; but rather be sensible of your own incapacity. How, then, did Socrates use to act? He obliged his antagonist himself to bear testimony to him; and wanted no other witness. Hence he might well say, “I give up all the rest, and am always satisfied with the testimony of my opponent; and I call in no one to vote, but my antagonist alone.” For he rendered the arguments drawn from natural impressions so clear, that every one saw and avoided the contradiction. “Does an envious man rejoice?” “By no means; he rather grieves.” (This he moves him to say by proposing the contrary.) “Well, and do you think envy to be a grief caused by evils?” “And who ever envied evils?” (Therefore he makes the other say, that envy is a grief caused by things good.) “Does any one envy those things which are nothing to him?” “No, surely.” Having thus fully drawn out his idea, he then leaves that point, not saying, “Define to me what envy is;” and after he has defined it, “You have defined it wrong; for the definition does not correspond to the thing defined.” There are phrases repulsive and obscure to the illiterate, which yet we cannot dispense with. But we have no capacity at all to move them, by such arguments as might lead them, in following the methods of their own minds, to admit or abandon any position. And from a consciousness of this incapacity, those among us who have any modesty give the matter entirely up; but the greater part, rashly entering upon these debates, mutually confound and are confounded, and at last, reviling and reviled, walk off. Whereas it was the principal and most peculiar characteristic of Socrates, never to be provoked in a dispute, nor to throw out any reviling or injurious expression; but to bear patiently with those who reviled him, and thus put an end to the controversy. If you would know how great abilities he had in this particular, read Xenophon’s Banquet, and you will see how many controversies he ended. Hence, even among the poets, this is justly mentioned with the highest commendation,—
Wisely at once the greatest strife to still.
But what then? This is no very safe affair now, and especially at Rome. For he who does it must not do it in a corer, but go to some rich consular senator, for instance, and question him. Pray, sir. can you tell me to whom you intrust your horses? “Yes, certainly.” Is it then to any one indifferently, though he be ignorant of horsemanship? “By no means.” To whom do you intrust your gold or your silver or your clothes? “Not to any one indifferently;” And did you ever consider to whom you committed the care of your body? “Yes, surely.” To one skilled in exercise or medicine, I suppose? “Without doubt.” Are these things your chief good, or are you possessed of something better than all of them? “What do you mean?” Something which makes use of these, and deliberates and counsels about each of them. “What, then; do you mean the soul?” You have guessed rightly; for indeed I do mean that. “I do really think it a much better possession than all the rest.” Can you show us, then, in what manner you have taken care of this soul? For it is not probable that a person of your wisdom and approved character in the state would carelessly suffer the most excellent thing that belongs to you to be neglected and lost. “No, certainly.” But do you take care of it yourself; and is it done by the instructions of another, or by your own ability?—Here, now, comes the danger that he may first say, “Pray, good sir, what business is that of yours? What are you to me?” Then if you persist in troubling him, he may lift up his hand and give you a box on the ear. I myself was once a great admirer of this method of instruction, till I fell into this kind of adventures.

> Greek: 12. ἃ μὲν δεῖ μαθόντα εἰδέναι χρῆσθαι λόγῳ, ἠκρίβωται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων. περὶ δὲ τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν τὴν προσήκουσαν τελέως ἀγύμναστοί ἐσμεν. δὸς γοῦν ᾧ θέλεις ἡμῶν ἰδιώτην τινὰ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον· καὶ οὐχ εὑρίσκει χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μικρὰ κινήσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἂν παρὰ σκέλος ἀπαντᾷ ἐκεῖνος, οὐκέτι δύναται μεταχειρίσασθαι, ἀλλʼ ἢ λοιδορεῖ λοιπὸν ἢ καταγελᾷ καὶ λέγει ἰδιώτης ἐστίν· οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι. ὁ δʼ ὁδηγός, ὅταν λάβῃ τινὰ πλανώμενον, ἤγαγεν ἐπὶ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν δέουσαν, οὐχὶ καταγελάσας ἢ λοιδορησάμενος ἀπῆλθεν. καὶ σὺ δεῖξον αὐτῷ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ ὄψει ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ. μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ μὴ δεικνύῃς, μὴ ἐκείνου καταγέλα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αἰσθάνου τῆς ἀδυναμίας τῆς αὑτοῦ. πῶς οὖν ἐποίει Σωκράτης; αὐτὸν ἠνάγκαζεν τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον αὐτῷ μαρτυρεῖν, ἄλλου δʼ οὐδενὸς ἐδεῖτο μάρτυρος. τοιγαροῦν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ λέγειν ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐῶ χαίρειν, ἀεὶ δὲ τῷ ἀντιλέγοντι ἀρκοῦμαι μάρτυρι· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους οὐκ ἐπιψηφίζω, τὸν δὲ προσδιαλεγόμενον μόνον. οὕτω γὰρ ἐναργῆ ἐτίθει τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐννοιῶν, ὥστε πάνθʼ ὁντιναοῦν συναισθανόμενον τῆς μάχης ἀναχωρεῖν ἀπʼ αὐτῆς. ἆρά γε ὁ φθονῶν χαίρει; — οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λυπεῖται. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐκίνησε τὸν πλησίον. τί δʼ; ἐπὶ κακοῖς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι λύπη ὁ φθόνος; καὶ τί ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶ κακῶν; οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνον ἐποίησεν εἰπεῖν ὅτι λύπη ἐστὶν ἐπʼ ἀγαθοῖς ὁ φθόνος. τί δέ; φθονοίη ἄν τις τοῖς οὐδὲν πρὸς αὐτόν; — οὐδαμῶς. καὶ οὕτως ἐκπεπληρωκὼς τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ διηρθρωκὼς ἀπηλλάσσετο, οὐ λέγων ὅτι ὅρισαί μοι τὸν φθόνον, εἶτα ὁρισαμένου κακῶς ὡρίσω· οὐ γὰρ ἀντακολουθεῖ τῷ κεφαλαιώδει τὸ ὁρικόν· ῥήματα τεχνικὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἰδιώταις φορτικὰ καὶ δυσπαρακολούθητα, ὧν ἡμεῖς ἀποστῆναι οὐ δυνάμεθα. ἐξ ὧν δʼ αὐτὸς ὁ ἰδιώτης ἐπακολουθῶν ταῖς αὑτοῦ φαντασίαις παραχωρῆσαι δύναιτʼ ἄν τι ἢ ἀθετῆσαι, οὐδαμῶς διὰ τούτων αὐτὸν κινῆσαι δυνάμεθα. καὶ λοιπὸν εἰκότως συναισθανόμενοι ταύτης ἡμῶν τῆς ἀδυναμίας ἀπεχόμεθα τοῦ πράγματος, ὅσοις γʼ ἐστί τι εὐλαβείας. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ εἰκαῖοι συγκαθέντες εἴς τι τοιοῦτον φύρονται καὶ φύρουσι καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα λοιδορήσαντες καὶ λοιδορηθέντες ἀπέρχονται. τὸ πρῶτον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ μάλιστα ἴδιον Σωκράτους μηδέποτε παροξυνθῆναι ἐν λόγῳ, μηδέποτε λοίδορον προενέγκασθαι μηδέν, μηδέποθʼ ὑβριστικόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν λοιδορούντων ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ παύειν μάχην. εἰ θέλετε γνῶναι, πόσην ἐν τούτῳ δύναμιν εἶχεν, ἀνάγνωτε τὸ Ξενοφῶντος Συμπόσιον καὶ ὄψεσθε πόσας μάχας διαλέλυκεν. διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἐν μεγίστῳ ἐπαίνῳ λέλεκται τὸ αἶψά τε καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσεν. τί οὖν; οὐ λίαν ἐστὶ νῦν ἀσφαλὲς τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ μάλιστα ἐν Ῥώμῃ. τὸν γὰρ ποιοῦντα αὐτὸ οὐκ ἐν γωνίᾳ δηλονότι δεήσει ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ προσελθόντα ὑπατικῷ τινι, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, πλουσίῳ πυθέσθαι αὐτοῦ ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ οὗτος, ᾧ τινι τοὺς ἵππους τοὺς σεαυτοῦ παρέδωκας; ἔγωγε. ἆρα τῷ τυχόντι καὶ ἀπείρῳ ἱππικῆς; οὐδαμῶς. τί δʼ; ᾧ τινι τὸ χρυσίον ἢ τὸ ἀργύριον ἢ τὴν ἐσθῆτα; οὐδὲ ταῦτα τῷ τυχόντι. τὸ σῶμα δὲ τὸ σαυτοῦ ἤδη τινὶ ἔσκεψαι ἐπιτρέψαι εἰς ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτοῦ; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἐμπείρῳ δηλονότι καὶ τούτῳ ἀλειπτικῆς ἢ ἰατρικῆς; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. πότερον ταῦτά σοι τὰ κράτιστά ἐστιν ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐκτήσω πάντων ἄμεινον; ποῖον καὶ λέγεις; τὸ αὐτοῖς νὴ Δία τούτοις χρώμενον καὶ δοκιμάζον ἕκαστον καὶ βουλευόμενον. ἆρά γε τὴν ψυχὴν λέγεις; ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες· ταύτην γάρ τοι καὶ λέγω. πολὺ νὴ Δία τῶν ἄλλων τοῦτο ἄμεινον δοκῶ μοι κεκτῆσθαι. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμεμέλησαι; οὐ γὰρ εἰκῇ χὠς ἔτυχεν εἰκός σε οὕτως σοφὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει δόκιμον τὸ κράτιστον τῶν σεαυτοῦ περιορᾶν ἀμελούμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον. οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ἐπιμεμέλησαι αὐτοῦ; πότερον μαθὼν παρά του ἢ εὑρὼν αὐτός; ὧδε λοιπὸν ὁ κίνδυνος, μὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἴπῃ τί δέ σοι μέλει, βέλτιστε; κύριός μου εἶ; εἶτʼ ἂν ἐπιμείνῃς πράγματα παρέχων, διαράμενος κονδύλους σοι δῷ. τούτου τοῦ πράγματος ἤμην ποτὲ ζηλωτὴς καὶ αὐτός, πρὶν εἰς ταῦτα ἐμπεσεῖν.

[¶1] 13. When I see any one anxious, I say, what does this man mean? Unless he wanted something or other not in his own power, how could he still be anxious? A musician, for instance, feels no anxiety while he is singing by himself; but when he appears upon the stage he does, even if his voice be ever so good, or he plays ever so well. For what he wishes is not only to sing well, but likewise to gain applause. But this is not in his own power. In short, where his skill lies, there is his courage. Bring any ignorant person, and he does not mind him; but in the point which he neither understands nor has studied, there he is anxious. “What point is that?” He does not understand what a multitude is, nor what the applause of a multitude. He has learnt, indeed, how to sound bass and treble; but what the applause of the many is, and what force it has in life, he neither understands nor has studied. Hence he must necessarily tremble and turn pale. I cannot indeed say that a man is no musician, when I see him afraid; but I can say something else, and indeed many things. And first of all I call him a stranger, and say, this man does not know in what country he is; and though he has lived here so long, he is ignorant of the laws and customs of the state, and what is permitted and what not; nor has he ever consulted any legal adviser, who might tell and explain to him the laws. But no man writes a will without knowing how it ought to be written, or consulting some one who knows; nor does he rashly sign a bond, or give security. Yet he indulges his desires and aversions, exerts his pursuits, intentions, and resolutions, without consulting any legal adviser about the matter. “How do you mean, without a legal adviser?” He knows not when he chooses what is not allowed him, and does not choose what is necessary; and he knows not what is his own, and what belongs to others; for if he did know he would never be hindered, would never be restrained, would never be anxious. “How so?” Why, does any one fear things that are not evils? “No.” Does any one fear things that seem evils indeed, but which it is in his own power to prevent? “No, surely.” If, then, the things independent of our will are neither good nor evil, and all things that do depend on will are in our own power, and can neither be taken away from us nor given to us unless we please, what room is there left for anxiety? But we are anxious about this paltry body or estate of ours, or about what Caesar thinks, and not at all about anything internal. Are we ever anxious not to take up a false opinion? No; for this is within our own power. Or not to follow any pursuit contrary to nature? No, nor this. When, therefore, you see any one pale with anxiety, just as the physician pronounces from the complexion that such a patient is disordered in the spleen, and another in the liver, so do you likewise say, this man is disordered in his desires and aversions; he cannot walk steadily; he is in a fever. 70r nothing else changes the complexion, or causes trembling, or sets the teeth chattering.
He crouching walks, or squats upon his heels. Therefore Zeno, when he was to meet Antigonus, felt no anxiety. For over that which he prized, Antigonus had no power; and those things over which he had power, Zeno did not regard. But Antigonus felt anxiety when he was to meet Zeno, and with reason, for he was desirous to please him; and this was external ambition. But Zeno was not solicitous to please Antigonus; for no one skilful in any art is solicitous to please a person unskilful. “I am solicitous to please you.” For what? Do you know the rules by which one man judges of another? Have you studied to understand what a good and what a bad man is, and how each becomes such? Why, then, are not you yourself a good man? “In what respect am I not?” Because no good man laments or sighs or groans; no good man turns pale and trembles and says, “How will such a one receive me; how will he hear me?” As he thinks fit, foolish man. Why do you trouble yourself about what belongs to others? Is it not his fault if he receives you ill? “Yes, surely.” And can one person be in fault and another the sufferer? “No.” Why, then, are you anxious about what belongs to others? “Well; but I am anxious how I shall speak to him.” What, then; cannot you speak to him as you will? “But I am afraid I shall be disconcerted.” If you were going to write down the name of Dion, should you be afraid of being disconcerted? “By no means.” What is the reason? Is it because you have learned how to write? “Yes.” And if you were going to read, would it not be exactly the same? “Exactly.” What is the reason? “Because every art gives a certain assurance and confidence on its own ground.” Have you not learned, then, how to speak? And what else did you study at school? “Syllogisms and convertible propositions.” For what purpose? Was it not in order to talk properly? And what is that but to talk seasonably and discreetly and intelligently, and without flutter or hesitation, and, by means of all this, with courage? “Very true.” When, therefore, you go into the field on horseback, are you anxious on being matched against one who is on foot,—you being practised and he unpractised? “Ay, but the person has power to kill me.” Then speak the truth, O unfortunate! and be not arrogant, nor take the philosopher upon you, nor conceal from yourself who are your masters; but while you are thus to be held by the body, follow the strongest. Socrates, indeed, had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to tyrants and judges, and in prison. Diogenes had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to Alexander, to Philip, to the pirates, to the person who bought him. This belonged to those who had studied the matter; who had courage. But do you go where you belong and remain there. Retire into some corner, and there sit and weave syllogisms, and propose them to others. For there is not in you a man who can rule the city.

> Greek: 13. ὅταν ἀγωνιῶντα ἴδω ἄνθρωπον, λέγω· οὗτος τί ποτε θέλει; εἰ μὴ τῶν οὐκ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ τι ἤθελεν, πῶς ἂν ἔτι ἠγωνία; διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς μόνος μὲν ᾁδων οὐκ ἀγωνιᾷ, εἰς θέατρον δʼ εἰσερχόμενος, κἂν λίαν εὔφωνος ᾖ καὶ καλῶς κιθαρίζῃ· οὐ γὰρ ᾆσαι μόνον θέλει καλῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐδοκιμῆσαι, τοῦτο δʼ οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἐπʼ αὐτῷ. λοιπὸν οὗ μὲν ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτῷ πρόσεστιν, ἐκεῖ τὸ θάρσος· φέρε ὃν θέλεις ἰδιώτην καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστρέφεται· ὅπου δʼ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδὲ μεμελέτηκεν, ἐκεῖ ἀγωνιᾷ. τί δʼ ἔστι τοῦτο; οὐκ οἶδεν, τί ἐστιν ὄχλος οὐδὲ τί ὄχλου ἔπαινος· ἀλλὰ τὴν νήτην μὲν τύπτειν ἔμαθεν καὶ τὴν ὑπάτην, ἔπαινος δʼ ὁ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν τί ἐστι καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει ἐν βίῳ οὔτε οἶδεν οὔτε μεμελέτηκεν αὐτό. ἀνάγκη λοιπὸν τρέμειν καὶ ὠχριᾶν. κιθαρῳδὸν μὲν οὖν οὐ δύναμαι εἰπεῖν μὴ εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδω τινὰ φοβούμενον, ἄλλο δέ τι δύναμαι εἰπεῖν καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν, ἀλλὰ πολλά. καὶ πρῶτον πάντων ξένον αὐτὸν καλῶ καὶ λέγω· οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ οἶδεν ποῦ τῆς γῆς ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τοσούτου χρόνου ἐπιδημῶν ἀγνοεῖ τοὺς νόμους τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τί ἔξεστι καὶ τί οὐκ ἔξεστιν. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ νομικόν τινα παρέλαβεν πώποτε τὸν ἐροῦντα αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξηγησόμενον τὰ νόμιμα· ἀλλὰ διαθήκην μὲν οὐ γράφει μὴ εἰδὼς πῶς δεῖ γράφειν ἢ παραλαβὼν τὸν εἰδότα οὐδʼ ἐγγύην ἄλλως σφραγίζεται ἢ ἀσφάλειαν γράφει, ὀρέξει δὲ χρῆται δίχα νομικοῦ καὶ ἐκκλίσει καὶ ὁρμῇ καὶ ἐπιβολῇ καὶ προθέσει. πῶς δίχα νομικοῦ; οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι θέλει τὰ μὴ διδόμενα καὶ οὐ θέλει τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ οὐκ οἶδεν οὔτε τὰ ἴδια οὔτε τὰ ἀλλότρια. εἰ δέ γʼ ᾔδει, οὐδέποτʼ ἂν ἐνεποδίζετο, οὐδέποτʼ ἐκωλύετο, οὐκ ἂν ἠγωνία. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; φοβεῖταί τις οὖν ὑπὲρ τῶν μὴ κακῶν; — οὔ. — τί δʼ; ὑπὲρ τῶν κακῶν μέν, ἐπʼ αὐτῷ δʼ ὄντων ὥστε μὴ συμβῆναι; — οὐδαμῶς. — εἰ οὖν τὰ μὲν ἀπροαίρετα οὔτʼ ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακά, τὰ προαιρετικὰ δὲ πάντα ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ οὔτʼ ἀφελέσθαι τις ἡμῶν αὐτὰ δύναται οὔτε περιποιῆσαι ἃ οὐ θέλομεν αὐτῶν, ποῦ ἔτι τόπος ἀγωνίας; ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ σωματίου ἀγωνιῶμεν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ κτησιδίου, περὶ τοῦ τί δόξει τῷ Καίσαρι, περὶ τῶν ἔσω δʼ οὐδενός. μή τι περὶ τοῦ μὴ ψεῦδος ὑπολαβεῖν; — οὔ· ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ γάρ ἐστιν. — μή τι τοῦ ὁρμῆσαι παρὰ φύσιν; — οὐδὲ περὶ τούτου. — ὅταν οὖν ἴδῃς τινὰ ὠχριῶντα, ὡς ὁ ἰατρὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ χρώματος λέγει τούτου ὁ σπλὴν πέπονθε, τούτου δὲ τὸ ἧπαρ, οὕτως καὶ σὺ λέγε τούτου ὄρεξις καὶ ἔκκλισις πέπονθεν, οὐκ εὐοδεῖ, φλεγμαίνει. χρῶμα γὰρ οὐ μεταβάλλει οὐδὲν ἄλλο οὐδὲ τρόμον ποιεῖ οὐδὲ ψόφον τῶν ὀδόντων οὐδὲ μετοκλάζει καὶ ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέρους πόδας ἵζει. διὰ τοῦτο Ζήνων μὲν Ἀντιγόνῳ μέλλων ἐντυγχάνειν οὐκ ἠγωνία· ἃ γὰρ οὗτος ἐθαύμαζεν, τούτων οὐδενὸς εἶχεν ἐκεῖνος ἐξουσίαν, ὧν δʼ εἶχεν ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐπεστρέφετο οὗτος· Ἀντίγονος δὲ Ζήνωνι μέλλων ἐντυγχάνειν ἠγωνία, καὶ εἰκότως· ἤθελε γὰρ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ, τοῦτο δʼ ἔξω ἔκειτο· οὗτος δʼ ἐκείνῳ οὐκ ἤθελεν, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλος τις τεχνίτης τῷ ἀτέχνῳ. ἐγώ σοι ἀρέσαι θέλω; ἀντὶ τίνος; οἶδας γὰρ τὰ μέτρα, καθʼ ἃ κρίνεται ἄνθρωπος ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπου; μεμέλ[ετ]ηκέ σοι γνῶναι, τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί κακὸς καὶ πῶς ἑκάτερον γίγνεται; διὰ τί οὖν σὺ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς οὐκ εἶ; — πῶς, φησίν, οὐκ εἰμί; — ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς πενθεῖ οὐδὲ στενάζει, οὐδεὶς οἰμώζει, οὐδεὶς ὠχριᾷ καὶ τρέμει οὐδὲ λέγει πῶς μʼ ἀποδέξεται, πῶς μου ἀκούσει; ἀνδράποδον, ὡς ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ. τί οὖν σοὶ μέλει περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; νῦν οὐκ ἐκείνου ἁμάρτημά ἐστι τὸ κακῶς ἀποδέξασθαι τὰ παρὰ σοῦ; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — δύναται δʼ ἄλλου μὲν εἶναι ἁμάρτημα, ἄλλου δὲ κακόν; — οὔ. — τί οὖν ἀγωνιᾷς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; — ναί· ἀλλʼ ἀγωνιῶ, πῶς ἐγὼ αὐτῷ λαλήσω. — εἶτʼ οὐκ ἔξεστι γὰρ ὡς θέλεις αὐτῷ λαλῆσαι; — ἀλλὰ δέδοικα μὴ ἐκκρουσθῶ. — μή τι γράφειν μέλλων τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα δέδοικας μὴ ἐκκρουσθῇς; — οὐδαμῶς. — τί τὸ αἴτιον; οὐχ ὅτι μεμελέτηκας γράφειν; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — τί δʼ; ἀναγιγνώσκειν μέλλων οὐχ ὡσαύτως ἂν εἶχες; — ὡσαύτως. — τί τὸ αἴτιον; ὅτι πᾶσα τέχνη ἰσχυρόν τι ἔχει καὶ θαρραλέον ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῆς. λαλεῖν οὖν οὐ μεμελέτηκας; καὶ τί ἄλλο ἐμελέτας ἐν τῇ σχολῇ; — συλλογισμοὺς καὶ μεταπίπτοντας. — ἐπὶ τί; οὐχ ὥστε ἐμπείρως διαλέγεσθαι; τὸ δʼ ἐμπείρως ἐστὶν οὐχὶ εὐκαίρως καὶ ἀσφαλῶς καὶ συνετῶς, ἔτι δʼ ἀπταίστως καὶ ἀπαραποδίστως, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις τεθαρρηκότως; — ναί. — ἱππεὺς οὖν ὢν εἰς πεδίον ἐληλυθὼς πρὸς πεζὸν ἀγωνιᾶς, ὅπου σὺ μεμελέτηκας, ἐκεῖνος δʼ ἀμελέτητός ἐστιν; — ναί· ἀλλὰ ἐξουσίαν ἔχει ἀποκτεῖναί με. — λέγε οὖν τὰ ἀληθῆ, δύστηνε, καὶ μὴ ἀλαζονεύου μηδὲ φιλόσοφος εἶναι ἀξίου μηδὲ ἀγνόει σου τοὺς κυρίους, ἀλλὰ μέχρις ἂν ἔχῃς ταύτην τὴν λαβὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἀκολούθει παντὶ τῷ ἰσχυροτέρῳ. λέγειν δὲ Σωκράτης ἐμελέτα ὁ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους οὕτως διαλεγόμενος, ὁ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς, ὁ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ. λέγειν Διογένης μεμελετήκει ὁ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον οὕτως λαλῶν, ὁ πρὸς Φίλιππον, ὁ πρὸς τοὺς πειρατάς, ὁ πρὸς τὸν ὠνησάμενον αὐτόν … (25, 26) ἐκείνοις, οἷς μεμέλ[ετ]ηκεν, τοῖς θαρροῦσι· σὺ δʼ ἐπὶ τὰ σαυτοῦ βάδιζε καὶ ἐκείνων ἀποστῇς μηδέποτε· εἰς τὴν γωνίαν ἀπελθὼν κάθησο καὶ πλέκε συλλογισμοὺς καὶ ἄλλῳ πρότεινε· οὐκ ἔστι δʼ ἐν σοὶ πόλεος ἡγεμὼν ἀνήρ.

[¶2] 14. When a certain Roman came to him with his son, and had heard one lesson, “This,” said Epictetus, “is the method of teaching;” and ceased. When the other desired him to go on, he answered, Every art seems tedious, when it is delivered to a person ignorant and unskilful in it. The things performed by the common arts quickly manifest the use for which they were made; and most of them have something attractive and agreeable. Thus the trade of a shoemaker, as one seeks to learn it, is an unpleasant thing; but the shoe is useful, and not unpleasing to the eye. The trade of a smith is extremely unattractive to an ignorant observer; but the work shows the usefulness of the art. You will see this much more strongly in music; for if you stand by while a person is learning, it will appear to you of all sciences the most unpleasant; but the effects are agreeable and delightful, even to those who do not understand it. So here we take it to be the work of one who studies philosophy, to bring his will into harmony with events; so that none of the things which happen may happen against our inclination, nor those which do not happen be desired by us. Hence they who have settled this point have it in their power never to be disappointed in what they seek, nor to incur what they shun; but to lead their own lives without sorrow, fear, or perturbation, and in society to preserve all the natural or acquired relations of son, father, brother, citizen, husband, wife, neighbor, fellow-traveller, ruler, or subject. Something like this is what we take to be the work of a philosopher. It remains to inquire, how it is to be effected. Now, e see that a carpenter becomes a carpenter by learning certain things; and a pilot, by learning certain. things, becomes a pilot. Probably, then, it is not sufficient, in the present case, merely to be willing to be wise and good; but it is moreover necessary that certain things should be learned. What these things are, is the question. The philosophers say that we are first to learn that there is a God, and that his providence directs the whole; and that it is not merely impossible to conceal from him our actions, but even our thoughts and emotions. We are next to learn what the gods are; for such as they are found to be, such must he seek to be to the utmost of his power, who would please and obey them. If the Deity is faithful, he too must be faithful; if free, beneficent, and noble, he must be free, beneficent, and noble likewise, in all his words and actions behaving as an imitator of God. “Whence, then, are we to begin?” If you will give me leave, I will tell you. It is necessary, in the first place, that you should understand words. “So then! I do not understand them now?” No. You do not. “How is it, then, that I use them?” Just as the illiterate use the words of the learned, and as brutes use the phenomena of nature. For use is one thing, and understanding another. But if you think you understand them, bring whatever words you please, and let us see whether we understand them or not. “Well; but it is a grievous thing for a man to be confuted who has grown old, and has perhaps served through his three campaigns to a senatorship.” I know it very well. For you now come to me, as if you wanted nothing. And how can it enter into your imagination that there should be anything in which you are deficient? You are rich; and perhaps have a wife and children, and a great number of domestics. Caesar takes notice of you; you have many friends at Rome; you render to all their dues; you know how to requite a favor, and revenge an injury. In what are you deficient? Suppose, then, I should prove to you that you are deficient in what is most necessary and important to happiness; and that hitherto you have taken care of everything, rather than your duty; and to complete all, that you understand not what God or man, or good or evil, means? That you are ignorant of all the rest, perhaps, you may bear to be told; but if I prove to you that you are ignorant even of yourself, how will you bear with me, and how will you have patience to stay and be convinced? Not at all. You will immediately be offended, and go away. And yet what injury have I done you; unless a looking-glass injures a person not handsome, when it shows him to himself such as he is; or unless a physician can be thought to affront his patient, when he says to him: “Do you think, sir, that you are not ill? You have a fever. Eat no meat to-day, and drink water”? Nobody cries out here, “What an intolerable affront!” But if you say to any one: You exhibit feverishness in your desires, and low habits in what you shun; your aims are contradictory, your pursuits not conformable to nature, your opinions rash and mistaken, he presently goes away, and complains that he is affronted. This is the position we assume. As, in a crowded fair, the horses and cattle are brought to be sold, and most men come either to buy or sell; but there are a few who come only to look at the fair, and inquire how it is carried on, and why in that manner, and who appointed it, and for what purpose,—thus, in this fair [of the world] some, like cattle, trouble themselves about nothing but fodder. To all of you who busy yourselves about possessions and farms and domestics and public posts, these things are nothing else but mere fodder. But there are some few men among the crowd who are fond of looking on, and considering: “What then, after all, is the world? Who governs it? Has it no governor? How is it possible, when neither a city nor a house can remain, ever so short a time, without some one to govern and take care of it, that this vast and beautiful system should be administered in a fortuitous and disorderly manner? Is there then a governor? Of what sort is he, and how does he govern? And what are we who are under him, and for what designed? Have we some connection and relation to him, or none?” In this manner are the few affected, and apply themselves only to view the fair, and then depart. Well; and they are laughed at by the multitude? Why, so are the lookers-on, by the buyers and sellers; and if the cattle had any apprehension, they too would laugh at such as admired anything but fodder.

> Greek: 14. εἰσελθόντος τινὸς τῶν Ῥωμαικῶν μετὰ υἱοῦ καὶ ἐπακούοντος ἑνὸς ἀναγνώσματος Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς διδασκαλίας καὶ ἀπεσιώπησεν. ἀξιοῦντος δʼ ἐκείνου εὑρεῖν τὰ ἑξῆς Κόπον ἔχει, ἔφη, πᾶσα τέχνη τῷ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ ἀπείρῳ αὐτῆς, ὅταν παραδιδῶται. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τήν τε χρείαν εὐθὺς ἐνδείκνυται πρὸς ὃ γέγονεν καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτῶν ἔχει τι καὶ ἀγωγὸν καὶ ἐπίχαρι. καὶ γὰρ σκυτεὺς πῶς μὲν μανθάνει τις παρεῖναι καὶ παρακολουθεῖν ἀτερπές, τὸ δʼ ὑπόδημα χρήσιμον καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλως οὐκ ἀηδές. καὶ τέκτονος ἡ μὲν μάθησις ἀνιαρὰ μάλιστα τῷ ἰδιώτῃ παρατυγχάνοντι, τὸ δʼ ἔργον ἐπιδείκνυσι τὴν χρείαν τῆς τέχνης. πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ μουσικῆς ὄψει αὐτό· ἂν γὰρ παρῇς τῷ διδασκομένῳ, φανεῖταί σοι πάντων ἀτερπέστατον τὸ μάθημα, τὰ μέντοι ἀπὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ἡδέα καὶ ἐπιτερπῆ τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἀκούειν. καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὲν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος τοιοῦτόν τι φανταζόμεθα, ὅτι δεῖ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν συναρμόσαι τοῖς γινομένοις, ὡς μήτε τι τῶν γινομένων ἀκόντων ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι μήτε τῶν μὴ γινομένων θελόντων ἡμῶν μὴ γίνεσθαι. ἐξ οὗ περίεστι τοῖς συστησαμένοις αὐτὸ ἐν ὀρέξει μὴ ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἐν ἐκκλίσει δὲ μὴ περιπίπτειν, ἀλύπως, ἀφόβως, ἀταράχως διεξάγειν καθʼ αὑτὸν μετὰ τῶν κοινωνῶν τηροῦντα τὰς σχέσεις τάς τε φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους, τὸν υἱόν, τὸν πατέρα, τὸν ἀδελφόν, τὸν πολίτην, τὸν ἄνδρα, τὴν γυναῖκα, τὸν γείτονα, τὸν σύνοδον, τὸν ἄρχοντα, τὸν ἀρχόμενον. τὸ ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος τοιοῦτόν τι φανταζόμεθα. λοιπὸν ἐφεξῆς τούτῳ ζητοῦμεν, πῶς ἔσται τοῦτο. ὁρῶμεν οὖν ὅτι ὁ τέκτων μαθών τινα γίνεται τέκτων, ὁ κυβερνήτης μαθών τινα γίνεται κυβερνήτης. μή ποτʼ οὖν καὶ ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἀπαρκεῖ τὸ βούλεσθαι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, χρεία δὲ καὶ μαθεῖν τινα; ζητοῦμεν οὖν τίνα ταῦτα. λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι μαθεῖν δεῖ πρῶτον τοῦτο, ὅτι ἔστι θεὸς καὶ προνοεῖ τῶν ὅλων καὶ οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν αὐτὸν οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντα, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ διανοούμενον ἢ ἐνθυμούμενον· εἶτα ποῖοί τινες εἰσίν. οἷοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνοι εὑρεθῶσιν, τὸν ἐκείνοις ἀρέσοντα καὶ πεισθησόμενον ἀνάγκη πειρᾶσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι ἐκείνοις· εἰ πιστόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι πιστόν· εἰ ἐλεύθερον, καὶ τοῦτον ἐλεύθερον· εἰ εὐεργετικόν, καὶ τοῦτον εὐεργετικόν· εἰ μεγαλόφρον, καὶ τοῦτον μεγαλόφρονα· ὡς θεοῦ τοίνυν ζηλωτὴν τὰ ἑξῆς πάντα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. πόθεν οὖν ἄρξασθαι δεῖ;— ἂν συγκαθῇς, ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι πρῶτον δεῖ σε τοῖς ὀνόμασι παρακολουθεῖν. — ὥστʼ ἐγὼ νῦν οὐ παρακολουθῶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν; — οὐ παρακολουθεῖς. — πῶς οὖν χρῶμαι αὐτοῖς; — οὕτως ὡς οἱ ἀγράμματοι ταῖς ἐγγραμμάτοις φωναῖς, ὡς τὰ κτήνη ταῖς φαντασίαις· ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι χρῆσις, ἄλλο παρακολούθησις. εἰ δʼ οἴει παρακολουθεῖν, φέρε ὃ θέλεις ὄνομα καὶ βασανίσωμεν αὑτούς, εἰ παρακολουθοῦμεν. — ἀλλʼ ἀνιαρὸν τὸ ἐξελέγχεσθαι πρεσβύτερον ἄνθρωπον ἤδη κἂν οὕτως τύχῃ τὰς τρεῖς στρατείας ἐστρατευμένον. — οἶδα κἀγώ. νῦν γὰρ σὺ ἐλήλυθας πρὸς ἐμὲ ὡς μηδενὸς δεόμενος. τίνος δʼ ἂν καὶ φαντασθείης ὡς ἐνδέοντος; πλουτεῖς, τέκνα ἔχεις τυχὸν καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ οἰκέτας πολλούς, ὁ Καῖσάρ σε οἶδεν, ἐν Ῥώμῃ πολλοὺς φίλους κέκτησαι, τὰ καθήκοντα ἀποδίδως, οἶδας τὸν εὖ ποιοῦντα ἀντευποιῆσαι καὶ τὸν κακῶς ποιοῦντα κακῶς ποιῆσαι. τί σοι λείπει; ἂν οὖν σοι δείξω, ὅτι τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα καὶ μέγιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ὅτι μέχρι δεῦρο πάντων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιμεμέλησαι, καὶ τὸν κολοφῶνα ἐπιθῶ· οὔτε τί θεός ἐστιν οἶδας οὔτε τί ἄνθρωπος οὔτε τί ἀγαθὸν οὔτε τί κακόν, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἴσως ἀνεκτόν, ὅτι δʼ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖς, πῶς δύνασαι ἀνασχέσθαι μου καὶ ὑποσχεῖν τὸν ἔλεγχον καὶ παραμεῖναι; οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλʼ εὐθὺς ἀπαλλάσσῃ χαλεπῶς ἔχων. καίτοι τί σοι ἐγὼ κακὸν πεποίηκα; εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἔσοπτρον τῷ αἰσχρῷ, ὅτι δεικνύει αὐτὸν αὐτῷ οἷός ἐστιν· εἰ μὴ καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς τὸν νοσοῦντα [ὅταν αὐτὸν] ὑβρίζει, ὅταν εἴπῃ αὐτῷ ἄνθρωπε, δοκεῖς μηδὲν ἔχειν, πυρέσσεις δέ· ἀσίτησον σήμερον, ὕδωρ πίε· καὶ οὐδεὶς λέγει ὦ δεινῆς ὕβρεως. ἐὰν δέ τινι εἴπῃς αἱ ὀρέξεις σου φλεγμαίνουσιν, αἱ ἐκκλίσεις ταπειναί εἰσιν, αἱ ἐπιβολαὶ ἀνομολογούμεναι, αἱ ὁρμαὶ ἀσύμφωνοι τῇ φύσει, αἱ ὑπολήψεις εἰκαῖαι καὶ ἐψευσμέναι, εὐθὺς ἐξελθὼν λέγει ὕβρισέν με. τοιαῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἡμέτερα ὡς ἐν πανηγύρει. τὰ μὲν κτήνη π[α]ραθησόμενα ἄγεται καὶ οἱ βόες, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν ὠνησόμενοι οἱ δὲ πωλήσοντες· ὀλίγοι δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ θέαν ἐρχόμενοι τῆς πανηγύρεως, πῶς τοῦτο γίνεται καὶ διὰ τί καὶ τίνες οἱ τιθέντες τὴν πανήγυριν καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι. οὕτως καὶ ἐνθάδʼ ἐν τῇ πανηγύρει ταύτῃ· οἱ μέν τινες ὡς κτήνη οὐδὲν πλέον πολυπραγμονοῦσι τοῦ χόρτου· ὅσοι γὰρ περὶ κτῆσιν καὶ ἀγροὺς καὶ οἰκέτας καὶ ἀρχάς τινας ἀναστρέφεσθε, ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χόρτος ἐστίν· ὀλίγοι δʼ εἰσὶν οἱ πανηγυρίζοντες ἄνθρωποι φιλοθεάμονες. τί ποτʼ οὖν ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος, τίς αὐτὸν διοικεῖ. οὐδείς; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε πόλιν μὲν ἢ οἶκον μὴ δύνασθαι διαμένειν μηδʼ ὀλιγοστὸν χρόνον δίχα τοῦ διοικοῦντος καὶ ἐπιμελομένου, τὸ δʼ οὕτως μέγα καὶ καλὸν κατασκεύασμα εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν οὕτως εὐτάκτως οἰκονομεῖσθαι; ἔστιν οὖν ὁ διοικῶν. ποῖός τις καὶ πῶς ὁ διοικῶν; ἡμεῖς δὲ τίνες ὄντες ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ γεγόναμεν καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον; ἆρά γʼ ἔχομέν τινα ἐπιπλοκὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ σχέσιν ἢ οὐδεμίαν; ταῦτʼ ἔστιν ἃ πάσχουσιν οὗτοι οἱ ὀλίγοι· καὶ λοιπὸν τούτῳ μόνῳ σχολάζουσι τῷ τὴν πανήγυριν ἱστορήσαντας ἀπελθεῖν. τί οὖν; καταγελῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ θεαταὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμπόρων· καὶ εἰ τὰ κτήνη συναίσθησίν τινα εἶχεν, κατεγέλα τῶν ἄλλο τι τεθαυμακότων ἢ τὸν χόρτον.

[¶3] 15. Some, when they hear such discourses as these, “That we ought to be steadfast; that the will is by nature free and unconstrained; and that all else is liable to restraint, compulsion, slavery, and tyranny,” imagine that they must remain immutably fixed to everything which they have determined. But it is first necessary that the determination should be a wise one. I agree that there should be sinews in the body, but such as in a healthy, an athletic body; for if you show me that you exhibit the [convulsed] sinews of a lunatic, and value yourself upon that, I will say to you, Seek a physician, man; this is not muscular vigor, but is really enervation. Such is the distemper of mind in those who hear these discourses in a wrong manner; like an acquaintance of mine, who, for no reason, had determined to starve himself to death. I went the third day, and inquired what was the matter. He answered, “am determined.” Well; but what is your motive? For if your determination be right, we will stay, and assist your departure; but, if unreasonable, change it. “We ought to keep our determinations.” What do you mean, sir? Not all of them; but such as are right. Else, if you should fancy that it is night, if this be your principle, do not change, but persist, and say, “We ought to keep to our determinations.” What do you mean, sir? Not to all of them. Why do you not begin by first laying the foundation, inquiring whether your determination be a sound one or not, and then build your firmness and constancy upon it. For if you lay a rotten and crazy foundation, you must not build; since the greater and more weighty the superstructure, the sooner will it fall. Without any reason, you are withdrawing from us, out of life, a friend, a companion, a fellow-citizen both of the greater and the lesser city; and while you are committing murder, and destroying an innocent person, you say, “We must keep to our determinations.” Suppose, by any means, it should ever come into your head to kill me; must you keep such a determination? With difficulty this person was, however, at last convinced; but there are some at present whom there is no convincing. So that now I think I understand, what before I did not, the meaning of that common saying, that a fool will neither bend nor break. May it never fall to my lot to have a wise, that is. an untractable, fool for my friend. “It is all to no purpose; I am determined.” So are madmen too; but the more strongly they are determined upon absurdities, the more need have they of hellebore. Why will you not act like a sick person, and apply yourself to a physician? “Sir, I am sick. Give me your assistance; consider what I am to do. It is my part to follow your directions.” So say in the present case: “know not what I ought to do; and I am come to learn.” “No; but talk to me about other things; for upon this I am determined.” What other things? What is of greater consequence, than to convince you that it is not sufficient to be determined, and to persist? This is the vigor of a madman; not of one in health. “I will die, if you compel me to this.” Why so, man; what is the matter? “am determined.” I have a lucky escape, that it is not your determination to kill me. “I will not be bribed [from my purpose].” Why so? “am determined.” Be assured, that with that very vigor which you now employ to refuse the bribe, you may hereafter have as unreasonable a propensity to take it; and again to say, “am determined.” As, in a distempered and rheumatic body, the humor tends sometimes to one part, sometimes to another; thus it is uncertain which way a sickly mind will incline. But if to its inclination and bent a spasmodic vigor be likewise added, the evil then becomes desperate and incurable.

> Greek: 15. ὅταν ἀκούσωσί τινες τούτων τῶν λόγων, ὅτι βέβαιον εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐλεύθερον φύσει καὶ ἀνανάγκαστον, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα κωλυτά, ἀναγκαστά, δοῦλα, ἀλλότρια, φαντάζονται ὅτι δεῖ παντὶ τῷ κριθέντι ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἀπαραβάτως ἐμμένειν. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον ὑγιὲς εἶναι δεῖ τὸ κεκριμένον. θέλω γὰρ εἶναι τόνους ἐν σώματι, ἀλλʼ ὡς ὑγιαίνοντι, ὡς ἀθλοῦντι· ἂν δέ μοι φρενιτικοῦ τόνους ἔχων ἐνδεικνύῃ[ς] καὶ ἀλαζονεύῃ ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς, ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι ἄνθρωπε, ζήτει τὸν θεραπεύσοντα. τοῦτο οὐκ εἰσὶ τόνοι, ἀλλʼ ἀτονία. ἕτερον τρόπον τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πάσχουσιν οἱ παρακούοντες τῶν λόγων τούτων. οἷον καὶ ἐμός τις ἑταῖρος ἐξ οὐδεμιᾶς αἰτίας ἔκρινεν ἀποκαρτερεῖν. ἔγνων ἐγὼ ἤδη τρίτην ἡμέραν ἔχοντος αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀποχῆς καὶ ἐλθὼν ἐπυνθανόμην τί ἐγένετο. — κέκρικα, φησίν. — ἀλλʼ ὅμως τί σε ἦν τὸ ἀναπεῖσαν; εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἔκρινας, ἰδοὺ παρακαθήμεθά σοι καὶ συνεργοῦμεν, ἵνʼ ἐξέλθῃς· εἰ δʼ ἀλόγως ἔκρινας, μετάθου. — τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν δεῖ. — τί ποιεῖς, ἄνθρωπε; οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς. ἐπεὶ παθὼν ἄρτι ὅτι νύξ ἐστιν, ἄν σοι δοκῇ, μὴ μετατίθεσο, ἀλλʼ ἔμμενε καὶ λέγε ὅτι τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν δεῖ. [τί ποιεῖς, ἄνθρωπε; οὐ πᾶσιν.] οὐ θέλεις τὴν ἀρχὴν στῆσαι καὶ τὸν θεμέλιον, τὸ κρίμα σκέψασθαι πότερον ὑγιὲς ἢ οὐχ ὑγιές, καὶ οὕτως λοιπὸν ἐποικοδομεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν εὐτονίαν, τὴν ἀσφάλειαν; ἂν δὲ σαπρὸν ὑποστήσῃ καὶ καταπῖπτον, οὐκ οἰκοδόμημά τι ὄν, ὅσῳ δʼ ἂν πλείονα καὶ ἰσχυρότερα ἐπιθῇς, τοσούτῳ θᾶττον [θᾶττον] κατενεχθήσεται. ἄνευ πάσης αἰτίας ἐξάγεις ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν φίλον καὶ συνήθη, τῆς αὐτῆς πόλεως πολίτην καὶ τῆς μεγάλης καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς· εἶτα φόνον ἐργαζόμενος καὶ ἀπολλύων ἄνθρωπον μηδὲν ἠδικηκότα λέγεις ὅτι τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν δεῖ. εἰ δʼ ἐπῆλθέν σοί πώς ποτʼ ἐμὲ ἀποκτεῖναι, ἔδει σε ἐμμένειν τοῖς κριθεῖσιν; ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν μόγις μετεπείσθη. τῶν δὲ νῦν τινας οὐκ ἔστι μεταθεῖναι. ὥστε μοι δοκῶ ὃ πρότερον ἠγνόουν νῦν εἰδέναι, τί ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ λεγόμενον· μωρὸν οὔτε πεῖσαι οὔτε ῥῆξαι ἔστιν. μή μοι γένοιτο φίλον ἔχειν σοφὸν μωρόν. δυσμεταχειριστότερον οὐδέν ἐστιν. κέκρικα. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μαινόμενοι· ἀλλʼ ὅσῳ βεβαιότερον κρίνουσι τὰ οὐκ ὄντα, τοσούτῳ πλείονος ἐλλεβόρου δέονται. οὐ θέλεις τὰ τοῦ νοσοῦντος ποιεῖν καὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν παρακαλεῖν; νοσῶ, κύριε· βοήθησόν μοι. τί με δεῖ ποιεῖν σκέψαι· ἐμόν ἐστι πείθεσθαί σοι. οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθʼ. ἃ δεῖ με ποιεῖν οὐκ οἶδα, ἐλήλυθα δὲ μαθησόμενος. οὔ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μοι λέγε. τοῦτο δὲ κέκρικα. περὶ ποίων ἄλλων; τί γάρ ἐστι μεῖζον ἢ προὐργιαίτερον τοῦ πεισθῆναί σε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ κεκρικέναι καὶ τὸ μὴ μεταθέσθαι; οὗτοι οἱ μανικοὶ τόνοι, οὐχ ὑγιεινοί. ἀποθανεῖν θέλω, ἄν με τοῦτο ἀναγκάσῃς. διὰ τί, ἄνθρωπε; τί ἐγένετο; κέκρικα. ἐσώθην, ὅτι οὐ κέκρικας ἐμὲ ἀποκτεῖναι. ἀργύριον οὐ λαμβάνω. διὰ τί; κέκρικα. ἴσθι ὅτι ᾧ τόνῳ νῦν χρῇ πρὸς τὸ μὴ λαμβάνειν, οὐδὲν κωλύει σε ἀλόγως ποτὲ ῥέψαι πρὸς τὸ λαμβάνειν καὶ πάλιν λέγειν ὅτι κέκρικα, ὥσπερ ἐν νοσοῦντι καὶ ῥευματιζομένῳ σώματι ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῦτα ποτὲ δʼ ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνα ῥέπει τὸ ῥεῦμα. οὕτως καὶ ἀσθενὴς ψυχή, ὅπου μὲν κλίνει, ἄδηλον ἔχει· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τόνος προσῇ τῷ κλίματι τούτῳ καὶ τῇ φορᾷ, τότε γίνεται τὸ κακὸν ἀβοήθητον καὶ ἀθεράπευτον.

[¶4] 16. Where lies good? In the will. Where evil? In the will. Where neither good nor evil? In things inevitable. What then?

> Greek: 16. ποῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν; — ἐν προαιρέσει. — ποῦ τὸ κακόν; — ἐν προαιρέσει. — ποῦ τὸ οὐδέτερον; — ἐν τοῖς ἀπροαιρέτοις.

[¶5] Does any one of us remember these lessons out of the schools? Does any one of us study how to answer for himself in the affairs of life, as in common questions? “Is it day?” “Yes.” “Is it night, then?” “No.” “Is the number of stars even?” “cannot tell.” When a bribe is offered you, have you learned to make the proper answer, that it is not a good?

> Greek: — τί οὖν; μέμνηταί τις ἡμῶν ἔξω τούτων τῶν λόγων; μελετᾷ τις αὐτὸς ἐφʼ αὑτοῦ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀποκρίνεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐρωτημάτων· ἆρά γε ἡμέρα ἐστίν; ναί. τί δέ; νύξ ἐστιν; οὔ. τί δʼ; ἄρτιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀστέρες; οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

[¶6] Have you exercised yourself in such answers as these, or only in sophistries? Why do you wonder, then, that you improve in points which you have studied;

> Greek: ὅταν σοι προφαίνηται ἀργύριον, μεμελέτηκας ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὴν δέουσαν ἀπόκρισιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθόν; ἤσκηκας ἐν ταύταις ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἢ πρὸς μόνα· τὰ σοφίσματα;

[¶7] while in those which you have not studied, there you remain the same? When an orator knows that he has written well, that he has committed to memory what he has written, and that he brings an agreeable voice with him, why is he still anxious?

> Greek: τί οὖν θαυμάζεις, εἰ, ὅπου μὲν μεμελέτηκας, ἐκεῖ κρείττων γένῃ σεαυτοῦ, ὅπου δʼ ἀμελετήτως ἔχεις, ἐκεῖ δʼ ὁ αὐτὸς διαμένεις;

[¶8] Because he is not contented with what he has studied. What does he want then?

> Greek: ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ὁ ῥήτωρ εἰδὼς ὅτι γέγραφε καλῶς, ὅτι ἀνείληφε τὰ γεγραμμένα, φωνὴν εἰσφέρων ἡδεῖαν ὅμως ἔτι ἀγωνιᾷ; ὅτι οὐκ ἀρκεῖται τῷ μελετῆσαι.

[¶9] To be applauded by the audience. He has studied the power of speaking, then; but he has not studied censure and applause. For when did he hear from any one what applause, what censure is?

> Greek: τί οὖν θέλει[ς]; ἐπαινεθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ δύνασθαι μελετᾶν ἤσκηται, πρὸς ἔπαινον δὲ καὶ ψόγον οὐκ ἤσκηται.

[¶10] What is the nature of each? What kind of applause is to be sought, and what kind of censure to be shunned? And when did he ever apply himself to study what follows from these lessons? Why do you wonder, then, if, in what he has learned, he excels others;

> Greek: πότε γὰρ ἤκουσεν παρά τινος, τί ἐστιν ἔπαινος, τί ἐστι ψόγος, τίς ἑκατέρου φύσις; τοὺς ποίους τῶν ἐπαίνων διωκτέον ἢ τοὺς ποίους τῶν ψόγων φευκτέον; πότε δʼ ἐμελέτησεν ταύτην τὴν μελέτην ἀκόλουθον τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις;

[¶11] but where he has not studied, he is the same with the rest of the world? Just as a musician knows how to play, sings well, and has the proper dress of his profession, yet trembles when he comes upon the stage.

> Greek: τί οὖν ἔτι θαυμάζεις, εἰ, ὅπου μὲν ἔμαθεν, ἐκεῖ διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων, ὅπου δʼ οὐ μεμελέτηκεν, ἐκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν;

[¶12] For the first he understands; but what the multitude is, or what mean the clamor and laughter of the multitude, he does not understand.

> Greek: ὡς ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς οἶδεν κιθαρίζειν, ᾁδει καλῶς, στατὸν ἔχει καλὸν καὶ ὅμως εἰσερχόμενος τρέμει· ταῦτα γὰρ οἶδεν, ὄχλος δὲ τί ἐστιν οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδʼ ὄχλου βοὴ οὐδὲ κατάγελως.

[¶13] Nor does he even know what anxiety itself is; whether it be our own affair, or that of others; or whether it be possible to suppress it, or not. Hence, if he is applauded, he is puffed up when he makes his exit; but if he is laughed at, the inflation is punctured, and subsides. Thus are we too affected.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγωνιᾶν τί ἐστιν οἶδεν, πότερον ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἢ ἀλλότριον, ἔστιν αὐτὸ παῦσαι ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. διὰ τοῦτο ἐὰν μὲν ἐπαινεθῇ, φυσηθεὶς ἐξῆλθεν· ἐὰν δὲ καταγελασθῇ, τὸ φυσημάτιον ἐκεῖνο ἐκεντήθη καὶ προσεκάθισεν.

[¶14] What do we admire? Externals. For what do we strive? Externals. And are we then in any doubt why we fear and are anxious? What is the consequence, then, when we esteem the things that are brought upon is to be evils?

> Greek: τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἡμεῖς πάσχομεν. τίνα θαυμάζομεν; τὰ ἐκτός. περὶ τίνα σπουδάζομεν; περὶ τὰ ἐκτός. εἶτʼ ἀποροῦμεν, πῶς φοβούμεθα ἢ πῶς ἀγωνιῶμεν;

[¶15] We cannot but fear; we cannot but be anxious. And then we say, “Lord God, how shall I avoid anxiety!”

> Greek: τί οὖν ἐνδέχεται, ὅταν τὰ ἐπιφερόμενα κακὰ ἡγώμεθα; οὐ δυνάμεθα μὴ φοβεῖσθαι, οὐ δυνάμεθα μὴ ἀγωνιᾶν.

[¶16] Have you not hands, foolish man? Has not God made them for you? You might as well kneel and pray to be cured of your catarrh. Take care of your disease, rather; and do not murmur. Well;

> Greek: εἶτα λέγομεν κύριε ὁ θεός, πῶς μὴ ἀγωνιῶ; μωρέ, χεῖρας οὐκ ἔχεις; οὐκ ἐποίησέν σοι αὐτὰς ὁ θεός; εὔχου νῦν καθήμενος, ὅπως αἱ μύξαι σου μὴ ῥέωσιν· ἀπόμυξαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ ἐγκάλει.

[¶17] and has he given you nothing in the present case? Has he not given you patience? Has he not given you magnanimity? Has he not given you fortitude? When you have such hands as these, do you still seek for aid from another?

> Greek: τί οὖν; ἐνταῦθά σοι οὐδὲν δέδωκεν; οὐ δέδωκέ σοι καρτερίαν, οὐ δέδωκέ σοι μεγαλοψυχίαν, οὐ δέδωκεν ἀνδρείαν; τηλικαύτας ἔχων χεῖρας ἔτι ζητεῖς τὸν ἀπομύξοντα;

[¶18] But we neither study nor regard these things. For give me but one who cares how he does anything, who does not regard the mete success of anything, but his own manner of acting. Who, when he is walking, regards his own action? Who, when he is deliberating, prizes the deliberation itself, and not the success that is to follow it?

> Greek: ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ μελετῶμεν ταῦτα οὐδʼ ἐπιστρεφόμεθα. ἐπεὶ δότε μοι ἕνα, ᾧ μέλει πῶς τι ποιήσῃ, ὃς ἐπιστρέφεται οὐ τοῦ τυχεῖν τινος, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αὑτοῦ· τίς περιπατῶν τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αὑτοῦ ἐπιστρέφεται; τίς βουλευόμενος αὐτῆς τῆς βουλῆς, οὐχὶ δὲ τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκείνου περὶ οὗ βουλεύεται;

## 10. Book II · chapters 16–19

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/10/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/10/#p-N

[¶0] If it happens to succeed, he is elated, and cries, “How prudently have we deliberated! Did not I tell you, my dear friend, that it was impossible, when we considered about anything, that it should not happen right?” But if it miscarries, the poor wretch is dejected, and knows not what to say about the matter. Who among us ever, for such a purpose, consulted a diviner?

> Greek: κἂν μὲν τύχῃ, ἐπῆρται καὶ λέγει πῶς γὰρ ἡμεῖς καλῶς ἐβουλευσάμεθα; οὐκ ἔλεγόν σοι, ἀδελφέ, ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἡμῶν τι σκεψαμένων μὴ οὕτως ἐκβῆναι; ἂν δʼ ἑτέρως χωρήσῃ, τεταπείνωται τάλας, οὐχ εὑρίσκει οὐδὲ τί εἴπῃ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων. τίς ἡμῶν τούτου ἕνεκα μάντιν παρέλαβεν;

[¶1] Who of us ever slept in a temple, to be instructed [in a dream] concerning his manner of acting? I say, who? Show me one who is truly noble and ingenuous, that I may see what I have long sought.

> Greek: τίς ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐνεκοιμήθη ὑπὲρ ἐνεργείας; τίς; ἕνα μοι δότε, ἵνα ἴδω τοῦτον, ὃν ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου ζητῶ, τὸν ταῖς ἀληθείαις εὐγενῆ καὶ εὐφυᾶ· εἴτε νέον εἴτε πρεσβύτερον, δότε.

[¶2] Show me either a young or an old man. Why, then, are we still surprised, if, when we waste all our attention on the mere materials of action, we are, in the manner of action itself, low, sordid, unworthy, timid, wretched, and altogether failures?

> Greek: τί οὖν ἔτι θαυμάζομεν εἰ περὶ μὲν τὰς ὕλας τετρίμμεθα, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ταπεινοί, ἀσχήμονες, οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, δειλοί, ἀταλαίπωροι, ὅλοι ἀτυχήματα; οὐ γὰρ μεμέληκεν ἡμῖν οὐδὲ μελετῶμεν.

[¶3] For we do not care about these things, nor make them our study. If we had feared, not death or exile, but fear itself, we should have studied not to fall into what appears to us to be evil.

> Greek: εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸν θάνατον ἢ τὴν φυγὴν ἐφοβούμεθα, ἀλλὰ τὸν φόβον, ἐμελετῶμεν ἂν ἐκείνοις μὴ περιπίπτειν ἃ φαίνεται ἡμῖν κακά.

[¶4] But as the case now stands, we are eager and loquacious in the schools; and when any little question arises about any of these things, we are prepared to trace its consequences; but drag us into practice, and you will find us miserably shipwrecked.

> Greek: νῦν δʼ ἐν μὲν τῇ σχολῇ γοργοὶ καὶ κατάγλωσσοι, κἂν ζητημάτιον ἐμπέσῃ περί τινος τούτων, ἱκανοὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ἐπελθεῖν· ἕλκυσον δʼ εἰς χρῆσιν καὶ εὑρήσεις τάλανας ναυαγούς. προσπεσέτω φαντασία ταρακτικὴ καὶ γνώσῃ, τί ἐμελετῶμεν καὶ πρὸς τί ἐγυμναζόμεθα.

[¶5] Let something of alarming aspect attack us, and you will perceive what we have been studying, and in what we are exercised.

> Greek: λοιπὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀμελετησίας προσεπισωρεύομεν ἀεί τινα καὶ προσπλάσσομεν μείζονα τῶν καθεστώτων.

[¶6] Besides, through this negligence we always exaggerate, and represent things greater than the reality. In a voyage, for instance, casting my eyes down upon the ocean below, and looking round me, and seeing no land, I am beside myself, and imagine that, if I should be shipwrecked, I must swallow all that ocean; not does it occur to me, that.

> Greek: εὐθὺς ἐγώ, ὅταν πλέω, κατακύψας εἰς τὸν βυθὸν ἢ τὸ πέλαγος περιβλεψάμενος καὶ μὴ ἰδὼν γῆν ἐξίσταμαι καὶ φανταζόμενος, ὅτι ὅλον με δεῖ τὸ πέλαγος τοῦτο ἐκπιεῖν, ἂν ναυαγήσω, οὐκ ἐπέρχεταί μοι, ὅτι μοι τρεῖς ξέσται ἀρκοῦσιν. τί οὖν με ταράσσει; τὸ πέλαγος; οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ δόγμα.

[¶7] three pints are enough for me. What is it, then, that alarms me,—the ocean? No; but my own impressions. Again, in an earthquake I imagine the city is going to fall upon me;

> Greek: πάλιν ὅταν σεισμὸς γένηται, φαντάζομαι ὅτι ἡ πόλις ἐπιπίπτειν μοι μέλλει· οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ μικρὸν λιθάριον, ἵνʼ ἔξω μου τὸν ἐγκέφαλον βάλῃ;

[¶8] but is not one little stone enough to knock my brains out? What is it, then, that oppresses and makes us beside ourselves? Why, what else but our own impressions?

> Greek: τίνα οὖν ἐστι τὰ βαροῦντα καὶ ἐξιστάντα ἡμᾶς; τίνα γὰρ ἄλλα ἢ τὰ δόγματα; τὸν γὰρ ἐξιόντα καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενον τῶν συνήθων καὶ ἑταίρων καὶ τόπων καὶ συναναστροφῆς τί ἐστι τὸ βαροῦν ἄλλο ἢ δόγμα;

[¶9] For what is it, but mere impressions, that distress him who leaves his country, and is separated from his acquaintance and friends and place and usual manner of life?

> Greek: τὰ γοῦν παιδία εὐθὺς ὅταν κλαύσῃ μικρὰ τῆς τιτθῆς ἀπελθούσης, πλακούντιον λαβόντα ἐπιλέλησται.

[¶10] When children cry, if their nurse happens to be absent for a little while, give them a cake, and they forget their grief. Shall we compare you to these children, then?

> Greek: θέλεις οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς παιδίοις ὁμοιῶμεν; οὔ, νὴ τὸν Δία. οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ πλακουντίου τοῦτο πάσχειν ἀξιῶ, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ δογμάτων ὀρθῶν.

[¶11] “No, indeed. For I do not desire to be pacified by a cake, but by right impressions. And what are they?” Such as a man ought to study all day long, so as not to be absorbed in what does not belong to him,—neither friend, place, nor academy, nor even his own body; but to remember the law, and to have that constantly before his eyes.

> Greek: τίνα δʼ ἐστὶ ταῦτα; ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν μελετῶντα μηδενὶ προσπάσχειν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, μηθʼ ἑταίρῳ μήτε τόπῳ μήτε γυμνασίοις, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τῷ σώματι τῷ αὑτοῦ, μεμνῆσθαι δὲ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦτον πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔχειν. τίς δʼ ὁ νόμος ὁ θεῖος;

[¶12] And what is the divine law? To preserve inviolate what is properly our own; not to claim what belongs to others; to use what is given us, and not desire what is not given us; and when anything is taken away, to restore it readily, and to be thankful for the time you have been permitted the use of it;

> Greek: τὰ ἴδια τηρεῖν, τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ διδομένοις μὲν χρῆσθαι, μὴ διδόμενα δὲ μὴ ποθεῖν, ἀφαιρουμένου δέ τινος ἀποδιδόναι εὐλύτως καὶ αὐτόθεν, χάριν εἰδότα οὗ ἐχρήσατο χρόνου, εἰ θέλεις μὴ κλάειν τὴν τιτθὴν καὶ μάμμην.

[¶13] and not cry after it, like a child for its nurse and its mamma. For what does it signify what gets the better of you, or on what you depend? Which is the worthier, one crying for a doll, or for an academy?

> Greek: τί γὰρ διαφέρει, τίνος ἥττων ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τίνος κρέμαται; τί κρείττων εἶ τοῦ διὰ κοράσιον κλάοντος, εἰ διὰ γυμνασίδιον καὶ στωίδια καὶ νεανισκάρια καὶ τοιαύτην διατριβὴν πενθεῖς;

[¶14] You lament for the portico and the assembly of young people, and such entertainments. Another comes lamenting that he must no longer drink the water of Dirce.

> Greek: ἄλλος ἐλθὼν ὅτι οὐκέτι τὸ τῆς Δίρκης ὕδωρ πίνειν μέλλει. τὸ γὰρ Μάρκιον χεῖρόν ἐστι τοῦ τῆς Δίρκης; ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνό μοι σύνηθες ἦν.

[¶15] Why, is not the Marcian water as good? “But I was used to that.” And in time you will be used to the other. And when you are attached to this too, you may weep again, and set yourself, in imitation of Euripides, to celebrate, in verse
The baths of Nero, and the Marcian water.

> Greek: καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν ἔσται σοι σύνηθες. εἶτʼ ἂν μὲν τοιούτῳ προσπάθῃς, καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν κλαῖε καὶ ζήτει στίχον ὅμοιον τῷ Εὐριπίδου ποιῆσαι θερμάς τε τὰς Νέρωνος Μάρκιόν θʼ ὕδωρ. ἴδε πῶς τραγῳδία γίνεται, ὅταν εἰς μωροὺς ἀνθρώπους πράγματα τὰ τυγχάνοντʼ ἐμπέσῃ.

[¶16] Hence see the origin of Tragedy, when trifling accidents befall foolish men. “Ah, when shall I see Athens and the citadel again?” Foolish man, are not you contented with what you see every day? Can you see anything better than the sun, the moon, the stars, the whole earth, the sea?

> Greek: πότε οὖν Ἀθήνας πάλιν ὄψομαι καὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; τάλας, οὐκ ἀρκεῖ σοι ἃ βλέπεις καθʼ ἡμέραν; κρεῖττόν τι ἔχεις ἢ μεῖζον ἰδεῖν τοῦ ἡλίου, τῆς σελήνης, τῶν ἄστρων, τῆς γῆς ὅλης, τῆς θαλάσσης;

[¶17] But if, besides, you comprehend him who administers the whole, and carry him about within yourself, do you still long after certain stones and a fine rock?

> Greek: εἰ δὲ δὴ παρακολουθεῖς τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα κἀκεῖνον ἐν σαυτῷ περιφέρεις, ἔτι ποθεῖς λιθάρια καὶ πέτραν κομψήν; ὅταν οὖν μέλλῃς ἀπολιπεῖν αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην, τί ποιήσεις;

[¶18] What will you do then, when you are to leave even the sun and moon? Will you sit crying, like an infant? What, then, have you been doing in the school? What did you hear? What did you learn? Why have you written yourself down a philosopher, instead of writing the real fact? “have prepared some abstracts, and read over Chrysippus;

> Greek: κλαύσεις καθήμενος ὡς τὰ παιδία; τί οὖν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἐποίεις, τί ἤκουες, τί ἐμάνθανες; τί σαυτὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπέγραφες ἐξὸν τὰ ὄντα ἐπιγράφειν; ὅτι εἰσαγωγὰς ἔπραξά[ς] τινας καὶ Χρυσίππεια ἀνέγνων, φιλοσόφου δʼ οὐδὲ θύραν παρῆλθον.

[¶19] but I have not so much as approached the door of philosophy. For what pretensions have I in common with Socrates, who died and who lived in such a manner;

> Greek: ποῦ γάρ μοι μέτεστι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οὗ Σωκράτει μετῆν τῷ οὕτως ἀποθανόντι, οὕτως ζήσαντι; οὗ Διογένει μετῆν;

[¶20] or with Diogenes?” Do you observe either of these crying, or out of humor, that he is not to see such a man, or such a woman; nor to live any longer at Athens nor at Corinth;

> Greek: ἐπινοεῖς τούτων τινὰ κλάοντα ἢ ἀγανακτοῦντα, ὅτι τὸν δεῖνα οὐ μέλλει βλέπειν οὐδὲ τὴν δεῖνα οὐδʼ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἔσεσθαι ἢ ἐν Κορίνθῳ, ἀλλʼ, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, ἐν Σούσοις ἢ ἐν Ἐκβατάνοις;

[¶21] but at Susa, for instance, or Ecbatana? For does he stay and repine, who may at any time, if he will, quit the entertainment, and play no longer? Why does he not stay, as children do, so long as he is amused?

> Greek: ᾧ γὰρ ἔξεστιν ἐξελθεῖν, ὅταν θέλῃ, τοῦ συμποσίου καὶ μηκέτι παίζειν, ἔτι οὗτος ἀνιᾶται μένων; οὐχὶ δʼ ὡς παιδιᾷ παραμένει, μέχρις ἂν ψυχαγωγῆται;

[¶22] Such a one, no doubt, will bear perpetual banishment and a sentence of death wonderfully well!

> Greek: ταχύ γʼ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπομείναι φυγήν τινα φυγεῖν εἰς ἅπαντα ἢ τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ κατακριθείς.

[¶23] Why will not you be weaned, as children are; and take more solid food? Will you never cease to cry after your mammas and nurses, whom the old women about you have taught you to bewail?

> Greek: οὐ θέλεις ἤδη ὡς τὰ παιδία ἀπογαλακτισθῆναι καὶ ἅπτεσθαι τροφῆς στερεωτέρας μηδὲ κλάειν μάμμας καὶ τιτθάς, γραῶν ἀποκλαύματα;

[¶24] “But if I go away, I shall trouble them also.” You trouble them! No; it will not be you; but that which troubles you too,—a mere impression. What have you to do then? Rid yourself of that impression;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἐκείνας ἀπαλλασσόμενος ἀνιάσω. σὺ αὐτὰς ἀνιάσεις; οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ καὶ σέ, τὸ δόγμα. τί οὖν ἔχεις ποιῆσαι; ἔξελε, τὸ δʼ ἐκείνων, ἂν εὖ ποιῶσιν, αὐταὶ ἐξελοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, οἰμώξουσι διʼ αὑτάς.

[¶25] and if they are wise, they will do the same for theirs; or if not, they must lament for themselves. Boldly make a desperate push, man, as the saying is, for prosperity, for freedom, for magnanimity.

> Greek: ἄνθρωπε, τὸ λεγόμενον τοῦτο ἀπονοήθητι ἤδη ὑπὲρ εὐροίας, ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας, ὑπὲρ μεγαλοψυχίας. ἀνάτεινόν ποτε τὸν τράχηλον ὡς ἀπηλλαγμένος δουλείας,

[¶26] Lift up your head at last, as being free from slavery. Dare to look up to God, and say, “Make use of me for the future as Thou wilt. I am of the same mind; I am one with Thee. I refuse nothing which seems good to Thee. Lead me whither Thou wilt. Clothe me in whatever dress Thou wilt. Is it Thy will that I should be in a public or a private condition; dwell here, or be banished; be poor, or rich?

> Greek: τόλμησον ἀναβλέψας πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς· ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, [ἰ]σός εἰμι· οὐδὲν παραιτοῦμαι τῶν σοὶ δοκούντων· ὅπου θέλεις, ἄγε· ἣν θέλεις ἐσθῆτα περίθες. ἄρχειν με θέλεις, ἰδιωτεύειν, μένειν, φεύγειν, πένεσθαι, πλουτεῖν; ἐγώ σοι ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τούτων πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπολογήσομαι· δείξω τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν οἵα ἐστίν.

[¶27] Under all these circumstances I will testify unto Thee before men.

> Greek: οὔ·

[¶28] I will explain the nature of every dispensation.” No? Rather sit alone, then, in safety, and wait till your mamma comes to feed you. If Hercules had sat loitering at home, what would he have been? Eurystheus, and not Hercules. Besides, by travelling through the world, how many acquaintances and how many friends he made. But none more his friend than God; for which reason he was believed to be the son of God, and was so.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἐν βοὸς κοιλίᾳ καθήμενος ἐκδέχου σου τὴν μάμμην, μέχρις σε χορτάσῃ. ὁ Ἡρακλῆς εἰ τοῖς ἐν οἴκῳ παρεκάθητο, τίς ἂν ἦν; Εὐρυσθεὺς καὶ οὐχὶ Ἡρακλῆς. ἄγε, πόσους δὲ περιερχόμενος τὴν οἰκουμένην συνήθεις ἔσχεν, φίλους; ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν φίλτερον τοῦ θεοῦ· διὰ τοῦτο ἐπιστεύθη Διὸς υἱὸς εἶναι καὶ ἦν. ἐκείνῳ τοίνυν πειθόμενος περιῄει καθαίρων ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀνομίαν.

[¶29] In obedience to him, he went about extirpating injustice and lawless force. But you are not Hercules, nor able to extirpate the evils of others; nor even Theseus, to extirpate the evils of Attica. Extirpate your own then. Expel, instead of Procrustes and Sciron, grief, fear, desire, envy, malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, intemperance.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ οὐκ εἶ Ἡρακλῆς καὶ οὐ δύνασαι καθαίρειν τὰ ἀλλότρια κακά, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ Θησεύς, ἵνα τὰ τῆς Ἀττικῆς καθάρῃς· τὰ σαυτοῦ κάθαρον. ἐντεῦθεν ἐκ τῆς διανοίας ἔκβαλε ἀντὶ Προκρούστου καὶ Σκίρωνος λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, φθόνον, ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν, φιλαργυρίαν, μαλακίαν, ἀκρασίαν.

[¶30] But these can be no otherwise expelled than by looking up to God alone, as your pattern; by attaching yourself to him alone, and being consecrated to his commands.

> Greek: ταῦτα δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἐκβαλεῖν, εἰ μὴ πρὸς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἀποβλέποντα, ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ προσπεπονθότα, τοῖς ἐκείνου προστάγμασι καθωσιωμένον. ἂν δʼ ἄλλο τι θέλῃς,

[¶31] If you wish for anything else, you will, with sighs and groans, follow what is stronger than you; always seeking prosperity without, and never able to find it. For you seek it where it is not, and neglect to seek it where it is.

> Greek: οἰμώζων καὶ στένων ἀκολουθήσεις τῷ ἰσχυροτέρῳ ἔξω ζητῶν ἀεὶ τὴν εὔροιαν καὶ μηδέποτʼ εὐροεῖν δυνάμενος. ἐκεῖ γὰρ αὐτὴν ζητεῖς, οὗ μή ἐστιν, ἀφεὶς ἐκεῖ ζητεῖν, ὅπου ἐστίν.

[¶32] 17. What is the first business of one who studies philosophy? To part with self-conceit. For it is impossible for any one to begin to learn what he thinks that he already knows.

> Greek: 17. τί πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος; ἀποβαλεῖν οἴησιν· ἀμήχανον γάρ, ἅ τις εἰδέναι οἴεται, ταῦτα ἄρξασθαι μανθάνειν.

[¶33] We all go to the philosophers, talking at random upon negative and positive duties; good and evil; fair and base. We praise, censure, accuse; we judge and dispute about fair and base enterprises. And yet for what do we go to the philosophers? To learn what we suppose ourselves not to know.

> Greek: τὰ μὲν οὖν ποιητέα καὶ οὐ ποιητέα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ πάντες ἄνω καὶ κάτω λαλοῦντες ἐρχόμεθα πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπαινοῦντες ψέγοντες, ἐγκαλοῦντες μεμφόμενοι, περὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν ἐπικρίνοντες καὶ διαλαμβάνοντες.

[¶34] And what is this? Propositions. We are desirous to hear what the philosophers say, for its elegance and acuteness; and some with a view only to gain. Now it is ridiculous to suppose that a person will learn anything but what he desires to learn;

> Greek: τίνος δʼ ἕνεκα προσερχόμεθα τοῖς φιλοσόφοις; ἃ οὐκ οἰόμεθα εἰδέναι. τίνα δʼ ἐστὶ ταῦτα; τὰ θεωρήματα. ἃ γὰρ λαλοῦσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, μαθεῖν θέλομεν ὡς κομψὰ καὶ δριμέα, οἱ δʼ, ἵνʼ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν περιποιήσωνται.

[¶35] or make an improvement, in what he does not learn. But most are deceived, in the same manner as Theopompus, the orator, when he blames Plato for defining everything.

> Greek: γελοῖον οὖν τὸ οἴεσθαι, ὅτι ἄλλα μέν τις μαθεῖν βούλεται, ἄλλα δὲ μαθήσεται, ἢ λοιπὸν ὅτι προκόψει τις ἐν οἷς οὐ μανθάνει.

[¶36] “For,” he says, “did none of us, before you, use the words ‘good’ and ‘just;’

> Greek: τὸ δʼ ἐξαπατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ὅπερ καὶ Θεόπομπον τὸν ῥήτορα, ὅπου καὶ Πλάτωνι ἐγκαλεῖ ἐπὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι ἕκαστα ὁρίζεσθαι.

[¶37] or did we utter them as empty sounds, without understanding what each of them meant?” Why, who tells you, Theopompus, that we had not natural ideas and general principles as to each of these?

> Greek: τί γὰρ λέγει; οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἔλεγεν ἀγαθὸν ἢ δίκαιον; ἢ μὴ παρακολουθοῦντες τί ἐστι τούτων ἕκαστον ἀσήμως καὶ κενῶς ἐφθεγγόμεθα τὰς φωνάς;

[¶38] But it is not possible to apply principles in detail, without having minutely distinguished them, and examined what details appertain to each. You may make the same objection to the physicians. For who of us did not use the words “wholesome” and “unwholesome,” before Hippocrates was born;

> Greek: τίς γάρ σοι λέγει, Θεόπομπε, ὅτι ἐννοίας οὐκ εἴχομεν ἑκάστου τούτων φυσικὰς καὶ προλήψεις; ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἐφαρμόζειν τὰς προλήψεις ταῖς καταλλήλοις οὐσίαις μὴ διαρθρώσαντα αὐτὰς καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκεψάμενον, ποίαν τινὰ ἑκάστῃ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὑποτακτέον.

[¶39] or did we utter them as empty sounds? For we have some general conception of what is wholesome too, but we cannot apply it. Hence one says, let the patient abstain from meat;

> Greek: ἐπεὶ τοιαῦτα λέγε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἰατρούς· τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἔλεγεν ὑγιεινόν τι καὶ νοσερόν, πρὶν Ἱπποκράτη γενέσθαι; ἢ κενῶς τὰς φωνὰς ταύτας ἀπηχοῦμεν;

[¶40] another, give it to him. One says, let him be bled; another, cup him. And what is the reason, but not being able to adapt the general conception of wholesomeness to particular cases? Thus, too, in life; who of us does not talk of good or evil, advantageous and disadvantageous; for who of us has not a general conception of each of these?

> Greek: ἔχομεν γάρ τινα καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ πρόληψιν, ἀλλʼ ἐφαρμόσαι οὐ δυνάμεθα. διὰ τοῦτο ὁ μὲν λέγει ἀνάτεινον, ὁ δὲ λέγει δὸς τροφήν· καὶ ὁ μὲν λέγει φλεβοτόμησον, ὁ δὲ λέγει σικύασον. τί τὸ αἴτιον; ἄλλο γε ἢ ὅτι τὴν τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ πρόληψιν οὐ δύναται καλῶς ἐφαρμόσαι τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους;

[¶41] But is it then a distinct and perfect one? Show me this. “How shall I show it?” Apply it properly in detail. Plato, to go no further, puts definitions under the general head of useful; but you, under that of useless.

> Greek: οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐνθάδʼ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον. ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον τίς ἡμῶν οὐ λαλεῖ; τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου πρόληψιν; ἆρʼ οὖν διηρθρωμένην καὶ τελείαν;

[¶42] Can both of you be right? How is it possible? Again, does not one man adapt the general conception of good to riches; another not to riches, but to pleasure or health?

> Greek: τοῦτο δεῖξον. πῶς δείξω; ἐφάρμοσον αὐτὴν καλῶς ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις. εὐθὺς τοὺς ὅρους Πλάτων μὲν ὑποτάσσει τῇ τοῦ χρησίμου προλήψει, σὺ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀχρήστου.

[¶43] In general, unless we who use words employ them vaguely, or without proper care in discrimination, why do we differ? Why do we wrangle? Why do we censure each other? But what occasion have I to mention this mutual contradiction?

> Greek: δυνατὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρους ὑμᾶς ἐπιτυγχάνειν; πῶς οἷόν τε; τῇ δὲ τοῦ πλούτου οὐσίᾳ οὐχ ὁ μέν τις ἐφαρμόζει τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρόληψιν, ὁ δʼ οὔ; τῇ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς, τῇ δὲ τῆς ὑγείας;

[¶44] If you yourself apply your principles properly, how comes it to pass that you do not prosper? Why do you meet with any hindrance? Let us for the present omit our second point concerning the pursuits and the duties relative to them;

> Greek: καθόλου γὰρ εἰ πάντες οἱ τὰ ὀνόματα λαλοῦντες μὴ κενῶς ἴσμεν ἕκαστα τούτων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελείας περὶ τὴν διάρθρωσιν τῶν προλήψεων δεόμεθα, τί διαφερόμεθα, τί πολεμοῦμεν, τί ψέγομεν ἀλλήλους;

[¶45] let us omit the third too, concerning assent. I waive all these for you. Let us insist only on the first, which affords almost a sensible proof that you do not properly apply your principles.

> Greek: καὶ τί μοι νῦν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μάχην παραφέρειν καὶ ταύτης μεμνῆσθαι; σὺ αὐτὸς εἰ ἐφαρμόζεις καλῶς τὰς προλήψεις, διὰ τί δυσροεῖς, διὰ τί ἐμποδίζῃ;

[¶46] You desire what is possible in itself, and possible for you. Why then are you hindered? Why are you not in a prosperous way? You do not shrink from the inevitable.

> Greek: ἀφῶμεν ἄρτι τὸν δεύτερον τόπον τὸν περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ τὴν κατὰ ταύτας περὶ τὸ καθῆκον φιλοτεχνίαν. ἀφῶμεν καὶ τὸν τρίτον τὸν περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις.

[¶47] Why then do you incur anything undesirable? Why are you unfortunate? When you desire anything, why does it not happen?

> Greek: χαρίζομαί σοι ταῦτα πάντα. στῶμεν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ σχεδὸν αἰσθητὴν παρέχοντος τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ μὴ ἐφαρμόζειν καλῶς τὰς προλήψεις.

[¶48] When you do not desire it, why happens it? For this is the greatest proof of ill success and misery: “I desire something and it does not happen; and what is more wretched than I?”

> Greek: νῦν σὺ θέλεις τὰ δυνατὰ καὶ τὰ σοὶ δυνατά; τί οὖν ἐμποδίζῃ; διὰ τί δυσροεῖς; νῦν οὐ φεύγεις τὰ ἀναγκαῖα; διὰ τί οὖν περιπίπτεις τινί, διὰ τί δυστυχεῖς; διὰ τί θέλοντός σού τι οὐ γίνεται καὶ μὴ θέλοντος γίνεται;

[¶49] From such impatience Medea came to murder her own children,—a lofty action in this point of view alone, that she had a proper impression of what it was to fail of one’s aim. “Thus I shall punish him who has injured and dishonored me; and what is so wicked a wretch good for?

> Greek: ἀπόδειξις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δυσροίας καὶ κακοδαιμονίας. θέλω τι καὶ οὐ γίνεται· καὶ τί ἐστιν ἀθλιώτερον ἐμοῦ; οὐ θέλω τι καὶ γίνεται· καὶ τί ἐστιν ἀθλιώτερον ἐμοῦ;

[¶50] But how is this to be effected? I will murder the children; but that will be punishing myself. And what care I?” This is the error of a powerful soul. For she knew not where the fulfilment of our desires is to be found;

> Greek: τοῦτο καὶ ἡ Μήδεια οὐχ ὑπομείνασα ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὰ τέκνα. μεγαλοφυῶς κατά γε τοῦτο. εἶχε γὰρ ἣν δεῖ φαντασίαν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἃ θέλει τινὶ μὴ προχωρεῖν.

[¶51] that it is not to be had from without, nor by altering the appointment of things. Do not demand the man for your husband, and then nothing which you desire will fail to happen.

> Greek: εἶτα οὕτως τιμωρήσομαι τὸν ἀδικήσαντά με καὶ ὑβρίσαντα. καὶ τί ὄφελος τοῦ κακῶς οὕτως διακειμένου; πῶς οὖν γένηται; ἀποκτείνω μὲν τὰ τέκνα. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμα υτὴν τιμωρήσομαι. καὶ τί μοι μέλει;

[¶52] Do not desire to keep him to yourself. Do not desire to stay at Corinth, and, in a word, have no will but the will of God, and who shall restrain you; who shall compel you, any more than Zeus?

> Greek: τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἔκπτωσις ψυχῆς μεγάλα νεῦρα ἐχούσης. οὐ γὰρ ᾔδει, ποῦ κεῖται τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ θέλομεν, ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἔξωθεν δεῖ λαμβάνειν οὐδὲ τὰ πράγματα μετατιθέντα καὶ μεθαρμοζόμενον.

[¶53] When you have such a guide, and conform your will and inclinations to his, why need you fear being disappointed? Fix your desire and aversion on riches or poverty; the one will be disappointed, the other incurred. Fix them on health.

> Greek: μὴ θέλε τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ οὐδὲν ὧν θέλεις οὐ γίνεται. μὴ θέλε αὐτὸν ἐξ ἅπαντός σοι συνοικεῖν, μὴ θέλε μένειν ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ ἁπλῶς μηδὲν ἄλλο θέλε ἢ ἃ ὁ θεὸς θέλει. καὶ τίς σε κωλύσει, τίς ἀναγκάσει; οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν Δία.

[¶54] power, honors, your country, friends, children,—in short, on anything beyond the control of your will,—you will be unfortunate. But fix them on Zeus, on the gods;

> Greek: ὅταν τοιοῦτον ἔχῃς ἡγεμόνα καὶ τοιούτῳ συνθέλῃς καὶ συνορέγῃ, τί φοβῇ ἔτι μὴ ἀποτύχῃς;

[¶55] give yourself up to these; let these govern; let your powers be ranged on the same side with these, and how can you be any longer unprosperous? But if, poor wretch, you envy, and pity, and are jealous, and tremble, and never cease a single day from complaining of yourself and the gods, why do you boast of your education?

> Greek: χάρισαί σου τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τὴν ἔκκλισιν πενίᾳ καὶ πλούτῳ· ἀποτεύξῃ, περιπεσῇ. ἀλλʼ ὑγιείᾳ· δυστυχήσεις· ἀρχαῖς, τιμαῖς, πατρίδι, φίλοις, τέκνοις, ἁπλῶς ἄν τινι τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων. ἀλλὰ τῷ Διὶ χάρισαι αὐτάς, τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς·

[¶56] What education, man,—that you have learned syllogisms?

> Greek: ἐκείνοις παράδος, ἐκεῖνοι κυβερνάτωσαν, μετʼ ἐκείνων τετάχθωσαν· καὶ ποῦ ἔτι δυσροήσεις;

[¶57] Why do not you, if possible, unlearn all these, and begin again, convinced that hitherto you have not even touched upon the essential point?

> Greek: εἰ δὲ φθονεῖς, ἀταλαίπωρε, καὶ ἐλεεῖς καὶ ζηλοτυπεῖς καὶ τρέμεις καὶ μίαν ἡμέραν οὐ διαλείπεις, ἐν ᾗ οὐ κατακλάεις καὶ σαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν θεῶν, καὶ τί ἔτι λέγεις πεπαιδεῦσθαι;

[¶58] And for the future, beginning from this foundation, proceed in order to the superstructure; that nothing may happen which you do not wish, and that everything may happen which you desire.

> Greek: ποίαν παιδείαν, ἄνθρωπε; ὅτι συλλογισμοὺς ἔπραξας, μεταπίπτοντας; οὐ θέλεις ἀπομαθεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν, πάντα ταῦτα καὶ ἄνωθεν ἄρξασθαι συναισθανόμενος ὅτι μέχρι νῦν οὐδʼ ἥψω τοῦ πράγματος,

[¶59] Give me but one young man who brings this intention with him to the school, who is a champion for this point, and says, “yield up all the rest;

> Greek: καὶ λοιπὸν ἔνθεν ἀρξάμενος προσοικοδομεῖν τὰ ἑξῆς, πῶς μηδὲν ἔσται σοῦ μὴ θέλοντος, θέλοντος μηδὲν οὐκ ἔσται;

[¶60] it suffices me, if once I become able to pass my life free from hindrance and grief, to stretch out my neck to all events as freely, and to look up to Heaven as the friend of God, fearing nothing that can happen.” Let any one of you show himself of such a disposition, that I may say, “Come into the place, young man, that is of right your own; for you are destined to be an ornament to philosophy. Yours are these possessions; yours these books; yours these discourses.”

> Greek: δότε μοι ἕνα νέον κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἐληλυθότα εἰς σχολήν, τούτου τοῦ πράγματος ἀθλητὴν γενόμενον καὶ λέγοντα ὅτι ἐμοὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα χαιρέτω, ἀρκεῖ δʼ εἰ ἐξέσται ποτὲ ἀπαραποδίστῳ καὶ ἀλύπῳ διαγαγεῖν καὶ ἀνατεῖναι τὸν τράχηλον πρὸς τὰ πράγματα ὡς ἐλεύθερον καὶ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναβλέπειν ὡς φίλον τοῦ θεοῦ μηδὲν φοβούμενον τῶν συμβῆναι δυναμένων. δειξάτω τις ὑμῶν αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον, ἵνα εἴπω·

[¶61] Then, when he has thoroughly mastered this first class, let him come to me again and say, “desire indeed to be free from passion and perturbation;

> Greek: ἔρχου, νεανίσκε, εἰς τὰ σά· σοὶ γὰρ εἵμαρται κοσμῆσαι φιλοσοφίαν, σά ἐστι ταῦτα τὰ κτήματα, σὰ τὰ βιβλία, σοὶ οἱ λόγοι.

[¶62] but I desire too, as a pious, a philosophic, and a diligent man, to know what is my duty to God, to my parents, to my relations, to my country, and to strangers.” Come into the second class too; for this likewise is yours. “But I have now sufficiently studied the second class too; and I would willingly be secure and unshaken by error and delusion, not only when awake, but even when asleep;

> Greek: εἶθʼ, ὅταν τοιοῦτον ἐκπονήσῃ καὶ καταθλήσῃ τὸν τόπον, πάλιν ἐλθών μοι εἰπάτω ἐγὼ θέλω μὲν καὶ ἀπαθὴς εἶναι καὶ ἀτάραχος, θέλω δʼ ὡς εὐσεβὴς καὶ φιλόσοφος καὶ ἐπιμελὴς εἰδέναι τί μοι πρὸς θεούς ἐστι καθῆκον, τί πρὸς γονεῖς, τί πρὸς ἀδελφούς, τί πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα, τί πρὸς ξένους.

[¶63] when warmed with wine;

> Greek: ἔρχου καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν δεύτερον τόπον· σός ἐστι καὶ οὗτος.

[¶64] when diseased with the spleen.” You are becoming as a god, man; your aims are sublime! “Nay; but I, for my part, desire to understand what Chrysippus says, in his logical treatise of the Pseudomenos.” Go hang yourself, pitiful man, with only such an aim as this!

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἤδη καὶ τὸν δεύτερον τόπον ἐκμεμελέτηκα. ἤθελον δʼ ἀσφαλῶς καὶ ἀσείστως καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐγρηγορώς, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθεύδων καὶ οἰνωμένος καὶ ἐν μελαγχολίᾳ. σὺ θεὸς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, σὺ μεγάλας ἔχεις ἐπιβολάς.

[¶65] What good will it do you? You will read the whole, lamenting all the while; and say to others, trembling, “Do as I do. Shall I read to you, my friend, and you to me? You write amazingly well;

> Greek: οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ θέλω γνῶναι, τί λέγει Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Ψευδομένου. οὐκ ἀπάγξῃ μετὰ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ταύτης, τάλας; καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος ἔσται; πενθῶν ἅπαν ἀναγνώσῃ καὶ τρέμων πρὸς ἄλλους ἐρεῖς.

[¶66] and you very finely imitate the style of Plato; and you, of Xenophon; and you, of Antisthenes.” And thus, having related your dreams to each other, you return again to the same state.

> Greek: οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς ποιεῖτε. θέλεις ἀναγνῶ σοι, ἀδελφέ; καὶ σὺ ἐμοί. θαυμαστῶς, ἄνθρωπε, γράφεις· καὶ σὺ μεγάλως εἰς τὸν Ξενοφῶντος χαρακτῆρα, σὺ εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος,

[¶67] Your desires and aversions, your pursuits, your intentions, your resolutions, your wishes, and endeavors are just what they were. You do not so much as seek for one to advise you, but are offended when you hear such things as these, and cry, “An ill-natured old man!

> Greek: σὺ εἰς τὸν Ἀντισθένους. εἶτʼ ἀλλήλοις ὀνείρους διηγησάμενοι πάλιν ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ἐπανέρχεσθε· ὡσαύτως ὀρέγεσθε, ὡσαύτως ἐκκλίνετε, ὁμοίως ὁρμᾶτε, ἐπιβάλλεσθε, προ[σ]τίθεσθε, ταὐτὰ εὔχεσθε, περὶ ταὐτὰ σπουδάζετε. εἶτα οὐδὲ ζητεῖτε τὸν ὑπομνήσοντα ὑμᾶς,

[¶68] He never wept over me, when I was setting out, nor said, To what a danger are you going to be exposed? If you come off safe, child, I will illuminate my house. This would have been the part of a man of feeling.” Truly it will be a mighty happiness if you do come off safe;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἄχθεσθε, ἐὰν ἀκούητε τούτων. εἶτα λέγετε ἀφιλόστοργος γέρων· ἐξερχομένου μου οὐκ ἔκλαυσεν οὐδʼ εἶπεν 1εἰς οἵαν περίστασιν ἀπέρχῃ μοι, τέκνον· ἂν σωθῇς, ἅψω λύχνους. ταῦτʼ ἔστι τὰ τοῦ φιλοστόργου;

[¶69] it will be worth while to make an illumination. For you ought to be immortal and exempt from sickness, to be sure.

> Greek: μέγα σοι ἀγαθὸν ἔσται σωθέντι τοιούτῳ καὶ λύχνων ἄξιον. ἀθάνατον γὰρ εἶναί σε δεῖ καὶ ἄνοσον.

[¶70] Throwing away, then, I say, this self-conceit, by which we fancy we have gained some knowledge of what is useful, we should come to philosophic reasoning as we do to mathematics and music;

> Greek: ταύτην οὖν, ὅπερ λέγω, τὴν οἴησιν τὴν τοῦ δοκεῖν εἰδέναι τι τῶν χρησίμων ἀποβάλλοντας ἔρχεσθαι δεῖ πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὡς πρὸς τὰ γεωμετρικὰ προσάγομεν, ὡς πρὸς τὰ μουσικά·

[¶71] otherwise we shall be far from making any improvement, even if we have read over all the compends and commentaries, not only of Chrysippus, but of Antipater, and Archedemus too.

> Greek: εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδʼ ἐγγὺς ἐσόμεθα τῷ προκόψαι, κἂν πάσας τὰς εἰσαγωγὰς καὶ τὰς συντάξεις τὰς Χρυσίππου μετὰ τῶν Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ Ἀρχεδήμου διέλθωμεν.

[¶72] 18. Every habit and faculty is preserved and increased by correspondent actions; as the habit of walking, by walking; of running, by running. If you would be a reader, read; if a writer, write. But if you do not read for a month together, but do something else, you will see what will be the consequence. So after sitting still for ten days, get up and attempt to take a long walk, and you will find how your legs are weakened. Upon the whole, then, whatever you would make habitual, practise it; and if you would not make a thing habitual, do not practise it, but habituate yourself to something else. It is the same with regard to the operations of the soul. Whenever you are angry, be assured that it is not only a present evil, but that you have increased a habit, and added fuel to a fire. When you are overcome by the seductions of a woman, do not consider it as a single defeat alone, but that you have fed, that you have increased, your dissoluteness. For it is impossible but that habits and faculties must either be first produced, or strengthened and increased, by corresponding actions. Hence the philosophers derive the growth of all maladies. When you once desire money, for example, if reason be applied to produce a sense of the evil, the desire ceases, and the governing faculty of the mind regains its authority; whereas, if you apply no remedy, it returns no more to its former state, but being again similarly excited, it kindles at the desire more quickly than before; and by frequent repetitions at last becomes callous, and by this malady is the love of money fixed. For he who has had a fever, even after it has left him, is not in the same state of health as before, unless he was perfectly cured; and the same thing happens in distempers of the soul likewise. There are certain traces and blisters left in it, which, unless they are well effaced, whenever a new hurt is received in the same part, instead of blisters will become sores. If you would not be of an angry temper, then, do not feed the habit. Give it nothing to help its increase. Be quiet at first and reckon the days in which you have not been angry. I used to be angry every day; now every other day; then every third and fourth day; and if you miss it so long as thirty days, offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving to God. For habit is first weakened and then entirely destroyed. “I was not vexed to-day, nor the next day, nor for three or four months after; but restrained myself under provocation.” Be assured that you are in an excellent way. “To-day, when I saw a handsome person, I did not say to myself, Oh. that I could possess her! and how happy is her husband” (for he who says this, says too, how happy is her gallant), “nor did I go on to fancy her in my arms.” On this I stroke my head and say, Well done, Epictetus; thou hast solved a hard problem, harder than the chief syllogism. But if the lady herself should happen to be willing and give me intimations of it, and send for me and press my hand and place herself next to me, and I should then forbear and get the victory,—that would be a triumph beyond all the forms of logic. This is the proper subject for exultation, and not one’s power in handling the syllogism. How then is this to be effected? Be willing to approve yourself to yourself. Be willing to appear beautiful in the sight of God; be desirous to converse in purity with your own pure mind, and with God; and then, if any such semblance bewilders you, Plato directs you: “Have recourse to expiations; go a suppliant to the temples of the averting deities.” It is sufficient, however, if you propose to yourself the example of wise and good men, whether alive or dead, and compare your conduct with theirs. Go to Socrates, and see him placed beside his beloved, yet not seduced by youth and beauty. Consider what a victory he was conscious of obtaining; what an Olympic triumph! How near does he rank to Hercules! So that, by Heaven! one might justly salute him, Hail! wondrous victor! instead of those sorry boxers and wrestlers, and the gladiators who resemble them. By placing such an example before you, you will conquer any alluring semblance, and not be drawn away by it. But in the first place, be not hurried away by excitement; but say, Semblance, wait for me a little. Let me see what you are, and what you represent. Let me try you. Then, afterwards, do not suffer it to go on drawing gay pictures of what will follow; if you do, it will lead you wherever it pleases. But rather oppose to it some good and noble semblance, and banish this base one. If you are habituated to this kind of exercise, you will see what shoulders, what nerves, what sinews, you will have. But now it is mere trifling talk, and nothing more. He is the true athlete who trains himself to deal with such semblances as these. Stay, wretch, do not be hurried away. The combat is great, the achievement divine,—for empire, for freedom, for prosperity, for tranquillity. Remember God. Invoke him for your aid and protector, as sailors do Castor and Pollux, in a storm. For what storm is greater than that which arises from these perilous semblances, contending to overset our reason? Indeed what is the storm itself, but a semblance? For do but take away the fear of death, and let there be as many thunders and lightnings as you please, you will find that to the reason all is serenity and calm; but if you are once defeated, and say, you will get the victory another time, and then the same thing over again; assure yourself that you will at last be reduced to so weak and wretched a condition, you will not so much as know when you do amiss; but you will even begin to make defences for your behavior, and thus verify the saying of Hesiod:—
With constant ills, the dilatory strive.

> Greek: 18. πᾶσα ἕξις καὶ δύναμις ὑπὸ τῶν καταλλήλων ἔργων συνέχεται καὶ αὔξεται, ἡ περιπατητικὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ περιπατεῖν, ἡ τροχαστικὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ τρέχειν. ἂν θέλῃς ἀναγνωστικὸς εἶναι, ἀναγίγνωσκε· ἂν γραφικός, γράφε. ὅταν δὲ τριάκοντα ἐφεξῆς ἡμέρας μὴ ἀναγνῷς, ἀλλʼ ἄλλο τι πράξῃς, γνώσῃ τὸ γινόμενον. οὕτως κἂν ἀναπέσῃς δέκα ἡμέρας, ἀναστὰς ἐπιχείρησον μακροτέραν ὁδὸν περιπατῆσαι καὶ ὄψει, πῶς σου τὰ σκέλη παραλύεται. καθόλου οὖν εἴ τι ποιεῖν ἐθέλῃς, ἑκτικὸν ποίει αὐτό· εἴ τι μὴ ποιεῖν ἐθέλῃς, μὴ ποίει αὐτό, ἀλλʼ ἔθισον ἄλλο τι πράττειν μᾶλλον ἀντʼ αὐτοῦ. οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν· ὅταν ὀργισθῇς, γίγνωσκε ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοι τοῦτο γέγονεν κακόν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι καὶ τὴν ἕξιν ηὔξησας καὶ ὡς πυρὶ φρύγανα παρέβαλες. ὅταν ἡττηθῇς τινος ἐν συνουσίᾳ, μὴ τὴν μίαν ἧτταν ταύτην λογίζου, ἀλλʼ ὅτι καὶ τὴν ἀκρασίαν σου τέτροφας, ἐπηύξησας. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν καταλλήλων ἔργων μὴ καὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις τὰς μὲν ἐμφύεσθαι μὴ πρότερον οὔσας, τὰς δʼ ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἰσχυροποιεῖσθαι. οὕτως ἀμέλει καὶ τὰ ἀρρωστήματα ὑποφύεσθαι λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι. ὅταν γὰρ ἅπαξ ἐπιθυμήσῃς ἀργυρίου, ἂν μὲν προσαχθῇ λόγος εἰς αἴσθησιν ἄξ[ι]ων τοῦ κακοῦ, πέπαυταί τε ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ ἐξαρχῆς ἀποκατέστη· ἐὰν δὲ μηδὲν προσαγάγῃς εἰς θεραπείαν, οὐκέτι εἰς ταὐτὰ ἐπάνεισιν, ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐρεθισθὲν ὑπὸ τῆς καταλλήλου φαντασίας θᾶττον ἢ πρότερον ἐξήφθη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ τούτου συνεχῶς γινομένου τυλοῦται λοιπὸν καὶ τὸ ἀρρώστημα βεβαιοῖ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν. ὁ γὰρ πυρέξας, εἶτα παυσάμενος οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει τῷ πρὸ τοῦ πυρέξαι, ἂν μή τι θεραπευθῇ εἰς ἅπαν. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν γίνεται. ἴχνη τινὰ καὶ μώλωπες ἀπολείπονται ἐν αὐτῇ, οὓς εἰ μή τις ἐξαλείψῃ καλῶς, πάλιν κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν μαστιγωθεὶς οὐκέτι μώλωπας, ἀλλʼ ἕλκη ποιεῖ. εἰ οὖν θέλεις μὴ εἶναι ὀργίλος, μὴ τρέφε σου τὴν ἕξιν, μηδὲν αὐτῇ παράβαλλε αὐξητικόν. τὴν πρώτην ἡσύχασον καὶ τὰς ἡμέρας ἀρίθμει ἃς οὐκ ὠργίσθης. καθʼ ἡμέραν εἰώθειν ὀργίζεσθαι, νῦν παρʼ ἡμέραν, εἶτα παρὰ δύο, εἶτα παρὰ τρεῖς. ἂν δὲ καὶ τριάκοντα παραλίπῃς, ἐπίθυσον τῷ θεῷ. ἡ γὰρ ἕξις ἐκλύεται τὴν πρώτην, εἶτα καὶ παντελῶς ἀναιρεῖται. σήμερον οὐκ ἐλυπήθην οὐδʼ αὔριον οὐδʼ ἐφεξῆς διμήνῳ καὶ τριμήνῳ· ἀλλὰ προσέσχον γενομένων τινῶν ἐρεθιστικῶν. γίγνωσκε ὅτι κομψῶς σοί ἐστιν. σήμερον καλὸν ἰδὼν ἢ καλὴν οὐκ εἶπον αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ ὅτι ὤφελόν τις μετὰ ταύτης ἐκοιμήθη καὶ μακάριος ὁ ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς· ὁ γὰρ τοῦτʼ εἰπὼν μακάριος καὶ ὁ μοιχός· οὐδὲ τὰ ἑξῆς ἀναζωγραφῶ, παροῦσαν αὐτὴν καὶ ἀποδυομένην καὶ παρακατακλινομένην. καταψῶ τὴν κορυφήν μου καὶ λέγω· εὖ, Ἐπίκτητε, κομψὸν σοφισμάτιον ἔλυσας, πολλῷ κομψότερον τοῦ Κυριεύοντος. ἂν δὲ καὶ βουλομένου τοῦ γυναικαρίου καὶ νεύοντος καὶ προσπέμποντος, ἂν δὲ καὶ ἁπτομένου καὶ συνεγγίζοντος ἀπόσχωμαι καὶ νικήσω, τοῦτο μὲν ἤδη τὸ σόφισμα ὑπὲρ τὸν Ψευδόμενον, ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἡσυχάζοντα. ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν ἄξιον, οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν Κυριεύοντα ἐρωτῆσαι. πῶς οὖν γένηται τοῦτο; θέλησον ἀρέσαι αὐτός ποτε σεαυτῷ, θέλησον καλὸς φανῆναι τῷ θεῷ· ἐπιθύμησον καθαρὸς μετὰ καθαροῦ σαυτοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ. εἶθʼ ὅταν προσπίπτῃ σοί τις φαντασία τοιαύτη, Πλάτων μὲν ὅτι ἴθι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀποδιοπομπήσεις, ἴθι ἐπὶ θεῶν ἀποτροπαίων ἱερὰ ἱκέτης· ἀρκεῖ κἂν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν συνουσίας ἀποχωρήσας πρὸς τούτῳ γίνῃ ἀντεξετάζων, ἄν τε τῶν ζώντων τινὰ ἔχῃς ἄν τε τῶν ἀποθανόντων. ἄπελθε πρὸς Σωκράτη καὶ ἴδε αὐτὸν συγκατακείμενον Ἀλκιβιάδῃ καὶ διαπαίζοντα αὐτοῦ τὴν ὥραν. ἐνθυμήθητι οἵαν νίκην ποτὲ ἔγνω ἐκεῖνος νενικηκότα ἑαυτόν, οἷα Ὀλύμπια, πόστος ἀφʼ Ἡρακλέους ἐγένετο· ἵνα τις, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, δικαίως ἀσπάζηται αὐτὸν χαῖρε, παράδοξε, οὐχὶ τοὺς σαπροὺς τούτους πύκτας καὶ παγκρατιαστὰς οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁμοίους αὐτοῖς, τοὺς μονομάχους. ταῦτα ἀντιθεὶς νικήσεις τὴν φαντασίαν, οὐχ ἑλκυσθήσῃ ὑπʼ αὐτῆς. τὸ πρῶτον δʼ ὑπὸ τῆς ὀξύτητος μὴ συναρπασθῇς, ἀλλʼ εἰπὲ ἔκδεξαί με μικρόν, φαντασία· ἄφες ἴδω τίς εἶ καὶ περὶ τίνος, ἄφες σε δοκιμάσω. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ ἐφῇς αὐτῇ προάγειν ἀναζωγραφούσῃ τὰ ἑξῆς. εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεταί σε ἔχουσα ὅπου ἂν θέλῃ. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἄλλην τινὰ ἀντεισάγαγε καλὴν καὶ γενναίαν φαντασίαν καὶ ταύτην τὴν ῥυπαρὰν ἔκβαλε. κἂν ἐθισθῇς οὕτως γυμνάζεσθαι, ὄψει, οἷοι ὦμοι γίνονται, οἷα νεῦρα, οἷοι τόνοι· νῦν δὲ μόνον τὰ λογάρια καὶ πλέον οὐδὲ ἕν. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἀσκητὴς ὁ πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας γυμνάζων ἑαυτόν. μεῖνον, τάλας, μὴ συναρπασθῇς. μέγας ὁ ἀγών ἐστιν, θεῖον τὸ ἔργον, ὑπὲρ βασιλείας, ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας, ὑπὲρ εὐροίας, ὑπὲρ ἀταραξίας. τοῦ θεοῦ μέμνησο, ἐκεῖνον ἐπικαλοῦ βοηθὸν καὶ παραστάτην ὡς τοὺς Διοσκόρους ἐν χειμῶνι οἱ πλέοντες. ποῖος γὰρ μείζων χειμὼν ἢ ὁ ἐκ φαντασιῶν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐκκρουστικῶν τοῦ λόγου; αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ χειμὼν τί ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ φαντασία; ἐπεί τοι ἆρον τὸν φόβον τοῦ θανάτου καὶ φέρε ὅσας θέλεις βροντὰς καὶ ἀστραπὰς καὶ γνώσῃ, ὅση γαλήνη ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ καὶ εὐδία. ἂν δʼ ἅπαξ ἡττηθεὶς εἴπῃς ὅτι ὕστερον νικήσεις, εἶτα πάλιν τὸ αὐτό, ἴσθι ὅτι οὕτως ποθʼ ἕξεις κακῶς καὶ ἀσθενῶς, ὥστε μηδʼ ἐφιστάνειν ὕστερον ὅτι ἁμαρτάνεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπολογίας ἄρξῃ πορίζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πράγματος· καὶ τότε βεβαιώσεις τὸ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου, ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν αἰεὶ δʼ ἀμβολιεργὸς ἀνὴρ ἄτῃσι παλαίει.

[¶73] 19. The science of “the ruling argument” appears to have its rise from hence. Of the following propositions, any two imply a contradiction to the third. They are these: “That everything past is necessarily true;” “that an impossibility is not the consequence of a possibility;” and, “that something is a possibility, which neither is nor will be true.” Diodorus, perceiving this contradiction, combined the first two, to prove that nothing is possible, which neither is nor will be true.

> Greek: 19. ὁ κυριεύων λόγος ἀπὸ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν ἠρωτῆσθαι φαίνεται· κοινῆς γὰρ οὔσης μάχης τοῖς τρισὶ τούτοις πρὸς ἄλληλα, τῷ [τὸ] πᾶν παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τῷ [ἀ]δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τῷ [**] δυνατὸν εἶναι ὃ οὔτʼ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτʼ ἔσται, συνιδὼν τὴν μάχην ταύτην ὁ Διόδωρος τῇ τῶν πρώτων δυεῖν πιθανότητι συνεχρήσατο πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι δυνατόν, ὃ οὔτʼ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτʼ ἔσται.

[¶74] Some again hold the second and third,—“that something is possible, which neither is nor will be true;” and “that an impossibility is not the consequence of a possibility;” and consequently assert, “that not everything past is necessarily true.” This way Cleanthes and his followers took; whom Antipater copiously defends.

> Greek: λοιπὸν ὁ μέν τις ταῦτα τηρήσει τῶν δυεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τέ τι δυνατόν, ὃ οὔτʼ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτʼ ἔσται, καὶ δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ· οὐ πᾶν δὲ παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Κλεάνθην φέρεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, οἷς ἐπὶ πολὺ συνηγόρησεν Ἀντίπατρος.

[¶75] Others, lastly, maintain the first and third,—“that something is possible; which neither is nor will be true;” and “that everything past is necessarily true;”

> Greek: οἱ δὲ τἆλλα δύο, ὅτι δυνατόν τʼ ἐστίν, ὃ οὔτʼ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτʼ ἔσται, καὶ πᾶν παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, δυνατῷ δʼ ἀδύνατον ἀκολουθεῖ.

[¶76] but then, “that an impossibility may be the consequence of a possibility.”

> Greek: τὰ τρία δʼ ἐκεῖνα τηρῆσαι ἀμήχανον διὰ τὸ κοινὴν εἶναι αὐτῶν μάχην.

[¶77] But all these three propositions cannot be at once maintained, because of their mutual contradiction. If any one should ask me, then, which of them I maintain, I answer him, that really I cannot tell. But I have heard it related that Diodorus held one opinion about them; the followers of Panthaedes, I think, and Cleanthes, another;

> Greek: ἂν οὖν τίς μου πύθηται σὺ δὲ ποῖα αὐτῶν τηρεῖς; ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα· παρείληφα δʼ ἱστορίαν τοιαύτην, ὅτι Διόδωρος μὲν ἐκεῖνα ἐτήρει, οἱ δὲ περὶ Πανθοίδην οἶμαι καὶ Κλεάνθην τὰ ἄλλα, οἱ δὲ περὶ Χρύσιππον τὰ ἄλλα.

[¶78] and Chrysippus a third. “What then is your opinion?” I express none. I was born to examine things as they appear to my own mind; to compare what is said by others, and thence to form some conviction of my own on any topic.

> Greek: σὺ οὖν τί; οὐδὲ γέγονα πρὸς τούτῳ, τῷ βασανίσαι τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ φαντασίαν καὶ συγκρῖναι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ δόγμα τι ἐμαυτοῦ ποιήσασθαι κατὰ τὸν τόπον. διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν διαφέρω τοῦ γραμματικοῦ.

[¶79] Of these things I have merely technical knowledge. Who was the father of Hector? Priam. Who were his brothers? Paris and Deiphobus. Who was his mother? Hecuba. this I have heard related. From whom? Homer. But I believe Hellanicus, and other authors, have written on the same subject.

> Greek: τίς ἦν ὁ τοῦ Ἕκτορος πατήρ; Πρίαμος. τίνες ἀδελφοί; Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Δηίφοβος. μήτηρ δʼ αὐτῶν τίς; Ἑκάβη. παρείληφα ταύτην τὴν ἱστορίαν. παρὰ τίνος; παρʼ Ὁμήρου. γράφει δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν δοκῶ καὶ Ἑλλάνικος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τοιοῦτος.

[¶80] And what better account have I of “the ruling argument”? But, if I were vain enough, I might, especially at some entertainment, astonish all the company by an enumeration of authors relating to it.

> Greek: κἀγὼ περὶ τοῦ Κυριεύοντος τί ἄλλο ἔχω ἀνωτέρω; ἀλλʼ ἂν ὦ κενός, μάλιστα ἐπὶ συμποσίῳ καταπλήσσομαι τοὺς παρόντας ἐξαριθμούμενος τοὺς γεγραφότας.

[¶81] Chrysippus has written wonderfully, in his first Book of Possibilities. Cleanthes and Archedemus have each written separately on this subject. Antipater too has written, not only in his Treatise of Possibilities, but especially in a discourse on “the ruling argument.”

> Greek: γέγραφεν δὲ καὶ Χρύσιππος θαυμαστῶς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Δυνατῶν. καὶ Κλεάνθης δʼ ἰδίᾳ γέγραφεν περὶ τούτου καὶ Ἀρχέδημος. γέγραφεν δὲ καὶ Ἀντίπατρος, οὐ μόνον δʼ ἐν τοῖς περὶ Δυνατῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατʼ ἰδίαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Κυριεύοντος. οὐκ ἀνέγνωκας τὴν σύνταξιν;

[¶82] Have you not read the work? “No.” Read it then. And what good will it do him? He will be more trifling and impertinent than he is already. For what else have you gained by reading it? What conviction have you formed upon this subject? But you tell us of Helen, and Priam, and the isle of Calypso, something which never was, nor ever will be.

> Greek: οὐκ ἀνέγνωκα. ἀνάγνωθι. καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται; φλυαρότερος ἔσται καὶ ἀκαιρότερος ἢ νῦν ἐστιν. σοὶ γὰρ τί ἄλλο προσγέγονεν ἀναγνόντι; ποῖον δόγμα πεποίησαι κατὰ τὸν τόπον; ἀλλʼ ἐρεῖς ἡμῖν Ἑλένην καὶ Πρίαμον καὶ τὴν τῆς Καλυψοῦς νῆσον τὴν οὔτε γενομένην οὔτʼ ἐσομένην.

## 11. Book II · chapters 19–22

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/11/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/11/#p-N

[¶0] And in these matters, indeed, it is of no great consequence if you retain the story, without forming any principle of your own.

> Greek: καὶ ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐδὲν μέγα τῆς ἱστορίας κρατεῖν, ἴδιον δὲ δόγμα μηδὲν πεποιῆσθαι. ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν δὲ πάσχομεν αὐτὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ τούτων.

[¶1] But we commit this error much more in dealing with moral questions, than upon such subjects as these. “Talk to me concerning good and evil.”

> Greek: εἰπέ μοι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ἄκουε· Ἰλιόθεν με φέρων ἄνεμος Κικόνεσσι πέλασσεν. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά,

[¶2] Hear:— “Winds blew from Ilium to Ciconian shores.” The expression became proverbial, signifying “from bad to worse.”—H. Some things are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good are the virtues, and whatever partakes of them;

> Greek: τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δʼ ἀδιάφορα. ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν, κακὰ δὲ κακίαι καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα κακίας, ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ μεταξὺ τούτων, πλοῦτος, ὑγίεια, ζωή, θάνατος, ἡδονή, πόνος.

[¶3] and the evil are vices, and what partakes of vice; the indifferent lie between these, as riches, health, life, death, pleasure, pain. “Whence do you know this?” [Suppose I say] Hellanicus says it, in his Egyptian History.

> Greek: πόθεν οἶδας; Ἑλλάνικος λέγει ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπτιακοῖς. τί γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτο εἰπεῖν ἢ ὅτι Διογένης ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ ἢ Χρύσιππος ἢ Κλεάνθης; βεβασάνικας οὖν τι αὐτῶν καὶ δόγμα σεαυτοῦ πεποίησαι;

[¶4] For what does it signify, whether one quotes the history of Hellanicus, or the ethics of Diogenes, or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes? Have you then examined any of these things, and formed convictions of your own? How, for instance, would you conduct yourself on shipboard?

> Greek: δείκνυε πῶς εἴωθας ἐν πλοίῳ χειμάζεσθαι. μέμνησαι ταύτης τῆς διαιρέσεως, ὅταν ψοφήσῃ τὸ ἱστίον καὶ ἀνακραυγάσαντί σοι κακόσχολός πως παραστὰς εἴπῃ λέγε μοι τοὺς θεούς σοι ἃ πρῴην ἔλεγες· μή τι κακία[ς] ἐστὶ τὸ ναυαγῆσαι, μή τι κακίας μετέχον;

[¶5] Remember these distinctions, when the mast rattles, and some idle fellow stands by you while you are screaming, and says: “For heaven’s sake!

> Greek: οὐκ ἄρας ξύλον ἐνσείσεις αὐτῷ; τί ἡμῖν καὶ σοί, ἄνθρωπε; ἀπολλύμεθα καὶ σὺ ἐλθὼν παίζεις.

[¶6] talk as you did a little while ago. Is it vice to suffer shipwreck; or does it partake of vice?” Would you not take up a log, and throw it at his head? “What have we to do with you, sir? We are perishing, and you come and jest.” Again, if Caesar should summon you to answer an accusation, remember these distinctions.

> Greek: ἂν δέ σε ὁ Καῖσαρ μεταπέμψηται κατηγορούμενον, μέμνησαι τῆς διαιρέσεως, ἄν τίς σοι εἰσιόντι καὶ ὠχριῶντι ἅμα καὶ τρέμοντι προσελθὼν εἴπῃ τί τρέμεις, ἄνθρωπε; περὶ τίνων σοί ἐστιν ὁ λόγος; μή τι ἔσω ὁ Καῖσαρ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν τοῖς εἰσερχομένοις δίδωσι;

[¶7] If, when you are going in, pale and trembling, any one should meet you and say, “Why do you tremble, sir? What is this affair you are engaged in? Does Caesar, within there, give virtue and vice to those who approach him?” “What, do you too insult me, and add to my evils?”

> Greek: τί μοι ἐμπαίζεις καὶ σὺ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοῖς; ὅμως, φιλόσοφε, εἰπέ μοι, τί τρέμεις; οὐχὶ θάνατός ἐστι τὸ κινδυνευόμενον ἢ δεσμωτήριον ἢ πόνος τοῦ σώματος ἢ φυγὴ ἢ ἀδοξία; τί γὰρ ἄλλο; μή τι κακία, μή τι μέτοχον κακίας; σὺ οὖν τίνα ταῦτα ἔλεγες;

[¶8] “Nay, but tell me, philosopher, why you tremble. Is there any other danger, but death, or a prison, or bodily pain, or exile, or slander?” “Why, what else should there be?” “Are any of these vice; or do they partake of vice?

> Greek: τί ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί, ἄνθρωπε; ἀρκεῖ ἐμοὶ τὰ ἐμὰ κακά. καὶ καλῶς λέγεις. ἀρκεῖ γάρ σοι τὰ σὰ κακά, ἡ ἀγέννεια, ἡ δειλία, ἡ ἀλαζονεία, ἣν ἠλαζονεύου ἐν τῇ σχολῇ καθήμενος. τί τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἐκαλλωπίζου; τί Στωικὸν ἔλεγες σεαυτόν;

[¶9] What, then, did you yourself use to say of these things?” “What have you to do with me, sir? My own evils are enough for me.” You say rightly. Your own evils are indeed enough for you;

> Greek: Τηρεῖτε οὕτως ἑαυτοὺς ἐν οἷς ἐπράσσετε καὶ εὑρήσετε τίνος ἔσθʼ αἱρέσεως. τοὺς πλείστους ὑμῶν Ἐπικουρείους εὑρήσετε, ὀλίγους τινὰς Περιπατητικοὺς καὶ τούτους ἐκλελυμένους.

[¶10] your baseness, your cowardice, and that arrogance by which you were elated, as you sat in the schools. Why did you assume plumage not your own? Why did you call yourself a Stoic?

> Greek: ποῦ γὰρ ἵνʼ ὑμεῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσην ἢ καὶ κρείττονα ἔργῳ ὑπολάβητε; Στωικὸν δὲ δείξατέ μοι, εἴ τινα ἔχητε.

[¶11] Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find of what sect you are. You will find that most of you are Epicureans; a few are Peripatetics, and those but loose ones.

> Greek: ποῦ ἢ πῶς; ἀλλὰ τὰ λογάρια τὰ Στωικὰ λέγοντας μυρίους. τὰ γὰρ Ἐπικούρεια αὐτοὶ οὗτοι χεῖρον λέγουσι; τὰ γὰρ Περιπατητικὰ οὐ καὶ αὐτὰ ὁμοίως ἀκριβοῦσιν;

[¶12] For by what action will you prove that you think virtue equal, and even superior, to all other things? Show me a Stoic, if you have one. Where? Or how should you? You can show, indeed, a thousand who repeat the Stoic reasonings.

> Greek: τίς οὖν ἐστι Στωικός; ὡς λέγομεν ἀνδριάντα Φειδιακὸν τὸν τετυπωμένον κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὴν Φειδίου, οὕτως τινά μοι δείξατε κατὰ τὰ δόγματα ἃ λαλεῖ τετυπωμένον.

[¶13] But do they repeat the Epicurean less well? Are they not just as perfect in the Peripatetic? Who then is a Stoic? As we call that a Phidian statue which is formed according to the art of Phidias, so show me some one person formed according to the principles which he professes.

> Greek: δείξατέ μοί τινα νοσοῦντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, κινδυνεύοντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, ἀποθνῄσκοντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, πεφυγαδευμένον καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, ἀδοξοῦντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα. δείξατʼ· ἐπιθυμῶ τινα νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἰδεῖν Στωικόν.

[¶14] Show me one who is sick, and happy; in danger, and happy; dying, and happy; exiled, and happy; disgraced, and happy. Show him to me; for, by Heaven!

> Greek: ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔχετε τὸν τετυπωμένον δεῖξαι· τόν γε τυπούμενον δείξατε, τὸν ἐπὶ ταῦτα κεκλικότα. εὐεργετήσατέ με· μὴ φθονήσητε ἀνθρώπῳ γέροντι ἰδεῖν θέαμα, ὃ μέχρι νῦν οὐκ εἶδον.

[¶15] I long to see a Stoic. But you have not one fully developed? Show me then one who is developing; one who is approaching towards this character. Do me this favor. Do not refuse an old man a sight which he has never yet seen. Do you suppose that you are to show the Zeus or Athena of Phidias, a work of ivory or gold? Let any of you show me a human soul desiring to be in unity with God;

> Greek: οἴεσθε ὅτι τὸν Δία τὸν Φειδίου δείξετε ἢ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, ἐλεφάντινον καὶ χρυσοῦν κατασκεύασμα. ψυχὴν δειξάτω τις ὑμῶν ἀνθρώπου θέλοντος ὁμογνωμονῆσαι τῷ θεῷ καὶ μηκέτι μήτε θεὸν μήτʼ ἄνθρωπον μέμφεσθαι, μὴ ἀποτυχεῖν τινος, μὴ περιπεσεῖν τινι, μὴ ὀργισθῆναι, μὴ φθονῆσαι, μὴ ζηλοτυπῆσαι (τί γὰρ δεῖ περιπλέκειν;

[¶16] not to accuse either God or man; not to be disappointed of its desire, nor incur its aversion; not to be angry; not to be envious; not to be jealous; in a word, desiring from a man to become a god;

> Greek: ), θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιθυμοῦντα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ σωματίῳ τούτῳ τῷ νεκρῷ περὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν Δία κοινωνίας βουλευόμενον. δείξατε. ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἔχετε. τί οὖν αὑτοῖς ἐμπαίζετε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κυβεύετε;

[¶17] and, in this poor mortal body, aiming to have fellowship with Zeus. Show him to me. But you cannot. Why then do you impose upon yourselves, and play tricks with others?

> Greek: καὶ περιθέμενοι σχῆμα ἀλλότριον περιπατεῖτε κλέπται καὶ λωποδύται τούτων τῶν οὐδὲν προσηκόντων ὀνομάτων καὶ πραγμάτων;

[¶18] Why do you put on a dress not your own, and walk about in it, mere thieves and pilferers of names and things which do not belong to you? I am now your preceptor, and you come to be instructed by me. And indeed my aim is to secure you from being restrained, compelled, hindered; to make you free, prosperous, happy; looking to God upon every occasion, great or small.

> Greek: καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν παιδευτής εἰμι ὑμέτερος, ὑμεῖς δὲ παρʼ ἐμοὶ παιδεύεσθε. κἀγὼ μὲν ἔχω ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἀποτελέσαι ὑμᾶς ἀκωλύτους, ἀναναγκάστους, ἀπαραποδίστους, ἐλευθέρους, εὐροοῦντας, εὐδαιμονοῦντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφορῶντας ἐν παντὶ καὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ· ὑμεῖς δὲ ταῦτα μαθησόμενοι καὶ μελετήσοντες πάρεστε.

[¶19] And you come to learn and study these things. Why then do you not finish your work, if you have the proper aims, and I, besides the aim, the proper qualifications?

> Greek: διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀνύετε τὸ ἔργον, εἰ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἔχετʼ ἐπιβολὴν οἵαν δεῖ κἀγὼ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιβολῇ καὶ παρασκευὴν οἵαν δεῖ;

[¶20] What is wanting? When I see an artificer, and the materials lying ready, I await the work. Now here is the artificer; here are the materials; what is it we want?

> Greek: τί τὸ λεῖπόν ἐστιν; ὅταν ἴδω τέκτονα, ὅτῳ ὕλη πάρεστιν παρακειμένη, ἐκδέχομαι τὸ ἔργον. καὶ ἐνθάδε τοίνυν ὁ τέκτων ἐστίν, ἡ ὕλη ἐστίν· τί ἡμῖν λείπει;

[¶21] Is not the thing capable of being taught? It is. Is it not in our own power, then? The only thing of all others that is so. Neither riches nor health nor fame nor, in short, anything else is in our power except a right use of the semblances of things. This alone is, by nature, not subject to restraint, not subject to hindrance.

> Greek: οὐκ ἔστι διδακτὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα; διδακτόν. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν; μόνον μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. οὔτε πλοῦτός ἐστιν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν οὔθʼ ὑγίεια οὔτε δόξα οὔτε ἄλλο τι ἁπλῶς πλὴν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. τοῦτο ἀκώλυτον φύσει μόνον, τοῦτο ἀνεμπόδιστον.

[¶22] Why then do not you finish it? Tell me the cause. It must be my fault, or yours, or from the nature of the thing. The thing itself is practicable, and the only thing in our power. The fault then must be either in me or in you, or, more truly, in both.

> Greek: διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀνύετε; εἴπατέ μοι τὴν αἰτίαν. ἢ γὰρ παρʼ ἐμὲ γίνεται ἢ παρʼ ὑμᾶς ἢ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος. αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ μόνον ἐφʼ ἡμῖν. λοιπὸν οὖν ἢ παρʼ ἐμέ ἐστιν ἢ παρʼ ὑμᾶς ἤ, ὅπερ ἀληθέστερον, παρʼ ἀμφοτέρους. τί οὖν;

[¶23] Well, then, shall we at length begin to carry such an aim with us? Let us lay aside all that is past. Let us begin. Only believe me, and you shall see.

> Greek: θέλετε ἀρξώμεθά ποτε τοιαύτην ἐπιβολὴν κομίζειν ἐνταῦθα; τὰ μέχρι νῦν ἀφῶμεν. ἀρξώμεθα μόνον, πιστεύσατέ μοι, καὶ ὄψεσθε.

[¶24] 20. Things true and evident must, of necessity, be recognized even by those who would contradict them. And perhaps one of the strongest proofs that there is such a thing as evidence is the necessity which compels even those who contradict it to make use of it.

> Greek: 20. τοῖς ὑγιέσι καὶ ἐναργέσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες προσχρῶνται. καὶ σχεδὸν τοῦτο μέγιστον ἄν τις ποιήσαιτο τεκμήριον τοῦ ἐναργές τι εἶναι, τὸ ἐπάναγκες εὑρίσκεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἀντιλέγοντι συγχρήσασθαι αὐτῷ·

[¶25] If a person, for instance, should deny that anything is universally true, he will be obliged to assert the contrary, that nothing is universally true. Foolish man, not so.

> Greek: οἷον εἴ τις ἀντιλέγοι τῷ εἶναί τι καθολικὸν ἀληθές, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἐναντίαν ἀπόφασιν οὗτος ὀφείλει ποιήσασθαι· οὐδέν ἐστι καθολικὸν ἀληθές. ἀνδράποδον, οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

[¶26] For what is this but an universal statement?

> Greek: τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἢ οἷον εἴ τι ἔστι καθολικόν, ψεῦδός ἐστιν;

[¶27] Again, suppose any one should come and say, “Know that there is nothing to be known; but all things are uncertain;” or another, “Believe me, for your good, that no man ought to be believed in anything;” or a third, “Learn from me that nothing is to be learned; I tell you this, and will teach the proof of it, if you please.”

> Greek: πάλιν ἄν τις παρελθὼν λέγῃ γίγνωσκε, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι γνωστόν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀτέκμαρτα ἢ ἄλλος ὅτι πίστευσόν μοι καὶ ὠφεληθήσῃ· οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀνθρώπῳ πιστεύειν ἢ πάλιν ἄλλος μάθε παρʼ ἐμοῦ, ἄνθρωπε, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται μαθεῖν· ἐγώ σοι λέγω τοῦτο καὶ διδάξω σε, ἐὰν θέλῃς·

[¶28] Now what difference is there between such as these, and those who call themselves Academics,—who say to us, “Be convinced that no one ever is convinced; believe us, that nobody believes anybody”?

> Greek: τίνι οὖν τούτων διαφέρουσιν οὗτοι — τίνες ποτέ; — οἱ Ἀκαδημαικοὺς αὑτοὺς λέγοντες; ὦ ἄνθρωποι, συγκατάθεσθε ὅτι οὐδεὶς συγκατατίθεται· πιστεύσατε ἡμῖν ὅτι οὐδεὶς πιστεύει οὐδενί.

[¶29] Thus also, when Epicurus would destroy the natural tie between mankind, he makes use of the very thing he is destroying. For what says he?

> Greek: οὕτως καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, ὅταν ἀναιρεῖν θέλῃ τὴν φυσικὴν κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, αὐτῷ τῷ ἀναιρουμένῳ συγχρῆται.

[¶30] “Be not deceived; be not seduced and mistaken. There is no natural tie between reasonable beings. Believe me. Those who say otherwise mislead and impose upon you.” Why are you concerned for us then? Let us be deceived.

> Greek: τί γὰρ λέγει; μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθε, ἄνθρωποι, μηδὲ παράγεσθε μηδὲ διαπίπτετε· οὐκ ἔστι φυσικὴ κοινωνία τοῖς λογικοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους· πιστεύσατέ μοι. οἱ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ παραλογίζονται.

[¶31] You will fare never the worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that there is a natural tie between mankind, and that it is by all means to be preserved. Nay, it will be much safer and better. Why do you give yourself any trouble about us, sir?

> Greek: τί οὖν σοι μέλει; ἄφες ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατηθῆναι. μή τι χεῖρον ἀπαλλάξεις, ἂν πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι πεισθῶμεν, ὅτι φυσική ἐστιν ἡμῖν κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ταύτην δεῖ παντὶ τρόπῳ φυλάσσειν; καὶ πολὺ κρεῖσσον καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον.

[¶32] Why do you break your rest for us? Why do you light your lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you compose so many volumes? Is it that none of us should be deceived concerning the gods, as if they took any care of men; or that we may not suppose the essence of good consists in anything but in pleasure?

> Greek: ἄνθρωπε, τί ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν φροντίζεις, τί διʼ ἡμᾶς ἀγρυπνεῖς, τί λύχνον ἅπτεις, τί ἐπανίστασαι, τί τηλικαῦτα βιβλία συγγράφεις; μή τις ἡμῶν ἐξαπατηθῇ περὶ θεῶν ὡς ἐπιμελουμένων ἀνθρώπων ἢ μή τις ἄλλην οὐσίαν ὑπολάβῃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἡδονήν;

[¶33] For if these things be so, lie down and sleep, and lead the life of which you judge yourself worthy,—that of a mere worm. Eat, drink, debauch, snore.

> Greek: εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ταῦτα ἔχει, βαλὼν κάθευδε καὶ τὰ τοῦ σκώληκος ποίει, ὧν ἄξιον ἔκρινας σεαυτόν· ἔσθιε καὶ πῖνε καὶ συνουσίαζε καὶ ἀφόδευε καὶ ῥέγκε.

[¶34] What is it to you, whether others think rightly or wrongly about these things? For what have you to do with us? You take care of sheep, because they afford their milk, their wool, and at last their flesh.

> Greek: τί δὲ σοὶ μέλει, πῶς οἱ ἄλλοι ὑπολήψονται περὶ τούτων, πότερον ὑγιῶς ἢ οὐχ ὑγιῶς; τί γὰρ σοὶ καὶ ἡμῖν; τῶν γὰρ προβάτων σοι μέλει, ὅτι παρέχει ἡμῖν αὑτὰ καρησόμενα καὶ ἀμελχθησόμενα καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον κατακοπησόμενα;

[¶35] And would it not be a desirable thing that men might be so lulled and enchanted by the Stoics as to give themselves up to be milked and fleeced by you, and such as you? Should not these doctrines be taught to your brother Epicureans only, and concealed from the rest of the world;

> Greek: οὐχὶ δʼ εὐκταῖον ἦν, εἰ ἐδύναντο οἱ ἄνθρωποι κατακηληθέντες καὶ ἐπᾳσθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Στωικῶν ἀπονυστάζειν καὶ παρέχειν σοι καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις καρησομένους καὶ ἀμελχθησομένους ἑαυτούς;

[¶36] who should by all means, above all things, be persuaded that we have a natural tie with each other, and that self-command is a good thing, in order that all may be kept safe for you?

> Greek: πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς Συνεπικουρείους ἔδει σε ταῦτα λέγειν, οὐχὶ δὲ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, πολὺ μάλιστʼ ἐκείνους πρὸ πάντων ἀναπείθειν, ὅτι φύσει κοινωνικοὶ γεγόναμεν, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἐγκράτεια, ἵνα σοι πάντα τηρῆται;

[¶37] Or is this tie to be preserved towards some and not towards others? Towards whom, then, is it to be preserved,—towards such as mutually preserve, or such as violate it? And who violate it more than you, who teach such doctrines?

> Greek: ἢ πρός τινας μὲν δεῖ φυλάττειν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν, πρός τινας δʼ οὔ; πρὸς τίνας οὖν δεῖ τηρεῖν; πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιτηροῦντας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς παραβατικῶς αὐτῆς ἔχοντας; καὶ τίνες παραβατικώτερον αὐτῆς ἔχουσιν ὑμῶν τῶν ταῦτα διειληφότων;

[¶38] What was it, then, that waked Epicurus from his sleep, and compelled him to write what he did; what else, but that which is of all influences the most powerful among mankind, Nature; which draws every one, however unwilling and reluctant, to its own purposes.

> Greek: τί οὖν ἦν τὸ ἐγεῖρον αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων καὶ ἀναγκάζον γράφειν ἃ ἔγραφεν; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ τὸ πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἰσχυρότατον, ἡ φύσις ἕλκουσα ἐπὶ τὸ αὑτῆς βούλημα ἄκοντα καὶ στένοντα;

[¶39] For since, she says, you think that there is no tie between mankind, write out this doctrine, and leave it for the use of others; and break your sleep upon that account;

> Greek: ὅτι γὰρ δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα τὰ ἀκοινώνητα, γράψον αὐτὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀπόλιπε καὶ ἀγρύπνησον διʼ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργῳ κατήγορος γενοῦ τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων.

[¶40] and by your own practice confute your own principles. Do we say that Orestes was roused from sleep because driven by the furies; and was not Epicurus waked by sterner furies and avengers, which would not suffer him to rest, but compelled him to utter his own ills, as wine and madness do the priests of Cybele?

> Greek: εἶτα Ὀρέστην μὲν ὑπὸ Ἐρινύων ἐλαυνόμενον φῶμεν ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων ἐξεγείρεσθαι· τούτῳ δʼ οὐ χαλεπώτεραι αἱ Ἐρινύες καὶ Ποιναί; ἐξήγειρον καθεύδοντα καὶ οὐκ εἴων ἠρεμεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἠνάγκαζον ἐξαγγέλλειν τὰ αὑτοῦ κακὰ ὥσπερ τοὺς Γάλλους ἡ μανία καὶ ὁ οἶνος.

[¶41] So strong and unconquerable a thing is human nature! For how can a vine have the properties not of a vine, but of an olivetree; or an olive-tree not those of an olive-tree, but of a vine?

> Greek: οὕτως ἰσχυρόν τι καὶ ἀνίκητόν ἐστιν ἡ φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη. πῶς γὰρ δύναται ἄμπελος μὴ ἀμπελικῶς κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐλαικῶς, ἢ ἐλαία πάλιν μὴ ἐλαικῶς, ἀλλʼ ἀμπελικῶς; ἀμήχανον, ἀδιανόητον.

[¶42] It is impossible. It is inconceivable. Neither, therefore, is it possible for a human creature entirely to lose human affections.

> Greek: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδʼ ἄνθρωπον οἷόν τε παντελῶς ἀπολέσαι τὰς κινήσεις τὰς ἀνθρωπικὰς καὶ οἱ ἀποκοπτόμενοι τάς γε προθυμίας τὰς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀποκόψασθαι οὐ δύνανται.

[¶43] But even those who have undergone a mutilation cannot have their inclinations also mutilated; and so Epicurus, when he had mutilated all the offices of a man, of a master of a family, of a citizen, and of a friend, did not mutilate the inclinations of humanity; for this he could not do, any more than the idle Academics can throw away or blind their own senses, though this be the point they chiefly labor.

> Greek: οὕτως καὶ Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν ἀνδρὸς πάντʼ ἀπεκόψατο καὶ τὰ οἰκοδεσπότου καὶ πολίτου καὶ φίλου, τὰς δὲ προθυμίας τὰς ἀνθρωπικὰς οὐκ ἀπεκόψατο· οὐ γὰρ ἠδύνατο, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ ἀταλαίπωροι Ἀκαδημαικοὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις τὰς αὑτῶν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ ἀποτυφλῶσαι δύνανται καίτοι τοῦτο μάλιστα πάντων ἐσπουδακότες.

[¶44] What a misfortune is it, when any one, after having received from Nature standards and rules for the knowledge of truth, does not strive to add to these, and make up their deficiencies; but, on the contrary, endeavors to take away and destroy whatever truth may be known even by them.

> Greek: τίς ἢ ἀτυχίας; λαβών τις παρὰ τῆς φύσεως μέτρα καὶ κανόνας εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ προσφιλοτεχνεῖ τούτοις προσθεῖναι καὶ προσεξεργάσασθαι τὰ λείποντα, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον, εἴ τι καὶ ἔχει γνωριστικὸν τῆς ἀληθείας, ἐξαιρεῖν πειρᾶται καὶ ἀπολλύειν.

[¶45] What say you, philosopher? What do you think of piety and sanctity? “If you please, I will prove that they are good.” Pray do prove it; that our citizens may be converted, and honor the Deity, and may no longer neglect what is of the highest importance.

> Greek: τί λέγεις, φιλόσοφε; τὸ εὐσεβὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ποῖόν τί σοι φαίνεται; ἂν θέλῃς, κατασκευάσω ὅτι ἀγαθόν. ναὶ κατασκεύασον, ἵνʼ οἱ πολῖται ἡμῶν ἐπιστραφέντες τιμῶσι τὸ θεῖον καὶ παύσωνταί ποτε ῥᾳθυμοῦντες περὶ τὰ μέγιστα. ἔχεις οὖν τὰς κατασκευάς; ἔχω καὶ χάριν οἶδα.

[¶46] “Do you accept these demonstrations, then?” I have, and I thank you. “Since you are so well pleased with this, then, learn these contrary propositions: that there are no gods, or, if there are, that they take no care of mankind, neither have we any concern with them; that this piety and sanctity, so much talked of by many, are only an imposition of boasting and sophistical men, or perhaps of legislators, for a terror and restraint to injustice.”

> Greek: ἐπεὶ οὖν ταῦτά σοι λίαν ἀρέσκει, λάβε τὰ ἐναντία· ὅτι θεοὶ οὔτʼ εἰσίν, εἴ τε καὶ εἰσίν, οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ κοινόν τι ἡμῖν ἐστι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τό τʼ εὐσεβὲς τοῦτο καὶ ὅσιον παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις λαλούμενον κατάψευσμά ἐστιν ἀλαζόνων ἀνθρώπων καὶ σοφιστῶν ἢ νὴ Δία νομοθετῶν εἰς φόβον καὶ ἐπίσχεσιν τῶν ἀδικούντων.

[¶47] Well done, philosopher. Our citizens are much the better for you.

> Greek: εὖ, φιλόσοφε· ὠφέλησας ἡμῶν τοὺς πολίτας, ἀνεκτήσω τοὺς νέους ῥέποντας ἤδη πρὸς καταφρόνησιν τῶν θείων.

[¶48] You have already brought back all the youth to a contempt of the Deity. “What! does not this please you, then? Learn next, that justice is nothing;

> Greek: τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀρέσκει σοι ταῦτα; λάβε νῦν, πῶς ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐδέν ἐστιν, πῶς ἡ αἰδὼς μωρία ἐστίν, πῶς πατὴρ οὐδέν ἐστιν, πῶς ὁ υἱὸς οὐδέν ἐστιν.

[¶49] that shame is folly; that the paternal relation is nothing; the filial, nothing.” Well said, philosopher; persist, convince the youth; that we may have many more to think and talk like you. By such doctrines as these, no doubt, have our well-governed states flourished! Upon these was Sparta founded! Lycurgus, by his laws and method of education, introduced such persuasions as these: that it is not base to be slaves, rather than honorable; nor honorable to be free, rather than base! They who died at Thermopylae, died from such principles as these!

> Greek: εὖ, φιλόσοφε· ἐπίμενε, πεῖθε τοὺς νέους, ἵνα πλείονας ἔχωμεν ταὐτά σοι πεπονθότας καὶ λέγοντας. ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων ηὐξήθησαν ἡμῖν αἱ εὐνομούμεναι πόλεις, Λακεδαίμων διὰ τούτους τοὺς λόγους ἐγένετο, Λυκοῦργος ταῦτα τὰ πείσματα ἐνεποίησεν αὐτοῖς διὰ τῶν νόμων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς παιδείας, ὅτι οὔτε τὸ δουλεύειν αἰσχρόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ἢ καλὸν οὔτε τὸ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καλὸν μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχρόν, οἱ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις ἀποθανόντες διὰ ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα ἀπέθανον, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τὴν πόλιν διὰ ποίους ἄλλους λόγους ἀπέλιπον;

[¶50] And from what other doctrines did the Athenians leave their city? And yet they who talk thus marry, and produce children, and engage in public affairs, and get themselves made priests and prophets. Of whom? Of gods that have no existence. And they consult the Pythian priestess, only to hear falsehoods, and interpret the oracles to others.

> Greek: εἶτα οἱ λέγοντες ταῦτα γαμοῦσι καὶ παιδοποιοῦνται καὶ πολιτεύονται καὶ ἱερεῖς καθιστᾶσιν αὑτοὺς καὶ προφήτας. τίνων; τῶν οὐκ ὄντων· καὶ τὴν Πυθίαν ἀνακρίνουσιν αὐτοί, ἵνα τὰ ψευδῆ πύθωνται, καὶ ἄλλοις τοὺς χρησμοὺς ἐξηγοῦνται. ὦ μεγάλης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ γοητείας.

[¶51] Oh, monstrous impudence and imposture! What are you doing, man? You contradict yourself every day; and you will not give up these paltry cavils. When you eat, where do you put your hand,—to your mouth, or to your eye? When you bathe, where do you go?

> Greek: ἄνθρωπε, τί ποιεῖς; αὐτὸς σεαυτὸν ἐξελέγχεις καθʼ ἡμέραν καὶ οὐ θέλεις ἀφεῖναι τὰ ψυχρὰ ταῦτα ἐπιχειρήματα; ἐσθίων ποῦ φέρεις τὴν χεῖρα; εἰς τὸ στόμα ἢ εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμόν; λουόμενος ποῦ ἐμβαίνεις; πότε τὴν χύτραν εἶπες λο[υ]πάδα ἢ τὴν τορύνην ὀβελίσκον;

[¶52] Do you ever call a kettle a dish, or a spoon a spit? If I were a servant to one of these gentlemen, were it at the hazard of being flayed every day, I would plague him. “Throw some oil into the bath, boy.” I would take pickle, and pour upon his head. “What is this?” Really, sir, I was impressed by a certain semblance so like oil as not to be distinguished from it.

> Greek: εἴ τινος αὐτῶν δοῦλος ἤμην, εἰ καὶ ἔδει με καθʼ ἡμέραν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ ἐκδέρεσθαι, ἐγὼ ἂν αὐτὸν ἐστρέβλουν. βάλε ἐλάδιον, παιδάριον, εἰς τὸ βαλανεῖον. ἔβαλον ἂν γάριον καὶ ἀπελθὼν κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτοῦ κατέχεον. τί τοῦτο; φαντασία μοι ἐγένετο ἐλαίου ἀδιάκριτος, ὁμοιοτάτη, νὴ τὴν σὴν τύχην.

[¶53] “Give me the soup.” I would carry him a dish full of vinegar. “Did I not ask for the soup?” Yes, sir; this is the soup. “Is not this vinegar?” Why so, more than soup? “Take it and smell it, take it and taste it.” How do you know, then, but our senses deceive us?

> Greek: δὸς ὧδε τὴν πτισάνην. ἤνεγκα ἂν αὐτῷ γεμίσας παροψίδα ὀξογάρου. οὐκ ᾔτησα τὴν πτισάνην; ναὶ κύριε· τοῦτο πτισάνη ἐστίν. τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ὀξόγαρον; τί μᾶλλον ἢ πτισάνη; λάβε καὶ ὀσφράνθητι, λάβε καὶ γεῦσαι. πόθεν οὖν οἶδας, εἰ αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἡμᾶς ψεύδονται;

[¶54] If I had three or four fellow-servants to join with me, I would make him either choke with passion and burst, or change his opinions. But now they insult us by making use of the gifts of nature, while in words they destroy them.

> Greek: τρεῖς, τέσσαρας τῶν συνδούλων εἰ ἔσχον ὁμονοοῦντας, ἀπάγξασθαι ἂν αὐτὸν ἐποίησα ῥηγνύμενον ἢ μεταθέσθαι. νῦν δʼ ἐντρυφῶσιν ἡμῖν τοῖς μὲν παρὰ τῆς φύσεως διδομένοις πᾶσι χρώμενοι, λόγῳ δʼ αὐτὰ ἀναιροῦντες.

[¶55] Those must be grateful and modest men, at least, who, while eating their daily bread, dare to say, “We do not know whether there be any such beings as Demeter, or Core, or Pluto.”

> Greek: εὐχάριστοί γʼ ἄνθρωποι καὶ αἰδήμονες. εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο καθʼ ἡμέραν ἄρτους ἐσθίοντες τολμῶσι λέγειν ὅτι οὐκ οἴδαμεν, εἰ ἔστι τις Δημήτηρ ἢ Κόρη ἢ Πλούτων·

[¶56] Not to mention that while they possess the blessings of night and day, of the annual seasons, of the stars, the earth, and the sea, they are not the last affected by any of these things; but only study to give out some idle problem, and when they have thus relieved themselves, go and bathe;

> Greek: ἵνα μὴ λέγω, ὅτι νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἀπολαύοντες καὶ μεταβολῶν τοῦ ἔτους καὶ ἄστρων καὶ θαλάσσης καὶ γῆς καὶ τῆς παρʼ ἀνθρώπων συνεργ[ε]ίας ὑπʼ οὐδενὸς τούτων οὐδὲ κατὰ ποσὸν ἐπιστρέφονται, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐξεμέσαι τὸ προβλημάτιον ζητοῦσι καὶ τὸν στόμαχον γυμνάσαντες ἀπελθεῖν εἰς βαλανεῖον.

[¶57] but take not the least care what they say, nor on what subjects, nor to whom, nor what may be the consequence of their talk,—whether any well-disposed young man, on hearing such doctrines, may not be affected by them, and so affected as entirely to lose the seeds of his good disposition;

> Greek: τί δʼ ἐροῦσι καὶ περὶ τίνων ἢ πρὸς τίνας καὶ τί ἔσται αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν λόγων τούτων, οὐδὲ κατὰ βραχὺ πεφροντίκασι· μή τι νέος εὐγενὴς ἀκούσας τῶν λόγων τούτων πάθῃ τι ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἢ καὶ παθὼν πάντʼ ἀπολέσῃ τὰ τῆς εὐγενείας σπέρματα·

[¶58] whether they may not furnish an adulterer with occasions of growing shameless in his guilt; whether a public plunderer may not find excuses from these doctrines; whether he, who neglects his parents, may not gain an additional confidence from them.

> Greek: μή τινι μοιχεύοντι ἀφορμὰς παράσχωμεν τοῦ ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα· μή τις τῶν νοσφιζομένων τὰ δημόσια εὑρεσιλογίας τινὸς ἐπιλάβηται ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων τούτων· μή τις τῶν αὑτοῦ γονέων ἀμελῶν θράσος τι καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων προσλάβῃ.

[¶59] “What things, then, in your opinion, are good and evil, fair and base,—such things, or such things?” But why should one argue any more with such as these, or interchange opinions, or endeavor to convince them?

> Greek: τί οὖν κατὰ σὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλόν; ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα; τί οὖν; ἔτι τούτων τις ἀντιλέγει τινὶ ἢ λόγον δίδωσιν ἢ λαμβάνει ἢ μεταπείθειν πειρᾶται;

[¶60] By Zeus! one might sooner hope to convince the most unnatural debauchees, than those who are thus deaf and blind to their own ills.

> Greek: πολὺ νὴ Δία μᾶλλον τοὺς κιναίδους ἐλπίσαι τις ἂν μεταπείσειν ἢ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀποκεκωφωμένους καὶ ἀποτετυφλωμένους τῶν περὶ αὑτοὺς κακῶν.

[¶61] 21. There are some things which men confess with ease, and others with difficulty. No one, for instance, will confess himself a fool or a blockhead; but, on the contrary, you will hear every one say, “wish my fortune were in proportion to my abilities.” But they easily confess themselves fearful, and say, “am somewhat timorous, I confess; but in other respects you will not find me a fool.” No one will easily confess himself intemperate in his desires, upon no account dishonest, nor indeed very envious or meddling; but many confess themselves to have the weakness of being compassionate. What is the reason of all this? The principal reason is an inconsistency and confusion in what relates to good and evil. But different people have different motives, and in general, whatever they imagine to be base, they do not absolutely confess. Fear and compassion they imagine to belong to a well-meaning disposition; but stupidity, to a slave. Offences against society they do not own; but in most faults they are brought to a confession chiefly from imagining that there is something involuntary in them, as in fear and compassion. And though a person should in some measure confess himself intemperate in his desires, he accuses his passion, and expects forgiveness, as for an involuntary fault. But dishonesty is not imagined to be, by any means, involuntary. In jealousy too there is something they suppose involuntary and this likewise, in some degree, they confess. Conversing therefore with such men, thus confused, thus ignorant what they say, and what are or are not their ills, whence they have them, and how they may be delivered from them, it is worth while, I think, to ask one’s self continually, “Am I too one of these? What do I imagine myself to be? How do I conduct myself,—as a prudent, as a temperate man? Do I, too, ever talk at this rate,—that I am sufficiently instructed for what may happen? Have I that persuasion that I know nothing which becomes one who knows nothing? Do I go to a master as to an oracle, prepared to obey; or do I also, like a mere driveller, enter the school only to learn and understand books which I did not understand before, or perhaps to explain them to others?” You have been fighting at home with your manservant; you have turned the house upside-down, and alarmed the neighborhood; and do you come to me with a pompous show of wisdom, and sit and criticise how I explain a sentence, how I prate whatever comes into my head? Do you come, envious and dejected that nothing has come from home for you, and in the midst of the disputations sit thinking on nothing but how your father or your brother may treat you? “What are they saying about me at home? Now they think I am improving, and say, He will come back with universal knowledge. I wish I could learn everything before my return; but this requires much labor, and nobody sends me anything. The baths are very bad at Nicopolis; and things go very ill both at home and here.” After all this, it is said, nobody is the better for the philosophic school. Why, who comes to the school? I mean, who comes to be reformed; who, to submit his principles to correction; who, with a sense of his wants? Why do you wonder, then, that you bring back from the school the very thing you carried there? For you do not come to lay aside, or correct, or change, your principles. How should you? Far from it. Rather consider this, therefore, whether you have not what you have come for. You have come to talk about theorems. Well; and are you not more impertinently talkative than you were? Do not these paltry theorems furnish you with matter for ostentation? Do you not solve convertible and hypothetical syllogisms? Why, then, are you still displeased, if you have the very thing for which you came? “Very true; but if my child or my brother should die; or if I must die or be tortured myself, what good will these things do me?” Why, did you come for this? Did you attend upon me for this? Was it upon any such account that you ever lighted your lamp, or sat up at night? Or did you, when you went into the walk, propose any delusive semblance to your own mind to be discussed, instead of a syllogism? Did any of you ever go through such a subject jointly? And after all, you say, theorems are useless. To whom? To such as apply them ill. For medicines for the eyes are not useless to those who apply them when and as they ought. Fomentations are not useless, dumb-bells are not useless: but they are useless to some, and on the contrary, useful to others. If you should ask me, now, are syllogisms useful? I should answer that they are useful; and, if you please, I will show you how. “Will they be of service to me, then?” Why, did you ask, man, whether they would be useful to you, or in general? If any one in a dysentery should ask me whether acids be useful, I should answer, they are. “Are they useful for me, then?” I say, no. First try to get the flux stopped, and the ulceration healed. Do you too first get your ulcers healed, your fluxes stopped. Quiet your mind, and bring it free from distraction to the school; and then you will know what force there is in reasoning.

> Greek: 21. τὰ μὲν ῥᾳδίως ὁμολογοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τὰ δʼ οὐ ῥᾳδίως. οὐδεὶς οὖν ὁμολογήσει ὅτι ἄφρων ἐστὶν ἢ ἀνόητος, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον πάντων ἀκούσεις λεγόντων ὤφελον ὡς φρένας ἔχω οὕτως καὶ τύχην εἶχον. δειλοὺς δὲ ῥᾳδίως ἑαυτοὺς ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ λέγουσιν ἐγὼ δειλότερός εἰμι, ὁμολογῶ· τὰ δʼ ἄλλʼ οὐχ εὑρήσεις με μωρὸν ἄνθρωπον. ἀκρατῆ οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὁμολογήσει τις, ἄδικον οὐδʼ ὅλως, φθονερὸν οὐ πάνυ ἢ περίεργον, ἐλεήμονα οἱ πλεῖστοι. τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον; τὸ μὲν κυριώτατον ἀνομολογία καὶ ταραχὴ ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ἄλλοις δʼ ἄλλα αἴτια καὶ σχεδὸν ὅσα ἂν αἰσχρὰ φαντάζωνται, ταῦτα οὐ πάνυ ὁμολογοῦσι· τὸ δὲ δειλὸν εἶναι εὐγνώμονος ἤθους φαντάζονται καὶ τὸ ἐλεήμονα, τὸ δʼ ἠλίθιον εἶναι παντελῶς ἀνδραπόδου· καὶ τὰ περὶ κοινωνίαν δὲ πλημμελήματα οὐ πάνυ προσίενται. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἁμαρτημάτων κατὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα φέρονται ἐπὶ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν αὐτά, ὅτι φαντάζονταί τι ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἀκούσιον καθάπερ ἐν τῷ δειλῷ καὶ ἐλεήμονι. κἂν ἀκρατῆ που παρομολογῇ τις αὑτόν, ἔρωτα προσέθηκεν, ὥστε συγγνωσθῆναι ὡς ἐπʼ ἀκουσίῳ. τὸ δʼ ἄδικον οὐδαμῶς φαντάζονται ἀκούσιον. ἔνι τι καὶ τῷ ζηλοτύπῳ, ὡς οἴονται, τοῦ ἀκουσίου· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τούτου παρομολογοῦσιν. ἐν οὖν τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις ἀναστρεφόμενον, οὕτως τεταραγμένοις, οὕτως οὐκ εἰδόσιν οὔθʼ ὅ τι λέγουσιν οὔθʼ ὅ τι ἔχουσιν κακὸν ἢ εἰ ἔχουσιν ἢ παρὰ τί ἔχουσιν ἢ πῶς παύσονται αὐτῶν, καὶ αὐτὸν οἶμαι ἐφιστάνειν ἄξιον συνεχὲς μή που καὶ αὐτὸς εἷς εἰμι ἐκείνων; τίνα φαντασίαν ἔχω περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ; πῶς ἐμαυτῷ χρῶμαι; μή τι καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς φρονίμῳ, μή τι καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἐγκρατεῖ; μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς λέγω ποτὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι εἰς τὸ ἐπιὸν πεπαίδευμαι; ἔχω ἣν δεῖ συναίσθησιν τὸν μηδὲν εἰδότα, ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶδα; ἔρχομαι πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ χρηστήρια πείθεσθαι παρεσκευασμένος; ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς κορύζης μεστὸς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν εἰσέρχομαι μόνην τὴν ἱστορίαν μαθησόμενος καὶ τὰ βιβλία νοήσων, ἃ πρότερον οὐκ ἐνόουν, ἂν δʼ οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐξηγησόμενος; ἄνθρωπʼ, ἐν οἴκῳ διαπεπύκτευκας τῷ δουλαρίῳ, τὴν οἰκίαν ἀνάστατον πεποίηκας, τοὺς γείτονας συντετάραχας· καὶ ἔρχῃ μοι καταστολὰς ποιήσας ὡς σοφὸς καὶ καθήμενος κρίνεις, πῶς ἐξηγησάμην τὴν λέξιν, πῶς τί ποτʼ ἐφλυάρησα τὰ ἐπελθόντα μοι; φθονῶν ἐλήλυθας, τεταπεινωμένος, ὅτι σοι ἐξ οἴκου φέρεται οὐδέν, καὶ κάθῃ μεταξὺ λεγομένων τῶν λόγων αὐτὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐνθυμούμενος ἢ πῶς ὁ πατὴρ τὰ πρός σε ἢ πῶς ὁ ἀδελφός; τί λέγουσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ ἄνθρωποι περὶ ἐμοῦ; νῦν οἴονταί με προκόπτειν καὶ λέγουσιν ὅτι ἥξει ἐκεῖνος πάντα εἰδώς. ἤθελόν πώς ποτε πάντα μαθὼν ἐπανελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ πόνου χρεία καὶ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν πέμπει καὶ ἐν Νικοπόλει σαπρῶς λούει τὰ βαλανεῖα καὶ ἐν οἴκῳ κακῶς καὶ ὧδε κακῶς. εἶτα λέγουσιν οὐδεὶς ὠφελεῖται ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς. τίς γὰρ ἔρχεται εἰς σχολήν, τίς γάρ, ὡς θεραπευθησόμενος; τίς ὡς παρέξων αὑτοῦ τὰ δόγματα ἐκκαθαρθησόμενα, τίς συναισθησόμενος τίνων δεῖται; τί οὖν θαυμάζετʼ, εἰ ἃ φέρετʼ εἰς τὴν σχολήν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀποφέρετε πάλιν; οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἀποθησόμενοι ἢ ἐπανορθώσοντες ἢ ἄλλʼ ἀντʼ αὐτῶν ληψόμενοι ἔρχεσθε. πόθεν; οὐδʼ ἐγγύς. ἐκεῖνο γοῦν βλέπετε μᾶλλον, εἰ ἐφʼ ὃ ἔρχεσθε τοῦτο ὑμῖν γίνεται. θέλετε λαλεῖν περὶ τῶν θεωρημάτων. τί οὖν; οὐ φλυαρότεροι γίνεσθε; οὐχὶ δὲ παρέχει τινὰ ὕλην ὑμῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὰ θεωρημάτια; οὐ συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύετε, μεταπίπτοντας; οὐκ ἐφοδεύετε Ψευδομένου λήμματα, ὑποθετικούς; τί οὖν ἔτι ἀγανακτεῖτε εἰ ἐφʼ ἃ πάρεστε, ταῦτα λαμβάνετε; ναί· ἀλλʼ ἂν ἀποθάνῃ μου τὸ παιδίον ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἐμὲ ἀποθνῄσκειν δέῃ ἢ στρεβλοῦσθαι, τί με τὰ τ⟨οι⟩αῦτα ὠφελήσει; μὴ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἦλθες, μὴ γὰρ τούτου ἕνεκά μοι παρακάθησαι, μὴ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτό ποτε λύχνον ἧψας ἢ ἠγρύπνησας; ἢ εἰς τὸν περίπατον ἐξελθὼν προέβαλές ποτε σαυτῷ φαντασίαν τινὰ ἀντὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ταύτην κοινῇ ἐφωδεύσατε; ποῦ ποτε; εἶτα λέγετε ἄχρηστα τὰ θεωρήματα. τίσιν; τοῖς οὐχ ὡς δεῖ χρωμένοις. τὰ γὰρ κολλύρια οὐκ ἄχρηστα τοῖς ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ ἐγχριομένοις, τὰ μαλάγματα δʼ οὐκ ἄχρηστα, οἱ ἁλτῆρες οὐκ ἄχρηστοι, ἀλλὰ τισὶν ἄχρηστοι, τισὶν πάλιν χρήσιμοι. ἄν μου πυνθάνῃ νῦν χρήσιμοί εἰσιν οἱ συλλογισμοί; ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι χρήσιμοι, κἂν θέλῃς, ἀποδείξω, πῶς. ἐμὲ οὖν τι ὠφελήκασιν; ἄνθρωπε, μὴ γὰρ ἐπύθου, εἰ σοὶ χρήσιμοι, ἀλλὰ καθόλου; πυθέσθω μου καὶ ὁ δυσεντερικός, εἰ χρήσιμον ὄξος, ἐρῶ ὅτι χρήσιμον. ἐμοὶ οὖν χρήσιμον; ἐρῶ οὔ. ζήτησον πρῶτον σταλῆναί σου τὸ ῥεῦμα, τὰ ἑλκύδρια ἀπουλωθῆναι. καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἄνδρες, τὰ ἕλκη πρῶτον θεραπεύετε, τὰ ῥεύματα ἐπιστήσατε, ἠρεμήσατε τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἀπερίσπαστον αὐτὴν ἐνέγκατε εἰς τὴν σχολήν· καὶ γνώσεσθε οἵαν ἰσχὺν ὁ λόγος ἔχει.

[¶62] 22. To whatever objects a person devotes his attention, these objects he probably loves. Do men ever devote their attention, then, to [what they think] evils? By no means. Or even to things indifferent?

> Greek: 22. περὶ ἅ τις ἐσπούδακεν, φιλεῖ ταῦτα εἰκότως. μή τι οὖν περὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐσπουδάκασιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι; οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ μή τι περὶ τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς αὐτούς; οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα.

[¶63] No, nor this. It remains, then, that good must be the sole object of their attention; and if of their attention, of their love too.

> Greek: ὑπολείπεται τοίνυν περὶ μόνα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐσπουδακέναι αὐτούς· εἰ δʼ ἐσπουδακέναι, καὶ φιλεῖν ταῦτα.

[¶64] Whoever, therefore, understands good, is capable likewise of love; and he who cannot distinguish good from evil, and things indifferent from both, how is it possible that he can love? The wise person alone, then, is capable of loving. “How so?

> Greek: ὅστις οὖν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, οὗτος ἂν καὶ φιλεῖν εἰδείη· ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος διακρῖναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τὰ οὐδέτερα ἀπʼ ἀμφοτέρων πῶς ἂν ἔτι οὗτος φιλεῖν δύναιτο; τοῦ φρονίμου τοίνυν ἐστὶ μόνου τὸ φιλεῖν.

[¶65] I am not this wise person, yet I love my child.”

> Greek: καὶ πῶς; φησίν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἄφρων ὢν ὅμως φιλῶ μου τὸ παιδίον.

[¶66] I protest it surprises me that you should, in the first place, confess yourself unwise. For in what are you deficient? Have not you the use of your senses? Do you not distinguish the semblances of things? Do you not provide such food and clothing and habitation as are suitable to you?

> Greek: — θαυμάζω μὲν νὴ τοὺς θεούς, πῶς καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡμολόγηκας ἄφρονα εἶναι σεαυτόν. τί γάρ σοι λείπει; οὐ χρῇ αἰσθήσει, οὐ φαντασίας διακρίνεις, οὐ τροφὰς προσφέρῃ τὰς ἐπιτηδείους τῷ σώματι, οὐ σκέπην, οὐκ οἴκησιν;

[¶67] Why then do you confess that you want wisdom? In truth, because you are often struck and disconcerted by semblances, and their speciousness gets the better of you; and hence you sometimes suppose the very same things to be good, then evil, and lastly, neither; and, in a word, you grieve, you fear, you envy, you are disconcerted, you change.

> Greek: πόθεν οὖν ὁμολογεῖς ἄφρων εἶναι; ὅτι νὴ Δία πολλάκις ἐξίστασαι ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ ταράττῃ καὶ ἡττῶσίν σε αἱ πιθανότητες αὐτῶν· καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ὑπολαμβάνεις, εἶτα ἐκεῖνα αὐτὰ κακά, ὕστερον δʼ οὐδέτερα· καὶ ὅλως λυπῇ, φοβῇ, φθονεῖς, ταράσσῃ, μεταβάλλῃ· διὰ ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖς ἄφρων εἶναι.

[¶68] Is it from this that you confess yourself unwise? And are you not changeable too in love? Riches, pleasure, in short, the very same things, you sometimes esteem good, and at other times evil. And do you not esteem the same persons too alternately as good and bad, at one time treating them with kindness, at another with enmity; at one time commending, and at another censuring them?

> Greek: ἐν δὲ τῷ φιλεῖν οὐ μεταβάλλῃ; ἀλλὰ πλοῦτον μὲν καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ ἁπλῶς αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ὑπολαμβάνεις εἶναι, ποτὲ δὲ κακά· ἀνθρώπους δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς οὐχὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθούς, ποτὲ δὲ κακοὺς καὶ ποτὲ μὲν οἰκείως ἔχεις, ποτὲ δʼ ἐχθρῶς αὐτοῖς καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐπαινεῖς, ποτὲ δὲ ψέγεις; — ναὶ καὶ ταῦτα πάσχω.

[¶69] “Yes. This too is the case with me.” Well, then; can he who is deceived in another be his friend, think you? “No, surely.” Or does he who loves him with a changeable affection bear him genuine good-will? “Nor he, neither.”

> Greek: — τί οὖν; ὁ ἐξηπατημένος περί τινος δοκεῖ σοι φίλος εἶναι αὐτοῦ; — οὐ πάνυ. — οὐδʼ ὁ μεταπτώτως ἑλόμενος αὐτὸν εἶναι εὔνους αὐτῷ; — οὐδʼ οὗτος. — ὁ δὲ νῦν λοιδορῶν μέν τινα, ὕστερον δὲ θαυμάζων;

[¶70] Or he who now vilifies, then admires him? “Nor he.” Do you not often see little dogs caressing and playing with each other, so that you would say nothing could be more friendly? But to learn what this friendship is, throw a bit of meat between them, and you will see.

> Greek: — οὐδʼ οὗτος. — τί οὖν; κυνάρια οὐδέποτʼ εἶδες σαίνοντα καὶ προσπαίζοντα ἀλλήλοις, ἵνʼ εἴπῃς οὐδὲν φιλικώτερον; ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἴδῃς, τί ἐστι φιλία, βάλε κρέας εἰς μέσον καὶ γνώσῃ.

[¶71] Do you too throw a bit of an estate betwixt you and your son, and you will see that he will quickly wish you under ground, and you him; and then you, no doubt, on the other hand will exclaim, What a son have I brought up!

> Greek: βάλε καὶ σοῦ καὶ τοῦ παιδίου μέσον ἀγρίδιον καὶ γνώσῃ, πῶς σὲ τὸ παιδίον ταχέως κατορύξαι θέλει καὶ σὺ τὸ παιδίον εὔχῃ ἀποθανεῖν. εἶτα σὺ πάλιν οἷον ἐξέθρεψα τεκνίον· πάλαι ἐκφέρει.

[¶72] He would bury me alive! Throw in a pretty girl, and the old fellow and the young one will both fall in love with her; or let fame or danger intervene, the words of the father of Admetus will be yours:—
You love to see the light. Doth not your father?

> Greek: βάλε κορασίδιον κομψὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ὁ γέρων φίλει κἀκεῖνος ὁ νέος· ἂν δέ, δοξάριον. ἂν δὲ κινδυνεῦσαι δέῃ, ἐρεῖς τὰς φωνὰς τὰς τοῦ Ἀδμήτου πατρός· [χαίρεις ὁρῶν φῶς, πατέρα δʼ οὐ χαίρειν δοκεῖς;] θέλεις βλέπειν φῶς, πατέρα δʼ οὐ θέλειν δοκεῖς;

[¶73] You fain would still behold it. Would not he?
The second line, as quoted by Epictetus, is not found in the received editions. Pheres, the father of Admetus, is defending himself for not consenting to die in place of his son.—H.

> Greek: οἴει ὅτι ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐφίλει τὸ ἴδιον παιδίον, ὅτε μικρὸν ἦν, οὐδὲ πυρέσσοντος αὐτοῦ ἠγωνία οὐδʼ ἔλεγεν πολλάκις ὅτι ὤφελον ἐγὼ μᾶλλον ἐπύρεσσον; εἶτα ἐλθόντος τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἐγγίσαντος ὅρα οἵας φωνὰς ἀφιᾶσιν.

[¶74] Do you suppose that he did not love his own child when it was little; that he was not in agonies when it had a fever, and often wished to undergo that fever in its stead? But, after all, when the trial comes home, you see what expressions he uses. Were not Eteocles and Polynices born of the same mother and of the same father? Were they not brought up, and did they not live and eat and sleep, together?

> Greek: ὁ Ἐτεοκλῆς καὶ ὁ Πολυνείκης οὐκ ἦσαν ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς μητρὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρός; οὐκ ἦσαν συντεθραμμένοι, συμβεβιωκότες, συμπεπωκότες, συγκεκοιμημένοι, πολλάκις ἀλλήλους καταπεφιληκότες; ὥστʼ εἴ τις οἶμαι εἶδεν αὐτούς, κατεγέλασεν ἂν τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐφʼ οἷς περὶ φιλίας παραδοξολογοῦσιν.

[¶75] Did not they kiss and fondle each other? So that any one, who saw them, would have laughed at all the paradoxes which philosophers utter about love. And yet when a kingdom, like a bit of meat, was thrown betwixt them, see what they say,—
Polynices:
Where wilt thou stand before the towers?

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἐμπεσούσης εἰς τὸ μέσον ὥσπερ κρέως τῆς τυραννίδος ὅρα οἷα λέγουσι· ποῦ ποτε στήσῃ πρὸ πύργων; — ὡς τί μʼ ἐρωτᾷς τῷδʼ; — ἀντιτάξομαι κτενῶν σε. — κἀμὲ τοῦδʼ ἔρως ἔχει. καὶ εὔχονται εὐχὰς τοιάσδε.

[¶76] Eteocles:
Why askest thou this of me?
Pol.:
I will oppose myself to thee, to slay thee.
Et.:
Me too the desire of this seizes. Such are the prayers they offer. Be not therefore deceived. No living being is held by anything so strongly as by its own needs.

> Greek: καθόλου γὰρ — μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθε — πᾶν ζῷον οὐδενὶ οὕτως ᾠκείωται ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ συμφέροντι. ὅ τι ἂν οὖν πρὸς τοῦτο φαίνηται αὐτῷ ἐμποδίζειν, ἄν τʼ ἀδελφὸς ᾖ τοῦτο ἄν τε πατὴρ ἄν τε τέκνον ἄν τʼ ἐρώμενος ἄν τʼ ἐραστής, μισεῖ, προβάλλεται, καταρᾶται.

[¶77] Whatever therefore appears a hindrance to these, be it brother or father or child or mistress or friend, is hated, abhorred, execrated;

> Greek: οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως φιλεῖν πέφυκεν ὡς τὸ αὑτοῦ συμφέρον· τοῦτο πατὴρ καὶ ἀδελφὸς καὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ πατρὶς καὶ θεός.

[¶78] for by nature it loves nothing like its own needs. This motive is father and brother and family and country and God. Whenever, therefore, the gods seem to hinder this, we vilify even them, and throw down their statues, and burn their temples;

> Greek: ὅταν γοῦν εἰς τοῦτο ἐμποδίζειν ἡμῖν οἱ θεοὶ δοκῶσιν, κἀκείνους λοιδοροῦμεν καὶ τὰ ἱδρύματα αὐτῶν καταστρέφομεν καὶ τοὺς ναοὺς ἐμπιπρῶμεν, ὥσπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐκέλευσεν ἐμπρησθῆναι τὰ Ἀσκλήπεια ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἐρωμένου.

[¶79] as Alexander ordered the temple of Esculapius to be burnt, because he had lost the man he loved. When, therefore, any one identifies his interest with those of sanctity, virtue, country, parents, and friends, all these are secured; but whenever he places his interest in anything else than friends, country, family, and justice, then these all give way, borne down by the weight of self-interest.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο ἂν μὲν ἐν ταὐτῷ τις θῇ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ πατρίδα καὶ γονεῖς καὶ φίλους, σῴζεται ταῦτα πάντα· ἂν δʼ ἀλλαχοῦ μὲν τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον, οἴχεται πάντα ταῦτα καταβαρούμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος.

## 12. Book II · chapters 22–26

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/12/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/12/#p-N

[¶0] For wherever I and mine are placed, thither must every living being gravitate. If in body, that will sway us; if in our own will, that;

> Greek: ὅπου γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ ἐμόν, ἐκεῖ ἀνάγκη ῥέπειν τὸ ζῷον· εἰ ἐν σαρκί, ἐκεῖ τὸ κυριεῦον εἶναι· εἰ ἐν προαιρέσει, ἐκεῖ[νο] εἶναι· εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός, ἐκεῖ[νο].

[¶1] if in externals, these. If, therefore, I rest my personality in the will, then only shall I be a friend, a son, or a father, such as I ought. For in that case it will be for my interest to preserve the faithful, the modest, the patient, the abstinent, the beneficent character;

> Greek: εἰ τοίνυν ἐκεῖ εἰμι ἐγώ, ὅπου ἡ προαίρεσις, οὕτως μόνως καὶ φίλος ἔσομαι οἷος δεῖ καὶ υἱὸς καὶ πατήρ. τοῦτο γάρ μοι συνοίσει τηρεῖν τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν ἀνεκτικόν, τὸν ἀφεκτικὸν καὶ συνεργητικόν, φυλάσσειν τὰς σχέσεις.

[¶2] to keep the relations of life inviolate. But if I place my personality in one thing, and virtue in another, the doctrine of Epicurus will stand its ground, that virtue is nothing, or mere opinion.

> Greek: ἂν δʼ ἀλλαχοῦ μὲν ἐμαυτὸν θῶ, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ τὸ καλόν, οὕτως ἰσχυρὸς γίνεται ὁ Ἐπικούρου λόγος, ἀποφαίνων ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἢ εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἔνδοξον.

[¶3] From this ignorance it was that the Athenians and Lacedemonians quarrelled with each other, and the Thebans with both; the Persian king with Greece, and the Macedonians with both; and now the Romans with the Getes. And in still remoter times the Trojan war arose from the same cause.

> Greek: διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιαν καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι διεφέροντο καὶ Θηβαῖοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους καὶ μέγας βασιλεὺς πρὸς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ Μακεδόνες πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους καὶ νῦν Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς Γέτας καὶ ἔτι πρότερον τὰ ἐν Ἰλίῳ διὰ ταῦτα ἐγένετο.

[¶4] Alexander [Paris] was the guest of Menelaus; and whoever had seen the mutual proofs of good-will that passed between them would never have believed that they were not friends. But a tempting bait, a pretty woman, was thrown in between them;

> Greek: ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος τοῦ Μενελάου ξένος ἦν, καὶ εἴ τις αὐτοὺς εἶδεν φιλοφρονουμένους ἀλλήλους, ἠπίστησεν ἂν τῷ λέγοντι οὐκ εἶναι φίλους αὐτούς. ἀλλʼ ἐβλήθη εἰς τὸ μέσον μερίδιον, κομψὸν γυναικάριον, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ πόλεμος.

[¶5] and thence came war. At present, therefore, when you see that dear brothers have, in appearance, but one soul do not immediately pronounce upon their love; not though they should swear it, and affirm it was impossible to live asunder.

> Greek: καὶ νῦν ὅταν ἴδῃς φίλους, ἀδελφοὺς ὁμονοεῖν δοκοῦντας, μὴ αὐτόθεν ἀποφήνῃ περὶ τῆς φιλίας τι αὐτῶν μηδʼ ἂν ὀμνύωσιν μηδʼ ἂν ἀδυνάτως ἔχειν λέγωσιν ἀπηλλάχθαι ἀλλήλων.

[¶6] For the governing faculty of a bad man is faithless, unsettled, undiscriminating, successively vanquished by different semblances.

> Greek: οὐκ ἔστι πιστὸν τὸ τοῦ φαύλου ἡγεμονικόν· ἀβέβαιόν ἐστιν, ἄκριτον, ἄλλοθʼ ὑπʼ ἄλλης φαντασίας νικώμενον.

[¶7] But inquire, not as others do, whether they were born of the same parents, and brought up together, and under the same preceptor; but this thing only, in what they place their interest,—in externals or in their own wills.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἐξέτασον μὴ ταῦθʼ ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γονέων καὶ ὁμοῦ ἀνατεθραμμένοι καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ αὐτῷ παιδαγωγῷ, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο μόνον, ποῦ τὸ συμφέρον αὐτοῖς τίθενται, πότερον ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν προαιρέσει.

[¶8] If in externals, you can no more pronounce them friends, than you can call them faithful, or constant, or brave, or free;

> Greek: ἂν ἐκτός, μὴ εἴπῃς φίλους οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ πιστοὺς ἢ βεβαίους ἢ θαρραλέους ἢ ἐλευθέρους, ἀλλὰ μηδʼ ἀνθρώπους, εἰ νοῦν ἔχεις.

[¶9] nay, nor even truly men, if you are wise. For it is no principle of humanity that makes them bite and vilify each other, and take possession of public assemblies, as wild beasts do of solitudes and mountains; and convert courts of justice into dens of robbers; that prompts them to be intemperate, adulterers, seducers; or leads them into other offences that men commit against each other,—all from that one single error, by which they risk themselves and their own concerns on things uncontrollable by will.

> Greek: οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὸν δόγμα ἐστὶ τὸ ποιοῦν δάκνειν ἀλλήλους καὶ λοιδορεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐρημίας καταλαμβάνειν ἢ τὰς ἀγορὰς ὡς τὰ ὄρη καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀποδείκνυσθαι τὰ λῃστῶν· οὐδὲ τὸ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μοιχοὺς καὶ φθορεῖς ἀπεργαζόμενον οὐδʼ ὅσʼ ἄλλα πλημμελοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι κατʼ ἀλλήλων διʼ ἓν καὶ μόνον τοῦτο δόγμα, τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀπροαιρέτοις τίθεσθαι αὑτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν.

[¶10] But if you hear that these men in reality suppose good to be placed only in the will, and in a right use of things as they appear, no longer take the trouble of inquiring if they are father and son, or old companions and acquaintances; but boldly pronounce that they are friends, and also that they are faithful and just.

> Greek: ἂν δʼ ἀκούσῃς, ὅτι ταῖς ἀληθείαις οὗτοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐκεῖ μόνον οἴονται τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὅπου προαίρεσις, ὅπου χρῆσις ὀρθὴ φαντασιῶν, μηκέτι πολυπραγμονήσῃς μήτʼ εἰ υἱὸς καὶ πατήρ ἐστι μήτʼ εἰ ἀδελφοὶ μήτʼ εἰ πολὺν χρόνον συμπεφοιτηκότες καὶ ἑταῖροι, ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ τοῦτο γνοὺς θαρρῶν ἀποφαίνου, ὅτι φίλοι, ὥσπερ ὅτι πιστοί, ὅτι δίκαιοι.

[¶11] For where else can friendship be met, but joined with fidelity and modesty, and the intercommunication of virtue alone? “Well;

> Greek: ποῦ γὰρ ἀλλαχοῦ φιλία ἢ ὅπου πίστις, ὅπου αἰδώς, ὅπου δόσις τοῦ καλοῦ, τῶν δʼ ἄλλων οὐδενός;

[¶12] but such a one paid me the utmost regard for so long a time, and did he not love me?” How can you tell, foolish man, if that regard be any other than he pays to his shoes, or his horse, when he cleans them? And how do you know but that when you cease to be a necessary utensil, he may throw you away, like a broken stool?

> Greek: ἀλλὰ τεθεράπευκέ με τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ· καὶ οὐκ ἐφίλει με; πόθεν οἶδας, ἀνδράποδον, εἰ οὕτως τεθεράπευκεν ὡς τὰ ὑποδήματα σπογγίζει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς τὸ κτῆνος; πόθεν οἶδας, εἰ τὴν χρείαν σʼ ἀποβαλόντα τὴν τοῦ σκευαρίου ῥίψει ὡς κατεαγὸς πινάκιον;

[¶13] “Well; but it is my wife, and we have lived together many years.” And how many did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus, and was the mother of children not a few?

> Greek: ἀλλὰ γυνή μου ἐστὶ καὶ τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ συμβεβιώκαμεν. πόσῳ δʼ ἡ Ἐριφύλη μετὰ τοῦ Ἀμφιαράου καὶ τέκνων μήτηρ καὶ πολλῶν;

[¶14] But a bauble came between them. What was this bauble? A false conviction concerning certain things. This turned her into a savage animal; this cut asunder all love, and suffered neither the wife nor the mother to continue such.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ὅρμος ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ μέσον. τί δʼ ἐστὶν ὅρμος; τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ἐκεῖνο ἦν τὸ θηριῶδες, ἐκεῖνο τὸ διακόπτον τὴν φιλίαν, τὸ οὐκ ἐῶν εἶναι γυναῖκα γαμετήν, [τὴν] μητέρα μητέρα.

[¶15] Whoever, therefore, among you studies either to be or to gain a friend, let him cut up all false convictions by the root, hate them, drive them utterly out of his soul.

> Greek: καὶ ὑμῶν ὅστις ἐσπούδακεν ἢ αὐτός τινι εἶναι φίλος ἢ ἄλλον κτήσασθαι φίλον, ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα ἐκκοπτέτω, ταῦτα μισησάτω, ταῦτα ἐξελασάτω ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ.

[¶16] Thus, in the first place, he will be secure from inward reproaches and contests, from vacillation and self-torment.

> Greek: καὶ οὕτως ἔσται πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ μὴ λοιδορούμενος, μὴ μαχόμενος, μὴ μετανοῶν, μὴ βασανίζων ἑαυτόν·

[¶17] Then, with respect to others, to every like-minded person he will be without disguise; to such as are unlike he will be patient, mild, gentle, and ready to forgive them, as failing in points of the greatest importance; but severe to none, being fully convinced of Plato’s doctrine, that the soul is never willingly deprived of truth.

> Greek: ἔπειτα καὶ ἑτέρῳ, τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ παντὶ ἁπλῶς, τοῦ δʼ ἀνομοίου ἀνεκτικός, πρᾷος πρὸς αὐτόν, ἥμερος, συγγνωμονικὸς ὡς πρὸς ἀγνοοῦντα, ὡς πρὸς διαπίπτοντα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· οὐδενὶ χαλεπός, ἅτʼ εἰδὼς ἀκριβῶς τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἄκουσα στέρεται τῆς ἀληθείας.

[¶18] Without all this, you may, in many respects, live as friends do; and drink and lodge and travel together, and even be born of the same parents; and so may serpents too; but neither they nor you can ever be really friends, while your accustomed principles remain brutal and execrable.

> Greek: εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πράξετε πάντα ὅσα οἱ φίλοι καὶ συμπιεῖσθε καὶ συσκηνήσετε καὶ συμπλεύσετε καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γεγενημένοι ἔσεσθε· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ὄφεις· φίλοι δʼ οὔτʼ ἐκεῖνοι οὔθʼ ὑμεῖς, μέχρις ἂν ἔχητε τὰ θηριώδη ταῦτα καὶ μιαρὰ δόγματα.

[¶19] 23. A book will always be read with more pleasure and ease, if it be written in fair characters; and so every one will the more easily attend to discourses likewise, if ornamented with proper and beautiful expressions.

> Greek: 23. βιβλίον πᾶς ἂν ἥδιον ἀναγνῴη καὶ ῥᾷον τὸ εὐσημοτέροις γράμμασι γεγραμμένον οὐκοῦν καὶ λόγους πᾶς ἄν τις ῥᾷον ἀκούσειε τοὺς εὐσχήμοσιν ἅμα καὶ εὐπρεπέσιν ὀνόμασι σεσημασμένους.

[¶20] It ought not then to be said, that there is no such thing as the faculty of eloquence; for this would be at once the part of an impious and timid person,—impious, because he dishonors the gifts of God; just as if he should deny any use in the faculties of sight, hearing, and speech itself.

> Greek: οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο ῥητέον, ὡς οὐδεμία δύναμίς ἐστιν ἀπαγγελτική· τοῦτο γὰρ ἅμα μὲν ἀσεβοῦς ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου, ἅμα δὲ δειλοῦ. ἀσεβοῦς μέν, ὅτι τὰς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χάριτας ἀτιμάζει, ὥσπερ εἰ ἀνῄρει τὴν εὐχρηστίαν τῆς ὁρατικῆς ἢ τῆς ἀκουστικῆς δυνάμεως ἢ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνητικῆς.

[¶21] Has God then given you eyes in vain? Is it in vain that he has infused into them such a strong and active spirit as to be able to represent the forms of distant objects?

> Greek: εἰκῇ οὖν σοι ὁ θεὸς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔδωκεν, εἰκῇ πνεῦμα ἐνεκέρασεν αὐτοῖς οὕτως ἰσχυρὸν καὶ φιλότεχνον, ὥστε μακρὰν ἐξικνούμενον ἀναμάσσεσθαι τοὺς τύπους τῶν ὁρωμένων;

[¶22] What messenger is so quick and diligent? Is it in vain that he has made the intermediate air so yielding and elastic that sight penetrates through it? And is it in vain that he has made the light, without which all the rest would be useless?

> Greek: καὶ ποῖος ἄγγελος οὕτως ὠκὺς καὶ ἐπιμελής; εἰκῇ δὲ καὶ τὸν μεταξὺ ἀέρα οὕτως ἐνεργὸν ἐποίησεν καὶ ἔντονον, ὥστε διʼ αὐτοῦ τεινομένου πως διικνεῖσθαι τὴν ὅρασιν; εἰκῇ δὲ φῶς ἐποίησεν, οὗ μὴ παρόντος οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων ὄφελος ἦν;

[¶23] Man, be not ungrateful, nor, on the other hand, unmindful of your superior advantages; but for sight and hearing, and indeed for life itself, and the supports of it, as fruits and wine and oil, be thankful to God; but remember that he has given you another thing, superior to them all, which uses them, proves them, estimates the value of each.

> Greek: ἄνθρωπε, μήτʼ ἀχάριστος ἴσθι μήτε πάλιν ἀμνήμων τῶν κρεισσόνων, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ μὲν τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ νὴ Δία ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τῶν συνεργῶν πρὸς αὐτό, ὑπὲρ καρπῶν ξηρῶν, ὑπὲρ οἴνου, ὑπὲρ ἐλαίου εὐχαρίστει τῷ θεῷ·

[¶24] For what is it that pronounces upon the value of each of these faculties? Is it the faculty itself?

> Greek: μέμνησο δʼ ὅτι ἄλλο τί σοι δέδωκεν κρεῖττον ἁπάντων τούτων, τὸ χρησόμενον αὐτοῖς, τὸ δοκιμάσον, τὸ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστου λογιούμενον.

[¶25] Did you ever perceive the faculty of sight or hearing to say anything concerning itself; or wheat, or barley, or horses, or dogs? No. These things are appointed as instruments and servants, to obey that which is capable of using things as they appear. If you inquire the value of anything, of what do you inquire? What is the faculty that answers you?

> Greek: τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀποφαινόμενον ὑπὲρ ἑκάστης τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων, πόσου τις ἀξία ἐστὶν αὐτῶν; μή τι αὐτὴ ἑκάστη ἡ δύναμις; μή τι τῆς ὁρατικῆς ποτʼ ἤκουσας λεγούσης τι περὶ ἑαυτῆς, μή τι τῆς ἀκουστικῆς; [μή τι πυρῶν; μή τι κριθῶν; μή τι ἵππου; μή τι κυνός;] ἀλλʼ ὡς διάκονοι καὶ δοῦλαι τεταγμέναι εἰσὶν ὑπηρετεῖν τῇ χρηστικῇ τῶν φαντασιῶν.

[¶26] How then can any faculty be superior to this, which uses all the rest as instruments, and tries and pronounces concerning each of them? For which of them knows what itself is, and what is its own value? Which of them knows when it is to be used, and when not?

> Greek: κἂν πύθῃ, πόσου ἕκαστον ἄξιόν ἐστιν, τίνος πυνθάνῃ; τίς σοι ἀποκρίνεται; πῶς οὖν δύναταί τις ἄλλη δύναμις κρείσσων εἶναι ταύτης, ἣ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς διακόνοις χρῆται καὶ δοκιμάζει αὐτὴ ἕκαστα καὶ ἀποφαίνεται;

[¶27] Which is it that opens and shuts the eyes, and turns them away from improper objects? Is it the faculty of sight? No; but that of Will. Which is it that opens and shuts the ears? Which is it by which they are made curious and inquisitive, or, on the contrary, deaf, and unaffected by what is said? Is it the faculty of hearing? No;

> Greek: τίς γὰρ ἐκείνων οἶδεν, τίς ἐστιν αὐτὴ καὶ πόσου ἀξία; τίς ἐκείνων οἶδεν, ὁπότε δεῖ χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ καὶ πότε μή; τίς ἐστιν ἡ ἀνοίγουσα καὶ κλείουσα τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ἀφʼ ὧν δεῖ ἀποστρέφουσα, τοῖς δὲ προσάγουσα; ἡ ὁρατική; οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἡ προαιρετική. τίς ἡ τὰ ὦτα ἐπικλείουσα καὶ ἀνοίγουσα;

[¶28] but that of Will.

> Greek: τίς, καθʼ ἣν περίεργοι καὶ πευθῆνες ἢ πάλιν ἀκίνητοι ὑπὸ λόγου; ἡ ἀκουστική;

[¶29] This, then, recognizing itself to exist amidst other faculties, all blind and deaf, and unable to discern anything but those offices in which they are appointed to minister and serve, itself alone sees clearly, and distinguishes the value of each of the rest. Will this, I say, inform us that anything is supreme but itself? What can the eye, when it is opened, do more than see? But whether we ought to look upon the wife of any one, and in what manner, what is it that decides us?

> Greek: οὐκ ἄλλη ἢ ἡ προαιρετικὴ δύναμις. εἶτʼ αὐτὴ ἰδοῦσα, ὅτι ἐν τυφλαῖς καὶ κωφαῖς ταῖς ἄλλαις ἁπάσαις δυνάμεσίν ἐστι μηδέ τι ἄλλο συνορᾶν δυναμέναις πλὴν αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἔργα, ἐφʼ οἷς τεταγμέναι εἰσὶ διακονεῖν ταύτῃ καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν, αὐτὴ δὲ μόνη ὀξὺ βλέπει καὶ τάς τʼ ἄλλας καθορᾷ, πόσου ἑκάστη ἀξία, καὶ αὑτήν, μέλλει ἡμῖν ἄλλο τι ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ κράτιστον εἶναι ἢ αὐτήν;

[¶30] The faculty of Will. Whether we ought to believe, or disbelieve what is said; or whether, if we do believe, we ought to be moved by it, or not, what is it that decides us?

> Greek: καὶ τί ποιεῖ ἄλλο ὀφθαλμὸς ἀνοιχθεὶς ἢ ὁρᾷ; εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὴν τοῦ τινος ἰδεῖν γυναῖκα καὶ πῶς, τίς λέγει;

[¶31] Is it not the faculty of Will?

> Greek: ἡ προαιρετική. εἰ δὲ δεῖ πιστεῦσαι τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν ἢ ἀπιστῆσαι καὶ πιστεύσαντα ἐρεθισθῆναι ἢ μή, τίς λέγει;

[¶32] Again, the very faculty of eloquence, and that which ornaments discourse, if any such peculiar faculty there be, what does it more than merely ornament and arrange expressions, as curlers do the hair?

> Greek: οὐχ ἡ προαιρετική; ἡ δὲ φραστικὴ αὕτη καὶ καλλωπιστικὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων, εἴ τις ἄρα ἰδία δύναμις, τί ἄλλο ποιεῖ ἤ, ὅταν ἐμπέσῃ λόγος περί τινος, καλλωπίζει τὰ ὀνομάτια καὶ συντίθησιν ὥσπερ οἱ κομμωταὶ τὴν κόμην;

[¶33] But whether it be better to speak or to be silent, or better to speak in this or in that manner, whether this be decent or indecent, and the season and use of each, what is it that decides for us, but the faculty of Will? What, then; would you have it appear, and bear testimony against itself? What means this?

> Greek: πότερον δʼ εἰπεῖν ἄμεινον ἢ σιωπῆσαι καὶ οὕτως ἄμεινον ἢ ἐκείνως καὶ τοῦτο πρέπον ἢ οὐ πρέπον, καὶ τὸν καιρὸν ἑκάστου καὶ τὴν χρείαν τίς ἄλλη λέγει ἢ ἡ προαιρετική; θέλεις οὖν αὐτὴν παρελθοῦσαν αὑτῆς καταψηφίσασθαι;

[¶34] If the case be thus, then that which serves may be superior to that to which it is subservient; the horse to the rider, the dog to the hunter, the instrument to the musician, or servants to the king. What is it that makes use of all the rest? The Will. What takes care of all?

> Greek: τί οὖν;, φησίν, εἰ οὕτως τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχει, καὶ δύναται τὸ διακονοῦν κρεῖσσον εἶναι ἐκείνου ᾧ διακονεῖ, ὁ ἵππος τοῦ ἱππέως ἢ ὁ κύων τοῦ κυνηγοῦ ἢ τὸ ὄργανον τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ ἢ οἱ ὑπηρέται τοῦ βασιλέως. — τί ἐστι τὸ χρώμενον;

[¶35] The Will. What destroys the whole man, at one time, by hunger; at another, by a rope or a precipice? The Will. Has man, then, anything stronger than this?

> Greek: προαίρεσις. τί ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων; προαίρεσις. τί ὅλον ἀναιρεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ποτὲ μὲν λιμῷ, ποτὲ δʼ ἀγχόνῃ, ποτὲ δὲ κατὰ κρημνοῦ; προαίρεσις.

[¶36] And how is it possible that what is liable to restraint should be stronger than what is not? What has a natural power to restrain the faculty of sight?

> Greek: εἶτα τούτου τί ἰσχυρότερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐστίν; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε τοῦ ἀκωλύτου τὰ κωλυόμενα; τὴν ὁρατικὴν δύναμιν τίνα πέφυκεν ἐμποδίζειν;

[¶37] The Will and its workings. And it is the same with the faculties of hearing and of speech. And what has a natural power of restraining the Will? Nothing beyond itself, only its own perversion. Therefore in the Will alone is vice; in the Will alone is virtue.

> Greek: καὶ προαίρεσις καὶ ἀπροαίρετα. τὴν ἀκουστικὴν ταὐτά, τὴν φραστικὴν ὡσαύτως. προαίρεσιν δὲ τί ἐμποδίζειν πέφυκεν; ἀπροαίρετον οὐδέν, αὐτὴ δʼ ἑαυτὴν διαστραφεῖσα. διὰ τοῦτο κακία μόνη αὕτη γίνεται ἢ ἀρετὴ μόνη.

[¶38] Since, then, the Will is such a faculty, and placed in authority over all the rest, suppose it to come forth and say to us that the body is of all things the most excellent!

> Greek: εἶτα τηλικαύτη δύναμις οὖσα καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτεταγμένη παρελθοῦσα ἡμῖν λεγέτω κράτιστον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν σάρκα. οὐδὲ εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ σὰρξ ἑαυτὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι κράτιστον, ἠνέσχετο ἄν τις αὐτῆς.

[¶39] If even the body itself pronounced itself to be the most excellent, it could not be borne. But now, what is it, Epicurus, that pronounces all this? What was it that composed volumes concerning “the End,” “the Nature of things,” “the Rule;” that assumed a philosophic beard;

> Greek: νῦν δὲ τί ἐστιν, Ἐπίκουρε, τὸ ταῦτα ἀποφαινόμενον; τὸ περὶ Τέλους συγγεγραφός, τὸ τὰ[ς] Φυσικά[ς], τὸ περὶ Κανόνος; τὸ τὸν πώγωνα καθεικός; τὸ γράφον, ὅτε ἀπέθνῃσκεν, ὅτι τὴν τελευταίαν ἄγοντες ἅμα καὶ μακαρίαν ἡμέραν;

[¶40] that as it was dying wrote that it was “then spending its last and happiest day”? Was this the body, or was it the faculty of Will?

> Greek: ἡ σὰρξ ἢ ἡ προαίρεσις; εἶτα τούτου τι κρεῖσσον ἔχειν ὁμολογεῖς καὶ οὐ μαίνῃ; οὕτως τυφλὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ κωφὸς εἶ;

[¶41] And can you, then, without madness, admit anything to be superior to this? Are you in reality so deaf and blind? What, then; does any one dishonor the other faculties? Heaven forbid! Does any one assert that there is no use or excellence in the faculty of sight?

> Greek: τί οὖν; ἀτιμάζει τις τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις; μὴ γένοιτο. λέγει τις μηδεμίαν εἶναι χρείαν ἢ προαγωγὴν … τῆς προαιρετικῆς δυνάμεως; μὴ γένοιτο. ἀνόητον, ἀσεβές, ἀχάριστον πρὸς τὸν θεόν. ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδίδωσιν.

[¶42] Heaven forbid! It would be stupid, impious, and ungrateful to God. But we render to each its due. There is some use in an ass, though not so much as in an ox; and in a dog, though not so much as in a servant;

> Greek: ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ ὄνου χρεία, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡλίκη βοός· ἔστι καὶ κυνός, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡλίκη οἰκέτου· ἔστι καὶ οἰκέτου, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡλίκη τῶν πολιτῶν· ἔστι καὶ τούτων, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡλίκη τῶν ἀρχόντων.

[¶43] and in a servant, though not so much as in the citizens; and in the citizens, though not so much as in the magistrates. And though some are more excellent than others, those uses which the last afford are not to be despised.

> Greek: οὐ μέντοι διὰ τὸ ἄλλα εἶναι κρείττονα καὶ ἣν παρέχει τὰ ἕτερα χρείαν ἀτιμαστέον. ἔστι τις ἀξία καὶ τῆς φραστικῆς δυνάμεως, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡλίκη τῆς προαιρετικῆς.

[¶44] The faculty of eloquence has thus its value, though not equal to that of the Will.

> Greek: ὅταν οὖν ταῦτα λέγω, μή τις οἰέσθω ὅτι ἀμελεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀξιῶ φράσεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀφθαλμῶν οὐδʼ ὤτων οὐδὲ χειρῶν οὐδὲ ποδῶν οὐδʼ ἐσθῆτος οὐδʼ ὑποδημάτων.

[¶45] When therefore I talk thus, let not any one suppose that I would have you neglect eloquence, any more than your eyes, or ears, or hands, or feet, or clothes, or shoes.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἄν μου πυνθάνῃ τί οὖν ἐστι κράτιστον τῶν ὄντων;, τί εἴπω; τὴν φραστικήν; οὐ δύναμαι· ἀλλὰ τὴν προαιρετικήν, ὅταν ὀρθὴ γένηται.

[¶46] But if you ask me what is the most excellent of things, what shall I say? I cannot say eloquence, but a right Will; for it is this which makes use of that and of all the other faculties, whether great or small. If this be set right, a bad man becomes good;

> Greek: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ κἀκείνῃ χρώμενον καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις πάσαις καὶ μικραῖς καὶ μεγάλαις δυνάμεσιν· τούτου κατορθωθέντος ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος [ἀγαθὸς] γίνεται, ἀποτευχθέντος κακὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται·

[¶47] if it be wrong, a good man becomes wicked. By this we are unfortunate or fortunate; we disapprove or approve each other.

> Greek: παρʼ ὃ ἀτυχοῦμεν, εὐτυχοῦμεν, μεμφόμεθʼ ἀλλήλους, εὐαρεστοῦμεν, ἁπλῶς ὃ λεληθὸς μὲν κακοδαιμονίαν ποιεῖται, τυχὸν δʼ ἐπιμελείας εὐδαιμονίαν.

[¶48] In a word, it is this which, neglected, forms unhappiness; and, well cultivated, happiness. But to take away the faculty of eloquence, and to say that it is in reality nothing, is not only ungrateful to those who gave it, but cowardly too.

> Greek: τὸ δʼ αἴρειν τὴν δύναμιν τῆς φραστικῆς καὶ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι μηδεμίαν ταῖς ἀληθείαις οὐ μόνον ἀχαρίστου ἐστὶ πρὸς τοὺς δεδωκότας, ἀλλὰ καὶ δειλοῦ.

[¶49] For such a person seems to me to be afraid that, if there be any such faculty, we may on occasion be compelled to respect it.

> Greek: ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος φοβεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ, μή, εἴπερ ἐστί τις δύναμις κατὰ τὸν τόπον, οὐ δυνηθῶμεν αὐτῆς καταφρονῆσαι.

[¶50] Such are they too, who deny any difference between beauty and deformity. Was it possible, then, to be affected in the same manner by seeing Thersites, as by Achilles;

> Greek: τοιοῦτοί εἰσι καὶ οἱ λέγοντες μηδεμίαν εἶναι παραλλαγὴν κάλλους πρὸς αἶσχος. εἶτα ὁμοίως ἦν κινηθῆναι τὸν Θερσίτην ἰδόντα καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα; ὁμοίως τὴν Ἑλένην καὶ ἣν ἔτυχε γυναῖκα;

[¶51] by Helen, as by any other woman? These also are the foolish and clownish notions of those who are ignorant of the nature of things, and afraid that whoever perceives such a difference must presently be carried away and overcome.

> Greek: καὶ ταῦτα μωρὰ καὶ ἄγροικα καὶ οὐκ εἰδότων τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν, ἀλλὰ φοβουμένων μὴ ἄν τις αἴσθηται τῆς διαφορᾶς, εὐθὺς συναρπασθεὶς καὶ ἡττηθεὶς ἀπέλθῃ.

[¶52] But the great point is to leave to each thing its own proper faculty, and then to see what the value of that faculty is; to learn what is the principal thing, and upon every occasion to follow that, and to make it the chief object of our attention;

> Greek: ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγα τοῦτο, ἀπολιπεῖν ἑκάστῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει καὶ ἀπολιπόντα ἰδεῖν τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὄντων καταμαθεῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐν παντὶ μεταδιώκειν, περὶ τοῦτο ἐσπουδακέναι, πάρεργα τἆλλα πρὸς τοῦτο πεποιημένον, οὐ μέντοι ἀμελοῦντα οὐδʼ ἐκείνων κατὰ δύναμιν.

[¶53] to consider other things as trifling in comparison with this, and yet, so far as we are able, not to neglect even these. We ought, for instance, to take care of our eyes; yet not as of the principal thing, but only on account of that which is principal;

> Greek: καὶ γὰρ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐπιμελητέον, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς τοῦ κρατίστου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων διὰ τὸ κράτιστον· ὅτι ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἄλλως ἕξει κατὰ φύσιν εἰ μὴ ἐν τούτοις εὐλογιστοῦν καὶ τὰ ἕτερα παρὰ τὰ ἕτερα αἱρούμενον.

[¶54] because that can no otherwise preserve its own nature, than by making a due estimate of the rest, and preferring some to others. What is the usual practice, then?

> Greek: τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ γινόμενον; οἷον εἴ τις ἀπιὼν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ διοδεύων πανδοκεῖον καλὸν ἀρέσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πανδοκείου καταμένοι ἐν τῷ πανδοκείῳ.

[¶55] That of a traveller who, returning into his own country, and meeting on the way with a good inn, being pleased with the inn, should remain there. Have you forgotten your intention, man?

> Greek: ἄνθρωπε, ἐπελάθου σου τῆς προθέσεως· οὐκ εἰς τοῦτο ὥδευες, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου. ἀλλὰ κομψὸν τοῦτο. πόσα δʼ ἄλλα πανδοκεῖα κομψά, πόσοι δὲ λειμῶνες· ἁπλῶς ὡς δίοδος.

[¶56] You were not travelling to this place, but only through it. “But this is a fine place.” And how many other fine inns are there, and how many pleasant fields, yet they are simply as a means of passage.

> Greek: τὸ δὲ προκείμενον ἐκεῖνο· εἰς τὴν πατρίδα ἐπανελθεῖν, τοὺς οἰκείους ἀπαλλάξαι δέους, αὐτὸν τὰ τοῦ πολίτου ποιεῖν, γῆμαι, παιδοποιεῖσθαι, ἄρξαι τὰς νομιζομένας ἀρχάς.

[¶57] What is the real business? To return to your country; to relieve the anxieties of your family; to perform the duties of a citizen; to marry, have children, and go through the public offices.

> Greek: οὐ γὰρ τοὺς κομψοτέρους ἡμῖν τόπους ἐκλεξόμενος ἐλήλυθας, ἀλλʼ ἐν οἷς ἐγένου καὶ ὧν κατατέταξαι πολίτης, ἐν τούτοις ἀναστραφησόμενος. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐνταῦθά ἐστι τὸ γινόμενον.

[¶58] For you did not travel in order to choose the finest places; but to return, to live in that where you were born, and of which you are appointed a citizen. Such is the present case. Because, by speech and such instruction, we are to perfect our education and purify our own will and rectify that faculty which deals with things as they appear;

> Greek: ἐπεὶ διὰ λόγου καὶ τοιαύτης παραδόσεως ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον δεῖ καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἐκκαθᾶραι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν χρηστικὴν τῶν φαντασιῶν ὀρθὴν κατασκευάσαι, ἀνάγκη δὲ τὴν παράδοσιν γίνεσθαι διά τινων θεωρημάτων καὶ διὰ λέξεως ποιᾶς καὶ μετά τινος ποικιλίας καὶ δριμύτητος τῶν θεωρημάτων,

[¶59] and because, for the statement of theorems, a certain diction, and some variety and subtilty of discourse are needful, many, captivated by these very things,—one by diction, another by syllogisms, a third by convertible propositions, just as our traveller was by the good inn,—go no further, but sit down and waste their lives shamefully there, as if amongst the sirens.

> Greek: ὑπʼ αὐτῶν τινες τούτων ἁλισκόμενοι καταμένουσιν αὐτοῦ, ὁ μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως, ὁ δʼ ὑπὸ συλλογισμῶν, ὁ δʼ ὑπὸ μεταπιπτόντων, ὁ δʼ ὑπʼ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου πανδοκείου, καὶ προσμείναντες κατασήπονται ὡς παρὰ ταῖς Σειρῆσιν.

[¶60] Your business, man, was to prepare yourself for such use of the semblances of things as nature demands; not to fail in what you seek, or incur what you shun; never to be disappointed or unfortunate, but free, unrestrained, uncompelled; conformed to the Divine Administration, obedient to that; finding fault with nothing, but able to say, from your whole soul, the verses which begin,
Conduct me, Zeus;

> Greek: ἄνθρωπε, τὸ προκείμενον ἦν σοι κατασκευάσαι σαυτὸν χρηστικὸν ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις κατὰ φύσιν, ἐν ὀρέξει ἀναπότευκτον, ἐν δʼ ἐκκλίσει ἀπερίπτωτον, μηδέποτʼ ἀτυχοῦντα, μηδέποτε δυστυχοῦντα, ἐλεύθερον, ἀκώλυτον, ἀνανάγκαστον, συναρμόζοντα τῇ τοῦ Διὸς διοικήσει, ταύτῃ πειθόμενον, ταύτῃ εὐαρεστοῦντα, μηδένα μεμφόμενον, μηδένʼ αἰτιώμενον, δυνάμενον εἰπεῖν τούτους τοὺς στίχους ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς ἄγου δέ μʼ, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γʼ ἡ Πεπρωμένη.

[¶61] and thou, O Destiny. While you have such a business before you, will you be so pleased with a pretty form of expression, or a few theorems, as to choose to stay and live with them, forgetful of your home, and say, “They are fine things!”

> Greek: εἶτα τοῦτο τὸ προκείμενον ἔχων ἀρέσαντός σοι λεξειδίου, ἀρεσάντων θεωρημάτων τινῶν αὐτοῦ καταμένεις καὶ κατοικεῖν προαιρῇ ἐπιλαθόμενος τῶν ἐν οἴκῳ καὶ λέγεις ταῦτα κομψά ἐστιν; τίς γὰρ λέγει μὴ εἶναι αὐτὰ κομψά;

[¶62] Why, who says they are not fine things? But only as a means; as an inn. For what hinders one speaking like Demosthenes from being miserable? What hinders a logician equal to Chrysippus from being wretched, sorrowful, envious, vexed, unhappy?

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ὡς δίοδον, ὡς πανδοκεῖα. τί γὰρ κωλύει φράζοντα ὡς Δημοσθένης ἀτυχεῖν; τί δὲ κωλύει συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύοντα ὡς Χρύσιππος ἄθλιον εἶναι, πενθεῖν, φθονεῖν, ἁπλῶς ταράσσεσθαι, κακοδαιμονεῖν;

[¶63] Nothing. You see, then, that these are merely unimportant inns, and what concerns you is quite another thing.

> Greek: οὐδὲ ἕν. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι πανδοκεῖα ἦν ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ἄξια, τὸ δὲ προκείμενον ἄλλο ἦν.

[¶64] When I talk thus to some, they suppose that I am setting aside all care about eloquence and about theorems; but I do not object to that, only the dwelling on these things incessantly, and placing our hopes there.

> Greek: ταῦτα ὅταν λέγω πρός τινας, οἴονταί με καταβάλλειν τὴν περὶ τὸ λέγειν ἐπιμέλειαν ἢ τὴν περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα. ἐγὼ δʼ οὐ ταύτην καταβάλλω, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ ταῦτʼ ἀκαταληκτικῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τίθεσθαι τὰς αὑτῶν ἐλπίδας.

[¶65] If any one, by maintaining this, hurts his hearers, place me amongst those hurtful people; for I cannot, when I see one thing to be the principal and most excellent, call another so to please you.

> Greek: εἴ τις τοῦτο παριστὰς βλάπτει τοὺς ἀκούοντας, κἀμὲ τίθεσθε ἕνα τῶν βλαπτόντων. οὐ δύναμαι δʼ ἄλλο βλέπων τὸ κράτιστον καὶ τὸ κυριώτατον ἄλλο λέγειν εἶναι, ἵνʼ ὑμῖν χαρίσωμαι.

[¶66] 24. When a certain person said to him, “I have often come to you with a desire of hearing you, and you have never given me any answer; but now, if possible, I entreat you to say something to me,”—Do you think, replied Epictetus, that as in other things, so in speaking, there is an art by which he who understands it speaks skilfully, and he who does not unskilfully? “I do think so.” He, then, who by speaking both benefits himself, and is able to benefit others, must speak skilfully; but he who injures and is injured, must be unskilful in this art. For you may find some speakers injured, and others benefited. And are all hearers benefited by what they hear? Or will you find some benefited, and some hurt? “Both.” Then those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear unskilfully, hurt. “Granted.” Is there any art of hearing, then, as well as of speaking? “It seems so.” If you please, consider it thus. To whom think you that the practice of music belongs? “To a musician.” To whom the proper formation of a statue? “To a sculptor.” And do you not imagine some art necessary even to view a statue skilfully? “I do.” If, therefore, to speak properly belongs to one who is skilful, do you not see that to hear profitably belongs likewise to one who is skilful? For the present, however, if you please, let us say no more of doing things perfectly and profitably, since we are both far enough from anything of that kind; but this seems to be universally confessed, that he who would hear philosophers needs some kind of exercise in hearing. Is it not so? Tell me, then, on what I shall speak to you. On what subject are you able to hear me? “On good and evil.” The good and evil of what,—of a horse? “No.” Of an ox? “No.” What, then; of a man? “Yes.” Do we know, then, what man is; what is his nature, what our idea of him, and how far our ears are open in this respect to him? Nay, do you understand what Nature is; or are you able in any degree to comprehend me when I come to say, “But I must use demonstration to you”? How should you? Do you comprehend what demonstration is, or how a thing is demonstrated, or by what methods; or what resembles a demonstration, and yet is not a demonstration? Do you know what true or false is; what is consequent upon anything, and what contradictory; suitable, or dissonant? But I must excite you to study philosophy. How shall I show you that contradiction among the generality of mankind, by which they differ concerning good and evil, profitable and unprofitable, when you know not what contradiction means? Show me, then, what I shall gain by discoursing with you? Excite an inclination in me, as a proper pasture excites an inclination to eating, in a sheep; for if you offer him a stone or a piece of bread, he will not be excited. Thus we too have certain natural inclinations to speaking, when the hearer appears to be somebody, when he gives us encouragement; but if he sits by like a stone or a tuft of grass, how can he excite any desire in a man? Does a vine say to an husbandman, “Take care of me”? No; but invites him to take care of it, by showing him that, if he does, it will reward him for his care. Who is there, whom bright and agreeable children do not attract to play, and creep, and prattle with them? But who was ever taken with an inclination to divert himself or bray with an ass; for be the creature ever so little, it is still a little ass. “Why then do you say nothing to me?” I have only this to say to you; that whoever is utterly ignorant what he is and wherefore he was born, and in what kind of a universe and in what society; what things are good and what evil, what fair and what base; who understands neither discourse nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what is false, nor is able to distinguish between them; such a one will neither exert his desires, nor aversions, nor pursuits conformably to Nature; he will neither aim, nor assent, nor deny, nor suspend his judgment conformably to Nature; but will wander up and down, entirely deaf and blind, supposing himself to be somebody, while he is nobody. Is there anything new in all this? Is not this ignorance the cause of all the errors that have happened, from the very origin of mankind? Why did Agamemnon and Achilles differ? Was it not for want of knowing what is advantageous, what disadvantageous? Does not one of them say it is advantageous to restore Chryseis to her father; the other, that it is not? Does not one say that he ought to take away the prize of the other; the other, that he ought not? Did they not by these means forget who they were, and for what purpose they had come there? Why, what did you come for, man,—to win mistresses, or to fight? “To fight.” With whom,—Trojans or Greeks? “With the Trojans.” Leaving Hector, then, do you draw your sword upon your own king? And do you, good sir, forgetting the duties of a king,—
Intrusted with a nation and its cares,
go to squabbling about a girl with the bravest of your allies, whom you ought by every method to conciliate and preserve? And will you be inferior to a subtle priest who pays his court anxiously to you fine gladiators? You see the effects produced by ignorance of what is truly advantageous. “But I am rich, as well as other people.” What, richer than Agamemnon? “But I am handsome too.” What, handsomer than Achilles? “But I have fine hair too.” Had not Achilles finer and brighter? Yet he never combed it exquisitely, nor curled it. “But I am strong too.” Can you lift such a stone, then, as Hector or Ajax? “But I am of a noble family too.” Is your mother a goddess, or your father descended from Zeus? And what good did all this do Achilles, when he sat crying for a girl? “But I am an orator.” And was not he? Do you not see how he treated the most eloquent of the Greeks,—Odysseus and Phoenix,—how he struck them dumb? This is all I have to say to you; and even this against my inclination. “Why so?” Because you have not excited me to it. For what can I see in you to excite me, as spirited horses their riders? Your person? That you disfigure. Your dress? That is effeminate. Your behavior. Your look? Absolutely nothing. When you would hear a philosopher, do not say to him, “You tell me nothing;” but only show yourself fit and worthy to hear; and you will find how you will move him to speak.

> Greek: 24. εἰπόντος αὐτῷ τινος ὅτι Πολλάκις ἐπιθυμῶν σου ἀκοῦσαι ἦλθον πρὸς σὲ καὶ οὐδέποτέ μοι ἀπεκρίνω· καὶ νῦν, εἰ δυνατόν, παρακαλῶ σε εἰπεῖν τί μοι, Δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, καθάπερ ἄλλου τινὸς εἶναι τέχνη οὕτως δὲ καὶ τοῦ λέγειν, ἣν ὁ μὲν ἔχων ἐμπείρως ἐρεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔχων ἀπείρως; — δοκεῖ. — οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν διὰ τοῦ λέγειν αὐτός τε ὠφελούμενος καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τε ὢν ὠφελεῖν οὗτος ἐμπείρως ἂν λέγοι, ὁ δὲ βλαπτόμενος μᾶλλον καὶ βλάπτων οὗτος ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη τῆς τέχνης ταύτης τῆς τοῦ λέγειν; εὕροις ἂν τοὺς μὲν βλαπτομένους τοὺς δʼ ὠφελουμένους. οἱ δʼ ἀκούοντες πάντες ὠφελοῦνται ἀφʼ ὧν ἀκούουσιν ἢ καὶ τούτων εὕροις ἂν τοὺς μὲν ὠφελουμένους τοὺς δὲ βλαπτομένους; — καὶ τούτων, ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὅσοι μὲν ἐμπείρως ἀκούουσιν ὠφελοῦνται, ὅσοι δʼ ἀπείρως βλάπτονται; — ὡμολόγει. — ἔστιν ἄρα τις ἐμπειρία καθάπερ τοῦ λέγειν οὕτως καὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν; — ἔοικεν. — εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ οὕτως σκέψαι αὐτό. τὸ μουσικῶς ἅψασθαι τίνος σοι δοκεῖ; — μουσικοῦ. — τί δέ; τὸν ἀνδριάντα ὡς δεῖ κατασκευάσαι τίνος σοι φαίνεται; — ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ. — τὸ ἰδεῖν ἐμπείρως οὐδεμιᾶς σοι προσδεῖσθαι φαίνεται τέχνης; — προσδεῖται καὶ τοῦτο. — οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ τοῦ ἐμπείρου ἐστίν, ὁρᾷς ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν ὠφελίμως τοῦ ἐμπείρου ἐστίν; καὶ τὸ μὲν τελείως καὶ ὠφελίμως, εἰ βούλει, πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀφῶμεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ μακράν ἐσμεν ἀμφότεροι παντὸς τοῦ τοιούτου· ἐκεῖνο δὲ πᾶς ἄν τις ὁμολογῆσαί μοι δοκεῖ, ὅτι ποσῆς γέ τινος τριβῆς περὶ τὸ ἀκούειν προσδεῖται ὁ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀκουσόμενος. ἢ γὰρ οὔ; περὶ τίνος οὖν λέγω πρὸς σέ; δεῖξόν μοι. περὶ τίνος ἀκοῦσαι δύνασαι; περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν; τίνος; ἆρά γε ἵππου; — οὔ. — ἀλλὰ βοός; — οὔ. — τί οὖν; ἀνθρώπου; — ναί. — οἴδαμεν οὖν, τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ, τίς ἡ ἔννοια; ἔχομεν καὶ κατὰ ποσὸν περὶ τοῦτο τὰ ὦτα τετρημένα; ἀλλὰ φύσις τί ἐστιν ἐννοεῖς ἢ δύνασαι καὶ κατὰ ποσὸν ἀκολουθῆσαί μοι λέγοντι; ἀλλʼ ἀποδείξει χρήσομαι πρὸς σέ; πῶς; παρακολουθεῖς γὰρ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, τί ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ πῶς τι ἀποδείκνυται ἢ διὰ τίνων; ἢ τίνα ὅμοια μὲν ἀποδείξει ἐστίν, ἀπόδειξις δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν; τί γάρ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς οἶδας ἢ τί ἐστι ψεῦδος; τί τίνι ἀκολουθεῖ, τί τίνι μάχεται ἢ ἀνομολογούμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀσύμφωνον; ἀλλὰ κινῶ σε πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν; πῶς παραδεικνύω σοι τὴν μάχην τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καθʼ ἣν διαφέρονται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων, αὐτὸ τοῦτο τί ἐστι μάχη οὐκ εἰδότι; δεῖξον οὖν μοι, τί περανῶ διαλεγόμενός σοι. κίνησόν μοι προθυμίαν. ὡς ἡ κατάλληλος πόα τῷ προβάτῳ φανεῖσα προθυμίαν αὐτῷ κινεῖ πρὸς τὸ φαγεῖν, ἂν δὲ λίθον ἢ ἄρτον παραθῇς, οὐ κινηθήσεται, οὕτως εἰσί τινες ἡμῖν φυσικαὶ προθυμίαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν, ὅταν ὁ ἀκουσόμενος φανῇ τις, ὅταν αὐτὸς ἐρεθίσῃ. ἂν δʼ ὡς λίθος ἢ χόρτος ᾖ παρακείμενος, πῶς δύναται ἀνθρώπῳ ὄρεξιν κινῆσαι; ἡ ἄμπελος μή τι λέγει τῷ γεωργῷ ἐπιμελοῦ μου; ἀλλʼ αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτῆς ἐμφαίνουσα, ὅτι ἐπιμεληθέντι λυσιτελήσει αὐτῷ, ἐκκαλεῖται πρὸς τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. τὰ παιδία τὰ πιθανὰ καὶ δριμέα τίνα οὐκ ἐκκαλεῖται πρὸς τὸ συμπαίζειν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνέρπειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμψελλίζειν; ὄνῳ δὲ τίς προθυμεῖται συμπαίζειν ἢ συνογκᾶσθαι; καὶ γὰρ εἰ μικρόν, ὅμως ὀνάριόν ἐστιν. τί οὖν μοι οὐδὲν λέγεις;— ἐκεῖνο μόνον ἔχω σοι εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὁ ἀγνοῶν, τίς ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ τί γέγονεν καὶ ἐν τίνι τούτῳ τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ μετὰ τίνων κοινωνῶν καὶ τίνα τὰ ἀγαθά ἐστι καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, καὶ μήτε λόγῳ παρακολουθῶν μήτʼ ἀποδείξει, μήτε τί ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ τί ψεῦδος, μήτε διακρῖναι ταῦτα δυνάμενος οὔτʼ ὀρέξεται κατὰ φύσιν οὔτʼ ἐκκλινεῖ οὔθʼ ὁρμήσει οὔτʼ ἐπιβαλεῖται, οὐ συγκαταθήσεται, οὐκ ἀνανεύσει, οὐκ ἐφέξει, τὸ σύνολον. κωφ[λ]ὸς καὶ τυφλὸς περιελεύσεται δοκῶν μέν τις εἶναι, ὢν δʼ οὐδείς. νῦν γὰρ πρῶτον τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει; οὐχὶ ἐξ οὗ γένος ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, ἐξ ἐκείνου πάντα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀτυχήματα παρὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιαν γεγένηται; Ἀγαμέμνων καὶ Ἀχιλλεὺς διὰ τί ἀλλήλοις διεφέροντο; οὐχὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, τίνα ἐστὶ συμφέροντα καὶ ἀσύμφορα; οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν λέγει, ὅτι συμφέρει ἀποδοῦναι τῷ πατρὶ τὴν Χρυσηίδα, ὁ δὲ λέγει, ὅτι οὐ συμφέρει; οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν λέγει, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν λαβεῖν τὸ ἄλλου γέρας, ὁ δέ, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ; οὐχὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπελάθοντο καὶ τίνες ἦσαν καὶ ἐπὶ τί ἐληλύθεσαν; ἔα, ἄνθρωπε, ἐπὶ τί ἐλήλυθας; ἐρωμένας κτησόμενος ἢ πολεμήσων; πολεμήσων. τίσι; τοῖς Τρωσὶν ἢ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν; τοῖς Τρωσίν. ἀφεὶς οὖν τὸν Ἕκτορα ἐπὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν σαυτοῦ σπᾷς τὸ ξίφος; σὺ δʼ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀφεὶς τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἔργα, ᾧ λαοί τʼ ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν, περὶ κορασιδίου διαπυκτεύεις τῷ πολεμικωτάτῳ τῶν συμμάχων, ὃν δεῖ παντὶ τρόπῳ περιέπειν καὶ φυλάττειν; καὶ χείρων γίνῃ κομψοῦ ἀρχιερέως, ὃς τοὺς καλοὺς μονομάχους διὰ πάσης ἐπιμελείας ἔχει; ὁρᾷς, οἷα ποιεῖ ἄγνοια περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων; ἀλλὰ κἀγὼ πλούσιός εἰμι. μή τι οὖν τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος πλουσιώτερος; ἀλλὰ καὶ καλός εἰμι. μή τι οὖν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως καλλίων; ἀλλὰ καὶ κόμιον κομψὸν ἔχω. ὁ δʼ Ἀχιλλεὺς οὐ κάλλιον καὶ ξανθόν; καὶ οὐκ ἐκτένιζεν αὐτὸ κομψῶς οὐδʼ ἔπλασσεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰσχυρός εἰμι. μή τι οὖν δύνασαι λίθον ἆραι ἡλίκον ὁ Ἕκτωρ ἢ ὁ Αἴας; ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐγενής. μή τι ἐκ θεᾶς μητρός, μή τι πατρὸς ἐγγόνου Διός; τί οὖν ἐκεῖνον ὠφελεῖ ταῦτα, ὅταν καθήμενος κλαίῃ διὰ τὸ κορασίδιον; ἀλλὰ ῥήτωρ εἰμί. ἐκεῖνος δʼ οὐκ ἦν; οὐ βλέπεις πῶς κέχρηται τοῖς δεινοτάτοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων περὶ λόγους Ὀδυσσεῖ καὶ Φοίνικι, πῶς αὐτοὺς ἀστόμους πεποίηκε; ταῦτά σοι μόνα ἔχω εἰπεῖν καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτα προθύμως. — διὰ τί; — ὅτι με οὐκ ἠρέθισας. εἰς τί γὰρ ἀπιδὼν ἐρεθισθῶ ὡς οἱ ἱππικοὶ περὶ τοὺς ἵππους τοὺς εὐφυεῖς; εἰς τὸ σωμάτιον; αἰσχρῶς αὐτὸ πλάσσεις. εἰς τὴν ἐσθῆτα; καὶ ταύτην τρυφερὰν ἔχεις. εἰς σχῆμα, εἰς βλέμμα; εἰς οὐδέν. ὅταν ἀκοῦσαι θέλῃς φιλοσόφου, μὴ λέγε αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐδέν μοι λέγεις, ἀλλὰ μόνον δείκνυε σαυτὸν τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὄψει, πῶς κινήσεις τὸν λέγοντα.

[¶67] 25. When one of the company said to him, “Convince me that logic is necessary,”—Would you have me, he said, demonstrate it to you? “Yes.” Then I must use a demonstrative form of argument. “Granted.” And how will you know, then, whether I argue sophistically? On this, the man being silent, You see, says he, that even by your own confession, logic is necessary; since without it, you cannot even learn whether it be necessary or not.

> Greek: 25. τῶν παρόντων δέ τινος εἰπόντος Πεῖσόν με, ὅτι τὰ λογικὰ χρήσιμά ἐστιν, Θέλεις, ἔφη, ἀποδείξω σοι τοῦτο; — ναί. — οὐκοῦν λόγον μʼ ἀποδεικτικὸν διαλεχθῆναι δεῖ; — ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ Πόθεν οὖν εἴσῃ, ἄν σε σοφίσωμαι; — σιωπήσαντος δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου Ὁρᾷς, ἔφη, πῶς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς ὅτι ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖά ἐστιν, εἰ χωρὶς αὐτῶν οὐδʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δύνασαι μαθεῖν, πότερον ἀναγκαῖα ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖά ἐστιν.

[¶68] 26. Every error implies a contradiction; for since he who errs does not wish to err, but to be in the right, it is evident that he acts contrary to his wish. What does a thief desire to attain? His own interest. If, then, thieving be really against his interest, he acts contrary to his own desire. Now, every rational soul is naturally averse to self-contradiction; but so long as any one is ignorant that it is a contradiction, nothing restrains him from acting contradictorily; but whenever he discovers it, he must as necessarily renounce and avoid it, as any one must dissent from a falsehood whenever he perceives it to be a falsehood; only while this does not appear, he assents to it as to a truth. He, then, is gifted in speech, and excels at once in exhortation and conviction, who can disclose to each man the contradiction by which he errs, and prove clearly to him that what he would he doth not, and what he would not, that he doth. For, if that be shown, he will depart from it of his own accord; but, till you have shown it, be not surprised that he remains where he is; for he proceeds on the semblance of acting rightly. Hence Socrates, relying on this faculty, used to say. “It is not my custom to cite any other witness for my assertions; but I am always contented with my opponent. I call and summon him for my witness; and his single evidence serves instead of all others.” For he knew that if a rational soul be moved by anything, the scale must turn whether it will or no. Show the governing faculty of Reason a contradiction, and it will renounce it; but till you have shown it, rather blame yourself than him who remains unconvinced.

> Greek: 26. πᾶν ἁμάρτημα μάχην περιέχει. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ ἁμαρτάνων οὐ θέλει ἁμαρτάνειν, ἀλλὰ κατορθῶσαι, δῆλον ὅτι ὃ μὲν θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ. τί γὰρ ὁ κλέπτης θέλει πρᾶξαι; τὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρον. οὐκ οὖν, εἰ ἀσύμφορόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὸ κλέπτειν, ὃ μὲν θέλει ποιεῖ. πᾶσα δὲ ψυχὴ λογικὴ φύσει διαβέβληται πρὸς μάχην· καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἂν μὴ παρακολουθῇ τούτῳ, ὅτι ἐν μάχῃ ἐστίν, οὐδὲν κωλύεται τὰ μαχόμενα ποιεῖν· παρακολουθήσαντα δὲ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἀποστῆναι τῆς μάχης καὶ φυγεῖν οὕτως ὡς καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεύδους ἀνανεῦσαι πικρὰ ἀνάγκη τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ, ὅτι ψεῦδός ἐστιν· μέχρι δὲ τοῦτο μὴ φαντάζηται, ὡς ἀληθεῖ ἐπινεύει αὐτῷ. δεινὸς οὖν ἐν λόγῳ, ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς καὶ προτρεπτικὸς καὶ ἐλεγκτικὸς οὗτος ὁ δυνάμενος ἑκάστῳ παραδεῖξαι τὴν μάχην, καθʼ ἣν ἁμαρτάνει, καὶ σαφῶς παραστῆσαι, πῶς ὃ θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ καὶ ὃ μὴ θέλει ποιεῖ. ἂν γὰρ τοῦτο δείξῃ τις, αὐτὸς ἀφʼ αὑτοῦ ἀναποχωρήσει. μέχρι δὲ μὴ δεικνύῃς, μὴ θαύμαζε, εἰ ἐπιμένει· κατορθώματος γὰρ φαντασίαν λαμβάνων ποιεῖ αὐτό. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ Σωκράτης ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει πεποιθὼς ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἐγὼ ἄλλον μὲν οὐδένα εἴωθα παρέχειν μάρτυρα ὧν λέγω, ἀρκοῦμαι δʼ ἀεὶ τῷ προσδιαλεγομένῳ καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἐπιψηφίζω καὶ καλῶ μάρτυρα καὶ εἷς ὢν οὗτος ἀρκεῖ μοι ἀντὶ πάντων. ᾔδει γάρ, ὑπὸ τίνος λογικὴ ψυχὴ κινεῖται, ζυγῷ ἐπιρρέψει, ἄν τε θέλῃς ἄν τε μή. λογικῷ ἡγεμονικῷ δεῖξον μάχην καὶ ἀποστήσεται· ἂν δὲ μὴ δεικνύῃς, αὐτὸς σαυτῷ μᾶλλον ἐγκάλει ἢ τῷ μὴ πειθομένῳ.

## 13. Book III · chapters 1–5

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/13/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/13/#p-N

[¶0] 1. A certain young rhetorician coming to him with his hair too elaborately ornamented, and his dress very fine, Tell me, said Epictetus, whether you do not think some horses and dogs beautiful and so of all other animals. “I do.” Are some men, then, likewise beautiful, and others deformed?

> Greek: 1. εἰσιόντος τινὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν νεανίσκου ῥητορικοῦ περιεργότερον ἡρμοσμένου τὴν κόμην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην περιβολὴν κατακοσμοῦντος Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, εἰ οὐ δοκοῦσίν σοι κύνες τʼ εἶναι καλοί τινες καὶ ἵπποι καὶ οὕτως τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἕκαστον;

[¶1] “Certainly.” Do we pronounce all these beautiful the same way, then, or each in some way peculiar to itself? You will judge of it by this;

> Greek: — δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ μὲν καλοί, οἱ δʼ αἰσχροί; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — πότερον οὖν κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἕκαστα τούτων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει καλὰ προσαγορεύομεν ἢ ἰδίως ἕκαστον; οὕτως δʼ ὄψει αὐτό.

[¶2] since we see a dog naturally formed for one thing, a horse for another, and a nightingale, for instance, for another, therefore, in general, it will be correct to pronounce each of them beautiful so far as it is developed suitably to its own nature; but since the nature of each is different, I think each of them must be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so? “Agreed.” Then what makes a dog beautiful makes a horse deformed, and what makes a horse beautiful makes a dog deformed, if their natures are different.

> Greek: ἐπειδὴ πρὸς ἄλλο μὲν ὁρῶμεν κύνα πεφυκότα, πρὸς ἄλλο[ν] δʼ ἵππον, πρὸς ἄλλο δʼ εἰ οὕτως τύχοι ἀηδόνα, καθόλου μὲν οὐκ ἀτόπως ἀποφήναιτʼ ἄν τις ἕκαστον τηνικαῦτα καλὸν εἶναι, ὁπότε κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν κράτιστʼ ἔχοι· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ φύσις ἑκάστου διάφορός ἐστιν, διαφόρως εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν καλόν· ἢ γὰρ οὔ;

[¶3] “So it seems.” For, I suppose, what makes a good Pancratiast makes no good wrestler, and a very ridiculous racer;

> Greek: — ὡμολόγει. — οὐκ οὖν ὅπερ κύνα ποιεῖ καλόν, τοῦτο ἵππον αἰσχρόν, ὅπερ δʼ ἵππον καλόν, τοῦτο κύνα αἰσχρόν, εἴ γε διάφοροι αἱ φύσεις εἰσὶν αὐτῶν;

[¶4] and the very same person who appears well as a Pentathlete might make a very ill figure in wrestling. “Very true.” What, then, makes a man beautiful? Is it on the same principle that a dog or a horse is beautiful?

> Greek: — ἔοικεν. — καὶ γὰρ τὸ παγκρατιαστὴν οἶμαι ποιοῦν καλὸν τοῦτο παλαιστὴν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ, δρομέα δὲ καὶ γελοιότατον· καὶ ὁ πρὸς πενταθλίαν καλὸς ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος πρὸς πάλην αἴσχιστος; — οὕτως, ἔφη.

[¶5] “The same.” What is it, then, that makes a dog beautiful? “That excellence which belongs to a dog.” What a horse? “The excellence of a horse.” What a man? Must it not be the excellence belonging to a man? If, then, you would appear beautiful, young man, strive for human excellence.

> Greek: — τί οὖν ποιεῖ ἄνθρωπον καλὸν ἢ ὅπερ τῷ γένει καὶ κύνα καὶ ἵππον; — τοῦτο, ἔφη. — τί οὖν ποιεῖ κύνα καλόν; ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ κυνὸς παροῦσα. τί ἵππον; ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἵππου παροῦσα. τί οὖν ἄνθρωπον; μή ποθʼ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἀνθρώπου παροῦσα;

[¶6] “What is that?” Consider whom you praise, when unbiassed by partiality;

> Greek: καὶ σὺ οὖν εἰ θέλεις καλὸς εἶναι, νεανίσκε, τοῦτο ἐκπόνει, τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἀνθρωπικήν.

[¶7] is it the honest or dishonest? “The honest.” The sober or the dissolute? “The sober.” The temperate or the intemperate? “The temperate.” Then, if you make yourself such a character, you know that you will make yourself beautiful; but while you neglect these things, though you use every contrivance to appear beautiful, you must necessarily be deformed.

> Greek: — τίς δʼ ἐστὶν αὕτη; — ὅρα, τίνας αὐτὸς ἐπαινεῖς, ὅταν δίχα πάθους τινὰς ἐπαινῇς· πότερα τοὺς δικαίους ἢ τοὺς ἀδίκους; — τοὺς δικαίους. — πότερον τοὺς σώφρονας ἢ τοὺς ἀκολάστους; — τοὺς σώφρονας. — τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς δʼ ἢ τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς; — τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς.

[¶8] I know not how to say anything further to you; for if I speak what I think, you will be vexed, and perhaps go away and return no more.

> Greek: — οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτόν τινα ποιῶν σαυτὸν ἴσθι ὅτι καλὸν ποιήσεις· μέχρις δʼ ἂν τούτων ἀμελῇς, αἰσχρόν σʼ εἶναι ἀνάγκη, κἂν πάντα μηχανᾷ ὑπὲρ τοῦ φαίνεσθαί σε καλόν.

[¶9] And if I do not speak, consider what I am doing. You come to me to be improved, and I do not improve you; and you come to me as to a philosopher, and I do not speak like a philosopher. Besides, how could it be consistent with my duty towards yourself, to pass you by as incorrigible?

> Greek: ἐντεῦθεν οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι πῶς εἴπω· ἄν τε γὰρ λέγω ἃ φρονῶ, ἀνιάσω σε καὶ ἐξελθὼν τάχα οὐδʼ εἰσελεύσῃ· ἄν τε μὴ λέγω, ὅρα οἷον ποιήσω, εἰ σὺ μὲν ἔρχῃ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὠφεληθησόμενος, ἐ[ρ]γὼ δʼ οὐκ ὠφελήσω σʼ οὐδέν, καὶ σὺ μὲν ὡς πρὸς φιλόσοφον, ἐγὼ δʼ οὐδὲν ἐρῶ σοι ὡς φιλόσοφος.

[¶10] If, hereafter, you should come to have sense, you will accuse me with reason: “What did Epictetus observe in me, that, when he saw me come to him in such a shameful condition, he overlooked it, and never said so much as a word about it?

> Greek: πῶς δὲ καὶ ὠμόν ἐστι πρὸς αὐτόν σε τὸ περιιδεῖν ἀνεπανόρθωτον ἄν ποθʼ ὕστερον φρένας σχῇς, εὐλόγως μοι ἐγκαλέσεις·

[¶11] Did he so absolutely despair of me? Was I not young? Was I not able to hear reason?

> Greek: τί εἶδεν ἐν ἐμοὶ ὁ Ἐπίκτητος, ἵνα βλέπων με τοιοῦτον εἰσερχόμενον πρὸς αὐτὸν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἔχοντα περιίδῃ καὶ μηδέποτε μηδὲ ῥῆμα εἴπῃ;

[¶12] How many young men, at that age, are guilty of many such errors! I am told of one Polemo, who, from a most dissolute youth, became totally changed.

> Greek: οὕτως μου ἀπέγνω; νέος οὐκ ἤμην; οὐκ ἤμην λόγου ἀκουστικός; πόσοι δʼ ἄλλοι νέοι ἐφʼ ἡλικίας πολλὰ τοιαῦτα διαμαρτάνουσιν;

[¶13] Suppose he did not think I should become a Polemo, he might nevertheless have set my locks to rights, he might have stripped off my bracelets and rings, he might have prevented my depilating my person. But when he saw me dressed like a—what shall I say?-he was silent.” I do not say like what;

> Greek: τινά ποτʼ ἀκούω Πολέμωνα ἐξ ἀκολαστοτάτου νεανίσκου τοσαύτην μεταβολὴν μεταβαλεῖν. ἔστω, οὐκ ᾤετό με Πολέμωνα ἔσεσθαι· τὴν μὲν κόμην ἠδύνατό μου διορθῶσαι, τὰ μὲν περιάμματά μου περιελεῖν, ψιλούμενόν με παῦσαι ἠδύνατο, ἀλλὰ βλέπων με — τίνος εἴπω; — σχῆμα ἔχοντα ἐσιώπα.

[¶14] when you come to your senses, you will say it yourself, and will know what it is, and who they are who adopt such a dress. If you should hereafter lay this to my charge, what excuse could I make? “Ay;

> Greek: ἐγὼ οὐ λέγω, τίνος ἐστὶ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦτο· σὺ δʼ αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς τόθʼ, ὅταν εἰς σαυτὸν ἔλθῃς, καὶ γνώσει, οἷόν ἐστι καὶ τίνες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι.

[¶15] but if I do speak, he will not regard me.” Why, did Laius regard Apollo Did not he go and get intoxicated, and bid farewell to the oracle? What then? Did this hinder Apollo from telling him the truth? Now, I am uncertain whether you will regard me or not;

> Greek: τοῦτό μοι ὕστερον ἂν ἐγκαλῇς, τί ἕξω ἀπολογήσασθαι; ναί· ἀλλʼ ἐρῶ καὶ οὐ πεισθήσεται. τῷ γὰρ Ἀπόλλωνι ἐπείσθη ὁ Λάιος; οὐκ ἀπελθὼν καὶ μεθυσθεὶς χαίρειν εἶπεν τῷ χρησμῷ; τί οὖν; παρὰ τοῦτο οὐκ εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀπόλλων τὰς ἀληθείας;

[¶16] but Apollo positively knew that Laius would not regard him, and yet he spoke. And why did he speak? You may as well ask, why is he Apollo; why doth he deliver oracles;

> Greek: καίτοι ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα οὔτʼ εἰ πεισθήσῃ μοι οὔτʼ εἰ μή· ἐκεῖνος δʼ ἀκριβέστατα ᾔδει, ὅτι οὐ πεισθήσεται, καὶ ὅμως εἶπεν.

[¶17] why hath he placed himself in such a post as a prophet, and the fountain of truth, to whom the inhabitants of the world should resort? Why is “know thyself” inscribed on the front of his temple, when no one heeds it? Did Socrates prevail upon all who came to him, to take care of themselves? Not upon the thousandth part;

> Greek: — διὰ τί δʼ εἶπεν; — διὰ τί δὲ Ἀπόλλων ἐστίν; διὰ τί δὲ χρησμῳδεῖ; διὰ τί δʼ εἰς ταύτην τὴν χώραν ἑαυτὸν κατατέταχεν, ὥστε μάντις εἶναι καὶ πηγὴ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔρχεσθαι τοὺς ἐκ τῆς οἰκουμένης; διὰ τί δὲ προγέγραπται τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν μηδενὸς αὐτὸ νοοῦντος;

[¶18] but being, as he himself declares, divinely appointed to such a post, he never deserted it. What said he even to his judges? “If you would acquit me, on condition that I should no longer act as I do now, I would not accept it, nor desist;

> Greek: Σωκράτης πάντας ἔπειθε τοὺς προσιό ντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἑαυτῶν; οὐδὲ τὸ χιλιοστὸν μέρος. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐπειδὴ εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου, ὥς φησιν αὐτός, κατετάχθη, μηκέτι ἐξέλιπεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς τί λέγει;

[¶19] but I will accost all I meet, whether young or old, and interrogate them in just the same manner; but particularly you, my fellow-citizens, since you are more nearly related to me.” “Are you so curious and officious, Socrates? What is it to you, how we act?” “What say you?

> Greek: ἄν μʼ ἀφῆτε, φησίν, ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἵνα μηκέτι ταῦτα πράσσω ἃ νῦν, οὐκ ἀνέξομαι οὐδʼ ἀνήσω· ἀλλὰ καὶ νέῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ τῷ ἐντυγχάνοντι προσελθὼν πεύσομαι ταῦτα ἃ καὶ νῦν πυνθάνομαι, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ὑμῶν, φησί, τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅτι ἐγγυτέρω μου γένει ἐστέ.

[¶20] While you are of the same community and the same kindred with me, will you be careless of yourself, and show yourself a bad citizen to the city, a bad kinsman to your kindred, and a bad neighbor to your neighborhood?” “Why, who are you?” Here one ought nobly to say, “am he who ought to take care of mankind.”

> Greek: οὕτως περίεργος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ πολυπράγμων; τί δέ σοι μέλει, τί ποιοῦμεν; οἷον καὶ λέγεις; κοινωνός μου ὢν καὶ συγγενὴς ἀμελεῖς σεαυτοῦ καὶ τῇ πόλει παρέχεις πολίτην κακὸν καὶ τοῖς συγγενέσι συγγενῆ καὶ τοῖς γείτοσι γείτονα.

[¶21] For it is not every little paltry heifer that dares resist the lion; but if the bull should come up, and resist him, would you say to him, “Who are you? What business is it of yours?” In every species, man, there is some one quality which by nature excels,—in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses.

> Greek: σὺ οὖν τίς εἶ; ἐνταῦθα μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὗτός εἰμι, ᾧ δεῖ μέλειν ἀνθρώπων. οὐδὲ γὰρ λέοντι τὸ τυχὸν βοίδιον τολμᾷ ἀντιστῆναι αὐτῷ· ἂν δʼ ὁ ταῦρος προσελθὼν ἀνθίστηται, λέγε αὐτῷ, ἄν σοι δόξῃ[ς], σὺ δὲ τίς εἶ; καὶ τί σοὶ μέλει;

[¶22] Do not say to whatever excels, “Who are you?” If you do, it will, somehow or other, find a voice to tell you, “am like the purple thread in a garment. Do not expect me to be like the rest; nor find fault with my nature, which has distinguished me from others.” “What, then; am I such a one? How should I be?” Indeed, are you such a one as to be able to hear the truth? I wish you were.

> Greek: ἄνθρωπε, ἐν παντὶ γένει φύεταί τι ἐξαίρετον· ἐν βουσίν, ἐν κυσίν, ἐν μελίσσαις, ἐν ἵπποις. μὴ δὴ λέγε τῷ ἐξαιρέτῳ σὺ οὖν τί εἶ; εἰ δὲ μή, ἐρεῖ σοι φωνήν ποθεν λαβὸν ἐγώ εἰμι τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐν ἱματίῳ πορφύρα· μή μʼ ἀξίου ὅμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἢ τῇ φύσει μου μέμφου, ὅτι με διαφέροντα παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐποίησεν.

[¶23] But, however, since I am condemned to wear a gray beard and a cloak, and you come to me as a philosopher, I will not treat you cruelly, nor as if I despaired of you; but will ask you, Who is it, young man, whom you would render beautiful? Know, first, who you are; and then adorn yourself accordingly. You are a human being; that is, a mortal animal, capable of a rational use of things as they appear.

> Greek: τί οὖν; ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος; πόθεν; σὺ γὰρ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἀκούειν τἀληθῆ; ὤφελεν. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐπεί πως κατεκρίθην πώγωνα ἔχειν πολιὸν καὶ τρίβωνα καὶ σὺ εἰσέρχῃ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὡς πρὸς φιλόσοφον, οὐ χρήσομαί σοι ὠμῶς οὐδʼ ἀπογνωστικῶς, ἀλλʼ ἐρῶ· νεανίσκε, τίνα θέλεις καλὸν ποιεῖν; γνῶθι πρῶτον τίς εἶ καὶ οὕτως κόσμει σεαυτόν.

[¶24] And what is this rational use? A perfect conformity to Nature. What have you, then, particularly excellent? Is it the animal part? No. The mortal? No. That which is capable of the mere use of these things? No.

> Greek: ἄνθρωπος εἶ· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ θνητὸν ζῷον χρηστικὸν φαντασίαις λογικῶς. τὸ δὲ λογικῶς τί ἐστιν; φύσει ὁμολογουμένως καὶ τελέως. τί οὖν ἐξαίρετον ἔχεις; τὸ ζῷον; οὔ. τὸ θνητόν; οὔ. τὸ χρηστικὸν φαντασίαις;

[¶25] The excellence lies in the rational part. Adorn and beautify this; but leave your hair to him who formed it as he thought good.

> Greek: οὔ. τὸ λογικὸν ἔχεις ἐξαίρετον· τοῦτο κόσμει καὶ καλλώπιζε· τὴν κόμην δʼ ἄφες τῷ πλάσαντι ὡς αὐτὸς ἠθέλησεν.

[¶26] Well, what other appellations have you? Are you a man or a woman? A man. Then adorn yourself as a man, not as a woman. A woman is naturally smooth and delicate, and if hairy, is a monster, and shown among the monsters at Rome.

> Greek: ἄγε, τίνας ἄλλας ἔχεις προσηγορίας; ἀνὴρ εἶ ἢ γυνή; — ἀνήρ. — ἄνδρα οὖν καλλώπιζε, μὴ γυναῖκα. ἐκείνη φύσει λεία γέγονε καὶ τρυφερά· κἂν ἔχῃ τρίχας πολλάς, τέρας ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέρασιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ δείκνυται.

[¶27] It is the same thing in a man not to be hairy; and if he is by nature not so, he is a monster. But if he depilates himself, what shall we do with him? Where shall we show him, and how shall we advertise him? “man to be seen, who would rather be a woman.” What a scandalous show!

> Greek: τοῦτο δʼ ἐπʼ ἀνδρός ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἔχειν· κἂν μὲν φύσει μὴ ἔχῃ, τέρας ἐστίν, ἂν δʼ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἐκκόπτῃ καὶ ἀποτίλλῃ, τί αὐτὸν ποιήσωμεν; ποῦ αὐτὸν δείξωμεν καὶ τί προγράψωμεν; δείξω ὑμῖν ἄνδρα, ὃς θέλει μᾶλλον γυνὴ εἶναι ἢ ἀνήρ.

[¶28] Who would not wonder at such an advertisement? I believe, indeed, that these very persons themselves would; not apprehending that it is the very thing of which they are guilty. Of what have you to accuse your nature, sir, that it has made you a man?

> Greek: ὦ δεινοῦ θεάματος· οὐδεὶς οὐχὶ θαυμάσει τὴν προγραφήν· νὴ τὸν Δία, οἶμαι ὅτι αὐτοὶ οἱ τιλλόμενοι οὐ παρακολουθοῦντες, ὅτι τοῦτʼ αὐτό ἐστιν, ὃ ποιοῦσιν, ποιοῦσιν. ἄνθρωπε, τί ἔχεις ἐγκαλέσαι σου τῇ φύσει;

[¶29] Why, were all to be born women, then? In that case what would have been the use of your finery? For whom would you have made yourself fine, if all were women?

> Greek: ὅτι σε ἄνδρα ἐγέννησεν; τί οὖν; πάσας ἔδει γυναῖκας γεννῆσαι; καὶ τί ἂν ὄφελος ἦν σοι τοῦ κοσμεῖσθαι; τίνι ἂν ἐκοσμοῦ, εἰ πάντες ἦσαν γυναῖκες;

[¶30] But the whole affair displeases you. Go to work upon the whole, then. Remove your manhood itself and make yourself a woman entirely, that we may be no longer deceived, nor you be half man, half woman. To whom would you be agreeable,—to the women? Be agreeable to them as a man.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀρέσκει σοι τὸ πραγμάτιον· ὅλον διʼ ὅλων αὐτὸ ποίησον· ἆρον — τί ποτʼ ἐκεῖνο; — τὸ αἴτιον τῶν τριχῶν· ποίησον εἰς ἅπαντα σαυτὸν γυναῖκα, ἵνα μὴ πλανώμεθα, μὴ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ ἀνδρός, τὸ δʼ ἥμισυ γυναικός.

[¶31] “Ay; but they are pleased with fops.” Go hang yourself. Suppose they were pleased with every debauchery, would you consent? Is this your business in life?

> Greek: τίνι θέλεις ἀρέσαι; τοῖς γυναικαρίοις; ὡς ἀνὴρ αὐτοῖς ἄρεσον. ναί· ἀλλὰ τοῖς λείοις χαίρουσιν. οὐκ ἀπάγξῃ; καὶ εἰ τοῖς κιναίδοις ἔχαιρον, ἐγένου ἂν κίναιδος;

[¶32] Were you born to please dissolute women?

> Greek: τοῦτό σοι τὸ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐγεννήθης, ἵνα σοι αἱ γυναῖκες αἱ ἀκόλαστοι χαίρωσιν;

[¶33] Shall we make such a one as you, in the Corinthian republic for instance, governor of the city, master of the youth, commander of the army, or director of the public games? Will you pursue the same practices when you are married?

> Greek: τοιοῦτόν σε θῶμεν πολίτην Κορινθίων, κἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, ἀστυνόμον ἢ ἐφήβαρχον ἢ στρατηγὸν ἢ ἀγωνοθέτην;

[¶34] For whom, and for what? Will you be the father of children, and introduce them into the state, such as yourself? Oh, what a fine citizen, and senator, and orator! Surely, young man, we ought to pray for a succession of young men disposed and bred like you!

> Greek: ἄγε καὶ γαμήσας τίλλεσθαι μέλλεις; τίνι καὶ ἐπὶ τί; καὶ παιδία ποιήσας εἶτα κἀκεῖνα τιλλόμενα ἡμῖν εἰσάξεις εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα; καλὸς πολίτης καὶ βουλευτὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ. τοιούτους δεῖ νέους εὔχεσθαι ἡμῖν φύεσθαι καὶ ἀνατρέφεσθαι;

[¶35] Now, when you have once heard this discourse, go home and say to yourself, It is not Epictetus who has told me all these things,—for how should he?—but some propitious god through him; for it would never have entered the head of Epictetus, who is not used to dispute with any one. Well, let us obey God then, that we may not incur the Divine displeasure.

> Greek: μή, τοὺς θεούς σοι, νεανίσκε· ἀλλʼ ἅπαξ ἀκούσας τῶν λόγων τούτων ἀπελθὼν σαυτῷ εἰπὲ ταῦτά μοι Ἐπίκτητος οὐκ εἴρηκεν· πόθεν γὰρ ἐκείνῳ; ἀλλὰ θεός τίς ποτʼ εὐμενὴς διʼ ἐκείνου. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐπῆλθεν Ἐπικτήτῳ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν οὐκ εἰωθότι λέγειν πρὸς οὐδένα. ἄγε οὖν τῷ θεῷ πεισθῶμεν, ἵνα μὴ θεοχόλωτοι ὦμεν.

[¶36] If a crow has signified anything to you by his croaking, it is not the crow that signifies it, but God through him. And if you have anything signified to you through the human voice, doth he not cause that man to tell it to you, that you may know the Divine power which acts thus variously, and signifies the greatest and principal things through the noblest messenger?

> Greek: οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἂν μὲν κόραξ κραυγάζων σημαίνῃ σοί τι, οὐχ ὁ κόραξ ἐστὶν ὁ σημαίνων, ἀλλʼ ὁ θεὸς διʼ αὐτοῦ· ἂν δὲ διʼ ἀνθρωπίνης φωνῆς σημαίνῃ τι, τὸν ἄνθρωπον ποιήσει λέγειν σοι ταῦτα, ἵνʼ ἀγνοῇς τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ δαιμονίου, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν οὕτως, τοῖς δʼ ἐκείνως σημαίνει, περὶ δὲ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ κυριωτάτων διὰ καλλίστου ἀγγέλου σημαίνει;

[¶37] What else does the poet mean, when he says,—
Since we forewarned him,
Sending forth Hermes. watchful Argicide,
Neither to slay, nor woo another’s wife.
Hermes, descending from heaven, was to warn him.

> Greek: τί ἐστιν ἄλλο, ὃ λέγει ὁ ποιητής; ἐπεὶ πρό οἱ εἴπομεν ἡμεῖς, Ἑρμείαν πέμψαντες ἐύσκοπον ἀργειφόντην, μήτʼ αὐτὸν κτείνειν μήτε μνάασθαι ἄκοιτιν.

[¶38] and the gods now, likewise, send a Hermes the Argicide as messenger to warn you not to invert the well-appointed order of things, nor be absorbed in fopperies; but suffer a man to be a man, and a woman to be a woman; a beautiful man to be beautiful as a man; a deformed man to be deformed as a man; for your personality lies not in flesh and hair, but in the Will.

> Greek: ὁ Ἑρμῆς καταβὰς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ λέγειν ταῦτα καὶ σοὶ νῦν λέγουσιν οἱ θεοὶ ταῦτα Ἑρμείαν πέμψαντες διάκτορον ἀργειφόντην μὴ ἐκστρέφειν τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα μηδὲ περιεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀφεῖναι τὸν ἄνδρα ἄνδρα, τὴν γυναῖκα γυναῖκα, τὸν καλὸν ἄνθρωπον ὡς καλὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν αἰσχρὸν ὡς ἄνθρωπον αἰσχρόν. ὅτι οὐκ εἶ κρέας οὐδὲ τρίχες, ἀλλὰ προαίρεσις·

[¶39] If you take care to have this beautiful, you will be beautiful.

> Greek: ταύτην ἂν σχῇς καλήν, τότʼ ἔστι καλός.

[¶40] But all this while, I dare not tell you that you are deformed; for I fancy you would rather hear anything than this.

> Greek: μέχρι δὲ νῦν οὐ τολμῶ σοι λέγειν, ὅτι αἰσχρὸς εἶ· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι πάντα θέλειν ἀκοῦσαι ἢ τοῦτο.

[¶41] But consider what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of all men, Alcibiades. “Endeavor to make yourself beautiful.” What does he mean to say to him,—“Curl your locks, and depilate your legs”? Heaven forbid! But rather, “Regulate your Will;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ὅρα, τί λέγει Σωκράτης τῷ καλλίστῳ πάντων καὶ ὡραιοτάτῳ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ· πειρῶ οὖν καλὸς εἶναι. τί αὐτῷ λέγει; πλάσσε σου τὴν κόμην καὶ τίλλε σου τὰ σκέλη; μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ κόσμει σου τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἔξαιρε τὰ φαῦλα δόγματα.

[¶42] throw away your wrong principles.” “What is to be done with the poor body, then?” Leave it to nature.

> Greek: τὸ σωμάτιον οὖν πῶς; ὡς πέφυκεν. ἄλλῳ τούτων ἐμέλησεν· ἐκείνῳ ἐπί[σ]τρεψον.

[¶43] Another hath taken care of such things. Give them up to him. “What, then; must one be a sloven?” By no means; but act in conformity to your nature. A man should care for his body, as a man;

> Greek: — τί οὖν; ἀκάθαρτον δεῖ εἶναι; — μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλʼ ὃς εἶ καὶ πέφυκας, τοῦτον κάθαιρε, ἄνδρα ὡς ἄνδρα καθάριον εἶναι, γυναῖκα ὡς γυναῖκα, παιδίον ὡς παιδίον.

[¶44] a woman, as a woman; a child, as a child. If not, let us pick out the mane of a lion, that he may not be slovenly; and the comb of a cock, for he too should be tidy. Yes, but let it be as a cock: and a lion, as a lion; and a hound. as a hound.

> Greek: οὔ· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ λέοντος ἐκτίλωμεν τὴν κόμην, ἵνα μὴ ἀκάθαρτος ᾖ, καὶ τοῦ ἀλεκτρυόνος τὸν λόφον· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτον καθάριον εἶναι. ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀλεκτρυόνα καὶ ἐκεῖνον ὡς λέοντα καὶ τὸν κυνηγετικὸν κύνα ὡς κυνηγετικόν.

[¶45] 2. There are three topics in philosophy, in which he who would be wise and good must be exercised: that of the desires and aversions, that he may not be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other; that of the pursuits and avoidances, and, in general, the duties of life, that he may act with order and consideration, and not carelessly; the third includes integrity of mind and prudence, and, in general, whatever belongs to the judgment. Of these points the principal and most urgent is that which reaches the passions; for passion is produced no otherwise than by a disappointment of one’s desires and an incurring of one’s aversions. It is this which introduces perturbations, tumults, misfortunes, and calamities; this is the spring of sorrow, lamentation, and envy; this renders us envious and emulous, and incapable of hearing reason. The next topic regards the duties of life. For I am not to be undisturbed by passions, in the same sense as a statue is; but as one who preserves the natural and acquired relations,—as a pious person, as. son, as a brother, as a father, as a citizen. The third topic belongs to those scholars who are now somewhat advanced; and is a security to the other two, that no bewildering semblance may surprise us, either in sleep, or wine, or in depression. This, say you, is beyond us. Yet our present philosophers, leaving the first and second topics, employ themselves wholly about the third; dealing in the logical subtilties. For they say that we must, by engaging in these subjects, take care to guard against deception. Who must? A wise and good man. Is this really, then, the thing you need? Have you mastered the other points? Are you not liable to be deceived by money? When you see a fine girl, do you oppose the seductive influence? If your neighbor inherits an estate, do you feel no vexation? Is it not steadfastness which you chiefly need? You learn even these very things, slave, with trembling, and a solicitous dread of contempt; and are inquisitive to know what is said of you. And if any one comes and tells you that, in a dispute as to which was the best of the philosophers, one of the company named a certain person as the only philosopher, that little soul of yours grows to the size of two cubits instead of an inch. But if another comes and says, “You are mistaken, he is not worth hearing; for what does he know? He has the first rudiments, but nothing more,” you are thunderstruck; you presently turn pale, and cry out, “will show what I am; that I am a great philosopher.” You exhibit by these very things what you are aiming to show in other ways. Do not you know that Diogenes exhibited some sophist in this manner, by pointing with his middle finger; and when the man was mad with rage, “This,” said Diogenes, “is the very man; I have exhibited him to you.” For a man is not shown by the finger in the same sense as a stone or a piece of wood, but whoever points out his principles shows him as a man. Let us see your principles too. For is it not evident that you consider your own Will as nothing, but are always aiming at something beyond its reach? As, what such a one will say of you, and what you shall be thought,—whether a man of letters; whether to have read Chrysippus or Antipater; and if Archedemus too, you have everything you wish. Why are you still solicitous, lest you should not show us what you are? Shall I tell you what you have shown yourself? A mean, discontented, passionate, cowardly person, complaining of everything, accusing everybody, perpetually restless, good for nothing. This you have shown us. Go now and read Archedemus; and then, if you hear but the noise of a mouse, you are a dead man; for you will die some such kind of death as—Who was it? Crinis; who valued himself extremely too, that he understood Archedemus. Wretch, why do you not let alone things that do not belong to you? These things belong to such as are able to learn them without perturbation; who can say, “am not subject to anger, or grief, or envy. I am not restrained; I am not compelled. What remains for me to do? I am at leisure; I am at ease. Let us now see how logical inversions are to be treated; let us consider, when an hypothesis is laid down, how we may avoid a contradiction.” To such persons do these things belong. They who are safe may light a fire, go to dinner if they please, and sing and dance; but you are for spreading sail just when your ship is going down.

> Greek: 2. τρεῖς εἰσι τόποι, περὶ οὓς ἀσκηθῆναι δεῖ τὸν ἐσόμενον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν· ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις, ἵνα μήτʼ ὀρεγόμενος ἀποτυγχάνῃ μήτʼ ἐκκλίνων περιπίπτῃ· ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον, ἵνα τάξει, ἵνα εὐλογίστως, ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶς· τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀνεξαπατησίαν καὶ ἀνεικαιότητα καὶ ὅλως ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. τούτων κυριώτατος καὶ μάλιστα ἐπείγων ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη· πάθος γὰρ ἄλλως οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ ὀρέξεως ἀποτυγχανούσης ἢ ἐκκλίσεως περιπιπτούσης. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ταραχάς, θορύβους, ἀτυχίας, ὁ δυστυχίας ἐπιφέρων, ὁ πένθη, οἰμωγάς, φθόνους, ὁ φθονερούς, ὁ ζηλοτύπους ποιῶν, διʼ ὧν οὐδʼ ἀκοῦσαι λόγου δυνάμεθα. δεύτερός ἐστιν ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον· οὐ δεῖ γάρ με εἶναι ἀπαθῆ ὡς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰς σχέσεις τηροῦντα τὰς φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους ὡς εὐσεβῆ, ὡς υἱόν, ὡς ἀδελφόν, ὡς πατέρα, ὡς πολίτην. τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ ἤδη τοῖς προκόπτουσιν ἐπιβάλλων, ὁ περὶ τὴν αὐτῶν τούτων ἀσφάλειαν, ἵνα μηδʼ ἐν ὕπνοις λάθῃ τις ἀνεξέταστος παρελθοῦσα φαντασία μηδʼ ἐν οἰνώσει μηδὲ μελαγχολῶντος. — τοῦτο ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, φησίν, ἐστίν. — οἱ δὲ νῦν φιλόσοφοι ἀφέντες τὸν πρῶτον τόπον καὶ τὸν δεύτερον καταγίνονται περὶ τὸν τρίτον· μεταπίπτοντας, ἠρωτῆσθαι περαίνοντας, ὑποθετικούς, ψευδομένους. — δεῖ γάρ, φησίν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὕλαις ταύταις γενόμενον διαφυλάξαι τὸ ἀνεξαπάτητον. — τίνα; τὸν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. σοὶ οὖν τοῦτο λείπει; τὰς ἄλλας ἐκπεπόνηκας; περὶ κερμάτιον ἀνεξαπάτητος εἶ; ἐὰν ἴδῃς κοράσιον καλόν, ἀντέχεις τῇ φαντασίᾳ; ἂν ὁ γείτων σου κληρονομήσῃ, οὐ δάκνῃ; νῦν οὐδὲν ἄλλο σοι λείπει ἢ ἀμεταπτωσία; τάλας, αὐτὰ ταῦτα τρέμων μανθάνεις καὶ ἀγωνιῶν, μή τίς σου καταφρονήσῃ, καὶ πυνθανόμενος, μή τίς τι περὶ σοῦ λέγει. κἄν τις ἐλθὼν εἴπῃ σοι ὅτι λόγου γινομένου, τίς ἄριστός ἐστι τῶν φιλοσόφων, παρών τις ἔλεγεν, ὅτι εἷς φιλόσοφος ὁ δεῖνα, γέγονέ σου τὸ ψυχάριον ἀντὶ δακτυλιαίου δίπηχυ. ἂν δʼ ἄλλος παρὼν εἴπῃ οὐδὲν εἴρηκας, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄξιον τοῦ δεῖνος ἀκροᾶσθαι· τί γὰρ οἶδεν; τὰς πρώτας ἀφορμὰς ἔχει, πλέον δʼ οὐδέν, ἐξέστηκας, ὠχρίακας, εὐθὺς κέκραγας ἐγὼ αὐτῷ δείξω, τίς εἰμι, ὅτι μέγας φιλόσοφος. βλέπεται ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων. τί θέλεις ἐξ ἄλλων δεῖξαι; οὐκ οἶδας, ὅτι Διογένης τῶν σοφιστῶν τινα οὕτως ἔδειξεν ἐκτείνας τὸν μέσον δάκτυλον, εἶτα ἐκμανέντος αὐτοῦ οὗτός ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὁ δεῖνα· ἔδειξα ὑμῖν αὐτόν; ἄνθρωπος γὰρ δακτύλῳ οὐ δείκνυται ὡς λίθος ἢ ὡς ξύλον, ἀλλʼ ὅταν τις τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ δείξῃ, τότε αὐτὸν ὡς ἄνθρωπον ἔδειξεν. βλέπωμεν καὶ σοῦ τὰ δόγματα. μὴ γὰρ οὐ δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι σὺ τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σαυτοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ τίθεσαι, ἔξω δὲ βλέπεις εἰς τὰ ἀπροαίρετα, τί ἐρεῖ ὁ δεῖνα καὶ τίς εἶναι δόξεις, εἰ φιλόλογος, εἰ Χρύσιππον ἀνεγνωκὼς ἢ Ἀντίπατρον; εἰ μὲν γὰρ καὶ Ἀρχέδημον, ἀπέχεις ἅπαντα. τί ἔτι ἀγωνιᾷς, μὴ οὐ δείξῃς ἡμῖν, τίς εἶ; θέλεις σοι εἴπω, τίνα ἡμῖν ἔδειξας; ἄνθρωπον παριόντα ταπεινόν, μεμψίμοιρον, ὀξύθυμον, δειλόν, πάντα μεμφόμενον, πᾶσιν ἐγκαλοῦντα, μηδέποτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, πέρπερον· ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἔδειξας. ἄπελθε νῦν καὶ ἀναγίγνωσκε Ἀρχέδημον· εἶτα μῦς ἂν καταπέσῃ καὶ ψοφήσῃ, ἀπέθανες. τοιοῦτος γάρ σε μένει θάνατος, οἷον καὶ τὸν — τίνα ποτʼ ἐκεῖνον; — τὸν Κρῖνιν. καὶ ἐκεῖνος μέγα ἐφρόνει, ὅτι ἐνόει Ἀρχέδημον. τάλας, οὐ θέλεις ἀφεῖναι ταῦτα τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς σέ; πρέπει ταῦτα τοῖς δυναμένοις δίχα ταραχῆς αὐτὰ μανθάνειν, οἷς ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ὀργίζομαι, οὐ λυποῦμαι, οὐ φθονῶ, οὐ κωλύομαι, οὐκ ἀναγκάζομαι. τί μοι λοιπόν; εὐσχολῶ, ἡσυχίαν ἄγω. ἴδωμεν, πῶς περὶ τὰς μεταπτώσεις τῶν λόγων δεῖ ἀναστρέφεσθαι· ἴδωμεν, πῶς ὑπόθεσίν τις λαβὼν εἰς οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἀπαχθήσεται. ἐκείνων ἐστὶ ταῦτα. τοῖς εὖ παθοῦσι πρέπει πῦρ καίειν, ἀριστᾶν, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ᾁδειν καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι· βυθιζομένου δὲ τοῦ πλοίου σύ μοι παρελθὼν ἐπαίρεις τοὺς σιφάρους.

[¶46] 3. The chief concern of a wise and good man is his own Reason. The body is the concern of a physician, and of a gymnastic trainer; and the fields, of the husbandman. The business of a wise and good man is to use the phenomena of existence conformably to Nature. Now, every soul, as it is naturally formed for an assent to truth, a dissent from falsehood, and a suspense of judgment with regard to things uncertain, so it is moved by a desire of good, an aversion from evil, and an indifference to what is neither good nor evil. For as a money-changer, or a gardener, is not at liberty to reject Caesar’s coin, but when once it is shown is obliged, whether he will or not, to deliver his wares in exchange for it, so is it with the soul. Apparent good at first sight attracts, and evil repels. Nor will the soul any more reject an evident appearance of good, than Caesar’s coin. Hence depends every movement, both of God and man; and hence good is preferred to every obligation, however near. My connection is not with my father; but with good. Are you so hard-hearted? Such is my nature, and such is the coin which God hath given me. If therefore good is interpreted to be anything but what is fair and just, away go father and brother and country and everything. What! Shall I overlook my own good, and give it up to you? For what? “am your father.” But not my good. “I am your brother.” But not my good. But if we place it in a rightly trained Will, good must then consist in an observance of the several relations of life; and then he who gives up mere externals acquires good. Your father deprives you of your money; but he does not hurt you. He will possess more land than you, as much more as he pleases; but will he possess more honor, more fidelity, more affection? Who can deprive you of this possession? Not even Zeus; for he did not will it so, since he has put this good into my own power, and given it me, like his own, uncompelled, unrestrained, and unhindered. But when any one deals in, coin different from this, then whoever shows it to him, may have whatever is sold for it in return. A thievish proconsul comes into the province. What coin does he use? Silver. Show it him, and carry off what you please. An adulterer comes. What coin does he use? Women. Take the coin, says one, and give me this trifle. “Give it me, and it is yours.” Another is addicted to other debauchery; give him but his coin, and take what you please. Another is fond of hunting; give him a fine pony or puppy, and he will sell you for it what you will, though it be with sighs and groans. For there is that within which controls him, and assumes this to be current coin. In this manner ought every one chiefly to train himself. When you go out in the morning, examine whomsoever you see or hear; and answer as if to a question. What have you seen? A handsome person. Apply the rule. Is this a thing controllable by Will or uncontrollable? Uncontrollable. Then discard it. What have you seen? One in agony for the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death is inevitable. Banish this despair, then. Has a consul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is the consular office,—controllable by Will or uncontrollable? Uncontrollable. Throw aside this too. It will not pass. Cast it away; it is nothing to you. If we acted thus, and practised in this manner from morning till night, by Heaven! something would be done. Whereas now, on the contrary, we are allured by every semblance, half-asleep; and if we ever awake, it is only a little in the school; but as soon as we go out, if we meet any one grieving, we say, “He is undone.” If a consul, “How happy is he!” If an exile, “How miserable!” If a poor man, “How wretched he has nothing to eat!” These miserable prejudices, then, are to be lopped off; and here is our whole strength to be applied. For what is weeping and groaning? Prejudice. What is misfortune? Prejudice. What is sedition, discord, complaint, accusation, impiety, levity? All these are prejudices, and nothing more; and prejudices concerning things uncontrollable by Will, as if they could be either good or evil. Let any one transfer these convictions to things controllable by Will, and I will engage that he will preserve his constancy, whatever be the state of things about him. The soul is like a vase filled with water; while the semblances of things fall like rays upon its surface. If the water is moved, the ray will seem to be moved likewise, though it is in reality without motion. When, therefore, any one is seized with a giddiness in his head, it is not the arts and virtues that are bewildered, but the mind in which they lie; when this recovers its composure, so will they likewise.

> Greek: 3. ὕλη τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικόν, τὸ σῶμα δʼ ἰατροῦ καὶ [ἀπ]ἀλείπτου, ὁ ἀγρὸς γεωργοῦ ὕλη· ἔργον δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ χρῆσθαι ταῖς φαντασίαις κατὰ φύσιν. πέφυκεν δὲ πᾶσα ψυχὴ ὥσπερ τῷ ἀληθεῖ ἐπινεύειν, πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος ἀνανεύειν, πρὸς τὸ ἄδηλον ἐπέχειν, οὕτως πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀρεκτικῶς κινεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἐκκλιτικῶς, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν οὐδετέρως. ὡς γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος νόμισμα οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἀποδοκιμάσαι τῷ τραπεζίτῃ οὐδὲ τῷ λαχανοπώλῃ, ἀλλʼ ἂν δείξῃς, θέλει οὐ θέλει, προέσθαι αὐτὸν δεῖ τὸ ἀντʼ αὐτοῦ πωλούμενον, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. τὸ ἀγαθὸν φανὲν εὐθὺς ἐκίνησεν ἐφʼ αὑτό, τὸ κακὸν ἀφʼ αὑτοῦ. οὐδέποτε δʼ ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίαν ἐναργῆ ἀποδοκιμάσει ψυχή, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ Καίσαρος νόμισμα. ἔνθεν ἐξήρτηται πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ θεοῦ. διὰ τοῦτο πάσης οἰκειότητος προκρίνεται τὸ ἀγαθόν. οὐδὲν ἐμοὶ καὶ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. οὕτως εἶ σκληρός; οὕτως γὰρ πέφυκα· τοῦτό μοι τὸ νόμισμα δέδωκεν ὁ θεός. διὰ τοῦτο, εἰ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, οἴχεται καὶ πατὴρ καὶ ἀδελφὸς καὶ πατρὶς καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ τὸ ἐμὸν ἀγαθὸν ὑπερίδω, ἵνα σὺ σχῇς, καὶ παραχωρήσω σοι; ἀντὶ τίνος; πατήρ σου εἰμί. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀγαθόν. ἀδελφός σου εἰμί. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀγαθόν. ἐὰν δʼ ἐν ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει θῶμεν, αὐτὸ τὸ τηρεῖν τὰς σχέσεις ἀγαθὸν γίνεται· καὶ λοιπὸν ὁ τῶν ἐκτός τινων ἐκχωρῶν, οὗτος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τυγχάνει. αἴρει τὰ χρήματα ὁ πατήρ. ἀλλʼ οὐ βλάπτει. ἕξει τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἀγροῦ ὁ ἀδελφός. ὅσον καὶ θέλει. μή τι οὖν τοῦ αἰδήμονος, μή τι τοῦ πιστοῦ, μή τι τοῦ φιλαδέλφου; ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας τίς δύναται ἐκβαλεῖν; οὐδʼ ὁ Ζεύς. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἠθέλησεν, ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸ ἐποίησεν καὶ ἔδωκεν οἷον εἶχεν αὐτός, ἀκώλυ[σ]τον, ἀνανάγκαστον, ἀπαραπόδιστον. ὅταν οὖν ἄλλῳ ἄλλο τὸ νόμισμα ᾖ, ἐκεῖνό τις δείξας ἔχει τὸ ἀντʼ αὐτοῦ πιπρασκόμενον. ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τὴν ἐπαρχίαν κλέπτης ἀνθύπατος. τίνι νομίσματι χρῆται; ἀργυρίῳ. δεῖξον καὶ ἀπόφερε ὃ θέλεις. ἐλήλυθεν μοιχός. τίνι νομίσματι χρῆται; κορασιδίοις. λάβε, φησίν, τὸ νόμισμα καὶ πώλησόν μοι τὸ πραγμάτιον. δὸς καὶ ἀγόραζε. ἄλλος περὶ παιδάρια ἐσπούδακεν. δὸς αὐτῷ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ λάβε ὃ θέλεις. ἄλλος φιλόθηρος. δὸς ἱππάριον καλὸν ἢ κυνάριον· οἰμώζων καὶ στένων πωλήσει ἀντʼ αὐτοῦ ὃ θέλεις. ἄλλος γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀναγκάζει ἔσωθεν, ὁ τὸ νόμισμα τοῦτο τεταχώς. πρὸς τοῦτο μάλιστα τὸ εἶδος αὑτὸν γυμναστέον. εὐθὺς ὄρθρου προελθὼν ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς, ὃν ἂν ἀκούσῃς, ἐξέταζε, ἀποκρίνου ὡς πρὸς ἐρώτημα. τί εἶδες; καλὸν ἢ καλήν; ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα. ἀπροαίρετον ἢ προαιρετικόν; ἀπροαίρετον· αἶρε ἔξω. τί εἶδες; πενθοῦντʼ ἐπὶ τέκνου τελευτῇ; ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα. ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν ἀπροαίρετον· αἶρε ἐκ τοῦ μέσου. ἀπήντησέ σοι ὕπατος; ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα. ὑπατεία ποῖόν τι ἐστίν; ἀπροαίρετον ἢ προαιρετικόν; ἀπροαίρετον· αἶρε καὶ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι δόκιμον· ἀπόβαλε, οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ. καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἐποιοῦμεν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἠσκούμεθα καθʼ ἡμέραν ἐξ ὄρθρου μέχρι νυκτός, ἐγίνετο ἄν τι, νὴ τοὺς θεούς. νῦν δʼ εὐθὺς ὑπὸ πάσης φαντασίας κεχηνότες λαμβανόμεθα καὶ μόνον, εἴπερ ἄρα, ἐν τῇ σχολῇ μικρόν τι διεγειρόμεθα· εἶτʼ ἐξελθόντες ἂν ἴδωμεν πενθοῦντα, λέγομεν ἀπώλετο· ἂν ὕπατον, μακάριος· ἂν ἐξωρισμένον, ταλαίπωρος· ἂν πένητα, ἄθλιος, οὐκ ἔχει πόθεν φάγῃ. ταῦτʼ οὖν ἐκκόπτειν δεῖ τὰ πονηρὰ δόγματα, περὶ τοῦτο συντετάσθαι. τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ κλαίειν καὶ οἰμώζειν; δόγμα. τί δυστυχία; δόγμα. τί στάσις, τί διχόνοια, τί μέμψις, τί κατηγορία, τί ἀσέβεια, τί φλυαρία; ταῦτα πάντα δόγματά ἐστι καὶ ἄλλο οὐδὲν καὶ δόγματα περὶ τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων ὡς ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ταῦτά τις ἐπὶ τὰ προαιρετικὰ μεταθέτω, κἀγὼ αὐτὸν ἐγγυῶμαι ὅτι εὐσταθήσει, ὡς ἂν ἔχῃ τὰ περὶ αὐτόν. οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ λεκάνη τοῦ ὕδατος, τοιοῦτον ἡ ψυχή, οἷον ἡ αὐγὴ ἡ προσπίπτουσα τῷ ὕδατι, τοιοῦτον αἱ φαντασίαι. ὅταν οὖν τὸ ὕδωρ κινηθῇ, δοκεῖ μὲν καὶ ἡ αὐγὴ κινεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι κινεῖται. καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν σκοτωθῇ τις, οὐχ αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ συγχέονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα, ἐφʼ οὗ εἰσιν· καταστάντος δὲ καθίσταται κἀκεῖνα.

[¶47] 4. When the Governor of Epirus had exerted himself with improper eagerness in favor of a comedian, and was upon that account publicly railed at, and, when he came to hear it, was highly displeased with those who railed at him, Why, what harm, said Epictetus, have these people done? They have shown favoritism; which is just what you did. “Is this a proper manner, then, of expressing their favor?” Seeing you, their governor, and the friend and vicegerent of Caesar, express it thus, was it not to be expected that they would express it thus too? For if this zealous favoritism is not right, do not show it yourself; and if it is, why are you angry at them for imitating you? For whom have the many to imitate, but you, their superiors? From whom are they to take example, when they come into the theatre, but from you? “Do but look how Caesar’s vicegerent sees the play! Has he cried out? I will cry out too. Has he leaped up from his seat? I too will leap up from mine. Do his slaves sit in different parts of the house, making an uproar? I indeed have no slaves; but I will make as much uproar as I can unaided.” You ought to consider, then, that when you appear in the theatre, you appear as a rule and example to others, how they ought to see the play. Why is it that they have railed at you? Because every man hates what hinders him. They would have one actor crowned; you, another. They hindered you, and you them. You proved the stronger. They have done what they could; they have railed at the person who hindered them. What would you have, then? Would you do as you please, and not have them even talk as they please? Where is the wonder of all this? Does not the husbandman rail at Zeus when he is hindered by him? Does not the sailor? Do men ever cease railing at Caesar? What, then; is Zeus ignorant of this? Are not the things that are said reported to Caesar? How then does he act? He knows that, if he were to punish all railers, he would have nobody left to command. When you enter the theatre, then, ought you to say, “Come, let Sophron be crowned”? No. But rather, “Come, let me at this time regulate my Will in a manner conformable to Nature. No one is dearer to me than myself. It is ridiculous, then, that because another man gains the victory as a player, I should be hurt. Whom do I wish to gain the victory? Him who does gain it; and thus he will always be victorious whom I wish to be so.” “But I would have Sophron crowned.” Why, celebrate as many games as you will at your own house, Nemean, Pythian, Isthmian, Olympic, and proclaim him victor in all; but in public do not arrogate more than your due, nor seek to monopolize what belongs to all; or if otherwise, bear to be railed at, for if you act like the mob, you reduce yourself co an equality with them.

> Greek: 4. τοῦ δʼ ἐπιτρόπου τῆς Ἠπείρου ἀκοσμότερον σπουδάσαντος κωμῳδῷ τινι καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δημοσίᾳ λοιδορηθέντος, εἶτα ἑξῆς ἀπαγγείλαντος πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐλοιδορήθη, καὶ ἀγανακτοῦντος πρὸς τοὺς λοιδορήσαντας Καὶ τί κακόν, ἔφη, ἐποίουν; ἐσπούδαζον καὶ οὗτοι ὡς καὶ σύ. εἰπόντος δʼ ἐκείνου Οὕτως οὖν τις σπουδάζει; σέ, ἔφη, βλέποντες τὸν αὐτῶν ἄρχοντα, τοῦ Καίσαρος φίλον καὶ ἐπίτροπον, οὕτως σπουδάζοντα οὐκ ἔμελλον καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτως σπουδάζειν; εἰ γὰρ μὴ δεῖ οὕτως σπουδάζειν, μηδὲ σὺ σπούδαζε· εἰ δὲ δεῖ, τί χαλεπαίνεις, εἴ σε ἐμιμήσαντο; τίνας γὰρ ἔχουσιν μιμήσασθαι οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ὑμᾶς; εἰς τίνας ἀπίδωσιν ἐλθόντες εἰς τὰ θέατρα ἢ ὑμᾶς; ὅρα πῶς ὁ ἐπίτροπος τοῦ Καίσαρος θεωρεῖ· κέκραγεν· κἀγὼ τοίνυν κραυγάσω. ἀναπηδᾷ· κἀγὼ ἀναπηδήσω. οἱ δοῦλοι αὐτοῦ διακάθηνται κραυγάζοντες· ἐγὼ δʼ οὐκ ἔχω δούλους· ἀντὶ πάντων αὐτὸς ὅσον δύναμαι κραυγάσω. εἰδέναι σε οὖν δεῖ, ὅταν εἰσέρχῃ εἰς τὸ θέατρον, ὅτι κανὼν εἰσέρχῃ καὶ παράδειγμα τοῖς ἄλλοις, πῶς αὐτοὺς δεῖ θεωρεῖν. τί οὖν σε ἐλοιδόρουν; ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος μισεῖ τὸ ἐμποδίζον. ἐκεῖνοι στεφανωθῆναι ἤθελον τὸν δεῖνα, σὺ ἕτερον· ἐκεῖνοι σοὶ ἐνεπόδιζον καὶ σὺ ἐκείνοις. σὺ εὑρίσκου ἰσχυρότερος· ἐκεῖνοι ὃ ἐδύναντο ἐποίουν, ἐλοιδόρουν τὸ ἐμποδίζον. τί οὖν θέλεις; ἵνα σὺ μὲν ποιῇς ὃ θέλεις, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ μηδʼ εἴπωσιν ἃ θέλουσιν; καὶ τί θαυμαστόν; οἱ γεωργοὶ τὸν Δία οὐ λοιδοροῦσιν, ὅταν ἐμποδίζωνται ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ; οἱ ναῦται οὐ λοιδοροῦσι; τὸν Καίσαρα παύονται λοιδοροῦντες; τί οὖν; οὐ γιγνώσκει ὁ Ζεύς; τῷ Καίσαρι οὐκ ἀπαγγέλλονται τὰ λεγόμενα; τί οὖν ποιεῖ; οἶδεν ὅτι, ἂν πάντας τοὺς λοιδοροῦντας κολάζῃ, οὐχ ἕξει τίνων ἄρξει. τί οὖν; ἔδει εἰσερχόμενον εἰς τὸ θέατρον τοῦτο εἰπεῖν ἄγε ἵνα Σώφρων στεφανωθῇ; ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο ἄγε ἵνα τηρήσω τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ὕλης κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν. ἐμοὶ παρʼ ἐμὲ φίλτερος οὐδείς· γελοῖον οὖν, ἵνʼ ἄλλος νικήσῃ κωμῳδῶν, ἐμὲ βλάπτεσθαι. — τίνα οὖν θέλω νικῆσαι; — τὸν νικῶντα· καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ νικήσει, ὃν θέλω. — ἀλλὰ θέλω στεφανωθῆναι Σώφρονα. — ἐν οἴκῳ ὅσους θέλεις ἀγῶνας ἄγων ἀνακήρυξον αὐτὸν Νέμεα, Πύθια, Ἴσθμια, Ὀλύμπια· ἐν φανερῷ δὲ μὴ πλεονέκτει μηδʼ ὑφάρπαζε τὸ κοινόν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνέχου λοιδορούμενος· ὡς, ὅταν ταὐτὰ ποιῇς τοῖς πολλοῖς, εἰς ἴσον ἐκείνοις καθιστᾷς σαυτόν.

[¶48] 5. “I am ill here,” said one of the scholars. “I will return home.” Were you never ill at home, then? Consider whether you are doing anything here conducive to the regulation of your Will; for if you make no improvement, it was to no purpose that you came. Go home, then, and take care of your domestic affairs. For if your Reason cannot be brought into conformity to nature, your land may. You may increase you: money, support the old age of your father, mix in the public assemblies, and rule as badly as you have lived, and do other such things. But if you are conscious to yourself that you are casting off some of your wrong principles, and taking up different ones in their room; and that you have transferred your scheme of life from things not controllable by will to those controllable; and that if you do sometimes cry alas, it is not for what concerns your father or your brother, but yourself,—why do you any longer plead illness? Do not you know that both illness and death must overtake us? At what employment? The husbandman at his plough, the sailor on his voyage. At what employment would you be taken? For, indeed, at what employment ought you to be taken? If there is any better employment at which you can be taken, follow that. For my own part, I would be found engaged in nothing but in the regulation of my own Will; how to render it undisturbed, unrestrained, uncompelled, free. I would be found studying this, that I may be able to say to God, “Have I transgressed thy commands? Have I perverted the powers, the senses, the instincts which thou hast given me? Have I ever accused thee, or censured thy dispensations? I have been ill, because it was thy pleasure, like others; but I willingly. I have been poor, it being thy will; but with joy. I have not been in power, because it was not thy will; and power I have never desired. Hast thou ever seen me saddened because of this? Have I not always approached thee with a cheerful countenance, prepared to execute thy commands and the indications of thy will? Is it thy pleasure that I should depart from this assembly? I depart. I give thee all thanks that thou hast thought me worthy to have a snare in it with thee; to behold thy works, and to join with thee in comprehending thy administration.” Let death overtake me while I am thinking, while I am writing, while I am reading such things as these. “But I shall not have my mother to hold my head when I am ill.” Get home then to your mother; for you are most fit to have your head held when you are ill. “But I used at home to lie on a fine couch.” Get to this couch of yours; for you are fit to lie upon such a one, even in health; so do not miss doing that for which you are qualified. But what says Socrates? “As one man rejoices in the improvement of his estate, another of his horse, so do I daily rejoice in perceiving myself to grow better.” “In what,—in pretty speeches?” Use courteous words, man. “In trifling theorems? What do they signify? Yet, indeed, I do not see that the philosophers are employed in anything else.” Do you think it nothing, to accuse and censure no one, God nor man; always to carry abroad and bring home the same countenance? These were the things which Socrates knew; and yet he never professed to know, or to teach anything; but if any one wanted pretty speeches, or little theorems, he brought him to Protagoras, to Hippias; just as, if any one had come for potherbs, he would have taken him to a gardener. Which of you, then, earnestly sets his heart on this? If you had, you would bear illness and hunger and death with cheerfulness. If any one of you has truly loved, he knows that I speak truth.

> Greek: 5. νοσῶ, φησίν, ἐνθάδε καὶ βούλομαι ἀπιέναι εἰς οἶκον. — ἐν οἴκῳ γὰρ ἄνοσος ἦς σύ; οὐ σκοπεῖς, εἴ τι ποιεῖς ἐνθάδε τῶν πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σαυτοῦ φερόντων, ἵνʼ ἐπανορθωθῇ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν ἀνύεις, περισσῶς καὶ ἦλθες. ἄπιθι, ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν ἐν οἴκῳ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ δύναταί σου τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν σχεῖν κατὰ φύσιν, τό γʼ ἀγρίδιον δυνήσεται· τό γε κερμάτιον αὐξήσεις, τὸν πατέρα γηροκομήσεις, ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἀναστραφήσῃ, ἄρξεις· κακὸς κακῶς τί ποτε ποιήσεις τῶν ἑξῆς. εἰ δὲ παρακολουθεῖς σαυτῷ, ὅτι ἀποβάλλεις τινὰ δόγματα φαῦλα καὶ ἄλλʼ ἀντʼ αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβάνεις καὶ τὴν σαυτοῦ στάσιν μετατέθεικας ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων ἐπὶ τὰ προαιρετικά, κἄν ποτʼ εἴπῃς οἴμοι, οὐ λέγεις διὰ τὸν πατέρα, τὸν ἀδελφόν, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐμέ, ἔτι ὑπολογίζῃ νόσον; οὐκ οἶδας, ὅτι καὶ νόσος καὶ θάνατος καταλαβεῖν ἡμᾶς ὀφείλουσίν τί ποτε ποιοῦντας; τὸν γεωργὸν γεωργοῦντα καταλαμβάνουσι, τὸν ναυτικὸν πλέοντα. σὺ τί θέλεις ποιῶν καταληφθῆναι; τί ποτε μὲν γὰρ ποιοῦντά σε δεῖ καταληφθῆναι. εἴ τι ἔχεις τούτου κρεῖσσον ποιῶν καταληφθῆναι, ποίει ἐκεῖνο. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καταληφθῆναι γένοιτο μηδενὸς ἄλλου ἐπιμελουμένῳ ἢ τῆς προαιρέσεως τῆς ἐμῆς, ἵνʼ ἀπαθής, ἵνʼ ἀκώλυτος, ἵνʼ ἀνανάγκαστος, ἵνʼ ἐλεύθερος. ταῦτα ἐπιτηδεύων θέλω εὑρεθῆναι, ἵνʼ εἰπεῖν δύνωμαι τῷ θεῷ μή τι παρέβην σου τὰς ἐντολάς; μή τι πρὸς ἄλλα ἐχρησάμην ταῖς ἀφορμαῖς ἃς ἔδωκας; μή τι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἄλλως, μή τι ταῖς προλήψεσιν; μή τί σοί ποτʼ ἐνεκάλεσα; μή τι ἐμεμψάμην σου τὴν διοίκησιν; ἐνόσησα, ὅτε ἠθέλησας· καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ ἑκών. πένης ἐγενόμην σου θέλοντος, ἀλλὰ χαίρων. οὐκ ἦρξα, ὅτι σὺ οὐκ ἠθέλησας· οὐδέποτʼ ἐπεθύμησα ἀρχῆς. μή τί με τούτου ἕνεκα στυγνότερον εἶδες; μὴ οὐ προσῆλθόν σοί ποτε φαιδρῷ τῷ προσώπῳ, ἕτοιμος εἴ τι ἐπιτάσσεις, εἴ τι σημαίνεις; νῦν με θέλεις ἀπελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς πανηγύρεως· ἄπειμι, χάριν σοι ἔχω πᾶσαν, ὅτι ἠξίωσάς με συμπανηγυρίσαι σοι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἔργα τὰ σὰ καὶ τῇ διοικήσει σου συμπαρακολουθῆσαι [σοί]. ταῦτά με ἐνθυμούμενον, ταῦτα γράφοντα, ταῦτα ἀναγιγνώσκοντα καταλάβοι ὁ θάνατος. ἀλλʼ ἡ μήτηρ μου τὴν κεφαλὴν νοσοῦντος οὐ κρατήσει. — ἄπιθι τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν μητέρα· ἄξιος γὰρ εἶ τὴν κεφαλὴν κρατούμενος νοσεῖν. — ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ κλιναρίου κομψοῦ ἐν οἴκῳ κατεκείμην. — ἄπιθί σου ἐπὶ τὸ κλινάριον· ἢ ὑγιαίνων ἄξιος εἶ ἐπὶ τοιούτου κατακεῖσθαι. μὴ τοίνυν ἀπόλλυε, ἃ δύνασαι ἐκεῖ ποιεῖν. ἀλλʼ ὁ Σωκράτης τί λέγει; ὥσπερ ἄλλος τις, φησίν, χαίρει[ν] τὸν ἀγρὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ ποιῶν κρείσσονα, ἄλλος τὸν ἵππον, οὕτως ἐγὼ καθʼ ἡμέραν χαίρω παρακολουθῶν ἐμαυτῷ βελτίονι γινομένῳ. — πρὸς τί; μή τι πρὸς λεξείδια; — ἄνθρωπε, εὐφήμει. — μή τι πρὸς θεωρημάτια; — τί ποιεῖς; — καὶ μὴν οὐ βλέπω, τί ἐστιν ἄλλο, περὶ ὃ ἀσχολοῦνται οἱ φιλόσοφοι. — οὐδέν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ μηδέποτε ἐγκαλέσαι τινί, μὴ θεῷ, μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ· μὴ μέμψασθαι μηδένα· τὸ αὐτὸ πρόσωπον ἀεὶ καὶ ἐκφέρειν καὶ εἰσφέρειν; ταῦτα ἦν, ἃ ᾔδει ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ ὅμως οὐδέποτε εἶπεν, ὅτι οἶδέν τι ἢ διδάσκει. εἰ δέ τις λεξείδια ᾔτει ἢ θεωρημάτια, ἀπῆγεν πρὸς Πρωταγόραν, πρὸς Ἱππίαν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ λάχανά τις ζητῶν ἐλήλυθεν, πρὸς τὸν κηπουρὸν ἂν αὐτὸν ἀπήγαγεν· τίς οὖν ὑμῶν ἔχει ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολήν; ἐπεί τοι εἰ εἴχετε, καὶ ἐνοσεῖτε ἂν ἡδέως καὶ ἐπεινᾶτε καὶ ἀπεθνῄσκετε. εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἠράσθη κορασίου κομψοῦ, οἶδεν ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω.

## 14. Book III · chapters 6–12

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/14/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/14/#p-N

[¶0] 6. When he was asked how it came to pass, that though the art of reasoning might be now more studied, yet the improvements made were formerly greater? In what instance, answered he, is it now more studied; and in what were the improvements greater? For in what now is most studied, in that will be found likewise the improvements. The present study is the solution of syllogisms, and in this improvements are made. But formerly the study was to harmonize the Reason with Nature; and improvement was made in that. Therefore do not confound things, nor, when you study one thing, expect improvement in another; but see whether any one of us who applies himself to think and act conformably to Nature ever fails of improvement. Depend upon it, you will not find one. A good man is invincible; for he does not contend where he is not superior. If you would have his land, take it; take his servants, take his office, take his body. But you will never frustrate his desire, nor make him incur his aversion. He engages in no combat but what concerns objects within his own control. How then can he fail to be invincible? Being asked what common-sense was, he answered: As that may be called a common ear which distinguishes only sounds, but that which distinguishes notes, an artistic one; so there are some things which men, not totally perverted, discern by their common natural powers; and such a disposition is called common-sense. It is not easy to gain the attention of effeminate young men,—for you cannot take up custard by a hook,—but the ingenuous, even if you discourage them, are the more eager for learning. Hence Rufus, for the most part, did discourage them; and made use of that as a criterion of the ingenuous and disingenuous. For, he used to say, as a stone, even if you throw it up, will by its own propensity be carried downward, so an ingenuous mind, the more it is forced from its natural bent, will incline towards it the more strongly.

> Greek: 6. πυθομένου δέ τινος, πῶς νῦν μᾶλλον ἐκπεπονημένου τοῦ λόγου πρότερον μείζονες προκοπαὶ ἦσαν, κατὰ τί, ἔφη, ἐκπεπόνηται καὶ κατὰ τί μείζους αἱ προκοπαὶ τότε ἦσαν; καθὸ γὰρ νῦν ἐκπεπόνηται, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ προκοπαὶ νῦν εὑρεθήσονται. καὶ νῦν μὲν ὥστε συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν ἐκπεπόνηται καὶ προκοπαὶ γίνονται· τότε δʼ ὥστε τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον τηρῆσαι καὶ ἐξεπονεῖτο καὶ προκοπαὶ ἦσαν. μὴ οὖν ἐνάλλασσε μηδὲ ζήτει, ὅταν ἄλλο ἐκπονῇς, ἐν ἄλλῳ προκόπτειν. ἀλλʼ ἴδε, εἴ τις ἡμῶν πρὸς τούτῳ ὤν, ὥστε κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν, οὐ προκόπτει. οὐδένα γὰρ εὑρήσεις. ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀήττητος· ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἀγωνίζεται, ὅπου μὴ κρείσσων, εἰ μὴ ὅπου κρείσσων ἐστίν. εἰ κατὰ τὸν ἀγρὸν θέλεις, λάβε· λάβε τοὺς οἰκέτας, λάβε τὴν ἀρχήν, λάβε τὸ σωμάτιον. τὴν δʼ ὄρεξιν οὐ ποιήσεις ἀποτευκτικὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἔκκλισιν περιπτωτικήν. εἰς τοῦτον μόνον τὸν ἀγῶνα καθίησιν τὸν περὶ τῶν προαιρετικῶν· πῶς οὖν οὐ μέλλει ἀήττητος εἶναι; πυθομένου δέ τινος, τί ἐστιν ὁ κοινὸς νοῦς, Ὥσπερ, φησίν, κοινή τις ἀκοὴ λέγοιτʼ ἂν ἡ μόνον φωνῶν διακριτική, ἡ δὲ τῶν φθόγγων οὐκέτι κοινή, ἀλλὰ τεχνική, οὕτως ἐστί τινα, ἃ οἱ μὴ παντάπασιν διεστραμμένοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἀφορμὰς ὁρῶσιν. ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις κοινὸς νοῦς καλεῖται. τῶν νέων τοὺς μαλακοὺς οὐκ ἔστι προτρέψαι ῥᾴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τυρὸν ἀγκίστρῳ λαβεῖν· οἱ δʼ εὐφυεῖς, κἂν ἀποτρέπῃς, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἔχονται τοῦ λόγου. διὸ καὶ ὁ Ῥοῦφος τὰ πολλὰ ἀπέτρεπεν τούτῳ δοκιμαστηρίῳ χρώμενος τῶν εὐφυῶν καὶ ἀφυῶν. ἔλεγε γὰρ ὅτι ὡς ὁ λίθος, κἂν ἀναβάλῃς, ἐνεχθήσεται κάτω ἐπὶ γῆν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ κατασκευήν, οὕτως καὶ ὁ εὐφυής, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἀποκρούεταί τις αὐτόν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον νεύει ἐφʼ ὃ πέφυκεν.

[¶1] 7. When the Governor, who was an Epicurean, came to him, “It is fit,” said he, “that we ignorant people should inquire of you philosophers what is the most valuable thing in the world; as those who come into a strange city do of the citizens and such as are acquainted with it; that after this inquiry we may go and take a view of it, as they do in cities. Now, almost every one admits that there are three things belonging to man,—soul, body, and externals. It belongs to such as you to answer which is the best. What shall we tell mankind? Is it the flesh?” And was it for this that Maximus took a voyage in winter as far as Cassiope to accompany his son? Was it to gratify the flesh? “No, surely.” Is it not fit, then, to study what is best? “Yes, beyond all other things.” What have we, then, better than flesh? “The soul.” Are we to prefer the good of the better, or of the worse? “Of the better.” Does the good of the soul consist in things controllable by Will or uncontrollable? “In things controllable.” Does the pleasure of the soul, then, depend on the Will? “It does.” And whence does this pleasure arise,—from itself? This is unintelligible. For there must exist some principal essence of good, in the attainment of which we shall enjoy this pleasure of the soul. “This too is granted.” In what, then, consists this pleasure of the soul? If it be in mental objects, the essence of good is found. For it is impossible that good should lie in one thing, and rational enjoyment in another; or that, if the cause is not good, the effect should be good. For, to make the effect reasonable, the cause must be good. But this you cannot reasonably allow; for it would be to contradict both Epicurus and the rest of your principles. It remains, then, that the pleasures of the soul must consist in bodily objects; and that there must be the cause and the essence of good. Maximus, therefore, did foolishly, if he took a voyage for the sake of anything but his body; that is, for the sake of what is best. A man does foolishly too, if he refrains from what is another’s, when he is a judge and able to take it. We should consider only this, if you please, how it may be done secretly and safely, and so that no one may know it. For Epicurus himself does not pronounce stealing to be evil, only the being found out in it; and prohibits it for no other reason, but because it is impossible to insure ourselves against discovery. But I say to you that, if it be done dexterously and cautiously, we shall not be discovered. Besides, we have powerful friends of both sexes at Rome; and the Greeks are weak; and nobody will dare to go up to Rome on such an affair. Why do you refrain from your own proper good? It is madness; it is folly. But if you were to tell me that you do refrain, I would not believe you. For, as it is impossible to assent to an apparent falsehood, or to deny an apparent truth, so it is impossible to abstain from an apparent good. Now, riches are a good, and, indeed, the chief instrument of pleasures. Why do not you acquire them? And why do not we corrupt the wife of our neighbor, if it can be done secretly? And if the husband should happen to be impertinent, why not cut his throat too, if you have a mind to be such a philosopher as you ought to be,—a complete one,—to be consistent with your own principles. Otherwise you will not differ from us who are called Stoics. For we, too, say one thing and do another; we talk well and act ill; but you will be perverse in a contrary way, teaching bad principles, and acting well. For Heaven’s sake represent to yourself a city of Epicureans. “I do not marry.” “Nor I; for we are not to marry nor have children, nor to engage in public affairs.” What will be the consequence of this? Whence are the citizens to come? Who will educate them? Who will be the governor of the youth? Who the master of their exercises? What then will he teach them? Will it be what used to be taught at Athens, or Lacedemon? Take a young man; bring him up according to your principles. These principles are wicked, subversive of a state, pernicious to families, not becoming even to women. Give them up, sir. You live in a capital city. You are to govern and judge uprightly, and to refrain from what belongs to others. No one’s wife or child, or silver or gold plate, is to have any charms for you, except your own. Provide yourself with principles consonant to these truths; and setting out thence, you will with pleasure refrain from things so persuasive to mislead and conquer. But if to their own persuasive force we can add such a philosophy as hurries us upon them and confirms us in them, what will be the consequence? In a sculptured vase, which is the best,—the silver, or the workmanship? In the hand the substance is flesh; but its operations are the principal thing. Accordingly, its functions are threefold,—relating to its existence, to the manner of its existence, and to its principal operations. Thus, likewise, do not set a value on the mere materials of man, the flesh; but on the principal operations which belong to him. “What are these?” Engaging in public business, marrying, the production of children, the worship of God, the care of parents, and, in general, the regulation of our desires and aversions, our pursuits and avoidances, in accordance with our nature. “What is our nature?” To be free, noble-spirited, modest. For what other animal blushes? What other has the idea of shame? But pleasure must be subjected to these, as an attendant and handmaid, to call forth our activity, and to keep us constant in natural operations. “But I am rich and want nothing.” Then why do you pretend to philosophize? Your gold and silver plate is enough for you. What need have you of principles? “Besides, I am Judge of the Greeks.” Do you know how to judge? Who has imparted this knowledge to you? “Caesar has given me a commission.” Let him give you a commission to judge of music; what good will it do you? But how were you made a Judge? Whose hand have you kissed,—that of Symphorus, or Numenius? Before whose door have you slept? To whom have you sent presents? After all, do you not perceive that the office of Judge puts you in the same rank with Numenius? “But I can throw whom I please into a prison.” So you may a stone. “But I can beat whom I will too.” So you may an ass. This is not a government over men. Govern us like reasonable creatures. Show us what is best for us, and we will pursue it; show us what is otherwise, and we will avoid it. Like Socrates, make us imitators of yourself. He was properly a governor of men, who controlled their desires and aversions, their pursuits, their avoidances. “Do this; do not that, or I will throw you into prison.” This is not a government for reasonable creatures. But “Do as Zeus has commanded, or you will be punished, and be a loser.” “What shall I lose?” Simply your own right action, your fidelity, honor, decency. You can find no losses greater than these.

> Greek: 7. τοῦ δὲ διορθωτοῦ εἰσελθόντος πρὸς αὐτὸν (ἦν δʼ οὗτος Ἐπικούρειος) ἄξιον, ἔφη, τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἡμᾶς παρʼ ὑμῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων πυνθάνεσθαι, καθάπερ τοὺς εἰς ξένην πόλιν ἐλθόντας παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ εἰδότων, τί κράτιστόν ἐστιν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἱστορήσαντες μετίωμεν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ θεώμεθα. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τρία ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, σχεδὸν οὐδεὶς ἀντιλέγει· λοιπὸν ὑμέτερόν ἐστιν ἀποκρίνασθαι, τί ἐστι τὸ κράτιστον. τί ἐροῦμεν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; τὴν σάρκα; καὶ διὰ ταύτην Μάξιμος ἔπλευσεν μέχρι Κασσιόπης χειμῶνος μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ προπέμπων, ἵνʼ ἡσθῇ τῇ σαρκί; ἀρνησαμένου δʼ ἐκείνου καὶ εἰπόντος Μὴ γένοιτο· οὐ προσήκει περὶ τὸ κράτιστον ἐσπουδακέναι; — πάντων μάλιστα προσήκει. — τί οὖν κρεῖσσον ἔχομεν τῆς σαρκός; — τὴν ψυχήν, ἔφη. — ἀγαθὰ δὲ τὰ τοῦ κρατίστου κρείττονά ἐστιν ἢ τὰ τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; — τὰ τοῦ κρατίστου. — ψυχῆς δὲ ἀγαθὰ πότερον προαιρετικά ἐστιν ἢ ἀπροαίρετα; — προαιρετικά. — προαιρετικὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονὴ ἡ ψυχική; — ἔφη. — αὕτη δʼ ἐπὶ τίσιν γίνεται; πότερον ἐφʼ αὑτῇ; ἀλλʼ ἀδιανόητόν ἐστιν· προηγουμένην γάρ τινα ὑφεστάναι δεῖ οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἧς τυγχάνοντες ἡσθησόμεθα κατὰ ψυχήν. — ὡμολόγει καὶ τοῦτο. — ἐπὶ τίνι οὖν ἡσθησόμεθα ταύτην τὴν ψυχικὴν ἡδονήν; εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ψυχικοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, εὕρηται ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. οὐ γὰρ δύναται ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δʼ ἐφʼ ᾧ εὐλόγως ἐπαιρόμεθα, οὐδὲ τοῦ προηγουμένου μὴ ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἐπιγέννημα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἵνα γὰρ εὔλογον ᾖ τὸ ἐπιγέννημα, τὸ προηγούμενον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴ εἴπητε φρένας ἔχοντες· ἀνακόλουθα γὰρ ἐρεῖτε καὶ Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑμῶν δόγμασιν. ὑπολείπεται λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἥδεσθαι τὴν κατὰ ψυχὴν ἡδονήν· πάλιν ἐκεῖνα γίνεται προηγούμενα καὶ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. διὰ τοῦτο ἀφρόνως ἐποίησε Μάξιμος, εἰ διʼ ἄλλο τι ἔπλευσεν ἢ διὰ τὴν σάρκα, τοῦτʼ ἔστι διὰ τὸ κράτιστον. ἀφρόνως δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ εἰ ἀπέχεται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων δικαστὴς ὢν καὶ δυνάμενος λαμβάνειν. ἀλλʼ ἄν σοι δόξῃ, ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκεπτώμεθα, ἵνα κεκρυμμένως, ἵνʼ ἀσφαλῶς, ἵνα μή τις γνῷ. τὸ γὰρ κλέψαι οὐδʼ αὐτὸς Ἐπίκουρος ἀποφαίνει κακόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμπεσεῖν· καὶ ὅτι πίστιν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν λαβεῖν ἀδύνατον, διὰ τοῦτο λέγει μὴ κλέπτετε. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν κομψῶς καὶ περιεσταλμένως γίνηται, λησόμεθα· εἶτα καὶ φίλους ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ ἔχομεν δυνατοὺς καὶ φίλ[ι]ας καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀδρανεῖς εἰσιν· οὐδεὶς τολμήσει ἀναβῆναι τούτου ἕνεκα. τί ἀπέχῃ τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ; ἄφρον ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ἠλίθιόν ἐστιν. ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἂν λέγῃς μοι, ὅτι ἀπέχῃ, πιστεύσω σοι. ὡς γὰρ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τῷ ψευδεῖ φαινομένῳ συγκαταθέσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπονεῦσαι, οὕτως ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ ἀποστῆναι. ὁ πλοῦτος δʼ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οἱονανεὶ τὸ ποιητικώτατόν γε τῶν ἡδονῶν. διὰ τί μὴ περιποιήσῃ αὐτόν; διὰ τί δὲ μὴ τὴν τοῦ γείτονος γυναῖκα διαφθείρωμεν, ἂν δυνώμεθα λαθεῖν, ἂν δὲ φλυαρῇ ὁ ἀνήρ, καὶ αὐτὸν προσεκτραχηλίσωμεν; εἰ θέλεις εἶναι φιλόσοφος οἷος δεῖ, εἴ γε τέλειος, εἰ ἀκολουθῶν σου τοῖς δόγμασιν· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδὲν διοίσεις ἡμῶν τῶν λεγομένων Στωικῶν· καὶ αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἄλλα λέγομεν, ἄλλα δὲ ποιοῦμεν. ἡμεῖς λέγομεν τὰ καλά, ποιοῦμεν τὰ αἰσχρά· σὺ τὴν ἐναντίαν διαστροφὴν ἔσῃ διεστραμμένος δογματίζων τὰ αἰσχρά, ποιῶν τὰ καλά. τὸν θεόν σοι, ἐπινοεῖς Ἐπικουρείων πόλιν; ἐγὼ οὐ γαμῶ. οὐδʼ ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ γαμητέον. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ παιδοποιητέον, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ πολιτευτέον. τί οὖν γένηται; πόθεν οἱ πολῖται; τίς αὐτοὺς παιδεύσει; τίς ἐφήβαρχος, τίς γυμνασίαρχος; τί δὲ καὶ παιδεύσει αὐτούς; ἃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπαιδεύοντο ἢ Ἀθηναῖοι; λάβε μοι νέον, ἄγαγε κατὰ τὰ δόγματά σου. πονηρά ἐστι τὰ δόγματα, ἀνατρεπτικὰ πόλεως, λυμαντικὰ οἴκων, οὐδὲ γυναιξὶ πρέποντα. ἄφες ταῦτʼ, ἄνθρωπε. ζῇς ἐν ἡγεμονούσῃ πόλει· ἄρχειν σε δεῖ, κρίνειν δικαίως, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, σοὶ καλὴν γυναῖκα φαίνεσθαι μηδεμίαν ἢ τὴν σήν, καλὸν παῖδα μηδένα, καλὸν ἀργύρωμα μηδέν, χρύσωμα μηδέν. τούτοις σύμφωνα δόγματα ζήτησον, ἀφʼ ὧν ὁρμώμενος ἡδέως ἀφέξῃ πραγμάτων οὕτως πιθανῶν πρὸς τὸ ἀγαγεῖν καὶ νικῆσαι. ἂν δὲ πρὸς τῇ πιθανότητι τῇ ἐκείνων καὶ φιλοσοφίαν τινά ποτε ταύτην ἐξευρηκότες ὦμεν συνεπωθοῦσαν ἡμᾶς ἐπʼ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐπιρρωννύουσαν, τί γένηται; ἐν τορεύματι τί κράτιστόν ἐστιν, ὁ ἄργυρος ἢ ἡ τέχνη; χειρὸς οὐσία μὲν ἡ σάρξ, προηγούμενα δὲ τὰ χειρὸς ἔργα. οὐκοῦν καὶ καθήκοντα τρισσά· τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ποιὰ εἶναι, τὰ δʼ αὐτὰ τὰ προηγούμενα. οὕτως καὶ ἀνθρώπου οὐ τὴν ὕλην δεῖ τιμᾶν, τὰ σαρκίδια, ἀλλὰ τὰ προηγούμενα. τίνα ἐστὶ ταῦτα; πολιτεύεσθαι, γαμεῖν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι, θεὸν σέβειν, γονέων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθόλου ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὡς ἕκαστον τούτων δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς πεφύκαμεν. πεφύκαμεν δὲ πῶς; ὡς ἐλεύθεροι, ὡς γενναῖοι, ὡς αἰδήμονες. ποῖον γὰρ ἄλλο ζῷον ἐρυθριᾷ, ποῖον αἰσχροῦ φαντασίαν λαμβάνει; τὴν ἡδονὴν δʼ ὑπόταξαι τούτοις ὡς διάκονον, ὡς ὑπηρέτιν, ἵνα προθυμίας ἐκκαλέσηται, ἵνʼ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔργοις παρακρατῇ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ πλούσιός εἰμι καὶ οὐδενὸς χρεία μοί ἐστιν. — τί οὖν ἔτι προσποιῇ φιλοσοφεῖν; ἀρκεῖ τὰ χρυσώματα καὶ τὰ ἀργυρώματα· τί σοι χρεία δογμάτων; — ἀλλὰ καὶ κριτής εἰμι τῶν Ἑλλήνων. — οἶδας κρίνειν; τί σε ἐποίησεν εἰδέναι; — Καῖσάρ μοι κωδίκελλον ἔγραψεν. — Γραψάτω σοι, ἵνα κρίνῃς περὶ τῶν μουσικῶν· καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος; ὅμως δὲ πῶς κριτὴς ἐγένου; τὴν τίνος χεῖρα καταφιλήσας, τὴν Συμφόρου ἢ τὴν Νουμηνίου; τίνος πρὸ τοῦ κοιτῶνος κοιμηθείς; τίνι πέμψας δῶρα; εἶτα οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ, ὅτι τοσούτου ἄξιόν ἐστι κριτὴν εἶναι ὅσου Νουμήνιος; — ἀλλὰ δύναμαι ὃν θέλω εἰς φυλακὴν βαλεῖν. — ὡς λίθον. — ἀλλὰ δύναμαι ξυλοκοπῆσαι ὃν θέλω. — ὡς ὄνον. οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων ἀρχή. ὡς λογικῶν ἡμῶν ἄρξον δεικνὺς ἡμῖν τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ ἀκολουθήσομεν· δείκνυε τὰ ἀσύμφορα καὶ ἀποστραφησόμεθα. ζηλωτὰς ἡμᾶς κατασκεύασον σεαυτοῦ ὡς Σωκράτης ἑαυτοῦ. ἐκεῖνος ἦν ὁ ὡς ἀνθρώπων ἄρχων, ὁ κατεσκευακὼς ὑποτεταχότας αὐτῷ τὴν ὄρεξιν τὴν αὑτῶν, τὴν ἔκκλισιν, τὴν ὁρμήν, τὴν ἀφορμήν. τοῦτο ποίησον, τοῦτο μὴ ποιήσῃς· εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς φυλακήν σε βαλῶ. οὐκέτι ὡς λογικῶν ἡ ἀρχὴ γίνεται. ἀλλʼ ὡς ὁ Ζεὺς διέταξεν, τοῦτο ποίησον· ἂν δὲ μὴ ποιήσῃς, ζημιωθήσῃ, βλαβήσῃ. ποίαν βλάβην; ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ποιῆσαι ἃ δεῖ· ἀπολέσεις τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν κόσμιον. τούτων ἄλλας βλάβας μείζονας μὴ ζήτει.

[¶2] 8. In the same manner as we exercise ourselves against sophistical questions, we should exercise ourselves likewise in relation to such semblances as every day occur; for these, too, offer questions to us. Such a one’s son is dead. What think you of it? Answer: It is a thing inevitable, and therefore not an evil. Such a one is disinherited by his father. What think you of it? It is inevitable; and so not an evil. Caesar has condemned him. This is inevitable, and so not an evil. He has been afflicted by it. This is controllable by Will; it is an evil. He has supported it bravely. This is within the control of Will; it is a good. If we train ourselves in this manner we shall make improvement; for we shall never assent to anything but what the semblance itself includes. A son is dead. What then? A son is dead. Nothing more? Nothing. A ship is lost. What then? A ship is lost. He is carried to prison. What then? He is carried to prison. That he is unhappy is an addition which every one must make for himself. “But Zeus does not order these things rightly.” Why so? Because he has made you to be patient? Because he has made you to be brave? Because he has made them to be no evils? Because it is permitted you, while you suffer them, to be happy? Because he has opened you the door whenever they do not suit you? Go out, man, and do not complain! If you would know how the Romans treat philosophers, hear. Italicus, esteemed one of the greatest philosophers among them, being in a passion with his own people when I was by, said, as if he had suffered some intolerable evil, “cannot bear it; you are the ruin of me; you will make me just like him,” pointing to me.

> Greek: 8. ὡς πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτήματα τὰ σοφιστικὰ γυμναζόμεθα, οὕτως καὶ πρὸς τὰς φαντασίας καθʼ ἡμέραν ἔδει γυμνάζεσθαι· προτείνουσι γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ αὗται ἐρωτήματα. ὁ υἱὸς ἀπέθανε τοῦ δεῖνος. ἀπόκριναι ἀπροαίρετον, οὐ κακόν. ὁ πατὴρ τὸν δεῖνα ἀποκληρονόμον ἀπέλ[ε]ιπεν. τί σοι δοκεῖ; ἀπροαίρετον, οὐ κακόν. Καῖσαρ αὐτὸν κατέκρινεν. ἀπροαίρετον, οὐ κακόν. ἐλυπήθη ἐπὶ τούτοις. προαιρετικόν, κακόν. γενναίως ὑπέμεινεν. προαιρετικόν, ἀγαθόν. κἂν οὕτως ἐθιζώμεθα, προκόψομεν· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄλλῳ συγκαταθησόμεθα ἢ οὗ φαντασία καταληπτικὴ γίνεται. ὁ υἱὸς ἀπέθανε. τί ἐγένετο; ὁ υἱὸς ἀπέθανεν. ἄλλο οὐδέν; οὐδ[ε]έν. τὸ πλοῖον ἀπώλετο. τί ἐγένετο; τὸ πλοῖον ἀπώλετο. εἰς φυλακὴν ἀπήχθη. τί γέγονεν; εἰς φυλακὴν ἀπήχθη. τὸ δʼ ὅτι κακῶς πέπραχεν ἐξ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος προστίθησιν. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ταῦτα ὁ Ζεὺς ποιεῖ. διὰ τί; ὅτι σε ὑπομενητικὸν ἐποίησεν, ὅτι μεγαλόψυχον, ὅτι ἀφεῖλεν αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι κακά, ὅτι ἔξεστίν σοι πάσχοντι ταῦτα εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὅτι σοι τὴν θύραν ἤνοιξεν, ὅταν σοι μὴ ποιῇ; ἄνθρωπε, ἔξελθε καὶ μὴ ἐγκάλει. πῶς ἔχουσι Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς φιλοσόφους ἂν θέλῃς γνῶναι, ἄκουσον. Ἰταλικὸς ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν αὐτῶν φιλόσοφος εἶναι παρόντος ποτέ μου χαλεπήνας τοῖς ἰδίοις, ὡς ἀνήκεστα πάσχων, οὐ δύναμαι, ἔφη, φέρειν· ἀπόλλυτέ με, ποιήσετέ με τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι, δείξας ἐμέ.

[¶3] 9. A person came to him who was going to Rome on a lawsuit in which his dignity was concerned; and after telling him the occasion of his journey, asked him what he thought of the affair. If you ask me, says Epictetus, what will happen to you at Rome, and whether you shall gain or lose your cause, I have no suggestion as to that. But if you ask me how you shall fare, I can answer, If you have right principles, well; if wrong ones, ill. For every action turns upon its principle. What was the reason that you so earnestly desired to be chosen Governor of the Gnossians? Principle. What is the reason that you are now going to Rome? Principle. And in winter too, and with danger and expense? Why, because it is necessary. What tells you so? Your principle. If, then, principles are the source of all our actions, wherever any one has bad principles the effect will correspond to the cause. Well, then; are all our principles sound? Are both yours and your antagonist’s? How then do you differ? Or are yours better than his? Why? You think so, and so thinks he of his, and so do madmen. This is a bad criterion. But show me that you have given some attention and care to your principles. As you now take a voyage to Rome for the government of the Gnossians, and are not contented to stay at home with the honors you before enjoyed, but desire something greater and more illustrious, did you ever take such a voyage in order to examine your own principles and to throw away the bad ones, if you happened to have any? Did you ever apply to any one upon this account? What time did you ever appoint to yourself for it? What age? Run over your years. If you are ashamed of me, do it for yourself. Did you examine your principles when you were a child? Did not you act then as now? When you were a youth, and frequented the schools of the orators, and yourself made declamations, did you ever imagine that you were deficient in anything? And when you became a man and entered upon public business, pleaded causes, and acquired credit, whom did you then recognize as your equal? How would you have borne that any one should examine whether your principles were bad? What, then, would you have me say to you? “Assist me in this affair.” I have no suggestion to offer for that. Neither are you come to me, if it be upon that account you came, as to a philosopher; but as you would come to an herb-seller or a shoemaker. “For what purposes, then, can the philosophers give suggestions?” For preserving and conducting the Reason conformably to Nature, whatever happens. Do you think this a small thing? “No, but the greatest.” Well, and does it require but a short time, and may it be taken as you pass by? If you can, take it then; and so you will say, “have visited Epictetus.” Ay; just as you would visit a stone or a statue. For you have seen me, and nothing more. But he visits a man, as a man, who learns his principles, and, in return, shows his own. Learn my principles; show me yours. Then say you have visited me. Let us confute each other. If I have any bad principle, take it away. If you have any, bring it forth. This is visiting a philosopher. No, but “It lies in our way, and while we are about hiring a ship, we may call on Epictetus. Let us see what he says.” And then when you are gone, you say, “Epictetus is nothing. His language was inaccurate, was barbarous.” For what else did you come to criticise? “Well; but if I employ myself in these things, I shall be without an estate, like you,—without plate, without equipage, like you.” Nothing, perhaps, is necessary to be said to this, but that I do not want them. But if you possess many things, you still want others; so that whether you will or not, you are poorer than I. “What then do I need?” What you have not,—constancy, a mind conformable to Nature, and a freedom from perturbation. Patron or no patron, what care I? But you do. I am richer than you; I am not anxious what Caesar will think of me; I flatter no one on that account. This I have, instead of silver and gold plate. You have your vessels of gold; but your discourse, your principles, your opinions, your pursuits, your desires, are of mere earthen ware. When I have all these conformable to Nature, why should not I bestow some study upon my reasoning too? I am at leisure. My mind is under no distraction. In this freedom from distraction, what shall I do? Have I anything more becoming a man than this? You, when you have nothing to do, are restless; you go to the theatre, or perhaps to bathe. Why should not the philosopher polish his reasoning? You have fine crystal and myrrhine vases; I have acute forms of arguing. To you, all you have appears little; to me all I have seems great. Your appetite is insatiable; mine is satisfied. When children thrust their hand into a narrow jar of nuts and figs, if they fill it, they cannot get it out again; then they begin crying. Drop a few of them, and you will get out the rest. And do you too drop your desire; do not demand much, and you will attain.

> Greek: 9. εἰσελθόντος δέ τινος πρὸς αὐτόν, ὃς εἰς Ῥώμην ἀνῄει δίκην ἔχων περὶ τιμῆς τῆς αὑτοῦ, πυθόμενος τὴν αἰτίαν, διʼ ἣν ἄνεισιν, ἐπερωτήσαντος ἐκείνου, τίνα γνώμην ἔχει περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, εἴ μου πυνθάνῃ, τί πράξεις ἐν Ῥώμῃ, φησίν, πότερον κατορθώσεις ἢ ἀποτεύξῃ, θεώρημα πρὸς τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχω· εἰ δὲ πυνθάνῃ, πῶς πράξεις, τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὀρθὰ δόγματα ἔχεις, καλῶς, εἰ δὲ φαῦλα, κακῶς. παντὶ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ πράσσειν τι δόγμα. τί γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ ἐπεθύμησας προστάτης χειροτονηθῆναι Κνωσίων; τὸ δόγμα. τί ἐστιν, διʼ ὃ νῦν εἰς Ῥώμην ἀνέρχῃ; τὸ δόγμα. καὶ μετὰ χειμῶνος καὶ κινδύνου καὶ ἀναλωμάτων; — ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστιν. — τίς σοι λέγει τοῦτο; τὸ δόγμα. οὐκοῦν εἰ πάντων αἴτια τὰ δόγματα, φαῦλα δέ τις ἔχει δόγματα, οἷον ἂν ᾖ τὸ αἴτιον, τοιοῦτον καὶ τὸ ἀποτελούμενον. ἆρʼ οὖν πάντες ἔχομεν ὑγιῆ δόγματα καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἀντίδικός σου; καὶ πῶς διαφέρεσθε; ἀλλὰ σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖνος; διὰ τί; δοκεῖ σοι. κἀκείνῳ καὶ τοῖς μαινομένοις. τοῦτο πονηρὸν κριτήριον. ἀλλὰ δεῖξόν μοι, ὅτι ἐπίσκεψίν τινα καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν πεποίησαι τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων. καὶ ὡς νῦν εἰς Ῥώμην πλεῖς ἐπὶ τῷ προστάτης εἶναι Κνωσίων καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ σοι μένειν ἐν οἴκῳ τὰς τιμὰς ἔχοντι ἃς εἶχες, ἀλλὰ μείζονός τινος ἐπιθυμεῖς καὶ ἐπιφανεστέρου, πότε οὕτως ἔπλευσας ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰ δόγματα ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ σαυτοῦ καὶ εἴ τι φαῦλον ἔχεις, ἐκβαλεῖν; τίνι προσελήλυθας τούτου ἕνεκα; ποῖον χρόνον ἐπέταξας σαυτῷ, ποίαν ἡλικίαν; ἔπελθέ σου τοὺς χρόνους, εἰ ἐμὲ αἰσχύνῃ, αὐτὸς πρὸς σαυτόν. ὅτε παῖς ἦς, ἐξήταζες τὰ σαυτοῦ δόγματα; οὐχὶ δʼ ὡς πάντα ποιεῖς, ἐποίεις ἃ ἐποίεις; ὅτε δὲ μειράκιον ἤδη καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων ἤκουες καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμελέτας, τί σοι λείπειν ἐφαντάζου; ὅτε δὲ νεανίσκος καὶ ἤδη ἐπολιτεύου καὶ δίκας αὐτὸς ἔλεγες καὶ εὐδοκίμεις, τίς σοι ἔτι ἴσος ἐφαίνετο; ποῦ δʼ ἂν ἠνέσχου ὑπό τινος ἐξεταζόμενος, ὅτι πονηρὰ ἔχεις δόγματα; τί οὖν σοι θέλεις εἴπω; — βοήθησόν μοι εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα. — οὐκ ἔχω πρὸς τοῦτο θεωρήματα· οὐδὲ σύ, εἰ τούτου ἕνεκα ἐλήλυθας πρὸς ἐμέ, ὡς πρὸς φιλόσοφον ἐλήλυθας, ἀλλʼ ὡς πρὸς λαχανοπώλην, ἀλλʼ ὡς πρὸς σκυτέα. — πρὸς τί οὖν ἔχουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι θεωρήματα; — πρὸς τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἂν ἀποβῇ, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἡμῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν. μικρόν σοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο; — οὔ· ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγιστον. — τί οὖν; ὀλίγου χρόνου χρείαν ἔχει καὶ ἔστι παρερχόμενον αὐτὸ λαβεῖν; εἰ δύνασαι, λάμβανε. εἶτʼ ἐρεῖς συνέβαλ[λ]ον Ἐπικτήτῳ ὡς λίθῳ, ὡς ἀνδριάντι. εἶδες γάρ με καὶ πλέον οὐδέν. ἀνθρώπῳ δʼ ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ συμβάλλει ὁ τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ καταμανθάνων καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει τὰ ἴδια δεικνύων. κατάμαθέ μου τὰ δόγματα, δεῖξόν μοι τὰ σὰ καὶ οὕτως λέγε συμβεβληκέναι μοι. ἐλέγξωμεν ἀλλήλους· εἴ τι ἔχω κακὸν δόγμα, ἄφελε αὐτό· εἴ τι ἔχεις, θὲς εἰς τὸ μέσον. τοῦτό ἐστι φιλοσόφῳ συμβάλλειν. οὔ· ἀλλὰ πάροδός ἐστι καὶ ἕως τὸ πλοῖον μισθούμεθα, δυνάμεθα καὶ Ἐπίκτητον ἰδεῖν· ἴδωμεν, τί ποτε λέγει. εἶτʼ ἐξελθὼν οὐδὲν ἦν ὁ Ἐπίκτητος, ἐσολοίκιζεν, ἐβαρβάριζεν. τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου κριταὶ εἰσέρχεσθε; ἀλλʼ ἂν πρὸς τούτοις, φησίν, ὦ, ἀγρὸν οὐχ ἕξω ὡς οὐδὲ σύ, ποτήρια ἀργυρᾶ οὐχ ἕξω ὡς οὐδὲ σύ, κτήνη καλὰ ὡς οὐδὲ σύ. πρὸς ταῦτα ἴσως ἀρκεῖ ἐκεῖνο εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἀλλὰ χρείαν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔχω· σὺ δʼ ἂν πολλὰ κτήσῃ, ἄλλων χρείαν ἔχεις, θέλεις οὐ θέλεις, πτωχότερός μου. — τίνος οὖν ἔχω χρείαν; — τοῦ σοὶ μὴ παρόντος· τοῦ εὐσταθεῖν, τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν, τοῦ μὴ ταράττεσθαι. πάτρων, οὐ πάτρων, τί μοι μέλει; σοὶ μέλει. πλουσιώτερός σου εἰμί· οὐκ ἀγωνιῶ, τί φρονήσει περὶ ἐμοῦ ὁ Καῖσαρ· οὐδένα κολακεύω τούτου ἕνεκα. ταῦτα ἔχω ἀντὶ τῶν ἀργυρωμάτων, ἀντὶ τῶν χρυσωμάτων. σὺ χρυσᾶ σκεύη, ὀστράκινον τὸν λόγον, τὰ δόγματα, τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, τὰς ὁρμάς, τὰς ὀρέξεις. ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα ἔχω κατὰ φύσιν, διὰ τί μὴ φιλοτεχνήσω καὶ περὶ τὸν λόγον; εὐσχολῶ γάρ· οὐ περισπᾶταί μου ἡ διάνοια. τί ποιήσω μὴ περισπώμενος; τούτου τί ἀνθρωπικώτερον ἔχω; ὑμεῖς ὅταν μηδὲν ἔχητε, ταράσσεσθε, εἰς θέατρον εἰσέρχεσθε ἢ ἀναλύετε· διὰ τί ὁ φιλόσοφος μὴ ἐξεργάσηται τὸν αὑτοῦ λόγον; σὺ κρυστάλλινα, ἐγὼ τὰ τοῦ Ψευδομένου· σὺ μούρρινα, ἐγὼ τὰ τοῦ Ἀποφάσκοντος. σοὶ πάντα μικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἔχεις, ἐμοὶ τὰ ἐμὰ πάντα μεγάλα. ἀπλήρωτός σου ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ἡ ἐμὴ πεπλήρωται. τοῖς παιδίοις εἰς στενόβρογχον κεράμιον καθιεῖσιν τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἐκφέρουσιν ἰσχαδοκάρυα τοῦτο συμβαίνει· ἂν πληρώσῃ τὴν χεῖρα, ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐ δύναται, εἶτα κλάει. ἄφες ὀλίγα ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξοίσεις. καὶ σὺ ἄφες τὴν ὄρεξιν· μὴ πολλῶν ἐπιθύμει καὶ οἴσεις.

[¶4] 10. We should have all our principles ready for use on every occasion,—at dinner, such as relate to dinner; in the bath, such as relate to the bath; in the bed, such as relate to the bed.
Let not the stealing god of sleep surprise,
Nor creep in slumbers on thy weary eyes,
Ere every action of the former day
Strictly thou dost, and righteously survey.
What have I done? In what have I transgressed?
What good, or ill, has this day’s life expressed?
Where have I failed in what I ought to do?
If evil were thy deeds, repent and mourn;
If good, rejoice. We should retain these verses so as to apply them to our use; not merely to say them by rote, as we do with verses in honor of Apollo. Again, in a fever we should have such principles ready as relate to a fever; and not, as soon as we are taken ill, forget all. Provided I do but act like a philosopher, let what will happen. Some way or other I depart must from this frail body, whether a fever comes or not. What is it to be a philosopher? Is it not to be prepared against events? Do you not comprehend that you then say, in effect, “If I am but prepared to bear all events with calmness, let what will happen?” Otherwise you are like an athlete, who, after receiving a blow, should quit the combat. In that case, indeed, you might leave off without a penalty. But what shall we get by leaving off philosophy? What, then; ought each of us to say upon every difficult occasion, “It was for this that I exercised; it was for this that I trained myself”? God says to you, Give me a proof if you have gone through the preparatory combats according to rule; if you have followed a proper diet and proper exercise; if you have obeyed your master; and after this, do you faint at the very time of action? Now is your time for a fever. Bear it well. For thirst; bear it well. For hunger; bear it well. Is it not in your power? Who shall restrain you? A physician may restrain you from drinking, but he cannot restrain you from bearing your thirst well. He may restrain you from eating, but he cannot restrain you from bearing hunger well. “But I cannot follow my studies.” And for what end do you follow them, slave? Is it not that you may be prosperous, that you may be constant, that you may think and act conformably to Nature? What restrains you, but that, in a fever, you may keep your Reason in harmony with Nature? Here is the test of the matter. Here is the trial of the philosopher; for a fever is a part of life, as is a walk, a voyage, or a journey. Do you read when you are walking? No, nor in a fever. But when you walk well, you attend to what belongs to a walker; so, if you bear a fever well, you have everything belonging to one in a fever. What is it to bear a fever well? Not to blame either God or man, not to be afflicted at what happens, to await death in a right and becoming manner, and to do what is to be done. When the physician enters, not to dread what he may say; nor, if he should tell you that you are doing well, to be too much rejoiced; for what good has he told you? When you were in health, what good did it do you? Not to be dejected when he tells you that you are very ill; for what is it to be very ill? To be near the separation of soul and body. What harm is there in this, then? If you are not near it now, will you not be near it hereafter? What, will the world be quite overturned when you die? Why, then, do you flatter your physician? Why do you say, “If you please, sir, I shall do well”? Why do you furnish an occasion to his pride? Why do not you treat a physician, with regard to an insignificant body,—which is not yours, but by nature mortal,—as you do a shoemaker about your foot, or a carpenter about a house? It is the season for these things, to one in a fever. If he fulfils these, he has what belongs to him. For it is not the business of a philosopher to take care of these mere externals,—of his wine, his oil, or his body,—but of his Reason. And how with regard to externals? Not to behave inconsiderately about them. What occasion is there, then, for fear; what occasion for anger, for desire, about things that belong to others, or are of no value? For two rules we should always have ready,—that there is nothing good or evil save in the Will; and that we are not to lead events, but to follow them. “My brother ought not to have treated me so.” Very true; but he must see to that. However he treats me, I am to act rightly with regard to him; for the one is my own concern, the other is not; the one cannot be restrained, the other may.

> Greek: 10. ἑκάστου δόγματος ὅταν ἡ χρεία παρῇ, πρόχειρον αὐτὸ ἔχειν δεῖ· ἐπʼ ἀρίστῳ τὰ περὶ ἀρίστου, ἐν βαλανείῳ τὰ περὶ βαλανείου, ἐν κοίτῃ τὰ περὶ κοίτης. μηδʼ ὕπνον μαλακοῖσιν ἐπʼ ὄμμασι προσδέξασθαι, πρὶν τῶν ἡμερινῶν ἔργων λογίσασθαι ἕκαστα· πῇ παρέβην; τί δʼ ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐ τετέλεσται; ἀρξάμενος δʼ ἀπὸ τοῦδε ἐπέξιθι· καὶ μετέπειτα δειλὰ μὲν ῥέξας ἐπιπλήσσεο, χρηστὰ δὲ τέρπου. καὶ τούτους τοὺς στίχους κατέχειν χρηστικῶς, οὐχ ἵνα διʼ αὐτῶν ἀναφωνῶμεν, ὡς διὰ τοῦ Παιὰν Ἄπολλον. πάλιν ἐν πυρετῷ τὰ πρὸς τοῦτο· μή, ἂν πυρέξωμεν, ἀφιέναι πάντα καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι· ἂν ἐγὼ ἔτι φιλοσοφήσω, ὃ θέλει γινέσθω. πού ποτʼ ἀπελθόντα τοῦ σωματίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εἴ τε καὶ πυρετὸς οὐκ ἔρχεται. τὸ δὲ φιλοσοφῆσαι τί ἐστιν; οὐχὶ παρασκευάσασθαι πρὸς τὰ συμβαίνοντα; οὐ παρακολουθεῖς οὖν, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι λέγεις ἂν ἔτι ἐγὼ παρασκευάσωμαι πρὸς τὸ πρᾴως φέρειν τὰ συμβαίνοντα, ὃ θέλει γινέσθω; οἷον εἴ τις πληγὰς λαβὼν ἀποσταίη τοῦ παγκρατιάζειν. ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖ μὲν ἔξεστι καταλῦσαι καὶ μὴ δέρεσθαι, ἐνθάδε δʼ ἂν καταλύσωμεν φιλοσοφοῦντες, τί ὄφελος; τί οὖν δεῖ λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐφʼ ἑκάστου τῶν τραχέων; ὅτι ἕνεκα τούτου ἐγυμναζόμην, ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἤσκουν. ὁ θεός σοι λέγει δός μοι ἀπόδειξιν, εἰ νομίμως ἤθλησας, εἰ ἔφαγες ὅσα δεῖ, εἰ ἐγυμνάσθης, εἰ τοῦ ἀλείπτου ἤκουσας· εἶτʼ ἐπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου καταμαλακίζῃ; νῦν τοῦ πυρέττειν καιρός ἐστιν, τοῦτο καλῶς γινέσθω· τοῦ διψᾶν, δίψα καλῶς· τοῦ πεινᾶν, πείνα καλῶς. οὐκ [ἐξ]ἔστιν ἐπὶ σοί; τίς σε κωλύσει; ἀλλὰ πιεῖν μὲν κωλύσει ὁ ἰατρός, καλῶς δὲ διψᾶν οὐ δύναται· καὶ φαγεῖν μὲν κωλύσει, πεινᾶν δὲ καλῶς οὐ δύναται. ἀλλʼ οὐ φιλολογῶ;— τίνος δʼ ἕνεκα φιλολογεῖς; ἀνδράποδον, οὐχ ἵνα εὐροῇς; οὐχ ἵνα εὐσταθῇς; οὐχ ἵνα κατὰ φύσιν ἔχῃς καὶ διεξάγῃς; τί κωλύει πυρέσσοντα κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν; ἐνθάδʼ ὁ ἔλεγχος τοῦ πράγματος, ἡ δοκιμασία τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος. μέρος γάρ ἐστι καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ βίου, ὡς περίπατος, ὡς πλοῦς, ὡς ὁδοιπορία, οὕτως καὶ πυρετός. μή τι περιπατῶν ἀναγιγνώσκεις; — οὔ. — οὕτως οὐδὲ πυρέσσων. ἀλλʼ ἂν καλῶς περιπατῇς, ἔχεις τὸ τοῦ περιπατοῦντος· ἂν καλῶς πυρέξῃς, ἔχεις τὰ τοῦ πυρέσσοντος. τί ἐστι καλῶς πυρέσσειν; μὴ θεὸν μέμψασθαι, μὴ ἄνθρωπον, μὴ θλιβῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν γινομένων, εὖ καὶ καλῶς προσδέχεσθαι τὸν θάνατον, ποιεῖν τὰ προστασσόμενα· ὅταν ὁ ἰατρὸς εἰσέρχηται, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι, τί εἴπῃ, μηδʼ ἂν εἴπῃ κομψῶς ἔχεις, ὑπερχαίρειν· τί γάρ σοι ἀγαθὸν εἶπεν; ὅτε γὰρ ὑγίαινες, τί σοι ἦν ἀγαθόν; μηδʼ ἂν εἴπῃ κακῶς ἔχεις, ἀθυμεῖν· τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ κακῶς ἔχειν; ἐγγίζειν τῷ διαλυθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος. τί οὖν δεινόν ἐστιν; ἐὰν νῦν μὴ ἐγγίσῃς, ὕστερον οὐκ ἐγγιεῖς; ἀλλὰ ὁ κόσμος μέλλει ἀνατρέπεσθαι σοῦ ἀποθανόντος; τί οὖν κολακεύεις τὸν ἰατρόν; τί λέγεις ἐὰν σὺ θέλῃς, κύριε, καλῶς ἕξω; τί παρέχεις αὐτῷ ἀφορμὴν τοῦ ἐπᾶραι ὀφρῦν; οὐχὶ δὲ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀξίαν αὐτῷ ἀποδίδως, ὡς σκυτεῖ περὶ τὸν πόδα, ὡς τέκτονι περὶ τὴν οἰκίαν, οὕτως καὶ τῷ ἰατρῷ περὶ τὸ σωμάτιον, τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν, τὸ φύσει νεκρόν; τούτων ὁ καιρός ἐστι τῷ πυρέσσοντι· ἂν ταῦτα ἐκπληρώσῃ, ἔχει τὰ αὑτοῦ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσόφου ταῦτα ⟨τὰ⟩ ἐκτὸς τηρεῖν, οὔτε ⟨τὸ⟩ οἰνάριον οὔτε τὸ ἐλάδιον οὔτε τὸ σωμάτιον, ἀλλὰ τί; τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικόν. τὰ δʼ ἔξω πῶς; μέχρι τοῦ μὴ ἀλογίστως κατὰ ταῦτα ἀναστρέφεσθαι. ποῦ οὖν ἔτι καιρὸς τοῦ φοβεῖσθαι; ποῦ οὖν ἔτι καιρὸς ὀργῆς; ποῦ φόβου περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, περὶ τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων; δύο γὰρ ταῦτα πρόχειρα ἔχειν δεῖ· ὅτι ἔξω τῆς προαιρέσεως οὐδέν ἐστιν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ προηγεῖσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλʼ ἐπακολουθεῖν. οὐκ ἔδει οὕτως μοι προσενεχθῆναι τὸν ἀδελφόν. οὔ· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἐκεῖνος ὄψεται. ἐγὼ δʼ, ὡς ἂν προσενεχθῇ, αὐτὸς ὡς δεῖ χρήσομαι τοῖς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμόν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἀλλότριον· τοῦτο οὐδεὶς κωλῦσαι δύναται, ἐκεῖνο κωλύεται.

[¶5] 11. There are some punishments appointed, as by a law, for such as disobey the Divine admnistration. Whoever shall esteem anything good, except what depends on the Will, let him envy, let him covet, let him flatter, let him be full of perturbation. Whoever esteems anything else to be evil, let him grieve, let him mourn, let him lament, let him be wretched. And yet, though thus severely punished, we cannot desist. Remember what the poet says of a guest,—
It were not lawful to affront a guest,
Even did the worst draw nigh. This too you should be prepared to say with regard to a father, It is not lawful for me to affront you, father, even if a worse than you had come; for all are from paternal Zeus. And so of a brother; for all are from kindred Zeus. And thus we shall find Zeus to be the superintendent of all the other relations.

> Greek: 11. εἰσί τινες ὡς ἐκ νόμου διατεταγμέναι κολάσεις τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει· ὃς ἂν ἄλλο τι ἡγήσηται ἀγαθὸν παρὰ τὰ προαιρετικά, φθονείτω, ἐπιθυμείτω, κολακευέτω, ταρασσέσθω· ὃς ἂν ἄλλο κακόν, λυπείσθω, πενθείτω, θρηνείτω, δυστυχείτω. καὶ ὅμως οὕτως πικρῶς κολαζόμενοι ἀποστῆναι οὐ δυνάμεθα. μέμνησο, τί λέγει ὁ ποιητὴς περὶ τοῦ ξένου· ξεῖνʼ, οὔ μοι θέμις ἔστʼ[ι καὶ], οὐδʼ εἰ κακίων σέθεν ⟨ἔλθοι,⟩ ⟨ξεῖνον ἀτιμῆσαι· πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἅπα⟩ντες ξεῖνοί τε πτωχοί τε. τοῦτο οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ πατρὸς πρόχειρον ἔχειν· οὔ μοι θέμις ἔστʼ οὐδʼ εἰ κακίων σέθεν ἔλθοι, πατέρʼ ἀτιμῆσαι· πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἅπαντες τοῦ Πατρῴου· καὶ ἐπʼ ἀδελφῷ· πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἅπαντες τοῦ Ὁμογνίου. καὶ οὕτως κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας σχέσεις εὑρήσομεν ἐπόπτην τὸν Δία.

[¶6] 12. We are not to carry our training beyond Nature and Reason; for thus we, who call ourselves philosophers, shall not differ from jugglers. For it is no doubt difficult to walk upon a rope, and not only difficult, but dangerous. Ought we too, for that reason, to make it our study to walk upon a rope, or balance a pole, or grasp a statue? By no means. It is not everything difficult or dangerous that is a proper training, but such things as are conducive to what lies before us to do. “And what is it that lies before us to do?” To have our desires and aversions free from restraint. “How is that?” Not to be disappointed of our desire, nor incur our aversion. To this ought our training to be directed. For without vigorous and steady training, it is not possible to preserve our desire undisappointed and our aversion unincurred; and therefore, if we suffer it to be externally employed on things uncontrollable by Will, be assured that your desire will neither gain its object, nor your aversion avoid it. And because habit has a powerful influence, and we are habituated to apply our desire and aversion to externals only. we must oppose one habit to another: and where the semblances are most treacherous, there oppose the force of training. I am inclined to pleasure. I will bend myself, even unduly, to the other side, as a matter of training. I am averse to pain. I will strive and wrestle with these semblances, that I may cease to shrink from any such object. For who is truly in training? He who endeavors totally to control desire, and to apply aversion only to things controllable by Will, and strives for it most in the most difficult cases. Hence different persons are to be trained in different ways. What signifies it, to this purpose, to balance a pole, or to go about with tent and implements [of exhibition]? If you are hasty, man, let it be your training to bear ill language patiently; and when you are affronted, not to be angry. Thus, at length, you may arrive at such a proficiency as, when any one strikes you, to say to yourself, “Let me suppose this to be like grasping a statue.” Next train yourself to make but a moderate use of wine,—not to drink a great deal, to which some are so foolish as to train themselves,—but to abstain from this first; and then to abstain from women and from gluttony. Afterwards you will venture into the lists at some proper season, by way of trial, if at all, to see whether these semblances get the better of you as much as they used to do. But at first flee from what is stronger than you. The contest between a fascinating woman and a young man just initiated into philosophy is unequal. The brass pot and the earthen pitcher, as the fable says, are an unfair match. Next to the desires and aversions is the second class, of the pursuits and avoidances; that they may be obedient to reason; that nothing may be done improperly, in point of time and place, or in any other respect. The third class relates to the faculty of assent and to what is plausible and persuasive. As Socrates said that we are not to lead a life which is not tested, so neither are we to admit an untested semblance; but to say, “Stop, let me see what you are and whence you come,” just as the police say, “Show me your pass.” “Have you that indorsement from Nature which is necessary to the acceptance of every semblance?” In short, whatever things are applied to the body by those who train it, so may these be used in our training if they any way affect desire or aversion. But if this be done for mere ostentation, it belongs to one who looks and seeks for something external, and strives for spectators to exclaim, “What a great man!” Hence Apollonius said well, “If you have a mind to train yourself for your own benefit, when you are choking with heat, take a little cold water in your mouth, and spit it out again, and hold your tongue.”

> Greek: 12. τὰς ἀσκήσεις οὐ δεῖ διὰ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ παραδόξων ποιεῖσθαι, ἐπεί τοι τῶν θαυματοποιῶν οὐδὲν διοίσομεν οἱ λέγοντες φιλοσοφεῖν. δύσκολον γάρ ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ σχοινίου περιπατεῖν καὶ οὐ μόνον δύσκολον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπικίνδυνον. τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς μελετᾶν ἐπὶ σχοινίου περιπατεῖν ἢ φοίνικα ἱστάνειν ἢ ἀνδριάντας περιλαμβάνειν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δύσκολον πᾶν καὶ ἐπικίνδυνον ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς ἄσκησιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσφορον τῷ προκειμένῳ ἐκπονηθῆναι. τί δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἐκπονηθῆναι; ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει ἀκωλύτως ἀναστρέφεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἐστιν, μήτε ὀρεγόμενον ἀποτυγχάνειν μήτʼ ἐκκλίνοντα περιπίπτειν. πρὸς τοῦτο οὖν καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν ῥέπειν δεῖ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναπότευκτον σχεῖν τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἀπερίπτωτον ἄνευ μεγάλης καὶ συνεχοῦς ἀσκήσεως, ἴσθι ὅτι, ἐὰν ἔξω ἐάσῃς ἀποστρέφεσθαι αὐτὴν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα, οὔτε τὴν ὄρεξιν ἐπιτευκτικὴν ἕξεις οὔτε τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἀπερίπτωτον. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔθος ἰσχυρὸν προηγῆται πρὸς μόνα ταῦτα εἰθισμένων ἡμῶν χρῆσθαι ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει, δεῖ τῷ ἔθει τούτῳ ἐναντίον ἔθος ἀντιθεῖναι καὶ ὅπου ὁ πολὺς ὄλισθος τῶν φαντασιῶν, ἐκεῖ ἀντιτιθέναι τὸ ἀσκητικόν. Ἑτεροκλινῶς ἔχω πρὸς ἡδονήν· ἀνατοιχήσω ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον τῆς ἀσκήσεως ἕνεκα. ἐκκλιτικῶς ἔχω πόνου· τρίψω μου καὶ γυμνάσω πρὸς τοῦτο τὰς φαντασίας ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποστῆναι τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ τοιούτου. τίς γάρ ἐστιν ἀσκητής; ὁ μελετῶν ὀρέξει μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι, ἐκκλίσει δὲ πρὸς μόνα τὰ προαιρετικὰ χρῆσθαι καὶ μελετῶν μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς δυσκαταπονήτοις. καθʼ ὃ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἀσκητέον. τί οὖν ὧδε ποιεῖ τὸ φοίνικα στῆσαι ἢ τὸ στέγην δερματίνην καὶ ὅλμον καὶ ὕπερον περιφέρειν; ἄνθρωπε, ἄσκησον, εἰ γοργὸς εἶ, λοιδορούμενος ἀνέχεσθαι, ἀτιμασθεὶς μὴ ἀχθεσθῆναι. εἶθʼ οὕτως προ[σ]βήσῃ, ἵνα, κἂν πλήξῃ σέ τις, εἴπῃς αὐτὸς πρὸς αὑτὸν ὅτι δόξον ἀνδριάντα περιειληφέναι. εἶτα καὶ οἰναρίῳ κομψῶς χρῆσθαι, μὴ εἰς τὸ πολὺ πίνειν (καὶ γὰρ περὶ τοῦτο ἐπαρίστεροι ἀσκηταί εἰσιν), ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εἰς τὸ ἀποσχέσθαι, καὶ κορασιδίου ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ πλακουνταρίου. εἶτά ποτε ὑπὲρ δοκιμασίας, εἰ ἄρα, καθήσεις εὐκαίρως αὐτὸς σαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γνῶναι, εἰ ὁμοίως ἡττῶσίν σε αἱ φαντασίαι. τὰ πρῶτα δὲ φεῦγε μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων. ἄνισος ἡ μάχη κορασιδίῳ κομψῷ πρὸς νέον ἀρχόμενον φιλοσοφεῖν· χύτρα, φασί, καὶ πέτρα οὐ συμφωνεῖ. μετὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τὴν ἔκκλισιν δεύτερος τ[ρ]όπος ὁ περὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ ἀφορμήν· ⟨ἵνʼ⟩ εὐπειθὴς τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα μὴ παρὰ καιρόν, μὴ παρὰ τόπον, μὴ παρὰ ἄλλην τινὰ τοιαύτην [ἀ]συμμετρίαν. τρίτος ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, ὁ πρὸς τὰ πιθανὰ καὶ ἑλκυστικά. ὡς γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν ἀνεξέταστον βίον μὴ ζῆν, οὕτως ἀνεξέταστον φαντασίαν μὴ παραδέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λέγειν ἔκδεξαι, ἄφες ἴδω, τίς εἶ καὶ πόθεν ἔρχῃ, ὡς οἱ νυκτοφύλακες δεῖξόν μοι τὰ συνθήματα. ἔχεις τὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως σύμβολον, ὃ δεῖ τὴν παραδεχθησομένην ἔχειν φαντασίαν; καὶ λοιπὸν ὅσα τῷ σώματι προσάγεται ὑπὸ τῶν γυμναζόντων αὐτό, ἂν μὲν ὧδέ που ῥέπῃ πρὸς ὄρεξιν καὶ ἔκκλισιν, εἴη ἂν καὶ αὐτὰ ἀσκητικά· ἂν δὲ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν, ἔξω νενευκότος ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλο τι θηρωμένου καὶ θεατὰς ζητοῦντος τοὺς ἐροῦντας ὦ[ς] μεγάλου ἀνθρώπου. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὅταν θέλῃς σαυτῷ ἀσκῆσαι, διψῶν ποτε καύματος ἐφέλκυσαι βρόγχον ψυχροῦ καὶ ἔκπτυσον καὶ μηδενὶ εἴπῃς.

## 15. Book III · chapters 13–21

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/15/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/15/#p-N

[¶0] 13. It is solitude to be in the condition of a helpless person. For he who is alone is not therefore solitary, any more than one in a crowd is the contrary. When, therefore, we lose a son, or a brother, or a friend, on whom we have been used to repose, we often say we are left solitary, even in the midst of Rome, where such a crowd is continually meeting us; where we live among so many, and where we have, perhaps, a numerous train of servants. For he is understood to be solitary who is helpless, and exposed to such as would injure him. Hence, in a journey especially, we call ourselves solitary when we fall among thieves; for it is not the sight of a man that removes our solitude, but of an honest man, a man of honor, and a helpful companion. If merely being alone is sufficient for solitude, Zeus may be said to be solitary at the great conflagration, and bewail himself that he hath neither Here, nor Athene, nor Apollo, nor brother, nor son, nor descendant, nor relation. This, some indeed say, he doth when he is alone at the conflagration. Such as these, moved by some natural principle, some natural desire of society and mutual love, and by the pleasure of conversation, do not rightly consider the state of a person who is alone. But none the less should we be prepared for this also, to suffice unto ourselves, and to bear our own company. For as Zeus converses with himself, acquiesces in himself, and contemplates his own administration, and is employed in thoughts worthy of himself; so should we too be able to talk with ourselves, and not to need the conversation of others, nor suffer ennui; to attend to the divine administration; to consider our relation to other beings; how we have formerly been affected by events, how we are affected now; what are the things that still press upon us; how these too may be cured, how removed; if anything wants completing, to complete it according to reason. You perceive that Caesar has procured us a profound peace; there are neither wars nor battles, nor great robberies nor piracies; but we may travel at all hours, and sail from east to west. But can Caesar procure us peace from a fever too; from a shipwreck; from a fire; from an earthquake; from a thunder-storm; nay, even from love? He cannot. From grief; from envy? No, not from any one of these. But the doctrine of philosophers promises to procure us peace from these too. And what doth it say? “If you will attend to me, O mortals! wherever you are, and whatever you are doing, you shall neither grieve, nor be angry, nor be compelled, nor restrained; but you shall live serene, and free from all.” Shall not he who enjoys this peace proclaimed, not by Caesar (for how should he have it to proclaim?), but by God, through Reason, be contented when he is alone, reflecting and considering, “To me there can now no ill happen; there is no thier, no earthquake. All is full of peace, all full of tranquillity; every road, every city, every assembly, neighbor, companion, is powerless to hurt me”? Another, whose care it is, provides you with food, with clothes, with senses, with ideas. Whenever he doth not provide what is necessary, he sounds a retreat; he opens the door and says to you, “Come.” Whither? To nothing dreadful; but to that whence you were made,—to what is friendly and congenial, to the elements. What in you was fire goes away to fire; what was earth, to earth; what air, to air; what water, to water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, nor Pyriphlegethon; but all is full of gods and divine beings. He who can have such thoughts, and can look upon the sun, moon, and stars, and enjoy the earth and sea, is no more solitary than he is helpless. “Well; but suppose any one should come and murder me when I am alone.” Foolish man!—not you, but that insignificant body of yours. What solitude is there then left; what destitution? Why do we make ourselves worse than children? What do they do when they are left alone? They take up shells and dust; they build houses, then pull them down; then build something else; and thus never want amusement. Suppose you were all to sail away; am I to sit and cry because I am left alone and solitary? Am I so unprovided with shells and dust? But children do this from folly; and shall we be wretched through wisdom? Every great gift is dangerous to a beginner. Study first how to live like a person in sickness; that in time you may know how to live like one in health. Abstain from food. Drink water. Totally repress your desire for some time, that you may at length use it according to reason; and if so, when you are stronger in virtue, you will use it well. No; but we would live immediately as men already wise, and be of service to mankind. Of what service? What are you doing? Why, have you been of so much service to yourself that you would exhort them? You exhort! Would you be of service to them, show them by your own example what kind of men philosophy makes, and do not trifle. When you eat, be of service to those who eat with you; when you drink, to those who drink with you. Be of service to them by giving way to all, yielding to them, bearing with them; and not by venting upon them your own ill-humor.

> Greek: 13. ἐρημία ἐστὶ κατάστασίς τις ἀβοηθήτου. οὐ γὰρ ὁ μόνος ὢν εὐθὺς καὶ ἔρημος, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ὁ ἐν πολλοῖς ὢν οὐκ ἔρημος. ὅταν γοῦν ἀπολέσωμεν ἢ ἀδελφὸν ἢ υἱὸν ἢ φίλον, ᾧ προσαναπαυόμεθα, λέγομεν ἀπολελεῖφθαι ἔρημοι, πολλάκις ἐν Ῥώμῃ ὄντες, τοσούτου ὄχλου ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶντος καὶ τοσούτων συνοικούντων, ἔσθʼ ὅτε πλῆθος δούλων ἔχοντες. θέλει γὰρ ὁ ἔρημος κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἀβοήθητός τις εἶναι καὶ ἐκκείμενος τοῖς βλάπτειν βουλομένοις. διὰ τοῦτο, ὅταν ὁδεύωμεν, τότε μάλιστα ἐρήμους λέγομεν ἑαυτούς, ὅταν εἰς λῃστὰς ἐμπέσωμεν. οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ὄψις ἐξαιρεῖται ἐρημίας, ἀλλὰ πιστοῦ καὶ αἰδήμονος καὶ ὠφελίμου. ἐπεὶ εἰ τὸ μόνον εἶναι ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἔρημον εἶναι, λέγε ὅτι καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει ἔρημός ἐστι καὶ κατακλαίει αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ· τάλας ἐγώ, οὔτε τὴν Ἥραν ἔχω οὔτε τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν οὔτε τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα οὔτε ὅλως ἢ ἀδελφὸν ἢ υἱὸν ἢ ἔγγονον ἢ συγγενῆ. ταῦτα καὶ λέγουσί τινες ὅτι ποιεῖ μόνος ἐν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει. οὐ γὰρ ἐπινοοῦσι διεξαγωγὴν μόνου καὶ ἀπό τινος φυσικοῦ ὁρμώμενοι, ἀπὸ τοῦ φύσει κοινωνικοῦ εἶναι καὶ φιλαλλήλου καὶ ἡδέως συναναστρέφεσθαι ἀνθρώποις. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον δεῖ τινα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο παρασκευὴν ἔχειν τὸ δύνασθαι αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀρκεῖν, δύνασθαι αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι· ὡς ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ σύνεστιν καὶ ἡσυχάζει ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐννοεῖ τὴν διοίκησιν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οἵα ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν ἐπινοίαις γίνεται πρεπούσαις ἑαυτῷ, οὕτως καὶ ἡμᾶς δύνασθαι αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῖς λαλεῖν, μὴ προσδεῖσθαι ἄλλων, διαγωγῆς μὴ ἀπορεῖν· ἐφιστάνειν τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει, τῇ αὑτῶν πρὸς τἆλλα σχέσει· ἐπιβλέπειν, πῶς πρότερον εἴχομεν πρὸς τὰ συμβαίνοντα, πῶς νῦν· τίνα ἐστὶν ἔτι τὰ θλίβοντα· πῶς ἂν θεραπευθῇ καὶ ταῦτα, πῶς ἐξαιρεθῇ· εἴ τινα ἐξεργασίας δεῖται τούτων, κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον ἐξεργάζεσθαι. ὁρᾶτε γάρ, ὅτι εἰρήνην μεγάλην ὁ Καῖσαρ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ παρέχειν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐκέτι πόλεμοι οὐδὲ μάχαι οὐδὲ λῃστήρια μεγάλα οὐδὲ πειρατικά, ἀλλʼ ἔξεστιν πάσῃ ὥρᾳ ὁδεύειν, πλεῖν ἀπʼ ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμάς. μή τι οὖν καὶ ἀπὸ πυρετοῦ δύναται ἡμῖν εἰρήνην παρασχεῖν, μή τι καὶ ἀπὸ ναυαγίου, μή τι καὶ ἀπὸ ἐμπρησμοῦ ἢ ἀπὸ σεισμοῦ ἢ ἀπὸ κεραυνοῦ; ἄγε ἀπʼ ἔρωτος; οὐ δύναται. ἀπὸ πένθους; οὐ δύναται. ἀπὸ φθόνου; οὐ δύναται. ἀπʼ οὐδενὸς ἁπλῶς τούτων· ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὑπισχνεῖται καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων εἰρήνην παρέχειν. καὶ τί λέγει; ἄν μοι προσέχητε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὅπου ἂν ἦτε, ὅ τι ἂν ποιῆτε, οὐ λυπηθήσεσθε, οὐκ ὀργισθήσεσθε, οὐκ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε, οὐ κωλυθήσεσθε, ἀπαθεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐλεύθεροι διάξετε ἀπὸ πάντων. ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην τις ἔχων [οὐχὶ] κεκηρυγμένην οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος (πόθεν γὰρ αὐτῷ ταύτην κηρύξαι;), ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κεκηρυγμένην διὰ τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἀρκεῖται, ὅταν ᾖ μόνος, ἐπιβλέπων καὶ ἐνθυμούμενος νῦν ἐμοὶ κακὸν οὐδὲν δύναται συμβῆναι, ἐμοὶ λῃστὴς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐμοὶ σεισμὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, πάντα εἰρήνης μεστά, πάντα ἀταραξίας· πᾶσα ὁδός, πᾶσα πόλις, πᾶς[α] σύνοδος, γείτων, κοινωνὸς ἀβλαβής. ἄλλος παρέχει τροφάς, ᾧ μέλει, ἄλλος ἐσθῆτα, ἄλλος αἰσθήσεις ἔδωκεν, ἄλλος προλήψεις. ὅταν δὲ μὴ παρέχῃ τἀναγκαῖα, τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν σημαίνει, τὴν θύραν ἤνοιξεν καὶ λέγει σοι ἔρχου. ποῦ; εἰς οὐδὲν δεινόν, ἀλλʼ ὅθεν ἐγένου, εἰς τὰ φίλα καὶ συγγενῆ, εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα. ὅσον ἦν ἐν σοὶ πυρός, εἰς πῦρ ἄπεισιν, ὅσον ἦν γῃδίου, εἰς γῄδιον, ὅσον πνευματίου, εἰς πνευμάτιον, ὅσον ὑδατίου, εἰς ὑδάτιον. οὐδεὶς Ἅιδης οὐδʼ Ἀχέρων οὐδὲ Κωκυτὸς οὐδὲ Πυριφλεγέθων, ἀλλὰ πάντα θεῶν μεστὰ καὶ δαιμόνων; ταῦτά τις ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ἔχων καὶ βλέπων τὸν ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα καὶ γῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ θαλάσσης ἔρημός ἐστιν οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ καὶ ἀβοήθητος. τί οὖν; ἄν τις ἐπελθών μοι μόνῳ ἀποσφάξῃ με; μωρέ, σὲ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ σωμάτιον. ποία οὖν ἔτι ἐρημία, ποία ἀπορία; τί χείρονας ἑαυτοὺς ποιῶμεν τῶν παιδαρίων; ἅ τινα ὅταν ἀπολειφθῇ μόνα, τί ποιεῖ; ἄραντα ὀστράκια καὶ σποδὸν οἰκοδομεῖ τί ποτε, εἶτα καταστρέφει καὶ πάλιν ἄλλο οἰκοδομεῖ· καὶ οὕτως οὐδέποτε ἀπορεῖ διαγωγῆς. ἐγὼ οὖν, ἂν πλεύσητε ὑμεῖς, μέλλω καθήμενος κλαίειν ὅτι μόνος ἀπελείφθην καὶ ἔρημος οὕτως; οὐκ ὀστράκια ἕξω, οὐ σποδόν; ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνα ὑπʼ ἀφροσύνης ταῦτα ποιεῖ, ἡμεῖς δʼ ὑπὸ φρονήσεως δυστυχοῦμεν; πᾶσα μεγάλη δύναμις ἐπισφαλὴς τῷ ἀρχομένῳ. φέρειν οὖν δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν. … ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ τῷ φθισικῷ. μελέτησόν ποτε διαγωγὴν ὡς ἄρρωστος, ἵνα ποθʼ ὡς ὑγιαίνων διαγάγῃς. ἀσίτησον, ὑδροπότησον· ἀπόσχου ποτὲ παντάπασιν ὀρέξεως, ἵνα ποτὲ καὶ εὐλόγως ὀρεχθῇς. εἰ δʼ εὐλόγως, ὅταν ἔχῃς τι ἐν σεαυτῷ ἀγαθόν, εὖ ὀρεχθήσῃ. οὔ· ἀλλʼ εὐθέως ὡς σοφοὶ διάγειν ἐθέλομεν καὶ ὠφελεῖν ἀνθρώπους. ποίαν ὠφέλειαν; τί ποιεῖς; σαυτὸν γὰρ ὠφέλησας; ἀλλὰ προτρέψαι αὐτοὺς θέλεις. σὺ γὰρ προτέτρεψαι; θέλεις αὐτοὺς ὠφελῆσαι. δεῖξον αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ, οἵους ποιεῖ φιλοσοφία, καὶ μὴ φλυάρει. ἐσθίων τοὺς συνεσθίοντας ὠφέλει, πίνων τοὺς πίνοντας, εἴκων πᾶσι, παραχωρῶν, ἀνεχόμενος, οὕτως αὐτοὺς ὠφέλει καὶ μὴ κατεξέρα αὐτῶν τὸ σαυτοῦ φλέγμα.

[¶1] 14. As bad performers cannot sing alone, but in a chorus, so some persons cannot walk alone. If you are anything, walk alone; talk by yourself; and do not skulk in the chorus. Think a little at last; look about you; sift yourself, that you may know what you are. If a person drinks water, or does anything else for the sake of training, upon every occasion he tells all he meets, “drink water.” Why, do you drink water merely for the sake of drinking it? If it does you any good to drink it. do so; if not, you act ridiculously. But if it is for your advantage that you drink it, say nothing about it before those who would criticise. Yet can it be possible that these are the very people you wish to please? Of actions, some are performed on their own account; others from circumstances, others from complaisance, others upon system. Two things must be rooted out of men, conceit and diffidence. Conceit lies in thinking that you want nothing; and diffidence in supposing it impossible that under such adverse circumstances you should ever succeed. Now, conceit is removed by confutation; and of this Socrates set the example. And consider and ascertain that the undertaking is not impracticable. The inquiry itself will do you no harm; and it is almost being a philosopher to inquire how it is possible to employ our desire and aversion without hindrance. “I am better than you, for my father has been consul.” “have been a tribune,” says another, “and you not.” If we were horses, would you say, “My father was swifter than yours; I have abundance of oats and hay and fine trappings”? What now, if, while you were saying this, I should answer: “Be it so. Let us run a race then”? Is there nothing in man analogous to a race in horses, by which it may be decided which is better or worse? Is there not honor, fidelity, justice? Show yourself the better in these, that you may be the better as a man. But if you only tell me that you can kick violently, I will tell you again that you value yourself on what is the property of an ass.

> Greek: 14. ὡς οἱ κακοὶ τραγῳδοὶ μόνοι ᾆσαι οὐ δύνανται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ πολλῶν, οὕτως ἔνιοι μόνοι περιπατῆσαι οὐ δύνανται. ἄνθρωπε, εἴ τις εἶ, καὶ μόνος περιπάτησον καὶ σαυτῷ λάλησον καὶ μὴ ἐν τῷ χορῷ κρύπτου. σκώφθητί ποτε, περίβλεψαι, ἐνσείσθητι, ἵνα γνῷς, τίς εἶ. ὅταν τις ὕδωρ πίνῃ ἢ ποιῇ τι ἀσκητικόν, ἐκ πάσης ἀφορμῆς λέγει αὐτὸ πρὸς πάντας. ἐγὼ ὕδωρ πίνω. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο ὕδωρ πίνεις, διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ πίνειν; ἄνθρωπε, εἴ σοι λυσιτελεῖ[ν] πίνειν, πῖνε· εἰ δὲ μή, γελοίως ποιεῖς. εἰ δὲ συμφέρει σοι καὶ πίνεις, σιώπα πρὸς τοὺς δυσαρεστοῦντας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. τί οὖν; αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀρέσκειν θέλεις; τῶν πραττομένων τὰ μὲν προηγουμένως πράττεται, τὰ δὲ κατὰ περίστασιν, τὰ δὲ κατʼ οἰκονομίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμπεριφοράν, τὰ δὲ κατʼ ἔνστασιν. δύο ταῦτα ἐξελεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἴησιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν. οἴησις μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ δοκεῖν μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, ἀπιστία δὲ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι εὐροεῖν τοσούτων περιεστηκότων. τὴν μὲν οὖν οἴησιν ἔλεγχος ἐξαιρεῖ, καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον ποιεῖ Σωκράτης. ὅτι δʼ οὐκ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα, σκέψαι καὶ ζήτησον. οὐδέν σε βλάψει ἡ ζήτησις αὕτη· καὶ σχεδὸν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν τοῦτʼ ἔστι, ζητεῖν, πῶς ἐνδέχεται ἀπαραποδίστως ὀρέξει χρῆσθαι καὶ ἐκκλίσει. κρείσσων εἰμὶ σοῦ· ὁ γὰρ πατήρ μου ὑπατικός ἐστιν. ἄλλος λέγει ἐγὼ δεδημάρχηκα, σὺ δʼ οὔ. εἰ δʼ ἵπποι ἦμεν, ἔλεγες ἂν ὅτι ὁ πατήρ μου ὠκύτερος ἦν ἢ ὅτι ἐγὼ ἔχω πολλὰς κριθὰς καὶ χόρτον ἢ ὅτι κομψὰ περιτραχήλια; εἰ οὖν ταῦτά σου λέγοντος εἶπον ὅτι ἔστω ταῦτα, τρέχωμεν οὖν; ἄγε, ἐπʼ ἀνθρώπου οὖν οὐδέν ἐστι τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐφʼ ἵππου δρόμος, ἐξ οὗ γνωσθήσεται ὁ χείρων καὶ ὁ κρείττων; μήποτʼ ἐστὶν αἰδώς, πίστις, δικαιοσύνη; τούτοις δείκνυε κρείττονα σεαυτόν, ἵνʼ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ᾖ κρείττων. ἄν μοι λέγῃς ὅτι μεγάλα λακτίζω, ἐρῶ σοι κἀγὼ ὅτι ἐπὶ ὄνου ἔργῳ μέγα φρονεῖς.

[¶2] 15. In every affair consider what precedes and follows, and then undertake it. Otherwise you will begin with spirit indeed, careless of the consequences, and when these are developed, you will shamefully desist. “I would conquer at the Olympic Games.” But consider what precedes and follows, and then, if it be for your advantage, engage in the affair. You must conform to rules, submit to a diet, refrain from dainties; exercise your body, whether you choose it or not, at a stated hour, in heat and cold; you must drink no cold water, and sometimes no wine,—in a word, you must give yourself up to your trainer as to a physician. Then, in the combat, you may be thrown into a ditch, dislocate your arm, turn your ankle, swallow abundance of dust, receive stripes [for negligence], and, after all, lose the victory. When you have reckoned up all this, if your inclination still holds, set about the combat. Otherwise, take notice, you will behave like children who sometimes play wrestlers, sometimes gladiators; sometimes blow a trumpet, and sometimes act a tragedy, when they happen to have seen and admired these shows. Thus you too will be at one time a wrestler, at another a gladiator; now a philosopher, now an orator; but nothing in earnest. Like an ape you mimic all you see, and one thing after another is sure to please you, but is out of favor as soon as it becomes familiar. For you have never entered upon anything considerately, nor after having surveyed and tested the whole matter; but carelessly, and with a half-way zeal. Thus some, when they have seen a philosopher, and heard a man speaking like Euphrates, —though indeed who can speak like him?—have a mind to be philosophers too. Consider first, man, what the matter is, and what your own nature is able to bear. If you would be a wrestler, consider your shoulders, your back, your thighs; for different persons are made for different things. Do you think that you can act as you do and be a philosopher; that you can eat, drink, be angry, be discontented, as you are now? You must watch, you must labor, you must get the better of certain appetites; must quit your acquaintances, be despised by your servant, be laughed at by those you meet; come off worse than others in everything,—in offices, in honors, before tribunals. When you have fully considered all these things, approach, if you please; if, by parting with them, you have a mind to purchase serenity, freedom, and tranquillity. If not, do not come hither; do not, like children, be now a philosopher, then a publican, then an orator, and then one of Caesar’s officers. These things are not consistent. You must be one man either good or bad. You must cultivate either your own Reason or else externals; apply yourself either to things within or without you; that is, be either a philosopher, or one 10f the mob.

> Greek: 15. ἑκάστου ἔργου σκόπει τὰ καθηγούμενα καὶ τὰ ἀκόλουθα καὶ οὕτως ἔρχου ἐπʼ αὐτό. εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἥξεις προθύμως ἅτε μηδὲν τῶν ἑξῆς ἐντεθυμημένος, ὕστερον δʼ ἀναφανέντων τινῶν αἰσχρῶς ἀποστήσῃ. θέλω Ὀλύμπια νικῆσαι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει τὰ καθηγούμενα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἀκόλουθα· καὶ οὕτως ἄν σοι λυσιτελῇ, ἅπτου τοῦ ἔργου. δεῖ σε εὐτακτεῖν, ἀναγκοφαγεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι πεμμάτων, γυμνάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀνάγκην, ὥρᾳ τεταγμένῃ, ἐν καύματι, ἐν ψύχει· μὴ ψυχρὸν πίνειν, μὴ οἶνον ὅτʼ ἔτυχεν· ἁπλῶς ὡς ἰατρῷ [γὰρ] παραδεδωκέναι σεαυτὸν τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ· εἶτα ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι παρορύσσεσθαι, ἔστιν ὅτε χεῖρα ἐκβαλεῖν, σφυρὸν στρέψαι, πολλὴν ἁφὴν καταπιεῖν, μαστιγωθῆναι· καὶ μετὰ τούτων πάντων ἔσθʼ ὅτε νικηθῆναι. ταῦτα λογισάμενος, ἂν ἔτι θέλῃς, ἔρχου ἐπὶ τὸ ἀθλεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅρα ὅτι ὡς τὰ παιδία ἀναστραφήσῃ, ἃ νῦν μὲν ἀθλητὰς παίζει, νῦν δὲ μονομάχους, νῦν δὲ σαλπίζει, εἶτα τραγῳδεῖ ὅ τι ἂν ἴδῃ καὶ θαυμάσῃ. οὕτως καὶ σὺ νῦν μὲν ἀθλητής, νῦν δὲ μονομάχος, εἶτα φιλόσοφος, εἶτα ῥήτωρ, ὅλῃ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ οὐδέν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ὁ πίθηκος πᾶν ὃ ἂν ἴδῃς μιμῇ καὶ ἀεί σοι ἄλλο ἐξ ἄλλου ἀρέσκει, τὸ σύνηθες δʼ ἀπαρέσκει. οὐ γὰρ μετὰ σκέψεως ἦλθες ἐπί τι οὐδὲ περιοδεύσας ὅλον τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐδὲ βασανίσας, ἀλλʼ εἰκῇ καὶ κατὰ ψυχρὰν ἐπιθυμίαν. οὕτως τινὲς ἰδόντες φιλόσοφον καὶ ἀκούσαντές τινος οὕτως λέγοντος, ὡς Εὐφράτης λέγει (καίτοι τίς οὕτως δύναται εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐκεῖνος;), θέλουσιν καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλοσοφεῖν. ἄνθρωπε, σκέψαι πρῶτον τί ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα, εἶτα καὶ τὴν σαυτοῦ φύσιν, τί δύνασαι βαστάσαι. εἰ παλαιστής, ἰδού σου τοὺς ὤμους, τοὺς μηρούς, τὴν ὀσφῦν. ἄλλος γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλο τι πέφυκεν. δοκεῖς ὅτι ταῦτα ποιῶν δύνασαι φιλοσοφεῖν; δοκεῖς ὅτι δύνασαι ὡσαύτως ἐσθίειν, ὡσαύτως πίνειν, ὁμοίως ὀργίζεσθαι, ὁμοίως δυσαρεστεῖν; ἀγρυπνῆσαι δεῖ, πονῆσαι, νικῆσαί τινας ἐπιθυμίας, ἀπελθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων, ὑπὸ παιδαρίου καταφρονηθῆναι, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπαντώντων καταγελασθῆναι, ἐν παντὶ ἔλασσον ἔχειν, ἐν ἀρχῇ, ἐν τιμῇ, ἐν δίκῃ. ταῦτα περισκεψάμενος, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προσέρχου, εἰ θέλεις ἀντικαταλλάξασθαι τούτων ἀπάθειαν, ἐλευθερίαν, ἀταραξίαν. εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ πρόσαγε, μὴ ὡς τὰ παιδία νῦν μὲν φιλόσοφος, ὕστερον δὲ τελώνης, εἶτα ῥήτωρ, εἶτα ἐπίτροπος Καίσαρος. ταῦτα οὐ συμφωνεῖ· ἕνα σε δεῖ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν· ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν σε δεῖ ἐξεργάζεσθαι τὸ σαυτοῦ ἢ τὰ ἐκτός· ἢ περὶ τὰ ἔσω φιλοπονεῖν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἔξω· τοῦτʼ ἔστι φιλοσόφου στάσιν ἔχειν ἢ ἰδιώτου. Ῥούφῳ τις ἔλεγεν Γάλβα σφαγέντος ὅτι νῦν προνοίᾳ ὁ κόσμος διοικεῖται;· ὁ δὲ μὴ παρέργως ποτʼ, ἔφη, ἀπὸ Γάλβα κατεσκεύασα, ὅτι προνοίᾳ ὁ κόσμος διοικεῖται;

[¶3] 16. He who frequently mingles with others, either in conversation or at entertainments, or in any familiar way of living, must necessarily either become like his companions, or bring them over to his own way. For if a dead coal be applied to a live one, either the first will quench the last, or the last kindle the first. Since, then, the danger is so great, caution must be used in entering into these familiarities with the crowd. remembering that it is impossible to touch a chimney-sweeper without being partaker of his soot. For what will you do if you have to discuss gladiators, horses, wrestlers, and, what is worse, men? “Such a one is good, another bad; this was well, that ill, done.” Besides, what if any one should sneer, or ridicule, or be ill-natured? Are any of you prepared, like a harper, who, when he takes his harp and tries the strings, finds out which notes are discordant, and knows how to put the instrument in tune? Have any of you such a faculty as Socrates had, who in every conversation could bring his companions to his own purpose? Whence should you have it? You must therefore be carried along by the crowd. And why are they more powerful than you? Because they utter their corrupt discourses from sincere opinion, and you your good ones only from your lips. Hence they are without strength or life; and it is disgusting to hear your exhortations and your poor miserable virtue proclaimed up hill and down. Thus it is that the crowd gets the better of you; for sincere opinion is always strong, always invincible. Therefore before wise sentiments are fixed in you, and you have acquired some power of self-defence, I advise you to be cautious in popular intercourse; otherwise, if you have any impressions made on you in the schools, they will melt away daily like wax before the sun. Get away then, far from the sun, while you have these waxen opinions. It is for this reason that the philosophers advise us to leave our country; because habitual practices draw the mind aside and prevent the formation of new habits. We cannot bear that those who meet us should say, “Hey-day! such a one is turned philosopher, who was formerly thus and so.” Thus physicians send patients with lingering distempers to another place and another air; and they do right. Do you too import other manners instead of those you carry out. Fix your opinions, and exercise yourself in them. No; but you go hence to the theatre, to the gladiators, to the walks, to the circus; then hither again, then back again,—just the same persons all the while! No good habit, no criticism, no animadversion upon ourselves. No observation what use we make of the appearances presented to our minds,—whether it be conformable, or contrary to Nature; whether we interpret them rightly or wrongly. Can I say to the inevitable that it is nothing to me? If this be not yet your case, flee from your former habits; flee from the crowd if you would ever begin to be anything.

> Greek: 16. ἀνάγκη τὸν συγκαθιέντα τισὶν ἐπιπλέον ἢ εἰς λαλιὰν ἢ εἰς συμπόσια ἢ ἁπλῶς εἰς συμβίωσιν ἢ αὐτὸν ἐκείνοις ἐξομοιωθῆναι ἢ ἐκείνους μεταθεῖναι ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ. καὶ γὰρ ἄνθρακα ἀπεσβεσμένον ἂν θῇ παρὰ τὸν καιόμενον, ἢ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀποσβέσει ἢ ἐκεῖνος τοῦτον ἐκκαύσει. τηλικούτου οὖν τοῦ κινδύνου ὄντος εὐλαβῶς δεῖ τοῖς ἰδιώταις συγκαθίεσθαι εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας συμπεριφορὰς μεμνημένους, ὅτι ἀμήχανον τὸν συνανατριβόμενον τῷ ἠσβολωμένῳ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸν ἀπολαῦσαι τῆς ἀσβόλης· τί γὰρ ποιήσεις, ἂν περὶ μονομάχων λαλῇ[ς], ἂν περὶ ἵππων, ἂν περὶ ἀθλητῶν, ἂν τὸ ἔτι τούτων χεῖρον περὶ ἀνθρώπων· ὁ δεῖνα κακός, ὁ δεῖνα ἀγαθός· τοῦτο καλῶς ἐγένετο, τοῦτο κακῶς· ἔτι ἂν σκώπτῃ, ἂν γελοιάζῃ, ἂν κακοηθίζηται; ἔχει τις ὑμῶν παρασκευὴν οἵαν ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τὴν λύραν λαβών, ὥστʼ εὐθὺς ἁψάμενος τῶν χορδῶν γνῶναι τὰς ἀσυμφώνους καὶ ἁρμόσασθαι τὸ ὄργανον; οἵαν εἶχεν δύναμιν Σωκράτης, ὥστʼ ἐν πάσῃ συμπεριφορᾷ ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ αὑτοῦ τοὺς συνόντας; πόθεν ὑμῖν; ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὑμᾶς περιάγεσθαι. διὰ τί οὖν ἐκεῖνοι ὑμῶν ἰσχυρότεροι; ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τὰ σαπρὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ δογμάτων λαλοῦσιν, ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ κομψὰ ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν· διὰ τοῦτο ἄτονά ἐστι καὶ νεκρά, καὶ σικχᾶναι ἔστιν ἀκούοντα ὑμῶν τοὺς προτρεπτικοὺς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ταλαίπωρον, ἣ ἄνω κάτω θρυλεῖται. οὕτως ὑμᾶς οἱ ἰδιῶται νικῶσιν. πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἰσχυρὸν τὸ δόγμα, ἀνίκητον τὸ δόγμα. μέχρις ἂν οὖν παγῶσιν ἐν ὑμῖν αἱ κομψαὶ ὑπολήψεις καὶ δυναμίν τινα περιποιήσησθε πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν, συμβουλεύω ὑμῖν εὐλαβῶς τοῖς ἰδιώταις συγκαταβαίνειν· εἰ δὲ μή, καθʼ ἡμέραν ὡς κηρὸς ἐν ἡλίῳ διατακήσεται, ὑμῶν εἴ τινα ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἐγγράφετε. μακρὰν οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου πού ποτε ὑπάγετε, μέχρις ἂν κηρίνας τὰς ὑπολήψεις ἔχητε. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν πατρίδων συμβουλεύουσιν ἀποχωρεῖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι τὰ παλαιὰ ἔθη περισπᾷ καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τινὰ ἄλλου ἐθισμοῦ, οὐδὲ φέρομεν τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας καὶ λέγοντας [ε]ἴδʼ ὁ δεῖνα φιλοσοφεῖ, ὁ τοῖος καὶ ὁ τοῖος. οὕτως καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ τοὺς μακρονοσοῦντας ἐκπέμπουσιν εἰς ἄλλην χώραν καὶ ἄλλον ἀέρα καλῶς ποιοῦντες. καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀντεισαγάγετε ἄλλα ἔθη· πήξατε ὑμῶν τὰς ὑπολήψεις, ἐναθλεῖτε αὐταῖς. οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἔνθεν ἐπὶ θεωρίαν, εἰς μονομαχίαν, εἰς ξυστόν, εἰς κίρκον· εἶτʼ ἐκεῖθεν ὧδε καὶ πάλιν ἔνθεν ἐκεῖ οἱ αὐτοί. καὶ ἔθος κομψὸν οὐδέν, οὔτε προσοχὴ οὔτʼ ἐπιστροφὴ ἐφʼ αὑτὸν καὶ παρατήρησις πῶς χρῶμαι ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις; κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν; πῶς ἀποκρίνωμαι πρὸς αὐτάς; ὡς δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ; ἐπιλέγω τοῖς ἀπροαιρέτοις, ὅτι οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ; εἰ γὰρ μήπω οὕτως ἔχητε, φεύγετε ἔθη τὰ πρότερον, φεύγετε τοὺς ἰδιώτας, εἰ θέλετε ἄρξασθαί ποτέ τινες εἶναι.

[¶4] 17. Whenever you lay anything to the charge of Providence, do but reflect, and you will find that it has happened agreeably to Reason. “Well; but a dishonest man has the advantage.” In what? “In money.” Here he ought to surpass you; because he flatters, he is shameless, he keeps awake. Where is the wonder? But look whether he has the advantage of you in fidelity or in honor. You will find he has not, but that wherever it is best for you to have the advantage of him, there you have it. I once said to one who was full of indignation at the good fortune of Philostorgus, “Why, would you be willing to sleep with Sura?” Heaven forbid, said he, that day should ever come! Why then are you angry that he is paid for what he sells; or how can you call him happy in possessions acquired by means which you detest? Or what harm does Providence do in giving the best things to the best men? Is it not better to have a sense of honor than to be rich? “Granted.” Why then are you angry, man, if you have what is best? Always remember, then, and have it in mind that a better man has the advantage of a worse in that direction in which he is better; and you will never have any indignation. “But my wife treats me ill.” Well; if you are asked what is the matter, answer, “My wife treats me ill.” “Nothing more?” Nothing. “My father gives me nothing.” But to call this an evil, some external and false addition must be made. We are not therefore to get rid of poverty, but of our impressions concerning it; and we shall do well. When Galba was killed, somebody said to Rufus, “Now, indeed, the world is governed by Providence.” I had never thought, answered Rufus, of extracting through Galba the slightest proof that the world was governed by Providence.

> Greek: 17. ὅταν τῇ προνοίᾳ ἐγκαλῇς, ἐπιστράφηθι καὶ γνώσῃ, ὅτι κατὰ λόγον γέγονεν. ναί, ἀλλʼ ὁ ἄδικος πλέον ἔχει. ἐν τίνι; ἐν ἀργυρίῳ· πρὸς γὰρ τοῦτό σου κρείττων ἐστίν, ὅτι κολακεύει, ἀναισχυντεῖ, ἀγρυπνεῖ. τί θαυμαστόν; ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο βλέπε, εἰ ἐν τῷ πιστὸς εἶναι πλέον σου ἔχει, εἰ ἐν τῷ αἰδήμων. οὐ γὰρ εὑρήσεις· ἀλλʼ ὅπου κρείττων, ἐκεῖ σαυτὸν εὑρήσεις πλέον ἔχοντα. κἀγώ ποτʼ εἶπόν τινι ἀγανακτοῦντι, ὅτι Φιλόστοργος εὐτυχεῖ, Ἤθελες ἂν σὺ μετὰ Σούρα κοιμᾶσθαι; — μὴ γένοιτο, φησίν, ἐκείνη ἡ ἡμέρα. — τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς, εἰ λαμβάνει τι ἀνθʼ οὗ πωλεῖ; ἢ πῶς μακαρίζεις τὸν διὰ τούτων, ἃ σὺ ἀπεύχῃ, κτώμενον ἐκεῖνα; ἢ τί κακὸν ποιεῖ ἡ πρόνοια, εἰ τοῖς κρείττοσι τὰ κρείττω δίδωσιν; ἢ οὐκ ἔστι κρεῖττον αἰδήμονα εἶναι ἢ πλούσιον; ὡμολόγει. τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς, ἄνθρωπε, ἔχων τὸ κρεῖττον; μέμνησθε οὖν ἀεὶ καὶ πρόχειρον ἔχετε, ὅτι νόμος οὗτος φυσικὸς τὸν κρείττονα τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν, ἐν ᾧ κρείττων ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδέποτʼ ἀγανακτήσετε. ἀλλʼ ἡ γυνή μοι κακῶς χρῆται. καλῶς. ἄν τίς σου πυνθάνηται, τί ἐστι τοῦτο, λέγε ἡ γυνή μοι κακῶς χρῆται. ἄλλο οὖν οὐδέν; οὐδέν. ὁ πατήρ μοι οὐδὲν δίδωσιν. … ὅτι δὲ κακόν ἐστιν, τοῦτο ἔσωθεν αὐτῷ δεῖ προσθεῖναι καὶ προσκαταψεύσασθαι; διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δεῖ τὴν πενίαν ἐκβάλλειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ αὐτῆς, καὶ οὕτως εὐροήσομεν.

[¶5] 18. When any alarming news is brought you, always have it ready in mind that no news can be brought you concerning what is within the power of your own Will. Can any one bring you news that your opinions or desires are ill conducted? By no means; only that such a person is dead. What is that to you then? That somebody speaks ill of you. And what is that to you then? That your father is perhaps forming some contrivance or other. Against what? Against your Will? How can he? No; but against your body, against your estate? You are very safe; this is not against you. But the Judge has pronounced you guilty of impiety. And did not the Judges pronounce the same of Socrates? Is his pronouncing a sentence any business of yours? No. Then why do you any longer trouble yourself about it? There is a duty incumbent on your father, which unless he performs, he loses the character of a father, of natural affection, of tenderness. Do not desire him to lose anything else by this; for every man suffers precisely where he errs. Your duty, on the other hand, is to meet the case with firmness, modesty, and mildness; otherwise you forfeit piety, modesty, and nobleness. Well, and is your Judge free from danger? No; he runs an equal hazard. Why, then, are you still afraid of his decision? What have you to do with the ills of another? Meeting the case wrongly would be your own ill. Let it be your only care to avoid that; but whether sentence is passed on you or not, as it is the business of another, so the ill belongs to him. “Such a one threatens you.” Me? No. “He censures you.” Let him look to it, how he does his own duty. “He will give an unjust sentence against you.” Poor wretch!

> Greek: 18. ὅταν σοί τι προσαγγελθῇ ταρακτικόν, ἐκεῖνο ἔχε πρόχειρον, ὅτι ἀγγελία περὶ οὐδενὸς προαιρετικοῦ γίνεται. μή τι γὰρ δύναταί σοί τις ἀγγεῖλαι, ὅτι κακῶς ὑπέλαβες ἢ κακῶς ὠρέχθης; — οὐδαμῶς. — ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἀπέθανέν τις· τί οὖν πρὸς σέ; ὅτι σε κακῶς τις λέγει· τί οὖν πρὸς σέ; ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ τάδε τινὰ ἑτοιμάζεται· ἐπὶ τίνα; μή τι ἐπὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν; πόθεν δύναται; ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τὸ σωμάτιον, ἐπὶ τὸ κτησείδιον· ἐσώθης, οὐκ ἐπὶ σέ. [οὐκοῦν] ἀλλʼ ὁ κριτὴς ἀποφαίνεται ὅτι ἠσέβησας. περὶ Σωκράτους δʼ οὐκ ἀπεφήναντο οἱ δικασταί; μή τι σὸν ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκεῖνον ἀποφήνασθαι; — οὔ. — τί οὖν ἔτι σοι μέλει; ἔστι τι τοῦ πατρός σου ἔργον, ὃ ἂν μὴ ἐκπληρώσῃ, ἀπώλεσεν τὸν πατέρα, τὸν φιλόστοργον, τὸν ἥμερον. ἄλλο δὲ μηδὲν ζήτει τούτου ἕνεκα αὐτὸν ἀπολές[θ]αι. οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ μέν τις ἁμαρτάνει, εἰς ἄλλο δὲ βλάπτεται. πάλιν σὸν ἔργον τὸ ἀπολογηθῆναι εὐσταθῶς, αἰδημόνως, ἀοργήτως. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπώλεσας καὶ σὺ τὸν υἱόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν γενναῖον. τί οὖν; ὁ κριτὴς ἀκίνδυνός ἐστιν; οὔ· ἀλλὰ κἀκείνῳ τὰ ἴσα κινδυνεύεται. τί οὖν ἔτι φοβῇ, τί ἐκεῖνος κρινεῖ; τί σοὶ καὶ τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ κακῷ; σὸν κακόν ἐστι τὸ κακῶς ἀπολογηθῆναι· τοῦτο φυλάσσου μόνον· κριθῆναι δʼ ἢ μὴ κριθῆναι ὥσπερ ἄλλου ἐστὶν ἔργον, οὕτως κακὸν ἄλλου ἐστίν. ἀπειλεῖ σοι ὁ δεῖνα. ἐμοί; οὔ. ψέγει σε. αὐτὸς ὄψεται, πῶς ποιεῖ τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον. μέλλει σε κατακρινεῖν ἀδίκως. ἄθλιος.

[¶6] 19. The first difference between one of the crowd and a philosopher is this: the one says, “am undone on the account of my child, my brother, my father;” but the other, if ever he be obliged to say, “am undone!” reflects, and adds, “on account of myself.” For the Will cannot be restrained or hurt by anything to which the Will does not extend, but only by itself. If, therefore, we always would incline this way, and whenever we are unsuccessful, would lay the fault on ourselves, and remember that there is no cause of perturbation and inconstancy but wrong principles, I pledge myself to you that we should make some proficiency. But we set out in a very different way from the very beginning. In infancy, for example, if we happen to stumble, our nurse does not chide us, but beats the stone. Why, what harm has the stone done? Was it to move out of its place for the folly of your child? Again, if we do not find something to eat when we come out of the bath, our tutor does not try to moderate our appetite, but beats the cook. Why, did we appoint you tutor of the cook, man? No; but of our child. It is he whom you are to correct and improve. By these means, even when we are grown up, we appear children. For an unmusical person is a child in music; an illiterate person, a child in learning; and an untaught one, a child in life.

> Greek: 19. ἡ πρώτη διαφορὰ ἰδιώτου καὶ φιλοσόφου· ὁ μὲν λέγει οὐαί μοι διὰ τὸ παιδάριον, διὰ τὸν ἀδελφόν, οὐαὶ διὰ τὸν πατέρα, ὁ δʼ, ἄν ποτʼ εἰπεῖν ἀναγκασθῇ, οὐαί μοι ἐπιστήσας λέγει διʼ ἐμέ. προαίρεσιν γὰρ οὐδὲν δύναται κωλῦσαι ἢ βλάψαι ἀπροαίρετον εἰ μὴ αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν. ἂν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ῥέψωμεν καὶ αὐτοί, ὥσθʼ ὅταν δυσοδῶμεν, αὑτοὺς αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ μεμνῆσθαι, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταραχῆς ἢ ἀκαταστασίας αἴτιόν ἐστιν ἢ δόγμα, ὀμνύω ὑμῖν πάντας θεούς, ὅτι προεκόψαμεν. νῦν δʼ ἄλλην ὁδὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐληλύθαμεν. εὐθὺς ἔτι παίδων ἡμῶν ὄντων ἡ τιτθή, εἴ ποτε προσεπταίσαμεν χάσκοντες, οὐχὶ ἡμῖν ἐπέπλησσεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν λίθον ἔτυπτεν. τί γὰρ ἐποίησεν ὁ λίθος; διὰ τὴν τοῦ παιδίου σου μωρίαν ἔδει μεταβῆναι αὐτόν; πάλιν ἂν μὴ εὕρωμεν φαγεῖν ἐκ βαλανείου, οὐδέποθʼ ἡμῶν καταστέλλει τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὁ παιδαγωγός, ἀλλὰ δέρει τὸν μάγειρον. ἄνθρωπε, μὴ γὰρ ἐκείνου σε παιδαγωγὸν κατεστήσαμεν; ἀλλὰ τοῦ παιδίου ἡμῶν· τοῦτο ἐπανόρθου, τοῦτο ὠφέλει. οὕτως καὶ αὐξηθέντες φαινόμεθα παιδία. παῖς γὰρ ἐν μουσικοῖς ὁ ἄμουσος, ἐν γραμματικοῖς ὁ ἀγράμματ[ικ]ος, ἐν βίῳ ὁ ἀπαίδευτος.

[¶7] 20. In considering sensible phenomena, almost all persons admit good and evil to lie in ourselves and not in externals. No one says it is good to be day, evil to be night, and the greatest evil that three should be four; but what? That knowledge is good and error evil. Even in connection with falsehood itself there may be one good thing,—the knowledge that it is falsehood. Thus, then, should it be in life also. “Health is a good; sickness an evil.” No, sir. But what? A right use of health is a good; a wrong one, an evil. So that, in truth, it is possible to be a gainer even by sickness. And is it not possible by death too; by mutilation? Do you think Menaeceus an inconsiderable gainer by death? “May whoever talks thus be such a gainer as he was!” Why, pray, sir, did not he preserve his patriotism, his magnanimity, his fidelity, his gallant spirit? And if he had lived on, would he not have lost all these? Would not cowardice, baseness, and hatred of his country, and a wretched love of life, have been his portion? Well, now; do not you think him a considerable gainer by dying? No; but I warrant you the father of Admetus was a great gainer by living on in so mean-spirited and wretched a way as he did! For did not he die at last? For Heaven’s sake, cease to be thus deluded by externals. Cease to make yourselves slaves, first of things, and then, upon their account, of the men who have the power either to bestow or to take them away. Is there any advantage, then, to be gained from these men? From all; even from a reviler. What advantage does a wrestler gain from him with whom he exercises himself before the combat? The greatest. And just in the same manner I exercise myself with this man. He exercises me in patience, in gentleness, in meekness. I am to suppose, then, that I gain an advantage from him who exercises my neck, and puts my back and shoulders in order; so that the trainer may well bid me grapple him with both hands, and the heavier he is the better for me; and yet it is no advantage to me when I am exercised in gentleness of temper! This is not to know how to gain an advantage from men. Is my neighbor a bad one? He is so to himself, but a good one to me; he exercises my good temper, my moderation. Is my father bad? To himself; but not to me. “This is the rod of Hermes. Touch with it whatever you please, and it will become gold.” No; but bring whatever you please, and I will turn it into good. Bring sickness, death, want, reproach, trial for life. All these, by the rod of Hermes, shall turn to advantage. “What will you make of death?” Why, what but an ornament to you; what but a means of your showing, by action, what that man is who knows and follows the will of Nature? “What will you make of sickness?” I will show its nature. I will make a good figure in it; I will be composed and happy; I will not beseech my physician, nor yet will I pray to die. What need you ask further? Whatever you give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, respectable, and eligible. No, but, “take care not to be sick—it is an evil.” Just as if one should say, “Take care that the semblance of three being four does not present itself to you. It is an evil.” How an evil, man? If I think as I ought about it, what hurt will it any longer do me? Will it not rather be even an advantage to me? If then I think as I ought of poverty, of sickness, of political disorder, is not that enough for me? Why then must I any longer seek good or evil in externals? But how is it? These truths are admitted here; but nobody carries them home, for immediately every one is in a state of war with his servant, his neighbors, with those who sneer and ridicule him. Many thanks to Lespius for proving every day that I know nothing.

> Greek: 20. ἐπὶ τῶν θεωρητικῶν φαντασιῶν πάντες σχεδὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπέλιπον, οὐχὶ δʼ ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός. οὐδεὶς λέγει ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι, κακὸν τὸ νύκτα εἶναι, μέγιστον δὲ κακῶν τὸ τρία τέσσαρα εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί; τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθόν, τὴν δʼ ἀπάτην κακόν, ὥστε καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀγαθὸν συνίστασθαι, τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ψεῦδος εἶναι αὐτό. ἔδει οὖν οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου. ὑγεία ἀγαθόν, νόσος δὲ κακόν; οὔ, ἄνθρωπε. ἀλλὰ τί; τὸ καλῶς ὑγιαίνειν ἀγαθόν, τὸ κακῶς κακόν. — ὥστε καὶ ἀπὸ νόσου ἔστιν ὠφεληθῆναι; — τὸν θεόν σοι, ἀπὸ θανάτου γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν; ἀπὸ π[λ]ηρώσεως γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν, μικρά σοι δοκεῖ ὁ Μενοικεὺς ὠφεληθῆναι, ὅτʼ ἀπέθνῃσκεν; — τοιαῦτά τις εἰπὼν ὠφεληθείη [ἢ] οἷα ἐκεῖνος ὠφελήθη. — ἔα, ἄνθρωπε, οὐκ ἐτήρησεν τὸν φιλόπατριν, τὸν μεγαλόφρονα, τὸν πιστόν, τὸν γενναῖον; ἐπιζήσας δὲ οὐκ ἀπώλλυεν ταῦτα πάντα; οὐ περιεποιεῖτο τὰ ἐναντία; τὸν δειλὸν οὐκ ἀνελάμβανεν, τὸν ἀγεννῆ, τὸν μισόπατριν, τὸν φιλόψυχον; ἄγε δοκεῖ σοι μικρὰ ὠφεληθῆναι ἀποθανών; οὔ· ἀλλʼ ὁ τοῦ Ἀδμήτου πατὴρ μεγάλα ὠφελήθη ζήσας οὕτως ἀγεννῶς καὶ ἀθλίως; ὕστερον γὰρ οὐκ ἀπέθανεν; παύσασθε, τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμῖν, τὰς ὕλας θαυμάζοντες, παύσασθʼ ἑαυτοὺς δούλους ποιοῦντες πρῶτον τῶν πραγμάτων, εἶτα διʼ αὐτὰ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ταῦτα περιποιεῖν ἢ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δυναμένων. ἔστιν οὖν ἀπὸ τούτων ὠφεληθῆναι;— ἀπὸ πάντων. — καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ λοιδοροῦντος; — τί δʼ ὠφελεῖ τὸν ἀθλητὴν ὁ προσγυμναζόμενος; τὰ μέγιστα. καὶ οὗτος ἐμοῦ προγυμναστὴς γίνεται· τὸ ἀνεκτικόν μου γυμνάζει, τὸ ἀόργητον, τὸ πρᾷον. οὔ· ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν τοῦ τραχήλου καθάπτων καὶ τὴν ὀσφῦν μου καὶ τοὺς ὤμους καταρτίζων ὠφελεῖ με καὶ ὁ ἀλείπτης καλῶς ποιῶν λέγει ἆρον ὕπερον ἀμφοτέραις καὶ ὅσῳ βαρύτερός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὠφελοῦμαι ἐγώ· εἰ δέ τις πρὸς ἀοργησίαν με γυμνάζει, οὐκ ὠφελεῖ με; τοῦτʼ ἔστι τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ἀπʼ ἀνθρώπων ὠφελεῖσθαι. κακὸς γείτων; αὑτῷ· ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ ἀγαθός· γυμνάζει μου τὸ εὔγνωμον, τὸ ἐπιεικές. κακὸς πατήρ; αὑτῷ· ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ ἀγαθός. τοῦτʼ ἔστι τὸ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ ῥαβδίον· οὗ θέλεις, φησίν, ἅψαι καὶ χρυσοῦν ἔσται. οὔ· ἀλλʼ ὃ θέλεις φέρε κἀγὼ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ποιήσω. φέρε νόσον, φέρε θάνατον, φέρε ἀπορίαν, φέρε λοιδορίαν, δίκην τὴν περὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων· πάντα ταῦτα τῷ ῥαβδίῳ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ ὠφέλιμα ἔσται. τὸν θάνατον τί ποιήσεις; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ ἵνα σε κοσμήσῃ ἢ ἵνα δείξῃς[ε] ἔργῳ διʼ αὐτοῦ, τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος τῷ βουλήματι τῆς φύσεως παρακολουθῶν; τὴν νόσον τί ποιήσεις; δείξω αὐτῆς τὴν φύσιν, διαπρέψω ἐν αὐτῇ, εὐσταθήσω, εὐροήσω, τὸν ἰατρὸν οὐ κολακεύσω, οὐκ εὔξομαι ἀποθανεῖν. τί ἔτι ἄλλο ζητεῖς; πᾶν ὃ ἂν δῷς, ἐγὼ αὐτὸ ποιήσω μακάριον, εὐδαιμονικόν, σεμνόν, ζηλωτόν. οὔ· ἀλλὰ βλέπε μὴ νοσήσῃς· κακόν ἐστιν. οἷον εἴ τις ἔλεγεν βλέπε μὴ λάβῃς ποτὲ φαντασίαν τοῦ τὰ τρία τέσσαρα εἶναι· κακόν ἐστιν. ἄνθρωπε, πῶς κακόν; ἂν ὃ δεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπολάβω, πῶς ἔτι με βλάψει; οὐχὶ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ὠφελήσει; ἂν οὖν περὶ πενίας ὃ δεῖ ὑπολάβω, ἂν περὶ νόσου, ἂν περὶ ἀναρχίας, οὐκ ἀρκεῖ μοι; οὐκ ὠφέλιμα ἔσται; πῶς οὖν ἔτι ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς τὰ κακὰ καὶ τἀγαθὰ δεῖ με ζητεῖν; ἀλλὰ τί; ταῦτα μέχρι ὧδε, εἰς οἶκον δʼ οὐδεὶς ἀποφέρει· ἀλλʼ εὐθὺς πρὸς τὸ παιδάριον πόλεμος, πρὸς τοὺς γείτονας, πρὸς τοὺς σκώψαντας, πρὸς τοὺς καταγελάσαντας. καλῶς γένοιτο Λεσβίῳ, ὅτι με καθʼ ἡμέραν ἐξελέγχει μηδὲν εἰδότα.

[¶8] 21. They who have merely received bare maxims are presently inclined to throw them up, as a sick stomach does its food. Digest it, and then you will not throw it up; otherwise it will be crude and impure, and unfit for nourishment. But show us, from what you have digested, some change in your ruling faculty; as wrestlers do in their shoulders, from their exercise and their diet; as artificers, in their skill, from what they have learnt. A carpenter does not come and say, “Hear me discourse on the art of building;” but he hires a building, and fits it up, and shows himself master of his trade. Let it be your business likewise to do something like this; be manly in your ways of eating, drinking, dressing; marry, have children, perform the duty of a citizen; bear reproach; bear with an unreasonable brother; bear with a father; bear with a son, a neighbor, a companion, as becomes a man. Show us these things, that we may see that you have really learned something from the philosophers. No; but “come and hear me repeat commentaries.” Get you gone, and seek somebody else upon whom to bestow them. “Nay, but I will explain the doctrines of Chrysippus to you as no other person can; I will elucidate his style in the clearest manner.” And is it for this, then, that young men leave their country and their own parents, that they may come and hear you explain words? Ought they not to return patient, active, free from passion, free from perturbation; furnished with such a provision for life, that, setting out with it, they will be able to bear all events well, and derive ornament from them? But how should you impart what you have not? For have you yourself done anything else, from the beginning, but spend your time in solving syllogisms and convertible propositions and interrogatory arguments? “But such a one has a school, and why should not I have one?” Foolish man, these things are not brought about carelessly and at haphazard; but there must be a fit age, and a method of life, and a guiding God. Is it not so? No one quits the port, or sets sail, till he hath sacrificed to the gods, and implored their assistance; nor do men sow without first invoking Ceres. And shall any one who has undertaken so great a work attempt it safely without the gods? And shall they who apply to such a one, apply to him with success? What are you doing else, man, but divulging the mysteries? As if you said, “There is a temple at Eleusis, and here is one too; there is a priest, and I will make a priest here; there is a herald, and I will appoint a herald too; there is a torch-bearer, and I will have a torch-bearer; there are torches, and so shall there be here. The words said, the things done, are the same. Where is the difference betwixt one and the other?” Most impious man! is there no difference? Are these things of use, out of place and out of time? A man should come with sacrifices and prayers, previously purified, and his mind affected by the knowledge that he is approaching sacred and ancient rites. Thus the mysteries become useful; thus we come to have an idea that all these things were appointed by the ancients for the instruction and correction of life. But you divulge and publish them without regard to time and place, without sacrifices, without purity; you have not the garment that is necessary for a priest, nor the fitting hair nor girdle, nor the voice, nor the age, nor have you purified yourself like him. But when you have got the words by heart, you say, “The mere words are sacred of themselves.” These things are to be approached in another manner. It is a great, it is a mystical affair; not given by chance, or to every one indifferently. Nay, mere wisdom, perhaps, is not a sufficient qualification for the care of youth. There ought to be likewise a certain readiness and aptitude for this, and indeed a particular physical temperament, and, above all, a counsel from God to undertake this office, as he counselled Socrates to undertake the office of confutation; Diogenes, that of authoritative reproof; Zeno, that of dogmatical instruction. But you set up for a physician, provided with nothing but medicines, and without knowing, or having studied, where or how they are to be applied. “Why, such a one had medicines for the eyes, and I have the same.” Have you also, then, a faculty of making use of them? Do you at all know when and how and to whom they will be of service? Why then do you act at hazard? Why are you careless in things of the greatest importance? Why do you attempt a matter unsuitable to you? Leave it to those who can perform it and do it honor. Do not you too bring a scandal upon philosophy by your means; nor be one of those who cause the thing itself to be calumniated. But if mere theorems delight you, sit quietly and turn them over by yourself; but never call yourself a philosopher, nor suffer another to call you so; but say, He is mistaken; for my desires are not different from what they were; nor my pursuits directed to other objects; nor my assents otherwise given; nor have I at all made any change from my former condition in the use of things as they appear. Think and speak thus of yourself, if you would think as you ought; if not, act at random, and do as you do; for it is appropriate to you.

> Greek: 21. ὅτι τὰ θεωρήματα ἀναλαβόντες ψιλὰ εὐθὺς αὐτὰ ἐξεμέσαι θέλουσιν ὡς οἱ στομαχικοὶ τὴν τροφήν. πρῶτον αὐτὸ πέψον, εἶθʼ οὕτω μὴ ἐξεμέσῃς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔμετος τῷ ὄντι γίνεται, πρᾶγμʼ ἀκάθαρτον καὶ ἄβρωτον. ἀλλʼ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἀναδοθέντων δεῖξόν τινα ἡμῖν μεταβολὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τοῦ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς οἱ ἀθληταὶ τοὺς ὤμους, ἀφʼ ὧν ἐγυμνάσθησαν καὶ ἔφαγον, ὡς οἱ τὰς τέχνας ἀναλαβόντες, ἀφʼ ὧν ἔμαθον. οὐκ ἔρχεται ὁ τέκτων καὶ λέγει ἀκούσατέ μου διαλεγομένου περὶ τῶν τεκτονικῶν, ἀλλʼ ἐκμισθωσάμενος οἰκίαν ταύτην κατασκευάσας δείκνυσιν, ὅτι ἔχει τὴν τέχνην. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ σὺ ποίησον· φάγε ὡς ἄνθρωπος, πίε ὡς ἄνθρωπος, κοσμήθητι, γάμησον, παιδοποίησον, πολίτευσαι· ἀνάσχου λοιδορίας, ἔνεγκε ἀδελφὸν ἀγνώμονα, ἔνεγκε πατέρα, ἔνεγκε υἱόν, γείτονα, σύνοδον. ταῦτα ἡμῖν δεῖξον, ἵνʼ ἴδωμεν, ὅτι μεμάθηκας ταῖς ἀληθείαις τι τῶν φιλοσόφων. οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἐλθόντες ἀκούσατέ μου σχόλια λέγοντος. ὕπαγε, ζήτει τίνων κατεξεράσεις. καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐξηγήσομαι τὰ Χρυσίππεια ὡς οὐδείς, τὴν λέξιν διαλύσω καθαρώτατα, προσθήσω ἄν που καὶ Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ Ἀρχεδήμου φοράν. εἶτα τούτου ἕνεκα ἀπολίπωσιν οἱ νέοι τὰς πατρίδας καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς τοὺς αὑτῶν, ἵνʼ ἐλθόντες λεξείδιά σου ἐξηγουμένου ἀκούσωσιν; οὐ δεῖ αὐτοὺς ὑποστρέψαι ἀνεκτικούς, συνεργητικούς, ἀπαθεῖς, ἀταράχους, ἔχοντάς τι ἐφόδιον τοιοῦτον εἰς τὸν βίον, ἀφʼ οὗ ὁρμώμενοι φέρειν δυνήσονται τὰ συμπίπτοντα καλῶς καὶ κοσμεῖσθαι ὑπʼ αὐτῶν; καὶ πόθεν σοι μεταδιδόναι τούτων ὧν οὐκ ἔχεις; αὐτὸς γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἐποίησας ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἢ περὶ ταῦτα κατετρίβης, πῶς οἱ συλλογισμοὶ ἀναλυθήσονται, πῶς οἱ μεταπίπτοντες, πῶς οἱ τῷ ἠρωτῆσθαι περαίνοντες; ἀλλʼ ὁ δεῖνα σχολὴν ἔχει· διὰ τί μὴ κἀγὼ σχῶ; οὐκ εἰκῇ ταῦτα γίνεται, ἀνδράποδον, οὐδʼ ὡς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡλικίαν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ βίον καὶ θεὸν ἡγεμόνα. οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ λι[πο]μένος μὲν οὐδεὶς ἀνάγεται μὴ θύσας τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ παρακαλέσας αὐτοὺς βοηθοὺς οὐδὲ σπείρουσιν ἄλλως οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἰ μὴ τὴν Δήμητρα ἐπικαλεσάμενοι· τηλικούτου δʼ ἔργου ἁψάμενός τις ἄνευ θεῶν ἀσφαλῶς ἅψεται καὶ οἱ τούτῳ προσιόντες εὐτυχῶς προσελεύσονται; τί ἄλλο ποιεῖς, ἄνθρωπε, ἢ τὰ μυστήρια ἐξορχῇ καὶ λέγεις οἴκημά ἐστι καὶ ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι, ἰδοὺ καὶ ἐνθάδε. ἐκεῖ ἱεροφάντης· καὶ ἐγὼ ποιήσω ἱεροφάντην. ἐκεῖ κήρυξ· κἀγὼ κήρυκα καταστήσω. ἐκεῖ δᾳδοῦχος· κἀγὼ δᾳδοῦχον. ἐκεῖ δᾷδες· καὶ ἐνθάδε. αἱ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· τὰ γινόμενα τί διαφέρει ταῦτα ἐκείνων; ἀσεβέστατε ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲν διαφέρει; καὶ παρὰ τόπον ταῦτα ὠφελεῖ καὶ παρὰ καιρόν· καὶ μετὰ θυσίας δὲ καὶ μετʼ εὐχῶν καὶ προηγνευκότα καὶ προδιακείμενον τῇ γνώμῃ, ὅτι ἱεροῖς προσελεύσεται καὶ ἱεροῖς παλαιοῖς. οὕτως ὠφέλιμα γίνεται τὰ μυστήρια, οὕτως εἰς φαντασίαν ἐρχόμεθα, ὅτι ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ καὶ ἐπανορθώσει τοῦ βίου κατεστάθη πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν. σὺ δʼ ἐξαγγέλλεις αὐτὰ καὶ ἐξορχῇ παρὰ καιρόν, παρὰ τόπον, ἄνευ θυμάτων, ἄνευ ἁγνείας· οὐκ ἐσθῆτα ἔχεις ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἱεροφάντην, οὐ κόμην, οὐ στρόφιον οἷον δεῖ, οὐ φωνήν, οὐχ ἡλικίαν, οὐχ ἥγνευκας ὡς ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλʼ αὐτὰς μόνας τὰς φωνὰς ἀνειληφὼς λέγεις. ἱεραί εἰσιν αἱ φωναὶ αὐταὶ καθʼ αὑτάς; ἄλλον τρόπον δεῖ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἐλθεῖν· μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, μυστικόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν οὐδὲ τῷ τυχόντι δεδομένον. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ σοφὸν εἶναι τυχὸν ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιμεληθῆναι νέων· δεῖ δὲ καὶ προχειρότητά τινα εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδειότητα πρὸς τοῦτο, νὴ τὸν Δία, καὶ σῶμα ποιὸν καὶ πρὸ πάντων τὸν θεὸν συμβουλεύειν ταύτην τὴν χώραν κατασχεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτει συνεβούλευεν τὴν ἐλεγκτικὴν χώραν ἔχειν, ὡς Διογένει τὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ ἐπιπληκτικήν, ὡς Ζήνωνι τὴν διδασκαλικὴν καὶ δογματικήν. σὺ δʼ ἰατρεῖον ἀνοίγεις ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἔχων ἢ φάρμακα, ποῦ δὲ ἢ πῶς ἐπιτίθεται ταῦτα, μήτε εἰδὼς μήτε πολυπραγμονήσας. ἰδοὺ ἐκεῖνος ταῦτα, κολλύρια· κἀγὼ ἔχω. μή τι οὖν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν χρηστικὴν αὐτοῖς; μή τι οἶδας καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς ὠφελήσει καὶ τίνα; τί οὖν κυβεύεις ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις, τί ῥᾳδιουργεῖς, τί ἐπιχειρεῖς πράγματι μηδέν σοι προσήκοντι; ἄφες αὐτὸ τοῖς δυναμένοις, τοῖς κοσμοῦσι. μὴ προστρίβου καὶ αὐτὸς αἶσχος φιλοσοφίᾳ διὰ σαυτοῦ, μηδὲ γίνου μέρος τῶν διαβαλλόντων τὸ ἔργον. ἀλλὰ εἴ σε ψυχαγωγεῖ τὰ θεωρήματα, καθήμενος αὐτὰ στρέφε αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ· φιλόσοφον δὲ μηδέποτʼ εἴπῃς σεαυτὸν μηδʼ ἄλλου ἀνάσχῃ λέγοντος, ἀλλὰ λέγε πεπλάνηται· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὔτʼ ὀρέγομαι ἄλλως ἢ πρότερον οὐδʼ ὁρμῶ ἐπʼ ἄλλα οὐδὲ συγκατατίθεμαι ἄλλοις οὐδʼ ὅλως ἐν χρήσει φαντασιῶν παρήλλαχά τι ἀπὸ τῆς πρότερον καταστάσεως. ταῦτα φρόνει καὶ λέγε περὶ σεαυτοῦ, εἰ θέλεις τὰ κατʼ ἀξίαν φρονεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, κύβευε καὶ ποίει ἃ ποιεῖς. ταῦτα γάρ σοι πρέπει.

## 16. Book III · chapter 22

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/16/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/16/#p-N

[¶0] 22. When one of his scholars, who seemed inclined to the Cynic philosophy, asked him what a Cynic must be, and what was the general plan of that sect, Let us examine it, he said, at our leisure.

> Greek: 22. πυθομένου δὲ τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς αὐτοῦ, ὃς ἐφαίνετο ἐπιρρεπῶς ἔχων πρὸς τὸ κυνίσαι, Ποῖόν τινα εἶναι δεῖ τὸν κυνίζοντα καὶ τίς ἡ πρόληψις ἡ τοῦ πράγματος, Σκεψόμεθα κατὰ σχολήν.

[¶1] But thus much I can tell you now, that he who attempts so great an affair without divine guidance is an object of divine wrath, and would only bring public dishonor upon himself.

> Greek: τοσοῦτον δʼ ἔχω σοι εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὁ δίχα θεοῦ τηλικούτῳ πράγματι ἐπιβαλλόμενος θεοχόλωτός ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δημοσίᾳ θέλει ἀσχημονεῖν.

[¶2] For in a well-regulated house no one comes and says to himself, “ought to be the manager here.” If he does, and the master returns and sees him insolently giving orders, he drags him out and has him punished.

> Greek: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν οἰκίᾳ καλῶς οἰκουμένῃ παρελθών τις αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ λέγει ἐμὲ δεῖ οἰκονόμον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπιστραφεὶς ὁ κύριος καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν σοβαρῶς διατασσόμενον, ἑλκύσας ἔτεμεν.

[¶3] Such is the case likewise in this great city. For here, too, is a master of the family who orders everything.

> Greek: οὕτως γίνεται καὶ ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ ταύτῃ πόλει. ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ ἐνθάδʼ οἰκοδεσπότης ἕκαστα ὁ διατάσσων.

[¶4] “You are the sun; you can, by making a circuit, form the year and the seasons, and increase and nourish the fruits; you can raise and calm the winds, and give an equable warmth to the bodies of men. Go; make your circuit, and thus move everything from the greatest to the least. You are a calf;

> Greek: σὺ ἥλιος εἶ· δύνασαι περιερχόμενος ἐνιαυτὸν ποιεῖν καὶ ὥρας καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς αὔξειν καὶ τρέφειν καὶ ἀνέμους κινεῖν καὶ ἀνιέναι καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων θερμαίνειν συμμέτρως· ὕπαγε, περιέρχου καὶ οὕτως διακίνει ἀπὸ τῶν μεγίστων ἐπὶ τὰ μικρότατα.

[¶5] when the lion appears, act accordingly, or you will suffer for it. You are a bull; come and fight; for that is incumbent on you and becomes you, and you can do it. You can lead an army to Troy;

> Greek: σὺ μοσχάριον εἶ· ὅταν ἐπιφανῇ λέων, τὰ σαυτοῦ πρᾶσσε· εἰ δὲ μή, οἰμώξεις. σὺ ταῦρος εἶ, προσελθὼν μάχου· σοὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐπιβάλλει καὶ πρέπει καὶ δύνασαι αὐτὸ ποιεῖν.

[¶6] be you Agamemnon. You can engage in single combat with Hector; be you Achilles.”

> Greek: σὺ δύνασαι ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐπὶ Ἴλιον· ἴσθι Ἀγαμέμνων. σὺ δύνασαι τῷ Ἕκτορι μονομαχῆσαι· ἴσθι Ἀχιλλεύς.

[¶7] But if Thersites had come and claimed the command, either he would not have obtained it, or, if he had, he would have disgraced himself before so many more witnesses.

> Greek: εἰ δὲ Θερσίτης παρελθὼν ἀντεποιεῖτο τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἔτυχεν ἢ τυχὼν ἂν ἠσχημόνησεν ἐν πλείοσι μάρτυσι.

[¶8] Do you, too, carefully deliberate upon this undertaking; it is not what you think it.

> Greek: καὶ σὺ[μ]βούλευσαι περὶ πράγματος ἐπιμελῶς· οὐκ ἔστιν οἷον δοκεῖ σοι.

[¶9] “I wear an old cloak now, and I shall have one then. I sleep upon the hard ground now, and I shall sleep so then. I will moreover take a wallet and a staff, and go about, and beg of those I meet, and begin by rebuking them; and if I see any one using effeminate practices, or arranging his curls, or walking in purple, I will rebuke him.”

> Greek: τριβώνιον καὶ νῦν φορῶ καὶ τόθʼ ἕξω, κοιμῶμαι καὶ νῦν σκληρῶς καὶ τότε κοιμήσομαι, πηρίδιον προσλήψομαι καὶ ξύλον καὶ περιερχόμενος αἰτεῖν ἄρξομαι τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας, λοιδορεῖν· κἂν ἴδω τινὰ δρωπακιζόμενον, ἐπιτιμήσω αὐτῷ, κἂν τὸ κόμιον πεπλακότα ἢ ἐν κοκκίνοις περιπατοῦντα.

[¶10] If you imagine this to be the whole thing, avaunt; come not near it; it belongs not to you.

> Greek: εἰ τοιοῦτόν τι φαντάζῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα, μακρὰν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ· μὴ προσέλθῃς, οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς σέ.

[¶11] But if you imagine it to be what it really is, and do not think yourself unworthy of it, consider how great a thing you undertake.

> Greek: εἰ δʼ οἷόν ἐστι φανταζόμενος οὐκ ἀπαξιοῖς σεαυτόν, σκέψαι ἡλίκῳ πράγματι ἐπιχειρεῖς.

[¶12] First, with regard to yourself; you must no longer, in any instance, appear as now. You must accuse neither God nor man. You must altogether control desire, and must transfer aversion to such things only as are controllable by Will. You must have neither anger, nor resentment, nor envy, nor pity. Neither boy, nor girl, nor fame, nor dainties must have charms for you.

> Greek: πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ σαυτὸν οὐκέτι δεῖ σε ὅμοιον ἐν οὐδενὶ φαίνεσθαι οἷς νῦν ποιεῖς, οὐ θεῷ ἐγκαλοῦντα, οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ· ὄρεξιν ἆραί σε δεῖ παντελῶς, ἔκκλισιν ἐπὶ μόνα μεταθεῖναι τὰ προαιρετικά· σοὶ μὴ ὀργὴν εἶναι, μὴ μῆνιν, μὴ φθόνον, μὴ ἔλεον· μὴ κοράσιόν σοι φαίνεσθαι καλόν, μὴ δοξάριον, μὴ παιδάριον, μὴ πλακουντάριον.

[¶13] For you must know that other men indeed fence themselves with walls and houses and darkness, when they indulge in anything of this kind, and have many concealments; a man shuts the door, places somebody before the apartment: “Say that he is out; say that he is engaged.”

> Greek: ἐκεῖνο γὰρ εἰδέναι σε δεῖ, ὅτι οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τοὺς τοίχους προβέβληνται καὶ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὸ σκότος, ὅταν τι τῶν τοιούτων ποιῶσιν, καὶ τὰ κρύψοντα πολλὰ ἔχουσιν. κέκλεικε τὴν θύραν, ἕστακέν τινα πρὸ τοῦ κοιτῶνος· ἄν τις ἔλθῃ, λέγε ὅτι ἔξω ἐστίν, οὐ σχολάζει.

[¶14] But the Cynic, instead of all this, must fence himself with virtuous shame; otherwise he will be improperly exposed in the open air. This is his house, this his door, this his porter, this his darkness. He must not wish to conceal anything relating to himself;

> Greek: ὁ Κυνικὸς δʼ ἀντὶ πάντων τούτων ὀφείλει τὴν αἰδῶ προβεβλῆσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, γυμνὸς καὶ ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ ἀσχημονήσει. τοῦτο οἰκία ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, τοῦτο θύρα, τοῦτο οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ κοιτῶνος, τοῦτο σκότος.

[¶15] for if he does, he is gone; he has lost the Cynic character, the openness, the freedom; he has begun to fear something external; he has begun to need concealment, nor can he get it when he will. For where shall he conceal himself, or how?

> Greek: οὔτε γὰρ θέλειν τι δεῖ ἀποκρύπτειν αὐτὸν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ (εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπῆλθεν, ἀπώλεσε τὸν Κυνικόν, τὸν ὕπαιθρον, τὸν ἐλεύθερον, ἦρκταί τι τῶν ἐντὸς φοβεῖσθαι, ἦρκται χρείαν ἔχειν τοῦ ἀποκρύψοντος) οὔτε ὅταν θέλῃ δύναται. ποῦ γὰρ αὑτὸν ἀποκρύψῃ ἢ πῶς;

[¶16] For if this tutor, this pedagogue of the public, should happen to slip, what must he suffer?

> Greek: ἂν δʼ ἀπὸ τύχης ἐμπέσῃ ὁ παιδευτὴς ὁ κοινός, ὁ παιδαγωγός, οἷα πάσχειν ἀνάγκη;

[¶17] Can he, then, who dreads these things, be thoroughly bold within, and prescribe to other men? Impracticable, impossible.

> Greek: ταῦτʼ οὖν δεδοικότα ἐπιθαρρεῖν οἷόν τʼ ἔτι ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς ἐπιστατεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις;

[¶18] In the first place, then, you must purify your own ruling faculty, to match this method of life.

> Greek: ἀμήχανον, ἀδύνατον. πρῶτον οὖν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν σε δεῖ τὸ σαυτοῦ καθαρὸν ποιῆσαι καὶ τὴν ἔνστασιν ταύτην·

[¶19] Now, the material for me to work upon is my own mind, as wood is for a carpenter, or leather for a shoemaker; and my business is a right use of things as they appear. But body is nothing to me;

> Greek: νῦν ἐμοὶ ὕλη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐμὴ διάνοια, ὡς τῷ τέκτονι τὰ ξύλα, ὡς τῷ σκυτεῖ τὰ δέρματα· ἔργον δʼ ὀρθὴ χρῆσις τῶν φαντασιῶν.

[¶20] its parts nothing to me. Let death come when it will, either of the whole body or of part. “Go into exile.” And whither?

> Greek: τὸ σωμάτιον δὲ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ· τὰ τούτου μέρη οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ. θάνατος; ἐρχέσθω, ὅταν θέλῃ, εἴτε ὅλου εἴτε μέρους τινός.

[¶21] Can any one turn me out of the universe? He cannot. But wherever I go there is the sun, the moon, the stars, dreams, auguries, communication with God. And even this preparation is by no means sufficient for a true Cynic.

> Greek: φυγή; καὶ ποῦ δύναταί τις ἐκβαλεῖν; ἔξω τοῦ κόσμου οὐ δύναται. ὅπου δʼ ἂν ἀπέλθω, ἐκεῖ ἥλιος, ἐκεῖ σελήνη, ἐκεῖ ἄστρα, ἐνύπνια, οἰωνοί, ἡ πρὸς θεοὺς ὁμιλία.

[¶22] But it must further be known that he is a messenger sent from Zeus to men, concerning good and evil; to show them that they are mistaken, and seek the essence of good and evil where it is not, but do not observe it where it is; that he is a spy, like Diogenes, when he was brought to Philip after the battle of Chaeronea.

> Greek: εἶθʼ οὕτως παρασκευασάμενον οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ἀρκεῖσθαι τὸν ταῖς ἀληθείαις Κυνικόν, ἀλλʼ εἰδέναι δεῖ, ὅτι ἄγγελος ἀπὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἀπέσταλται καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ὑποδείξων αὐτοῖς, ὅτι πεπλάνηνται καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ ζητοῦσι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὅπου οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅπου δʼ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἐνθυμοῦνται,

[¶23] For, in effect, a Cynic is a spy to discover what things are friendly, what hostile, to man; and he must, after making an accurate observation, come and tell them the truth; not be struck with terror, so as to point out to them enemies where there are none;

> Greek: καὶ ὡς ὁ Διογένης ἀπαχθεὶς πρὸς Φίλιππον μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην κατάσκοπος εἶναι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι κατάσκοπός ἐστιν ὁ Κυνικὸς τοῦ τίνα ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις φίλα καὶ τίνα πολέμια.

[¶24] nor, in any other instance, be disconcerted or confounded by appearances. He must, then, if it should so happen, be able to lift up his voice, to come upon the stage, and say, like Socrates: O mortals, whither are you hurrying?

> Greek: καὶ δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀκριβῶς κατασκεψάμενον ἐλθόντʼ ἀπαγγεῖλαι τἀληθῆ μήθʼ ὑπὸ φόβου ἐκπλαγέντα, ὥστε τοὺς μὴ ὄντας πολεμίους δεῖξαι, μήτε τινὰ ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν παραταραχθέντα ἢ συγχυθέντα.

[¶25] What are you about? Why do you tumble up and down, O miserable wretches! like blind men? You are going the wrong way, and have forsaken the right. You seek prosperity and happiness in a wrong place, where they are not; nor do you give credit to another, who shows you where they are. Why do you seek this possession without? It lies not in the body; if you do not believe me, look at Myro, look at Ofellius.

> Greek: δεῖ οὖν αὐτὸν δύνασθαι ἀνατεινάμενον, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ἐπὶ σκηνὴν τραγικὴν ἀνερχόμενον λέγειν τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους· ἰὼ ἄνθρωποι, ποῖ φέρεσθε; τί ποιεῖτε, ὦ ταλαίπωροι; ὡς τυφλοὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω κυλίεσθε· ἄλλην ὁδὸν ἀπέρχεσθε τὴν οὖσαν ἀπολελοιπότες, ἀλλαχοῦ ζητεῖτε τὸ εὔρουν καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονικόν, ὅπου οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδʼ ἄλλου δεικνύοντος πιστεύετε.

[¶26] It is not in wealth; if you do not believe me, look upon Croesus; look upon the rich of the present age, how full of lamentation their life is. It is not in power; for otherwise, they who have been twice and thrice consuls must be happy; but they are not. To whom shall we give heed in these things,—to you who look only upon the externals of their condition, and are dazzled by appearances, or to themselves?

> Greek: τί αὐτὸ ἔξω ζητεῖτε; ἐν σώματι οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ ἀπιστεῖτε, ἴδετε Μύρωνα, ἴδετε Ὀφέλλιον. ἐν κτήσει οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ δʼ ἀπιστεῖτε, ἴδετε Κροῖσον, ἴδετε τοὺς νῦν πλουσίους, ὅσης οἰμωγῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν μεστός ἐστιν. ἐν ἀρχῇ οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ μή γε, ἔδει τοὺς δὶς καὶ τρὶς ὑπάτους εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ.

[¶27] What do they say?

> Greek: τίσιν περὶ τούτου πιστεύσομεν; ὑμῖν τοῖς ἔξωθεν τὰ ἐκείνων βλέπουσιν καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας περιλαμπομένοις ἢ αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις;

[¶28] Hear them when they groan, when they sigh, when they pronounce themselves the more wretched and in more danger from these very consulships, this glory and splendor. It is not in empire; otherwise Nero and Sardanapalus had been happy.

> Greek: τί λέγουσιν; ἀκούσατε αὐτῶν, ὅταν οἰμώζωσιν, ὅταν στένωσιν, ὅταν διʼ αὐτὰς τὰς ὑπατείας καὶ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ἀθλιώτερον οἴωνται καὶ ἐπικινδυνότερον ἔχειν.

[¶29] But not even Agamemnon was happy, though a better man than Sardanapalus or Nero. But when others sleep soundly, what is he doing?
Forth by the roots he rends his hairs. And what does he himself say? “wander bewildered; my heart leaps forth from my bosom.” Why, which of your affairs goes ill, poor wretch, your possessions? No. Your body? No. But you have gold and brass in abundance. What then goes ill? That part of you is neglected and corrupted, whatever it be called, by which we desire, and shrink;

> Greek: ἐν βασιλείᾳ οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ μή, Νέρων ἂν εὐδαίμων ἐγένετο καὶ Σαρδανάπαλλος. ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ Ἀγαμέμνων εὐδαίμων ἦν καίτοι κομψότερος ὢν Σαρδαναπάλλου καὶ Νέρωνος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων ῥεγκόντων ἐκεῖνος τί ποιεῖ; πολλὰς ἐκ κεφαλῆς προθελύμνους ἕλκετο χαίτας. καὶ αὐτὸς τί λέγει; πλάζομαι ὧδε, φησίν, καὶ ἀλαλύκτημαι· κραδίη δέ μοι ἔξω στηθέων ἐκθρῴσκει. τάλας, τί τῶν σῶν ἔχει κακῶς;

[¶30] by which we pursue, and avoid. How neglected? It is ignorant of that for which it was naturally formed, of the essence of good, and of the essence of evil. It is ignorant what is its own, and what another’s.

> Greek: ἡ κτῆσις; οὐκ ἔχει. τὸ σῶμα; οὐκ ἔχει. ἀλλὰ πολύχρυσος εἶ καὶ πολύχαλκος· τί οὖν σοι κακόν ἐστιν; ἐκεῖνο, ὅ τι ποτὲ ἠμέληταί σου καὶ κατέφθαρται, ᾧ ὀρεγόμεθα, ᾧ ἐκκλίνομεν, ᾧ ὁρμῶμεν καὶ ἀφορμῶμεν.

[¶31] And when anything belonging to others goes ill, it says, “am undone; the Greeks are in danger!” (Poor ruling faculty! which alone is neglected, and has no care taken of it.) “They will die by the sword of the Trojans!”

> Greek: πῶς ἠμέληται; ἀγνοεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρὸς ἣν πέφυκε καὶ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τί ἴδιον ἔχει καὶ τί ἀλλότριον. καὶ ὅταν τι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων κακῶς ἔχῃ, λέγει οὐαί μοι, οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες κινδυνεύουσι.

[¶32] And if the Trojans should not kill them, will they not die? “Yes, but not all at once.” Why, where is the difference? For if it be an evil to die, then whether it be all at once or singly, it is equally an evil. Will anything more happen than the separation of soul and body? “Nothing.” And when the Greeks perish, is the door shut against you? Is it not in your power to die? “It is.” Why then do you lament, while you are a king and hold the sceptre of Zeus?

> Greek: ταλαίπωρον ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ μόνον ἀτημέλητον καὶ ἀθεράπευτον. μέλλουσιν ἀποθνῄσκειν ὑπὸ τῶν Τρώων ἀναιρεθέντες. ἂν δʼ αὐτοὺς οἱ Τρῶες μὴ ἀποκτείνωσιν, οὐ μὴ ἀποθάνωσιν; ναί, ἀλλʼ οὐχʼ ὑφʼ ἓν πάντες. τί οὖν διαφέρει; εἰ γὰρ κακόν ἐστι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν, ἄν τε ὁμοῦ ἄν τε καθʼ ἕνα ὁμοίως κακόν ἐστιν. μή τι ἄλλο τι μέλλει γίνεσθαι ἢ τὸ σωμάτιον χωρίζεσθαι καὶ ἡ ψυχή;

[¶33] A king is no more to be made unfortunate than a god. What are you, then? You are a mere shepherd, truly so called; for you weep, just as shepherds do when the wolf seizes any of their sheep; and they who are governed by you are mere sheep.

> Greek: οὐδέν. σοὶ δὲ ἀπολλυμένων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡ θύρα κέκλεισται; οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἀποθανεῖν; ἔξεστιν. τί οὖν πενθεῖς; οὐᾶ, βασιλεὺς καὶ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς σκῆπτρον ἔχων. ἀτυχὴς βασιλεὺς οὐ γίνεται· οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀτυχὴς θεός.

[¶34] But why do you come hither? Was your desire in any danger; your aversion; your pursuits; your avoidances? “No,” he says, “but my brother’s wife has been stolen.”

> Greek: τί οὖν εἶ; ποιμὴν ταῖς ἀληθείαις· οὕτως γὰρ κλάεις ὡς οἱ ποιμένες, ὅταν λύκος ἁρπάσῃ τι τῶν προβάτων αὐτῶν· καὶ οὗτοι δὲ πρόβατά εἰσιν οἱ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἀρχόμενοι.

[¶35] Is it not great good luck, then, to be rid of an adulterous wife? “But must we be held in contempt by the Trojans?” What are they,—wise men, or fools? If wise, why do you go to war with them?

> Greek: τί δὲ καὶ ἤρχου; μή τι ὄρεξις ὑμῖν ἐκινδυνεύετο, μή τι ἔκκλισις, μή τι ὁρμή, μή τι ἀφορμή; οὔ, φησίν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μου τὸ γυναικάριον ἡρπάγη.

[¶36] If fools, why do you heed them? Where, then, does our good lie, since it does not lie in these things? Tell us, sir, you who are our messenger and spy. Where you do not think, nor are willing to seek it.

> Greek: οὐκ οὖν κέρδος μέγα στερηθῆναι μοιχικοῦ γυναικαρίου; καταφρονηθῶμεν οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν Τρώων; τίνων ὄντων; φρονίμων ἢ ἀφρόνων; εἰ φρονίμων, τί αὐτοῖς πολεμεῖτε; εἰ ἀφρόνων, τί ὑμῖν μέλει;

[¶37] For if you were willing, you would find it in yourselves; nor would you wander abroad, nor seek what belongs to others, as your own. Turn your thoughts upon yourselves. Consider the impressions which you have. What do you imagine good to be? What is prosperous, happy, unhindered.

> Greek: ἐν τίνι οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν; εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, κύριε ἄγγελε καὶ κατάσκοπε. ὅπου οὐ δοκεῖτε οὐδὲ θέλετε ζητῆσαι αὐτό. εἰ γὰρ ἠθέλετε, εὕρετε ἂν αὐτὸ ἐν ὑμῖν ὂν οὐδʼ ἂν ἔξω ἐπλάζεσθε οὐδʼ ἂν ἐζητεῖτε τὰ ἀλλότρια ὡς ἴδια.

[¶38] Well, and do you not naturally imagine it great? Do you not imagine it valuable? Do you not imagine it incapable of being hurt? Where, then, must you seek prosperity and exemption from hindrance,—in that which is enslaved, or free? “In the free.” Is your body, then, enslaved or free?

> Greek: ἐπιστρέψατε αὐτοὶ ἐφʼ ἑαυτούς, καταμάθετε τὰς προλήψεις ἃς ἔχετε. ποῖόν τι φαντάζεσθε τὸ ἀγαθόν; τὸ εὔρουν, τὸ εὐδαιμονικόν, τὸ ἀπαραπόδιστον. ἄγε, μέγα δʼ αὐτὸ φυσικῶς οὐ φαντάζεσθε; ἀξιόλογον οὐ φαντάζεσθε; ἀβλαβὲς οὐ φαντάζεσθε;

[¶39] We do not know. Do you not know that it is the slave of fever, gout, defluxion, dysentery; of a tyrant; of fire, steel; of everything stronger than itself? “Yes, it is a slave.” How, then, can anything belonging to the body be unhindered? And how can that be great or valuable, which is by nature lifeless, earth, clay?

> Greek: ἐν ποίᾳ οὖν ὕλῃ δεῖ ζητεῖν τὸ εὔρουν καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστον; ἐν τῇ δούλῃ ἢ ἐν τῇ ἐλευθέρᾳ; ἐν τῇ ἐλευθέρᾳ. τὸ σωμάτιον οὖν ἐλεύθερον ἔχετε ἢ δοῦλον; οὐκ ἴσμεν. οὐκ ἴστε ὅτι πυρετοῦ δοῦλόν ἐστιν, ποδάγρας, ὀφθαλμίας, δυσεντερίας, τυράννου, πυρός, σιδήρου, παντὸς τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου;

[¶40] What, then; have you nothing free? “Possibly nothing.” Why, who can compel you to assent to what appears false? No one. Or who, not to assent to what appears true? No one.

> Greek: ναὶ δοῦλον. πῶς οὖν ἔτι ἀνεμπόδιστον εἶναί τι δύναται τῶν τοῦ σώματος; πῶς δὲ μέγα ἢ ἀξιόλογον τὸ φύσει νεκρόν, ἡ γῆ, ὁ πηλός; τί οὖν; οὐδὲν ἔχετε ἐλεύθερον; μήποτε οὐδέν.

[¶41] Here, then, you see that there is something in you naturally free. But which of you can desire or shun, or use his active powers of pursuit or avoidance, or prepare or plan anything, unless he has been impressed by an appearance of its being for his advantage or his duty?

> Greek: καὶ τίς ὑμᾶς ἀναγκάσαι δύναται συγκαταθέσθαι τῷ ψευδεῖ φαινομένῳ; οὐδείς. τίς δὲ μὴ συγκαταθέσθαι τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀληθεῖ; οὐδείς.

[¶42] No one. You have, then, in these too something unrestrained and free. Cultivate this, unfortunates; take care of this; seek for good here.

> Greek: ἐνθάδʼ οὖν ὁρᾶτε, ὅτι ἔστι τι ἐν ὑμῖν ἐλεύθερον φύσει. ὀρέγεσθαι δʼ ἢ ἐκκλίνειν ἢ ὁρμᾶν ἢ ἀφορμᾶν ἢ παρασκευάζεσθαι ἢ προτίθεσθαι τίς ὑμῶν δύναται μὴ λαβὼν φαντασίαν λυσιτελοῦς ἢ μὴ καθήκοντος; οὐδείς.

[¶43] “But how is it possible that a man destitute, naked, without house or home, squalid, unattended, an outcast, can lead a prosperous life?” See;

> Greek: ἔχετε οὖν καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀκώλυτον καὶ ἐλεύθερον. ταλαίπωροι, τοῦτο ἐξεργάζεσθε, τούτου ἐπιμέλεσθε, ἐνταῦθα ζητεῖτε τὸ ἀγαθόν.

[¶44] God hath sent us one, to show in practice that it is possible. “Take notice of me, that I am without a country, without a house, without an estate, without a servant;

> Greek: καὶ πῶς ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἔχοντα, γυμνόν, ἄοικον, ἀνέστιον, αὐχμῶντα, ἄδουλον, ἄπολιν διεξάγειν εὐρόως;

[¶45] I lie on the ground;

> Greek: ἰδοὺ ἀπέσταλκεν ὑμῖν ὁ θεὸς τὸν δείξοντα ἔργῳ, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται.

[¶46] have no wife, no children, no coat; but have only earth and heaven and one poor cloak. And what need I? Am not I without sorrow, without fear? Am not I free?

> Greek: ἴδετέ με, ἄοικός εἰμι, ἄπολις, ἀκτήμων, ἄδουλος· χαμαὶ κοιμῶμαι· οὐ γυνή, οὐ παιδία, οὐ πραιτωρίδιον, ἀλλὰ γῆ μόνον καὶ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἓν τριβωνάριον.

[¶47] Did any of you ever see me disappointed of my desire, or incurring my aversion? Did I ever blame God or man? Did I ever accuse any one? Have any of you seen me look discontented? How do I treat those whom you fear and of whom you are struck with awe? Is it not like poor slaves? Who that sees me does not think that he sees his own king and master?”

> Greek: καὶ τί μοι λείπει[ν]; οὐκ εἰμὶ ἄλυπος, οὐκ εἰμὶ ἄφοβος, οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐλεύθερος; πότε ὑμῶν εἶδέν μέ τις ἐν ὀρέξει [με] ἀποτυγχάνοντα, πότʼ ἐν ἐκκλίσει περιπίπτοντα; πότʼ ἐμεμψάμην ἢ θεὸν ἢ ἄνθρωπον, πότʼ ἐνεκάλεσά τινι; μή τις ὑμῶν ἐσκυθρωπακότα με εἶδεν;

[¶48] This is the language, this the character, this the undertaking, of a Cynic. No, [but you think only of] the wallet and the staff and a large capacity of swallowing and appropriating whatever is given you;

> Greek: πῶς δʼ ἐντυγχάνω τούτοις, οὓς ὑμεῖς φοβεῖσθε καὶ θαυμάζετε; οὐχ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις; τίς με ἰδὼν οὐχὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ὁρᾶν οἴεται καὶ δεσπότην;

[¶49] abusing unseasonably those you meet, or showing your bare arm. Do you consider how you shall attempt so important an undertaking? First take a mirror. View your shoulders, examine your back, your loins.

> Greek: ἴδε κυνικαὶ φωναί, ἴδε χαρακτήρ, ἴδʼ ἐπιβολή. οὔ· ἀλλὰ πηρίδιον καὶ ξύλον καὶ γνάθοι μεγάλαι· καταφαγεῖν πᾶν ὃ [ε]ἂν δῷς ἢ ἀποθησαυρίσαι ἢ τοῖς ἀπαντῶσι λοιδορεῖσθαι ἀκαίρως ἢ καλὸν τὸν ὦμον δεικνύειν.

[¶50] It is the Olympic Games, man, for which you are to be entered; not a poor slight contest. In the Olympic Games a champion is not allowed merely to be conquered and depart;

> Greek: τηλικούτῳ πράγματι ὁρᾷς πῶς μέλλεις ἐγχειρεῖν; ἔσοπτρον πρῶτον λάβε, ἴδε σου τοὺς ὤμους, κατάμαθε τὴν ὀσφύν, τοὺς μηρούς. Ὀλύμπια μέλλεις ἀπογράφεσθαι, ἄνθρωπε, οὐχί τινά ποτε ἀγῶνα ψυχρὸν καὶ ταλαίπωρον.

[¶51] but must first be disgraced in the view of the whole world,—not of the Athenians alone, or Spartans, or Nicopolitans; and then he who has prematurely departed must be whipped too, and, before that, must have suffered thirst and heat, and have swallowed an abundance of dust. Consider carefully, know yourself; consult the Divinity; attempt nothing without God;

> Greek: οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν Ὀλυμπίοις νικηθῆναι μόνον καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν ὅλης τῆς οἰκουμένης βλεπούσης δεῖ ἀσχημονῆσαι, οὐχὶ Ἀθηναίων μόνον ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ Νικοπολιτῶν, εἶτα καὶ δέρεσθαι δεῖ τὸν εἰκῇ ἐξελθόντα, πρὸ δὲ τοῦ δαρῆναι διψῆσαι, καυματισθῆναι, πολλὴν ἁφὴν καταπιεῖν.

[¶52] for if he counsels you, be assured that it is his will, whether that you should become eminent, or that you should suffer many a blow.

> Greek: βούλευσαι ἐπιμελέστερον, γνῶθι σαυτόν, ἀνάκρινον τὸ δαιμόνιον, δίχα θεοῦ μὴ ἐπιχειρήσῃς. ἂν γὰρ συμβουλεύσῃ, ἴσθι ὅτι μέγαν σε θέλει γενέσθαι ἢ πολλὰς πληγὰς λαβεῖν.

[¶53] For there is this fine circumstance connected with the character of a Cynic, that he must be beaten like an ass, and yet, when beaten, must love those who beat him as the father, as the brother of all. “No, to be sure; but if anybody beats you, stand publicly and roar out, ‘O Caesar!

> Greek: καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο λίαν κομψὸν τῷ Κυνικῷ παραπέπλεκται· δέρεσθαι αὐτὸν δεῖ ὡς ὄνον καὶ δερόμενον φιλεῖν αὐτοὺς τοὺς δέροντας ὡς πατέρα πάντων, ὡς ἀδελφόν.

[¶54] am I to suffer such things in breach of your peace? Let us go before the Proconsul.’”

> Greek: οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἄν τίς σε δέρῃ, κραύγαζε στὰς ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ὦ Καῖσαρ, ἐν τῇ σῇ εἰρήνῃ οἷα πάσχω; ἄγωμεν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθύπατον.

[¶55] But what is Caesar to a Cynic, or what is the Proconsul, or any one else, but Zeus, who hath deputed him, and whom he serves? Does he invoke any other but him? And is he not persuaded that, whatever he suffers of this sort, it is Zeus who doth it to exercise him?

> Greek: Κυνικῷ δὲ Καῖσαρ τί ἐστιν ἢ ἀνθύπατος ἢ ἄλλος ἢ ὁ καταπεπομφὼς αὐτὸν καὶ ᾧ λατρεύει, ὁ Ζεύς; ἄλλον τινὰ ἐπικαλεῖται ἢ ἐκεῖνον; οὐ πέπεισται δʼ, ὅ τι ἂν πάσχῃ τούτων, ὅτι ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν γυμνάζει;

[¶56] Now Hercules, when he was exercised by Eurystheus, did not think himself miserable: but executed with alacrity all that was to be done. And shall he who is appointed to the combat, and exercised by Zeus, cry out and take offence at things? A worthy person, truly, to bear the sceptre of Diogenes! Hear what he in a fever said to those who were passing by.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν Ἡρακλῆς ὑπὸ Εὐρυσθέως γυμναζόμενος οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ἀόκνως ἐπετέλει πάντα τὰ προσταττόμενα· οὗτος δʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἀθλούμενος καὶ γυμναζόμενος μέλλει κεκραγέναι καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν, ἄξιος φορεῖν τὸ σκῆπτρον τὸ Διογένους; ἄκουε, τί λέγει ἐκεῖνος πυρέσσων πρὸς τοὺς παριόντας·

[¶57] “Foolish men, why do you not stay? Do you take such a journey to Olympia to see the destruction or combat of the champions; and have you no inclination to see the combat between a man and a fever?”

> Greek: κακαί, ἔφη, κεφαλαί, οὐ μενεῖτε; ἀλλʼ ἀθλητῶν μὲν ὄλεθρον ἢ μάχην ὀψόμενοι ἄπιτε ὁδὸν τοσαύτην εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν· πυρετοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου μάχην ἰδεῖν οὐ βούλεσθε;

[¶58] Such a one, who took a pride in difficult circumstances, and thought himself worthy to be a spectacle to those who passed by, was a likely per son indeed to accuse God, who had deputed him, as treating him unworthily! For what subject of accusation shall he find,—that he preserves a decency of behavior?

> Greek: ταχύ γʼ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐνεκάλεσεν τῷ θεῷ καταπεπομφότι αὐτὸν ὡς παρʼ ἀξίαν αὐτῷ χρωμένῳ, ὅς γε ἐνεκαλλωπίζετο ταῖς περιστάσεσι καὶ θέαμα εἶναι ἠξίου τῶν παριόντων. ἐπὶ τίνι γὰρ ἐγκαλέσει; ὅτι εὐσχημονεῖ; [ὅ]τί κατηγορεῖ; ὅτι λαμπροτέραν ἐπιδείκνυται τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ;

[¶59] With what does he find fault,—that he sets his own virtue in a clearer light? Well; and what does he say of poverty; of death;

> Greek: ἄγε, περὶ πενίας δὲ τί λέγει, περὶ θανάτου, περὶ πόνου; πῶς συνέκρινεν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὑτοῦ τῇ μεγάλου βασιλέως;

[¶60] of pain i How did he compare his happiness with that of the Persian king; or rather, thought it beyond comparison! For amidst perturbations, and griefs, and fears, and disappointed desires, and incurred aversions, how can there be any entrance for happiness?

> Greek: μᾶλλον δʼ οὐδὲ συγκριτὸν ᾤετο εἶναι. ὅπου γὰρ ταραχαὶ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ φόβοι καὶ ὀρέξεις ἀτελεῖς καὶ ἐκκλίσεις περιπίπτουσαι καὶ φθόνοι καὶ ζηλοτυπίαι, ποῦ ἐκεῖ πάροδος εὐδαιμονίας; ὅπου δʼ ἂν ᾖ σαπρὰ δόγματα, ἐκεῖ πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι ἀνάγκη.

[¶61] And where there are corrupt principles, there must all these things necessarily be. -The same young man inquiring whether, if a friend should desire to come to him and take care of him when he was sick, he should comply?

> Greek: πυθομένου δὲ τοῦ νεανίσκου, εἰ νοσήσας ἀξιοῦντος φίλου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν ὥστε νοσοκομηθῆναι ὑπακούσει, Ποῦ δὲ φίλον μοι δώσεις Κυνικοῦ;

[¶62] And where, says Epictetus, will you find me the friend of a Cynic? For to be worthy of being numbered among his friends, a person ought to be such another as himself; he ought to be a partner of the sceptre and the kingdom, and a worthy minister, if he would be honored with his friendship;

> Greek: ἔφη. δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἄλλον εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ἵνʼ ἄξιος ᾖ φίλος αὐτοῦ ἀριθμεῖσθαι. κοινωνὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ σκήπτρου καὶ τῆς βασιλείας καὶ διάκονον ἄξιον, εἰ μέλλει φιλίας ἀξιωθήσεσθαι, ὡς Διογένης Ἀντισθένους ἐγένετο, ὡς Κράτης Διογένους.

[¶63] as Diogenes was the friend of Antisthenes; as Crates, of Diogenes. Do you think that he who only comes to him and salutes him is his friend;

> Greek: ἢ δοκεῖ σοι, ὅτι, ἂν χαίρειν αὐτῷ λέγῃ προσερχόμενος, φίλος ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ κἀκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἄξιον ἡγήσεται τοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰσελθεῖν;

[¶64] and that he will think him worthy of being entertained as such?

> Greek: ὥστε ἄν σοι δοκῇ καὶ ἐνθυμηθῇς τι τοιοῦτον, κοπρίαν μᾶλλον περιβλέπου κομψήν, ἐν ᾗ πυρέξεις, ἀποσκέπουσαν τὸν βορέαν, ἵνα μὴ περιψυγῇς.

[¶65] If such a thought comes into your head, rather look round you for some desirable dunghill to shelter you in your fever from the north wind, that you may not perish by taking cold.

> Greek: σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς θέλειν εἰς οἶκόν τινος ἀπελθὼν διὰ χρόνου χορτασθῆναι. τί οὖν σοι καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγματι τηλικούτῳ;

[¶66] But you seem to me to prefer to get into somebody’s house, and to be well fed there awhile. What business have you, then, even to attempt so important an undertaking as this? “But,” said the young man, “will marriage and parentage be recognized as important duties by a Cynic?”

> Greek: γάμος δʼ, ἔφη, καὶ παῖδες προηγουμένως παραληφθήσονται ὑπὸ τοῦ Κυνικοῦ; — ἄν μοι σοφῶν, ἔφη, δῷς πόλιν, τάχα μὲν οὐδʼ ἥξει τις ῥᾳδίως ἐπὶ τὸ κυνίζειν. τίνων γὰρ ἕνεκα ἀναδέξηται ταύτην τὴν διεξαγωγήν;

[¶67] Grant me a community of sages, and no one there, perhaps, will readily apply himself to the Cynic philosophy. For on whose account should he there embrace that method of life?

> Greek: ὅμως δʼ ἂν ὑποθώμεθα, οὐδὲν κωλύσει καὶ γῆμαι αὐτὸν καὶ παιδοποιήσασθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ ἔσται ἄλλη τοιαύτη καὶ ὁ πενθερὸς ἄλλος τοιοῦτος καὶ τὰ παιδία οὕτως ἀνατραφήσεται.

[¶68] However, supposing he does, there will be nothing to restrain him from marrying and having children. For his wife will be such another as himself, his father-in-law such another as himself, and his children will be brought up in the same manner. But as the state of things now is, like that of an army prepared for battle, is it not necessary that a Cynic should be without distraction; entirely attentive to the service of God; at liberty to walk among mankind;

> Greek: τοιαύτης δʼ οὔσης καταστάσεως, οἵα νῦν ἐστιν, ὡς ἐν παρατάξει, μή ποτʼ ἀπερίσπαστον εἶναι δεῖ τὸν Κυνικόν, ὅλον πρὸς τῇ διακονίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπιφοιτᾶν ἀνθρώποις δυνάμενον, οὐ προσδεδεμένον καθήκουσιν ἰδιωτικοῖς οὐδʼ ἐμπεπλεγμένον σχέσεσιν, ἃς παραβαίνων οὐκέτι σώσει τὸ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ πρόσωπον, τηρῶν δʼ ἀπολεῖ τὸν ἄγγελον καὶ κατάσκοπον καὶ κήρυκα τῶν θεῶν;

[¶69] not tied down to common duties, nor entangled in relations, which if he transgresses, he will no longer keep the character of a wise and good man;

> Greek: ὅρα γάρ, ὅτι αὐτὸν ἀποδεικνύναι δεῖ τινα τῷ πενθερῷ, ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς ἄλλοις συγγενέσι τῆς γυναικός, αὐτῇ τῇ γυναικί· εἰς νοσοκομίας λοιπὸν ἐκκλείεται, εἰς πορισμόν.

[¶70] and which if he observes, there is an end of him, as the messenger and spy and herald of the gods? For consider, there are some offices due to his father-in-law, some to the other relations of his wife, some to his wife herself. Besides, after this, he is confined to the care of his family when sick, and to providing for their support. At the very least, he must have a vessel to warm water in, to bathe his child; there must be wool, oil, a bed, a cup for his wife after her delivery; and thus the furniture increases; more business, more distraction. Where, for the future, is this king whose time is devoted to the public good?—
To whom the people is trusted, and many a care?

> Greek: ἵνα τἆλλα ἀφῶ, δεῖ αὐτὸν κουκκούμιον, ὅπου θερμὸν ποιήσει τῷ παιδίῳ, ἵνʼ αὐτὸ λούσῃ εἰς σκάφην· ἐρίδια τεκούσῃ τῇ γυναικί, ἔλαιον, κραβάττιον, ποτήριον (γίνεται ἤδη πλείω σκευάρια)· τὴν ἄλλην ἀσχολίαν, τὸν περισπασμόν. ποῦ μοι λοιπὸν ἐκεῖνος ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ τοῖς κοινοῖς προσευκαιρῶν, ᾧ λαοί τʼ ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν· ὃν δεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπισκοπεῖν, τοὺς γεγαμηκότας, τοὺς πεπαιδοποιημένους, τίς καλῶς χρῆται τῇ αὑτοῦ γυναικί, τίς κακῶς, τίς διαφέρεται, ποία οἰκία εὐσταθεῖ, ποία οὔ, ὡς ἰατρὸν περιερχόμενον καὶ τῶν σφυγμῶν ἁπτόμενον;

[¶71] who ought to superintend others, married men, fathers of children,—whether one treats his wife well or ill; who quarrels;

> Greek: σὺ πυρέττεις, σὺ κεφαλαλγεῖς, σὺ ποδαγρᾷς· σὺ ἀνάτεινον, σὺ φάγε, σὺ ἀλούτησον· σὲ δεῖ τμηθῆναι, σὲ δεῖ καυθῆναι.

[¶72] which family is well regulated; which not,—like a physician who goes about and feels the pulse of his patients: “You have a fever; you the headache; you the gout. Do you abstain from food; do you eat; do you omit bathing; you must have an incision made; you be cauterized.” Where shall he have leisure for this who is tied down to common duties?

> Greek: ποῦ σχολὴ τῷ εἰς τὰ ἰδιωτικὰ καθήκοντα ἐνδεδεμένῳ; οὐ δεῖ αὐτὸν πορίσαι ἱματίδια τοῖς παιδίοις; ἄγε, πρὸς γραμματιστὴν ἀποστεῖλαι πινακίδια ἔχοντα, γραφεῖα, τιτλάρια, καὶ τούτοις κραβάττιον ἑτοιμάσαι; οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας ἐξελθόντα δύναται Κυνικὰ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, κρεῖσσον ἦν αὐτὰ γενόμενα ῥῖψαι ἢ οὕτως ἀποκτεῖναι.

[¶73] Must he not provide clothes for his children, and send them, with pens and ink and paper, to a schoolmaster?

> Greek: σκόπει, ποῦ κατάγομεν τὸν Κυνικόν, πῶς αὐτοῦ τὴν βασιλείαν ἀφαιρούμεθα.

[¶74] Must he not provide a bed for them,—for they cannot be Cynics from their very birth? Otherwise, it would have been better to expose them as soon as they were born than to kill them thus. Do you see to what we bring down our Cynic; how we deprive him of his kingdom? “Well, but Crates was married.”

> Greek: — ναί· ἀλλὰ Κράτης ἔγημεν. — περίστασίν μοι λέγεις ἐξ ἔρωτος γενομένην καὶ γυναῖκα τιθεῖς ἄλλον Κράτητα. ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν γάμων καὶ ἀπεριστάτων ζητοῦμεν καὶ οὕτως ζητοῦντες οὐχ εὑρίσκομεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ καταστάσει προηγούμενον τῷ Κυνικῷ τὸ πρᾶγμα.

[¶75] The case of which you speak was a particular one, arising from love; and the woman was another Crates. But we are inquiring about ordinary and common marriages; and in this inquiry we do not find the affair much suited to the condition of a Cynic.
How then shall he keep up society?

> Greek: πῶς οὖν ἔτι, φησίν, διασώσει τὴν κοινωνίαν;— τὸν θεόν σοι· μείζονα δʼ εὐεργετοῦσιν ἀνθρώπους οἱ ἢ δύο ἢ τρία κακόρυγχα παιδία ἀνθʼ αὑτῶν εἰσάγοντες ἢ οἱ ἐπισκοποῦντες πάντας κατὰ δύναμιν ἀνθρώπους, τί ποιοῦσιν, πῶς διάγουσιν, τίνος ἐπιμελοῦνται, τίνος ἀμελοῦσι παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον;

[¶76] For Heaven’s sake, do they confer a greater benefit upon the world who leave two or three brats in their stead, than those who, so far as possible, oversee all mankind,—what they do, how they live; what they attend to, what they neglect, in spite of their duty?

> Greek: καὶ Θηβαίους μείζονα ὠφέλησαν ὅσοι τεκνία αὐτοῖς κατέλιπον Ἐπαμινώνδου τοῦ ἀτέκνου ἀποθανόντος; καὶ Ὁμήρου πλείονα τῇ κοινωνίᾳ συνεβάλετο Πρίαμος ὁ πεντήκοντα γεννήσας περικαθάρματα ἢ Δαναὸς ἢ Αἴολος;

[¶77] Did all those who left children to the Thebans do them more good than Epaminondas, who died childless? And did Priam, who was the father of fifty profligates, or Danaus, or Aeolus, conduce more to the advantage of society than Homer?

> Greek: εἶτα στρατηγία μὲν ἢ σύνταγμά τινα ἀπείρξει γάμου ἢ παιδοποιίας καὶ οὐ δόξει οὗτος ἀντʼ οὐδενὸς ἠλλάχθαι τὴν ἀτεκνίαν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ Κυνικοῦ βασιλεία οὐκ ἔσται ἀνταξία;

[¶78] Shall a military command, or any other post, then, exempt a man from marrying and becoming a father, so that he shall be thought to have made sufficient amends for the want of children; and shall not the kingdom of a Cynic be a proper compensation for it?

> Greek: μήποτε οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα τοῦ μεγέθους αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φανταζόμεθα κατʼ ἀξίαν τὸν χαρακτῆρα τὸν Διογένους, ἀλλʼ εἰς τοὺς νῦν ἀποβλέπομεν, τοὺς τραπεζῆας πυλαωρούς, οἳ οὐδὲν μιμοῦνται ἐκείνους ἢ εἴ [ὅ]τι ἄρα πόρδωνες γίνονται, ἄλλο δʼ οὐδέν;

[¶79] Perhaps we do not understand his grandeur, nor duly represent to ourselves the character of Diogenes; but we think of Cynics as they are now, who stand like dogs watching at tables, and who have only the lowest things in common with the others;

> Greek: ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἐκίνει ταῦτα οὐδʼ ἂν ἐπεθαυμάζομεν, εἰ μὴ γαμήσει ἢ παιδοποιήσεται. ἄνθρωπε, πάντας ἀνθρώπους πεπαιδοποίηται, τοὺς ἄνδρας υἱοὺς ἔχει, τὰς γυναῖκας θυγατέρας· πᾶσιν οὕτως προσέρχεται, οὕτως πάντων κήδεται.

[¶80] else things like these would not move us, nor should we be astonished that a Cynic will not marry nor have children. Consider, sir, that he is the father of mankind;

> Greek: ἢ σὺ δοκεῖς ὑπὸ περιεργίας λοιδορεῖσθαι τοῖς ἀπαντῶσιν; ὡς πατὴρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, ὡς ἀδελφὸς καὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ πατρὸς ὑπηρέτης τοῦ Διός.

[¶81] that all men are his sons, and all women his daughters. Thus he attends to all; thus takes care of all. What!

> Greek: ἄν σοι δόξῃ, πυθοῦ μου καὶ εἰ πολιτεύσεται. σαννίων, μείζονα πολιτείαν ζητεῖς, ἧς πολιτεύ[σ]εται;

[¶82] do you think it is from impertinence that he rebukes those he meets? He does it as a father, as a brother, as a minister of the common parent, Zeus. Ask me, if you please, too, whether a Cynic will engage in the administration of the commonwealth. What commonwealth do you inquire after, foolish man, greater than what he administers?

> Greek: ἢ ἐν Ἀθηναίοις παρελθὼν ἐρεῖ τις περὶ προσόδων ἢ πόρων, ὃν δεῖ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις διαλέγεσθαι, ἐπίσης μὲν Ἀθηναίοις, ἐπίσης δὲ Κορινθίοις, ἐπίσης δὲ Ῥωμαίοις οὐ περὶ πόρων οὐδὲ περὶ προσόδων οὐδὲ περὶ εἰρήνης ἢ πολέμου, ἀλλὰ περὶ εὐδαιμονίας [ἢ] καὶ κακοδαιμονίας, περὶ εὐτυχίας καὶ δυστυχίας, περὶ δουλείας καὶ ἐλευθερίας;

[¶83] Why should he harangue among the Athenians about revenues and taxes, whose business it is to debate with all mankind,—with the Athenians, Corinthians, and Romans equally,—not about taxes and revenues, or peace and war, but about happiness and misery, prosperity and adversity, slavery and freedom?

> Greek: τηλικαύτην πολιτείαν πολιτευομένου ἀνθρώπου σύ μου πυνθάνῃ εἰ πολιτεύσεται; πυθοῦ μου καί, εἰ ἄρξει· πάλιν ἐρῶ σοι· μωρέ, ποίαν ἀρχὴν μείζονα, ἧς ἄρχει;

[¶84] Do you ask me whether a man engages in the administration of the commonwealth who administers such a commonwealth as this?

> Greek: χρεία μέντοι καὶ σώματος ποιοῦ τῷ τοιούτῳ. ἐπεί τοι ἂν φθισικὸς προέρχηται, λεπτὸς καὶ ὠχρός, οὐκέτι ὁμοίαν ἔμφασιν ἡ μαρτυρία αὐτοῦ ἔχει.

[¶85] Ask me, too, whether he will accept any command. I will answer you again, What command, foolish one, is greater than that which he now exercises? But he has need of a constitution duly qualified; for if he should appear consumptive, thin, and pale, his testimony has no longer the same authority.

> Greek: δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐ μόνον τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιδεικνύοντα παριστάνειν τοῖς ἰδιώταις ὅτι ἐνδέχεται δίχα τῶν θαυμαζομένων εἶναι ὑπʼ αὐτῶν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀφελὴς καὶ λιτὴ καὶ ὕπαιθρος δίαιτα οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα λυμαίνεται·

[¶86] For he must not only give a proof to the vulgar, by the constancy of his mind, that it is possible to be a man of weight and merit without those things that strike them with admiration;

> Greek: ἰδοὺ καὶ τούτου μάρτυς εἰμὶ ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμόν. ὡς Διογένης ἐποίει· στίλβων γὰρ περιήρχετο καὶ κατʼ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἐπέστρεφε τοὺς πολλούς.

[¶87] but he must show, too, by his body, that a simple and frugal diet, under the open air, does no injury to the constitution. “See, I and my body bear witness to this.” As Diogenes did; for he went about in hale condition, and gained the attention of the many by his mere physical aspect.

> Greek: ἐλεούμενος δὲ Κυνικὸς ἐπαίτης δοκεῖ· πάντες ἀποστρέφονται, πάντες προσκόπτουσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ῥυπαρὸν αὐτὸν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ὡς μηδὲ κατὰ τοῦτο τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀποσοβεῖν, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν τὸν αὐχμὸν αὐτοῦ δεῖ καθαρὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγωγόν.

[¶88] But a Cynic in poor condition seems a mere beggar; all avoid him, all are offended at him; for he ought not to appear slovenly, so as to drive people from him;

> Greek: δεῖ δὲ καὶ χάριν πολλὴν προσεῖναι φυσικὴν τῷ Κυνικῷ καὶ ὀξύτητα (εἰ δὲ μή, μύξα γίνεται, ἄλλο δʼ οὐδέν), ἵνα ἑτοίμως δύνηται καὶ παρακειμένως πρὸς τὰ ἐμπίπτοντα ἀπαντᾶν.

[¶89] but even his indigence should be clean and attractive.

> Greek: ὡς Διογένης πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα σὺ εἶ ὁ Διογένης ὁ μὴ οἰόμενος εἶναι θεούς; καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, σὲ θεοῖς ἐχθρὸν νομίζων;

[¶90] Much natural tact and acuteness are likewise necessary in a Cynic (otherwise he is almost worthless), that he may be able to give an answer, readily and pertinently, upon every occasion. So Diogenes, to one who asked him, “Are you that Diogenes who does not believe there are any gods?”

> Greek: πάλιν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐπιστάντι αὐτῷ κοιμωμένῳ καὶ εἰπόντι οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα ἔνυπνος ἔτι ὢν ἀπήντησεν ᾧ λαοί τʼ ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν.

[¶91] How so, replied he, when I think you odious to them? Again, when Alexander surprised him sleeping, and repeated,—
To sleep all the night becomes not a man who gives counsel;

> Greek: πρὸ πάντων δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτοῦ δεῖ καθαρώτερον εἶναι τοῦ ἡλίου· εἰ δὲ μή, κυβευτὴν ἀνάγκη καὶ ῥᾳδιουργόν, ὅστις ἐνεχόμενός τινι αὐτὸς κακῷ ἐπιτιμήσει τοῖς ἄλλοις.

[¶92] before he was quite awake, he responded,— “To whom the people is trusted, and many a care.” But, above all, the reason of the man must be clearer than the sun; otherwise he must necessarily be a common cheat and a rascal if, while himself guilty of some vice, he reproves others. For consider how the case stands.

> Greek: ὅρα γάρ, οἷόν ἐστιν. τοῖς βασιλεῦσι τούτοις καὶ τυράννοις οἱ δορυφόροι καὶ τὰ ὅπλα παρεῖχε τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τισιν καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας καὶ αὐτοῖς οὖσι κακοῖς, τῷ Κυνικῷ ἀντὶ τῶν ὅπλων καὶ τῶν δορυφόρων τὸ συνειδὸς τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην παραδίδωσιν.

[¶93] Arms and guards give a power to common kings and tyrants of reproving and of punishing delinquents, though they be wicked themselves; but to a Cynic, instead of arms and guards, conscience gives this power. When he knows that he has watched and labored for mankind; that he has slept pure, and waked still purer; and that he hath regulated all his thoughts as the friend, as the minister of the gods, as a partner of the empire of Zeus;

> Greek: ὅταν ἴδῃ[ς], ὅτι ὑπερηγρύπνηκεν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων καὶ πεπόνηκεν καὶ καθαρὸς μὲν κεκοίμηται, καθαρώτερον δʼ αὐτὸν ἔτι ὁ ὕπνος ἀφῆκεν, ἐντεθύμηται δʼ, ὅσα ἐντεθύμηται ὡς φίλος τοῖς θεοῖς, ὡς ὑπηρέτης, ὡς μετέχων τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ Διός, πανταχοῦ δʼ αὐτῷ πρόχειρον τὸ ἄγου δέ μʼ ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ σύ γʼ ἡ Πεπρωμένη, καὶ ὅτι εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ γινέσθω·

[¶94] that he is ready to say, upon all occasions,—
Conduct me, Zeus, and thou, O Destiny,
and, “If it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be,” why should he not dare to speak boldly to his own brethren, to his children;

> Greek: διὰ τί μὴ θαρρήσῃ παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ, πρὸς τὰ τέκνα, ἁπλῶς πρὸς τοὺς συγγενεῖς;

[¶95] in a word, to his kindred? Hence he who is thus qualified is neither impertinent nor a busybody; for he is not busied about the affairs of others, but his own, when he oversees the transactions of men.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε περίεργος οὔτε πολυπράγμων ἐστὶν ὁ οὕτω διακείμενος· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἀλλότρια πολυπραγμονεῖ, ὅταν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἐπισκοπῇ, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἴδια. εἰ δὲ μή, λέγε καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν πολυπράγμονα, ὅταν τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπισκοπῇ καὶ ἐξετάζῃ καὶ παραφυλάσσῃ καὶ τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας κολάζῃ.

[¶96] Otherwise call a general a busybody, when he oversees, inspects, and watches his soldiers and punishes the disorderly. But if you reprove others at the very time that you have booty under your own arm, I will ask you if you had not better go into a corner, and eat up what you have stolen.

> Greek: ἐὰν δʼ ὑπὸ μάλης ἔχων πλακουντάριον ἐπιτιμᾷς ἄλλοις, ἐρῶ σοι· οὐ θέλεις μᾶλλον ἀπελθὼν εἰς γωνίαν καταφαγεῖν ἐκεῖνο ὃ κέκλοφας; τί δὲ σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις;

## 17. Book III · chapters 22–24

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/17/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/17/#p-N

[¶0] But what have you to do with the concerns of others? For what are you? Are you the bull in the herd, or the queen of the bees? Show me such ensigns of empire as she has from nature.

> Greek: τίς γὰρ εἶ; ὁ ταῦρος εἶ ἢ ἡ βασίλισσα τῶν μελισσῶν; δεῖξόν μοι τὰ σύμβολα τῆς ἡγεμονίας, οἷα ἐκείνη ἐκ φύσεως ἔχει. εἰ δὲ κηφὴν εἶ ἐπιδικαζόμενος τῆς βασιλείας τῶν μελισσῶν, οὐ δοκεῖς ὅτι καὶ σὲ καταβαλ[λ]οῦσιν οἱ συμπολιτευόμενοι, ὡς αἱ μέλισσαι τοὺς κηφῆνας;

[¶1] But if you are a drone, and arrogate to yourself the kingdom of the bees, do you not think that your fellow-citizens will drive you out, just as the bees do the drones? A Cynic must, besides, have so much patience as to seem insensible and like a stone to the vulgar. No one reviles, no one beats, no one affronts him;

> Greek: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνεκτικὸν τοσοῦτον ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν Κυνικόν, ὥστʼ αὐτὸν ἀναίσθητον δοκεῖν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ λίθον· οὐδεὶς αὐτὸν λοιδορεῖ, οὐδεὶς τύπτει, οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει· τὸ σωμάτιον δʼ αὐτοῦ δέδωκεν αὐτὸς χρῆσθαι τῷ θέλοντι ὡς βούλεται.

[¶2] but he has surrendered his body to be treated at pleasure by any one who will. For he remembers that the inferior, in whatever respect it is the inferior, must be conquered by the superior;

> Greek: μέμνηται γάρ, ὅτι τὸ χεῖρον ἀνάγκη νικᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὅπου χεῖρόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ σωμάτιον τῶν πολλῶν χεῖρον, τὸ ἀσθενέστερον τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων.

[¶3] and the body is inferior to the multitude, the weaker to the stronger. He never, therefore, enters into a combat where he can be conquered, but immediately gives up what belongs to others;

> Greek: οὐδέποτʼ οὖν εἰς τοῦτον καταβαίνει τὸν ἀγῶνα, ὅπου δύναται νικηθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εὐθὺς ἐξίσταται, τῶν δούλων οὐκ ἀντιποιεῖται.

[¶4] he does not claim what is slavish and dependent;

> Greek: ὅπου δὲ προαίρεσις καὶ χρῆσις τῶν φαντασιῶν, ἐκεῖ ὄψει, ὅσα ὄμματα ἔχει, ἵνʼ εἴπῃς, ὅτι Ἄργος τυφλὸς ἦν πρὸς αὐτόν.

[¶5] but in what concerns Will and the use of things as they appear you will see that he has so many eyes, you would say Argus was blind to him. Is his assent ever precipitate; his pursuits ever rash; his desire ever disappointed; his aversion ever incurred;

> Greek: μή που συγκατάθεσις προπετής, μή που ὁρμὴ εἰκαία, μή που ὄρεξις ἀποτευκτική, μή που ἔκκλισις περιπτωτική, μή που ἐπιβολὴ ἀτελής, μή που μέμψις, μή που ταπείνωσις ἢ φθόνος;

[¶6] his aim ever fruitless? Is he ever querulous, ever dejected, ever envious? Here lies all his attention and application. With regard to other things, he enjoys profound quiet.

> Greek: ὧδε ἡ πολλὴ προσοχὴ καὶ σύντασις, τῶν δʼ ἄλλων ἕνεκα ὕπτιος ῥέγκει· εἰρήνη πᾶσα. λῃστὴς προαιρέσεως οὐ γίνεται, τύραννος οὐ γίνεται.

[¶7] All is peace. There is no robber, no tyrant for the Will. But there is for the body? Yes. The estate? Yes. Magistracies and honors? Yes. And what cares he for these? When any one, therefore, would frighten him with them he says: “Go look for children; masks are frightful to them;

> Greek: σωματίου δέ; ναί. καὶ κτησειδίου; ναί· καὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ τιμῶν. τί οὖν αὐτῷ τούτων μέλει; ὅταν οὖν τις διὰ τούτων αὐτὸν ἐκφοβῇ, λέγει αὐτῷ ὕπαγε, ζήτει τὰ παιδία· ἐκείνοις τὰ προσωπεῖα φοβερά ἐστιν, ἐγὼ δʼ οἶδα, ὅτι ὀστράκινά ἐστιν, ἔσωθεν δὲ οὐδὲν ἔχει.

[¶8] but I know they are only shells, and have nothing within.” Such is the affair about which you are deliberating;

> Greek: περὶ τοιούτου πράγματος βουλεύῃ. ὥστε ἐάν σοι δόξῃ, τὸν θεόν σοι, ὑπέρθου καὶ ἰδού σοι πρῶτον τὴν παρασκευήν.

[¶9] therefore, if you please, for Heaven’s sake! defer it, and first consider how you are prepared for it. Observe what Hector says to Andromache,—
War is the sphere for all men, and for me.

> Greek: ἰδοὺ γάρ, τί καὶ ὁ Ἕκτωρ λέγει τῇ Ἀνδρομάχῃ· ὕπαγε, φησίν, μᾶλλον εἰς οἶκον καὶ ὕφαινε· πόλεμος δʼ ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει πᾶσι, μάλιστα δʼ ἐμοί.

[¶10] Thus conscious was he of his own qualifications and of her weakness.

> Greek: οὕτως καὶ τῆς ἰδίας παρασκευῆς συνῄσθετο καὶ τῆς ἐκείνης ἀδυναμίας.

[¶11] 23. First, say to yourself what you would be; and then do what you have to do. For in almost everything we see this to be the practice.

> Greek: 23. τίς εἶναι θέλεις, σαυτῷ πρῶτον εἰπέ· εἶθʼ οὕτως ποίει ἃ ποιεῖς. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν ἁπάντων οὕτως ὁρῶμεν γινόμενα.

[¶12] Olympic champions first determine what they would be, and then act accordingly. To a racer in a longer course there must be one kind of diet, walking, anointing, and training; to one in a shorter, all these must be different; and to a Pentathlete, still more different. You will find the case the same in the manual arts. If a carpenter, you must have such and such things;

> Greek: οἱ ἀθλοῦντες πρῶτον κρίνουσιν, τίνες εἶναι θέλουσιν, εἶθʼ οὕτως τὰ ἑξῆς ποιοῦσιν. εἰ δολιχοδρόμος, τοιαύτη τροφή, τοιοῦτος περίπατος, τοιαύτη τρῖψις, τοιαύτη γυμνασία· εἰ σταδιοδρόμος, πάντα ταῦτα ἀλλοῖα· εἰ πένταθλος, ἔτι ἀλλοιότερα. οὕτως εὑρήσεις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν.

[¶13] if a smith, such other. For if we do not refer each of our actions to some end, we shall act at random; if to an improper one, we shall miss our aim. Further, there is a general and a particular end.

> Greek: εἰ τέκτων, τοιαῦτα ἕξεις· εἰ χαλκεύς, τοιαῦτα. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν γινομένων ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ἂν μὲν ἐπὶ μηδὲν ἀναφέρωμεν, εἰκῇ ποιήσομεν· ἐὰν δʼ ἐφʼ ὃ μὴ δεῖ, διεσφαλμένως.

[¶14] The first is, to act as a man. What is comprehended in this? To be gentle, yet not sheepish; not to be mischievous, like a wild beast.

> Greek: λοιπὸν ἡ μέν τίς ἐστι κοινὴ ἀναφορά, ἡ δʼ ἰδία. πρῶτον ἵνʼ ὡς ἄνθρωπος. ἐν τούτῳ τί περιέχεται; μὴ ὡς πρόβατον, εἰ βλαπτικῶς καὶ ἐπιεικῶς, ὡς θηρίον.

[¶15] But the particular end relates to the study and choice of each individual. A harper is to act as a harper; a carpenter, as a carpenter; a philosopher, as a philosopher; an orator, as an orator.

> Greek: ἡ δʼ ἰδία πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα ἑκάστου καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν. ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς ὡς κιθαρῳδός, ὁ τέκτων ὡς τέκτων, ὁ φιλόσοφος ὡς φιλόσοφος, ὁ ῥήτωρ ὡς ῥήτωρ.

[¶16] When, therefore, you say, “Come, and hear me discourse,” observe, first, not to do this at random; and, in the next place, after you have found to what end you refer it, consider whether it be a proper one. Would you be useful, or be praised?

> Greek: ὅταν οὖν λέγῃς δεῦτε καὶ ἀκούσατέ μου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος ὑμῖν, σκέψαι πρῶτον μὴ εἰκῇ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν. εἶτʼ ἂν εὕρῃς, ὅτι ἀναφέρεις, σκέψαι, εἰ ἐφʼ ὃ δεῖ. ὠφελῆσαι θέλεις ἢ ἐπαινεθῆναι;

[¶17] You presently hear him say, “What do I value the praise of the multitude?” And he says well; for this is nothing to a musician, or a geometrician, as such. You would be useful then.

> Greek: εὐθὺς ἀκούεις λέγοντος ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαίνου τίς λόγος; καὶ καλῶς λέγει. οὐδὲ[ν] γὰρ τῷ μουσικῷ, καθὸ μουσικός ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τῷ γεωμετρικῷ.

[¶18] In what? Tell us, that we too may run to make part of your audience. Now, is it possible for any one to benefit others, who has received no benefit himself? No; for neither can he who is not a carpenter, or a shoemaker, benefit any one in respect to those arts.

> Greek: οὐκοῦν ὠφελῆσαι θέλεις; πρὸς τί; εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ τρέχωμεν εἰς τὸ ἀκροατήριόν σου. νῦν δύναταί τις ὠφελῆσαι ἄλλους μὴ αὐτὸς ὠφελημένος; οὔ. οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰς τεκτονικὴν ὁ μὴ τέκτων οὐδʼ εἰς σκυτικὴν ὁ μὴ σκυτεύς.

[¶19] Would you know, then, whether you have received benefit? Produce your principles, philosopher. What is the aim and promise of desire? Not to be disappointed.

> Greek: θέλεις οὖν γνῶναι, εἰ ὠφέλησαι; φέρε σου τὰ δόγματα, φιλόσοφε. τίς ἐπαγγελία ὀρέξεως; μὴ ἀποτυγχάνειν. τίς ἐκκλίσεως;

[¶20] What of aversion? Not to be incurred. Come, do we fulfil this promise? Tell me the truth; but, if you falsify, I will tell it to you. The other day, when your audience came but coldly together, and did not receive what you said with acclamations of applause, you went away dejected.

> Greek: μὴ περιπίπτειν. ἄγε, πληροῦμεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν; εἰπέ μοι τἀληθῆ· ἂν δὲ ψεύσῃ, ἐρῶ σοι· πρῴην ψυχρότερόν σου τῶν ἀκροατῶν συνελθόντων καὶ μὴ ἐπιβοησάντων σοι τεταπεινωμένος ἐξῆλθες·

[¶21] Again, the other day when you were praised, you went about asking everybody, “What did you think of me?” “Upon my life, sir, it was prodigious.”

> Greek: πρῴην ἐπαινεθεὶς περιήρχου καὶ πᾶσιν ἔλεγες τί σοι ἔδοξα; θαυμαστῶς, κύριε, τὴν ἐμήν σοι σωτηρίαν. πῶς δʼ εἶπον ἐκεῖνο; τὸ ποῖον; ὅπου διέγραψα τὸν Πᾶνα καὶ τὰς Νύμφας.

[¶22] “But how did I express myself upon that subject?” “Which?” “Where I gave a description of Pan and the Nymphs.”

> Greek: ὑπερφυῶς. εἶτά μοι λέγεις, ἐν ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει κατὰ φύσιν ἀναστρέφῃ; ὕπαγε, ἄλλον πεῖθε.

[¶23] “Most excellently.” And do you tell me, after this, that you regulate your desires and aversions conformably to Nature? Get you gone! Persuade somebody else. Did not you, the other day, praise a man contrary to your own opinion?

> Greek: τὸν δεῖνα δὲ πρῴην οὐκ ἐπῄνεις παρὰ τὸ σοὶ φαινόμενον; τὸν δεῖνα δʼ οὐκ ἐκολάκευες τὸν συγκλητικόν; ἤθελές σου τὰ παιδία εἶναι τοιαῦτα; — μὴ γένοιτο.

[¶24] Did not you flatter a certain senator? Yet would you wish your own children to be like him? “Heaven forbid!” Why then did you praise and cajole him? “He is an ingenuous young man, and attentive to discourses.” How so?

> Greek: — τίνος οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπῄνεις καὶ περιεῖπες αὐτόν; — εὐφυὴς νεανίσκος καὶ λόγων ἀκουστικός. — πόθεν τοῦτο; — ἐμὲ θαυμάζει. — εἴρηκας τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. εἶτα τί δοκεῖ σοι; αὐτοί σου οὗτοι οὐ καταφρονοῦσιν λεληθότως;

[¶25] “He admires me.” Now indeed you have produced your proof. After all, what do you think? Do not these very people secretly despise you? When a man conscious of no good action or intention finds some philosopher saying, “You are a great genius, and of a frank and candid disposition,” what do you think he says, but, “This man has some need of me”?

> Greek: ὅταν οὖν ἄνθρωπος συνειδὼς ἑαυτῷ μηθὲν ἀγαθὸν μήτε πεποιηκότι μήτʼ ἐνθυμουμένῳ εὕρῃ φιλόσοφον τὸν λέγοντα μεγαλοφυὴς καὶ ἁπλοῦς καὶ ἀκέραιος, τί δοκεῖς ἄλλο αὐτὸν λέγειν ἢ οὗτός τινά ποτέ μου χρείαν ἔχει;

[¶26] Pray tell me what mark of a great genius he has shown. You see he has long conversed with you, has heard your discourses, has attended your lectures. Has he turned his attention to himself?

> Greek: ἢ εἰπέ μοι, τί μεγαλοφυοῦς ἔργον ἐπιδέδεικται; ἰδοὺ σύνεστί σοι τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ, διαλεγομένου σου ἀκήκοεν, ἀναγιγνώσκοντος ἀκήκοεν. κατέσταλται, ἐπέστραπται ἐφʼ αὑτόν; ᾔσθηται, ἐν οἵοις κακοῖς ἐστιν; ἀποβέβληκεν οἴησιν; ζητεῖ τὸν διδάξοντα;

[¶27] Has he perceived his own faults? Has he thrown off his conceit? Does he seek an instructor? “Yes, he does.” An instructor how to live? No, fool, but how to talk; for it is upon this account that he admires you. Hear what he says: “This man writes with very great art, and much more finely than Dion.”

> Greek: — ζητεῖ, φησί. — τὸν διδάξοντα, πῶς δεῖ βιοῦν; οὔ, μωρέ· ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ φράζειν· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα καὶ σὲ θαυμάζει. ἄκουσον αὐτοῦ, τίνα λέγει. οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος πάνυ τεχνικώτατα γράφει, Δίωνος πολὺ κάλλιον. ὅλον ἄλλο ἐστίν.

[¶28] That is quite another thing. Does he say, This is a modest, faithful, calm person? But if he said this too, I would ask him, if be is faithful, what it is to be faithful? And if he could not tell, I would add, “First learn the meaning of what you say, and then speak.”

> Greek: μή τι λέγει ὁ ἄνθρωπος αἰδήμων ἐστίν, οὗτος πιστός ἐστιν, οὗτος ἀτάραχός ἐστιν; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔλεγεν, εἶπον ἂν αὐτῷ ἐπειδὴ οὗτος πιστός ἐστιν, οὗτος ὁ πιστὸς τί ἐστιν; καὶ εἰ μὴ εἶχεν εἰπεῖν, προσέθηκα ἂν ὅτι πρῶτον μάθε, τί λέγεις, εἶθʼ οὕτως λέγε.

[¶29] While you are in this bad disposition, then, and gaping after applauders, and counting your hearers, can you be of benefit to others? “To-day I had many more hearers.” “Yes, many; we think there were five hundred.” “You say nothing; estimate them at a thousand.” “Dion never had so great an audience.” “How should he?” “And they have a fine taste for discourses.” “What is excellent, sir, will move even a stone.”

> Greek: οὕτως οὖν κακῶς διακείμενος καὶ χάσκων περὶ τοὺς ἐπαινέσοντας καὶ ἀριθμῶν τοὺς ἀκούοντάς σου θέλεις ἄλλους ὠφελεῖν; σήμερόν μου πολλῷ πλείονες ἤκουσαν. ναί, πολλοί. δοκοῦμεν ὅτι πεντακόσιοι. οὐδὲν λέγεις· θὲς αὐτοὺς χιλίους. Δίωνος οὐδέποτʼ ἤκουσαν τοσοῦτοι. πόθεν αὐτῷ; καὶ κομψῶς αἰσθάνονται λόγων.

[¶30] Here is the language of a philosopher! Here is the disposition of one who is to be beneficial to mankind! Here is the man, attentive to discourses, who has read the works of the Socratic philosophers, as such; not as if they were the writings of orators, like Lysias and Isocrates! “have often wondered by what arguments—” No; “By what argument;”

> Greek: τὸ καλόν, κύριε, καὶ λίθον κινῆσαι δύναται. ἰδοὺ φωναὶ φιλοσόφου, ἰδοὺ διάθεσις ὠφελήσοντος ἀνθρώπους· ἰδοὺ ἀκηκοὼς ἄνθρωπος λόγου, ἀνεγνωκὼς τὰ Σωκρατικὰ ὡς Σωκρατικά, οὐχὶ δʼ ὡς Λυσίου καὶ Ἰσοκράτους. πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα, τίσιν ποτὲ λόγοις. οὔ· ἀλλὰ τίνι ποτὲ λόγῳ· τοῦτʼ ἐκείνου λειότερον.

[¶31] that is the more perfectly accurate expression. Is this to have read them any otherwise than as you read little pieces of poetry? If you read them as you ought, you would not dwell on such trifles, but would rather consider such a passage as this: “Anytus and Melitus may kill, but they cannot hurt me.” And “am always so disposed as to defer to none of my friends, but to that reason which, after examination, appears to me to be the best.”

> Greek: μὴ γὰρ ἄλλως αὐτὰ ἀνεγνώκατε ἢ ὡς ᾠδάρια; ὡς εἴ γε ἀνεγιγνώσκετε ὡς δεῖ, οὐκ ἂν πρὸς τούτοις ἐγίνεσθε, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἐβλέπετε ἐμὲ δʼ Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύνανται, βλάψαι δʼ οὔ καὶ ὅτι ὡς ἐγὼ ἀ[ι]εὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος μηδενὶ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμῶν ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἄν μοι σκοπουμένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται.

[¶32] Hence, whoever heard Socrates say, “know, or teach anything”? But he sent different people to different instructors; they came to him, desiring to be introduced to the philosophers;

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο τίς ἤκουσέ ποτε Σωκράτους λέγοντος ὅτι οἶδά τι καὶ διδάσκω; ἀλλὰ ἄλλον ἀλλαχοῦ ἔπεμπεν. τοιγαροῦν ἤρχοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀξιοῦντες φιλοσόφοις ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ συσταθῆναι κἀκεῖνος ἀπῆγεν καὶ συνίστανεν.

[¶33] and he took them and introduced them. No; but [you think] as he accompanied them he used to give them such advice as this: “Hear me discourse to-day at the house of Quadratus.” Why should I hear you? Have you a mind to show me how finely you put words together, sir?

> Greek: οὔ· ἀλλὰ προσπέμπων ἔλεγεν ἄκουσόν μου σήμερον διαλεγομένου ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ Κοδράτου. τί σου ἀκούσω; ἐπιδεῖξαί μοι θέλεις, ὅτι κομψῶς συντιθεῖς τὰ ὀνόματα; συντιθεῖς, ἄνθρωπε· καὶ τί σοι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν;

[¶34] And what good does that do you? “But praise me.” What do you mean by praising you? “Say, Incomparable! prodigious!” Well; I do say it. But if praise be that which the philosophers call by the appellation of good, what have I to praise you for? If it be good to speak well, teach me, and I will praise you.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἐπαίνεσόν με. τί λέγεις τὸ ἐπαίνεσον; εἰπέ μοι οὐᾶ καὶ θαυμαστῶς. ἰδοὺ λέγω. εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἔπαινος ἐκεῖνο, ὅ τι ποτὲ λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι τῶν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κατηγορίᾳ, τί σε ἔχω ἐπαινέσαι; εἰ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ φράζειν ὀρθῶς, δίδαξόν με καὶ ἐπαινέσω.

[¶35] “What, then; ought these things to be heard without pleasure?” By no means. I do not hear even a harper without pleasure; but am I therefore to devote myself to playing upon the harp? Hear what Socrates says to his judges: “It would not be decent for me to appear before you, at this age, composing speeches like a boy.” Like a boy, he says.

> Greek: τί οὖν; ἀηδῶς δεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούειν; μὴ γένοιτο. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδὲ κιθαρῳδοῦ ἀηδῶς ἀκούω· μή τι οὖν τούτου ἕνεκα κιθαρῳδεῖν με δεῖ στάντα; ἄκουσον, τί λέγει Σωκράτης· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ φησίν.

[¶36] For it is, without doubt, a pretty accomplishment to select words and place them together, and then to read or speak them gracefully in public; and in the midst of the discourse to observe that “he vows by all that is good, there are but few capable of these things.”

> Greek: ἔστι γὰρ τῷ ὄντι κομψὸν τὸ τεχνίον ἐκλέξαι ὀνομάτια καὶ ταῦτα συνθεῖναι καὶ παρελθόντα εὐφυῶς ἀναγνῶναι ἢ εἰπεῖν καὶ μεταξὺ ἀναγιγνώσκοντα ἐπιφθέγξασθαι ὅτι τούτοις οὐ πολλοὶ δύνανται παρακολουθεῖν, μὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν σωτηρίαν.

[¶37] But does a philosopher apply to people to hear him? Does he not attract those who are fitted to receive benefit from him, in the same manner as the sun or their necessary food does? What physician applies to anybody to be cured by him? (Though now indeed I hear that the physicians at Rome apply for patients; but in my time they were applied to.)

> Greek: φιλόσοφος δʼ ἐπʼ ἀκρόασιν παρακαλεῖ;— οὐχὶ δʼ ὡς ὁ ἥλιος ἄγει αὐτὸς ἐφʼ ἑαυτὸν τὴν τροφήν, οὕτως δὲ καὶ οὗτος ἄγει τοὺς ὠφεληθησομένους; ποῖος ἰατρὸς παρακαλεῖ, ἵνα τις ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ θεραπευθῇ; καίτοι νῦν ἀκούω ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ παρακαλοῦσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ· πλὴν ἐπʼ ἐμοῦ παρεκαλοῦντο.

[¶38] “I apply to you to come and hear that you are in a bad way, and that you take care of everything but what you ought; that you know not what is good or evil, and are unfortunate and unhappy.” A fine application! And yet, unless the discourse of a philosopher has this effect, both that and the speaker are lifeless.

> Greek: παρακαλῶ σε ἐλθόντα ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι σοι κακῶς ἐστι καὶ πάντων μᾶλλον ἐπιμελῇ ἢ οὗ δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ὅτι ἀγνοεῖς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶ καὶ δυστυχής. κομψὴ παράκλησις. καὶ μὴν ἂν μὴ ταῦτα ἐμποιῇ ὁ τοῦ φιλοσόφου λόγος, νεκρός ἐστι καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ λέγων.

[¶39] Rufus used to say, “If you are at leisure to praise me, I speak to no purpose.” And indeed he used to speak in such a manner, that each of us who heard him supposed that some person had accused us to him; he so precisely hit upon what was done by us, and placed the faults of every one before his eyes.

> Greek: εἴωθε λέγειν ὁ Ῥοῦφος εἰ εὐσχολεῖτε ἐπαινέσαι με, ἐγὼ δʼ οὐδὲν λέγω. τοιγαροῦν οὕτως ἔλεγεν, ὥσθʼ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν καθήμενον οἴεσθαι, ὅτι τίς ποτε αὐτὸν διαβέβληκεν· οὕτως ἥπτετο τῶν γιγνομένων, οὕτως πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐτίθει τὰ ἑκάστου κακά.

[¶40] The school of a philosopher is a surgery. You are not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain; for you do not come there in health; but one of you has a dislocated shoulder; another, an abscess; a third, a fistula; a fourth, the headache.

> Greek: ἰατρεῖόν ἐστιν, ἄνδρες, τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου σχολεῖον· οὐ δεῖ ἡσθέντας ἐξελθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἀλγήσαντας. ἔρχεσθε γὰρ οὐχ ὑγιεῖς, ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν ὦμον ἐκβεβληκώς, ὁ δʼ ἀπόστημα ἔχων, ὁ δὲ σύριγγα, ὁ δὲ κεφαλαλγῶν.

[¶41] And am I, then, to sit uttering pretty, trifling thoughts and little exclamations, that, when you have praised me, you may each of you go away with the same dislocated shoulder, the same aching head, the same fistula. and the same abscess that you brought?

> Greek: εἶτʼ ἐγὼ καθίσας ὑμῖν λέγω νοημάτια καὶ ἐπιφωνημάτια, ἵνʼ ὑμεῖς ἐπαινέσαντές με ἐξέλθητε, ὁ μὲν τὸν ὦμον ἐκφέρων οἷον εἰσήνεγκεν, ὁ δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, ὁ δὲ τὴν σύριγγα, ὁ δὲ τὸ ἀπόστημα;

[¶42] And is it for this that young men are to travel? And do they leave their parents, their friends, their relations, and their estates, that they may praise you while you are uttering little exclamations? Was this the practice of Socrates; of Zeno; of Cleanthes? What then!

> Greek: εἶτα τούτου ἕνεκα ἀποδημήσωσιν ἄνθρωποι νεώτεροι καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς τοὺς αὑτῶν ἀπολίπωσιν καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ τὸ κτησίδιον, ἵνα σοι οὐᾶ φῶσιν ἐπιφωνημάτια λέγοντι; τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἐποίει, τοῦτο Ζήνων, τοῦτο Κλεάνθης;

[¶43] is there not in speaking a style and manner of exhortation? Who denies it? Just as there is a manner of confutation and of instruction. But who ever, therefore, added that of ostentation for a fourth?

> Greek: τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ προτρεπτικὸς χαρακτήρ; — τίς γὰρ οὐ λέγει; ὡς ὁ ἐλεγκτικός, ὡς ὁ διδασκαλικός. τίς οὖν πώποτε τέταρτον εἶπεν μετὰ τούτων τὸν ἐπιδεικτικόν;

[¶44] For in what doth the hortatory manner consist? In being able to show, to one and all, the contradictions in which they are involved; and that they care for everything rather than what they mean to care for; for they mean the things conducive to happiness, but they seek them where they are not to be found.

> Greek: τίς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ προτρεπτικός; δύνασθαι καὶ ἑνὶ καὶ πολλοῖς δεῖξαι τὴν μάχην ἐν ᾗ κυλίονται· καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον πάντων φροντίζουσιν ἢ ὧν θέλουσιν. θέλουσι μὲν γὰρ τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν φέροντα, ἀλλαχοῦ δʼ αὐτὰ ζητοῦσι.

[¶45] To effect this, must a thousand seats be placed, and an audience invited; and you, in a fine robe or cloak, ascend the rostrum, and describe the death of Achilles? Forbear, for Heaven’s sake! to bring, so far as you are able, good works and practices into disgrace.

> Greek: τοῦτο ἵνα γένηται, δεῖ τεθῆναι χίλια βάθρα καὶ παρακληθῆναι τοὺς ἀκουσομένους καὶ σὲ ἐν κομψῷ στολίῳ ἢ τριβωναρίῳ ἀναβάντα ἐπὶ πούλβινον διαγράφειν, πῶς Ἀχιλλεὺς ἀπέθανεν; παύσασθε, τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμῖν, καλὰ ὀνόματα καὶ πράγματα καταισχύνοντες, ὅσον ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῖς.

[¶46] Nothing, to be sure, gives more force to exhortation than when the speaker shows that he has need of the hearers;

> Greek: οὐδὲν προτρεπτικώτερον ἢ ὅταν ὁ λέγων ἐμφαίνῃ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὅτι χρείαν αὐτῶν ἔχει.

[¶47] but tell me who, when he hears you reading or speaking, is solicitous about himself; or turns his attention upon himself; or says, when he is gone away, “The philosopher hit me well”?

> Greek: ἢ εἰπέ μοι, τίς ἀκούων ἀναγιγνώσκοντός σου ἢ διαλεγομένου περὶ αὑτοῦ ἠγωνίασεν ἢ ἐπεστράφη· εἰς αὑτὸν ἢ ἐξελθὼν εἶπεν ὅτι καλῶς μου ἥψατο ὁ φιλόσοφος· οὐκέτι δεῖ ταῦτα ποιεῖν;

[¶48] Instead of this, even though you are in high vogue, one hearer merely remarks to another, “He spoke finely about Xerxes!” “No,” says the other; “but on the battle of Thermopylae!” Is this the audience for a philosopher?

> Greek: οὐχὶ δʼ, ἂν λίαν εὐδοκιμῇς, λέγει πρός τινα κομψῶς ἔφρασεν τὰ περὶ τὸν Ξέρξην, ἄλλος οὔ· ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Πύλαις μάχην; τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀκρόασις φιλοσόφου;

[¶49] 24. Let not another’s disobedience to Nature become an ill to you; for you were not born to be depressed and unhappy with others, but to be happy with them.

> Greek: 24. τὸ ἄλλου παρὰ φύσιν σοὶ κακὸν μὴ γινέσθω· οὐ γὰρ συνταπεινοῦσθαι πέφυκας οὐδὲ συνατυχεῖν, ἀλλὰ συνευτυχεῖν.

[¶50] And if any is unhappy, remember that he is so for himself; for God made all men to enjoy felicity and peace.

> Greek: ἂν δέ τις ἀτυχῇ, μέμνησο, ὅτι παρʼ αὑτὸν ἀτυχεῖ. ὁ γὰρ θεὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἐπὶ τὸ εὐσταθεῖν ἐποίησεν.

[¶51] He hath furnished all with means for this purpose; having given them some things for their own, others not for their own. Whatever is subject to restraint, compulsion, or deprivation is not their own; whatever is not subject to restraint is their own. And the essence of good and evil he has placed in things which are our own, as it became him who provides for, and protects us, with paternal care.

> Greek: πρὸς τοῦτο ἀφορμὰς ἔδωκεν, τὰ μὲν ἴδια δοὺς ἑκάστῳ, τὰ δʼ ἀλλότρια· τὰ μὲν κωλυτὰ καὶ ἀφαιρετὰ καὶ ἀναγκαστὰ οὐκ ἴδια, τὰ δʼ ἀκώλυτα ἴδια· τὴν δʼ οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἦν ἄξιον τὸν κηδόμενον ἡμῶν καὶ πατρικῶς προιστάμενον, ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις.

[¶52] “But I have parted with such a one, and he is therefore in grief.” And why did he esteem what belonged to another his own?

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἀποκεχώρηκα τοῦ δεῖνος καὶ ὀδυνᾶται. διὰ τί γὰρ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἴδια ἡγήσατο; διὰ τί, ὅτε σε βλέπων ἔχαιρεν, οὐκ ἐπελογίζετο, ὅτι θνητὸς εἶ, ἀποδημητικὸς εἶ; τοιγαροῦν τίνει δίκας τῆς αὑτοῦ μωρίας.

[¶53] Why did he not consider, while he was happy in seeing you, that you are mortal, that you are liable to change your abode? Therefore he bears the punishment of his own folly. But to what purpose, or for what cause, do you too suffer depression of spirits? Have you not studied these things? Like trifling, silly women, have you regarded the things you took delight in, the places, the persons, the conversations, as if they were to last for ever;

> Greek: σὺ δʼ ἀντὶ τίνος; ἐπὶ τί κλάεις σεαυτόν; ἢ οὐδὲ σὺ ταῦτα ἐμελέτησας, ἀλλʼ ὡς τὰ γύναια τὰ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πᾶσιν οἷς ἔχαιρες ὡς ἀ[ι]εὶ συνεσόμενος συνῆς, τοῖς τόποις, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ταῖς διατριβαῖς; καὶ νῦν κλαίων ἐκάθισας, ὅτι μὴ τοὺς αὐτοὺς βλέπεις καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τόποις διατρίβεις.

[¶54] and do you now sit crying, because you do not see the same people, nor live in the same place?

> Greek: τούτου γὰρ ἄξιος εἶ, ἵνα καὶ τῶν κοράκων καὶ κορωνῶν ἀθλιώτερος ᾖς, οἷς ἔξεστιν ἵπτασθαι, ὅπου θέλουσιν, καὶ μετοικοδομεῖν τὰς νεοσσιὰς καὶ τὰ πελάγη διαπερᾶν μὴ στένουσιν μηδὲ ποθοῦσι τὰ πρῶτα.

[¶55] Indeed, you deserve to be so overcome, and thus to become more wretched than ravens or crows, which, without groaning or longing for their former state, can fly where they will, build their nests in another place, and cross the seas. “Ay, but this happens from their want of reason.”

> Greek: — ναί· ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄλογα εἶναι πάσχει αὐτά. — ἡμῖν οὖν λόγος ἐπὶ ἀτυχίᾳ καὶ κακοδαιμονίᾳ δέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἵνʼ ἄθλιοι, ἵνα πενθοῦντες διατελῶμεν;

[¶56] Was reason then given to us by the gods for the purpose of unhappiness and misery, to make us live wretched and lamenting? Oh, by all means, let every one be deathless! Let nobody go from home! Let us never go from home ourselves, but remain rooted to a spot, like plants!

> Greek: ἢ πάντες ἔστωσαν ἀθάνατοι καὶ μηδεὶς ἀποδημείτω, μηδʼ ἡμεῖς ποῦ ἀποδημῶμεν, ἀλλὰ μένωμεν ὡς τὰ φυτὰ προσερριζωμένοι· ἂν δέ τις ἀποδημήσῃ τῶν συνήθων, καθήμενοι κλαίωμεν καὶ πάλιν, ἂν ἔλθῃ, ὀρχώμεθα καὶ κροτῶμεν ὡς τὰ παιδία;

[¶57] And if any of our acquaintance should quit his abode, let us sit and cry;

> Greek: οὐκ ἀπογαλακτίσομεν ἤδη ποθʼ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μεμνησόμεθα ὧν ἠκούσαμεν παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων;

[¶58] and when he comes back, let us dance and clap our hands like children. Shall we never wean ourselves, and remember what we have heard from the philosophers,—unless we have heard them only as juggling enchanters,—that the universe is one great city, and the substance one of which it is formed; that there must necessarily be a certain rotation of things;

> Greek: εἴ γε μὴ ὡς ἐπαοιδῶν αὐτῶν ἠκούομεν, ὅτι ὁ κόσμος οὗτος μία πόλις ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ οὐσία, ἐξ ἧς δεδημιούργηται, μία καὶ ἀνάγκη περίοδόν τινα εἶναι καὶ παραχώρησιν ἄλλων ἄλλοις καὶ τὰ μὲν διαλύεσθαι, τὰ δʼ ἐπιγίνεσθαι, τὰ μὲν μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι.

[¶59] that some must give way to others, some be dissolved, and others rise in their stead; some remain in the same situation, and others be moved; but that all is full of beloved ones, first of the gods, and then of men, by nature endeared to each other;

> Greek: πάντα δὲ φίλων μεστά, πρῶτα μὲν θεῶν, εἶτα καὶ ἀνθρώπων φύσει πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾠκειωμένων· καὶ δεῖ τοὺς μὲν παρεῖναι ἀλλήλοις, τοὺς δʼ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, τοῖς μὲν συνοῦσι χαίροντας, τοῖς δʼ ἀπαλλαττομένοις μὴ ἀχθομένους.

[¶60] that some must be separated, others live together, rejoicing in the present, and not grieving for the absent; and that man, besides a natural greatness of mind and contempt of things independent on his own will, is likewise formed not to be rooted to the earth, but to go at different times to different places;

> Greek: ὁ δʼ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τῷ φύσει μεγαλόφρων εἶναι καὶ πάντων τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων καταφρονητικὸς ἔτι κἀκεῖνο ἔσχηκε τὸ μὴ ἐρριζῶσθαι μηδὲ προσπεφυκέναι τῇ γῇ, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοτʼ ἐπʼ ἄλλους ἵεσθαι τόπους ποτὲ μὲν χρειῶν τινων ἐπειγουσῶν, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς θέας ἕνεκα.

[¶61] sometimes on urgent occasions, and sometimes merely for the sake of observation. Such was the case of Odysseus, who
Saw the cities and watched the habits of various men;
—H. and, even before him, of Hercules, to travel over the habitable world,
Observing manners, good or ill, of men;

> Greek: καὶ τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ τὸ συμβὰν τοιοῦτόν τι ἦν· πολλῶν δʼ ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω· καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ περιελθεῖν τὴν οἰκουμένην ὅλην ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντα καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐκβάλλοντα καὶ καθαίροντα, τὴν δʼ ἀντεισάγοντα.

[¶62] to expel and clear away the one, and, in its stead, to introduce the other. Yet how many friends do you not think he must have at Thebes; how many at Argos; how many at Athens; and how many did he acquire in his travels? He married, too, when he thought it a proper time, and became a father, and then quitted his children;

> Greek: καίτοι πόσους οἴει φίλους ἔσχεν ἐν Θήβαις, πόσους ἐν Ἄργει, πόσους ἐν Ἀθήναις, πόσους δὲ περιερχόμενος ἐκτήσατο, ὅς γε καὶ ἐγάμει, ὅπου καιρὸς ἐφάνη αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπαιδοποιεῖτο καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἀπέλειπεν οὐ στένων οὐδὲ ποθῶν οὐδʼ ὡς ὀρφανοὺς ἀφιείς;

[¶63] not lamenting and longing for them, nor as if he had left them orphans;

> Greek: ᾔδει γάρ, ὅτι οὐδείς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ὀρφανός, ἀλλὰ πάντων ἀ[ι]εὶ καὶ διηνεκῶς ὁ πατήρ ἐστιν ὁ κηδόμενος.

[¶64] for he knew that no human creature is an orphan, but that there is a father who always, and without intermission, takes care of all. For he had not merely heard it as matter of talk, that Zeus was the Father of Mankind; but he esteemed and called him his own Father, and performed all that he did with a view to him.

> Greek: οὐ γὰρ μέχρι λόγου ἠκηκόει, ὅτι πατήρ ἐστιν ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅς γε καὶ αὑτοῦ πατέρα ᾤετο αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκάλει καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀφορῶν ἔπραττεν ἃ ἔπραττεν. τοιγάρτοι πανταχοῦ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ διάγειν εὐδαιμόνως.

[¶65] Hence he was, in every place, able to live happy. But it is never possible to make happiness consistent with a longing after what is not present. For true happiness implies the possession of all which is desired, as in case of satiety with food;

> Greek: οὐδέποτε δʼ ἐστὶν οἷόν τʼ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐλθεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ πόθον τῶν οὐ παρόντων τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονοῦν ἀπέχειν δεῖ πάντα ἃ θέλει, πεπληρωμένῳ τινὶ ἐοικέναι· οὐ δίψος δεῖ προσεῖναι αὐτῷ, οὐ λιμόν.

[¶66] there must be no thirst, no hunger. “But Odysseus longed for his wife, and sat weeping on a rock.” Why do you regard Homer and his fables in everything? Or, if Odysseus really did weep, what was he but a wretched man?

> Greek: — ἀλλʼ ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐπεπόνθει πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ ἔκλαιεν ἐπὶ πέτρα[ι]ς καθεζόμενος. — σὺ δʼ Ὁμήρῳ πάντα προσέχεις καὶ τοῖς μύθοις αὐτοῦ; ἢ εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἔκλαεν, τί ἄλλο ἢ ἐδυστύχει; τίς δὲ καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς δυστυχεῖ;

[¶67] But what wise and good man is wretched? The universe is surely but ill governed, if Zeus does not take care that his subjects may be happy like himself. But these are unlawful and profane thoughts;

> Greek: τῷ ὄντι κακῶς διοικεῖται τὰ ὅλα, εἰ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖται ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πολιτῶν, ἵνʼ ὦσιν ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ, εὐδαίμονες. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὐ θεμιτὰ οὐδʼ ὅσια ἐνθυμηθῆναι,

[¶68] and Odysseus, if he did indeed cry and bewail himself, was not a good man. For who can be a good man who does not know what he is? And who knows this, and yet forgets that all things made are perishable; and that it is not possible for man and man always to live together?

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς, εἰ μὲν ἔκλαεν καὶ ὠδύρετο, οὐκ ἦν ἀγαθός. τίς γὰρ ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ οὐκ εἰδώς, ὅς ἐστιν; τίς δʼ οἶδεν ταῦτα ἐπιλελησμένος, ὅτι φθαρτὰ τὰ γενόμενα καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπῳ συνεῖναι οὐ δυνατὸν ἀεί;

[¶69] What then? To desire impossibilities is base and foolish; it is the behavior of a stranger [to the world];

> Greek: τί οὖν; τῶν μὴ δυνατῶν ἐφίεσθαι ἀνδραποδῶδες, ἠλίθιον, ξένου θεομαχοῦντος, ὡς μόνον οἷόν τε, τοῖς δόγμασι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ.

[¶70] of one who fights against God in the only way he can, by holding false principles. “But my mother grieves when she does not see me.” And why has she not learned these doctrines? I do not say that care ought not to be taken that she may not lament;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἡ μήτηρ μου στένει μὴ ὁρῶσά με.— διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἔμαθεν τούτους τοὺς λόγους; καὶ οὐ τοῦτό φημι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελητέον τοῦ μὴ οἰμώζειν αὐτήν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ θέλειν τὰ ἀλλότρια ἐξ ἅπαντος.

[¶71] but that we are not to insist absolutely upon what is not in our own power. Now, the grief of another is not in my power; but my own grief is. I will therefore absolutely suppress my own, for that is in my power;

> Greek: λύπη δʼ ἡ ἄλλου ἀλλότριόν ἐστιν, ἡ δʼ ἐμὴ ἐμόν. ἐγὼ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν παύσω ἐξ ἅπαντος, ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ γάρ ἐστιν· τὸ δʼ ἀλλότριον πειράσομαι κατὰ δύναμιν, ἐξ ἅπαντος δʼ οὐ πειράσομαι.

[¶72] and I will endeavor to suppress another’s grief so far as I am able; but I will not insist upon it absolutely, otherwise I shall fight against God; I shall resist Zeus, and oppose him in the administration of the universe; and not only my children’s children will bear the punishment of this disobedience and fighting against God, but I myself too,—starting, and full of perturbation, both in the day-time and in my nightly dreams;

> Greek: εἰ δὲ μή, θεομαχήσω, ἀντιθήσω πρὸς τὸν Δία, ἀντιδιατάξομαι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ὅλα. καὶ τἀπίχειρα τῆς θεομαχίας ταύτης καὶ ἀπειθείας οὐ παῖδες παίδων ἐκτίσουσιν, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ μεθʼ ἡμέραν, νυκτὸς διὰ τῶν ἐνυπνίων ἐκπηδῶν, ταρασσόμενος, πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀπαγγελίαν τρέμων, ἐξ ἐπιστολῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἠρτημένην ἔχων τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάθειαν.

[¶73] trembling at every message, and having my peace dependent on intelligence from others. “Somebody is come from Rome.” “trust no harm has happened.” Why, what harm can happen to you where you are not?

> Greek: ἀπὸ Ῥώμης τις ἥκει. μόνον μή τι κακόν. τί δὲ κακὸν ἐκεῖ σοι συμβῆναι δύναται, ὅπου μὴ εἶ; ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος. μόνον μή τι κακόν. οὕτως σοι πᾶς τόπος δύναται δυστυχίας εἶναι αἴτιος.

[¶74] “From Greece.” “No harm, I hope.” Why, at this rate, every place may be the cause of misfortune to you.

> Greek: οὐχ ἱκανὸν ἐκεῖ σε ἀτυχεῖν, ὅπου αὐτὸς εἶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πέραν θαλάσσης καὶ διὰ γραμμάτων; οὕτως ἀσφαλῶς σοι τὰ πράγματα ἔχει;

[¶75] Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate where you are, but it must happen beyond sea, too, and by letters? Such is the security of your condition! “But what if my friends there should be dead?”

> Greek: — τί οὖν, ἂν ἀποθάνωσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ φίλοι; — τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο ἢ οἱ θνητοὶ ἀπέθανον; ἢ πῶς ἅμα μὲν γηρᾶσαι θέλεις, ἅμα δὲ μηδενὸς τῶν στεργομένων μὴ [ε]ἰδεῖν θάνατον;

[¶76] What, indeed, but that those are dead who were born to die? Do you at once wish to grow old, and yet not to see the death of any one you love? Do you not know that, in a long course of time, many and various events must necessarily happen;

> Greek: οὐκ οἶσθʼ, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μακρῷ χρόνῳ πολλὰ καὶ ποικίλα ἀποβαίνειν ἀνάγκη, τοῦ μὲν πυρετὸν γενέσθαι κρείττονα, τοῦ δὲ λῃστήν, τοῦ δὲ τύραννον;

[¶77] that a fever must get the better of one, a highwayman of another, a tyrant of a third? For such is the world we live in; such they who live in it with us. Heats and colds, improper diet, journeys, voyages, winds, and various accidents destroy some, banish others;

> Greek: τοιοῦτο γὰρ τὸ περιέχον, τοιοῦτον οἱ συνόντες, ψύχη καὶ καύματα καὶ τροφαὶ ἀσύμμετροι καὶ ὁδοιπορίαι καὶ πλοῦς καὶ ἄνεμοι καὶ περιστάσεις ποικίλαι· τὸν μὲν ἀπώλεσαν, τὸν δʼ ἐξώρισαν, τὸν δʼ εἰς πρεσβείαν, ἄλλον δʼ εἰς στρατείαν ἐνέβαλον.

[¶78] destine one to an embassy, another to a camp. And now, pray, will you sit in consternation about all these things, lamenting, disappointed, wretched, dependent on another;

> Greek: κάθησο τοίνυν πρὸς πάντα ταῦτα ἐπτοημένος, πενθῶν, ἀτυχῶν, δυστυχῶν, ἐξ ἄλλου ἠρτημένος καὶ τούτου οὐχ ἑνός, οὐ δυεῖν, ἀλλὰ μυρίων ἐπὶ μυρίοις.

[¶79] and not on one or two only, but ten thousand times ten thousand? Is this what you have heard from the philosophers; this what you have learned? Do you not know what sort of a thing warfare is? One must keep guard, another go out for a spy, another even to battle.

> Greek: ταῦτα ἤκουες παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ταῦτʼ ἐμάνθανες; οὐκ οἶσθʼ, ὅτι στρατεία τὸ χρῆμά ἐστιν; τὸν μὲν δεῖ φυλάττειν, τὸν δὲ κατασκοπήσοντα ἐξιέναι, τὸν δὲ καὶ πολεμήσοντα· οὐχ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι πάντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐδʼ ἄμεινον.

[¶80] It is neither possible, nor indeed desirable, that all should be in the same place; but you, neglecting to perform the orders of your General, complain whenever anything a little hard is commanded; and do not consider what influence you have on the army, so far as lies in your power. For, if all should imitate you, nobody will dig a trench, or throw up a rampart, or stand guard, or expose himself to danger;

> Greek: σὺ δʼ ἀφεὶς ἐκτελεῖν τὰ προστάγματα τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅταν τί σοι προσταχθῇ τραχύτερον, καὶ οὐ παρακολουθεῖς, οἷον ἀποφαίνεις, ὅσον ἐπὶ σοί, τὸ στράτευμα, ὅτι ἄν σε πάντες μιμήσωνται, οὐ τάφρον σκάψει τις, οὐ χάρακα περιβαλεῖ, οὐκ ἀγρυπνήσει, οὐ κινδυνεύσει, ἀλλὰ ἄχρηστος δόξει στρατεύεσθαι.

[¶81] but every one will appear useless to the expedition. Again, if you were a sailor in a voyage, suppose you were to fix upon one place, and there remain,—if it should be necessary to climb the mast, refuse to do it; if to run to the bow of the ship, refuse to do it! And what captain would tolerate you?

> Greek: πάλιν ἐν πλοίῳ ναύτης ἂν πλέῃς, μίαν χώραν κάτεχε καὶ ταύτην προσλιπάρει· ἂν δʼ ἐπὶ τὸν ἱστὸν ἀναβῆναι δέῃ, μὴ θέλε, ἂν εἰς τὴν πρῴραν διαδραμεῖν, μὴ θέλε· καὶ τίς ἀνέξεταί σου κυβερνήτης; οὐχὶ δʼ ὡς σκεῦος ἄχρηστον ἐκβαλεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐμπόδιον καὶ κακὸν παράδειγμα τῶν ἄλλων ναυτῶν;

[¶82] Would he not throw you overboard as a useless piece of goods and mere luggage,.and a bad example to the other sailors? Thus, also, in the present case; every one’s life is a warfare, and that long and various.

> Greek: οὕτως δὲ καὶ ἐνθάδε· στρατεία τίς ἐστιν ὁ βίος ἑκάστου καὶ αὕτη μακρὰ καὶ ποικίλη. τηρεῖν σε δεῖ τὸ τοῦ στρατιώτου καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πρὸς νεῦμα πράσσειν ἕκαστα·

[¶83] You must observe the duty of a soldier, and perform everything at the nod of your General, and even, if possible, divine what he would have done.

> Greek: εἰ οἷόν τε, μαντευόμενον ἃ θέλει. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅμοιος ἐκεῖνος ὁ στρατηγὸς καὶ οὗτος οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν οὔτε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ὑπεροχήν.

[¶84] For there is no comparison between the above-mentioned General and this whom you now obey, either in power or excellence of character. You are placed in an extensive command, and not in a mean post; your life is a perpetual magistracy? Do you not know that such a one must spend but little time on his affairs at home, but be much abroad, either commanding or obeying;

> Greek: τέταξαι ἐν πόλει ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ταπεινῇ τινι χώρᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ βουλευτής. οὐκ οἶσθʼ, ὅτι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὀλίγα μὲν δεῖ οἰκονομεῖν, τὰ πολλὰ δʼ ἀποδημεῖν ἄρχοντα ἢ ἀρχόμενον ἢ ὑπηρετοῦντά τινι ἀρχῇ ἢ στρατευόμενον ἢ δικάζοντα; εἶτά μοι θέλεις ὡς φυτὸν προσηρτῆσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τόποις καὶ προσερριζῶσθαι;

[¶85] attending on the duties either of a magistrate, a soldier, or a judge? And now, pray, would you be fixed and rooted on the same spot, like a plant? “Why;

> Greek: — ἡδὺ γάρ ἐστιν. — τίς οὔ φησιν; ἀλλὰ καὶ ζωμὸς ἡδύς ἐστι καὶ γυνὴ καλὴ ἡδύ ἐστιν. τί ἄλλο λέγουσιν οἱ τέλος ποιούμενοι τὴν ἡδονήν;

[¶86] it is pleasant.” Who denies it? And so is a ragout pleasant, and a fine woman is pleasant. Is not this just what they say who make pleasure their end? Do you not perceive whose language you have spoken? That of Epicureans and debauchees. And while you follow their practices and hold their principles, do you talk to us of the doctrines of Zeno and Socrates?

> Greek: οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ, τίνων ἀνθρώπων φωνὴν ἀφῆκας; ὅτι Ἐπικουρείων καὶ κιναίδων; εἶτα τὰ ἐκείνων ἔργα πράσσων καὶ τὰ δόγματα ἔχων τοὺς λόγους ἡμῖν λέγεις τοὺς Ζήνωνος καὶ Σωκράτους; οὐκ ἀπορρίψεις ὡς μακροτάτω τἀλλότρια, οἷς κοσμῇ μηδέν σοι προσήκουσιν;

[¶87] Why do you not throw away as far as possible those assumed traits which belong to others, and with which you have nothing to do? What else do the Epicureans desire than to sleep without hindrance, and rise without compulsion; and when they have risen, to yawn at their leisure and wash their faces; then write and read what they please; then prate about some trifle or other, and be applauded by their friends, whatever they say;

> Greek: ἢ τί ἄλλο θέλουσιν ἐκεῖνοι ἢ καθεύδειν ἀπαραποδίστως καὶ ἀναναγκάστως καὶ ἀναστάντες ἐφʼ ἡσυχίας χασμήσασθαι καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ἀποπλῦναι, εἶτα γράψαι καὶ ἀναγνῶναι ἃ θέλουσιν, εἶτα φλυαρῆσαί τί ποτʼ ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων, ὅ τι ἂν λέγωσιν, εἶτα εἰς περίπατον προελθόντες καὶ ὀλίγα περιπατήσαντες λούσασθαι, εἶτα φαγεῖν, εἶτα κοιμηθῆναι, οἵαν δὴ κοίτην καθεύδειν τοὺς τοιούτους εἰκός — τί ἄν τις λέγοι; ἔξεστιν γὰρ τεκμαίρεσθαι.

[¶88] then go out for a walk, and, after they have taken a turn, bathe, and then eat, and then to bed? In what manner they spend their time there, why should one say? For it is easily guessed. Come now;

> Greek: ἄγε, φέρε μοι καὶ σὺ τὴν σαυτοῦ διατριβήν, ἣν ποθεῖς, ζηλωτὰ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Διογένους. τί θέλεις ἐν Ἀθήναις ποιεῖν; ταῦτα αὐτά;

[¶89] do you also tell me what course of life you desire to lead, who are a zealot for truth, and Diogenes, and Socrates? What would you do at Athens,—these very same things? Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? They who falsely pretend to the Roman citizenship are punished severely;

> Greek: μή τι ἕτερα; τί οὖν Στωικὸν σαυτὸν εἶναι λέγεις; εἶτα οἱ μὲν τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας καταψευδόμενοι κολάζονται πικρῶς, τοὺς δʼ οὕτως μεγάλου καὶ σεμνοῦ καταψευδομένους πράγματος καὶ ὀνόματος ἀθῴους ἀπαλλάττεσθαι δεῖ;

[¶90] and must those be dismissed with impunity who falsely claim so great a thing, and so venerable a title, as you? Or is not this impossible;

> Greek: ἢ τοῦτό γε οὐ δυνατόν, ἀλλʼ ὁ νόμος θεῖος καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ἀναπόδραστος οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς μεγίστας εἰσπρασσόμενος κολάσεις παρὰ τῶν τὰ μέγιστα ἁμαρτανόντων;

[¶91] and is there not a divine and powerful and inevitable law, which exacts the greatest punishments from those who are guilty of the greatest offences? For what says this law?—Let him who claims what belongs not to him be arrogant, be vainglorious, be base, be a slave; let him grieve, let him envy, let him pity;

> Greek: τί γὰρ λέγει; ὁ προσποιούμενος τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔστω ἀλαζών, ἔστω κενόδοξος· ὁ ἀπειθῶν τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει ἔστω ταπεινός, ἔστω δοῦλος, λυπείσθω, φθονείτω, ἐλεείτω, τὸ κεφάλαιον πάντων, δυστυχείτω, θρηνείτω.

[¶92] and, in a word, let him lament and be miserable. “What then! would you have me pay my court to such a one? Would you have me frequent his door?” If reason requires it for your country, for your relations, for mankind, why should you not go? You are not ashamed to go to the door of a shoemaker when you want shoes, nor of a gardener when you want lettuce. Why, then, in regard to the rich, when you have some similar want?

> Greek: τί οὖν; θέλεις με τὸν δεῖνα θεραπεύειν; ἐπὶ θύρα[ι]ς αὐτοῦ πορεύεσθαι; — εἰ[ς] τοῦτο αἱρεῖ λόγος, ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος, ὑπὲρ τῶν συγγενῶν, ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων, διὰ τί μὴ ἀπέλθῃς; ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ μὲν τὰς τοῦ σκυτέως οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ πορευόμενος, ὅταν δέῃ ὑποδημάτων, οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ κηπουροῦ, ὅταν θιδράκων, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων, ὅταν τινὸς ὁμοίου δέῃ;

[¶93] “Ay; but I need not be awed before a shoemaker.” Nor before a rich man. “I need not flatter a gardener.” Nor a rich man.

> Greek: — ναί· τὸν σκυτέα γὰρ οὐ θαυμάζω. — μηδὲ τὸν πλούσιον. — οὐδὲ τὸν κηπουρὸν κολακεύσω. — μηδὲ τὸν πλούσιον. πῶς οὖν τύχω οὗ δέομαι;

[¶94] “How, then, shall I get what I want?” Why, do I bid you go in expectation of getting it? No; only that you may do your duty.

> Greek: — ἐγὼ δέ σοι λέγω ὅτι ὡς τευξόμενος ἀπέρχου; οὐχὶ δὲ μόνον, ἵνα πράξῃς τὸ σαυτῷ πρέπον;

[¶95] “Why, then, after all, should I go?” That you may have gone; that you may have discharged the duties of a citizen, of a brother, of a friend.

> Greek: — τί οὖν ἔτι πορεύομαι; — ἵνʼ ἀπέλθῃς, ἵνα ἀποδεδωκὼς ᾖς τὰ τοῦ πολίτου ἔργα, τὰ ἀδελφοῦ, τὰ φίλου.

[¶96] And, after all, remember that you are going as if to a shoemaker, to a gardener, who has no monopoly of anything great or respectable, though he should sell it ever so dear. You are going as if to buy lettuces worth an obolus, but by no means worth a talent.

> Greek: καὶ λοιπὸν μέμνησο, ὅτι πρὸς σκυτέα ἀφῖξαι, πρὸς λαχανοπώλην, οὐδενὸς μεγάλου ἢ σεμνοῦ ἔχοντα τὴν ἐξουσίαν, κἂν αὐτὸ πολλοῦ πωλῇ. ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς θίδρακας ἀπέρχῃ· ὀβολοῦ γάρ εἰσιν, ταλάντου δʼ οὐκ εἰσίν.

[¶97] So here, too, if the matter is worth going to his door about, I will go; if it is worth talking with him about, I will talk with him. But if one must kiss his hand, too, and cajole him with praise, that is paying too dear. It is not expedient for myself, nor my country, nor my fellow-citizens, nor my friends, to destroy what constitutes the good citizen and the friend.

> Greek: οὕτως κἀνταῦθα. τοῦ ἐπὶ θύρας ἐλθεῖν ἄξιον τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἔστω, ἀφίξομαι. τοῦ διαλεχθῆναι οὕτως· ἔστω, διαλεχθήσομαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χεῖρα δεῖ καταφιλῆσαι καὶ θωπεῦσαι διʼ ἐπαίνου. ἄπαγε, ταλάντου ἐστίν· οὐ λυσιτελεῖ μοι οὐδὲ τῇ πόλει οὐδὲ τοῖς φίλοις ἀπολέσαι καὶ πολίτην ἀγαθὸν καὶ φίλον.

[¶98] “But one will appear not to have set heartily about the business, if one thus fails.” What, have you again forgotten why you went?

> Greek: ἀλλὰ δόξεις μὴ προτεθυμῆσθαι μὴ ἀνύσας. πάλιν ἐπελάθου, τίνος ἕνεκα ἐλήλυθας; οὐκ οἶσθʼ, ὅτι ἀνὴρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς οὐδὲν ποιεῖ τοῦ δόξαι ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πεπρᾶχθαι καλῶς;

[¶99] Do you not know that a wise and good man does nothing for appearance, but everything for the sake of having acted well? “What advantage is it, then, to him, to have acted well?” What advantage is it to one who writes down the name of Dion without a blunder? The having written it.

> Greek: — τί οὖν ὄφελος αὐτῷ τοῦ πρᾶξαι καλῶς; — τί δʼ ὄφελος τῷ γράφοντι τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα, ὡς χρὴ γράφειν; αὐτὸ τὸ γράψαι. — ἔπαθλον οὖν οὐδέν; — σὺ δὲ ζητεῖς ἔπαθλον ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ μεῖζον τοῦ τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια πράττειν;

[¶100] “Is there no reward, then?” Why, do you seek any greater reward for a good man than the doing what is fair and just? And yet, at Olympia, you desire nothing else, but think it enough to be crowned victor.

> Greek: ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ δʼ οὐδεὶς ἄλλο οὐδέν, ἀλλʼ ἀρκεῖν σοι δοκεῖ τὸ ἐστεφανῶσθαι Ὀλύμπια. οὕτως σοι μικρὸν καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον εἶναι φαίνεται τὸ εἶναι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδαίμονα;

[¶101] Does it appear to you so small and worthless a thing to be just, good, and happy? Besides, being introduced by God into this Great City [the world], and bound to discharge at this time the duties of a man, do you still want nurses and a mamma; and are you conquered and effeminated by the tears of poor weak women? Are you thus determined never to cease being an infant?

> Greek: πρὸς ταῦτα ὑπὸ θεῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ταύτην εἰσηγμένος καὶ ἤδη τῶν ἀνδρὸς ἔργων ὀφείλων ἅπτεσθαι τιτθὰς ἐπιποθεῖς καὶ μάμμην καὶ κάμπτει σε καὶ ἀποθηλύνει κλαίοντα γύναια μωρά; οὕτως οὐδέποτε παύσει παιδίον· ὢν νήπιον; οὐκ οἶσθʼ, ὅτι ὁ τὰ παιδίου ποιῶν ὅσῳ πρεσβύτερος τοσούτῳ γελοιότερος;

[¶102] Do not you know that, if one acts like a child, the older he is, so much the more he is ridiculous? Did you never visit any one at Athens at his own house? “Yes; whomsoever I pleased.”

> Greek: ἐν Ἀθήναις δʼ οὐδένα ἑώρας εἰς οἶκον αὐτοῦ φοιτῶν; — ὃν ἐβουλόμην. — καὶ ἐνθάδε τοῦτον θέλε ὁρᾶν καὶ ὃν βούλει ὄψει· μόνον μὴ ταπεινῶς, μὴ μετʼ ὀρέξεως ἢ ἐκκλίσεως καὶ ἔσται τὰ σὰ καλῶς.

[¶103] Why, now you are here, be willing to visit this person, and you will still see whom you please;

> Greek: τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἐλθεῖν ἐστιν οὐδʼ ἐν τῷ ἐπὶ θύραις στῆναι, ἀλλʼ ἔνδον ἐν τοῖς δόγμασιν.

[¶104] only let it be without meanness, without undue desire or aversion, and your affairs will go well; but their going well, or not, does not consist in going to the house and standing at the door, or the contrary; but lies within, in your own principles, when you have acquired a contempt for things uncontrollable by Will, and esteem none of them your own, but hold that what belongs to you is only to judge and think, to exert rightly your aims, your desires, and aversions.

> Greek: ὅταν τὰ ἐκτὸς καὶ ἀπροαίρετα ἠτιμακὼς ᾖς καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῶν σὸν ἡγημένος, μόνα δʼ ἐκεῖνα σά, τὸ κρῖναι καλῶς, τὸ ὑπολαβεῖν, τὸ ὁρμῆσαι, τὸ ὀρεχθῆναι, τὸ ἐκκλῖναι, ποῦ ἔτι κολακείας τόπος, ποῦ ταπεινοφροσύνης; τί ἔτι ποθεῖς τὴν ἡσυχίαν τὴν ἐκεῖ, τί τοὺς συνήθεις τόπους;

[¶105] What further room is there after this for flattery, for meanness?

> Greek: ἔκδεξαι βραχὺ καὶ τούτους πάλιν ἕξεις συνήθεις. εἶτα ἂν οὕτως ἀγεννῶς ἔχῃς, πάλιν καὶ τούτων ἀπαλλαττόμενος κλαῖε καὶ στένε.

## 18. Book III · chapters 24–26

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/18/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/18/#p-N

[¶0] Why do you still long for the quiet you elsewhere enjoyed; for places familiar to you? Stay a little, and these will become familiar to you in their turn;

> Greek: πῶς οὖν γένωμαι φιλόστοργος;— ὡς γενναῖος, ὡς εὐτυχής· οὐδέποτε γὰρ αἱρεῖ ὁ λόγος ταπεινὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ κατακλᾶσθαι οὐδʼ ἐξ ἄλλου κρέμασθαι οὐδὲ μέμψασθαί ποτε θεὸν ἢ ἄνθρωπον.

[¶1] and then, if you are so mean-spirited, you may weep and lament again on leaving these. “How, then, am I to preserve an affectionate disposition?” As becomes a noble-spirited and happy person. For reason will never tell you to be dejected and broken-hearted, or to depend on another, or to reproach either God or man.

> Greek: οὕτως μοι γίνου φιλόστοργος ὡς ταῦτα τηρήσων· εἰ δὲ διὰ τὴν φιλοστοργίαν ταύτην, [τ]ἥντινά ποτε καὶ καλεῖς φιλοστοργίαν, δοῦλος μέλλεις εἶναι καὶ ἄθλιος, οὐ λυσιτελεῖ φιλόστοργον εἶναι.

[¶2] Be affectionate in such a manner as to observe all this. But if, from affection, as you call it, you are to be a slave and miserable, it is not worth your while to be affectionate.

> Greek: καὶ τί κωλύει φιλεῖν τινα ὡς θνητόν, ὡς ἀποδημητικόν; ἢ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἐφίλει τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ; ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐλεύθερος, ὡς μεμνημένος, ὅτι πρῶτον δεῖ θεοῖς εἶναι φίλον.

[¶3] And what restrains you from loving any one as a mortal,—as a person who may be obliged to quit you?

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν παρέβη τῶν πρεπόντων ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ οὔτʼ ἀπολογούμενος οὐθʼ ὑποτιμώμενος οὔτʼ ἔτι πρόσθεν βουλεύων ἢ στρατευόμενος.

[¶4] Pray did not Socrates love his own children? But it was as became one who was free, and mindful that his first duty was to gain the love of the gods.

> Greek: ἡμεῖς δὲ πάσης προφάσεως πρὸς τὸ ἀ[γ]γεννεῖς εἶναι εὐποροῦμεν, οἱ μὲν διὰ παῖδα, οἱ δὲ διὰ μητέρα, ἄλλοι δὲ διʼ ἀδελφούς.

[¶5] Hence he violated no part of the character of a good man, either in his defence or in fixing a penalty on himself. Nor yet before, when he was a senator or a soldier.

> Greek: διʼ οὐδένα δὲ προσήκει δυστυχεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐτυχεῖν διὰ πάντας, μάλιστα δὲ διὰ τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς κατασκευάσαντα.

[¶6] But we make use of every pretence to be mean-spirited; some on account of a child; some, of a mother; and some, of a brother. But it is not fit to be unhappy on account of any one, but happy on account of all;

> Greek: ἄγε, Διογένης δʼ οὐκ ἐφίλει οὐδένα, ὃς οὕτως ἥμερος ἦν καὶ φιλάνθρωπος, ὥστε ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοσούτους πόνους καὶ ταλαιπωρίας τοῦ σώματος ἄσμενος ἀναδέχεσθαι;

[¶7] and chiefly of God, who has constituted us for this purpose. What!

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἐφίλει πῶς; ὡς τοῦ Διὸς διάκονον ἔδει, ἅμα μὲν κηδόμενος, ἅμα δʼ ὡς τῷ θεῷ ὑποτεταγμένος.

[¶8] did Diogenes love nobody, who was so gentle and benevolent as cheerfully to undergo so many pains and miseries of body for the common good of mankind? Yes, he did love them; but how? As became a minister of Zeus; at once caring for men, and obedient to God. Hence the whole earth, not any particular place, was his country. And when he was taken captive he did not long for Athens and his friends and acquaintance there, but made himself acquainted with the pirates, and endeavored to reform them;

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο πᾶσα γῆ πατρὶς ἦν ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ, ἐξαίρετος δʼ οὐδεμία· καὶ ἁλοὺς οὐκ ἐπόθει τὰς Ἀθήνας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐκεῖ συνήθεις καὶ φίλους, ἀλλʼ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πειραταῖς συνήθης ἐγίνετο καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν ἐπειρᾶτο. καὶ πραθεὶς ὕστερον ἐν Κορίνθῳ διῆγεν οὕτως ὡς πρόσθεν ἐν Ἀθήναις καὶ εἰς Περραιβοὺς δʼ ἂν ἀπελθὼν ὡσαύτως εἶχεν.

[¶9] and when he was at last sold into captivity, he lived at Corinth just as before at Athens;

> Greek: οὕτως ἐλευθερία γίνεται. διὰ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἐξ οὗ μʼ Ἀντισθένης ἠλευθέρωσεν, οὐκέτι ἐδούλευσα.

[¶10] and if he had gone to the Perrhaebeans, he would have been exactly the same. Thus is freedom acquired. Hence he used to say, “Ever since Antisthenes made me free I have ceased to be a slave.”

> Greek: πῶς ἠλευθέρωσεν; ἄκουε, τί λέγει· ἐδίδαξέν με τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐμά. κτῆσις οὐκ ἐμή· συγγενεῖς, οἰκεῖοι, φίλοι, φήμη, συνήθεις τόποι, διατριβή, πάντα ταῦτα ὅτι ἀλλότρια.

[¶11] How did he make him free? Hear what he says: “He taught me what was my own and what not. An estate is not my own.

> Greek: σὸν οὖν τί; χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. ταύτην ἔδειξέν μοι ὅτι ἀκώλυτον ἔχω, ἀνανάγκαστον· οὐδεὶς ἐμποδίσαι δύναται, οὐδεὶς βιάσασθαι ἄλλως χρήσασθαι ἢ ὡς θέλω.

[¶12] Kindred, domestics friends, reputation, familiar places, manner of life, all belong to another.” “What is your own, then?” “The right use of the phenomena of existence. He showed me that I have this, not subject to restraint or compulsion;

> Greek: τίς οὖν ἔτι ἔχει μου ἐξουσίαν; Φίλιππος ἢ Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ Περδίκκας ἢ ὁ μέγας βασιλεύς; πόθεν αὐτοῖς; τὸν γὰρ ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπου μέλλοντα ἡττᾶσθαι πολὺ πρότερον ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων δεῖ ἡττᾶσθαι.

[¶13] no one can hinder or force me in this, any otherwise than as I please. Who, then, after this, has any power over me,—Philip, or Alexander, or Perdiccas, or the Persian king? Whence should they have it? For he that is to be subdued by man must first be subdued by things.

> Greek: οὗτινος οὖν οὐχ ἡδονὴ κρείττων ἐστίν, οὐ πόνος, οὐ δόξα, οὐ πλοῦτος, δύναται δʼ, ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, τὸ σωμάτιον ὅλον προσπτύσας τινὶ ἀπελθεῖν, τίνος ἔτι οὗτος δοῦλός ἐστιν, τίνι ὑποτέτακται;

[¶14] He, therefore, of whom neither pleasure, nor pain, nor fame, nor riches can get the better; and he who is able, whenever he thinks fit, to abandon his whole body with contempt and depart, whose slave can he ever be?

> Greek: εἰ δʼ ἡδέως ἐν Ἀθήναις διῆγεν καὶ ἥττητο ταύτης τῆς διατριβῆς, ἐπὶ παντὶ ἂν ἦν τὰ ἐκείνου πράγματα, ὁ ἰσχυρότερος κύριος ἂν ἦν λυπῆσαι αὐτόν.

[¶15] To whom is he subject?” But if Diogenes had taken pleasure in living at Athens, and had been subdued by that manner of life, his affairs would have been at every one’s disposal;

> Greek: πῶς ἂν δοκεῖς τοὺς πειρατὰς ἐκολάκευεν, ἵνʼ αὐτὸν Ἀθηναίων τινὶ πωλήσωσιν, ἵνʼ ἴδῃ ποτὲ τὸν Πειραιᾶ τὸν καλὸν καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη καὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν;
τίς ὢν [ε]ἴδῃς, ἀνδράποδον;

[¶16] and whoever was stronger would have had the power of grieving him. How would he have flattered the pirates, think you, to make them sell him to some Athenian, that he might see again the fine Piraus, the Long Walls, and the Citadel? How would you see them,—as a slave and a miserable wretch? And what good would that do you? “No; but as free.” How free?

> Greek: δοῦλος καὶ ταπεινός· καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος; — οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἐλεύθερος. — δεῖξον, πῶς ἐλεύθερος. ἰδοὺ ἐπείληπταί σου τίς ποτε οὗτος ὁ ἐξάγων σε ἀπὸ τῆς συνήθους σοι διατριβῆς καὶ λέγει δοῦλος ἐμὸς εἶ· ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ γάρ ἐστι κωλῦσαί σε διάγειν ὡς θέλεις, ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ τὸ ἀνεῖναί σε, τὸ ταπεινοῦν· ὅταν θέλω, πάλιν εὐφραίνῃ καὶ μετέωρος πορεύῃ εἰς Ἀθήνας.

[¶17] See, somebody lays hold on you, takes you away from your usual manner of life, and says: “You are my slave; for it is in my power to restrain you from living as you like. It is in my power to afflict and humble you.

> Greek: τί λέγεις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν δουλαγωγοῦντά σε; ποῖον αὐτῷ καρπιστὴν δίδως; ἢ οὐδʼ ὅλως ἀντιβλέπεις, ἀλλʼ ἀφεὶς τοὺς πολλοὺς λόγους ἱκετεύεις, ἵνα ἀφεθῇς;

[¶18] Whenever I please you may be cheerful once more, and set out elated for Athens.” What do you say to him who thus enslaves you? What rescuer can you find? Or dare you not so much as look up at him; but, without making many words, do you supplicate to be dismissed? Why, you ought even to go to prison, man, with alacrity, with speed, outstripping your conductors.

> Greek: ἄνθρωπε, εἰς φυλακήν σε δεῖ χαίροντα ἀπιέναι, σπεύδοντα, φθάνοντα τοὺς ἀπάγοντας. εἶτά μοι σὺ μὲν ἐν Ῥώμῃ διάγειν ὀκνεῖς, τὴν Ἑλλάδα ποθεῖς; ὅταν δʼ ἀποθνῄσκειν δέῃ, καὶ τότε μέλλεις ἡμῶν κατακλαίειν, ὅτι τὰς Ἀθήνας οὐ μέλλεις βλέπειν καὶ ἐν Λυκείῳ οὐ περιπατήσεις;

[¶19] Instead of this do you regret living at Rome and long for Greece? And when you must die, will you then, too, come crying to us that you shall no more see Athens, nor walk in the Lyceum? Is it for this that you have travelled? Is it for this that you have been seeking for somebody to do you good?

> Greek: ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀπεδήμησας; τούτου ἕνεκα ἐζήτησάς τινι συμβαλεῖν, ἵνʼ ὠφεληθῇς ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ; ποίαν ὠφέλειαν; συλλογισμοὺς ἵνʼ ἀναλύσῃς ἑκτικώτερον ἢ ἐφοδεύσης ὑποθετικούς; καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἀδελφὸν ἀπέλιπες, πατρίδα, φίλους, οἰκείους, ἵνα ταῦτα μαθὼν ἐπανέλθῃς;

[¶20] What good,—that you may the more easily solve syllogisms and manage hypothetical arguments? And is it for this reason you left your brother, your country, your friends, your family, that you might carry back such acquirements as these?

> Greek: ὥστʼ οὐχ ὑπὲρ εὐσταθείας ἀπεδήμεις, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἀταραξίας, οὐχ ἵνʼ ἀβλαβὴς γενόμενος μηκέτι μηδένα μέμφῃ, μηδενὶ ἐγκαλῇς, μηδείς σε ἀδικῇ καὶ οὕτως τὰς σχέσεις ἀποσῴζῃς ἀπαραποδίστως;

[¶21] So that you did not travel to learn constancy nor tranquillity; not that. secured from harm, you might complain of no one, accuse no one;

> Greek: καλὴν ἐστείλω ταύτην τὴν ἐμπορίαν, συλλογισμοὺς καὶ μεταπίπτοντας καὶ ὑποθετικούς· κἄν σοι φανῇ, ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ καθίσας πρόγραψον ὡς οἱ φαρμακοπῶλαι.

[¶22] that no one might injure you; and that thus you might preserve your human relations, without impediment. You have made a fine traffic of it, to carry home hypothetical arguments and convertible propositions! If you please, too, sit in the market, and cry them for sale, as mountebanks do their medicines. Why will you not rather deny that you know even what you have learned, for fear of bringing a scandal upon such theorems as useless?

> Greek: οὐκ ἀρνήσῃ καὶ ὅσα ἔμαθες εἰδέναι, ἵνα μὴ διαβάλῃς τὰ θεωρήματα ὡς ἄχρηστα; τί σοι κακὸν ἐποίησεν φιλοσοφία; τί σε ἠδίκησε Χρύσιππος, ἵνʼ αὐτοῦ τοὺς πόνους ἔργῳ αὐτὸς ἀχρήστους ἐξελέγχῃς; οὐκ ἤρκει σοι τὰ ἐκεῖ κακά, ὅσα εἶχες αἴτια τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ πενθεῖν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀπεδήμησας, ἀλλὰ πλείω προσέλαβες;

[¶23] What harm has philosophy done you,—in what has Chrysippus injured you,—that you should demonstrate by your actions that such studies are of no value?

> Greek: κἂν ἄλλους πάλιν ἔχῃς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους, ἕξεις πλείονα τοῦ οἰμώζειν αἴτια, κἂν πρὸς ἄλλην χώραν προσπαθῇς. τί οὖν ζῇς; ἵνα λύπας ἄλλας ἐπʼ ἄλλαις περιβάλῃ, διʼ ἃς ἀτυχεῖς;

[¶24] Had you not evils enough at home? How many causes for grief and lamentation had you there, even if you had not travelled? But you have added more; and if you ever get any new acquaintance and friends, you will find fresh causes for groaning;

> Greek: εἶτά μοι καλεῖς τοῦτο φιλοστοργίαν; ποίαν, ἄνθρωπε, φιλοστοργίαν; εἰ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδενὸς κακοῦ αἴτιον γίνεται· εἰ κακόν ἐστιν, οὐδέν μοι καὶ αὐτῇ ἐγὼ πρὸς τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πέφυκα, πρὸς κακὰ οὐ πέφυκα.

[¶25] and, in like manner, if you attach yourself to any other country. To what purpose, therefore, do you live,—to heap sorrow upon sorrow, to make you wretched? And then you tell me this is affection. What affection, man? If it be good, it cannot be the cause of any ill; if ill, I will have nothing to do with it.

> Greek: τίς οὖν ἡ πρὸς τοῦτο ἄσκησις; πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ἀνωτάτω καὶ κυριωτάτη καὶ εὐθὺς ὥσπερ ἐν πύλαις, ὅταν τινὶ προσπάσχῃς, οὐδενὶ τῶν ἀναφαιρέτων, ἀλλά τινι τοιούτῳ γένει, οἷόν ἐστι χύτρα, οἷον ὑάλινον ποτήριον, ἵνʼ ὅταν καταγῇ, μεμνημένος [μὴν] μὴ ταραχθῇς.

[¶26] I was born for my own good, not ill. “What, then, is the proper training for these cases?” First, the highest and principal means, and as obvious as if at your very door, is this,—that when you attach yourself to anything, it may not be as to a secure possession. “How, then?” As to something brittle as glass or earthenware;

> Greek: οὕτως καὶ ἐνθάδʼ, ἐὰν παιδίον σαυτοῦ καταφιλῇς, ἐὰν ἀδελφόν, ἐὰν φίλον, μηδέποτε ἐπιδῷς τὴν φαντασίαν εἰς ἅπαν μηδὲ τὴν διάχυσιν ἐάσῃς προελθεῖν ἐφʼ ὅσον αὐτὴ θέλει, ἀλλʼ ἀντίσπασον, κώλυσον, οἷον οἱ τοῖς θριαμβεύουσιν ἐφεστῶτες ὄπισθεν καὶ ὑπομιμνῄσκοντες, ὅτι ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν.

[¶27] that when it happens to be broken, you may not lose your self-command. So here, too, when you embrace your child, or your brother, or your friend, never yield yourself wholly to the fair semblance, nor let the passion pass into excess; but curb it, restrain it,—like those who stand behind triumphant victors, and remind them that they are men.

> Greek: τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ σὺ ὑπομίμνῃσκε σεαυτόν, ὅτι θνητὸν φιλεῖς, οὐδὲν τῶν σεαυτοῦ φιλεῖς· ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος σοι δέδοται, οὐκ ἀναφαίρετον οὐδʼ εἰς ἅπαν, ἀλλʼ ὡς σῦκον, ὡς σταφυλή, τῇ τεταγμένῃ ὥρᾳ τοῦ ἔτους· ἂν δὲ χειμῶνος ἐπιποθῇς, μωρὸς εἶ.

[¶28] Do you likewise remind yourself that you love what is mortal; that you love what is not your own. It is allowed you for the present, not irrevocably, nor forever; but as a fig, or a bunch of grapes, in the appointed season.

> Greek: οὕτως κἂν τὸν υἱὸν ἢ τὸν φίλον τότε ποθῇς, ὅτε οὐ δέδοταί σοι, ἴσθι, ὅτι χειμῶνος σῦκον ἐπιποθεῖς. οἷον γάρ ἐστι χειμὼν πρὸς σῦκον, τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πᾶσα ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ὅλων περίστασις πρὸς τὰ κατʼ αὐτὴν ἀναιρούμενα.

[¶29] If you long for these in winter, you are foolish. So, if you long for your son, or your friend, when you cannot have him, remember that you are wishing for figs in winter. For as winter is to a fig, so is every accident in the universe to those things with which it interferes.

> Greek: καὶ λοιπὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷς χαίρεις τινί, τὰς ἐναντίας φαντασίας σαυτῷ πρό[σ]βαλε. τί κακόν ἐστι μεταξὺ καταφιλοῦντα τὸ παιδίον ἐπιψελλίζοντα λέγειν αὔριον ἀποθανῇ, τῷ φίλῳ ὡσαύτως αὔριον ἀποδημήσεις ἢ σὺ ἢ ἐγὼ καὶ οὐκέτι ὀψόμεθα ἀλλήλους;

[¶30] In the next place, whatever objects give you pleasure, call before yourself the opposite images. What harm is there, while you kiss your child, in saying softly, “To-morrow you may die;”

> Greek: — ἀλλὰ δύσφημά ἐστι ταῦτα. — καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐπαοιδῶν ἔνιαι, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ὠφελοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπιστρέφομαι, μόνον ὠφελείτω. σὺ δὲ δύσφημα καλεῖς ἄλλα ἢ τὰ κακοῦ τινος σημαντικά;

[¶31] and so to your friend, “To-morrow either you or I may go away, and we may see each other no more”? “But these sayings are ominous.” And so are some incantations; but because they are useful, I do not mind it; only let them be useful.

> Greek: δύσφημόν ἐστι δειλία, δύσφημον ἀγέννεια, πένθος, λύπη, ἀναισχυντία· ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα δύσφημά ἐστιν. καίτοι γε οὐδὲ ταῦτα ὀκνεῖν δεῖ φθέγγεσθαι ὑπὲρ φυλακῆς τῶν πραγμάτων.

[¶32] But do you call anything ominous except what implies some ill? Cowardice is ominous; baseness is ominous; lamentation, grief, shamelessness. These are words of bad omen; and yet we ought not to shrink from using them, as a guard against the things they mean. But do you tell me that a word is ominous which is significant of anything natural?

> Greek: δύσφημον δέ μοι λέγεις ὄνομα φυσικοῦ τινὸς πράγματος σημαντικόν; λέγε δύσφημον εἶναι καὶ τὸ θερισθῆναι τοὺς στάχυας· ἀπώλειαν γὰρ σημαίνει τῶν σταχύων· ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ τοῦ κόσμου. λέγε δύσφημον καὶ τὸ φυλλορροεῖν καὶ τὸ ἰσχάδα γίνεσθαι ἀντὶ σύκου καὶ ἀσταφίδας ἐκ σταφυλῆς.

[¶33] Say, too, that it is ominous for ears of corn to be reaped; for this signifies the destruction of the corn, but not of the world. Say, too, that the fall of the leaf is ominous;

> Greek: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν προτέρων εἰσὶν εἰς ἕτερα μεταβολαί· οὐκ ἀπώλεια, ἀλλὰ τεταγμένη τις οἰκονομία καὶ διοίκησις. τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἀποδημία, [καὶ] μεταβολὴ μικρά·

[¶34] and that confectionery should be produced from figs, and raisins from grapes.

> Greek: τοῦτο θάνατος, μεταβολὴ μείζων ἐκ τοῦ νῦν ὄντος οὐκ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλʼ εἰς τὸ νῦν μὴ ὄν.

[¶35] For all these are changes from a former state into another,—not a destruction, but a certain appointed economy and administration. Such is absence, a slight change;

> Greek: — οὐκέτι οὖν ἔσομαι; — οὐκ ἔσει· ἀλλʼ ἄλλο τι, οὗ νῦν ὁ κόσμος χρείαν ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ σὺ ἐγένου οὐχ ὅτε σὺ ἠθέλησας, ἀλλʼ ὅτε ὁ κόσμος χρείαν ἔσχεν.

[¶36] such is death, a greater change,—not from what now is nothing, but to what now is not. “What, then; shall I be no more?” True; but you will be something else, of which at present the world has no need; for even you were not produced when you pleased, but when the world had need of you.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς μεμνημένος, τίς τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ πόθεν ἐλήλυθεν καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος γέγονεν, πρὸς μόνῳ τούτῳ ἐστίν, πῶς τὴν αὑτοῦ χώραν ἐκπληρώσῃ εὐτάκτως καὶ εὐπειθῶς τῷ θεῷ.

[¶37] Hence a wise and good man, mindful who he is and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is attentive only how he may fill his post regularly and dutifully before God.

> Greek: ἔτι μʼ εἶναι θέλεις; ὡς ἐλεύθερος, ὡς γενναῖος, ὡς σὺ ἠθέλησας· σὺ γάρ με ἀκώλυτον ἐποίησας ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς.

[¶38] “Dost thou wish me still to live? Let me live free and noble, as thou desirest;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ οὐκέτι μου χρείαν ἔχεις; καλῶς σοι γένοιτο· καὶ μέχρι νῦν διὰ σὲ ἔμενον, διʼ ἄλλον οὐδένα, καὶ νῦν σοι πειθόμενος ἀπέρχομαι.

[¶39] for thou hast made me incapable of restraint in what is my own. But hast thou no further use for me? Farewell! I have stayed thus long through thee alone, and no other;

> Greek: πῶς ἀπέρχῃ; πάλιν ὡς σὺ ἠθέλησας, ὡς ἐλεύθερος, ὡς ὑπηρέτης σός, ὡς ᾐσθημένος σου τῶν προσταγμάτων καὶ ἀπαγορευμάτων.

[¶40] and now I depart in obedience to thee.” “How do you depart?” “Still as thou wilt; as one free, as thy servant, as one sensible of thy commands and thy prohibitions. But, while I am employed in thy service, what wouldst thou have me to be,—a prince, or a private man; a senator, or a plebeian;

> Greek: μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ διατρίβω ἐν τοῖς σοῖς, τίνα με θέλεις εἶναι; ἄρχοντα ἢ ἰδιώτην, βουλευτὴν ἢ δημότην, στρατιώτην ἢ στρατηγόν, παιδευτὴν ἢ οἰκοδεσπότην; ἣν ἂν χώραν καὶ τάξιν ἐγχειρίσῃς, ὡς λέγει ὁ Σωκράτης, μυριάκις ἀποθανοῦμαι πρότερον ἢ ταύτην ἐγκαταλείψω.

[¶41] a soldier, or a general; a preceptor, or a master of a family?

> Greek: ποῦ δέ μʼ εἶναι θέλεις; ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἢ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἢ ἐν Θήβαις ἢ ἐν Γυάροις; μόνον ἐκεῖ μου μέμνησο.

[¶42] Whatever post or rank thou shalt assign me, like Socrates, I will die a thousand times rather than desert it. Where wouldst thou have me to be,—at Rome, or at Athens; at Thebes, or at Gyaros? Only remember me there. If thou shalt send me where men cannot live conformably to nature, I will not depart unbidden, but upon a recall as it were sounded by thee.

> Greek: ἄν μʼ ἐκεῖ πέμπῃς, ὅπου κατὰ φύσιν διεξαγωγὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων, οὐ σοὶ ἀπειθῶν ἔξειμι, ἀλλʼ ὡς σοῦ μοι σημαίνοντος τὸ ἀνακλητικόν· οὐκ ἀπολείπω σε· μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλʼ αἰσθάνομαι, ὅτι μου χρείαν οὐκ ἔχεις.

[¶43] Even then I do not desert thee; Heaven forbid! but I perceive that thou hast no use for me.

> Greek: ἂν δὲ διδῶται κατὰ φύσιν διεξαγωγή, οὐ ζητήσω ἄλλον τόπον ἢ ἐν ᾧ εἰμὶ ἢ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἢ μεθʼ ὧν εἰμί.

[¶44] If a life conformable to nature be granted, I will seek no other place but that in which I am, nor any other company but those with whom I dwell.” Let these things be ready at hand, night and day. These things write; these things read;

> Greek: ταῦτα νυκτός, ταῦτα ἡμέρας πρόχειρα ἔστω· ταῦτα γράφειν, ταῦτα ἀναγιγνώσκειν· περὶ τούτων τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς αὑτόν, πρὸς ἕτερον μή τι ἔχεις μοι πρὸς τοῦτο βοηθῆσαι; καὶ πάλιν ἄλλῳ προσελθεῖν καὶ ἄλλῳ.

[¶45] of these things talk both to yourself and others. [Ask them,] “Have you any assistance to give me for this purpose?”

> Greek: εἶτα ἄν τι γένηται τῶν λεγομένων ἀβουλήτων, εὐθὺς ἐκεῖνο πρῶτον ἐπικουφίσει σε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπροσδόκητον.

[¶46] And, again, go and ask another and another. Then, if any of those things should happen that are called disagreeable, this will surely be a relief to you, in the first place, that it was not unexpected.

> Greek: μέγα γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ ᾔδειν θνητὸν γεγεννηκώς. οὕτως γὰρ ἐρεῖς καὶ ὅτι ᾔδειν θνητὸς ὤν, ᾔδειν ἀποδημητικὸς ὤν, ᾔδειν ἔκβλητος ὤν,

[¶47] For it is much to be able always to say, “knew that I begot one born to die.” Thus do you say too, “knew that I was liable to die, to travel, to be exiled, to be imprisoned.” If afterwards you turn to yourself, and seek from what quarter the event proceeds, you will presently recollect: “It is from things uncontrollable by will, not from what is my own.

> Greek: ᾔδειν εἰς φυλακὴν ἀπότακτος ὤν. εἶτʼ ἂν ἐπιστρέφῃς κατὰ σαυτὸν καὶ ζητήσῃς τὴν χώραν, ἐξ ἧς ἐστι τὸ συμβεβηκός, εὐθὺς ἀναμνησθήσῃ, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, τῶν οὐκ ἐμῶν· τί οὖν πρὸς [σ]ἐμέ; εἶτα τὸ κυριώτατον τίς δʼ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπιπέπομφεν;

[¶48] What then is it to me?”

> Greek: ὁ ἡγεμὼν ἢ ὁ στρατηγός, ἡ πόλις, ὁ τῆς πόλεως νόμος. δὸς οὖν αὐτό· δεῖ γάρ με ἀ[ι]εὶ τῷ νόμῳ πείθεσθαι ἐν παντί.

[¶49] Then, further, which is the chief point: “Who sent this,—the commander, the general, the city, the public law? Give it to me, then, for I must always obey the law in all things.”

> Greek: εἶθʼ ὅταν σε ἡ φαντασία δάκνῃ (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοί), ἀναμάχου τῷ λόγῳ, καταγωνίζου αὐτήν, μὴ ἐάσῃς ἐνισχύειν μηδὲ προάγειν ἐπὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ἀναπλάσσουσαν ὅσα θέλει καὶ ὡς θέλει.

[¶50] Further yet, when any delusive appearance molests you (for this may not depend on you), strive against it, and conquer it through reason. Do not suffer it to gain strength, nor to lead you indefinitely on, beguiling you at its own will. If you are at Gyaros, do not represent to yourself the manner of living at Rome,—how many pleasures you used to find there, and how many would attend your return;

> Greek: ἂν ἐν Γυάροις ᾖς, μὴ ἀνάπλασσε τὴν ἐν Ῥώμῃ διατριβὴν καὶ ὅσαι διαχύσεις ἦσαν ἐκεῖ διάγοντι, ὅσαι γένοιντʼ ἂν ἐπανελθόντι· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖ τέτασο, ὅπως δεῖ τὸν ἐν Γυάροις διάγοντα, ἐν Γυάροις ἐρρωμένως διάγειν. κἂν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ᾖς, μὴ ἀνάπλασσε τὴν ἐν Ἀθήναις διατριβήν, ἀλλὰ περὶ μόνης τῆς ἐκεῖ μελέτα.

[¶51] but dwell rather on this point,—how he who must live at Gyaros may live there nobly. And if you are at Rome, do not represent to yourself the manner of living at Athens; but consider only how you ought to live where you are.

> Greek: εἶτʼ ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπασῶν διαχύσεων ἐκείνην ἀντείσαγε, τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ παρακολουθεῖν, ὅτι πείθῃ τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι οὐ λόγῳ, ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἐκτελεῖς.

[¶52] Lastly, for all other pleasures substitute the consciousness that you are obeying God, and performing not in word, but in deed, the duty of a wise and good man. How great a thing is it to be able to say to yourself: “What others are now solemnly arguing in the schools, and can state in paradoxes, this I put in practice.

> Greek: οἷον γάρ ἐστιν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δύνασθαι εἰπεῖν νῦν ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς σεμνολογοῦσιν καὶ παραδοξολογεῖν δοκοῦσι, ταῦτα ἐγὼ ἐπιτελῶ· κἀκεῖνοι καθήμενοι τὰς ἐμὰς ἀρετὰς ἐξηγοῦνται καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ ζητοῦσιν καὶ ἐμὲ ὑμνοῦσιν·

[¶53] Those qualities which are there discoursed, disputed, celebrated, I have made mine own. Zeus hath been pleased to let me recognize this within myself, and himself to discern whether he hath in me one fit for a soldier and a citizen, and to employ me as a witness to other men, concerning things uncontrollable by will.

> Greek: καὶ τούτου με ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸν παρʼ ἐμαυτοῦ λαβεῖν ἀπόδειξιν ἠθέλησεν καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ γνῶναι, εἰ ἔχει στρατιώτην οἷον δεῖ, πολίτην οἷον δεῖ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις προάγειν με μάρτυρα τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων. ἴδετε, ὅτι εἰκῇ φοβεῖσθε, μάτην ἐπιθυμεῖτε ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖτε. τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἔξω μὴ ζητεῖτε, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ζητεῖτε· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐχ εὑρήσετε.

[¶54] See that your fears were vain, your appetites vain. Seek not good from without; seek it within yourselves, or you will never find it. For this reason he now brings me hither, now sends me thither; sets me before mankind, poor, powerless, sick; banishes me to Gyaros; leads me to prison; not that he hates me,—Heaven forbid! for who hates the most faithful of his servants?—nor that he neglects me, for he neglects not one of the smallest things;

> Greek: ἐπὶ τούτοις με νῦν μὲν ἐνταῦθα ἄγει, νῦν δʼ ἐκεῖ πέμπει, πένητα δείκνυσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, δίχα ἀρχῆς, νοσοῦντα· εἰς Γύαρα ἀποστέλλει, εἰς δεσμωτήριον εἰσάγει. οὐ μισῶν· μὴ γένοιτο· τίς δὲ μισεῖ τὸν ἄριστον τῶν ὑπηρετῶν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ; οὐδʼ ἀμελῶν, ὅς γε οὐδὲ τῶν μικροτάτων τινὸς ἀμελεῖ, ἀλλὰ γυμνάζων καὶ μάρτυρι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους χρώμενος.

[¶55] but to exercise me, and make use of me as a witness to others. Appointed to such a service, do I still care where I am, or with whom, or what is said of me,—instead of being wholly attentive to God and to his orders and commands?”

> Greek: εἰς τοιαύτην ὑπηρεσίαν κατατεταγμένος ἔτι φροντίζω, ποῦ εἰμι ἢ μετὰ τίνων ἢ τί περὶ ἐμοῦ λέγουσιν; οὐχὶ δʼ ὅλος πρὸς τὸν θεὸν τέταμαι καὶ τὰς ἐκείνου ἐντολὰς καὶ τὰ προστάγματα;

[¶56] Having these principles always at hand, and practising them by yourself, and making them ready for use, you will never want any one to comfort and strengthen you.

> Greek: ταῦτα ἔχων ἀεὶ ἐν χερσὶ καὶ τρίβων αὐτὸς παρὰ σαυτῷ καὶ πρόχειρα ποιῶν οὐδέποτε δεήσῃ τοῦ παραμυθουμένου, τοῦ ἐπιρρωννύντος.

[¶57] For shame does not consist in having nothing to eat, but in not having wisdom enough to exempt you from fear and sorrow.

> Greek: καὶ γὰρ αἰσχρὸν οὐ τὸ φαγεῖν μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ λόγον μὴ ἔχειν ἀρκοῦντα πρὸς ἀφοβίαν, πρὸς ἀλυπίαν.

[¶58] But if you once acquire that exemption, will a tyrant or his guards or courtiers be anything to you? Will offices or office-seekers disturb you, who have received so great a command from Zeus?

> Greek: ἂν δʼ ἅπαξ περιποιήσῃ τὸ ἄλυπον καὶ ἄφοβον, ἔτι σοι τύραννος ἔσται τις ἢ δορυφόρος ἢ Καισαριανοὶ ἢ ὀρδινατίων δήξεταί σε ἢ οἱ ἐπιθύοντες ἐν τῷ Καπιτωλίῳ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀπτικίοις τὸν τηλικαύτην ἀρχὴν παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς εἰληφότα;

[¶59] Only do not make a parade over it, nor grow insolent upon it; but show it by your actions; and though no one else should notice it, be content that you are well and blessed.

> Greek: μόνον μὴ πόμπευε αὐτὴν μηδʼ ἀλαζονεύου ἐπʼ αὐτῇ, ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ δείκνυε· κἂν μηδεὶς αἰσθάνηται, ἀρκοῦ αὐτὸς ὑγιαίνων καὶ εὐδαιμονῶν.

[¶60] 25. Consider which of your undertakings you have fulfilled, which not, and wherefore; which give you pleasure, which pain, in the reflection; and, if possible, recover yourself where you have failed. For the champions in this greatest of combats must not grow weary, but should even contentedly bear chastisement. For this is no combat of wrestling or boxing, where both he who succeeds and he who fails may possibly be of very great worth or of little, indeed may be very fortunate or very miserable, but this combat is for good fortune and happiness itself. What is the case, then? Here, even if we have renounced the contest, no one restrains us from renewing it, nor need we wait for another four years for the return of another Olympiad; but recollecting and recovering yourself, and returning with the same zeal, you may renew it immediately; and even if you should again yield, you may again begin; and if you once get the victory, you become like one who has never yielded. Only do not begin by forming the habit of this, to do it with pleasure, and then, like quails that have fled the fighting-pit, go about as if you were a brave champion, although you have been conquered throughout all the games. “I am conquered in presence of a girl. But what of it? I have been thus conquered before.” “I am excited to wrath against some one. But I have been in anger before.” You talk to us just as if you had come off unhurt. As if one should say to his physician, who had forbidden him to bathe, “Why, did not I bathe before?” Suppose the physician should answer him, “Well, and what was the consequence of your bathing? Were you not feverish? Had you not the headache?” So, when you before railed at somebody, did you not act like an ill-natured person; like an impertinent one? Have not you fed this habit of yours by corresponding actions? When you were conquered by a pretty girl, did you come off with impunity? Why, then, do you talk of what you have done before? You ought to remember it, I think, as slaves do whipping, so as to refrain from the same faults. “But the case is unlike; for there it is pain that causes the remembrance. But what is the pain, what the punishment, of my committing these faults? For when was I ever thus trained to the avoidance of bad actions?” Yet the pains of experience, whether we will or not, have their beneficial influence.

> Greek: 25. σκέψαι, ὧν προέθου ἀρχόμενος, τίνων μὲν ἐκράτησας, τίνων δʼ οὔ, καὶ πῶς ἐφʼ οἷς μὲν εὐφραίνῃ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος, ἐφʼ οἷς δʼ ἄχθῃ, καὶ εἰ δυνατόν, ἀνάλαβε κἀκεῖνα ὧν ἀπώλισθες. οὐ γὰρ ἀποκνητέον τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν μέγιστον ἀγωνιζομένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ πληγὰς ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ ὑπὲρ πάλης καὶ παγκρατίου ὁ ἀγὼν πρόκειται, οὗ καὶ τυχόντι καὶ μὴ τυχόντι ἔξεστιν μὲν πλείστου ἀξίῳ, ἔξεστι δὲ ὀλίγου εἶναι καὶ νὴ Δία ἔξεστιν μὲν εὐτυχεστάτῳ, ἔξεστι δὲ κακοδαιμονεστάτῳ εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εὐτυχίας καὶ εὐδαιμονίας. τί οὖν; οὐδʼ ἂν ἀπαυδήσωμεν ἐνταῦθα, κωλύει τις πάλιν ἀγωνίζεσθαι οὐδὲ δεῖ περιμεῖναι τετραετίαν ἄλλην, ἵνʼ ἔλθῃ ἄλλα Ὀλύμπια, ἀλλʼ εὐθὺς ἀναλαβόντι καὶ ἀνακτησαμένῳ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἰσφέροντι προθυμίαν ἔξεστιν ἀγωνίζεσθαι· κἂν πάλιν ἀπείπῃς, πάλιν ἔξεστιν, κἂν ἅπαξ νικήσῃς, ὅμοιος εἶ τῷ μηδέποτε ἀπειπόντι. μόνον μὴ ὑπὸ ἔθους τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡδέως αὐτὸ ἄρξῃ ποιεῖν· καὶ λοιπὸν ὡς κακὸς ἀθλητὴς περιέρχῃ νικώμενος τὴν περίοδον ὅμοιος τοῖς ἀποφυγοῦσιν ὄρτυξιν. ἡττᾷ με φαντασία παιδισκαρίου καλοῦ. τί γάρ; πρῴην οὐχ ἡττήθην; προθυμία μοι γίνεται ψέξαι τινά. πρῴην γὰρ οὐκ ἔψεξα; οὕτως ἡμῖν λαλεῖς ὡς ἀζήμιος ἐξεληλυθώς, οἱονεί τις τῷ ἰατρῷ κωλύοντι λούσασθαι λέγοι πρῴην γὰρ οὐκ ἐλουσάμην; ἂν οὖν ὁ ἰατρὸς αὐτῷ ἔχῃ λέγειν ἄγε, λουσάμενος οὖν τί ἔπαθες; οὐκ ἐπύρεξας; οὐκ ἐκεφαλάλγησας; καὶ σὺ ψέξας πρῴην τινὰ οὐ κακοήθους ἔργον ἔπραξας; οὐ φλυάρου; οὐκ ἔθρεψάς σου τὴν ἕξιν ταύτην παραβάλλων αὐτῇ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα; ἡττηθεὶς δὲ τοῦ παιδισκαρίου ἀπῆλθες ἀζήμιος; τί οὖν τὰ πρῴην λέγεις; ἔδει δʼ οἶμαι μεμνημένον, ὡς οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν πληγῶν, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν αὐτῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅμοιον· ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ὁ πόνος τὴν μνήμην ποιεῖ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ποῖος πόνος, ποία ζημία; πότε γὰρ εἰθίσθης φεύγειν τὸ κακῶς ἐνεργῆσαι;

[¶61] 26. Are not you ashamed to be more fearful and mean-spirited than fugitive slaves? To what estates, to what servants, do they trust, when they run away and leave their masters? Do they not, after carrying off a little with them for the first days, travel over land and sea, contriving first one, then another, method of getting food? And what fugitive ever died of hunger?

> Greek: 26. οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ δειλότερος ὢν καὶ ἀγεννέστερος τῶν δραπετῶν; πῶς ἐκεῖνοι φεύγοντες ἀπολείπουσι τοὺς δεσπότας, ποίοις ἀγροῖς πεποιθότες, ποίοις οἰκέταις; οὐχὶ δʼ ὀλίγον ὅσον πρὸς τὰς πρώτας ἡμέρας ὑφελόμενοι εἶθʼ ὕστερον διὰ γῆς ἢ καὶ θαλάττης φέρονται ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης ἀφορμὴν πρὸς τὸ διατρέφεσθαι φιλοτεχνοῦντες;

[¶62] But you tremble, and lie awake at night, for fear you should want necessaries. Foolish man! are you so blind?

> Greek: καὶ τίς πώποτε δραπέτης λιμῷ ἀπέθανεν; σὺ δὲ τρέμεις, μή σοι λείπῃ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, καὶ τὰς νύκτας ἀγρυπνεῖς.

[¶63] Do not you see the way whither the want of necessaries leads? “Why, whither does it lead?” Whither a fever or a falling stone may lead,—-to death. Have you not, then, often said this to your companions? Have you not read, have you not written, many things on this point? And how often have you arrogantly boasted that you are undisturbed by fears of death! “Ay; but my family, too, will perish with hunger.”

> Greek: ταλαίπωρε, οὕτως τυφλὸς εἶ καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὅποι φέρει ἡ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔνδεια; ποῦ γὰρ φέρει; ὅπου καὶ ὁ πυρετός, ὅπου καὶ λίθος ἐπιπεσών, εἰς θάνατον. τοῦτο[ν] οὖν οὐ πολλάκις σὺ αὐτὸς εἶπες πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους, πολλὰ δʼ ἀνέγνως τοιαῦτα, πολλὰ δʼ ἔγραφες; ποσάκις δʼ ἠλαζονεύσω, ὅτι πρός γε τὸ ἀποθανεῖν μετρίως ἔχεις;

[¶64] What then? Does their hunger lead any other way than yours? Is there not the same descent, the same state below?

> Greek: — ναί· ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐμοὶ πεινήσουσιν. — τί οὖν; μή τι καὶ ὁ ἐκείνων λιμὸς ἀλλαχοῦ που φέρει; οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ αὐτή που κάθοδος;

[¶65] Will you not, then, in every want and necessity, look with confidence there, where even the most rich and powerful, and kings and tyrants themselves, must descend? You indeed may descend hungry, perhaps, and they full of indigestion and drunkenness. For have you often seen a beggar who did not live to old age, nay, to extreme old age?

> Greek: τὰ κάτω τὰ αὐτά; οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἐκεῖ βλέπειν θαρρῶν πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν καὶ ἔνδειαν, ὅπου καὶ τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς μεγίστας ἄρξαντας καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς βασιλεῖς καὶ τυράννους δεῖ κατελθεῖν, καὶ σὲ πεινῶντα, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, ἐκείνους δὲ διαρραγέντας ὑπὸ ἀπεψιῶν καὶ μέθης;

[¶66] Chilled by day and night, lying on the ground, and eating only what is barely necessary, they yet seem almost to become incapable of dying. But cannot you write? Cannot you keep a school? Cannot you be a watchman at somebody’s door? “But it is shameful to come to this necessity.”

> Greek: τίνα πώποτʼ ἐπαίτην ῥᾳδίως εἶδες μὴ γέροντα; τίνα δʼ οὐκ ἐσχατόγηρων; ἀλλὰ ῥιγῶντες τὰς νύκτας καὶ τὰς ἡμέρας καὶ χαμαὶ ἐρριμμένοι καὶ ὅσον αὐτὸ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον σιτούμενοι ἐγγὺς ἥκουσιν τῷ μηδʼ ἀποθανεῖν δύνασθαι,

[¶67] First, therefore, learn what things are shameful, and then claim to be a philosopher; but at present do not suffer even another to call you so. Is that shameful to you which is not your own act; of which you are not the cause; which has happened to you by accident, like a fever or the headache? If your parents were poor, or left others their heirs, or, though living, do not assist you, are these things shameful for you?

> Greek: σὺ δʼ ὁλόκληρος ἄνθρωπος χεῖρας ἔχων καὶ πόδας περὶ λιμοῦ δέδοικας οὕτως; οὐκ ἀντλεῖν δύνασθαι, οὐ γράφειν, οὐ παιδαγωγεῖν, οὐ θύραν ἀλλοτρίαν φυλάττειν; — ἀλλʼ αἰσχρὸν εἰς ταύτην ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀνάγκην. — μάθε οὖν πρῶτον, τίνα τὰ αἰσχρά ἐστιν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν λέγε σαυτὸν φιλόσοφον. τὸ νῦν δὲ μηδʼ ἂν ἄλλος τις εἴπῃ σε, ἀνέχου.

[¶68] Is this what you have learned from the philosophers? Have you never heard that what is shameful is blamable; and what is blamable must be something which deserves to be blamed? Whom do you blame for an action not his own, which he has not himself performed?

> Greek: αἰσχρόν ἐστί σοι τὸ μὴ σὸν ἔργον, οὗ σὺ αἴτιος οὐκ εἶ, ὃ ἄλλως ἀπήντησέν σοι, ὡς κεφαλαλγία, ὡς πυρετός; εἴ σου οἱ γονεῖς πένητες ἦσαν ἢ πλούσιοι μὲν ἦσαν, ἄλλους δὲ κληρονόμους ἀπέλιπον καὶ ζῶντες οὐκ ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὐδέν, σοὶ ταῦτα αἰσχρά ἐστιν;

[¶69] Did you, then, make your father such as he is; or is it in your power to mend him? Is that permitted you? What, then; must you desire what is not permitted, and when you fail of it be ashamed?

> Greek: ταῦτα ἐμάνθανες παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις; οὐδέποτε ἤκουσας, ὅτι τὸ αἰσχρὸν ψεκτόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ψεκτὸν ἄξιόν ἐστι τοῦ ψέγεσθαι; τίνα ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ αὑτοῦ ἔργῳ, ὃ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐποίησεν;

[¶70] Are you thus accustomed, even when you are studying philosophy, to depend on others, and to hope nothing from yourself? Sigh, then, and groan, and eat in fear that you shall have no food to-morrow.

> Greek: σὺ οὖν ἐποίησας τοῦτο, τὸν πατέρα τοιοῦτον; ἢ ἔξεστίν σοι ἐπανορθῶσαι αὐτόν; δίδοταί σοι τοῦτο; τί οὖν; δεῖ σε θέλειν τὰ μὴ διδόμενα ἢ μὴ τυγχάνοντα αὐτῶν αἰσχύνεσθαι;

[¶71] Tremble, lest your servants should rob you, or run away from you, or die.

> Greek: οὕτως δὲ καὶ εἰθίζου φιλοσοφῶν ἀφορᾶν εἰς ἄλλους καὶ μηδὲν αὐτὸς ἐλπίζειν ἐκ σεαυτοῦ;

[¶72] Thus live on forever, whoever you are, who have applied yourself to philosophy in name only, and as much as in you lies have disgraced its principles, by showing that they are unprofitable and useless to those who profess them.

> Greek: τοιγαροῦν οἴμωζε καὶ στένε καὶ ἔσθιε δεδοικώς, μὴ οὐ σχῇς τροφὰς αὔριον· περὶ τῶν δουλαρίων τρέμε, μὴ κλέψῃ τι, μὴ φύγῃ, μὴ ἀποθάνῃ.

[¶73] You have never made constancy, tranquillity, and serenity the object of your desires; have sought no teacher for this knowledge, but many for mere syllogisms. You have never, by yourself, confronted some delusive semblance with, “Can I bear this, or can I not bear it? What remains for me to do?” But, as if all your affairs went safe and well, you have aimed only-to secure yourself in your present possessions. What are they?

> Greek: οὕτως σὺ ζῆθι καὶ μὴ παύσῃ μηδέποτε, ὅστις ὀνόματι μόνον πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν προσῆλθες καὶ τὰ θεωρήματα αὐτῆς ὅσον ἐπὶ σοὶ κατῄσχυνας ἄχρηστα ἐπιδείξας καὶ ἀνωφελῆ τοῖς ἀναλαμβάνουσιν· οὐδέποτε δʼ εὐσταθείας ὠρέχθης, ἀταραξίας, ἀπαθείας· οὐδένα τούτου ἕνεκα ἐθεράπευσας, συλλογισμῶν δʼ ἕνεκα πολλούς· οὐδέποτε τούτων τινὰ τῶν φαντασιῶν διεβασάνισας αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ δύναμαι φέρειν ἢ οὐ δύναμαι; τί μοι τὸ λοιπόν ἐστιν;,

[¶74] Cowardice, baseness, worldliness, desires unaccomplished, unavailing aversions. These are the things which you have been laboring to secure. Ought you not first to have acquired something by the use of reason, and then to have provided security for that? Whom did you ever see building a series of battlements without placing them upon a wall?

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ὡς πάντων ἐχόντων σοι καλῶς καὶ ἀσφαλῶς περὶ τὸν τελευταῖον κατεγίνου τόπον, τὸν τῆς ἀμεταπτωσίας, ἵνʼ ἀμετάπτωτα σχῇς τίνα; τὴν δειλίαν, τὴν ἀγέννειαν, τὸν θαυμασμὸν τῶν πλουσίων, τὴν ἀτελῆ ὄρεξιν, τὴν ἀποτευκτικὴν ἔκκλισιν· περὶ τῆς τούτων ἀσφαλείας ἐφρόντιζες.

[¶75] And what porter is ever set where there is no door? But you study! Can you show me what you study? “Not to be shaken by sophistry.” Shaken from what? Show me first what you have in your custody; what you measure, or what you weigh;

> Greek: οὐκ ἔδει προσκτήσασθαι πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, εἶτα τούτῳ περιποιεῖν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν; καὶ τίνα πώποτʼ εἶδες τριγχὸν περιοικοδομοῦντα μηδενὶ τειχίον περιβαλλόμενον αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ; ποῖος δὲ θυρωρὸς καθίσταται ἐπὶ οὐδεμιᾷ θύρᾳ;

[¶76] and then accordingly show me your weights and measures, and to what purpose you measure that which is but dust.

> Greek: ἀλλὰ σὺ μελετᾷς ἀποδεικνύειν δύνασθαι· τίνα; μελετᾷς μὴ ἀποσαλεύεσθαι διὰ σοφισμάτων· ἀπὸ τίνων;

[¶77] Ought you not to show what makes men truly happy, what makes their affairs proceed as they wish; how we may blame no one, accuse no one; how acquiesce in the administration of the universe?

> Greek: δεῖξόν μοι πρῶτον, τί τηρεῖς, τί μετρεῖς ἢ τί ἱστάνεις· εἶθʼ οὕτως ἐπιδείκνυε τὸν ζυγὸν ἢ τὸν μέδιμνον.

[¶78] Show me these things. “See, I do show them,” say you; “will solve syllogisms to you.” This is but the measure, O unfortunate! and not the thing measured. Hence you now pay the penalty due for neglecting philosophy. You tremble; you lie awake;

> Greek: ἢ μέχρι τίνος μετρήσεις τὴν σποδόν; οὐ ταῦτά σε ἀποδεικνύειν δεῖ, ἃ ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εὐδαίμονας, ἃ ποιεῖ προχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς τὰ πράγματα ὡς θέλουσιν, διʼ ἃ οὐ δεῖ μέμφεσθαι οὐδενί, ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδενί, πείθεσθαι τῇ διοικήσει τῶν ὅλων; ταῦτά μοι δείκνυε.

[¶79] you advise with everybody, and if the result of the advice does not please everybody, you think that you have been ill-advised. Then you dread hunger, as you fancy;

> Greek: ἰδοὺ δεικνύω, φησίν, ἀναλύσω σοι συλλογισμούς. τοῦτο τὸ μετροῦν ἐστιν, ἀνδράποδον· τὸ μετρούμενον δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν.

[¶80] yet it is not hunger that you dread, but you are afraid that you will not have some one to cook for you, some one else for a butler, another to pull off your shoes, a fourth to dress you, others to rub you, others to follow you;

> Greek: διὰ ταῦτα νῦν τίνεις δίκας ὧν ἠμέλησας [φιλοσοφίας]· τρέμεις, ἀγρυπνεῖς, μετὰ πάντων βουλεύῃ· κἂν μὴ πᾶσιν ἀρέσκειν μέλλῃ τὰ βουλεύματα, κακῶς οἴει βεβουλεῦσθαι.

[¶81] that when you have undressed yourself in the bathing-room, and stretched yourself out, like a man crucified, you may be rubbed here and there; and the attendant may stand by, and say, “Come this way; give your side;

> Greek: εἶτα φοβῇ λιμόν, ὡς δοκεῖς. σὺ δʼ οὐ λιμὸν φοβῇ, ἀλλὰ δέδοικας μὴ οὐ σχῇς μάγειρον, μὴ οὐ σχῇς ἄλλον ὀψωνητήν, ἄλλον τὸν ὑποδήσοντα, ἄλλον τὸν ἐνδύσοντα, ἄλλους τοὺς τρίψοντας, ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκολουθήσοντας,

[¶82] take hold of his head; turn your shoulder;” and that when you are returned home from the bath you may cry out, “Does nobody bring anything to eat?” and then, “Take away; wipe the table.” This is your dread, that you will not be able to lead the life of a sick man. But learn the life of those in health,—how slaves live, how laborers, how those who are genuine philosophers; how Socrates lived, even with a wife and children; how Diogenes; how Cleanthes, at once studying and drawing water [for his livelihood]. If these are the things you would have, you can possess them everywhere, and with a fearless confidence. “In what?” In the only thing that can be confided in;

> Greek: ἵνʼ ἐν τῷ βαλανείῳ ἐκδυσάμενος καὶ ἐκτείνας σεαυτὸν ὡς οἱ ἐσταυρωμένοι τρίβῃ ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν, εἶθʼ ὁ ἀλείπτης ἐπιστὰς λέγῃ μετάβηθι, δὸς πλευρόν, κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ λάβε, παράθες τὸν ὦμον, εἶτʼ ἐλθὼν ἐκ τοῦ βαλανείου εἰς οἶκον κραυγάσῃς οὐδεὶς φέρει φαγεῖν;, εἶτʼ ἆρον τὰς τραπέζας, σπόγγισον. τοῦτο φοβῇ, μὴ οὐ δύνῃ ζῆν ἀρρώστου βίον, ἐπεί τοι τὸν τῶν ὑγιαινόντων μάθε, πῶς οἱ δοῦλοι ζῶσιν, πῶς οἱ ἐργάται, πῶς οἱ γνησίως φιλοσοφοῦντες, πῶς Σωκράτης ἔζησεν, ἐκεῖνος μὲν καὶ μετὰ γυναικὸς καὶ παίδων, πῶς Διογένης, πῶς Κλεάνθης ἅμα σχολάζων καὶ ἀντλῶν.

[¶83] in what is sure, incapable of being restrained or taken away,—your own will. But why have you contrived to make yourself so useless and good for nothing that nobody will receive you into his house, nobody take care of you;

> Greek: ταῦτα ἂν θέλῃς ἔχειν, ἕξεις πανταχοῦ καὶ ζήσεις θαρρῶν. τίνι; ᾧ μόνῳ θαρρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τῷ πιστῷ, τῷ ἀκωλύτῳ, τῷ ἀναφαιρέτῳ, τοῦτʼ ἔστι τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ σεαυτοῦ.

[¶84] but although, if any sound, useful vessel be thrown out of doors, whoever finds it will take it up and prize it as something gained, yet nobody will take you up, but everybody esteem you a loss. What, cannot you so much as perform the office of a dog or a cock?

> Greek: διὰ τί δʼ οὕτως ἄχρηστον καὶ ἀνωφελῆ σαυτὸν παρεσκεύακας, ἵνα μηδείς σε εἰς οἰκίαν θέλῃ δέξασθαι, μηδεὶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι; ἀλλὰ σκεῦος μὲν ὁλόκληρον καὶ χρήσιμον ἔξω ἐρριμμένον πᾶς τις εὑρὼν ἀναιρήσεται καὶ κέρδος ἡγήσεται, σὲ δʼ οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ πᾶς ζημίαν.

[¶85] Why, then, do you wish to live any longer if you are so worthless? Does any good man fear that food should fail him?

> Greek: οὕτως οὐδὲ κυνὸς δύνασαι χρείαν παρασχεῖν οὐδʼ ἀλεκτρυόνος. τί οὖν ἔτι ζῆν θέλεις τοιοῦτος ὤν;

[¶86] It does not fail the blind; it does not fail the lame. Shall it fail a good man? A paymaster is always to be found for a soldier, or a laborer, or a shoemaker, and shall one be wanting to a good man?

> Greek: φοβεῖταί τις ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, μὴ λείπωσιν αὐτῷ τροφαί; τοῖς τυφλοῖς οὐ λείπουσι, τοῖς χωλοῖς οὐ λείπουσι· λείψουσιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ; καὶ στρατιώτῃ μὲν ἀγαθῷ οὐ λείπει ὁ μισθοδοτῶν οὐδʼ ἐργάτῃ οὐδὲ σκυτεῖ· τῷ δʼ ἀγαθῷ λείψει;

[¶87] Is God so negligent of his own institutions, of his servants, of his witnesses, whom alone he uses for examples to the uninstructed, to show that he exists, and that he administers the universe rightly, and doth not neglect human affairs, and that no evil can happen to a good man, either living or dead? What, then, is the case, when he doth not bestow food?

> Greek: οὕτως ὁ θεὸς ἀμελεῖ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἐπιτευγμάτων, τῶν διακόνων, τῶν μαρτύρων, οἷς μόνοις χρῆται παραδείγμασιν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους, ὅτι καὶ ἔστι καὶ καλῶς διοικεῖ τὰ ὅλα καὶ οὐκ ἀμελεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων καὶ ὅτι ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ οὐδέν ἐστι κακὸν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτʼ ἀποθανόντι;

[¶88] What else than that, like a good general, he hath made me a signal of retreat? I obey, I follow, speaking well of my leader, praising his works. For I came when it seemed good to him;

> Greek: — τί οὖν, ὅταν μὴ παρέχῃ τροφάς; — τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ ὡς ἀγαθὸς στρατηγὸς τὸ ἀνακλητικόν μοι σεσήμαγκεν; πείθομαι, ἀκολουθῶ, ἐπευφημῶν τὸν ἡγεμόνα, ὑμνῶν αὐτοῦ τὰ ἔργα.

[¶89] and, again, when it seems good to him, I depart; and in life it was my business to praise God within myself and to every auditor, and to the world. Doth he grant me but few things? Doth he refuse me affluence?

> Greek: καὶ γὰρ ἦλθον, ὅτʼ ἐκείνῳ ἔδοξεν, καὶ ἄπειμι πάλιν ἐκείνῳ δοκοῦν καὶ ζῶντός μου τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ἦν, ὑμνεῖν τὸν θεὸν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπʼ ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς.

[¶90] It is not his pleasure that I should live luxuriously; for he did not grant that even to Hercules, his own son; but another reigned over Argos and Mycene, while he obeyed, labored, and strove.

> Greek: οὐ παρέχει μοι πολλά, οὐκ ἄφθονα, τρυφᾶν με οὐ θέλει οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ παρεῖχεν, τῷ υἱεῖ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλʼ ἄλλος ἐβασίλευεν Ἄργους καὶ Μυκηνῶν, ὁ δʼ ἐπετάσσετο καὶ ἐπόνει καὶ ἐγυμνάζετο.

[¶91] And Eurystheus was just what he was,—neither truly king of Argos, nor of Mycene; not being indeed king over himself. But Hercules was ruler and governor of the whole earth and seas; the expeller of lawlessness and injustice; the introducer of justice and sanctity. And this he effected naked and alone.

> Greek: καὶ ἦν Εὐρυσθεὺς μέν, ὃς ἦν, οὔτε Ἄργους οὔτε Μυκηνῶν βασιλεύς, ὅς γʼ οὐδʼ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ, ὁ δʼ Ἡρακλῆς ἁπάσης γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἄρχων καὶ ἡγεμὼν ἦν, καθαρτὴς ἀδικίας καὶ ἀνομίας, εἰσαγωγεὺς δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ὁσιότητος· καὶ ταῦτα ἐποίει καὶ γυμνὸς καὶ μόνος.

[¶92] Again, when Ulysses was shipwrecked and cast away, did his helpless condition at all deject him? Did it break his spirit? No; but how did he go to Nausicaa and her attendants, to ask those necessaries which it seems most shameful to beg from another?
As some lion, bred in the mountains, confiding in strength.

> Greek: ὁ δʼ Ὀδυσσεὺς ὅτε ναυαγὸς ἐξερρίφη, μή τι ἐταπείνωσεν αὐτὸν ἡ ἀπορία, μή τι ἐπέκλασεν; ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀπῄει πρὸς τὰς παρθένους αἰτήσων τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, ὧν αἴσχιστον εἶναι δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι παρʼ ἄλλου; ὥς τε λέων ὀρεσίτροφος. τίνι πεποιθώς;

[¶93] H. Confiding in what? Not in glory, or in riches, or in dominion, but in his own strength; that is, in his knowledge of what is within him and without him.

> Greek: οὐ δόξῃ οὐδὲ χρήμασιν οὐδʼ ἀρχαῖς, ἀλλʼ ἀλκῇ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, τοῦτʼ ἔστι δόγμασι περὶ τῶν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν.

[¶94] For this alone is what can render us free and incapable of restraint; can raise the heads of the humble, and make them look with unaverted eyes full in the face of the rich and of the tyrants; and this is what philosophy bestows.

> Greek: ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι μόνα τὰ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ποιοῦντα, τὰ τοὺς ἀκωλύτους, τὰ τὸν τράχηλον ἐπαίροντα τῶν τεταπεινομένων, τὰ ἀντιβλέπειν ποιοῦντα ὀρθοῖς τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους, πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους.

[¶95] But you will not even set forth with confidence; but all trembling about such trifles as clothes and plate. Foolish man! have you thus. wasted your time till now? “But what if I should be ill?”

> Greek: καὶ τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου δῶρον τοῦτο ἦν, σὺ δʼ οὐκ ἐξελεύσῃ θαρρῶν, ἀλλὰ περιτρέμων τοῖς ἱματιδίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀργυρωματίοις; δύστηνε, οὕτως ἀπώλεσας τὸν μέχρι νῦν χρόνον;

[¶96] It will then be for the best that you should be ill. “Who will take care of me?” God and your friends. “I shall lie in a hard bed.” But like a man. “I shall not have a convenient room.” Then you will be ill in an inconvenient one. “Who will provide food for me?” They who provide for others too; you will be ill like Manes.

> Greek: τί οὖν, ἂν νοσήσω;— νοσήσεις καλῶς. — τίς με θεραπεύσει; — ὁ θεός, οἱ φίλοι. — σκληρῶς κατακείσομαι. — ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀνήρ. — οἴκημα ἐπιτήδειον οὐχ ἕξω. — ἐν ἐπιτηδείῳ οὐ νοσήσεις; — τίς μοι ποιήσει τὰ τροφεῖα; — οἱ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιοῦντες· ὡς Μάνης νοσήσεις. — τί δὲ καὶ τὸ πέρας τῆς νόσου;

[¶97] “But what will be the conclusion of my illness,—any other than death?” Why, do you not know, then, that the origin of all human evils, and of baseness and cowardice, is not death, but rather the fear of death?

> Greek: — ἄλλο τι ἢ θάνατος; ἆρʼ οὖν ἐνθυμῇ, ὅτι κεφάλαιον τοῦτο πάντων τῶν κακῶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἀγεννείας καὶ δειλίας οὐ θάνατός ἐστιν, μᾶλλον δʼ ὁ τοῦ θανάτου φόβος;

[¶98] Fortify yourself, therefore, against this. Hither let all your discourses, readings, exercises, tend. And then you will know that thus alone are men made free.

> Greek: ἐπὶ τοῦτον οὖν μοι γυμνάζου, ἐνταῦθα νευέτωσαν οἱ λόγοι πάντες, τὰ ἀσκήματα, τὰ ἀναγνώσματα, καὶ εἴσῃ, ὅτι οὕτως μόνως ἐλευθεροῦνται ἄνθρωποι.

## 19. Book IV · chapter 1

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/19/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/19/#p-N

[¶0] 1. He is free who lives as he likes; who is not subject to compulsion, to restraint, or to violence; whose pursuits are unhindered, his desires successful, his aversions unincurred.

> Greek: 1. ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν ὁ ζῶν ὡς βούλεται, ὃν οὔτʼ ἀναγκάσαι ἔστιν οὔτε κωλῦσαι οὔτε βιάσασθαι, οὗ αἱ ὁρμαὶ ἀνεμπόδιστοι, αἱ ὀρέξεις ἐπιτευκτικαί, αἱ ἐκκλίσεις ἀπερίπτωτοι.

[¶1] Who, then, would wish to lead a wrong course of life? “No one.” Who would live deceived, erring, unjust, dissolute, discontented, dejected? “No one.” No wicked man, then, lives as he likes;

> Greek: τίς οὖν θέλει ζῆν ἁμαρτάνων; — οὐδείς. — τίς θέλει ζῆν ἐξαπατώμενος, προπίπτων, ἄδικος ὤν, ἀκόλαστος, μεμψίμοιρος, ταπεινός;

[¶2] therefore no such man is free. And who would live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, with disappointed desires and unavailing aversions?

> Greek: — οὐδείς. — οὐδεὶς ἄρα τῶν φαύλων ζῇ ὡς βούλεται· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδʼ ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν.

[¶3] “No one.” Do we then find any of the wicked exempt from these evils? “Not one.”

> Greek: τίς δὲ θέλει λυπούμενος ζῆν, φοβούμενος, φθονῶν, ἐλεῶν, ὀρεγόμενος καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων, ἐκκλίνων καὶ περιπίπτων;

[¶4] Consequently, then, they are not free. If some person who has been twice consul should hear this, he will forgive you, provided you add, “but you are wise, and this has no reference to you.”

> Greek: — οὐδὲ εἷς. — ἔχομεν οὖν τινα τῶν φαύλων ἄλυπον, ἄφοβον, ἀπερίπτωτον, ἀναπότευκτον; — οὐδένα. — οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερον.

[¶5] But if you tell him the truth, that, in point of slavery, he does not necessarily differ from those who have been thrice sold, what but chastisement can you expect?

> Greek: ταῦτα ἄν τις ἀκούσῃ δισύπατος, ἂν μὲν προσθῇς ὅτι ἀλλὰ σύ γε σοφὸς εἶ, οὐδὲν πρὸς σὲ ταῦτα, συγγνώσεταί σοι.

[¶6] “For how,” he says, “am I a slave? My father was free, my mother free.

> Greek: ἂν δʼ αὐτῷ τὰς ἀληθείας εἴπῃς ὅτι τῶν τρὶς πεπραμένων οὐδὲν διαφέρεις πρὸς τὸ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς δοῦλος εἶναι, τί ἄλλο ἢ πληγάς σε δεῖ προσδοκᾶν;

[¶7] Besides, I am a senator, too, and the friend of Caesar, and have been twice consul, and have myself many slaves.” In the first place, most worthy sir, perhaps your father too was a slave of the same kind; and your mother, and your grandfather, and all your series of ancestors.

> Greek: πῶς γάρ, φησίν, ἐγὼ δοῦλός εἰμι; ὁ πατὴρ ἐλεύθερος, ἡ μήτηρ ἐλευθέρα, οὗ ὠνὴν οὐδεὶς ἔχει· ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκλητικός εἰμι καὶ Καίσαρος φίλος καὶ ὑπάτευκα καὶ δούλους πολλοὺς ἔχω.

[¶8] But even were they ever so free, what is that to you? For what if they were of a generous, you of a mean spirit; they brave, and you a coward; they sober, and you dissolute?

> Greek: πρῶτον μέν, ὦ βέλτιστε συγκλητικέ, τάχα σου καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τὴν αὐτὴν δουλείαν δοῦλος ἦν καὶ ἡ μήτηρ καὶ ὁ πάππος καὶ ἐφεξῆς πάντες οἱ πρόγονοι.

[¶9] “But what,” he says, “has this to do with my being a slave?” Is it no part of slavery to act against your will, under compulsion, and lamenting? “Be it so. But who can compel me but the master of all, Caesar?”

> Greek: εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἦσαν ἐλεύθεροι, τί τοῦτο πρὸς σέ; τί γάρ, εἰ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γενναῖοι ἦσαν, σὺ δʼ ἀγεννής; ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἄφοβοι, σὺ δὲ δειλός; ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἐγκρατεῖς, σὺ δʼ ἀκόλαστος;

[¶10] By your own confession, then, you have one master; and let not his being, as you say, master of all, give you any comfort; for then you are merely a slave in a large family.

> Greek: καὶ τί, φησί, τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ δοῦλον εἶναι;— οὐδέν σοι φαίνεται εἶναι τὸ ἄκοντά τι ποιεῖν, τὸ ἀναγκαζόμενον, τὸ στένοντα πρὸς τὸ δοῦλον εἶναι;

[¶11] Thus the Nicopolitans, too, frequently cry out, “By the genius of Caesar we are free!”

> Greek: — τοῦτο μὲν ἔστω, φησίν. ἀλλὰ τίς με δύναται ἀναγκάσαι, εἰ μὴ ὁ πάντων κύριος Καῖσαρ;

[¶12] For the present, however, if you please, we will let Caesar alone. But tell me this. Have you never been in love with any one, either of a servile or liberal condition? “Why, what has that to do with being slave or free?”

> Greek: — οὐκοῦν ἕνα μὲν δεσπότην σαυτοῦ καὶ σὺ αὐτὸς ὡμολόγησας. ὅτι δὲ πάντων, ὡς λέγεις, κοινός ἐστιν, μηδέν σε τοῦτο παραμυθείσθω, ἀλλὰ γίγνωσκε, ὅτι ἐκ μεγάλης οἰκίας δοῦλος εἶ.

[¶13] Were you never commanded anything by your mistress that you did not choose? Have you never flattered your fair slave?

> Greek: οὕτως καὶ Νικοπολῖται ἐπιβοᾶν εἰώθασι νὴ τὴν Καίσαρος τύχην, ἐλεύθεροί ἐσμεν.

[¶14] Have you never kissed her feet? And yet if you were commanded to kiss Caesar’s feet, you would think it an outrage and an excess of tyranny. What else is this than slavery?

> Greek: ὅμως δʼ, ἐάν σοι δοκῇ, τὸν μὲν Καίσαρα πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀφῶμεν, ἐκεῖνο δέ μοι εἰπέ· οὐδέποτʼ ἠράσθης τινός; οὐ παιδισκαρίου, οὐ παιδαρίου, οὐ δούλου, οὐκ ἐλευθέρου;

[¶15] Have you never gone out by night where you did not desire? Have you never spent more than you chose?

> Greek: — τί οὖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ δοῦλον εἶναι ἢ ἐλεύθερον;

[¶16] Have you not sometimes uttered your words with sighs and groans? Have you never borne to be reviled and shut out of doors? But if you are ashamed to confess your own follies, see what Thrasonides says and does;

> Greek: — οὐδέποθʼ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐρωμένης ἐπετάγης οὐδὲν ὧν οὐκ ἤθελες; οὐδέποτέ σου τὸ δουλάριον ἐκολάκευσας; οὐδέποτʼ αὐτοῦ τοὺς πόδας κατεφίλησας; καίτοι τοῦ Καίσαρος ἄν σέ τις ἀναγκάσῃ, ὕβριν αὐτὸ ἡγῇ καὶ ὑπερβολὴν τυραννίδος.

[¶17] who, after having fought more battles perhaps than you, went out by night, when [his slaves Geta would not dare to go; nay, had he been compelled to do it, would have gone bewailing and lamenting the bitterness of servitude. And what says he afterwards?

> Greek: τί οὖν ἄλλο ἐστὶ δουλεία; νυκτὸς οὐδέποτʼ ἀπῆλθες, ὅπου οὐκ ἤθελες; ἀνάλωσας, ὅσα οὐκ ἤθελες; εἶπάς τινα οἰμώζων καὶ στένων, ἠνέσχου λοιδορούμενος, ἀποκλειόμενος;

[¶18] “contemptible girl has enslaved me, whom no enemy ever enslaved.” Wretch! to be the slave of a girl and a contemptible girl too! Why, then, do you still call yourself free? Why do you boast your military expeditions? Then he calls for a sword, and is angry with the person who, out of kindness, denies it; and sends presents to her who hates him;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ εἰ σὺ αἰσχύνῃ τὰ σαυτοῦ ὁμολογεῖν, ὅρα ἃ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ὁ Θρασωνίδης, ὃς τοσαῦτα στρατευσάμενος, ὅσα τάχα οὐδὲ σύ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐξελήλυθε νυκτός, ὅτε ὁ Γέτας οὐ τολμᾷ ἐξελθεῖν, ἀλλʼ εἰ προσηναγκάζετο ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, πόλλʼ ἂν ἐπικραυγάσας καὶ τὴν πικρὰν δουλείαν ἀπολοφυράμενος ἐξῆλθεν.

[¶19] and begs, and weeps, and then again is elated on every little success. But what elation? Is he raised above desire or fear?

> Greek: εἶτα, τί λέγει; παιδισκάριόν με, φησίν, καταδεδούλωκʼ εὐτελές, ὃν οὐδὲ εἷς τῶν πολεμίων οὐπώποτε.

[¶20] Consider what is our idea of freedom in animals. Some keep tame lions, and feed them and even lead them about; and who will say that any such lion is free?

> Greek: τάλας, ὅς γε καὶ παιδισκαρίου δοῦλος εἶ καὶ παιδισκαρίου εὐτελοῦς. τί οὖν ἔτι σαυτὸν ἐλεύθερον λέγεις; τί δὲ προφέρεις σου τὰς στρατείας;

[¶21] Nay, does he not live the more slavishly the more he lives at ease? And who that had sense and reason would wish to be one of those lions? Again, how much will caged birds suffer in trying to escape?

> Greek: εἶτα ξίφος αἰτεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ὑπʼ εὐνοίας μὴ διδόντα χαλεπαίνει[ν] καὶ δῶρα τῇ μισούσῃ πέμπει καὶ δεῖται καὶ κλαίει, πάλιν δὲ μικρὰ εὐημερήσας ἐπαίρεται· πλὴν καὶ τότε πῶς;

[¶22] Nay, some of them starve themselves rather than undergo such a life;

> Greek: μηδʼ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ φοβεῖσθαι οὔτʼ ἐλευθερίαν.

[¶23] others are saved only with difficulty and in a pining condition;

> Greek: σκέψαι δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων, πῶς χρώμεθα τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

[¶24] and the moment they find any opening, out they go. Such a desire have they for their natural freedom, and to be at their own disposal, and unrestrained. “And what harm can this confinement do you?” “What say you? I was born to fly where I please, to live in the open air, to sing when I please. You deprive me of all this, and then ask what harm I suffer?”

> Greek: λέοντας τρέφουσιν ἡμέρους ἐγκλείσαντες καὶ σιτίζουσι καὶ κομίζουσιν ἔνιοι μεθʼ αὑτῶν. καὶ τίς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον τὸν λέοντα ἐλεύθερον; οὐχὶ δʼ ὅσῳ μαλακώτερον διεξάγει, τοσούτῳ δουλικώτερον; τίς δʼ ἂν λέων αἴσθησιν καὶ λογισμὸν λαβὼν βούλοιτο τούτων τις εἶναι τῶν λεόντων;

[¶25] Hence we will allow those only to be free who will not endure captivity, but, so soon as they are taken, die and so escape. Thus Diogenes somewhere says that the only way to freedom is to die with ease.

> Greek: ἄγε, τὰ δὲ πτηνὰ ταῦτα ὅταν ληφθῇ καὶ ἐγκεκλειμένα τρέφηται, οἷα πάσχει ζητοῦντα ἐκφυγεῖν; καὶ ἔνιά γε αὐτῶν λιμῷ διαφθείρεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπομένει τὴν τοιαύτην διεξαγωγήν,

[¶26] And he writes to the Persian king, “You can no more enslave the Athenians than you can fish.” “How? Can I not get possession of them?” “If you do,” said he, “they will leave you, and be gone like fish. For catch a fish, and it dies.

> Greek: ὅσα δʼ οὖν διασῴζεται, μόγις καὶ χαλεπῶς καὶ φθίνοντα, κἂν ὅλως εὕρῃ τι παρεῳγμένον, ἐξεπήδησεν. οὕτως ὀρέγεται τῆς φυσικῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ τοῦ αὐτόνομα καὶ ἀκώλυτα εἶναι.

[¶27] And if the Athenians, too, die as soon as you have caught them, of what use are your warlike preparations?” This is the voice of a free man who had examined the matter in earnest, and, as it might be expected, found it all out.

> Greek: καὶ τί σοι κακόν ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα; οἷα λέγεις; πέτεσθαι πέφυκα ὅπου θέλω, ὕπαιθρον διάγειν, ᾁδειν ὅταν θέλω· σύ με πάντων τούτων ἀφαιρῇ καὶ λέγεις τί σοι κακόν ἐστιν;

[¶28] But if you seek it where it is not, what wonder if you never find it? A slave wishes to be immediately set free.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνα μόνα ἐροῦμεν ἐλεύθερα, ὅσα τὴν ἅλωσιν οὐ φέρει, ἀλλʼ ἅμα τε ἑάλω καὶ ἀποθανόντα διέφυγεν.

[¶29] Think you it is because he is desirous to pay his fee [of manumission] to the officer? No, but because he fancies that, for want of acquiring his freedom, he has hitherto lived under restraint and unprosperously.

> Greek: οὕτως καὶ Διογένης που λέγει μίαν εἶναι μηχανὴν πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν τὸ εὐκόλως ἀποθνῄσκειν, καὶ τῷ Περσῶν βασιλεῖ γράφει ὅτι τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν καταδουλώσασθαι οὐ δύνασαι· οὐ μᾶλλον, φησίν, ἢ τοὺς ἰχθύας.

[¶30] “If I am once set free,” he says, “it is all prosperity; I care for no one; I can speak to all as being their equal and on a level with them. I go where I will, I come when and how I will.” He is at last made free, and presently having nowhere to eat he seeks whom he may flatter, with whom he may sup.

> Greek: πῶς; οὐ γὰρ λήψομαι αὐτούς; ἂν λάβῃς, φησίν, εὐθὺς ἀπολιπόντες σε οἰχήσονται, καθάπερ οἱ ἰχθύες. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων ὃν ἂν λάβῃς, ἀπέθανεν· καὶ οὗτοι ληφθέντες ἐὰν ἀποθνῄσκωσιν, τί σοί ἐστι τῆς παρασκευῆς ὄφελος;

[¶31] He then either submits to the basest and most infamous degradation, and if he can obtain admission to some great man’s table, falls into a slavery much worse than the former;

> Greek: τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἐλευθέρου ἀνδρὸς φωνὴ σπουδῇ ἐξητακότος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ὥσπερ εἰκὸς εὑρηκότος. ἂν δʼ ἀλλαχοῦ ζητῇς ἢ ὅπου ἐστίν, τί θαυμαστόν, εἰ οὐδέποτε αὐτὸ εὑρίσκεις;

[¶32] or perhaps, if the ignorant fellow should grow rich, he doats upon some girl, laments, and is unhappy, and wishes for slavery again. “For what harm did it do me? Another clothed me, another shod me, another fed me, another took care of me when I was sick.

> Greek: ὁ δοῦλος εὐθὺς εὔχεται ἀφεθῆναι ἐλεύθερος. διὰ τί; δοκεῖτε, ὅτι τοῖς εἰκοστώναις ἐπιθυμεῖ δοῦναι ἀργύριον; οὔ· ἀλλʼ ὅτι φαντάζεται μέχρι νῦν διὰ τὸ μὴ τετυχηκέναι τούτου ἐμποδίζεσθαι καὶ δυσροεῖν.

[¶33] It was but in a few things, by way of return, I used to serve him. But now, miserable wretch! what do I suffer, in being a slave to many, instead of one!

> Greek: ἂν ἀφεθῶ, φησίν, εὐθὺς πᾶσα εὔροια, οὐδενὸς ἐπιστρέφομαι, πᾶσιν ὡς ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος λαλῶ, πορεύομαι ὅπου θέλω, ἔρχομαι ὅθεν θέλω καὶ ὅπου θέλω.

[¶34] Yet, if I can be promoted to equestrian rank, I shall live in the utmost prosperity and happiness.” In order to obtain this, he first deservedly suffers; and as soon as he has obtained it, it is all the same again. “But then,” he says, “if I do but get a military command, I shall be delivered from all my troubles.”

> Greek: εἶτα ἀπηλευθέρωται καὶ εὐθὺς μὲν οὐκ ἔχων, ποῖ φάγῃ, ζητεῖ, τίνα κολακεύσῃ, παρὰ τίνι δειπνήσῃ· εἶτα ἢ ἐργάζεται τῷ σώματι καὶ πάσχει τὰ δεινότατα κἂν σχῇ τινα φάτνην, ἐμπέπτωκεν εἰς δουλείαν πολὺ τῆς προτέρας χαλεπω

[¶35] He gets a military command. He suffers as much as the vilest rogue of a slave; and, nevertheless, he asks for a second command and a third;

> Greek: τέραν ἢ καὶ εὐπορήσας ἄνθρωπος ἀπειρόκαλος πεφίληκε παιδισκάριον καὶ δυστυχῶν ἀνακλαίεται καὶ τὴν δουλείαν ποθεῖ.

[¶36] and when he has put the finishing touch, and is made a senator, then he is a slave indeed. When he comes into the public assembly, it is then that he undergoes his finest and most splendid slavery.

> Greek: τί γάρ μοι κακὸν ἦν; ἄλλος μʼ ἐνέδυεν, ἄλλος μʼ ὑπέδει, ἄλλος ἔτρεφεν, ἄλλος ἐνοσοκόμει, ὀλίγα αὐτῷ ὑπηρέτουν. νῦν δὲ τάλας οἷα πάσχω πλείοσι δουλεύων ἀνθʼ ἑνός;

[¶37] [It is needful] not to be foolish, but to learn what Socrates taught, the nature of things; and not rashly to apply general principles to particulars.

> Greek: ὅμως δʼ ἐὰν δακτυλίους, φησίν, λάβω, τότε γʼ εὐρούστατα διάξω καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατα. πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα λάβῃ, πάσχει ὧν ἐστιν ἄξιος· εἶτα λαβὼν πάλιν ταὐτά.

[¶38] For the cause of all human evils is the not being able to apply general principles to special cases. But different people have different grounds of complaint; one, for instance, that he is sick.

> Greek: εἶτά φησιν ἂν μὲν στρατεύσωμαι, ἀπηλλάγην πάντων τῶν κακῶν. στρατεύεται, πάσχει ὅσα μαστιγίας καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον δευτέραν αἰτεῖ στρατείαν καὶ τρίτην.

[¶39] That is not the trouble; it is in his principles. Another, that he is poor; another, that he has a harsh father and mother; another, that he is not in the good graces of Caesar.

> Greek: εἶθʼ ὅταν αὐτὸν τὸν κολοφῶνα ἐπιθῇ καὶ γένηται συγκλητικός, τότε γίνεται δοῦλος εἰς σύλλογον ἐρχόμενος, τότε τὴν καλλίστην καὶ λιπαρωτάτην δουλείαν δουλεύει.

[¶40] This is nothing else but not understanding how to apply our principles. For who has not an idea of evil, that it is hurtful; that it is to be avoided; that it is by all means to be prudently guarded against?

> Greek: ἵνα μὴ μωρὸς ᾖ, ἀλλʼ ἵνα μάθῃ, ἃ ἔλεγεν ὁ Σωκράτης, τί ἐστι τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον, καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ τὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζῃ ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις.

[¶41] One principle does not contradict another, except when it comes to be applied. What, then, is this evil,—-thus hurtful and to be avoided?

> Greek: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντων τῶν κακῶν, τὸ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς μὴ δύνασθαι ἐφαρμόζειν. τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους.

[¶42] “Not to be the friend of Caesar,” says some one. He is gone; he has failed in applying his principles; he is embarrassed; he seeks what is nothing to the purpose. For if he comes to be Caesar’s friend, he is still no nearer to what he sought. For what is it that every man seeks?

> Greek: ἡμεῖς δʼ ἄλλοι ἄλλο οἰόμεθα. ὁ μὲν ὅτι νοσεῖ. οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλʼ ὅτι τὰς προλήψεις οὐκ ἐφαρμόζει. ὁ δʼ ὅτι πτωχός ἐστιν, ὁ δʼ ὅτι πατέρα χαλεπὸν ἔχει ἢ μητέρα, τῷ δʼ ὅτι ὁ Καῖσαρ οὐχ ἵλεώς ἐστιν. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ μόνον τὸ τὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν μὴ εἰδέναι.

[¶43] To be secure, to be happy, to do what he pleases without restraint and without compulsion. When he becomes the friend of Caesar, then does he cease to be restrained; to be compelled? Is he secure? Is he happy? Whom shall we ask?

> Greek: ἐπεὶ τίς οὐκ ἔχει κακοῦ πρόληψιν, ὅτι βλαβερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι φευκτόν ἐστιν, ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀποικονόμητόν ἐστιν; πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἔλθῃ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐφαρμόζειν.

[¶44] Whom can we better credit than this very man who has been his friend? Come forth and tell us whether you sleep more quietly now than before you were the friend of Caesar. You presently hear him cry, “Leave off, for Heaven’s sake! and do not insult me. You know not the miseries I suffer; there is no sleep for me;

> Greek: τί οὖν τὸ κακόν ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ βλαβερὸν καὶ φευκτόν; λέγει τὸ Καίσαρος μὴ εἶναι φίλον· ἀπῆλθεν, ἀπέ[σ]πεσεν τῆς ἐφαρμογῆς, θλίβεται, ζητεῖ τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον· ὅτι τυχὼν τοῦ φίλος εἶναι Καίσαρος οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῦ ζητουμένου οὐ τέτευχεν.

[¶45] but one comes and says that Caesar is already awake; another, that he is just going out. Then follow perturbations, then cares.” Well, and when did you use to sup the more pleasantly,—formerly, or now? Hear what he says about this too. When he is not invited, he is distracted; and if he is, he sups like a slave with his master, solicitous all the while not to say or do anything foolish.

> Greek: τί γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ ζητεῖ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος; εὐσταθῆσαι, εὐδαιμονῆσαι, πάντα ὡς θέλει ποιεῖν, μὴ κωλύεσθαι, μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι. ὅταν οὖν γένηται Καίσαρος φίλος, πέπαυται κωλυόμενος, πέπαυται ἀναγκαζόμενος, εὐσταθεῖ, εὐροεῖ; τίνος πυθώμεθα; τίνα ἔχομεν ἀξιοπιστότερον ἢ αὐτὸν τοῦτον τὸν γεγονότα φίλον;

[¶46] And what think you? Is he afraid of being whipped like a slave? No such easy penalty. No; but rather, as becomes so great a man, Caesar’s friend, of losing his head. And when did you bathe the more quietly; when did you perform your exercises the more at your leisure; in short, which life would you rather wish to live,—your present, or the former?

> Greek: ἐλθὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, πότε ἀταραχώτερον ἐκάθευδες, νῦν ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι φίλος τοῦ Καίσαρος; εὐθὺς ἀκούεις ὅτι παῦσαι, τοὺς θεούς σοι, ἐμπαίζων μου τῇ τύχῃ· οὐκ οἶδας, οἷα πάσχω τάλας· οὐδʼ ὕπνος ἐπέρχεταί μοι, ἀλλʼ ἄλλος ἐλθὼν λέγει, ὅτι ἤδη ἐγρηγορεῖ, ἤδη πρόεισιν· εἶτα ταραχαί, εἶτα φροντίδες.

[¶47] I could swear there is no one so stupid and insensible as not to deplore his miseries, in proportion as he is the more the friend of Caesar. Since, then, neither they who are called kings nor the friends of kings live as they like, who, then, after all, is free? Seek, and you will find; for you are furnished by nature with means for discovering the truth. But if you are not able by these alone to find the consequence, hear them who have sought it. What do they say?

> Greek: ἄγε, ἐδείπνεις δὲ πότε εὐαρεστότερον, νῦν ἢ πρότερον; ἄκουσον αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τούτων τί λέγει· ὅτι, ἂν μὲν μὴ κληθῇ, ὀδυνᾶται, ἂν δὲ κληθῇ, ὡς δοῦλος παρὰ κυρίῳ δειπνεῖ μεταξὺ προσέχων, μή τι μωρὸν εἴπῃ ἢ ποιήσῃ. καὶ τί δοκεῖς φοβεῖται; μὴ μαστιγωθῇ ὡς δοῦλος; πόθεν αὐτῷ οὕτως καλῶς; ἀλλʼ ὡς πρέπει τηλικοῦτον ἄνδρα, Καίσαρος φίλον, μὴ ἀπολέσῃ τὸν τράχηλον.

[¶48] Do you think freedom a good? “The greatest.” Can any one, then, who attains the greatest good be unhappy or unsuccessful in his affairs? “No.”

> Greek: ἐλούου δὲ πότʼ ἀταραχώτερον; ἐγυμνάζου δὲ πότε σχολαίτερον; τὸ σύνολον ποῖον μᾶλλον ἤθελες βίον βιοῦν, τὸν νῦν ἢ τὸν τότε;

[¶49] As many, therefore, as you see unhappy, lamenting, unprosperous,—confidently pronounce them not free. “I do.”

> Greek: ὀμόσαι δύναμαι, ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἐστὶν ἀναίσθητος ἢ ἀναλήθης, μὴ ἀποδύρασθαι τὰς αὑτοῦ συμφοράς, ὅσῳ ἂν ᾖ φίλτερος.

[¶50] Henceforth, then, we have done with buying and selling, and such like stated conditions of becoming slaves. For if these concessions hold, then, whether the unhappy man be a great or a little king,—of consular or bi-consular dignity,—he is not free. “Agreed.” Further, then, answer me this: do you think freedom to be something great and noble and valuable? “How should I not?”

> Greek: ὅταν οὖν μήτε οἱ βασιλεῖς λεγόμενοι ζῶσιν ὡς θέλουσι μήθʼ οἱ φίλοι τῶν βασιλέων, τίνες ἔτι εἰσὶν ἐλεύθεροι; — ζήτει καὶ εὑρήσεις. ἔχεις γὰρ ἀφορμὰς παρὰ τῆς φύσεως πρὸς εὕρεσιν τῆς ἀληθείας. εἰ δʼ αὐτὸς οὐχ οἷός τε εἶ κατὰ ταύτας ψιλὰς πορευόμενος εὑρεῖν τὸ ἑξῆς, ἄκουσον παρὰ τῶν ἐζητηκότων.

[¶51] Is it possible, then, that he who acquires anything so great and valuable and noble should be of an abject spirit? “It is not.” Whenever, then, you see any one subject to another, and flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently say that he too is not free; and not only when he does this for a supper, but even if it be for a government, nay, a consulship.

> Greek: τί λέγουσιν; ἀγαθόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ἐλευθερία; — τὸ μέγιστον. — δύναται οὖν τις τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ τυγχάνων κακοδαιμονεῖν ἢ κακῶς πράσσειν; — οὔ. — ὅσους οὖν ἂν ἴδῃς κακοδαιμονοῦντας, δυσροοῦντας, πενθοῦντας, ἀποφαίνου θαρρῶν μὴ εἶναι ἐλευθέρους. — ἀποφαίνομαι.

[¶52] Call those indeed little slaves who act thus for the sake of little things; and call the others, as they deserve, great slaves. “Be this, too, agreed.” Well, do you think freedom to be something independent and self-determined? “How can it be otherwise?”

> Greek: — οὐκοῦν ἀπὸ μὲν ὠνῆς καὶ πράσεως καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐν κτήσει κατατάξεως ἤδη ἀποκεχωρήκαμεν. εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ὡμολόγησας ταῦτα, ἄν τε μέγας βασιλεὺς κακοδαιμονῇ, οὐκ ἂν ἐλεύθερος, ἄν τε μικρὸς ἄν θʼ ὑπατικὸς ἄν τε δισύπατος. — ἔστω.

[¶53] Him, then, whom it is in the power of another to restrain or to compel, affirm confidently to be by no means free. And do not heed his grandfathers or great-grandfathers, or inquire whether he has been bought or sold;

> Greek: ἔτι οὖν ἀπόκριναί μοι κἀκεῖνο· δοκεῖ σοι μέγα τι εἶναι καὶ γενναῖον ἡ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀξιόλογον; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — ἔστιν οὖν τυγχάνοντά τινος οὕτως μεγάλου καὶ ἀξιολόγου καὶ γενναίου ταπεινὸν εἶναι; — οὐκ ἔστιν.

[¶54] but if you hear him say from his heart and with emotion, “my master,” though twelve Lictors should march before him, call him a slave. And if you should hear him say, “Wretch that I am! what do I suffer!” call him a slave. In short, if you see him wailing, complaining, unprosperous, call him a slave, even in purple. “Suppose, then, that he does nothing of all this.” Do not yet say that he is free; but learn whether his principles are in any event liable to compulsion, to restraint, or disappointment;

> Greek: — ὅταν οὖν ἴδῃς τινὰ ὑποπεπτωκότα ἑτέρῳ ἢ κολακεύοντα παρὰ τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ, λέγε καὶ τοῦτον θαρρῶν μὴ εἶναι ἐλεύθερον· καὶ μὴ μόνον, ἂν δειπναρίου ἕνεκα αὐτὸ ποιῇ, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐπαρχίας ἕνεκα κἂν ὑπατείας. ἀλλʼ ἐκείνους μὲν μικροδούλους λέγε τοὺς μικρῶν τινων ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦντας, τούτους δʼ, ὡς εἰσὶν ἄξιοι, μεγαλοδούλους.

[¶55] and if you find this to be the case, call him a slave, keeping holiday during the Saturnalia. Say that his master is abroad; that he will come presently; and you will know what he suffers.

> Greek: — ἔστω καὶ ταῦτα. — δοκεῖ δέ σοι ἡ ἐλευθερία αὐτεξούσιόν τι εἶναι καὶ αὐτόνομον; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — ὅντινα οὖν ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ κωλῦσαι ἔστι καὶ ἀναγκάσαι, θαρρῶν λέγε μὴ εἶναι ἐλεύθερον.

[¶56] “Who will come?” Whoever has the power either of bestowing or of taking away any of the things he desires. “Have we so many masters, then?” We have. For, prior to all such, we have the things themselves for our masters. Now they are many; and it is through these that the men who control the things inevitably become our masters too. For no one fears Caesar himself;

> Greek: καὶ μή μοι πάππους αὐτοῦ καὶ προπάππους βλέπε καὶ ὠνὴν ζήτει καὶ πρᾶσιν, ἀλλʼ ἂν ἀκούσῃς λέγοντος ἔσωθεν καὶ ἐκ πάθους κύριε, κἂν δώδεκα ῥάβδοι προάγωσιν, λέγε δοῦλον· κἂν ἀκούσῃς λέγοντος τάλας ἐγώ, οἷα πάσχω, λέγε δοῦλον· ἂν ἁπλῶς ἀποκλαιόμενον ἴδῃς, μεμφόμενον, δυσροοῦντα, λέγε δοῦλον περιπόρφυρον ἔχοντα.

[¶57] but death, banishment, confiscation, prison, disgrace. Nor does any one love Caesar unless he be a person of great worth; but we love riches, the tribunate, the praetorship, the consulship. When we love or hate or fear such things, they who have the disposal of them must necessarily be our masters. Hence we even worship them as gods.

> Greek: ἂν οὖν μηδὲν τούτων ποιῇ, μήπω εἴπῃς ἐλεύθερον, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ κατάμαθε, μή τι ἀναγκαστά, μή τι κωλυτικά, μή τι δυσροητικά· κἂν εὕρῃς τοιοῦτον, λέγε δοῦλον ἀνοχὰς ἔχοντα ἐν Σατο[υ]ρναλίοις· λέγε, ὅτι ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ ἀποδημεῖ· εἶθʼ ἥξει καὶ γνώσῃ οἷα πάσχει.

[¶58] For we consider that whoever has the disposal of the greatest advantages is a deity; and then further reason falsely, “But such a one has the control of the greatest advantages; therefore he is a deity.” For if we reason falsely, the final inference must be also false. What is it, then, that makes a man free and independent?

> Greek: — τίς ἥξει; — πᾶς ὃς ἂν ἐξουσίαν ἔχῃ τῶν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ τινος θελομένων πρὸς τὸ περιποιῆσαι ταῦτα ἢ ἀφελέσθαι. — οὕτως οὖν πολλοὺς κυρίους ἔχομεν; — οὕτως. τὰ γὰρ πράγματα προτέρους τούτων κυρίους ἔχομεν· ἐκεῖνα δὲ πολλά ἐστιν. διὰ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς τούτων τινὸς ἔχοντας ἐξουσίαν κυρίους εἶναι·

[¶59] For neither riches, nor consulship, nor the command of provinces nor of kingdoms, can make him so; but something else must be found. What is it that keeps any one from being hindered and restrained in penmanship, for instance? “The science of penmanship.” In music? “The science of music.” Therefore in life too, it must be the science of living. As you have heard it in general, then, consider it likewise in particulars. Is it possible for him to be unrestrained who desires any of those things that are within the power of others?

> Greek: ἐπεί τοι οὐδεὶς αὐτὸν τὸν Καίσαρα φοβεῖται, ἀλλὰ θάνατον, φυγήν, ἀφαίρεσιν τῶν ὄντων, φυλακήν, ἀτιμίαν. οὐδὲ φιλεῖ τις τὸν Καίσαρα, ἂν μή τι ᾖ πολλοῦ ἄξιος, ἀλλὰ πλοῦτον φιλοῦμεν, δημαρχίαν, στρατηγίαν, ὑπατείαν. ὅταν ταῦτα φιλῶμεν καὶ μισῶμεν καὶ φοβώμεθα, ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἐξουσίαν αὐτῶν ἔχοντας κυρίους ἡμῶν εἶναι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὡς θεοὺς αὐτοὺς προσκυνοῦμεν·

[¶60] “No.” Can he avoid being hindered? “No.” Therefore neither can he be free. Consider, then, whether we have nothing or everything in our own sole power,—or whether some things are in our own power and some in that of others. “What do you mean?”

> Greek: ἐννοοῦμεν γάρ, ὅτι τὸ ἔχον ἐξουσίαν τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελείας θεῖόν ἐστιν, εἶθʼ ὑποτάσσομεν κακῶς οὗτος δʼ ἔχει [τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελείας· θεῖόν ἐστιν. εἶθʼ ὑποτάσσομεν κακῶς, οὗτος δʼ ἔχει] τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελείας ἐξουσίαν. ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γενόμενον ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπενεχθῆναι κακῶς.

[¶61] When you would have your body perfect, is it in your own power, or is it not? “It is not.” When you would be healthy? “It is not.” When you would be handsome? “It is not.” When you would live or die? “It is not.”

> Greek: τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ποιοῦν ἀκώλυτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ αὐτεξούσιον; πλοῦτος γὰρ οὐ ποιεῖ οὐδʼ ὑπατεία οὐδʼ ἐπαρχία οὐδὲ βασιλεία, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τι ἄλλο εὑρεθῆναι.

[¶62] Body then is not our own; but is subject to everything that proves stronger than itself. “Agreed.” Well; is it in your own power to have an estate when you please, and such a one as you please? “No.” Slaves? “No.” Clothes? “No.” A house? “No.”

> Greek: τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῷ γράφειν ἀκώλυτον ποιοῦν καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστον; — ἡ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ γράφειν. — τί δʼ ἐν τῷ κιθαρίζειν; — ἡ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ κιθαρίζειν. — οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ βιοῦν ἡ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ βιοῦν.

[¶63] Horses? “Indeed, none of these.” Well, if you desire ever so earnestly to have your children live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your own power? “No, it is not.”

> Greek: ὡς μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς, ἀκήκοας· σκέψαι δʼ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους. τὸν ἐφιέμενόν τινος τῶν ἐπʼ ἄλλοις ὄντων ἐνδέχεται ἀκώλυτον εἶναι; — οὔ. — ἐνδέχεται ἀπαραπόδιστον;

[¶64] Will you then say that there is nothing independent, which is in your own power alone, and unalienable? See if you have anything of this sort. “I do not know.”

> Greek: — οὔ. — οὐκοῦν οὐδʼ ἐλεύθερον. ὅρα οὖν· πότερον οὐδὲν ἔχομεν, ὃ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν μόνοις ἐστίν, ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστιν, τὰ δʼ ἐπʼ ἄλλοις;

[¶65] But consider it thus: can any one make you assent to a falsehood? “No one.” In the matter of assent, then, you are unrestrained and unhindered. “Agreed.” Well, and can any one compel you to exert your aims towards what you do not like? “He can. For when he threatens me with death, or fetters, he thus compels me.” If, then, you were to despise dying or being fettered, would you any longer regard him?

> Greek: — πῶς λέγεις; — τὸ σῶμα ὅταν θέλῃς ὁλόκληρον εἶναι, ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν ἢ οὔ; — οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐμοί. — ὅταν δʼ ὑγιαίνειν; — οὐδὲ τοῦτο. — ὅταν δὲ καλὸν εἶναι; — οὐδὲ τοῦτο. — ζῆν δὲ καὶ ἀποθανεῖν; — οὐδὲ τοῦτο. — οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἀλλότριον, ὑπεύθυνον παντὸς τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου.

[¶66] “No.” Is despising death, then, an action in our power, or is it not? “It is.” Is it therefore in your power also to exert your aims towards anything, or is it not? “Agreed that it is. But in whose power is my avoiding anything?” This, too, is in your own. “What then if, when I am exerting myself to walk, any one should restrain me?” What part of you can he restrain?

> Greek: — ἔστω. — τὸν ἀγρὸν δʼ ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν ἔχειν, ὅταν θέλῃς καὶ ἐφʼ ὅσον θέλεις καὶ οἷον θέλεις; — οὔ. — τὰ δὲ δουλάρια; — οὔ. — τὰ δʼ ἱμάτια; — οὔ. — τὸ δὲ οἰκίδιον; — οὔ. — τοὺς δʼ ἵππους; — τούτων μὲν οὐδέν. — ἂν δὲ τὰ τέκνα σου ζῆν θέλῃς ἐξ ἅπαντος ἢ τὴν γυναῖκα ἢ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἢ τοὺς φίλους, ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν; — οὐδὲ ταῦτα.

[¶67] Can he restrain your assent? “No, but my body.” Ay, as he may a stone. “Be it so. But still I cease to walk.”

> Greek: πότερον οὖν οὐδὲν ἔχεις αὐτεξούσιον, ὃ ἐπὶ μόνῳ ἐστὶ σοί, ἢ ἔχεις τι τοιοῦτον; — οὐκ οἶδα. — ὅρα οὖν οὕτως καὶ σκέψαι αὐτό.

[¶68] And who claimed that walking was one of the actions that cannot be restrained? For I only said that your exerting yourself towards it could not be restrained.

> Greek: μή τις δύναταί σε ποιῆσαι συγκαταθέσθαι τῷ ψεύδει; — οὐδείς. — οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῷ συγκαταθετικῷ τόπῳ ἀκώλυτος εἶ καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστος.

[¶69] But wherever the body and its assistance are essential, you have already heard that nothing is in your power. “Be this, too, agreed.” And can any one compel you to desire against your Will? “No one.” Or to propose, or intend, or, in short, not to be beguiled by the appearances of things?

> Greek: — ἔστω. — ἄγε, ὁρμῆσαι δέ σε ἐφʼ ὃ μὴ θέλεις τις δύναται ἀναγκάσαι; — δύναται. ὅταν γάρ μοι θάνατον ἢ δεσμὰ ἀπειλῇ, ἀναγκάζει μʼ ὁρμῆσαι. — ἂν οὖν καταφρονῇς τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν καὶ τοῦ δεδέσθαι, ἔτι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστρέφῃ;

[¶70] “Nor this. But when I desire anything, he can restrain me from obtaining what I desire.” If you desire anything that is truly within your reach, and that cannot be restrained, how can he restrain you?

> Greek: — οὔ. — σὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἔργον τὸ καταφρονεῖν θανάτου ἢ οὐ σόν; — ἐμόν. — σὸν ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ὁρμῆσαι ἢ οὔ; — ἔστω ἐμόν. — τὸ δʼ ἀφορμῆσαι τίνος;

[¶71] “By no means.” And pray who claims that he who longs for what depends on another will be free from restraint? “May I not long for health, then?” By no means; nor for anything else that depends on another;

> Greek: σὸν καὶ τοῦτο. — τί οὖν, ἂν ἐμοῦ ὁρμήσαντος περιπατῆσαι ἐκεῖνός με κωλύσῃ; — τί σου κωλύσει; μή τι τὴν συγκατάθεσιν; — οὔ· ἀλλὰ τὸ σωμάτιον. — ναί, ὡς λίθον. — ἔστω· ἀλλʼ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ περιπατῶ.

[¶72] for what is not in your own power, either to procure or to preserve when you will, that belongs to another. Keep off not only your hands from it, but even more than these, your desires. Otherwise you have given yourself up as a slave;

> Greek: — τίς δέ σοι εἶπεν τὸ περιπατῆσαι σὸν ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀκώλυτον; ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἔλεγον ἀκώλυτον μόνον τὸ ὁρμῆσαι· ὅπου δὲ σώματος χρεία καὶ τῆς ἐκ τούτου συνεργείας, πάλαι ἀκήκοας, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι σόν.

[¶73] you have put your neck under the yoke, if you admire any of the things which are not your own, but which are subject and mortal, to which of them soever you are attached. “Is not my hand my own?”

> Greek: — ἔστω καὶ ταῦτα. — ὀρέγεσθαι δέ σε οὗ μὴ θέλεις τις ἀναγκάσαι δύναται; — οὐδείς. — προθέσθαι δʼ ἢ ἐπιβαλέσθαι τις ἢ ἁπλῶς χρῆσθαι ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις;

[¶74] It is a part of you, but it is by nature clay, liable to restraint, to compulsion; a slave to everything stronger than itself. And why do I say, your hand? You ought to hold your whole body but as a useful ass, with a pack-saddle on, so long as may be, so long as it is allowed you.

> Greek: — οὐδὲ τοῦτο· ἀλλὰ ὀρεγόμενόν με κωλύσει τυχεῖν οὗ ὀρέγομαι. — ἂν τῶν σῶν τινος ὀρέγῃ καὶ τῶν ἀκωλύτων, πῶς σε κωλύσει; — οὐδαμῶς. — τίς οὖν σοι λέγει, ὅτι ὁ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὀρεγόμενος ἀκώλυτός ἐστιν;

[¶75] But if there should come a military conscription, and a soldier should lay hold on it, let it go.

> Greek: Ὑγείας οὖν μὴ ὀρέγωμαι;— μηδαμῶς, μηδʼ ἄλλου ἀλλοτρίου μηδενός.

[¶76] Do not resist, or murmur; otherwise you will be first beaten and lose the ass after all. And since you are thus to regard even the body itself, think what remains to do concerning things to be provided for the sake of the body. If that be an ass, the rest are but bridles, pack-saddles, shoes, oats, hay for him. Let these go too. Quit them yet more easily and expeditiously.

> Greek: ὃ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ σοὶ παρασκευάσαι ἢ τηρῆσαι ὅτε θέλεις, τοῦτο ἀλλότριόν ἐστιν. μακρὰν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ οὐ μόνον τὰς χεῖρας, ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρότερον τὴν ὄρεξιν· εἰ δὲ μή, παρέδωκας σαυτὸν δοῦλον, ὑπέθηκας τὸν τράχηλον, ἂν θαυμάσῃς τῶν [τι] μὴ σῶν ᾧ τινι ἂν τῶν ὑπευθύνων καὶ θνητῶν προσπαθῇς. — ἡ χεὶρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμή;

[¶77] And when you are thus prepared and trained to distinguish what belongs to others from your own;

> Greek: — μέρος ἐστὶ σόν, φύσει δὲ πηλός, κωλυτόν, ἀναγκαστόν, δοῦλον παντὸς τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου.

[¶78] what is liable to restraint from what is not; to esteem the one your own property, but not the other; to keep your desire, to keep your aversion, carefully regulated by this point,—whom have you any longer to fear? “No one.” For about what should you be afraid,—about what is your own, in which consists the essence of good and evil?

> Greek: καὶ τί σοι λέγω χεῖρα; ὅλον τὸ σῶμα οὕτως ἔχειν σε δεῖ ὡς ὀνάριον ἐπισεσαγμένον, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἂν διδῶται· ἂν δʼ ἀγγαρεία ᾖ καὶ στρατιώτης ἐπιλάβηται, ἄφες, μὴ ἀντίτεινε μηδὲ γόγγυζε. εἰ δὲ μή, πληγὰς λαβὼν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸ ὀνάριον.

[¶79] And who has any power over this? Who can take it away? Who can hinder you, any more than God can be hindered? But are you afraid for body, for possessions, for what belongs to others, for what is nothing to you? And what have you been studying all this while, but to distinguish between your own and that which is not your own;

> Greek: ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα οὕτως ἔχειν σε δέῃ, ὅρα, τί ἀπολείπεται περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα τοῦ σώματος ἕνεκα παρασκευάζεται. ὅταν ἐκεῖνο ὀνάριον ᾖ, τἆλλα γίνεται χαλινάρια τοῦ ὀναρίου, σαγμάτια, ὑποδημάτια, κριθαί, χόρτος. ἄφες κἀκεῖνα, ἀπόλυε θᾶττον καὶ εὐκολώτερον ἢ τὸ ὀνάριον.

[¶80] what is in your power and what is not in your power; what is liable to restraint and what is not? And for what purpose have you applied to the philosophers,—that you might nevertheless be disappointed and unfortunate? No doubt you will be exempt from fear and perturbation! And what is grief to you?

> Greek: καὶ ταύτην τὴν παρασκευὴν παρασκευασάμενος καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν ἀσκήσας τὰ ἀλλότρια ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων διακρίνειν, τὰ κωλυτὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκωλύτων, ταῦτα πρὸς σαυτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐκεῖνα μὴ πρὸς σαυτόν, ἐνταῦθα ἐπιστρόφως ἔχειν τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἐνταῦθα τὴν ἔκκλισιν, μή τι ἔτι φοβῇ τινα;

[¶81] For whatsoever we anticipate with fear, we endure with grief. And for what will you any longer passionately wish? For you have acquired a temperate and steady desire of things dependent on will, since they are accessible and desirable;

> Greek: — οὐδένα. — περὶ τίνος γὰρ φοβήσῃ; περὶ τῶν σεαυτοῦ, ὅπου σοι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ; καὶ τίς τούτων ἐξουσίαν ἔχει; τίς ἀφελέσθαι αὐτὰ δύναται, τίς ἐμποδίσαι; οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν θεόν.

[¶82] and you have no desire of things uncontrollable by will. so as to leave room for that irrational, and impetuous, and precipitate passion. Since then you are thus affected with regard to things, what man can any longer be formidable to you? What has man that he can be formidable to man, either in appearance, or speech, or mutual intercourse?

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς κτήσεως; ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; ὑπὲρ τῶν οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ; καὶ τί ἄλλο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμελέτας ἢ διακρίνειν τὰ σὰ καὶ οὐ σά, τὰ ἐπὶ σοὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοί, τὰ κωλυτὰ καὶ ἀκώλυτα; τίνος δὲ ἕνεκα προσῆλθες τοῖς φιλοσόφοις; ἵνα μηδὲν ἧττον ἀτυχῇς καὶ δυστυχῇς;

[¶83] No more than horse to horse, or dog to dog, or bee to bee. But things are formidable to every one, and whenever any person can either give these to another, or take them away, he becomes formidable too. “How, then, is this citadel to be destroyed?” Not by sword or fire, but by principle. For if we should demolish the visible citadel, shall we have demolished also that of some fever, of some fair woman,—in short, the citadel [of temptation] within ourselves;

> Greek: οὐκοῦν ἄφοβος μὲν οὕτως ἔσει καὶ ἀτάραχος. λύπη δὲ τί πρὸς σέ; ὧν γὰρ προσδοκωμένων φόβος γίνεται, καὶ λύπη παρόντων. ἐπιθυμήσεις δὲ τίνος ἔτι; τῶν μὲν γὰρ προαιρετικῶν ἅτε καλῶν ὄντων καὶ παρόντων σύμμετρον ἔχεις καὶ καθισταμένην τὴν ὄρεξιν, τῶν δʼ ἀπροαιρέτων οὐδενὸς ὀρέγῃ, ἵνα καὶ τόπον σχῇ τὸ ἄλογον ἐκεῖνο καὶ ὠστικὸν καὶ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἠπειγμένον;

[¶84] and have turned out the tyrants to whom we are subject upon all occasions and every day, sometimes the same, sometimes others? From hence we must begin; hence demolish the citadel, and turn out the tyrants,—give up body, members, riches, power, fame, magistracies, honors, children, brothers, friends; esteem all these as belonging to others. And if the tyrants be turned out from hence, why should I also demolish the external citadel, at least on my own account?

> Greek: ὅταν οὖν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα οὕτως ἔχῃς, τίς ἔτι ἄνθρωπος δύναται φοβερὸς εἶναι; τί γὰρ ἔχει ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ φοβερὸν ἢ ὀφθεὶς ἢ λαλήσας ἢ ὅλως συναναστραφείς; οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ ἵππος ἵππῳ ἢ κύων κυνὶ ἢ μέλισσα μελίσσῃ. ἀλλὰ τὰ πράγματα ἑκάστῳ φοβερά ἐστιν· ταῦτα δʼ ὅταν περιποιεῖν τις δύνηταί τινι ἢ ἀφελέσθαι, τότε καὶ αὐτὸς φοβερὸς γίνεται.

[¶85] For what harm to me from its standing? Why should I turn out the guards? For in what point do they affect me? It is against others that they direct their fasces, their staves, and their swords. Have I ever been restrained from what I willed, or compelled against my will? Indeed, how is this possible? I have placed my pursuits under the direction of God.

> Greek: πῶς οὖν ἀκρόπολις καταλύεται; οὐ σιδήρῳ οὐδὲ πυρί, ἀλλὰ δόγμασιν. ἂν γὰρ τὴν οὖσαν ἐν τῇ πόλει καθέλωμεν, μή τι καὶ τὴν τοῦ πυρετοῦ, μή τι καὶ τὴν τῶν καλῶν γυναικαρίων, μή τι ἁπλῶς τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν τυράννους ἀποβεβλήκαμεν, οὓς ἐφʼ ἑκάστοις καθʼ ἡμέραν ἔχομεν, ποτὲ μὲν τοὺς αὐτούς, ποτὲ δʼ ἄλλους;

[¶86] Is it his will that I should have a fever? It is my will too. Is it his will that I should pursue anything? It is my will too. Is it his will that I should desire? It is my will too. Is it his will that I should obtain anything? It is mine too. Is it not his will? It is not mine.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἔνθεν ἄρξασθαι δεῖ καὶ ἔνθεν καθελεῖν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ἐκβάλλειν τοὺς τυράννους· τὸ σωμάτιον ἀφεῖναι, τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ, τὰς δυνάμεις, τὴν κτῆσιν, τὴν φήμην, ἀρχάς, τιμάς, τέκνα, ἀδελφούς, φίλους, πάντα ταῦτα ἡγήσασθαι ἀλλότρια.

[¶87] Is it his will that I should be tortured? Then it is my will to be tortured. Is it his will that I should die? Then it is my will to die. Who can any longer restrain or compel me, contrary to my own opinion? No more than Zeus. It is thus that cautious travellers act.

> Greek: κἂν ἔνθεν ἐκβληθῶσιν οἱ τύραννοι, τί ἔτι ἀποτειχίζω τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα; ἑστῶσα γὰρ τί μοι ποιεῖ; τί ἔτι ἐκβάλλω τοὺς δορυφόρους; ποῦ γὰρ αὐτῶν αἰσθάνομαι; ἐπʼ ἄλλους ἔχουσιν τὰς ῥάβδους καὶ τοὺς κοντοὺς καὶ τὰς μαχαίρας.

[¶88] Does some one hear that the road is beset by robbers? He does not set out alone, but waits for the retinue of an ambassador or quaestor or proconsul, and when he has joined himself to their company, goes along in safety. Thus does the prudent man act in the world. There are many robberies, tyrants, storms, distresses, losses of things most dear.

> Greek: ἐγὼ δʼ οὐπώποτʼ οὔτε θέλων ἐκωλύθην οὔτʼ ἠναγκάσθην μὴ θέλων καὶ πῶς τοῦτο δυνατόν; προσκατατέταχά μου τὴν ὁρμὴν τῷ θεῷ. θέλει μʼ ἐκεῖνος πυρέσσειν· κἀγὼ θέλω. θέλει ὁρμᾶν ἐπί τι· κἀγὼ θέλω. θέλει ὀρέγεσθαι· κἀγὼ θέλω. θέλει με τυχεῖν τινος· κἀγὼ βούλομαι.

[¶89] Where is there any refuge? How can he go alone unattacked? What retinue can he wait for, to go safely through his journey? To what company shall he join himself,—to some rich man;

> Greek: οὐ θέλει· οὐ βούλομαι. ἀποθανεῖν οὖν θέλω· στρεβλωθῆναι οὖν θέλω. τίς ἔτι με κωλῦσαι δύναται παρὰ τὸ ἐμοὶ φαινόμενον ἢ ἀναγκάσαι; οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν Δία.

[¶90] to some consular senator? And what good will that do me? He may be robbed himself, groaning and lamenting. And what if my fellow-traveller himself should turn against me and rob me? What shall I do? I say I will be the friend of Caesar.

> Greek: οὕτως ποιοῦσι καὶ τῶν ὁδοιπόρων οἱ ἀσφαλέστεροι. ἀκήκοεν ὅτι λῃστεύεται ἡ ὁδός· μόνος οὐ τολμᾷ καθεῖναι, ἀλλὰ περιέμεινεν συνοδίαν ἢ πρεσβευτοῦ ἢ ταμίου ἢ ἀνθυπάτου καὶ προσκατατάξας ἑαυτὸν παρέρχεται ἀσφαλῶς.

[¶91] While I am his companion, no one will injure me, Yet before I can become illustrious enough for this, what must I bear and suffer!

> Greek: οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ποιεῖ ὁ φρόνιμος. πολλὰ λῃστήρια, τύραννοι, χειμῶνες, ἀπορίαι, ἀποβολαὶ τῶν φιλτάτων.

[¶92] How often, and by how many, must I be robbed! And then, if I do become the friend of Caesar, he too is mortal; and if, by any accident, he should become my enemy, where can I best retreat,—to a desert?

> Greek: ποῦ τις καταφύγῃ; πῶς ἀλῄστευτος παρέλθῃ; ποίαν συνοδίαν περιμείνας ἀσφαλῶς διέλθῃ; τίνι προσκατατάξας ἑαυτόν;

[¶93] Well, and may not a fever come there? What can be done, then? Is it not possible to find a fellow-traveller safe, faithful, brave, incapable of being surprised?

> Greek: τῷ δεῖνι, τῷ πλουσίῳ, τῷ ὑπατικῷ. καὶ τί μοι ὄφελος; αὐτὸς ἐκδύεται, οἰμώζει, πενθεῖ. τί δʼ, ἂν ὁ συνοδοιπόρος αὐτὸς ἐπʼ ἐμὲ στραφεὶς λῃστής μου γένηται;

[¶94] A person who reasons thus, understands and considers that if he joins himself to God, he shall go safely through his journey. “How do you mean, join himself?” That whatever is the will of God may be his will too; that whatever is not the will of God may not be his.

> Greek: τί ποιήσω; φίλος ἔσομαι Καίσαρος· ἐκείνου με ὄντα ἑταῖρον οὐδεὶς ἀδικήσει. πρῶτον μέν, ἵνα γένωμαι, π[ρ]όσα με δεῖ τλῆναι καὶ παθεῖν, ποσάκις καὶ ὑπὸ πόσων λῃστευθῆναι· εἶτα ἐὰν γένωμαι, καὶ οὗτος θνητός ἐστιν [καὶ οὗτος θνητός].

[¶95] “How, then, can this be done?” Why, how otherwise than by considering the workings of God’s power and his administration?

> Greek: ἂν δʼ αὐτὸς ἔκ τινος περιστάσεως ἐχθρός μου γένηται, ἀναχωρῆσαί πού ποτε κρεῖσσον;

[¶96] What has he given me to be my own, and independent? What has he reserved to himself? He has given me whatever depends on will.

> Greek: εἰς ἐρημίαν; ἄγε, ἐκεῖ πυρετὸς οὐκ ἔρχεται; τί οὖν γένηται; οὐκ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν ἀσφαλῆ σύνοδον, πιστόν, ἰσχυρόν, ἀνεπιβούλευτον;

[¶97] The things within my power he has made incapable of hindrance or restraint. Bat how could he make a body of clay incapable of hindrance?

> Greek: οὕτως ἐφίστησιν καὶ ἐννοεῖ, ὅτι, ἐὰν τῷ θεῷ προσκατατάξῃ ἑαυτόν, διελεύσεται ἀσφαλῶς.

[¶98] Therefore he has subjected possessions, furniture, house, children, wife, to the revolutions of the universe. Why, then, do I fight against God?

> Greek: πῶς λέγεις προσκατατάξαι;— ἵνʼ, ὃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος θέλῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς θέλῃ καί, ὃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος μὴ θέλῃ, τοῦτο μηδʼ αὐτὸς θέλῃ.

[¶99] Why do I will to retain that which depends not on will; that which is not granted absolutely, but how,—in such a manner and for such a time as was thought proper? But he who gave takes away. Why, then, do I resist? Besides being a fool, in contending with a stronger than my self, I shall be unjust, which is a more important consideration. For whence had I these things, when I came into the world? My father gave them to me.

> Greek: — πῶς οὖν τοῦτο γένηται; — πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως ἢ ἐπισκεψαμένῳ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν διοίκησιν; τί μοι δέδωκεν ἐμὸν καὶ αὐτεξούσιον, τί αὑτῷ κατέλ[ε]ιπεν; τὰ προαιρετικά μοι δέδωκεν, ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν, ἀνεμπόδιστα, ἀκώλυτα. τὸ σῶμα τὸ πήλινον πῶς ἐδύνατο ἀκώλυτον ποιῆσαι; ὑπέταξεν οὖν τῇ τῶν ὅλων περιόδῳ, τὴν κτῆσιν, τὰ σκεύη, τὴν οἰκίαν, τὰ τέκνα, τὴν γυναῖκα.

[¶100] And who gave them to him? And who made the sun; who the fruits; who the seasons; who their connection and relations with each other? And after you have received all, and even your very self, from another, are you angry with the giver, and do you complain, if he takes anything away from you? Who are you;

> Greek: τί οὖν θεομαχῶ; τί θέλω τὰ μὴ θελητά, τὰ μὴ δοθέντα μοι ἐξ ἅπαντος ἔχειν; ἀλλὰ πῶς; ὡς δέδοται καὶ ἐφʼ ὅσον δύναται. ἀλλʼ ὁ δοὺς ἀφαιρεῖται. τί οὖν ἀντιτείνω; οὐ λέγω, ὅτι ἠλίθιος ἔσομαι τὸν ἰσχυρότερον βιαζόμενος, ἀλλʼ ἔτι πρότερον ἄδικος.

[¶101] and for what purpose did you come? Was it not he who brought you here? Was it not he who showed you the light? Hath not he given you companions? Hath not he given you senses? Hath not he given you reason? And as whom did he bring you here?

> Greek: πόθεν γὰρ ἔχων αὐτὰ ἦλθον; ὁ πατήρ μου αὐτὰ ἔδωκεν. ἐκείνῳ δὲ τίς; τὸν ἥλιον δὲ τίς πεποίηκε, τοὺς καρποὺς δὲ τίς, τὰς δʼ ὥρας τίς, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμπλοκὴν καὶ κοινωνίαν τίς;

[¶102] Was it not as a mortal? Was it not as one to live with a little portion of flesh upon earth, and to see his administration;

> Greek: εἶτα σύμπαντα εἰληφὼς παρʼ ἄλλου καὶ αὐτὸν σεαυτόν, ἀγανακτεῖς καὶ μέμφῃ τὸν δόντα, ἄν σού τι ἀφέληται;

[¶103] to behold the spectacle with him, and partake of the festival for a short time? After having beheld the spectacle and the solemnity, then, as long as it is permitted you, will you not depart when he leads you out, adoring and thankful for what you have heard and seen? “No; but I would enjoy the feast still longer.” So would the initiated [in the mysteries], too, be longer in their initiation;

> Greek: τίς ὢν καὶ ἐπὶ τί ἐληλυθώς; οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνός σε εἰσήγαγεν; οὐχὶ τὸ φῶς ἐκεῖνός σοι ἔδειξεν; οὐ συνεργοὺς δέδωκεν; οὐ καὶ αἰσθήσεις; οὐ λόγον; ὡς τίνα δὲ εἰσήγαγεν; οὐχ ὡς θνητόν; οὐχ ὡς μετὰ ὀλίγου σαρκιδίου ζήσοντα ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ θεασόμενον τὴν διοίκησιν αὐτοῦ καὶ συμπομπεύσοντα αὐτῷ καὶ συνεορτάσοντα πρὸς ὀλίγον;

[¶104] so, perhaps, would the spectators at Olympia see more combatants. But the solemnity is over. Go away. Depart like a grateful and modest person; make room for others.

> Greek: οὐ θέλεις οὖν, ἕως δέδοταί σοι, θεασάμενος τὴν πομπὴν καὶ τὴν πανήγυριν εἶτα, ὅταν σʼ ἐξάγῃ, πορεύεσθαι προσκυνήσας καὶ εὐχαριστήσας ὑπὲρ ὧν ἤκουσας καὶ εἶδες;

[¶105] Others, too, must be born as you were; and when they are born must have a place, and habitations, and necessaries. But if the first do not give way, what room is there left? Why are you insatiable, unconscionable? Why do you crowd the world? “Ay, but I would have my wife and children with me too.” Why, are they yours? Are they not the Giver’s? Are they not his who made you also? Will you not then quit what belongs to another? Will you not yield to your Superior? “Why, then, did he bring me into the world upon these conditions?”

> Greek: οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἔτι ἑορτάζειν ἤθελον. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μύσται μυεῖσθαι; τάχα καὶ οἱ ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ ἄλλους ἀθλητὰς βλέπειν· ἀλλὰ ἡ πανήγυρις πέρας ἔχει· ἔξελθε, ἀπαλλάγηθι ὡς εὐχάριστος, ὡς αἰδήμων· δὸς ἄλλοις τόπον· δεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ ἄλλους, καθάπερ καὶ σὺ ἐγένου, καὶ γενομένους ἔχειν χώραν καὶ οἰκήσεις, τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. ἂν δʼ οἱ πρῶτοι μὴ ὑπεξάγωσιν, τί ὑπολείπεται; τί ἄπληστος εἶ; τί ἀνίκανος; τί στενοχωρεῖς τὸν κόσμον;

[¶106] Well, if it is not worth your while, depart. He has no need of a discontented spectator. He wants such as will share the festival; make part of the chorus; who will extol, applaud, celebrate the solemnity.

> Greek: — ναί· ἀλλὰ τὰ τεκνία μετʼ ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι θέλω καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα. — σὰ γάρ ἐστιν; οὐχὶ τοῦ δόντος; οὐχὶ καὶ τοῦ σὲ πεποιηκότος; εἶτα οὐκ ἐκστήσῃ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; οὐ παραχωρήσεις τῷ κρείσσονι;

[¶107] He will not be displeased to see the wretched and fearful dismissed from it. For when they were present they did not behave as at a festival, nor fill a proper place, but lamented, found fault with the Deity, with their fortune, with their companions.

> Greek: — τί οὖν μʼ εἰσῆγεν ἐπὶ τούτοις; — καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιεῖ σοι, ἔξελθε· οὐκ ἔχει χρείαν θεατοῦ μεμψιμοίρου. τῶν συνεορταζόντων δεῖται, τῶν συγχορευόντων, ἵνʼ ἐπικροτῶσι μᾶλλον, ἐπιθειάζωσιν, ὑμνῶσι δὲ τὴν πανήγυριν.

[¶108] They were insensible both of their advantages and of the powers which they received for far different purposes,—the powers of magnanimity, nobleness of spirit, fortitude, and that which now concerns us, freedom. “For what purpose, then, have I received these things?” To use them. “How long?” As long as he who lent them pleases. If, then, they are not necessary, do not make an idol of them, and they will not be so; do not tell yourself that they are necessary, when they are not.

> Greek: τοὺς ἀταλαιπώρους δὲ καὶ δειλοὺς οὐκ ἀηδῶς ὄψεται ἀπολελειμμένους τῆς πανηγύρεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ παρόντες ὡς ἐν ἑορτῇ διῆγον οὐδʼ ἐξεπλήρουν τὴν χώραν τὴν πρέπουσαν, ἀλλʼ ὠδυνῶντο, ἐμέμφοντο τὸν δαίμονα, τὴν τύχην, τοὺς συνόντας· ἀναίσθητοι καὶ ὧν ἔτυχον καὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεων, ἃς εἰλήφασι πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία, μεγαλοψυχίας, γενναιότητος, ἀνδρείας, αὐτῆς τῆς νῦν ζητουμένης ἐλευθερίας.

## 20. Book IV · chapters 1–4

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/20/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/20/#p-N

[¶0] This should be our study from morning till night beginning with the least and frailest things, as with earthenware, with glassware. Afterwards proceed to a suit of clothes, a dog, a horse, an estate; thence to yourself, body, members, children, wife, brothers.

> Greek: — ἐπὶ τί οὖν εἴληφα ταῦτα; — χρησόμενος. — μέχρι τίνος; — μέχρις ἂν ὁ χρήσας θέλῃ. — ἂν οὖν ἀναγκαῖά μοι ᾖ; — μὴ πρόσπασχε αὐτοῖς καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. σὺ αὐτὰ αὑτῷ μὴ εἴπῃς ἀναγκαῖα καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν.

[¶1] Look everywhere around you, and be able to detach yourself from these things. Correct your principles. Permit nothing to cleave to you that is not your own; nothing to grow to you that may give you agony when it is torn away. And say, when you are daily training yourself as you do here, not that you act the philosopher, which may be a presumptuous claim, but that you are asserting your freedom.

> Greek: ταύτην τὴν μελέτην ἕωθεν εἰς ἑσπέραν μελετᾶν ἔδει. ἀπὸ τῶν μικροτάτων, ἀπὸ τῶν εὐεπηρεαστοτάτων ἀρξάμενος, ἀπὸ χύτρας, ἀπὸ ποτηρίου, εἶθʼ οὕτως ἐπὶ χιτωνάριον πρόσελθε, ἐπὶ κυνάριον, ἐπὶ ἱππάριον, ἐπὶ ἀγρίδιον· ἔνθεν ἐπὶ σαυτόν, τὸ σῶμα, τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τέκνα, τὴν γυναῖκα, τοὺς ἀδελφούς.

[¶2] For this is true freedom. This is the freedom that Diogenes gained from Antisthenes, and declared it was impossible that he should ever after be a slave to any one.

> Greek: πανταχοῦ περιβλέψας ἀπόρριψον ἀπὸ σεαυτοῦ· κάθηρον τὰ δόγματα, μή τι προσήρτηταί σοι τῶν οὐ σῶν, μή τι συμπέφυκεν, μή τι ὀδυνήσει σʼ ἀποσπώμενον.

[¶3] Hence, when he was taken prisoner, how did he treat the pirates? Did he call any of them master? I do not mean the name, for I am not afraid of a word, but of the disposition from whence the word proceeds.

> Greek: καὶ λέγε γυμναζόμενος καθʼ ἡμέραν, ὡς ἐκεῖ, μὴ ὅτι φιλοσοφεῖς (ἔστω φορτικὸν τὸ ὄνομα), ἀλλʼ ὅτι καρπιστὴν δίδως. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἐλευθερία.

[¶4] How did he reprove them for feeding their prisoners ill? How was he sold?

> Greek: ταύτην ἠλευθερώθη Διογένης παρʼ Ἀντισθένους καὶ οὐκέτι ἔφη καταδουλωθῆναι δύνασθαι ὑπʼ οὐδενός.

[¶5] Did he seek a master? No, but a slave. And when he was sold, how did he converse with his lord? He immediately disputed with him whether he ought to be dressed or shaved in the manner he was; and how he ought to bring up his children.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο πῶς ἑάλω, πῶς τοῖς πειραταῖς ἐχρῆτο· μή τι κύριον εἶπέν τινα αὐτῶν; καὶ οὐ λέγω τὸ ὄνομα· οὐ γὰρ τὴν φωνὴν φοβοῦμαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀφʼ οὗ ἡ φωνὴ ἐκπέμπεται.

[¶6] And where is the wonder? For if the same master had bought some one to instruct his children in gymnastic exercises, would he in those exercises have treated him as a servant or as a master? And so if he had bought a physician or an architect. In every department the skilful must necessarily be superior to the unskilful.

> Greek: πῶς ἐπιτιμᾷ αὐτοῖς, ὅτι κακῶς ἔτρεφον τοὺς ἑαλωκότας· πῶς ἐπράθη· μή τι κύριον ἐζήτει; ἀλλὰ δοῦλον. πῶς δὲ πραθεὶς ἀνεστρέφετο πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην· εὐθὺς διελέγετο πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι οὐχ οὕτως ἐστολίσθαι δεῖ αὐτόν, οὐχ οὕτως κεκάρθαι, περὶ τῶν υἱῶν, πῶς δεῖ αὐτοὺς διάγειν.

[¶7] What else, then, can he be but master, who possesses the universal knowledge of life? For who is master in a ship? The pilot. Why? Because whoever disobeys him is a loser. “But a master can put me in chains.” Can he do it, then, without being a loser?

> Greek: καὶ τί θαυμαστόν; εἰ γὰρ παιδοτρίβην ἐώνητο, ἐν τοῖς παλαιστρικοῖς ὑπηρέτῃ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐχρῆτο ἢ κυρίῳ; εἰ δʼ ἰατρόν, ὡσαύτως, εἰ δʼ ἀρχιτέκτονα. καὶ οὕτως ἐφʼ ἑκάστης ὕλης τὸν ἔμπειρον τοῦ ἀπείρου κρατεῖν πᾶσα ἀνάγκη.

[¶8] “I think not, indeed.” But because he must be a loser, he evidently must not do it; for no one acts unjustly without being a loser. “And how does he suffer, who puts his own slave in chains?” What think you? From the very fact of chaining him.

> Greek: ὅστις οὖν καθόλου τὴν περὶ βίον ἐπιστήμην κέκτηται, τί ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ τὸν δεσπότην; τίς γάρ ἐστιν ἐν νηὶ κύριος; — ὁ κυβερνήτης. — διὰ τί; ὅτι ὁ ἀπειθῶν αὐτῷ ζημιοῦται.

[¶9] This you yourself must grant, if you would hold to the doctrine that man is not naturally a wild, but a gentle, animal. For when is it that a vine is in a bad condition?

> Greek: — ἀλλὰ δεῖραί με δύναται. — μή τι οὖν ἀζημίως; — οὕτως μὲν κἀγὼ ἔκρινον. — ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἀζημίως, διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔξεστιν· οὐδενὶ δʼ ἀζήμιόν ἐστι τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα.

[¶10] “When it is in a condition contrary to its nature.” How is it with a cock? “The same.” It is therefore the same with a man also. What is his nature,—to bite and kick and throw into prison and cut off heads?

> Greek: — καὶ τίς ἡ ζημία τῷ δήσαντι τὸν αὑτοῦ δοῦλον, ἣν δοκεῖς; — τὸ δῆσαι· τοῦτο ὃ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογήσεις, ἂν θέλῃς σῴζειν, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστι θηρίον, ἀλλʼ ἥμερον ζῷον.

[¶11] No, but to do good, to assist, to indulge the wishes of others. Whether you will or not, then, he is in a bad condition whenever he acts unreasonably.

> Greek: ἐπεὶ πότʼ ἄμπελος πράσσει κακῶς; ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν πράσσῃ. πότʼ ἀλεκτρυών;

[¶12] “And so was not Socrates in a bad condition?” No, but his judges and accusers. “Nor Helvidius, at Rome?” No, but his murderer. “How do you talk?” Why, just as you do. You do not call that cock in a bad condition which is victorious, and yet wounded;

> Greek: ὡσαύτως. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπος. τίς οὖν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις; δάκνειν καὶ λακτίζειν καὶ εἰς φυλακὴν βάλλειν καὶ ἀποκεφαλίζειν; οὔ· ἀλλʼ εὖ ποιεῖν, συνεργεῖν, ἐπεύχεσθαι. τότʼ οὖν κακῶς πράσσει, ἄν τε θέλῃς ἄν τε μή, ὅταν ἀγνωμονῇ.

[¶13] but that which is conquered and comes off unhurt. Nor do you call a dog happy which neither hunts nor toils; but when you see him perspiring, and distressed, and panting with the chase.

> Greek: ὥστε Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔπραξε κακῶς;— οὔ, ἀλλʼ οἱ δικασταὶ καὶ οἱ κατήγοροι. — οὐδʼ ἐν Ῥώμῃ Ἑλουίδιος; — οὔ, ἀλλʼ ὁ ἀποκτείνας αὐτόν. — πῶς λέγεις;

[¶14] In what do we talk paradoxes? If we say that the evil of everything consists in what is contrary to its nature, is this a paradox? Do you not say it with regard to other things? Why, therefore, in the case of man alone, do you take a different view?

> Greek: — ὡς καὶ σὺ ἀλεκτρυόνα οὐ λέγεις κακῶς πρᾶξαι τὸν νικήσαντα καὶ κατακοπέντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀπλῆγα ἡττηθέντα· οὐδὲ κύνα εὐδαιμονίζεις τὸν μήτε διώκοντα μήτε πονοῦντα, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἱδρῶντα ἴδῃς, ὅταν ὀδυνώμενον, ὅταν ῥηγνύμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ δρόμου.

[¶15] But further, it is no paradox to say that by nature man is gentle and social and faithful. “This is none.” How then [is it a paradox to say] that, when he is whipped, or imprisoned, or beheaded, he is not hurt? If he suffers nobly, does he not come off even the better and a gainer?

> Greek: τί παραδοξολογοῦμεν, εἰ λέγομεν παντὸς κακὸν εἶναι τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν; τοῦτο παράδοξόν ἐστιν; σὺ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων οὐ λέγεις; διὰ τί ἐπὶ μόνου οὖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλως φέρῃ;

[¶16] But he is the person hurt who suffers the most miserable and shameful evils; who, instead of a man, becomes a wolf, a viper, or a hornet.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ὅτι λέγομεν ἥμερον εἶναι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν φύσιν καὶ φιλάλληλον καὶ πιστήν, τοῦτο παράδοξον οὐκ ἔστιν; — οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

[¶17] Come, then; let us recapitulate what has been granted. The man who is unrestrained, who has all things in his power as he wills, is free; but he who may be restrained or compelled or hindered, or thrown into any condition against his will, is a slave. “And who is unrestrained?” He who desires none of those things that belong to others.

> Greek: — πῶς οὖν ἔτι οὐ δερόμενος βλάπτεται ἢ δεσμευόμενος ἢ ἀποκεφαλιζόμενος; οὐχὶ οὕτως μέν· εἰ γενναίως πάσχει, καὶ προσκερδαίνων καὶ προσωφελούμενος ἀπέρχεται, ἐκεῖνος δὲ βλαπτόμενός ἐστιν ὁ τὰ οἰκτρότατα πάσχων καὶ αἴσχιστα, ὁ ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου λύκος γινόμενος ἢ ἔχις ἢ σφήξ;

[¶18] “And what are those things which belong to others?” Those which are not in our own power, either to have or not to have; or to have them thus or so. Body, therefore, belongs to another; its parts to another; property to another.

> Greek: ἄγε οὖν ἐπέλθωμεν τὰ ὡμολογημένα. ὁ ἀκώλυτος ἄνθρωπος ἐλεύθερος, ᾧ πρόχειρα τὰ πράγματα ὡς βούλεται. ὃν δʼ ἔστιν ἢ κωλῦσαι ἢ ἀναγκάσαι ἢ ἐμποδίσαι ἢ ἄκοντα εἴς τι ἐμβαλεῖν, δοῦλός ἐστιν.

[¶19] If, then, you attach yourself to any of these as your own, you will be punished as he deserves who desires what belongs to others.

> Greek: τίς δʼ ἀκώλυτος; ὁ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐφιέμενος. τίνα δʼ ἀλλότρια; ἃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν οὔτʼ ἔχειν οὔτε μὴ ἔχειν οὔτε ποιὰ ἔχειν ἢ πῶς ἔχοντα.

[¶20] This is the way that leads to freedom, this the only deliverance from slavery, to be able at length to say, from the bottom of one’s soul,—
Conduct me, Zeus, and thou, O Destiny,
Wherever your decrees have fixed my lot.
-H. But what say you, philosopher?

> Greek: οὐκοῦν τὸ σῶμα ἀλλότριον, τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἀλλότρια, ἡ κτῆσις ἀλλοτρία. ἂν οὖν τινι τούτων ὡς ἰδίῳ προσπαθῇς, δώσεις δίκας ἃς ἄξιον τὸν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐφιέμενον.

[¶21] A tyrant calls upon you to speak something unbecoming you. Will you say it, or will you not? “Stay, let me consider.” Would you consider now? And what did you use to consider when you were in the schools?

> Greek: αὕτη ἡ ὁδὸς ἐπʼ ἐλευθερίαν ἄγει, αὕτη μόνη ἀπαλλαγὴ δουλείας, [μόνῃ] τὸ δυνηθῆναί ποτʼ εἰπεῖν ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς τὸ ἄγου δέ μʼ, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γʼ ἡ Πεπρωμένη, ὅποι ποθʼ ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος.

[¶22] Did you not study what things were good and evil, and what indifferent? “did.” Well, and what were the opinions which pleased us? “That just and fair actions were good; unjust and base ones, evil.” Is living a good? “No.” Dying, an evil? “No.” A prison? “No.” And what did a mean and dishonest speech, the betraying a friend, or the flattering a tyrant, appear to us?

> Greek: ἀλλὰ τί λέγεις, φιλόσοφε; καλεῖ σε ὁ τύραννος ἐροῦντά τι ὧν οὐ πρέπει σοι. λέγεις ἢ οὐ λέγεις; εἰπέ μοι. — ἄφες σκέψωμαι. — νῦν σκέψῃ; ὅτε δʼ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἦς, τί ἐσκέπτου; οὐκ ἐμελέτας, τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τίνα οὐδέτερα; — Ἐσκεπτόμην. — τίνα οὖν ἤρεσκεν ὑμῖν;

[¶23] “Evils.” Why, then, are you still considering, and have not already considered and come to a resolution? For what sort of a consideration is this: “Whether I ought, when it is in my power, to procure myself the greatest good, instead of procuring myself the greatest evil.”

> Greek: — τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ ἄδικα καὶ αἰσχρὰ κακά. — μή τι τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθόν; — οὔ. — μή τι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν κακόν; — οὔ. — μή τι φυλακή; — οὔ. — λόγος δʼ ἀγεννὴς καὶ ἄπιστος καὶ φίλου προδοσία καὶ κολακεία τυράννου τί ὑμῖν ἐφαίνετο;

[¶24] A fine and necessary consideration, truly, and deserving mighty deliberation! Why do you trifle with us, man? No one ever needed to consider any such point; nor, if you really imagined things fair and honest to be good, things base and dishonest to be evil, and all other things indifferent, would you ever be in such a perplexity as this, or near it;

> Greek: — κακά. — τί οὖν; οὐχὶ σκέπτῃ, οὐχὶ δʼ ἔσκεψαι καὶ βεβούλευσαι. ποία γὰρ σκέψις, εἰ καθήκει μοὶ δυναμένῳ τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ ἐμαυτῷ περιποιῆσαι, τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ μὴ περιποιῆσαι; καλὴ σκέψις καὶ ἀναγκαία, πολλῆς βουλῆς δεομένη. τί ἡμῖν ἐμπαίζεις, ἄνθρωπε;

[¶25] but you would presently be able to distinguish by your understanding as you do by your sight. For do you ever have to consider whether black is white, or whether light is heavy? Do you not follow the plain evidence of your senses?

> Greek: οὐδέποτε τοιαύτη σκέψις γίνεται. οὐδʼ εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις κακὰ μὲν ἐφαντάζου τὰ αἰσχρά, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα οὐδέτερα, ἦλθες ἂν ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπίστασιν, οὐδʼ ἐγγύς· ἀλλʼ αὐτόθεν διακρίνειν εἶχες, ὥσπερ ὄψει τῇ διανοίᾳ.

[¶26] Why, then, do you say that you are now considering whether things indifferent are to be avoided, rather than evils? The truth is, you have no principles; for things indifferent do not impress you as such, but as the greatest evils;

> Greek: πότε γὰρ σκέπτῃ, εἰ τὰ μέλανα λευκά ἐστιν, εἰ τὰ βαρέα κοῦφα; οὐχὶ δὲ τοῖς ἐναργῶς φαινομένοις ἐπακολουθεῖς; πῶς οὖν νῦν σκέπτεσθαι λέγεις, εἰ τὰ οὐδέτερα τῶν κακῶν φευκτότερα;

[¶27] and these last, on the other hand, as things of no importance. For thus has been your practice from the first. “Where am I?

> Greek: ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔχεις τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ φαίνεταί σοι οὔτε ταῦτα οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα κακά, οὔτʼ ἐκεῖνα κακά, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

[¶28] If I am in the school and there is an audience, I talk as the philosophers do; but if I am out of the school, then away with this stuff that belongs only to scholars and fools.” This man is accused by the testimony of a philosopher, his friend; this philosopher turns parasite; another hires himself out for money;

> Greek: οὕτως γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴθισας σεαυτόν· ποῦ εἰμι; ἐν σχολῇ. καὶ ἀκούουσί μου τίνες; λέγω μετὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων. ἀλλʼ ἐξελήλυθα τῆς σχολῆς· ἆρον ἐκεῖνα τὰ τῶν σχολαστικῶν καὶ τῶν μωρῶν. οὕτως καταμαρτυρεῖται φίλος ὑπὸ φιλοσόφου, οὕτως παρασιτεῖ φιλόσοφος,

[¶29] a third does that in the very senate. When one is not governed by appearances, then his principles speak for themselves.

> Greek: οὕτως ἐπʼ ἀργυρίῳ ἐκμισθοῖ ἑαυτόν, οὕτως ἐν συγκλήτῳ τις οὐ λέγει τὰ φαινόμενα· ἔνδοθεν τὸ δόγμα αὐτοῦ βοᾷ,

[¶30] You are a poor cold lump of prejudice, consisting of mere phrases, on which you hang as by a hair. You should preserve yourself firm and practical, remembering that you are to deal with real things.

> Greek: οὐ ψυχρὸν καὶ ταλαίπωρον ὑποληψείδιον ἐκ λόγων εἰκαίων ὡς ἐκ τριχὸς ἠρτημένον, ἀλλὰ ἰσχυρὸν καὶ χρηστικὸν καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἔργων γεγυμνάσθαι μεμυημένον.

[¶31] In what manner do you hear,—I will not say that your child is dead, for how could you possibly bear that?—but that your oil is spilled, your wine consumed?

> Greek: παραφύλαξον σαυτόν, πῶς ἀκούεις — οὐ λέγω, ὅτι τὸ παιδίον σου ἀπέθανεν· πόθεν σοι; ἀλλʼ ὅτι σου τὸ ἔλαιον ἐξεχέθη, ὁ οἶνος ἐξεπόθη,

[¶32] Would that some one, while you are bawling, would only say this: “Philosopher, you talk quite otherwise when in the schools. Why do you deceive us? Why, when you are a worm, do you call yourself a man?”

> Greek: ἵνα τις ἐπιστὰς διατεινομένῳ σοι τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ μόνον εἴπῃ φιλόσοφε, ἄλλα λέγεις ἐν τῇ σχολῇ· τί ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατᾷς; τί σκώληξ ὢν λέγεις, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος εἶ;

[¶33] I should be glad to be near one of these philosophers while he is revelling in debauchery, that I might see how he demeans himself, and what sayings he utters; whether he remembers the title he bears and the discourses which he hears, or speaks, or reads.

> Greek: ἤθελον ἐπιστῆναί τινι αὐτῶν συνουσιάζοντι, ἵνα ἴδω, πῶς τείνεται καὶ ποίας φωνὰς ἀφίησιν, εἰ μέμνηται τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ, τῶν λόγων οὓς ἀκούει ἢ λέγει ἢ ἀναγιγνώσκει.

[¶34] “And what is all this to freedom?” It lies in nothing else than this,—whether you rich people approve or not.

> Greek: καὶ τί ταῦτα πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν;— οὐκ ἄλλα μὲν οὖν ἢ ταῦτʼ, ἄν τε θέλητε ὑμεῖς οἱ πλούσιοι ἄν τε μή.

[¶35] “And who affords evidence of this?” Who but yourselves? You who have a powerful master, and live by his motion and nod, and faint away if he does but look sternly upon you, who pay your court to old men and old women, and say, “cannot do this or that, it is not in my power.” Why is it not in your power? Did you not just now contradict me, and say you were free?

> Greek: — καὶ τί[ς] σοι μαρτυρεῖ ταῦτα; — τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ τὸν κύριον τὸν μέγαν ἔχοντες καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου νεῦμα καὶ κίνημα ζῶντες, κἄν τινα ὑμῶν ἴδῃ μόνον συνεστραμμένῳ βλέμματι, ἀποψυχόμενοι, τὰς γραίας θεραπεύοντες καὶ τοὺς γέροντας καὶ λέγοντες ὅτι οὐ δύναμαι τοῦτο ποιῆσαι· οὐκ ἐξεστί μοι;

[¶36] “But Aprylla has forbidden me.” Speak the truth, then, slave, and do not run away from your masters nor deny them, nor dare to assert your freedom, when you have so many proofs of your slavery.

> Greek: διὰ τί οὐκ ἔξεστίν σοι; οὐκ ἄρτι ἐμάχου μοι λέγων ἐλεύθερος εἶναι; ἀλλὰ Ἄπρυλλά με κεκώλυκεν. λέγε οὖν τὰς ἀληθείας, δοῦλε, καὶ μὴ δραπέτευέ σου τοὺς κυρίους μηδʼ ἀπαρνοῦ μηδὲ τόλμα καρπιστὴν διδόναι τοσούτους ἔχων τῆς δουλείας ἐλέγχους.

[¶37] One might indeed find some excuse for a person compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion, even when at the same time he sees what is best without having resolution enough to follow it, since he is withheld by something overpowering, and in some measure divine. But who can bear with you, who are in love with old men and old women, and perform menial offices for them, and bribe them with presents, and wait upon them like a slave when they are sick;

> Greek: καίτοι τὸν μὲν ὑπʼ ἔρωτος ἀναγκαζόμενόν τι ποιεῖν παρὰ τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ ἅμα μὲν ὁρῶντα τὸ ἄμεινον, ἅμα δʼ οὐκ ἐξευτονοῦντα ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἄν τις συγγνώμης ἄξιον ὑπολάβοι, ἅθʼ ὑπό τινος βιαίου καὶ τρόπον τινὰ θείου κατεσχημένον.

[¶38] at the same time wishing they may die, and inquiring of the physician whether their distemper be yet mortal? And again, when for these great and venerable magistracies and honors you kiss the hands of the slaves of others; so that you are the slave of those who are not free themselves! And then you walk about in state, a praetor or a consul. Do I not know how you came to be praetor;

> Greek: σοῦ δὲ τίς ἀνάσχοιτο τῶν γραῶν ἐρῶντος καὶ τῶν γερόντων καὶ ἐκείνας ἀπομύσσοντος καὶ ἀποπλύνοντος καὶ δωροδοκοῦντος καὶ ἅμα μὲν νοσούσας θεραπεύοντος ὡς δούλου, ἅμα δʼ ἀποθανεῖν εὐχομένου καὶ τοὺς ἰατροὺς διακρίνοντος, εἰ ἤδη θανασίμως ἔχουσιν; ἢ πάλιν ὅταν ὑπὲρ τῶν μεγάλων τούτων καὶ σεμνῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τιμῶν τὰς χεῖρας τῶν ἀλλοτρίων δούλων καταφιλῇς, ἵνα μηδʼ ἐλευθέρων δοῦλος ᾖς;

[¶39] whence you received the consulship; who gave it to you? For my own part, I would not even live, if I must live by Felicio’s means, and bear his pride and slavish insolence.

> Greek: εἶτά μοι σεμνὸς περιπατεῖς στρατηγῶν, ὑπατεύων, οὐκ οἶδα, πῶς ἐστρατήγησας, πόθεν τὴν ὑπατείαν ἔλαβες, τίς σοι αὐτὴν ἔδωκεν;

[¶40] For I know what a slave is, blinded by what he thinks good fortune. “Are you free yourself, then?” you may ask. By Heaven, I wish and pray for it. But I own I cannot yet face my masters.

> Greek: ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδὲ ζῆν ἤθελον, εἰ διὰ Φηλικίωνα ἔδει ζῆσαι τῆς ὀφρύος αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ δουλικοῦ φρυάγματος ἀνασχόμενον. οἶδα γάρ, τί ἐστι δοῦλος εὐτυχῶν ὡς δοκεῖ καὶ τετυφ[λ]ωμένος.

[¶41] I still pay a regard to my body, and set a great value on keeping it whole; though, for that matter, it is not whole. But I can show you one who was free, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. “How so?” Not because he was of free parents, for he was not;

> Greek: σὺ οὖν, φησίν, ἐλεύθερος εἶ;— θέλω νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ εὔχομαι, ἀλλʼ οὔπω δύναμαι ἀντιβλέψαι τοῖς κυρίοις, ἔτι τιμῶ τὸ σωμάτιον, ὁλόκληρον αὐτὸ ἔχειν ἀντὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι καίτοι μηδʼ ὁλόκληρον ἔχων.

[¶42] but because he was so in himself; because he had cast away all which gives a handle to slavery; nor was there any way of getting at him, nor anywhere to lay hold on him, to enslave him. Everything sat loose upon him; everything only just hung on. If you took hold on his possessions, he would rather let them go than follow you for them;

> Greek: ἀλλὰ δύναμαί σοι δεῖξαι ἐλεύθερον, ἵνα μηκέτι ζητῇς τὸ παράδειγμα. Διογένης ἦν ἐλεύθερος. πόθεν τοῦτο; οὐχ ὅτι ἐξ ἐλευθέρων ἦν (οὐ γὰρ ἦν), ἀλλʼ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἦν, ὅτι ἀποβεβλήκει πάσας τὰς τῆς δουλείας [β]λαβὰς οὐδʼ ἦν, ὅπως τις προσέλθῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐδʼ ὅθεν λάβηται πρὸς τὸ καταδουλώσασθαι.

[¶43] if on his leg, he let go his leg; if his body, he let go his body; acquaintance, friends, country, just the same. For he knew whence he had them, and from whom, and upon what conditions he received them. But he would never have forsaken his true parents, the gods, and his real country [the universe]; nor have suffered any one to be more dutiful and obedient to them than he;

> Greek: πάντα εὔλυτα εἶχεν, πάντα μόνον προσηρτημένα. εἰ τῆς κτήσεως ἐπελάβου, αὐτὴν ἀφῆκεν ἄν σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἠκολούθησεν διʼ αὐτήν· εἰ τοῦ σκέλους, τὸ σκέλος· εἰ ὅλου τοῦ σωματίου, ὅλον τὸ σωμάτιον· οἰκείους, φίλους, πατρίδα ὡσαύτως. ᾔδει, πόθεν ἔχει καὶ παρὰ τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν λαβών.

[¶44] nor would any one have died more readily for his country than he. He never had to inquire whether he should act for the good of the whole universe; for he remembered that everything that exists belongs to that administration, and is commanded by its ruler.

> Greek: τοὺς μέν γʼ ἀληθ[ε]ινοὺς προγόνους, τοὺς θεούς, καὶ τὴν τῷ ὄντι πατρίδα οὐδεπώποτʼ ἂν ἐγκατέλ[ε]ιπεν οὐδὲ παρεχώρησεν ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑπακούειν οὐδʼ ὑπεραπέθανεν ἂν εὐκολώτερον τῆς πατρίδος ἄλλος.

[¶45] Accordingly, see what he himself says and writes. “Upon this account,” said he, “Diogenes, it is in your power to converse as you will with the Persian monarch and with Archidamus, king of the Lacedemonians.”

> Greek: οὐ γὰρ ἐζήτει ποτὲ δόξαι τι ποιεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων, ἀλλʼ ἐμέμνητο, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γενόμενον ἐκεῖθέν ἐστιν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνης πράττεται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ διοικοῦντος αὐτὴν παρεγγυᾶται.

[¶46] Was it because he was born of free parents? Or was it because they were descended from slaves, that all the Athenians, and all the Lacedemonians, and Corinthians, could not converse with them as they pleased;

> Greek: τοιγαροῦν ὅρα, τί λέγει αὐτὸς καὶ γράφει· διὰ τοῦτό σοι, φησίν, ἔξεστιν, ὦ Διόγενες, καὶ τῷ Περσῶν βασιλεῖ καὶ Ἀρχιδάμῳ τῷ Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς βούλει διαλέγεσθαι.

[¶47] but feared and paid court to them? Why then is it in your power, Diogenes? “Because I do not esteem this poor body as my own. Because I want nothing. Because this and nothing else is a law to me.”

> Greek: ἆρά γʼ ὅτι ἐξ ἐλευθέρων ἦν; πάντες γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ πάντες Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Κορίνθιοι διὰ τὸ ἐκ δούλων εἶναι οὐκ ἠδύναντο αὐτοῖς ὡς ἠβούλοντο διαλέγεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐδεδοίκεσαν καὶ ἐθεράπευον;

[¶48] These were the things that enabled him to be free. And that you may not urge that I show you the example of a man clear of incumbrances, without a wife or children or country or friends or relations, to bend and draw him aside, take Socrates, and consider him, who had a wife and children, but held them not as his own;

> Greek: διὰ τί οὖν, φησίν, ἔξεστιν; ὅτι τὸ σωμάτιον ἐμὸν οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι, ὅτι οὐδενὸς δέομαι, ὅτι ὁ νόμος μοι πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλο οὐδέν. ταῦτα ἦν τὰ ἐλεύθερον ἐκεῖνον ἐάσαντα.

[¶49] had a country, friends, relations, but held them only so long as it was proper, and in the manner that was proper; submitting all these to the law and to the obedience due to it. Hence, when it was proper to fight, he was the first to go out, and exposed himself to danger without the least reserve.

> Greek: καὶ ἵνα μὴ δόξῃς, ὅτι παράδειγμα δείκνυμι ἀνδρὸς ἀπεριστάτου μήτε γυναῖκα ἔχοντος μήτε τέκνα μήτε πατρίδα ἢ φίλους ἢ συγγενεῖς, ὑφʼ ὧν κάμπτεσθαι καὶ περισπᾶσθαι ἠδύνατο, λάβε Σωκράτη καὶ θέασαι γυναῖκα καὶ παιδία ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ ὡς ἀλλότρια[ν], πατρίδα, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἔδει καὶ ὡς ἔδει, φίλους, συγγενεῖς, πάντα ταῦτα ὑποτεταχότα τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον εὐπειθείᾳ.

[¶50] But when he was sent by the thirty tyrants to apprehend Leon, because he esteemed it a base action, he did not even deliberate about it; though he knew that, perhaps, he might die for it. But what did that signify to him? For it was something else that he wanted to preserve, not his mere flesh;

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο, στρατεύεσθαι μὲν ὁπότʼ ἔδει, πρῶτος ἀπῄει κἀκεῖ ἐκινδύνευεν ἀφειδέστατα· ἐπὶ Λέοντα δʼ ὑπὸ τῶν τυράννων πεμφθείς, ὅτι αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖτο, οὐδʼ ἐπεβουλεύσατο εἰδώς, ὅτι ἀποθανεῖν δεήσει, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ.

[¶51] but his fidelity, his honor, free from attack or subjection. And afterwards, when he was to make a defence for his life, does he behave like one having children, or a wife?

> Greek: καὶ τί αὐτῷ διέφερεν; ἄλλο γάρ τι σῴζειν ἤθελεν· οὐ τὸ σαρκίδιον, ἀλλὰ τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα.

[¶52] No, but like a single man. And how does he behave, when required to drink the poison? When he might escape, and Crito would have him escape from prison for the sake of his children, what says he?

> Greek: ταῦτα ἀπαρεγχείρητα, ἀνυπότακτα. εἶθʼ ὅτʼ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ἔδει ὑπὲρ τοῦ ζῆν, μή τι ὡς τέκνα ἔχων ἀναστρέφεται, μή τι ὡς γυναῖκα; ἀλλʼ ὡς μόνος. τί δʼ, ὅτε πιεῖν ἔδει τὸ φάρμακον, πῶς ἀναστρέφεται;

[¶53] Does he esteem it a fortunate opportunity? How should he? But he considers what is becoming, and neither sees nor regards anything else. “For I am not desirous,” he says, “to preserve this pitiful body; but that part which is improved and preserved by justice, and impaired and destroyed by injustice.” Socrates is not to be basely preserved. He who refused to vote for what the Athenians commanded;

> Greek: δυνάμενος διασωθῆναι καὶ τοῦ Κρίτωνος αὐτῷ λέγοντος ὅτι ἔξελθε διὰ τὰ παιδία τί λέγει; ἕρμαιον ἡγεῖτο αὐτό; πόθεν; ἀλλὰ τὸ εὔσχημον σκοπεῖ, τἆλλα δʼ οὐδʼ ὁρᾷ, οὐδʼ ἐπιλογίζεται. οὐ γὰρ ἤθελεν, φησίν, σῶσαι τὸ σωμάτιον, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ τῷ δικαίῳ μὲν αὔξεται καὶ σῴζεται, τῷ δʼ ἀδίκῳ μειοῦται καὶ ἀπόλλυται.

[¶54] he who contemned the thirty tyrants; he who held such discourses on virtue and moral beauty,—such a man is not to be preserved by a base action, but is preserved by dying, instead of running away.

> Greek: Σωκράτης δʼ αἰσχρῶς οὐ σῴζεται, ὁ μὴ ἐπιψηφίσας Ἀθηναίων κελευόντων, ὁ τοὺς τυράννους ὑπεριδών, ὁ τοιαῦτα περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ καλοκἀγαθίας διαλεγόμενος·

[¶55] For even a good actor is preserved as such by leaving off when he ought; not by going on to act beyond his time. “What then will become of your children?”

> Greek: τοῦτον οὐκ ἔστι σῶσαι αἰσχρῶς, ἀλλʼ ἀποθνῄσκων σῴζεται, οὐ φεύγων. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὑποκριτὴς παυόμενος ὅτε δεῖ σῴζεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὑποκρινόμενος παρὰ καιρόν.

[¶56] “If I had gone away into Thessaly, you would have taken care of them; and will there be no one to take care of them when I am departed to Hades?” You see how he ridicules and plays with death.

> Greek: τί οὖν ποιήσει τὰ παιδία; εἰ μὲν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀπῄειν, ἐπεμελήθητε αὐτῶν· εἰς Ἅιδου δέ μου ἀποδημήσαντος οὐδεὶς ἔσται ὁ ἐπιμελησόμενος; ὅρα, πῶς ὑποκορίζεται καὶ σκώπτει τὸν θάνατον.

[¶57] But if it had been you or I, we should presently have proved by philosophical arguments that those who act unjustly are to be repaid in their own way; and should have added, “If I escape I shall be of use to many; if I die, to none.” Nay, if it had been necessary, we should have crept through a mouse-hole to get away.

> Greek: εἰ δʼ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ ἦμεν, εὐθὺς ἂν καταφιλοσοφήσαντες ὅτι τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας δεῖ τοῖς ἴσοις ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ προσθέντες ὅτι ὄφελος ἔσομαι πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις σωθείς, ἀποθανὼν δʼ οὐδενί, εἰ [γ]ἄρʼ ἔδει διὰ τρώγλης ἐκδύντας, ἐξήλθομεν ἄν.

[¶58] But how should we have been of use to any? Where must they have dwelt? If we were useful alive, should we not be of still more use to mankind by dying when we ought and as we ought?

> Greek: καὶ πῶς ἂν ὠφελήσαμέν τινα; ποῦ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ἔμενον ἐκεῖνοι; ἢ οἳ ὄντες ἦμεν ὠφέλιμοι, οὐχὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀποθανόντες ἂν ὅτε ἔδει καὶ ὡς ἔδει ὠφελήσαμεν ἀνθρώπους;

[¶59] And now the remembrance of the death of Socrates is not less, but even more useful to the world than that of the things which he did and said when alive.

> Greek: καὶ νῦν Σωκράτους ἀποθανόντος οὐθὲν ἧττον ἢ καὶ πλεῖον ὠφέλιμός ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ μνήμη ὧν ἔτι ζῶν ἔπραξεν ἢ εἶπεν.

[¶60] Study these points, these principles, these discourses; contemplate these examples if you would be free, if you desire the thing in proportion to its value.

> Greek: ταῦτα μελέτα, ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα, τούτους τοὺς λόγους, εἰς ταῦτα ἀφόρα τὰ παραδείγματα, εἰ θέλεις ἐλεύθερος εἶναι, εἰ ἐπιθυμεῖς κατʼ ἀξίαν τοῦ πράγματος.

[¶61] And where is the wonder that you should purchase so good a thing at the price of other things, be they never so many and so great? Some hang themselves, others break their necks, and sometimes even whole cities have been destroyed for that which is reputed freedom;

> Greek: καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, εἰ τηλικοῦτο πρᾶγμα τοσούτων καὶ τηλικούτων ὠνῇ; ὑπὲρ τῆς νομιζομένης ἐλευθερίας ταύτης οἱ μὲν ἀπάγχονται, οἱ δὲ κατακρημνίζουσιν αὑτούς, ἔστι δʼ ὅτε καὶ πόλεις ὅλαι ἀπώλοντο·

[¶62] and will not you for the sake of the true and secure and inviolable freedom, repay God what he hath given when he demands it? Will you not study not only, as Plato says, how to die, but how to be tortured and banished and scourged; and, in short, how to give up all that belongs to others?

> Greek: ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθ[ε]ινῆς καὶ ἀνεπιβουλεύτου καὶ ἀσφαλοῦς ἐλευθερίας ἀπαιτοῦντι τῷ θεῷ ἃ δέδωκεν οὐκ ἐκστήσῃ; οὐχ, ὡς Πλάτων λέγει, μελετήσεις οὐχὶ ἀποθνῄσκειν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ στρεβλοῦσθαι καὶ φεύγειν καὶ δέρεσθαι καὶ πάνθʼ ἁπλῶς ἀποδιδόναι τἀλλότρια;

[¶63] If not, you will be a slave among slaves, though you were ten thousand times a consul; and even though you should rise to the palace, you will never be the less so. And you will feel that, though philosophers (as Cleanthes says) do, perhaps, talk contrary to common opinion, yet it is not contrary to reason.

> Greek: ἔσει τοίνυν δοῦλος ἐν δούλοις, κἂν μυριάκις ὑπατεύσῃς, κἂν εἰς τὸ παλάτιον ἀναβῇς, οὐδὲν ἧττον· καὶ αἰσθήσει, ὅτι παράδοξα μὲν ἴσως φασὶν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ἔλεγεν, οὐ μὴν παράλογα.

[¶64] For you will find it true, in fact, that the things that are eagerly followed and admired are of no use to those who have gained them; while they who have not yet gained them imagine that, if they are acquired, every good will come along with them; and then, when they are acquired, there is the same feverishness, the same agitation, the same nausea, and the same desire for what is absent.

> Greek: ἔργῳ γὰρ εἴσῃ, ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐστι καὶ τούτων τῶν θαυμαζομένων καὶ σπουδαζομένων ὄφελος οὐδέν ἐστι τοῖς τυχοῦσι· τοῖς δὲ μηδέπω τετευχόσι φαντασία γίνεται, ὅτι παραγενομένων αὐτῶν ἅπαντα παρέσται αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀγαθά· εἶθʼ ὅταν παραγένηται, τὸ καῦμα ἴσον, ὁ ῥιπτασμὸς ὁ αὐτός, ἡ ἄση, ἡ τῶν οὐ παρόντων ἐπιθυμία.

[¶65] For freedom is not procured by a full enjoyment of what is desired, but by controlling the desire.

> Greek: οὐ γὰρ ἐκπληρώσει τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων ἐλευθερία παρασκευάζεται, ἀλλὰ ἀνασκευῇ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.

[¶66] And in order to know that this is true, take the same pains about these which you have taken about other things. Hold vigils to acquire a set of principles that will make you free.

> Greek: καὶ ἵνʼ εἰδῇς, ὅτι ἀληθῆ ταῦτά ἐστιν, ὡς ἐκείνων ἕνεκα πεπόνηκας, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα μετάθες τὸν πόνον· ἀγρύπνησον ἕνεκα τοῦ δόγμα περιποιήσασθαι ἐλευθεροποιόν,

[¶67] Instead of a rich old man, pay your court to a philosopher. Be seen about his doors. You will not get any disgrace by being seen there. You will not return empty or unprofited if you go as you ought. However, try at least. The trial is not dishonorable.

> Greek: θεράπευσον ἀντὶ γέροντος πλουσίου φιλόσοφον, περὶ θύρας ὄφθητ[α]ι τὰς τούτου· οὐκ ἀσχημονήσεις ὀφθείς, οὐκ ἀπελεύσῃ κενὸς οὐδʼ ἀκερδής, ἂν ὡς δεῖ προσέλθῃς. εἰ δὲ μή, πείρασόν γʼ· οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσχρὰ ἡ πεῖρα.

[¶68] 2. To this point you must attend before all others: not to be so attached to any one of your former acquaintances or friends as to condescend to behavior like his; otherwise you will undo yourself. But if it comes into your head, “shall appear odd to him, and he will not treat me as before,” remember that there is nothing to be had for nothing; nor is it possible that he who acts in the same manner as before should not remain the same person. Choose, then, whether you will be loved by those who formerly loved you, and be like your former self; or be better, and not meet with the same treatment. For if this last is preferable, immediately incline altogether this way, and let no other kind of reasoning draw you aside; for no one can improve while he is wavering. If, then, you prefer this to everything, if you would be fixed only on this, and employ all your pains about it, give up everything else. Otherwise this wavering will affect you in both directions; you will neither make a due improvement, nor preserve the advantages you had before. For before, by setting your heart entirely on things of no value, you were agreeable to your companions. But you cannot excel in both styles; you must necessarily lose as much of the one as you partake of the other. If you do not drink with those with whom you used to drink, you cannot appear equally agreeable to them. Choose, then, whether you would be. a drunkard, and agreeable to them, or sober, and disagreeable to them. If you do not sing with those with whom you used to sing, you cannot be equally dear to them. Here too, then, choose which you will. For if it is better to be modest and decent than to have it said of you “what an agreeable fellow,” give up the rest; renounce it; withdraw yourself; have nothing to do with it. But if this does not please you, incline with your whole force the contrary way. Be one of the debauchees; one of the adulterers. Act all that is consistent with such a character, and you will obtain what you would have. Jump up in the theatre, too, and roar out in praise of the dancer. But characters so different are not to be confounded You cannot act both Thersites and Agamemnon. If you would be Thersites, you must be hump-backed and bald; if Agamemnon, great and noble, and faithful to those who are under your care When you have lost anything external, have always at hand the consideration of what you have got instead of it; and if this be of more value, do not by any means call yourself a loser,—whether it be a horse for an ass; an ox for a sheep; a good action for a piece of money; a due composure of mind for a dull jest; or modesty for indecent talk.

> Greek: 2. τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ πρὸ πάντων σε δεῖ προσέχειν, μή ποτε ἄρα τῶν προτέρων συνήθων ἢ φίλων ἀνακραθῇς τινι οὕτως, ὥστʼ εἰς τὰ αὐτὰ συγκαταβῆναι αὐτῷ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπολεῖς σεαυτόν. ἂν δέ σʼ ὑποτρέχῃ ὅτι ἀδέξιος αὐτῷ φανοῦμαι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἕξει ὡς πρότερον, μέμνησο, ὅτι προῖκα οὐδὲν γίνεται οὐδʼ ἔστι δυνατὸν μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ποιοῦντα [μὴ] τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ ποτέ. ἐλοῦ οὖν πότερον θέλεις, ὁμοίως φιλεῖσθαι ὑφʼ ὧν πρότερον ὅμοιος ὢν τῷ πρότερον σεαυτῷ ἢ κρείσσων ὢν μὴ τυγχάνειν τῶν ἴσων. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο κρεῖσσον, αὐτόθεν ἀπόνευσον ἐπὶ τοῦτο μηδέ σε περισπάτωσαν οἱ ἕτεροι διαλογισμοί. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐπαμφοτερίζων δύναται προκόψαι, ἀλλʼ εἰ τοῦτο πάντων προκέκρικας, εἰ πρὸς τούτῳ μόνῳ θέλεις εἶναι, εἰ τοῦτο ἐκπονῆσαι, ἄφες ἅπαντα τἆλλα· εἰ δὲ μή, οὗτος ὁ ἐπαμφοτερισμὸς ἑκάτερόν σοι ποιήσει, οὔτε προκόψεις κατʼ ἀξίαν οὔτʼ ἐκείνων τεύξῃ, ὧν πρότερον ἐτύγχανες. πρότερον γὰρ εἰλικρινῶς ἐφιέμενος τῶν οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἡδὺς ἦς τοῖς συνοῦσιν. οὐ δύνασαι δʼ ἐν ἀμφοτέρῳ τῷ εἴδει διενεγκεῖν· ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη, καθόσον ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου κοινωνῇς, ἀπολείπεσθαί σʼ ἐν θατέρῳ. οὐ δύνασαι μὴ πίνων μεθʼ ὧν ἔπινες ὁμοίως ἡδὺς αὐτοῖς φαίνεσθαι· ἑλοῦ οὖν, πότερον μεθυστὴς εἶναι θέλεις καὶ ἡδὺς ἐκείνοις ἢ νήφων ἀηδής. οὐ δύνασαι μὴ ᾁδων μεθʼ ὧν ᾖδες ὁμοίως φιλεῖσθαι ὑπʼ αὐτῶν· ἑλοῦ οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα, πότερον θέλεις. εἰ γὰρ κρεῖσσον τὸ αἰδήμονα εἶναι καὶ κόσμιον τοῦ εἰπεῖν τινα ἡδὺς ἄνθρωπος, ἄφες τὰ ἕτερα, ἀπόγνωθι, ἀποστράφηθι, μηδὲν σοὶ καὶ αὐτοῖς. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀρέσει ταῦτα, ὅλος ἀπόκλινον ἐπὶ τἀναντία· γενοῦ εἷς τῶν κιναίδων, εἷς τῶν μοιχῶν καὶ ποίει τὰ ἑξῆς καὶ τεύξῃ ὧν θέλεις. καὶ ἀναπηδῶν ἐπικραύγαζε τῷ ὀρχηστῇ. διάφορα δʼ οὕτως πρόσωπα οὐ μίγνυται· οὐ δύνασαι καὶ Θερσίτην ὑποκρίνασθαι καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα. ἂν Θερσίτης εἶναι θέλῃς, κυρτόν σε εἶναι δεῖ, φαλακρόν· ἂν Ἀγαμέμνων, μέγαν καὶ καλὸν καὶ τοὺς ὑποτεταγμένους φιλοῦντα.

[¶69] 3. By continually remembering this, you will preserve your character such as it ought to be. Otherwise, consider that you are spending your time in vain; and all that to which you are now applying your mind, you are about to spill and overturn. And there needs but little, merely a small deviation from reason, to destroy and overset all. A pilot does not need so much apparatus to overturn a ship as to save it; but if he exposes it a little too much to the wind, it is lost; even if he should not do it by design, but only for a moment be thinking of something else, it is lost. Such is the case here too. If you do but nod a little, all that you have hitherto accomplished is gone. Take heed, then, to the appearances of things. Keep yourself watchful over them. It is no inconsiderable matter that you have to guard; but modesty, fidelity, constancy, docility, innocence, fearlessness, serenity,—in short, freedom. For what will you sell these? Consider what the purchase is worth. “But shall I not get such a thing instead of it?” Consider, if you do not get it, what it is that you have instead. Suppose I have decency, and another the office of tribune; I have modesty, and he the praetorship? But I do not applaud where it is unbecoming; I will pay no undeserved honor; for I am free, and the friend of God, so as to obey him willingly; and I must not value anything else, neither body, nor possessions, nor fame,—in short, nothing. For it is not his will that I should value them. If this had been his pleasure, he would have placed in them my good, which now he has not done; therefore I cannot transgress his commands. Seek in all things your own highest good; and for other aims, recognize them so far as the case requires, and in accordance with reason, contented with this alone. Otherwise you will be unfortunate, disappointed, restrained, hindered. These are the established laws, these the statutes. Of these one ought to be an expositor, and to these obedient, rather than to those of Masurius and Cassius.

> Greek: 3. ἐκεῖνο πρόχειρον ἔχε, ὅταν τινὸς ἀπολείπῃ τῶν ἐκτός, τί ἀντʼ αὐτοῦ περιποιῇ· κἂν ᾖ πλείονος ἄξιον, μηδέποτʼ εἴπῃς ὅτι ἐζημίωμαι· οὐδʼ ἂν ἀντὶ ὄνου ἵππον, οὐδʼ ἀντὶ προβάτου βοῦν, οὐδʼ ἀντὶ κέρματος πρᾶξιν καλήν, οὐδʼ ἀντὶ ψυχρολογίας ἡσυχίαν οἵαν δεῖ, οὐδʼ ἀντὶ αἰσχρολογίας αἰδῶ. τούτων μεμνημένος πανταχοῦ διασώσεις τὸ σαυτοῦ πρόσωπον οἷον ἔχειν σε δεῖ. εἰ δὲ μή, σκόπει, ὅτι ἀπόλλυνται οἱ χρόνοι εἰκῇ καὶ ὅσα νῦν προσέχεις σεαυτῷ, μέλλεις ἐκχεῖν ἅπαντα ταῦτα καὶ ἀνατρέπειν. ὀλίγου δὲ χρεία ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπώλειαν τὴν πάντων καὶ ἀνατροπήν, μικρᾶς ἀποστροφῆς τοῦ λόγου. ἵνα ὁ κυβερνήτης ἀνατρέψῃ τὸ πλοῖον, οὐ χρείαν ἔχει τῆς αὐτῆς παρασκευῆς, ὅσης εἰς τὸ σῶσαι· ἀλλὰ μικρὸν πρὸς τὸν ἄνεμον ἂν ἐπιστρέψῃ, ἀπώλετο· κἂν μὴ αὐτὸς ἑκών, ὑποπαρενθυμηθῇ δʼ, ἀπώλετο. τοιοῦτόν ἐστί τι καὶ ἐνθάδε· μικρὸν ἂν ἀπονυστάξῃς, ἀπῆλθεν πάντα τὰ μέχρι νῦν συνειλεγμένα. πρόσεχε οὖν ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἐπαγρύπνει. οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν τὸ τηρούμενον, ἀλλʼ αἰδὼς καὶ πίστις καὶ εὐστάθεια, ἀπάθεια, ἀλυπία, ἀφοβία, ἀταραξία, ἁπλῶς ἐλευθερία. τίνων μέλλεις ταῦτα πωλεῖν; βλέπε, πόσου ἀξίων. — ἀλλʼ οὐ τεύξομαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἀντʼ αὐτοῦ. — βλέπε καὶ τυγχάνων πάλιν ἐκείνου, τί ἀντʼ αὐτοῦ λαμβάνεις. ἐγὼ εὐκοσμίαν, ἐκεῖνος δημαρχίαν· ἐκεῖνος στρατηγίαν, ἐγὼ αἰδῶ. ἀλλʼ οὐ κραυγάζω, ὅπου ἀπρεπές· ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀναστήσομαι, ὅπου μὴ δεῖ. ἐλεύθερος γάρ εἰμι καὶ φίλος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνʼ ἑκὼν πείθωμαι αὐτῷ. τῶν δʼ ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἀντιποιεῖσθαί με δεῖ, οὐ σώματος, οὐ κτήσεως, οὐκ ἀρχῆς, οὐ φήμης, ἁπλῶς οὐδενός· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος βούλεταί μʼ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι αὐτῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἤθελεν, ἀγαθὰ πεποιήκει αὐτὰ ἂν ἐμοί. νῦν δʼ οὐ πεποίηκεν· διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν δύναμαι παραβῆναι τῶν ἐντολῶν. τήρει τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ σαυτοῦ ἐν παντί, τῶν δʼ ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ διδόμενον μέχρι τοῦ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν αὐτοῖς, τούτῳ μόνῳ ἀρκούμενος. εἰ δὲ μή, δυστυχήσεις, ἀτυχήσεις, κωλυθήσῃ, ἐμποδισθήσῃ. οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖθεν ἀπεσταλμένοι νόμοι, ταῦτα τὰ διατάγματα· τούτων ἐξηγητὴν δεῖ γενέσθαι, τούτοις ὑποτεταγμένον, οὐ τοῖς Μασουρίου καὶ Κασσίου.

[¶70] 4. Remember that it is not only the desire of riches and power that debases us and subjects us to others, but even that of quiet, leisure, learning, or travelling. For, in general, reverence for any external thing whatever makes us subject to others.

> Greek: 4. μέμνησο, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιθυμία ἀρχῆς καὶ πλούτου ταπεινοὺς ποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλοις ὑποτεταγμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡσυχίας καὶ σχολῆς καὶ ἀποδημίας καὶ φιλολογίας. ἁπλῶς γὰρ οἷον [ε]ἂν ᾖ τὸ ἐκτός, ἡ τιμὴ αὐτοῦ ὑποτάσσει ἄλλῳ.

[¶71] Where is the difference, then, whether you desire to be a senator or not to be a senator? Where is the difference, whether you desire power or to be out of power? Where is the difference, whether you say, “am in a wretched way, I have nothing to do; but am tied down to books, as inactive as if I were dead;” or “am in a wretched way, I have no leisure to read”?

> Greek: τί οὖν διαφέρει συγκλήτου ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι συγκλητικόν; τί διαφέρει ἀρχῆς ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ ἀναρχίας; τί διαφέρει λέγειν ὅτι κακῶς μοί ἐστιν, οὐδὲν ἔχω τί πράξω, ἀλλὰ τοῖς βιβλίοις προσδέδεμαι ὡς νεκρὸς ἢ λέγειν κακῶς μοί ἐστιν, οὐκ εὐσχολῶ ἀναγνῶναι;

[¶72] For as levees and power are among things external and uncontrollable by will, so likewise is a book.

> Greek: ὡς γὰρ ἀσπασμοὶ καὶ ἀρχὴ τῶν ἐκτός ἐστι καὶ ἀπροαιρέτων, οὕτως καὶ βιβλίον.

[¶73] For what purpose would you read? Tell me. For if you rest merely in being amused and learning something, you are insignificant and miserable. But if you refer it to the proper end, what is that end but a life truly prosperous? And if reading does not procure you a prosperous life, of what use is it? “But it does procure a prosperous life (say you);

> Greek: ἢ τίνος ἕνεκα θέλεις ἀναγνῶναι; εἰπέ μοι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπʼ αὐτὸ[υ] καταστρέφεις [ἐπʼ αὐτὸ] τὸ ψυχαγωγηθῆναι ἢ μαθεῖν τι, ψυχρὸς εἶ καὶ ταλαίπωρος. εἰ δʼ ἐφʼ ὃ δεῖ ἀναφέρεις, τί τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἄλλο ἢ εὔροια; εἰ δέ σοι τὸ ἀναγιγνώσκειν εὔροιαν μὴ περιποιῇ, τί ὄφελος αὐτοῦ;

[¶74] and therefore I am.uneasy at being deprived of it.” And what sort of prosperity is that which everything can hinder,—I do not say Caesar alone, or Caesar’s friend, but a crow, a man practising the flute, a fever, or ten thousand other things? Nothing is so essential to prosperity as that it should be permanent and unhindered.

> Greek: — ἀλλὰ περιποιεῖ, φησίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀγανακτῶ ὡς ἀπολειπόμενος αὐτοῦ. — καὶ τίς αὕτη ἡ εὔροια, ἣν ὁ τυχὼν ἐμποδίσαι δύναται, οὐ λέγω Καῖσαρ ἢ Καίσαρος φίλος, ἀλλὰ κόραξ, αὐλητής, πυρετός, ἄλλα τρισμύρια; ἡ δʼ εὔροια οὐδὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τὸ διηνεκὲς καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστον.

[¶75] Suppose I am now called to do something. I go, therefore, and will be attentive to the bounds and measures which ought to be observed; that I may act modestly, steadily, and without desire or aversion as to externals.

> Greek: νῦν καλοῦμαι πράξων τι, ἄπειμι νῦν προσέξων τοῖς μέτροις ἃ δεῖ τηρεῖν, ὅτι αἰδημόνως, ὅτι ἀσφαλῶς, ὅτι δίχα ὀρέξεως καὶ ἐκκλίσεως τῆς πρὸς τὰ ἐκτός,

[¶76] In the next place, I am attentive to other men, what they say, and how they are moved; and that not from ill-nature, nor that I may have an opportunity for censure or ridicule; but I turn to myself. “Am I also guilty of the same faults; and how then shall I leave them off?”

> Greek: καὶ λοιπὸν προσέχω τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τίνα φασί, πῶς κινοῦνται, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ κακοήθως οὐδʼ ἵνα ἔχω ψέγειν ἢ καταγελῶ, ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἐμαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφω, εἰ ταὐτὰ κἀγὼ ἁμαρτάνω. πῶς οὖν παύσωμαι; τότε καὶ ἐγὼ ἡμάρτανον· νῦν δʼ οὐκέτι, χάρις τῷ θεῷ.

[¶77] or, “once thus erred, but, God be thanked, not now.” Well, when you have done thus, and been employed on such things, have you not done as good a work as if you had read a thousand lines or written as many? For are you uneasy at not reading while you are eating?

> Greek: ἄγε, ταῦτα ποιήσας καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γενόμενος χεῖρον ἔργον πεποίηκας ἢ χιλίους στίχους ἀναγνοὺς ἢ γράψας ἄλλους τοσούτους; ὅταν γὰρ ἐσθίῃς, ἄχθῃ, ὅτι μὴ ἀναγιγνώσκεις; οὐκ ἀρκῇ τῷ καθʼ ἃ ἀνέγνωκας ἐσθίειν;

[¶78] When you eat, or bathe, or exercise, are you not satisfied with doing it in a manner corresponding to what you have read? Why, then, do you not reason in like manner about everything?

> Greek: ὅταν λούῃ; ὅταν γυμνάζῃ; διὰ τί οὖν ἐπὶ πάντων οὐχ ὁμαλίζεις, καὶ ὅταν Καίσαρι προσίῃς καὶ ὅταν τῷ δεῖνι; εἰ τὸν ἀπαθῆ τηρεῖς, εἰ τὸν ἀκατάπληκτον,

[¶79] When you approach Caesar or any other person, if you preserve yourself dispassionate, fearless, sedate; if you are rather an observer of what is done than the subject of observation; if you do not envy those who are preferred to you;

> Greek: εἰ τὸν κατεσταλμένον, εἰ βλέπεις μᾶλλον τὰ γινόμενα ἢ βλέπῃ, εἰ μὴ φθονεῖς τοῖς προτιμωμένοις, εἰ μὴ ἐκπλήσσουσίν σε αἱ ὗλαι, τί σοι λείπει; βιβλία; πῶς ἢ ἐπὶ τί;

[¶80] if you are not overcome by the occasion, what need you more? Books? How, or to what end? For these are not the real preparation for living, but living is made up of things very different.

> Greek: οὐχὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ βιοῦν παρασκευή τίς ἐστιν αὕτη; τὸ βιοῦν δʼ ἐξ ἄλλων τινῶν ἢ τούτων συμπληροῦται. οἷον ἂν εἰ ὁ ἀθλητὴς κλαίῃ εἰς τὸ στάδιον εἰσιών, ὅτι μὴ ἔξω γυμνάζεται.

[¶81] Just as if a champion, when he enters the lists, should begin crying because he is not still exercising in advance. It was for this that you were exercised.

> Greek: τούτων ἕνεκα ἐγυμνάζου, ἐπὶ τοῦτο οἱ ἁλτῆρες, ἡ ἁφή, οἱ νεανίσκοι. καὶ νῦν ἐκεῖνα ζητεῖς, ὅτε τοῦ ἔργου καιρός ἐστιν;

[¶82] For this were the dumb-bells, the dust, and your young antagonists. And do you now seek for these when it is the time for actual business?

> Greek: οἷον εἰ ἐπὶ τοῦ συγκαταθετικοῦ τόπου παρισταμένων φαντασιῶν τῶν μὲν καταληπτικῶν, τῶν δʼ ἀκαταλήπτων μὴ ταύτας διακρίνειν θέλοιμεν, ἀλλʼ ἀναγιγνώσκειν τὰ Περὶ καταλήψεως.

[¶83] This is just as if, in forming our opinions, when perplexed between true and false semblances, we should, instead of practically distinguishing between them, merely peruse dissertations on evidence. What, then, is the trouble? That we have neither learned by reading, nor by writing, how to deal practically with the semblances of things according to the laws of nature. But we stop at learning what is said, and, being able to explain it to others, at solving syllogisms and arranging hypothetical arguments.

> Greek: τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον; ὅτι οὐδέποτε τούτου ἕνεκα ἀνέγνωμεν, οὐδέποτε τούτου ἕνεκα ἐγράψαμεν, ἵνʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων κατὰ φύσιν χρώμεθα ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις, ἀλλʼ αὐτοῦ καταλήγομεν μαθεῖν, τί λέγεται, καὶ ἄλλῳ δύνασθαι ἐξηγήσασθαι, τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἀναλῦσαι καὶ τὸν ὑποθετικὸν ἐφοδεῦσαι.

[¶84] Hence where the study is, there, too, is the hindrance. Do you desire absolutely what is out of your power?

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο ὅπου ἡ σπουδή, ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ ἐμποδισμός. θέλεις τὰ μὴ ἐπὶ σοὶ ἐξ ἅπαντος; κωλύου τοίνυν, ἐμποδίζου, ἀποτύγχανε.

[¶85] Be restrained then, be hindered, be disappointed. But if we were to read dissertations about the exertion of our efforts, not merely to see what might be said about our efforts, but to exert them well; on desire and aversion, that we might not be disappointed of our desires, nor incur our aversions; on the duties of life, that mindful of our relations, we might do nothing irrational nor inconsistent with them;

> Greek: εἰ δὲ τὰ Περὶ ὁρμῆς τούτου ἕνεκα ἀναγιγνώσκοιμεν, οὐχ ἵνα ἴδωμεν, τί λέγεται περὶ ὁρμῆς, ἀλλʼ ἵνα ὁρμῶμεν· τὰ Περὶ ὀρέξεως δὲ καὶ ἐκκλίσεως, ἵνα μήποτʼ ὀρεγόμενοι ἀποτυγχάνωμεν μήτʼ ἐκκλίνοντες περιπίπτωμεν· τὰ Περὶ καθήκοντος δʼ, ἵνα μεμνημένοι τῶν σχέσεων μηδὲν ἀλογίστως μηδὲ παρʼ αὐτὰ ποιῶμεν·

[¶86] then we should not be provoked at being hindered in our reading; but should be contented with the performance of actions suitable to us, and should learn a new standard of computation. Not, “To-day I have perused so many lines; I have written so many;”

> Greek: οὐκ ἂν ἠγανακτοῦμεν πρὸς τὰ ἀναγνώσματα ἐμποδιζόμενοι, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὰ ἔργα ἀποδιδόναι τὰ κατ[α]άλληλα ἠρκούμεθα καὶ ἠριθμοῦμεν ἂν οὐ ταῦτα, ἃ μέχρι νῦν ἀριθμεῖν εἰθίσμεθα σήμερον ἀνέγνων στίχους τοσούσδε, ἔγραψα τοσούσδε,

[¶87] but, “To-day I have used my efforts as the philosophers direct. I have restrained my desire. absolutely; I have applied my aversion only to things controllable by will. I have not been terrified by such a one, nor put out of countenance by such another. I have exercised my patience, my abstinence, my beneficence.” And thus we should thank God for what we ought to thank him.

> Greek: ἀλλὰ σήμερον ὁρμῇ ἐχρησάμην, ὡς παραγγέλλεται ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὀρέξει οὐκ ἐχρησάμην, ἐκκλίσει πρὸς μόνα τὰ προαιρετικά, οὐ κατεπλάγην τὸν δεῖνα, οὐκ ἐδυσωπήθην ὑπὸ τοῦ δεῖνος, τὸ ἀνεκτικὸν ἐγύμνασα, τὸ ἀφεκτικόν, τὸ συνεργητικόν καὶ οὕτως ἂν ηὐχαριστοῦμεν τῷ θεῷ ἐφʼ οἷς δεῖ εὐχαριστεῖν.

[¶88] But now we resemble the crowd in another way also, and do not know it. One is afraid that he shall not be in power; you, that you shall.

> Greek: νῦν δʼ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἴσμεν, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄλλον τρόπον ὅμοιοι τοῖς πολλοῖς γινόμεθα. ἄλλος φοβεῖται, μὴ οὐκ ἄρξῃ· σύ, μὴ ἄρξῃς.

[¶89] By no means be afraid of it, man; but as you laugh at him, laugh at yourself. For there is no difference, whether you thirst like one in a fever, or dread water like him who is bit by a mad dog.

> Greek: μηδαμῶς, ἄνθρωπε. ἀλλʼ ὡς καταγελᾷς τοῦ φοβουμένου μὴ ἄρξαι, οὕτως καὶ σαυτοῦ καταγέλα. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ἢ διψῆν πυρέσσοντα ἢ ὡς λυσσώδη ὑδροφόβον εἶναι.

## 21. Book IV · chapters 4–6

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/21/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/21/#p-N

[¶0] Else how can you say, like Socrates, “If it so pleases God, so let it be”? Do you think that Socrates, if he had fixed his desires on the leisure of the lyceum or the academy, or the conversation of the youth there, day after day, would have made so many campaigns as he did, so readily? Would not he have lamented and groaned: “How wretched am I! now must I be miserable here, when I might be sunning myself in the lyceum”?

> Greek: ἢ πῶς ἔτι δυνήσῃ εἰπεῖν τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους εἰ ταύτῃ φίλον τῷ θεῷ, ταύτῃ γινέσθω; δοκεῖς, Σωκράτης εἰ ἐπεθύμει ἐν Λυκείῳ ἢ ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ σχολάζειν καὶ διαλέγεσθαι καθʼ ἡμέραν τοῖς νέοις, εὐκόλως ἂν ἐστρατεύσατο ὁσάκις ἐστρατεύσατο; οὐχὶ δʼ ὠδύρετʼ ἂν καὶ ἔστενεν τάλας ἐγώ, νῦν ἐνθάδʼ ἀτυχῶ ἄθλιος δυνάμενος ἐν Λυκείῳ ἡλιάζεσθαι;

[¶1] Was that your business in life, then, to sun yourself? Was it not to be truly successful; to be unrestrained and free? And how could he have been Socrates, if he had lamented thus? How could he after that have written Paeans in a prison?

> Greek: τοῦτο γάρ σου τὸ ἔργον ἦν, ἡλιάζεσθαι; οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ εὐροεῖν, τὸ ἀκώλυτον εἶναι, τὸ ἀπαραπόδιστον; καὶ πῶς ἂν ἔτι ἦν Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ὠδύρετο; πῶς ἂν ἔτι ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ παιᾶνας ἔγραφεν;

[¶2] In short, then, remember this, that so far as you prize anything external to your own will, you impair that will. And not only power is external to it, but the being out of power too; not only business, but leisure too. “Then must I live in this tumult now?”

> Greek: ἁπλῶς οὖν ἐκείνου μέμνησο, ὅτι, πᾶν ὃ ἔξω τῆς προαιρέσεως τῆς σαυτοῦ τιμήσεις, ἀπώλεσας τὴν προαίρεσιν. ἔξω δʼ ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ἀρχή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναρχία, οὐ μόνον ἀσχολία, ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολή.

[¶3] What do you call a tumult? “multitude of people.” And where is the hardship? Suppose it to be the Olympic Games. Think it a public assembly. There, too, some bawl out one thing, some another; some push the rest. The baths are crowded. Yet who of us is not pleased with these assemblies, and does not grieve to leave them? Do not be hard to please, and squeamish at what happens. “Vinegar is disagreeable, for it is sour.

> Greek: νῦν οὖν ἐμὲ ἐν τῷ θορύβῳ τούτῳ διεξάγειν. τί λέγεις θορύβῳ; ἐν πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις; καὶ τί χαλεπόν; δόξον ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ εἶναι, πανήγυριν αὐτὸν ἥγησαι. κἀκεῖ ἄλλος ἄλλο τι κέκραγεν, ἄλλος ἄλλο τι πράσσει, ἄλλος τῷ ἄλλῳ ἐνσείεται. ἐν τοῖς βαλανείοις ὄχλος· καὶ τίς ἡμῶν οὐ χαίρει τῇ πανηγύρει ταύτῃ καὶ ὀδυνώμενος αὐτῆς ἀπαλλάσσεται;

[¶4] Honey is disagreeable, for it disorders my constitution. I do not like vegetables.” “So I do not like retirement, it is a desert; I do not like a crowd, it is a tumult.” Why, if things are so disposed that you are to live atone or with few, call this condition repose, and make use of it as you ought.

> Greek: μὴ γίνου δυσάρεστος μηδὲ κακοστόμαχος πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα. τὸ ὄξος σαπρόν, δριμὺ γάρ· τὸ μέλι σαπρόν, ἀνατρέπει γάρ μου τὴν ἕξιν· λάχανα οὐ θέλω. οὕτως καὶ σχολὴν οὐ θέλω, ἐρημία ἐστίν, ὄχλον οὐ θέλω, θόρυβός ἐστιν.

[¶5] Talk with yourself, judge of the appearances presented to your mind; train your mental habits to accuracy. But if you happen on a crowd, call it one of the public games, a grand assembly, a festival. Endeavor to share in the festival with the rest of the world. For what sight is more pleasant to a lover of mankind than a great number of men?

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἂν μὲν οὕτως φέρῃ τὰ πράγματα, ὥστε μόνον ἢ μετʼ ὀλίγων διεξαγαγεῖν, ἡσυχίαν αὐτὸ κάλει καὶ χρῶ τῷ πράγματι, εἰς ὃ δεῖ· λάλει σεαυτῷ, γύμναζε τὰς φαντασίας, ἐξεργάζου τὰς προλήψεις. ἂν δʼ εἰς ὄχλον ἐμπέσῃς, ἀγῶνα αὐτὸ λέγε, πανήγυριν, ἑορτήν, συνεορτάζειν πειρῶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

[¶6] We see companies of oxen or horses with pleasure. We are highly delighted to see a great many ships. Who is sorry to see a great many men? “But they stun me with their noise.” Then your hearing is hindered;

> Greek: τί γάρ ἐστιν ἥδιον θέαμα τῷ φιλανθρώπῳ ἢ ἄνθρωποι πολλοί; ἵππων ἀγέλας ἢ βοῶν ἡδέως ὁρῶμεν, πλοῖα πολλὰ ὅταν ἴδωμεν, διαχεόμεθα· ἀνθρώπους πολλοὺς βλέπων τις ἀνιᾶται;

[¶7] and what is that to you? Is your faculty of making a right use of the appearances of things hindered too? Or who can restrain you from using your desire and aversion, your powers of pursuit and avoidance, conformably to nature? What tumult is sufficient for this?

> Greek: ἀλλὰ κατακραυγάζουσί μου. οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀκοή σου ἐμποδίζεται. τί οὖν πρὸς σέ; μή τι καὶ δύναμις ἡ ταῖς φαντασίαις χρηστική; καὶ τίς σε κωλύει ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει χρῆσθαι κατὰ φύσιν, ὁρμῇ καὶ ἀφορμῇ; ποῖος θόρυβος πρὸς τοῦτο ἱκανός;

[¶8] Do but remember the general rules. What is mine; what not mine? What is allotted me? What is it the will of God that I should do now? What is not his will?

> Greek: σὺ μόνον μέμνησο τῶν καθολικῶν· τί ἐμόν, τί οὐκ ἐμόν; τί μοι δίδοται; τί θέλει με ποιεῖν ὁ θεὸς νῦν, τί οὐ θέλει;

[¶9] A little while ago it was his will that you should be at leisure, should talk with yourself, write about these things, read, hear, prepare yourself. You have had sufficient time for this. At present he says to you, “Come now to the combat. Show us what you have learned; how you have wrestled.” How long would you exercise by yourself? It is now the time to show whether you are of the Lumber of those champions who merit victory, or of those who go about the world conquered in all the circle of games.

> Greek: πρὸ ὀλίγου χρόνου ἤθελέν σε σχολάζειν, σαυτῷ λαλεῖν, γράφειν περὶ τούτων, ἀναγιγνώσκειν, ἀκούειν, παρασκευάζεσθαι· ἔσχες εἰς τοῦτο ἱκανὸν χρόνον. νῦν σοι λέγει ἐλθὲ ἤδη ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα, δεῖξον ἡμῖν, τί ἔμαθες, πῶς ἤθλησας. μέχρι τίνος γυμνασθήσῃ μόνος; ἤδη καιρὸς γνῶναί σε, πότερον τῶν ἀξιονίκων εἶ τις ἀθλητῶν ἢ ἐκείνων, οἳ τὴν οἰκουμένην περιέρχονται νικώμενοι.

[¶10] Why, then, are you out of humor? There is no combat without a tumult. There must be many preparatory exercises, many acclamations, many masters, many spectators.

> Greek: τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς; οὐδεὶς ἀγὼν δίχα θορύβου γίνεται. πολλοὺς δεῖ προγυμναστὰς εἶναι, πολλοὺς τοὺς ἐπικραυγάζοντας, πολλοὺς ἐπιστάτας, πολλοὺς θεατάς.

[¶11] “But I would live in quiet.” Why, then, lament and groan as you deserve. For what greater punishment is there to those who are uninstructed and disobedient to the orders of God, than to grieve, to mourn, to envy; in short, to be disappointed and unhappy? Are you not willing to deliver yourself from all this? “And how shall I deliver myself?”

> Greek: — ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ ἤθελον ἐφʼ ἡσυχίας διάγειν. — οἴμωζε τοίνυν καὶ στένε, ὥσπερ ἄξιος εἶ. τίς γὰρ ἄλλη μείζων ταύτης ζημία τῷ ἀπαιδεύτῳ καὶ ἀπειθοῦντι τοῖς θείοις διατάγμασιν ἢ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι, τὸ πενθεῖν, τὸ φθονεῖν, ἁπλῶς τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ δυστυχεῖν; τούτων οὐ θέλεις ἀπαλλάξαι σεαυτόν;
καὶ πῶς ἀπαλλάξω;

[¶12] Have you not heard that you must absolutely control desire, and apply aversion to such things only as are controllable by will; that you must consent to resign all,—body, possessions, fame, books, tumults, power, exemption from power? For to whichsoever your disposition is, you are a slave; you are under subjection; you are made liable to restraint, to compulsion; you are altogether the property of others.

> Greek: — οὐ πολλάκις ἤκουσας, ὅτι ὄρεξιν ἆραί σε δεῖ παντελῶς, τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἐπὶ μόνα τρέψαι τὰ προαιρετικά, ἀφεῖναί σε δεῖ πάντα, τὸ σῶμα, τὴν κτῆσιν, τὴν φήμην, τὰ βιβλία, θόρυβον, ἀρχάς, ἀναρχίαν; ὅπου γὰρ ἂν κλίνῃς, ἐδούλευσας, ὑπετάγης, κωλυτὸς ἐγένου, ἀναγκαστός, ὅλος ἐπʼ ἄλλοις.

[¶13] But have that maxim of Cleanthes always ready,—
Conduct me, Zeus; and thou, O Destiny. Is it your will that I should go to Rome? Conduct me to Rome. To Gyaros? To Gyaros. To Athens? To Athens. To prison?

> Greek: ἀλλὰ τὸ Κλεάνθους πρόχειρον ἄγου δέ μʼ, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γʼ ἡ Πεπρωμένη. θέλετʼ εἰς Ῥώμην; εἰς Ῥώμην. εἰς Γύαρα; εἰς Γύαρα. εἰς Ἀθήνας; εἰς Ἀθήνας. εἰς φυλακήν; εἰς φυλακήν.

[¶14] To prison. If you once say, “When may I go to Athens?” you are undone. This desire, if it be unaccomplished, must necessarily render you disappointed; and if fulfilled, vain respecting what ought not to elate you; if, on the contrary, you are hindered, then you are wretched through incurring what you do not like.

> Greek: ἂν ἅπαξ εἴπῃς πότε τις εἰς Ἀθήνας ἀπέλθῃ;, ἀπώλου. ἀνάγκη γε ταύτην τὴν ὄρεξιν ἀτελῆ μὲν οὖσαν ἀτυχῆ σε ποιεῖν, τελειωθεῖσαν δὲ κενόν, ἐφʼ οἷς οὐ δεῖ ἐπαιρόμενον· πάλιν ἂν ἐμποδισθῇς, δυστυχῆ, περιπίπτοντα οἷς οὐ θέλεις.

[¶15] Therefore give up all these things. “Athens is a fine place.” But it is a much finer thing to be happy, serene, tranquil, not to have your affairs dependent on others.

> Greek: ἄφες οὖν ταῦτα πάντα. καλαὶ αἱ Ἀθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν κάλλιον πολύ, τὸ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι, τὸ ἀτάραχον, τὸ ἐπὶ μηδενὶ κεῖσθαι τὰ σὰ πράγματα.

[¶16] “Rome is full of tumults and visits.” But prosperity is worth all difficulties. If, then, it be a proper time for these, why do not you withdraw your aversion from them?

> Greek: θόρυβος ἐν Ῥώμῃ καὶ ἀσπασμοί. ἀλλὰ τὸ εὐροεῖν ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν δυσκόλων. εἰ οὖν τούτων καιρός ἐστιν, διὰ τί οὐκ αἴρεις αὐτῶν τὴν ἔκκλισιν; τίς ἀνάγκη ὡς ὄνον ξυλοκοπούμενον ἀχθοφορεῖν;

[¶17] What necessity is there for you to be made to carry your burden, by being cudgelled like an ass? Otherwise, consider that you must always be a slave to him who has the power to procure your discharge,—to every one who has the power of hindering you,—and must worship him like your evil genius.

> Greek: εἰ δὲ μή, ὅρα ὅτι δεῖ σε δουλεύειν ἀεὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ σοι διαπράξασθαι τὴν ἔξοδον, τῷ πᾶν ἐμποδίσαι δυναμένῳ κἀκεῖνον θεραπεύειν ὡς Κακοδαίμονα.

[¶18] The only way to real prosperity (let this rule be at hand morning, noon, and night) is a resignation of things uncontrollable by will; to esteem nothing as property; to deliver up all things to our tutelar genius and to fortune;

> Greek: μία ὁδὸς ἐπὶ εὔροιαν ( τοῦτο καὶ ὄρθρου καὶ μεθʼ ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτωρ ἔστω πρόχειρον), ἀπόστασις τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, τὸ μηδὲν ἴδιον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ παραδοῦναι πάντα τῷ δαιμονίῳ, τῇ τύχῃ, ἐκείνους ἐπιτρόπους αὐτῶν ποιήσασθαι,

[¶19] to leave the control of them to those whom Zeus hath made such; to be ourselves devoted to that only which is really ours,—to that which is incapable of restraint,—and whatever we read or write or hear, to refer all to this.

> Greek: οὓς καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς πεποίηκεν, αὐτὸν δὲ πρὸς ἑνὶ εἶναι μόνῳ, τῷ ἰδίῳ, τῷ ἀκωλύτῳ, καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀναφέροντα τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν καὶ γράφειν καὶ ἀκούειν.

[¶20] Therefore I cannot call any one industrious, if I hear only that he reads or writes; nor do I call him so even if he adds the whole night to the day, unless I know to what he applies it. For not even you would call him industrious who sits up for the sake of a girl;

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δύναμαι εἰπεῖν φιλόπονον, ἂν ἀκούσω τοῦτο μόνον, ὅτι ἀναγιγνώσκει ἢ γράφει, κἂν προσθῇ τις, ὅτι ὅλας τὰς νύκτας, οὔπω λέγω, ἂν μὴ γνῶ τὴν ἀναφοράν. οὐδὲ γὰρ σὺ λέγεις φιλόπονον τὸν διὰ παιδισκάριον ἀγρυπνοῦντα· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδʼ ἐγώ.

[¶21] nor, therefore, in the other case do I. But if he does it for fame, I call him ambitious; if for money, avaricious;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἐὰν μὲν ἕνεκα δόξης αὐτὸ ποιῇ, λέγω φιλόδοξον, ἂν δʼ ἕνεκα ἀργυρίου, φιλάργυρον, οὐ φιλόπονον.

[¶22] if from the desire of learning, bookish; but not industrious. But if he applies his labor to his ruling faculty, in order to treat and regulate it conformably to nature, then only I call him industrious.

> Greek: ἂν δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικὸν ἀναφέρῃ τὸν πόνον, ἵνʼ ἐκεῖνο κατὰ φύσιν ἔχῃ καὶ διεξάγῃ, τότε λέγω μόνον φιλόπονον.

[¶23] Never praise or blame any person on account of outward actions that are common to all; but only on account of principles.

> Greek: μηδέποτε γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν μήτʼ ἐπαινεῖτε μήτε ψέγετε, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ δογμάτων. ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι τὰ ἴδια ἑκάστου, τὰ καὶ τὰς πράξεις αἰσχρὰς ἢ καλὰς ποιοῦντα·

[¶24] These are the peculiar property of each individual, and the things which make actions good or bad.

> Greek: τούτων μεμνημένος χαῖρε τοῖς παροῦσιν καὶ ἀγάπα ταῦτα, ὧν καιρός ἐστιν.

[¶25] Mindful of this, enjoy the present and accept all things in their season. If you meet in action any of those things which you have made a subject of study, rejoice in them. If you have laid aside ill-nature and reviling; if you have lessened your harshness, indecent language, inconsiderateness, effeminacy; if you are not moved by the same things as formerly, or in the same manner as formerly,—you may keep a perpetual festival, to-day for success in one affair, tomorrow for another.

> Greek: εἴ τινα ὁρᾷς, ὧν ἔμαθες καὶ διεσκέψω, ἀπαντῶντά σοι εἰς τὰ ἔργα, εὐφραίνου ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς. εἰ τὸ κακόηθες καὶ λοίδορον ἀποτέθεισαι, μεμείωκας, εἰ τὸ προπετές, εἰ τὸ αἰσχρολόγον, εἰ τὸ εἰκαῖον, εἰ τὸ ἐπισεσυρμένον, εἰ οὐ κινῇ ἐφʼ οἷς πρότερον, εἰ οὐχ ὁμοίως γʼ ὡς πρότερον, ἑορτὴν ἄγειν δύνασαι καθʼ ἡμέραν, σήμερον, ὅτι καλῶς ἀνεστράφης ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἔργῳ, αὔριον, ὅτι ἐν ἑτέρῳ.

[¶26] How much better a reason for sacrifice is this than obtaining a consulship or a government! These things you have from yourself and from the gods. Remember this,—who it is that gave them, and to whom and for what purpose.

> Greek: πόσῳ μείζων αἰτία θυσίας ἢ ὑπατεία ἢ ἐπαρχία. ταῦτα ἐκ σοῦ αὐτοῦ γίνεταί σοι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν. ἐκεῖνο μέμνησο, τίς ὁ διδούς ἐστι καὶ τίσιν καὶ διὰ τίνα.

[¶27] Habituated once to these reasonings, can you still think that it makes any difference what place God allots you? Are not the gods everywhere at the same distance? Do not they everywhere see equally what is doing?

> Greek: τούτοις τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς ἐντρεφόμενος ἔτι διαφέρῃ, ποῦ ὢν εὐδαιμονήσεις, ποῦ ὢν ἀρέσεις τῷ θεῷ; οὐ πανταχόθεν τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχουσιν; οὐ πανταχόθεν ὁμοίως ὁρῶσιν τὰ γινόμενα;

[¶28] 5. A wise and good person neither quarrels with any one himself, nor, as far as possible, suffers another to do so.

> Greek: 5. ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς οὔτʼ αὐτὸς μάχεταί τινι οὔτʼ ἄλλον ἐᾷ κατὰ δύναμιν.

[¶29] The life of Socrates affords us an example of this too, as well as of other things; since he not only everywhere avoided quarrelling himself, but did not even suffer others to quarrel.

> Greek: παράδειγμα δὲ καὶ τούτου καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκκειται ἡμῖν ὁ βίος ὁ Σωκράτους, ὃς οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς πανταχοῦ ἐξέφυγεν μάχην, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἄλλους μάχεσθαι εἴα.

[¶30] See in Xenophon’s Banquet how many quarrels he ended; how, again, he bore with Thrasymachus, with Polus, with Callicles; how with his wife, how with his son, who attempted to confute him, and cavilled at him.

> Greek: ὅρα παρὰ Ξενοφῶντι ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ πόσας μάχας λέλυκεν, πῶς πάλιν ἠνέσχετο Θρασυμάχου, πῶς Πώλου, πῶς Καλλικλέους, πῶς τῆς γυναικὸς ἠνείχετο, πῶς τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐξελεγχόμενος ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, σοφιζόμενος.

[¶31] For he well remembered that no one is master of the ruling faculty of another; and therefore he desired nothing but what was his own. “And what is that?”

> Greek: λίαν γὰρ ἀσφαλῶς ἐμέμνητο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀλλοτρίου ἡγεμονικοῦ κυριεύει. οὐδὲν οὖν ἄλλο ἤθελεν ἢ τὸ ἴδιον.

[¶32] Not that any particular person should be dealt with conformably to nature, for that belongs to others; but that while they act in their own way, as they please, he should nevertheless live conformably to nature, only doing what belongs to himself, in order to make them live conformably to nature also.

> Greek: τί δʼ ἔστι τοῦτο; οὐχ ἱκ … ος οὗτος … κατὰ φύσιν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀλλότριον· ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἐκείνων τὰ ἴδια ποιούντων, ὡς αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ, αὐτὸς μηδὲν ἧττον κατὰ φύσιν ἕξει καὶ διεξάξει μόνον τὰ αὑτοῦ ποιῶν πρὸς τὸ κἀκείνους ἔχειν κατὰ φύσιν.

[¶33] For this is the point that a wise and good person has in view. To have the command of an army? No; but if it be allotted him, to properly apply his own powers in that sphere. To marry? No; but if marriage be allotted him, to act in this sphere also according to the laws of nature.

> Greek: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ ἀεὶ πρόκειται τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ. στρατηγῆσαι; οὔ· ἀλλʼ, ἂν διδῶται, ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ὕλης τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικὸν τηρῆσαι. γῆμαι; οὔ· ἄλλʼ, ἂν διδῶται γάμος, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ὕλῃ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα αὑτὸν τηρῆσαι.

[¶34] But if he expects perfection in his wife or his child, then he asks to have that for his own which really belongs to others.

> Greek: ἂν δὲ θέλῃ τὸν υἱὸν μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν ἢ τὴν γυναῖκα, θέλει τὰ ἀλλότρια μὴ εἶναι ἀλλότρια. καὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν μανθάνειν τὰ ἴδια καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια.

[¶35] And wisdom consists in this very point, to learn what things are our own and what belong to others. What room is there then for quarrelling, to a person thus disposed? For does he wonder at anything that happens? Does it appear strange to him? Does he not prepare for worse and more grievous injuries from bad people than actually happen to him?

> Greek: ποῦ οὖν ἔτι μάχης τόπος τῷ οὕτως ἔχοντι; μὴ γὰρ θαυμάζει τι τῶν γινομένων; μὴ γὰρ καινὸν αὐτῷ φαίνεται; μὴ γὰρ οὐ χείρονα καὶ χαλεπώτερα προσδέχεται τὰ παρὰ τῶν φαύλων ἢ ἀποβαίνει αὐτῷ; μὴ γὰρ οὐ κέρδος λογίζεται πᾶν ὅ τι ἀπολείπουσιν τοῦ ἐσχάτου;

[¶36] Does he not reckon it so much gained if they come short of the last extremities? Such a one has reviled you. You are much obliged to him that he has not struck you. But he has struck you too.

> Greek: ἐλοιδόρησέν σε ὁ δεῖνα. πολλὴ χάρις αὐτῷ, ὅτι μὴ ἔπληξεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔπληξεν. πολλὴ χάρις, ὅτι μὴ ἔτρωσεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτρωσεν. πολλὴ χάρις, ὅτι μὴ ἀπέκτεινεν.

[¶37] You are much obliged to him that he has not wounded you too. But he has wounded you too. You are much obliged to him that he has not killed you. For when did he ever learn, or from whom, that he is a gentle, that he is a social, animal;

> Greek: πότε γὰρ ἔμαθεν ἢ παρὰ τίνι, ὅτι ἥμερόν ἐστι ζῷον, ὅτι φιλάλληλον, ὅτι μεγάλη βλάβη τῷ ἀδικοῦντι αὐτὴ ἡ ἀδικία; ταῦτα οὖν μὴ μεμαθηκὼς μηδὲ πεπεισμένος, διὰ τί μὴ ἀκολουθήσῃ τῷ φαινομένῳ συμφέροντι;

[¶38] that the very injury itself is a great mischief to him who inflicts it? As, then, he has not learned these things, nor believes them, why should he not follow what appears to be for his interest?

> Greek: βέβληκεν ὁ γείτων λίθους. μή τι οὖν σὺ ἡμάρτηκας; ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐν οἴκῳ κατεάγη. σὺ οὖν σκευάριον εἶ;

[¶39] Your neighbor has thrown stones. What then; is it any fault of yours? But your goods are broken. What then; are you a piece of furniture? No, but your essence consists in the faculty of will. What behavior then is assigned you in return?

> Greek: οὔ, ἀλλὰ προαίρεσις. τί οὖν σοι δίδοται πρὸς τοῦτο; ὡς μὲν λύκῳ ἀντιδάκνειν καὶ ἄλλους πλείονας λίθους βάλλειν· ἀνθρώπῳ δʼ ἐὰν ζητῇς, ἐπίσκεψαί σου τὸ ταμιεῖον, ἴδε τίνας δυνάμεις ἔχων ἐλήλυθας· μή τι τὴν θηριώδη; μή τι τὴν μνησικακητικήν;

[¶40] If you are considering yourself as a wolf, then to bite again, to throw more stones. But if you ask the question as a man, then examine your treasure; see what faculties you have brought into the world with you.

> Greek: ἵππος οὖν πότʼ ἄθλιός ἐστιν; ὅταν τῶν φυσικῶν δυνάμεων στέρηται· οὐχ ὅταν μὴ δύνηται κοκκύζειν, ἀλλʼ ὅταν μὴ τρέχειν. ὁ δὲ κύων; ὅταν πέτεσθαι μὴ δύνηται;

[¶41] Are they fitted for ferocity; for revenge? When is a horse miserable? When he is deprived of his natural faculties; not when he cannot crow, but when he cannot run. And a dog? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot hunt. Is not a man, then, also unhappy in the same manner;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ὅταν μὴ ἰχνεύειν. μή ποτʼ οὖν οὕτως καὶ ἄνθρωπος δυστυχής ἐστιν οὐχ ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος λέοντας πνίγειν ἢ ἀνδριάντας περιλαμβάνειν (οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο δυνάμεις τινὰς ἔχων ἐλήλυθεν παρὰ τῆς φύσεως), ἀλλʼ ὁ ἀπολωλεκὼς τὸ εὔγνωμον, ὁ τὸ πιστόν;

[¶42] not he who cannot strangle lions or perform great athletic feats (for he has received no faculties for this purpose from nature); but he who has lost his rectitude of mind, his fidelity? This is he who ought to receive public condolence for the misfortunes into which he is fallen; not, by Heaven! either he who has the misfortune to be born or to die; but he whom it has befallen while he lives to lose what is properly his own;

> Greek: τοῦτον ἔδει συνελθόντας θρηνεῖν, εἰς ὅσα κακὰ ἐλήλυθεν· οὐχὶ μὰ Δία τὸν φύντα ἢ τὸν ἀποθανόντα, ἀλλʼ ᾧ ζῶντι συμβεβήκει ἀπολέσαι τὰ ἴδια, οὐ τὰ πατρῷα, τὸ ἀγρίδιον καὶ τὸ οἰκίδιον καὶ τὸ πανδοκεῖον καὶ τὰ δουλάρια (τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἴδιον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀλλότρια, δοῦλα, ὑπεύθυνα ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις διδόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν κυρίων),

[¶43] not his paternal possessions, his paltry estate or his house, his lodging or his slaves, for none of these are a man’s own; but all these belong to others, are servile, dependent, and very variously assigned by the disposers of them.

> Greek: ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀνθρωπικά,τοὺς χαρακτῆρας, οὓς ἔχων ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐλήλυθεν, οἵους καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νομισμάτων ζητοῦντες, ἂν μὲν εὕρωμεν, δοκιμάζομεν, ἂν δὲ μὴ εὕρωμεν, ῥιπτοῦμεν.

[¶44] But his personal qualifications as a man, the impressions which he brought into the world stamped upon his mind; such as we look for in money, accepting or rejecting it accordingly. “What impression has this piece of money?” “Trajan’s.” “Give it me.” “Nero’s.” Throw it away. It is false; it is good for nothing. So in the other case.

> Greek: τίνος ἔχει τὸν χαρακτῆρα τοῦτο τὸ τετράσσαρον; Τραιανοῦ; φέρε. Νέρωνος; ῥῖψον ἔξω, ἀδόκιμόν ἐστιν, σαπρόν. οὕτως καὶ ἐνθάδε. τίνα ἔχει χαρακτῆρα τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ; ἥμερον, κοινωνικόν, ἀνεκτικόν, φιλάλληλον. φέρε, παραδέχομαι, ποιῶ πολίτην τοῦτον, παραδέχομαι γείτονα, σύμπλουν.

[¶45] “What stamp have his principles?” “Gentleness, social affection, patience, good-nature.” Bring them hither. I receive them. I make such a man a citizen; I receive him for a neighbor, a fellow-traveller.

> Greek: ὅρα μόνον, μὴ Νερωνιανὸν ἔχει χαρακτῆρα. μή τι ὀργίλος ἐστίν, μή τι μηνιτής, μή τι μεμψίμοιρος; ἂν αὐτῷ φανῇ, πατάσσει τὰς κεφαλὰς τῶν ἀπαντώντων.

[¶46] Only see that he have not the Neronian stamp. Is he passionate? Is he resentful? Is he querulous? Would he, if he took the fancy, break the heads of those who fell in his way?

> Greek: τί οὖν ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν; μὴ γὰρ ἐκ ψιλῆς μορφῆς κρίνεται τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον; ἐπεὶ οὕτως λέγε καὶ τὸ κήρινον μῆλον εἶναι.

[¶47] Why then do you call him a man? For is everything determined by a mere outward form? Then say, just as well, that a piece of wax is an apple, or that it has the smell and taste too.

> Greek: καὶ ὀδμὴν ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ καὶ γεῦσιν· οὐκ ἀρκεῖ ἡ ἐκτὸς περιγραφή. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡ ῥὶς ἐξαρκεῖ καὶ οἱ ὀφθαλμοί, ἀλλʼ ἂν τὰ δόγματα ἔχῃ ἀνθρωπικά.

[¶48] The external figure is not enough; nor, consequently, is it sufficient to constitute a man that he has a nose and eyes, if he have not the proper principles of a man. Such a one does not understand reason, or apprehend when he is confuted. He is like an ass. Another is dead to the sense of shame.

> Greek: οὗτος οὐκ ἀκούει λόγου, οὐ παρακολουθεῖ ἐλεγχόμενος· ὄνος ἐστίν. τούτου τὸ αἰδῆμον ἀπονενέκρωται· ἄχρηστός ἐστιν, πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ζητεῖ, τίνα ἀπαντήσας λακτίσῃ ἢ δάκῃ· ὥστε οὐδὲ πρόβατον ἢ ὄνος, ἀλλά τί ποτε ἄγριον θηρίον.

[¶49] He is a worthless creature; anything rather than a man. Another seeks whom he may kick or bite; so that he is neither sheep nor ass. But what then? He is a wild beast. “Well, but would you have me despised, then?” By whom,—by those who know you? And how can they despise you who know you to be gentle and modest?

> Greek: τί οὖν; θέλεις με καταφρονεῖσθαι; — ὑπὸ τίνων; ὑπὸ εἰδότων; καὶ πῶς καταφρονήσουσιν εἰδότες τοῦ πρᾴου, τοῦ αἰδήμονος; ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγνοούντων; τί σοι μέλει; οὔ τινι γὰρ ἄλλῳ τεχνίτῃ τῶν ἀτέχνων. — ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιφυήσονταί μοι.

[¶50] But perhaps by those who do not know you? And what is that to you? For no other artist troubles himself about those ignorant of art.

> Greek: —τί λέγεις τὸ ἐμοί; δύναταί τις τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σὴν βλάψαι ἢ κωλῦσαι ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις χρῆσθαι ὡς πέφυκεν;—

[¶51] “But people will be much readier to attack me.” Why do you say me? Can any one hurt your will, or restrain you from treating, conformably to nature, the phenomena of existence? Why, then, are you disturbed and desirous to make yourself appear formidable? Why do you not make public proclamation that you are at peace with all mankind, however they may act; and that you chiefly laugh at those who suppose they can hurt you?

> Greek: οὔ. — τί οὖν ἔτι ταράσσῃ καὶ φοβερὸν σαυτὸν θέλεις ἐπιδεικνύειν; οὐχὶ δὲ παρελθὼν εἰς μέσον κηρύσσεις, ὅτι εἰρήνην ἄγεις πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, ὅ τι ἂν ἐκεῖνοι ποιῶσι, καὶ μάλιστʼ ἐκείνων καταγελᾷς, ὅσοι σε βλάπτειν δοκοῦσιν; ἀνδράποδα ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδὲ τίς εἰμὶ οὐδὲ ποῦ μου τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν· οὐ πρόσοδος αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ ἐμά.

[¶52] “These wretches neither know who I am, nor in what consist my good and evil; nor how little they can touch what is really mine.” Thus the inhabitants of a fortified city laugh at the besiegers. “What trouble, now, are these people giving themselves for nothing!

> Greek: οὕτως καὶ ἐχυρὰν πόλιν οἱ οἰκοῦντες καταγελῶσι τῶν πολιορκούντων· νῦν οὗτοι τί πρᾶγμα ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ μηδενί; ἀσφαλές ἐστιν ἡμῶν τὸ τεῖχος, τροφὰς ἔχομεν ἐπὶ πάμπολυν χρόνον, τὴν ἄλλην ἅπασαν παρασκευήν.

[¶53] Our wall is secure; we have provisions for a very long time, and every other preparation.” These are what render a city fortified and impregnable; but nothing but its principles render the human soul so.

> Greek: ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ πόλιν ἐχυρὰν καὶ ἀνάλωτον ποιοῦντα, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δόγματα. ποῖον γὰρ τεῖχος οὕτως ἰσχυρὸν ἢ ποῖον σῶμα οὕτως ἀδαμάντινον ἢ ποία κτῆσις ἀναφαίρετος ἢ ποῖον ἀξίωμα οὕτως ἀνεπιβούλευτον;

[¶54] For what wall is so strong, what body so impenetrable, what possession so unalienable, what dignity so secured against stratagems? All things else, everywhere else, are mortal, easily reduced; and whoever in any degree fixes his mind upon them must necessarily be subject to perturbation, despair, terrors, lamentations, disappointed desires, and unavailing aversions.

> Greek: πάντα πανταχοῦ θνητά, εὐάλωτα, οἷς τισιν τὸν ὁπωσοῦν προσέχοντα πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ταράσσεσθαι, κακελπιστεῖν, φοβεῖσθαι, πενθεῖν, ἀτελεῖς ἔχειν τὰς ὀρέξεις, περιπτωτικὰς ἔχειν τὰς ἐκκλίσεις.

[¶55] And will we not fortify, then, the only citadel that is granted us; and withdrawing ourselves from what is mortal and servile, diligently improve what is immortal and by nature free? Do we not remember that no one either hurts or benefits another; but only the views which we hold concerning everything? It is this that hurts us;

> Greek: εἶτα οὐ θέλομεν τὴν μόνην δεδομένην ἡμῖν ἀσφάλειαν ἐχυρὰν ποιεῖν; οὐδʼ ἀποστάντες τῶν θνητῶν καὶ δούλων τὰ ἀθάνατα καὶ φύσει ἐλεύθερα ἐκπονεῖν; οὐδὲ μεμνήμεθα, ὅτι οὔτε βλάπτει ἄλλος ἄλλον οὔτε ὠφελεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων δόγμα, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ βλάπτον, τοῦτο τὸ ἀνατρέπον, τοῦτο μάχη, τοῦτο στάσις, τοῦτο πόλεμος;

[¶56] this that overturns us. Here is the fight, the sedition, the war. It was nothing else that made Eteocles and Polynices enemies, but their views concerning empire, and their principles concerning exile;

> Greek: Ἐτεοκλέα καὶ Πολυνείκη τὸ πεποιηκὸς οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τυραννίδος, τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ φυγῆς, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἔσχατον τῶν κακῶν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

[¶57] that the one seemed the extremest evil, the other the greatest good. Now, the very nature of every one is to pursue good, to avoid evil; to esteem him as an enemy and betrayer who deprives us of the one and involves us in the other, though he be a brother, or a son, or father.

> Greek: φύσις δʼ αὕτη παντός, τὸ διώκειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, φεύγειν τὸ κακόν· τὸν ἀφαιρούμενον θατέρου καὶ περιβάλλοντα τῷ ἐναντίῳ, τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι πολέμιον, ἐπίβουλον, κἂν ἀδελφὸς ᾖ, κἂν υἱός, κἂν πατήρ.

[¶58] For nothing is more nearly related to us than good. So that if good and evil consist in externals, there is no affection between father and son, brother and brother;

> Greek: τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ συγγενέστερον οὐδέν· λοιπὸν εἰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, οὔτε πατὴρ υἱοῖς φίλος οὔτʼ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῷ, πάντα δὲ πανταχοῦ μεστὰ πολεμίων, ἐπιβούλων, συκοφαντῶν.

[¶59] but all is everywhere full of enemies, betrayers, sycophants. But if a right choice be the only good, and a wrong one the only evil, what further room is there for quarrelling, for reviling? About what can it be? About what is nothing to us. Against whom? Against the ignorant, against the unhappy, against those who are deceived in the most important respects.

> Greek: εἰ δʼ οἵα δεῖ προαίρεσις, τοῦτο μόνον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, καὶ οἵα μὴ δεῖ, τοῦτο μόνον κακόν, ποῦ ἔτι μάχη, ποῦ λοιδορία; περὶ τίνων; περὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς; πρὸς τίνας; πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας, πρὸς τοὺς δυστυχοῦντας, πρὸς τοὺς ἠπατημένους περὶ τῶν μεγίστων;

[¶60] Mindful of this, Socrates lived in his own house, patiently bearing a furious wife, a senseless son. For what were the effects of her fury? The throwing as much water as she pleased on his head, the trampling a cake under her feet. “And what is this to me, if I think such things nothing to me?

> Greek: τούτων Σωκράτης μεμνημένος τὴν οἰκ[ε]ίαν τὴν αὑτοῦ ᾤκει γυναικὸς ἀνεχόμενος τραχυτάτης, υἱοῦ ἀγνώμονος. τραχεῖα γὰρ πρὸς τί ἦν; ἵνʼ ὕδωρ καταχέῃ τῆς κεφαλῆς ὅσον καὶ θέλει, ἵνα καταπατήσῃ τὸν πλακοῦντα· καὶ τί πρὸς ἐμέ, ἂν ὑπολάβω, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς ἐμέ;

[¶61] This very point is my business; and neither a tyrant, nor a master; shall restrain my will; nor multitudes, though I am a single person; nor one ever so strong, though I am ever so weak. For this is given by God to every one, free from restraint.”

> Greek: τοῦτο δʼ ἐμὸν ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ οὔτε τύραννος κωλύσει με θέλοντα οὔτε δεσπότης οὔτε οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν ἕνα οὔθʼ ὁ ἰσχυρότερος τὸν ἀσθενέστερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀκώλυτον δέδοται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑκάστῳ.

[¶62] These principles make friendship in families, concord in cities, peace in nations. They make a person grateful to God, everywhere courageous, as dealing with things merely foreign and of minor importance.

> Greek: ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα ἐν οἰκίᾳ φιλίαν ποιεῖ, ἐν πόλει ὁμόνοιαν, ἐν ἔθνεσιν εἰρήνην, πρὸς θεὸν εὐχάριστον, πανταχοῦ θαρροῦντα, ὡς περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ὡς περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων.

[¶63] But we, alas! are able indeed to write and read these things, and to praise them when they are read;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἡμεῖς γράψαι μὲν καὶ ἀναγνῶναι ταῦτα καὶ ἀναγιγνωσκόμενα ἐπαινέσαι ἱκανοί, πεισθῆναι δʼ οὐδʼ ἐγγύς.

[¶64] but very far from being convinced by them. In that case, what is said of the Lacedemonians,—
Lions at home, foxes at Ephesus, may be applied to us, too; lions in the school, but foxes out of it.

> Greek: τοιγαροῦν τὸ περὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων λεγόμενον οἴκοι λέοντες, ἐν Ἐφέσῳ δʼ ἀλώπεκες καὶ ἐφʼ ἡμῶν ἁρμόσει· ἐν σχολῇ λέοντες, ἔξω δʼ ἀλώπεκες.

[¶65] 6. It vexes me, say you, to be pitied. Is this your affair, then, or theirs who pity you? And further, how is it in your power to prevent it? “It is, if I show them that I do not need pity.” But are you now in such a condition as not to need pity, or are you not?

> Greek: 6. ἀνιῶμαι, φησίν, ἐλεούμενος. — πότερον οὖν σὸν ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐλεεῖσθαί σε ἢ τῶν ἐλεούντων; τί δʼ; ἐπὶ σοί ἐστι τὸ παῦσαι αὐτό; — ἐπʼ ἐμοί, ἂν δεικνύω αὐτοῖς μῆ ἄξιον ἐλέου ὄντα ἐμαυτόν.

[¶66] “think I am. But these people do not pity me for what, if anything, would deserve pity, my faults; but for poverty, and want of power, and sicknesses, and deaths, and other things of that kind.” Are you, then, prepared to convince the world that none of these things is in reality an evil;

> Greek: — πότερον δʼ ἤδη σοι ὑπάρχει τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐλέου ἄξιον ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει; — δοκῶ ἔγωγε, ὅτι ὑπάρχει. ἀλλʼ οὗτοί γʼ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐλεοῦσιν, ἐφʼ οἷς, εἴπερ ἄρα, ἦν ἄξιον, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ πενίᾳ καὶ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ νόσοις καὶ θανάτοις καὶ ἄλλοις τοιούτοις.

[¶67] but that it is possible for a person to be happy, even when he is poor, and without honors and power? Or are you prepared to put on the appearance of being rich and powerful? The last of these is the part of an arrogant, silly, worthless fellow.

> Greek: — πότερον οὖν πείθειν παρεσκεύασαι τοὺς πολλούς, ὡς ἄρα οὐδὲν τούτων κακόν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οἷόν τε καὶ πένητι καὶ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀτίμῳ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἢ σαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύειν αὐτοῖς πλουτοῦντα καὶ ἄρχοντα;

[¶68] Observe, too, by what means this fiction must be carried on. You must hire some poor slaves, and get possessed of a few little pieces of plate, and often show them in public; and though they are the same, endeavor to conceal that they are the same; you must have gay clothes and other finery, and make a show of being honored by your great people; and endeavor to sup with them, or be thought to sup with them; and use some vile arts with your person, to make it appear handsomer and genteeler than it really is. All this you must contrive, if you would take the second way not to be pitied.

> Greek: τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν δεύτερα ἀλαζόνος καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίου. καὶ ἡ προσποίησις ὅρα διʼ οἵων ἂν γένοιτο· δουλάριά σε χρήσασθαι δεήσει καὶ ἀργυρωμάτια ὀλίγα κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ταῦτα ἐν φανερῷ δεικνύειν, εἰ οἷόν τε, ταὐτὰ πολλάκις καὶ λανθάνειν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι ταὐτά ἐστιν, καὶ ἱματίδια στιλπνὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πομπὴν καὶ τὸν τιμώμενον ἐπιφαίνειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν τούτων καὶ δειπνεῖν πειρᾶσθαι παρʼ αὐτοῖς ἢ δοκεῖν γε, ὅτι δειπνεῖς, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα δέ τινα κακοτεχνεῖν, ὡς εὐμορφότερον φαίνεσθαι καὶ γενναιότερον τοῦ ὄντος·

[¶69] And the first is impracticable as well as tedious, to undertake the very thing that Zeus himself could not do,—to convince all mankind what things are really good and evil. Is this granted you? The only thing granted you is to convince yourself; and you have not yet done that; and yet do you undertake to convince others? Why, who has lived so long with you as you have with yourself?

> Greek: ταῦτά σε δεῖ μηχανᾶσθαι, εἰ τὴν δευτέραν ὁδὸν ἀπιέναι θέλεις ὥστε μὴ ἐλεεῖσθαι. ἡ πρώτη δὲ καὶ ἀνήνυτος καὶ μακρά, ὃ ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἠδυνήθη ποιῆσαι, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν, πάντας ἀνθρώπους πεῖσαι, τίνα ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά.

[¶70] Who is so likely to have faith in you, in order to be convinced by you, as yourself? Who is more truly a well-wisher or a friend to you than yourself?

> Greek: μὴ γὰρ δέδοταί σοι τοῦτο; ἐκεῖνο μόνον σοι δέδοται, σαυτὸν πεῖσαι. καὶ οὔπω πέπεικας· εἶτά μοι νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς πείθειν τοὺς ἄλλους;

[¶71] How is it, then, that you have not yet convinced yourself? Should you not now revolve these things? What you were studying was this: to learn to be exempt from grief, perturbation, and meanness, and to be free.

> Greek: καὶ τίς σοι τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ σύνεστιν ὡς σὺ σαυτῷ; τίς δὲ οὕτως πιθανός ἐστί σοι πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι ὡς σὺ σαυτῷ; τίς δʼ εὐνούστερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἔχων ἢ σὺ σαυτῷ;

[¶72] Have you not heard, then, that the only way that leads to this is to give up what is beyond the control of will; to withdraw from it, and confess that it belongs to others?

> Greek: πῶς οὖν οὔπω πέπεικας σαυτὸν μαθεῖν; νῦν οὐχὶ ἄνω κάτω; τοῦτʼ ἔστι περὶ ὃ ἐσπούδακας; οὐ μανθάνειν, ὥστε ἄλυπος εἶναι καὶ ἀτάραχος καὶ ἀταπείνωτος καὶ ἐλεύθερος;

[¶73] To what order of things belongs another’s opinion about you? “Things uncontrollable by will.” Is it nothing then to you? “Nothing.”

> Greek: πρὸς ταῦτα οὖν οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὅτι μία ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ φέρουσα, ἀφεῖναι τὰ ἀπροαίρετα καὶ ἐκστῆναι αὐτῶν καὶ ὁμολογῆσαι αὐτὰ ἀλλότρια;

[¶74] While you are still piqued and disturbed about it, then, do you consider that you are convinced concerning good and evil? Letting others alone, then, why will you not be your own scholar and teacher? Let others look to it, whether it be for their advantage to think and act contrary to nature;

> Greek: τὸ οὖν ἄλλον τι ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ σοῦ ποίου εἴδους ἐστίν; — τοῦ ἀπροαιρέτου. — οὐκοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ; — οὐδέν. — ἔτι οὖν δακνόμενος ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ταρασσόμενος οἴει πεπεῖσθαι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν;

[¶75] but no one is nearer to me than myself. What means this? I have heard the reasonings of philosophers, and assented to them; yet, in fact, I am not the more relieved. Am I so stupid?

> Greek: οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἀφεὶς τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτὸς σαυτῷ γενέσθαι καὶ μαθητὴς καὶ διδάσκαλος; ὄψονται οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ αὐτοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν, ἐμοὶ δʼ οὐδείς ἐστιν ἐγγίων ἐμοῦ.

[¶76] And yet, in other things to which I had an inclination, I was not found very stupid; but I quickly learned grammar and the exercises of the palaestra, and geometry, and the solution of syllogisms. Has not reason, then, convinced me? And yet there is no one of the other things that I so much approved or liked from the very first. And now I read concerning these subjects, I hear discourses upon them, I write about them, and I have not yet found any principle more sure then this.

> Greek: τί οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν λόγους ἀκήκοα τοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ συγκατατίθεμαι αὐτοῖς, ἔργῳ δʼ οὐδὲν γέγονα κουφότερος; μή τι οὕτως ἀφυής εἰμι; καὶ μὴν περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἐβουλήθην, οὐ λίαν ἀφυὴς εὑρέθην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γράμματα ταχέως ἔμαθον καὶ παλαίειν καὶ γεωμετρεῖν καὶ συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν.

[¶77] What, then, do I need? Is not this the difficulty, that the contrary principles are not removed out of my mind? Is it not that I have not strengthened these opinions by exercise, nor practised them in action;

> Greek: μή τι οὖν οὐ πέπεικέ με ὁ λόγος; καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἄλλα τινὰ οὕτως ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐδοκίμασα ἣ εἱλόμην καὶ νῦν περὶ τούτων ἀναγιγνώσκω, ταῦτα ἀκούω, ταῦτα γράφω· ἄλλον οὐχ εὑρήκαμεν μέχρι νῦν ἰσχυρότερον τούτου λόγον.

[¶78] but, like arms thrown aside, they are grown rusty, and do not suit me? Yet neither in the palaestra, nor writing, nor reading, nor solving syllogisms, am I contented with merely learning; but I apply in every way the forms of arguments which are presented to me, and I invent others;

> Greek: τί οὖν τὸ λεῖπόν μοι ἐστίν; μὴ οὐκ ἐξῄρηται τἀναντία δόγματα; μὴ αὐταὶ αἱ ὑπολήψεις ἀγύμναστοί εἰσιν οὐδʼ εἰθισμέναι ἀπαντᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα, ἀλλʼ ὡς ὁπλάρια ἀποκείμενα κατίωται καὶ οὐδὲ περιαρμόσαι μοι δύναται;

[¶79] and the same of convertible propositions. But the necessary principles by which I might become exempted from fear, grief, and passion, and be unrestrained and free, I do not exercise, nor bestow on them the proper care.

> Greek: καίτοι οὔτʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ παλαίειν οὔτʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ γράφειν ἢ ἀναγιγνώσκειν ἀρκοῦμαι τῷ μαθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἄνω κάτω στρέφω τοὺς προτεινομένους καὶ ἄλλους πλέκω καὶ μεταπίπτοντας ὡσαύτως.

[¶80] And then I trouble myself what others will say of me; whether I shall appear to them worthy of regard; whether I shall appear happy. Will you not see, foolish man, what you can say of yourself;

> Greek: τὰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖα θεωρήματα, ἀφʼ ὧν ἔστιν ὁρμώμενον ἄλυπον γενέσθαι, ἄφοβον ἀπαθῆ, ἀκώλυτον, ἐλεύθερον, ταῦτα δʼ οὐ γυμνάζω οὐδὲ μελετῶ κατὰ ταῦτα τὴν προσήκουσαν μελέτην.

[¶81] what sort of person you appear to yourself in your opinions, in your desires, in your aversions, in your pursuits, in your preparation, in your intention, in the other proper works of a man?

> Greek: εἶτά μοι μέλει, τί οἱ ἄλλοι περὶ ἐμοῦ ἐροῦσιν, εἰ φανοῦμαι αὐτοῖς ἀξιόλογος, εἰ φανοῦμαι εὐδαίμων;

[¶82] But instead of that, do you trouble yourself whether others pity you? “Very true. But I am pitied without reason.” Then are you not pained by this?

> Greek: ταλαίπωρε, οὐ θέλεις βλέπειν, τί σὺ λέγεις περὶ σαυτοῦ; τίς φαίνῃ σαυτῷ; τίς ἐν τῷ ὑπολαμβάνειν, τίς ἐν τῷ ὀρέγεσθαι, τίς ἐν τῷ ἐκκλίνειν· τίς ἐν ὁρμῇ, παρασκευῇ, ἐπιβολῇ, τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἀνθρωπικοῖς ἔργοις;

[¶83] And is not he who is in pain to be pitied? “Yes.” How, then, are you pitied without reason? For you render yourself worthy of pity by what you suffer upon being pitied. What says Antisthenes, then? Have you never heard?—“It is kingly, O Cyrus, to do well and to be ill spoken of.” My head is well, and all around me think it aches. What is that to me?

> Greek: ἀλλὰ μέλει σοι, εἴ σε ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἄλλοι; — ναί· ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐλεοῦμαι. — οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὀδυνᾷ; ὁ δέ γε ὀδυνώμενος ἐλεεινός ἐστιν; — ναί. — πῶς οὖν ἔτι παρὰ ἀξίαν ἐλεῇ; αὐτοῖς γὰρ οἷς περὶ τὸν ἔλεον πάσχεις κατασκευάζεις σεαυτὸν ἄξιον τοῦ ἐλεεῖσθαι.

[¶84] I am free from a fever; and they compassionate me as if I had one. “Poor soul, what a long while have you had this fever!”

> Greek: τί οὖν λέγει Ἀντισθένης; οὐδέποτʼ ἤκουσας; βασιλικόν, ὦ Κῦρε, πράττειν μὲν εὖ, κακῶς δʼ ἀκούειν.

[¶85] I say, too, with a dismal countenance, Ay, indeed, it is now a long time that I have been ill. “What can be the consequence, then?” What pleases God. And at the same time I secretly laugh at those who pity me. What forbids, then, but that the same may be done in the other case? I am poor, but I have right principles concerning poverty. What is it to me, then, if people pity me for my poverty? I am not in power and others are;

> Greek: τὴν κεφαλὴν ὑγιᾶ ἔχω καὶ πάντες οἴονται ὅτι κεφαλαλγῶ. τί μοι μέλει; ἀπύρετός εἰμι καὶ ὡς πυρέσσοντί μοι συνάχθονται· τάλας, ἐκ τοσούτου χρόνου οὐ διέλειπες πυρέσσων. λέγω καὶ ἐγὼ σκυθρωπάσας ὅτι ναί· ταῖς ἀληθείαις πολὺς ἤδη χρόνος, ἐξ οὗ μοι κακῶς ἐστιν. τί οὖν γένηται; ὡς ἂν ὁ θεὸς θέλῃ. καὶ ἅμα ὑποκαταγελῶ τῶν οἰκτειρόντων με.

[¶86] but I have such opinions as I ought to have concerning power and the want of power. Let them see to it who pity me. I am neither hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold. But because they are hungry and thirsty, they suppose me to be so too. What can I do for them?

> Greek: τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως; πένης εἰμί, ἀλλὰ ὀρθὸν δόγμα ἔχω περὶ πενίας. τί οὖν μοι μέλει, εἴ μʼ ἐπὶ τῇ πενίᾳ ἐλεοῦσιν; οὐκ ἄρχω, ἄλλοι δʼ ἄρχουσιν. ἀλλʼ ὃ δεῖ ὑπειληφέναι, ὑπείληφα περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ ἄρχειν.

[¶87] Am I to go about making proclamation, and saying, Do not deceive yourselves, good people, I am very well; I care for neither poverty, nor want of power, nor anything else but right principles? These I possess unrestrained, and care for nothing further. But what trifling is this! How have I right principles when I am not contented to be what I am; but am in agony as to how I shall appear? “But others will get more, and be preferred to me.”

> Greek: ὄψονται οἱ ἐλεοῦντές με, ἐγὼ δʼ οὔτε πεινῶ οὔτε διψῶ οὔτε ῥιγῶ, ἀλλʼ ἀφʼ ὧν αὐτοὶ πεινῶσιν ἢ διψῶσιν οἴονται κἀμέ. τί οὖν αὐτοῖς ποιήσω; περιερχόμενος κηρύσσω καὶ λέγω μὴ πλανᾶσθε, ἄνδρες, ἐμοὶ καλῶς ἐστιν· οὔτε πενίας ἐπιστρέφομαι οὔτε ἀναρχίας οὔτε ἁπλῶς ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἢ δογμάτων ὀρθῶν· ταῦτα ἔχω ἀκώλυτα, οὐδενὸς πεφρόντικα ἔτι;

[¶88] Well, what is more reasonable than that they who take pains for anything should get most in that particular direction in which they take pains?

> Greek: καὶ τίς αὕτη φλυαρία; πῶς ἔτι ὀρθὰ δόγματα ἔχω μὴ ἀρκούμενος τῷ εἶναι ὅς εἰμι, ἀλλʼ ἐπτοημένος ὑπὲρ τοῦ δοκεῖν;

[¶89] They have taken pains for power; you, for right principles. They, for riches; you, for a proper use of the phenomena of existence. See whether they have the advantage of you in that for which you have taken pains, and which they neglect; if they judge better concerning the natural bounds and limits of things;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἄλλοι πλειόνων τεύξονται καὶ προτιμηθήσονται. — τί οὖν εὐλογώτερον ἢ τοὺς περί τι ἐσπουδακότας ἐν ἐκείνῳ πλεῖον ἔχειν, ἐν ᾧ ἐσπουδάκασιν; περὶ ἀρχὰς ἐσπουδάκασιν, σὺ περὶ δόγματα· καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον, σὺ περὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν.

[¶90] if their desires are less often disappointed than yours, their aversions less often incurred; if they aim better in their intentions, in their purposes, in their pursuits; if they preserve a becoming behavior as men, as sons, as parents, and so on with the other relations of life. But if they are in power, and you not, why will you not speak the truth to yourself; that you do nothing for the sake of power, but that they do everything?

> Greek: ὅρα, εἰ ἐν τούτῳ σου πλέον ἔχουσιν, περὶ ὃ σὺ μὲν ἐσπούδακας, ἐκεῖνοι δʼ ἀμελοῦσιν· εἰ συγκατατίθενται μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φυσικὰ μέτρα, εἰ ὀρέγονταί σου ἀναποτευκτότερον, εἰ ἐκκλίνουσιν ἀπεριπτωτότερον, εἰ ἐν ἐπιβολῇ, ἐν προθέσει, εἰ ἐν ὁρμῇ μᾶλλον εὐστοχοῦσιν, εἰ τὸ πρέπον σῴζουσιν ὡς ἄνδρες, ὡς υἱοί, ὡς γονεῖς, εἶθʼ ἑξῆς κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν σχέσεων ὀνόματα.

[¶91] It were very reasonable that he who carefully seeks anything should be less successful than he who neglects it! “No; but since I take care to have right principles, it is more reasonable that I should excel.”

> Greek: εἰ δʼ ἄρχουσιν ἐκεῖνοι, σὺ δʼ οὐ θέλεις σαυτῷ τὰς ἀληθείας εἰπεῖν, ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν τούτου ἕνεκα ποιεῖς, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ πάντα, ἀλογώτατον δὲ τὸν ἐπιμελούμενόν τινος ἔλαττον φέρεσθαι [οὐ] ἢ τὸν ἀμελοῦντα;

[¶92] Yes, in respect to what you take pains about, your principles. But give up to others the things in which they have taken more pains than you. Else it is just as if, because you have right principles, you should expect to aim an arrow better than an archer, or to forge better than a smith. In that case cease to take pains about principles, and apply yourself to those things which you wish to possess, and then begin crying, if you do not succeed;

> Greek: ⟨οὔ,⟩ ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ φροντίζω ἐγὼ δογμάτων ὀρθῶν, εὐλογώτερόν μέ ἐστιν ἄρχειν. — ἐν ᾧ φροντίζεις, ἐν δόγμασιν· ἐν ᾧ δʼ ἄλλοι μᾶλλόν σου πεφροντίκασιν, ἐκείνοις παραχώρει. οἷον εἰ διὰ τὸ δόγματα ἔχειν ὀρθὰ ἠξίους τοξεύων μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνειν τῶν τοξοτῶν ἢ χαλκεύων μᾶλλον τῶν χαλκέων.

[¶93] for you deserve to cry. But now you claim that you are engaged and absorbed in other things;

> Greek: ἄφες οὖν τὴν περὶ τὰ δόγματα σπουδὴν καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀναστρέφου, ἃ κτήσασθαι θέλεις, καὶ τότε κλαῖε, ἐάν σοι μὴ προχωρῇ· κλαίειν γὰρ ἄξιος εἶ.

[¶94] and they say well that no man can be of two trades. One man, as soon as he rises and goes out, seeks to whom he may pay his compliments, whom he may flatter, to whom he may send a present, how he may please the favorite;

> Greek: νῦν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι λέγεις, ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν, ὅτι ἔργον ἔργῳ οὐ κοινωνεῖ.

[¶95] how, by doing mischief to one, he may oblige another. Whenever he prays, he prays for things like these; whenever he sacrifices, he sacrifices for things like these.

> Greek: ὁ μὲν ἐξ ὄρθρου ἀναστὰς ζητεῖ, τίνα ἐξ οἴκου ἀσπάσηται, τίνι κεχαρισμένον λόγον εἴπῃ, τίνι δῶρον πέμψῃ, πῶς τῷ ὀρχηστῇ ἀρέσῃ, πῶς κακοηθισάμενος ἄλλον ἄλλῳ χαρίσηται.

[¶96] To these he transfers the Pythagorean precept,—
Let not the stealing god of Sleep surprise. Where have I failed in point of flattery? What have I done,—anything like a free, brave-spirited man?

> Greek: ὅταν εὔχηται, περὶ τούτων εὔχεται· ὅταν θύῃ, ἐπὶ τούτοις θύει· τὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου μὴ δʼ ὕπνον μαλακοῖσιν ἐπʼ ὄμμασι προσδέξασθαι ἐνταῦθα παρατέθεικεν.

[¶97] If he should find anything of this sort, he rebukes and accuses himself. “What business had you to say that? For could you not have lied? Even the philosophers say there is no objection against telling a lie.” But, on the other hand, if you have in reality been careful about nothing else but to make a right use of the phenomena of existence;

> Greek: πῇ παρέβην; τῶν πρὸς κολακείαν. τί ἔρεξα; μή τι ὡς ἐλεύθερος, μή τι ὡς γενναῖος; κἂν εὕρῃ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπιτιμᾷ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖ τί γάρ σοι καὶ τοῦτο εἰπεῖν; οὐ γὰρ ἐνῆν ψεύσασθαι; λέγουσιν καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι οὐδὲν κωλύει ψεῦδος εἰπεῖν.

[¶98] then, as soon as you are up in the morning, consider what you need in order to be free from passion; what, to enjoy tranquillity? “In what do I consist,—merely in body, in estate, in reputation? None of these. What, then? I am a reasonable creature.

> Greek: σὺ δʼ εἴπερ ταῖς ἀληθείαις οὐδενὸς ἄλλου πεφρόντικας ἢ χρήσεως οἵας δεῖ φαντασιῶν, εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς ἕωθεν ἐνθυμοῦ τίνα μοι λείπει πρὸς ἀπάθειαν; τίνα πρὸς ἀταραξίαν; τίς εἰμι; μή τι σωμάτιον, μή τι κτῆσις, μή τι φήμη; οὐδὲν τούτων. ἀλλὰ τί; λογικόν εἰμι ζῷον.

[¶99] What, then, is required of me?” Meditate upon your actions. Where have I failed in any requisite for prosperity? What have I done, either unfriendly or unsocial? What have I omitted that was necessary in these points?

> Greek: τίνα οὖν τὰ ἀπαιτήματα; ἀναπόλει τὰ πεπραγμένα. πῇ παρέβην τῶν πρὸς εὔροιαν; τί ἔρεξα ἢ ἄφιλον ἢ ἀκοινώνητον ἢ ἄγνωμον; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη πρὸς ταῦτα;

[¶100] Since there is so much difference, then, in your desires, your actions, your wishes, would you yet have an equal share with others in those things about which you have not taken pains, and they have?

> Greek: τοσαύτης οὖν διαφορᾶς οὔσης τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων, τῶν ἔργων, τῶν εὐχῶν ἔτι θέλεις τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐκείνοις, περὶ ἃ σὺ μὲν οὐκ ἐσπούδακας, ἐκεῖνοι δʼ ἐσπουδάκασιν;

[¶101] And do you wonder, after all, and are you out of humor, if they pity you? But they are not out of humor, if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced that they are in possession of their proper good;

> Greek: εἶτα θαυμάζεις, εἴ σʼ ἐλεοῦσιν, καὶ ἀγανακτεῖς; ἐκεῖνοι δʼ οὐκ ἀγανακτοῦσιν, εἰ σὺ αὐτοὺς ἐλεεῖς. διὰ τί; ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι μὲν πεπεισμένοι εἰσίν, ὅτι ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνουσιν, σὺ δʼ οὐ πέπεισαι.

[¶102] but you are not convinced that you are. Hence you are not contented with your own condition, but desire theirs; whereas they are contented with theirs, and do not desire yours. For if you were really convinced that it is you who are in possession of what is good, and that they are mistaken, you would not so much as think what they say about you.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο σὺ μὲν οὐκ ἀρκῇ τοῖς σοῖς, ἀλλʼ ἐφίεσαι τῶν ἐκείνων· ἐκεῖνοι δʼ ἀρκοῦνται τοῖς ἑαυτῶν καὶ οὐκ ἐφίενται τῶν σῶν. ἐπεί τοι εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἐπέπεισο, ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ σὺ ὁ ἐπιτυγχάνων εἶ, ἐκεῖνοι δʼ ἀποπεπλάνηνται, οὐδʼ ἂν ἐνεθυμοῦ, τί λέγουσι περὶ σοῦ.

## 22. Book IV · chapters 7–10

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/22/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/22/#p-N

[¶0] 7. What makes a tyrant formidable? His guards, say you, and their swords; they who protect his bedchamber, and they who keep out intruders.

> Greek: 7. τί ποιεῖ φοβερὸν τὸν τύραννον; — οἱ δορυφόροι, φησίν, καὶ αἱ μάχαιραι αὐτῶν καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ κοιτῶνος καὶ οἱ ἀποκλείοντες τοὺς εἰσιόντας.

[¶1] Why, then, if you bring a child to him amidst these guards, is it not afraid? Is it because the child does not know what they mean?

> Greek: — διὰ τί οὖν, ἂν παιδίον αὐτῷ προσαγάγῃς μετὰ τῶν δορυφόρων ὄντι, οὐ φοβεῖται; ἢ ὅτι οὐκ αἰσθάνεται τούτων τὸ παιδίον;

[¶2] Suppose, then, that any one knows what is meant by guards, and that they are armed with swords; and for that very reason comes in the tyrant’s way, being desirous, on account of some misfortune, to die, and seeking to die easily by the hand of another. Does such a man fear the guards? No; for he desires the very thing that renders them formidable.

> Greek: ἂν οὖν τῶν δορυφόρων τις αἰσθάνηται καὶ ὅτι μαχαίρας ἔχουσιν, ἐπʼ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο προσέρχηται αὐτῷ θέλων ἀποθανεῖν διά τινα περίστασιν καὶ ζητῶν ὑπʼ ἄλλου παθεῖν αὐτὸ εὐκόλως, μή τι φοβεῖται τοὺς δορυφόρους; — θέλει γὰρ τοῦτο, διʼ ὃ φοβεροί εἰσιν. —

[¶3] Well, then; if any one, being without an absolute desire to live or die, but indifferent to it, comes in the way of a tyrant, what prevents his approaching him without fear?

> Greek: ἂν οὖν τις μήτʼ ἀποθανεῖν μήτε ζῆν θέλων ἐξ ἅπαντος ἀλλʼ ὡς ἂν διδῶται, προσέρχηται αὐτῷ, τί κωλύει μὴ δεδοικότα προσέρχεσθαι αὐτόν;

[¶4] Nothing. If, then, another should think concerning his estate, or wife, or children, as this man thinks concerning his body; and, in short, from some madness or folly should be of such a disposition as not to care whether he has them or not; but just as children, playing with shells, are busied with the play, but not with the shells, so he should pay no regard to these affairs, except to carry on the play with them, what tyrant, what guards, or swords are any longer formidable to such a man? And is it possible that any one should be thus disposed towards these things from madness, and the Galileans from mere habit;

> Greek: — οὐδέν. — ἄν τις οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὴν κτῆσιν ὡσαύτως ἔχῃ καθάπερ οὗτος πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πρὸς τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ ἁπλῶς ὑπό τινος μανίας καὶ ἀπονοίας οὕτως ᾖ[ν] διακείμενος, ὥστʼ ἐν μηδενὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὸ ἔχειν ταῦτα ἢ μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ὀστρακίοις τὰ παιδία παίζοντα περὶ μὲν τῆς παιδιᾶς διαφέρεται, τῶν ὀστρακίων δʼ οὐ πεφρόντικεν, οὕτως δὲ καὶ οὗτος τὰς μὲν ὕλας παρʼ οὐδὲν ᾖ[ν] πεποιημένος, τὴν παιδιὰν δὲ τὴν περὶ αὐτὰς καὶ ἀναστροφὴν ἀσπάζηται· ποῖος ἔτι τούτῳ τύραννος φοβερὸς ἢ ποῖοι δορυφόροι ἢ ποῖαι μάχαιραι αὐτῶν;

[¶5] yet that no one should be able to learn, from reason and demonstration, that God made all things in the world, and made the whole world itself unrestrained and perfect, and all its parts for the use of the whole? All other creatures are indeed excluded from a power of comprehending the administration of the world;

> Greek: εἶτα ὑπὸ μανίας μὲν δύναταί τις οὕτως διατεθῆναι πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι· ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται μαθεῖν, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς πάντα πεποίηκεν τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον ὅλον μὲν ἀκώλυτον καὶ αὐτοτελῆ, τὰ ἐν μέρει δʼ αὐτοῦ πρὸς χρείαν τῶν ὅλων;

[¶6] but a reasonable being has abilities for the consideration of all these things,—both that itself is a part, and what part; and that it is fit the parts should submit to the whole. Besides, being by nature constituted noble, magnanimous, and free, it sees that of the things which relate to it some are unrestrained and in its own power, some restrained and in the power of others,—the unrestrained, such as depend on will;

> Greek: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πάντα ἀπήλλακται τοῦ δύνασθαι παρακολουθεῖν τῇ διοικήσει αὐτοῦ· τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀφορμὰς ἔχει πρὸς ἀναλογισμὸν τούτων ἁπάντων, ὅτι τε μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖόν τι μέρος καὶ ὅτι τὰ μέρη τοῖς ὅλοις εἴκειν ἔχει καλῶς.

[¶7] the restrained, such as do not depend on it.

> Greek: πρὸς τούτοις δὲ φύσει γενναῖον καὶ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ ἐλεύθερον γενόμενον ὁρᾷ, διότι τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ τὰ μὲν ἀκώλυτα ἔχει καὶ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ κωλυτὰ καὶ ἐπʼ ἄλλοις· ἀκώλυτα μὲν τὰ προαιρετικά, κωλυτὰ δὲ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα.

[¶8] And for this reason, if it esteems its good and its interest to consist in things unrestrained and in its own power, it will be free, prosperous, happy, safe, magnanimous, pious, thankful to God for everything, never finding fault with anything, never censuring anything that is brought about by him. But if it esteems its good and its interest to consist in externals, and things uncontrollable by will, it must necessarily be restrained, be hindered, be enslaved to those who have the power over those things which it admires and fears;

> Greek: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὲν ἐν τούτοις μόνοις ἡγήσηται τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὑτοῦ καὶ συμφέρον, τοῖς ἀκωλύτοις καὶ ἐφʼ ἑαυτῷ, ἐλεύθερον ἔσται, εὔρουν, εὔδαιμον, ἀβλαβές, μεγαλόφρον, εὐσεβές, χάριν ἔχον ὑπὲρ πάντων τῷ θεῷ, μηδαμοῦ μεμφόμενον μηδενὶ τῶν γενομένων, μηδενὶ ἐγκαλοῦν·

[¶9] it must necessarily be impious, as supposing itself injured by God, and unjust, as claiming more than its share;

> Greek: ἂν δʼ ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς καὶ ἀπροαιρέτοις, ἀνάγκη κωλύεσθαι αὐτό, ἐμποδίζεσθαι, δουλεύειν τοῖς ἐκείνων ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν, ἃ τεθαύμακεν καὶ φοβεῖται,

[¶10] it must necessarily, too, be abject and base. Why may not he, who discerns these things, live with an easy and light heart, quietly awaiting whatever may happen, and bearing contentedly what has happened?

> Greek: ἀνάγκη δʼ ἀσεβὲς εἶναι ἅτε βλάπτεσθαι οἰόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἄνισον, ἀεὶ αὑτῷ τοῦ πλείονος περιποιητικόν, ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ταπεινὸν εἶναι καὶ μικροπρεπές.

[¶11] Shall it be poverty? Bring it; and you shall see what poverty is when it is met well. Would you have power?

> Greek: ταῦτα τί κωλύει διαλαβόντα ζῆν κούφως καὶ εὐηνίως, πάντα τὰ συμβαίνειν δυνάμενα πρᾴως ἐκδεχόμενον, τὰ δʼ ἤδη συμβεβηκότα φέροντα;

[¶12] Bring toils too along with it. Banishment? Wherever I go, it will be well with me there;

> Greek: θέλεις πενίαν; φέρε καὶ γνώσῃ, τί ἐστι πενία τυχοῦσα καλοῦ ὑποκριτοῦ.

[¶13] for it was well with me here,—not on account of the place, but of the principles which I shall carry away with me; for no one can deprive me of these; on the contrary, they alone are my property, and cannot be taken away; and their possession suffices me wherever I am, or whatever I do. “But it is now time to die.” What is that you call dying? Do not talk of the thing in a tragic strain;

> Greek: θέλεις ἀρχάς; φέρε, καὶ πόνους. ἀλλʼ ἐξορισμόν; ὅπου ἂν ἀπέλθω, ἐκεῖ μοι καλῶς ἔσται· καὶ γὰρ ἐνθάδε οὐ διὰ τὸν τόπον ἦν μοι καλῶς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ δόγματα, ἃ μέλλω μετʼ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀποφέρειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναταί τις ἀφελέσθαι αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μόνα ἐμά ἐστι καὶ ἀναφαίρετα καὶ ἀρκεῖ μοι παρόντα, ὅπου ἂν ὦ καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῶ.

[¶14] but state the thing as it is, that it is time for your material part to revert whence it came. And where is the terror of this? What part of the world is going to be lost? What is going to happen that is new or prodigious? Is it for this that a tyrant is formidable? Is it on this account that the swords of his guards seem so large and sharp?

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἤδη καιρὸς ἀποθανεῖν. τί λέγεις ἀποθανεῖν; μὴ τραγῴδει τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλʼ εἰπὲ ὡς ἔχει ἤδη καιρὸς τὴν ὕλην, ἐξ ὧν συνῆλθεν, εἰς ἐκεῖνα πάλιν ἀποκαταστῆναι. καὶ τί δεινόν; τί μέλλει ἀπόλλυσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, τί γενέσθαι καινόν, παράλογον; τούτων ἕνεκα φοβερός ἐστιν ὁ τύραννος;

[¶15] Try these things upon others. For my part I have examined the whole. No one has authority over me. God has made me free; I know his commands;

> Greek: διὰ ταῦτα οἱ δορυφόροι μεγάλας δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν τὰς μαχαίρας καὶ ὀξείας; ἄλλοις ταῦτα· ἐμοὶ δʼ ἔσκεπται περὶ πάντων, εἰς ἐμὲ οὐδεὶς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει.

[¶16] after this no one can enslave me. I have a proper vindicator of my freedom; proper judges. Are you the master of my body? But what is that to me? Of my little estate? But what is that to me?

> Greek: ἠλευθέρωμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔγνωκα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐντολάς, οὐκέτι οὐδεὶς δουλαγωγῆσαί με δύναται, καρπιστὴν ἔχω οἷον δεῖ, δικαστὰς οἵους δεῖ.

[¶17] Of banishment and chains? Why, all these again, and my whole body, I give up to you; make a trial of your power whenever you please, and you will find how far it extends. Whom, then, can I any longer fear,—those who guard the chamber? Lest they should do what,—shut me out?

> Greek: οὐχὶ τοῦ σώματός σου κύριός εἰμι; τί οὖν πρὸς ἐμέ; οὐχὶ τοῦ κτησιδίου; τί οὖν πρὸς ἐμέ; οὐχὶ φυγῆς ἢ δεσμῶν; πάλιν τούτων πάντων καὶ τοῦ σωματίου ὅλου σοι αὐτοῦ ἐξίσταμαι, ὅταν θέλῃς. πείρασαί μοί σου τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ γνώσῃ, μέχρι τίνος αὐτὴν ἔχεις.

[¶18] If they find me desirous to come in, let them. “Why do you come to the door, then?” Because it is fitting for me that, while the play lasts, I should play too. “How then are you incapable of being shut out?” Because, if I am not admitted, I would not wish to go in;

> Greek: τίνα οὖν ἔτι φοβηθῆναι δύναμαι; τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ κοιτῶνος; μὴ τί ποιήσωσιν; ἀποκλείσωσί με; ἄν με εὕρωσι θέλοντα εἰσελθεῖν, ἀποκλεισάτωσαν. — τί οὖν ἔρχῃ ἐπὶ θύρας; — ὅτι καθήκειν ἐμαυτῷ δοκῶ μενούσης τῆς παιδιᾶς συμπαίζειν.

[¶19] but would much rather that things should be as they are, for I esteem what God wills to be better than what I will. To him I yield myself, as a servant and a follower. My pursuits, my desires, my very will, must coincide with his, Being shut out does not affect me; but those who push to get in. Why, then, do not I push too? Because I know that there is no really good thing distributed to those who get in.

> Greek: — πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἀποκλείῃ; — ὅτι ἂν μή τίς με δέχηται, οὐ θέλω εἰσελθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνο θέλω τὸ γινόμενον. κρεῖττον γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι ὃ ὁ θεὸς θέλει ἢ ὃ ἐγώ. προσκείσομαι διάκονος καὶ ἀκόλουθος ἐκείνῳ, συνορμῶ, συνορέγομαι, ἁπλῶς συνθέλω. ἀποκλεισμὸς ἐμοὶ οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τοῖς βιαζομένοις.

[¶20] But when I hear any one congratulated on the favor of Caesar, I ask what he has got. “A province.” Has he the needed wisdom also? “A public office.” Has he with it the knowledge how to use it? If not, why should I push my way in? Some one scatters nuts and figs.

> Greek: διὰ τί οὖν οὐ βιάζομαι; οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ἔσω ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν διαδίδοται τοῖς εἰσελθοῦσιν. ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἀκούσω τινὰ μακαριζόμενον, ὅτι τιμᾶται ὑπὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος, λέγω τί αὐτῷ συμβαίνει; μή τι οὖν καὶ δόγμα, οἷον δεῖ ἐπαρχίαν; μή τι οὖν καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι ἐπιτροπῇ;

[¶21] Children scramble and quarrel for them; but not men, for they think them trifles. But if any one should scatter shells, not even children would scramble for these. Provinces are being distributed; let children look to it. Money;

> Greek: τί ἔτι διωθοῦμαι; ἰσχαδοκάρυά τις διαρριπτεῖ· τὰ παιδία ἁρπάζει καὶ ἀλλήλοις διαμάχεται· οἱ ἄνδρες οὐχί, μικρὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ ἡγοῦνται. ἂν δʼ ὀστράκια διαρριπτῇ τις, οὐδὲ τὰ παιδία ἁρπάζει.

[¶22] let children look to it. Military command, a consulship; let children scramble for them. Let these be shut out, be beaten, kiss the hands of the giver or of his slaves. But to me they are mere figs and nuts. “What then is to be done?”

> Greek: ἐπαρχίαι διαδίδονται· ὄψεται τὰ παιδία. ἀργύριον· ὄψεται τὰ παιδία. στρατηγία, ὑπατεία· διαρπαζέτω τὰ παιδία· ἐκκλειέσθω, τυπτέσθω, καταφιλείτω τὰς χεῖρας τοῦ διδόντος, τῶν δούλων· ἐμοὶ δʼ ἰσχαδοκάρυόν ἐστιν.

[¶23] If you miss them, while he is throwing them, do not trouble yourself about it; but if a fig should fall into your lap, take it, and eat it; for one may pay so much regard even to a fig. But if I am to stoop and throw down one [rival], or be thrown down by another, and flatter those who succeed, a fig is not worth this, nor is any other of those things which are not really good, and which the philosophers have persuaded me not to esteem as good.

> Greek: τί οὖν, ἂν ἀπὸ τύχης ῥιπτοῦντος αὐτοῦ ἔλθῃ εἰς τὸν κόλπον ἰσχάς; ἄρας κατάφαγε· μέχρι τοσούτου γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἰσχάδα τιμῆσαι. ἵνα δὲ κ[ρ]ύψω καὶ ἄλλον ἀνατρέψω ἢ ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἀνατραπῶ καὶ κολακεύσω τοὺς εἰσιόντας, οὐκ ἀξία οὔτʼ ἰσχὰς οὔτʼ ἄλλο τι τῶν οὐκ ἀγαθῶν, ἅ με ἀναπεπείκασιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι μὴ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι.

[¶24] Show me the swords of the guards. “See how large and how sharp they are.” What, then, can these great and sharp swords do?

> Greek: δείκνυέ μοι τὰς μαχαίρας τῶν δορυφόρων. ἰδοῦ, ἡλίκαι εἰσὶ καὶ πῶς ὀξεῖαι. τί οὖν ποιοῦσιν αἱ μεγάλαι αὗται μάχαιραι καὶ ὀξεῖαι;

[¶25] “They kill.” And what can a fever do? “Nothing else.” And a [falling] tile? “Nothing else.” Do you then wish me to be bewildered by all these things, and to worship them, and to go about as a slave to them all?

> Greek: ἀποκτ[ε]ιννύουσιν. πυρετὸς δὲ τί ποιεῖ; ἄλλο οὐδέν. κεραμὶς δὲ τί ποιεῖ; ἄλλο οὐδέν. θέλεις οὖν πάντα ταῦτα θαυμάζω καὶ προσκυνῶ καὶ δοῦλος πάντων περιέρχωμαι;

[¶26] Heaven forbid! But having once learned that everything that is born must likewise die (that the world may not be at a stand, nor the course of it hindered), I no longer see any difference, whether this be effected by a fever, or a tile, or a soldier; but if any comparison is to be made, I know that the soldier will effect it with less pain and more speedily.

> Greek: μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλʼ ἅπαξ μαθών, ὅτι τὸ γενόμενον καὶ φθαρῆναι δεῖ, ἵνα ὁ κόσμος μὴ ἵστηται μηδʼ ἐμποδίζηται, οὐκέτι διαφέρομαι, πότερον πυρετὸς αὐτὸ ποιήσει ἢ κεραμὶς ἢ στρατιώτης, ἀλλʼ εἰ δεῖ συγκρῖναι, οἶδʼ ὅτι ἀπονώτερον αὐτὸ καὶ ταχύτερον ὁ στρατιώτης ποιήσει.

[¶27] Since then I neither fear any of those things which he can inflict upon me, nor covet anything which he can bestow, why do I stand any longer in awe of a tyrant? Why am I amazed at him? Why do I fear his guards?

> Greek: ὅταν οὖν μήτε φοβῶμαί τι ὧν διαθεῖναί με δύναται μήτʼ ἐπιθυμῶ τινος ὧν παρασχεῖν, τί ἔτι θαυμάζω αὐτόν, τί ἔτι τέθηπα; τί φοβοῦμαι τοὺς δορυφόρους; τί χαίρω, ἄν μοι φιλανθρώπως λαλήσῃ καὶ ἀποδέξηταί με, καὶ ἄλλοις διηγοῦμαι, πῶς μοι ἐλάλησεν;

[¶28] Why do I rejoice, if he speaks kindly to me, and receives me graciously; and why boast to others of my reception?

> Greek: μὴ γὰρ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, μὴ γὰρ Διογένης, ἵνʼ ὁ ἔπαινος αὐτοῦ ἀπόδειξις ᾖ περὶ ἐμοῦ;

[¶29] For is he Socrates or Diogenes, that his praise should show what I am? Or have I set my heart on imitating his manners? But to keep up the play I go to him and serve him, so long as he commands nothing unreasonable or improper. But if he should say to me, “Go to Salamis, and bring Leon,” I bid him seek another, for I play no longer.

> Greek: μὴ γὰρ τὸ ἦθος ἐζήλωκα αὐτοῦ; ἀλλὰ τὴν παιδιὰν σῴζων ἔρχομαι πρὸς [εμ]αὐτὸν καὶ ὑπηρετῶ, μέχρις ἂν ὅτου μηδὲν ἀβέλτερον κελεύῃ μηδʼ ἄρρυθμον. ἂν δέ μοι λέγῃ ἄπελθε ἐπὶ Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, λέγω αὐτῷ ζήτει ἄλλον· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκέτι παίζω.

[¶30] “Lead him away.” I follow as a part of the play. “But your head will be taken off.” And will his own remain on forever; or yours, who obey him? “But you will be thrown out unburied.” If I am identical with my corpse, I shall be thrown out;

> Greek: ἄπαγε αὐτόν. ἀκολουθῶ ἐν παιδιᾷ. ἀλλʼ ἀφαιρεῖταί σου ὁ τράχηλος. ἐκείνου δʼ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ ἐπιμένει, ὑμῶν δὲ τῶν πειθομένων; ἀλλʼ ἄταφος ῥιφήσῃ. εἰ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ νεκρός, ῥιφήσομαι· εἰ δʼ ἄλλος εἰμὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ, κομψότερον λέγε, ὡς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ μὴ ἐκφόβει με.

[¶31] but if I am something else than the corpse, speak more handsomely, as the thing is, and do not think to frighten me. These things are frightful to children and fools. But if any one who has once entered into the school of a philosopher knows not what he himself is, then he deserves to be frightened, and to flatter the last object of flattery; if he has not yet learnt that he is neither flesh, nor bones, nor nerves, but is that which makes use of these, and regulates and comprehends the phenomena of existence.

> Greek: τοῖς παιδίοις ταῦτα φοβερά ἐστι καὶ τοῖς ἀνοήτοις. εἰ δέ τις εἰς φιλοσόφου σχολὴν ἅπαξ εἰσελθὼν οὐκ οἶδεν, τί ἐστιν αὐτός, ἄξιός ἐστι φοβεῖσθαι καὶ κολακεύειν ὃ ὕστερον ἐκολάκευεν· εἰ μήπω μεμάθηκεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σὰρξ οὐδʼ ὀστᾶ οὐδὲ νεῦρα, ἀλλὰ τὸ τούτοις χρώμενον, τὸ καὶ διοικοῦν καὶ παρακολουθοῦν ταῖς φαντασίαις.

[¶32] “Well; but these reasonings make men despise the laws.” And what reasonings, then, render those who use them more obedient to the laws?

> Greek: ναί· ἀλλʼ οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι καταφρονητὰς ποιοῦσι τῶν νόμων. — καὶ ποῖοι μᾶλλον λόγοι πειθομένους παρέχουσι τοῖς νόμοις τοὺς χρωμένους; νόμος δʼ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ἐπὶ μωρῷ.

[¶33] But the law of fools is no law. And yet, see how these reasonings render us properly disposed, even towards such persons, since they teach us not to assert against them any claim wherein they can surpass us.

> Greek: καὶ ὅμως ὅρα, πῶς καὶ πρὸς τούτους ὡς δεῖ ἔχοντας παρασκευάζουσιν, οἵ γε διδάσκουσιν μηδενὸς ἀντιποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἡμᾶς νικῆσαι δύνωνται.

[¶34] They teach us to give up body, to give up estate, children, parents, brothers, to yield everything, to let go everything, excepting only principles; which even Zeus has excepted and decreed to be every one’s own property.

> Greek: περὶ τὸ σωμάτιον διδάσκουσιν ἐξίστασθαι, περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν ἐξίστασθαι, περὶ τὰ τέκνα, γονεῖς [δʼ], ἀδελφούς, πάντων παραχωρεῖν, πάντα ἀφιέναι· μόνα τὰ δόγματα ὑπεξαιροῦνται, ἃ καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐξαίρετα ἑκάστου εἶναι ἠθέλησεν.

[¶35] What unreasonableness, what breach of the laws, is there in this? Where you are superior and stronger, there I give way to you. Where, on the contrary, I am superior, do you submit to me; for this has been my study, and not yours.

> Greek: ποία ἐνθάδε παρανομία, ποία ἀβελτερία; ὅπου κρείττων εἶ καὶ ἰσχυρότερος, ἐκεῖ σοι ἐξίσταμαι· ὅπου πάλιν ἐγὼ κρείττων, σὺ παραχώρει μοι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ μεμέληκεν, σοὶ δʼ οὔ.

[¶36] Your study has been to walk upon a mosaic floor, to be attended by your servants and clients, to wear fine clothes, to have a great number of hunters, fiddlers, and players.

> Greek: σοὶ μέλει, πῶς ἐν ὀρθοστρώτοις οἰκῇς, ἔτι πῶς παῖδές σοι καὶ πιλλᾶτοι διακονῶσιν, πῶς ἐσθῆτα περίβλεπτον φορῇς, πῶς κυνηγοὺς πολλοὺς ἔχῃς, πῶς κιθαρῳδούς, τραγῳδούς.

[¶37] Do I lay any claim to these? On the other hand, have you made a study of principles, or even of your own reason? Do you know of what parts it consists; how they are combined and joined, and with what powers?

> Greek: μή τι ἀντιποιοῦμαι; μή τι οὖν δογμάτων σοι μεμέληκε; μή τι τοῦ λόγου τοῦ σεαυτοῦ; μή τι οἶδας, ἐκ τίνων μορίων συνέστηκεν, πῶς συνάγεται, τίς ἡ διάρθρωσις αὐτοῦ, τίνας ἔχει δυνάμεις καὶ ποίας τινάς;

[¶38] Why, then, do you take it amiss, if another, who has studied them, has the advantage of you in these things? “But they are of all things the greatest.” Well; and who restrains you from being conversant with them, and attending to them ever so carefully? Or who is better provided with books, with leisure, with assistants?

> Greek: τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς, εἰ ἄλλος ἐν τούτοις σου πλέον ἔχει ὁ μεμελετηκώς; — ἀλλὰ ταῦτʼ ἔστι τὰ μέγιστα. — καὶ τίς σε κωλύει περὶ ταῦτʼ ἀναστρέφεσθαι καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; τίς δὲ μείζονα ἔχει παρασκευὴν βιβλίων, εὐσχολίας, τῶν ὠφελησόντων;

[¶39] Only turn your thoughts now and then to these matters; bestow but a little time upon your own ruling faculty. Consider what is the power you have, and whence it came, that uses all other things, that examines them all, that chooses, that rejects.

> Greek: μόνον ἀπόνευσόν ποτε ἐπὶ ταῦτα, ἀπόνειμον κἂν ὀλίγον χρόνον τῷ σαυτοῦ ἡγεμονικῷ· σκέψαι τί ποτʼ ἔχεις τοῦτο καὶ πόθεν ἐληλυθός, τὸ πᾶσιν τοῖς ἄλλοις χρώμενον, πάντα τἆλλα δοκιμάζον, ἐκλεγόμενον, ἀπεκλεγόμενον.

[¶40] *But while you employ yourself merely about externals, you will possess those indeed beyond all rivals; but all else will be, just as you elect to have it, sordid and neglected.

> Greek: μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀναστρέφῃ, ἐκεῖνα ἕξεις οἷα οὐδείς, τοῦτο δʼ οἷον αὐτὸ ἔχειν θέλεις, ῥυπαρὸν καὶ ἀτημέλητον.

[¶41] 8. Never commend or censure any one for common actions, nor attribute to them either skilfulness or unskilfulness; and thus you will at once be free both from rashness and ill-nature. Such a one bathes hastily.

> Greek: 8. μηδέποτʼ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν τινα μήτʼ ἐπαινέσητε μήτε ψέξητε μήτε τέχνην τινὰ ἢ ἀτεχνίαν προσμαρτυρήσητε· καὶ ἅμα μὲν προπετείας ἑαυτοὺς ἀπαλλάξετε, ἅμα δὲ κακοηθείας.

[¶42] Does he therefore do it ill? Not at all.—But what?

> Greek: οὗτος ταχέως λούεται. κακῶς οὖν ποιεῖ; οὐ πάντως.

[¶43] Hastily. “Is everything well done, then?” By no means. But what is done from good principles is well done; what from bad ones, ill. Till you know from what principle any one acts, neither commend nor censure the action. But the principle is not easily discerned from the external appearance.

> Greek: ἀλλὰ τί; ταχέως λούεται. — πάντα οὖν καλῶς γίνεται; — οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ δογμάτων ὀρθῶν καλῶς, τὰ δʼ ἀπὸ μοχθηρῶν μοχθηρῶς. σὺ δὲ μέχρις ἂν καταμάθῃς τὸ δόγμα, ἀφʼ οὗ τις ποιεῖ ἕκαστα, μήτʼ ἐπαίνει τὸ ἔργον μήτε ψέγε.

[¶44] Such a one is a carpenter. Why? He uses an axe. What proof is that? Such a one is a musician, for he sings. What proof is that? Such a one is a philosopher. Why?

> Greek: δόγμα δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥᾳδίως κρίνεται. οὗτος τέκτων ἐστίν. διὰ τί; χρῆται σκεπάρνῳ. τί οὖν τοῦτο; οὗτος μουσικός· ᾁδει γάρ. καὶ τί τοῦτο; οὗτος φιλόσοφος. διὰ τί;

[¶45] Because he wears a cloak and long hair. What then do mountebanks wear? And so, when people see any.of these acting indecently, they presently say, “See what the philosopher does.” But they ought rather, from his acting indecently, to say that he is no philosopher.

> Greek: τρίβωνα γὰρ ἔχει καὶ κόμην. οἱ δʼ ἀγύρται τί ἔχουσιν; διὰ τοῦτο, ἂν ἀσχημονοῦντά τις ἴδῃ τινὰ αὐτῶν, εὐθὺς λέγει ἰδοὺ ὁ φιλόσοφος τί ποιεῖ. ἔδει δʼ ἀφʼ ὧν ἠσχημόνει μᾶλλον λέγειν αὐτὸν μὴ εἶναι φιλόσοφον.

[¶46] For if indeed the essence of philosophic pursuits is to wear a cloak and long hair, they say right; but if it be rather to keep himself free from faults, since he does not fulfil his profession, why do not they deprive him of his title? For this is the way with regard to other arts.

> Greek: εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου πρόληψις καὶ ἐπαγγελία, ἔχειν τρίβωνα καὶ κόμην, καλῶς ἂν ἔλεγον· εἰ δʼ ἐκείνη μᾶλλον, ἀναμάρτητον εἶναι, διὰ τί οὐχὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πληροῦν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν ἀφαιροῦνται αὐτὸν τῆς προσηγορίας;

[¶47] When we see any one handle an axe awkwardly, we do not say, “Where is the use of this art? See how poorly carpenters acquit themselves,” but we say the very contrary, “This man is no carpenter; for he handles an axe awkwardly.”

> Greek: οὕτως γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. ὅταν ἴδῃ τις κακῶς πελεκῶντα, οὐ λέγει τί ὄφελος τεκτονικῆς; ἰδοὺ οἱ τέκτονες οἷα ποιοῦσι κακά, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον λέγει οὗτος οὐκ ἔστι τέκτων, πελεκᾷ γὰρ κακῶς.

[¶48] So, if we hear any one sing badly, we do not say, “Observe how musicians sing,” but rather, “This fellow is no musician.”

> Greek: ὁμοίως κἂν ᾁδοντός τινος ἀκούσῃ κακῶς, οὐ λέγει ἰδοὺ πῶς ᾁδουσιν οἱ μουσικοί, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οὗτος [ὅτι] οὐκ ἔστι μουσικός.

[¶49] It is with regard to philosophy alone that people are thus affected. When they see any one acting inconsistently with the profession of a philosopher, they do. not take away his title; but assuming that he is a philosopher, and then reasoning from his improper behavior, they infer that philosophy is of no use. “What then is the reason of this?”

> Greek: ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίας δὲ μόνης τοῦτο πάσχουσιν· ὅταν τινὰ ἴδωσι παρὰ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ποιοῦντα, οὐχὶ τῆς προσηγορίας ἀφαιροῦνται αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ θέντες εἶναι φιλόσοφον, εἶτʼ ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ γινομένου λαβόντες, ὅτι ἀσχημονεῖ, ἐπάγουσι μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν. τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον;

[¶50] Because we pay some regard to the idea which we have of a carpenter and a musician, and so of other artists, but not of a philosopher; which idea being thus vague and confused, we judge of it only from external appearances.

> Greek: ὅτι τὴν μὲν τοῦ τέκτονος πρόληψιν πρεσβεύομεν καὶ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ καὶ ὡσαύτως τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν, τὴν τοῦ φιλοσόφου δʼ οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἅτε συγκεχυμένην καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτον ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς μόνον κρίνομεν.

[¶51] And of what other art do we form our opinion from the dress or the hair? Has it not principles too, and materials, and an aim? What, then, are the materials of a philosopher,—a cloak?

> Greek: καὶ ποία ἄλλη τέχνη ἀπὸ σχήματος ἀναλαμβάνεται καὶ κόμης, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ θεωρήματα ἔχει καὶ ὕλην καὶ τέλος;

[¶52] No, but reason. What his aim,—to wear a cloak? No, but to have his reason in good order. What are his principles? Are they how to get a great beard, or long hair? No, but rather, as Zeno expresses it, to know the elements of reason, what is each separately and how linked together, and what their consequences. Why, then, will you not first see, whether when acting improperly he fulfils his profession, ere you proceed to blame the study?

> Greek: τίς οὖν ὕλη τοῦ φιλοσόφου; μὴ τρίβων; οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος. τί τέλος; μή τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. ποῖα θεωρήματα; μή τι τὰ περὶ τοῦ πῶς πώγων μέγας γίνεται ἢ κόμη βαθεῖα; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἃ Ζήνων λέγει, γνῶναι τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα, ποῖόν τι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστι καὶ πῶς ἁρμόττεται πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἀκόλουθά ἐστιν.

[¶53] Whereas now, when acting soberly yourself, you say, in regard to whatever he appears to do amiss, “Observe the philosopher!” as if it were proper to call a person who does such things a philosopher. And again, “This is philosophical!” But you do not say, “Observe the carpenter, or observe the musician,” when you know one of them to be an adulterer, or see him to be a glutton.

> Greek: οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἰδεῖν πρῶτον, εἰ πληροῖ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν ἀσχημονῶν, καὶ οὕτως τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι ἐγκαλεῖν; νῦν δʼ, αὐτὸς ὅταν σωφρονῇς, ἐξ ὧν ποιεῖν σοι δοκεῖ κακῶς, λέγεις ὅρα τὸν φιλόσοφον (ὡς οὐ πρέποντος λέγειν τὸν ταῦτα ποιοῦντα φιλόσοφον) καὶ πάλιν τοῦτο φιλόσοφός ἐστιν. ὅρα δὲ τὸν τέκτονα οὐ λέγεις, ὅταν μοιχεύοντά τινα γνῷς ἢ λιχνεύοντα ἴδῃς, οὐδὲ ὅρα τὸν μουσικόν.

[¶54] So, in some small degree, even you perceive what the profession of a philosopher is, but are misled and confounded by your own carelessness.

> Greek: οὕτως ἐπὶ ποσὸν αἰσθάνῃ καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπολισθάνεις δὲ καὶ συγχέῃ ὑπὸ ἀμελετησίας.

[¶55] And, indeed, even those called philosophers enter upon their profession by commonplace beginnings. As soon as they have put on the cloak and let their beards grow, they cry, “am a philosopher.”

> Greek: ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ καλούμενοι φιλόσοφοι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν τὸ πρᾶγμα μετίασιν· εὐθὺς ἀναλαβόντες τρίβωνα καὶ πώγωνα καθέντες φασὶν ἐγὼ φιλόσοφός εἰμι.

[¶56] Yet no one says, “am a musician,” merely because he has bought a fiddle and fiddlestick; nor, “am a smith,” because he is dressed in the cap and apron. But they take their name from their art, not from their garb. For this reason, Euphrates was in the right to say, “long endeavored to conceal my embracing the philosophic life;

> Greek: οὐδεὶς δʼ ἐρεῖ ἐγὼ μουσικός εἰμι, ἂν πλῆκτρον καὶ κιθάραν ἀγοράσῃ, οὐδʼ ἐγὼ χαλκεύς εἰμι, ἂν πιλίον καὶ περίζωμα περιθῆται, ἀλλʼ ἁρμόζεται μὲν τὸ σχῆμα πρὸς τὴν τέχνην, ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης δὲ τὸ ὄνομα, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ σχήματος ἀναλαμβάνουσιν.

[¶57] and it was of use to me. For, in the first place, I knew that whatever I did right I did not for spectators, but for myself. I ate in a seemly manner, for my own approbation. I preserved composure of look and manner, all for God and myself. Then, as I contended alone, I alone was in danger.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς Εὐφράτης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐπειρώμην λανθάνειν φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ἦν μοι, φησίν, τοῦτο ὠφέλιμον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ᾔδειν, ὅσα καλῶς ἐποίουν, ὅτι οὐ διὰ τοὺς θεατὰς ἐποίουν, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐμαυτόν· ἤσθιον ἐμαυτῷ καλῶς, κατεσταλμένον εἶχον τὸ βλέμμα, τὸν περίπατον· πάντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ θεῷ.

[¶58] Philosophy was in no danger, on my doing anything shameful or unbecoming; nor did I hurt the rest of the world, which, by offending as a philosopher, I might have done.

> Greek: εἶτα ὥσπερ μόνος ἠγωνιζόμην, οὕτως μόνος καὶ ἐκινδύνευον· οὐδὲν ἐμοὶ δράσαντι τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀπρεπὲς τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐκινδυνεύετο, οὐδʼ ἔβλαπτον τοὺς πολλοὺς ὡς φιλόσοφος ἁμαρτάνων.

[¶59] For this reason, they who were ignorant of my intention, used to wonder that while I conversed and lived entirely with philosophers, I never took up the character.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὴ εἰδότες μου τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἐθαύμαζον, πῶς πᾶσι φιλοσόφοις χρώμενος καὶ συζῶν αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐφιλοσόφουν.

[¶60] And where was the harm, that I should be discovered to be a philosopher by my actions, rather than by the usual badges? See how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, how I bear, how I forbear; how I assist others; how I direct my desires, how my aversions; how I preserve the natural and acquired relations, without confusion and without obstruction. Judge of me hence, if you can.

> Greek: καὶ τί κακόν, ἐν οἷς ἐποίουν ἐπιγιγνώσκεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συμβόλοις μή; βλέπε, πῶς ἐσθίω, πῶς πίνω, πῶς καθεύδω, πῶς ἀνέχομαι, πῶς ἀπέχομαι, πῶς συνεργῶ, πῶς ὀρέξει χρῶμαι, πῶς ἐκκλίσει, πῶς τηρῶ τὰς σχέσεις τὰς φυσικὰς ἢ ἐπιθέτους ἀσυγχύτως καὶ ἀπαραποδίστως· ἐκεῖθέν με κρῖνε, εἰ δύνασαι.

[¶61] But if you are so deaf and blind that you would not suppose Hephaistos himself to be a good smith, unless you saw the cap upon his head, where is the harm in not being found out by so foolish a judge?”

> Greek: εἰ δʼ οὕτως κωφὸς εἶ καὶ τυφλός, ἵνα μηδὲ τὸν Ἥφαιστον ὑπολαμβάνῃς καλὸν χαλκέα, ἂν μὴ τὸ πιλίον ἴδῃς περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περικείμενον, τί κακὸν ὑφʼ οὕτως ἠλιθίου κριτοῦ ἀγνοεῖσθαι;

[¶62] It was thus, too, that Socrates concealed himself from the multitude; and some even came and desired him to introduce them to philosophers.

> Greek: οὕτως ἐλάνθα νε παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις Σωκράτης καὶ ἤρχοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀξιοῦντες φιλοσόφοις συσταθῆναι.

[¶63] Was he accustomed to be displeased, then, like us; and to say, What! do not you take me for a philosopher? No, he took them and introduced them; contented with merely being a philosopher, and rejoicing in feeling no annoyance that he was not thought one.

> Greek: μή τι οὖν ἠγανάκτει ὡς ἡμεῖς καὶ ἔλεγεν ἐγὼ δέ σοι οὐ φαίνομαι φιλόσοφος;; ἀλλʼ ἀπῆγεν καὶ συνίστα ἑνὶ ἀρκούμενος τῷ εἶναι φιλόσοφος, χαίρων δὲ καί, ὅτι μὴ δοκῶν οὐκ ἐδάκνετο· ἐμέμνητο γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου ἔργου.

[¶64] For he remembered his business; and what is the business of a wise and good man,—to have many scholars? By no means. Let those see to it who have made this their study. Well, then;

> Greek: τί ἔργον καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ; μαθητὰς πολλοὺς ἔχειν; οὐδαμῶς. ὄψονται οἱ περὶ τοῦτο ἐσπουδακότες. ἀλλὰ θεωρήματα δύσκολα ἀκριβοῦν; ὄψονται καὶ περὶ τούτων ἄλλοι.

[¶65] is it to be a perfect master of difficult theorems? Let others see to that too. What, then, was his position, and what did he desire to be? What constituted his hurt or advantage? “If,” said he, “any one can still hurt me, I am accomplishing nothing;

> Greek: ποῦ οὖν αὐτὸς καὶ ἦν τις καὶ εἶναι ἤθελεν; ὅπου βλάβη καὶ ὠφέλεια. εἴ μέ τις, φησίν, βλάψαι δύναται, ἐγὼ οὐδὲν ποιῶ· εἰ ἄλλον περιμένω, ἵνα με ὠφελήσῃ, ἐγὼ οὐδέν εἰμι. θέλω τι καὶ οὐ γίνεται· ἐγὼ ἀτυχής εἰμι.

[¶66] If I depend for my advantage upon another, I am nothing. Have I any wish unaccomplished? Then I am unhappy.” To such a combat he invited every one, and, in my opinion, yielded to no one. But do you think it was by making proclamation, and saying, “I am such a one”?

> Greek: εἰς τοσοῦτο σκάμμα προεκαλεῖτο πάντα ὁντιναοῦν καὶ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ ἐκστῆναι οὐδενί — τί δοκεῖτε; καταγγέλλων καὶ λέγων ἐγὼ τοιοῦτός εἰμι; μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὢν τοιοῦτος.

[¶67] Far from it; but by being such a one. For it is folly and insolence to say, “I am passive and undisturbed. Be it known to you, mortals, that while you are disturbed and vexed about things of no value, I alone am free from all perturbation.”

> Greek: πάλιν γὰρ τοῦτο μωροῦ καὶ ἀλαζόνος ἐγὼ ἀπαθής εἰμι καὶ ἀτάραχος· μὴ ἀγνοεῖτε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὅτι ὑμῶν κυκωμένων καὶ θορυβουμένων περὶ τὰ μηδενὸς ἄξια μόνος ἐγὼ ἀπήλλαγμαι πάσης ταραχῆς.

[¶68] Are you, then, so little satisfied with your exemption from pain. that you must needs make proclamation: “Come hither, all you who have the gout, or the headache, or a fever, or are lame, or blind;

> Greek: οὕτως οὐκ ἀρκεῖ σοι τὸ μηδὲν ἀλγεῖν, ἂν μὴ κηρύσσῃς συνέλθετε πάντες οἱ ποδαγρῶντες, οἱ κεφαλαλγοῦντες, οἱ πυρέσσοντες, οἱ χωλοί, οἱ τυφλοί, καὶ ἴδετέ με ἀπὸ παντὸς πάθους ὑγιᾶ;

[¶69] and see me, free from every distemper”? This is vain and shocking, unless you can show, like Aesculapius, by what method of cure they may presently become as free from distempers as yourself, and can bring your own health as a proof of it.

> Greek: τοῦτο κενὸν καὶ φορτικόν, εἰ μή τι[ς] ὡς ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς εὐθὺς ὑποδεῖξαι δύνασαι, πῶς θεραπεύοντες εὐθὺς ἔσονται ἄνοσοι κἀκεῖνοι, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο φέρεις παράδειγμα τὴν ὑγίειαν τὴν σεαυτοῦ.

[¶70] Such is the Cynic honored with the sceptre and diadem from Zeus;

> Greek: τοιοῦτος γάρ τίς ἐστιν ὁ Κυνικὸς τοῦ σκήπτρου καὶ διαδήματος ἠξιωμένος παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ λέγων ἵνʼ ἴδητε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἀταραξίαν οὐχ ὅπου ἐστὶ ζητεῖτε,

[¶71] who says, “That you may see, O mankind, that you do not seek happiness and tranquillity where it is, but where it is not, behold, I am sent an example to you from God,—who have neither estate, nor house, nor wife, nor children, nor even a bed, coat, or furniture. And yet see how in what good condition I am. Try me; and if you see me free from perturbation, hear the remedies, and by what means I was cured.”

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ὅπου μή ἐστιν, ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν παράδειγμα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπέσταλμαι μήτε κτῆσιν ἔχων μήτε οἶκον μήτε γυναῖκα μήτε τέκνα, ἀλλὰ μηδʼ ὑπόστρωμα μηδὲ χιτῶνα μηδὲ σκεῦος· καὶ ἴδετε, πῶς ὑγιαίνω· πειράθητέ μου κἂν ἴδητε ἀτάραχον, ἀκούσατε τὰ φάρμακα καὶ ὑφʼ ὧν ἐθεραπεύθην.

[¶72] This now is benevolent and noble. But consider whose business it is. That of Zeus, or his whom he judges worthy of this office; that he may never show to the world anything to impeach his own testimony for virtue and against externals. Neither pallid of hue, nor wiping tears from his cheek.
-H. And not only this, but he does not desire or seek for company or place or amusement, as boys do the vintage time, or holidays;

> Greek: τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη καὶ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ γενναῖον. ἀλλʼ ὁρᾶτε, τίνος ἔργον ἐστίν· τοῦ Διὸς ἢ ὃν ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἄξιον κρίνῃ ταύτης τῆς ὑπηρεσίας, ἵνα μηδαμοῦ μηδὲν παραγυμνώσῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς, διʼ οὗ τὴν μαρτυρίαν τὴν αὑτοῦ, ἣν τῇ ἀρετῇ μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καταμαρτυρεῖ, αὐτὸς ἄκυρον ποιήσῃ· οὔτʼ ὠχρήσαντα χρόα κάλλιμον οὔτε παρειῶν δάκρυʼ ὀμορξάμενον.

[¶73] being always fortified by virtuous shame, as others are by walls and gates and sentinels. But now, they who have only such an inclination to philosophy as weak stomachs have to some kinds of food, of which they will presently grow sick, expect to hasten to the sceptre, to the kingdom.

> Greek: καὶ οὐ μόνον ταῦτα, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ ποθοῦντά τι ἢ ἐπιζητοῦντα, ἄνθρωπον ἢ τόπον ἢ διαγωγήν, ὡς τὰ παιδία τὸν τρυγητὸν ἢ τὰς ἀργίας, αἰδοῖ πανταχοῦ κεκοσμημένον, ὡς οἱ ἄλλοι τοίχοις καὶ θύραις καὶ θυρωροῖς.

[¶74] They let their hair grow, assume the cloak, bare the shoulder, wrangle with all they meet; and if they see any one in a thick, warm coat, must needs wrangle with him. First harden yourself against all weather, man. Consider your inclination; whether it be not that of a weak stomach, or of a longing woman.

> Greek: νῦν δʼ αὐτὸ μόνον κινηθέντες πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, ὡς οἱ κακοστόμαχοι πρός τι βρωμάτιον, ὃ μετὰ μικρὸν σικχαίνειν μέλλουσιν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ σκῆπτρον, ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν. καθεῖκε τὴν κόμην, ἀνείληφε τρίβωνα, γυμνὸν δεικνύει τὸν ὦμον, μάχεται τοῖς ἀπαντῶσιν κἂν ἐν φαινόλῃ τινὰ ἴδῃ, μάχεται αὐτῷ.

[¶75] First study to conceal what you are; philosophize a little while by yourself. Fruit is produced thus: the seed must first be buried in the ground, lie hid there some time, and grow up by degrees, that it may come to perfection.

> Greek: ἄνθρωπε, χειμάσκησον πρῶτον· ἰδοῦ σου τὴν ὁρμήν, μὴ κακοστομάχου ἢ κισσώσης γυναικός ἐστιν. ἀγνοεῖσθαι μελέτησον πρῶτον, τίς εἶ· σαυτῷ φιλοσόφησον ὀλίγον χρόνον.

[¶76] But if it produces the ear before the stalk has its proper joints, it is imperfect, and of the garden of Adonis. Now you are a poor plant of this kind. You have blossomed too soon; the winter will kill you.

> Greek: οὕτως καρπὸς γίνεται· κατορυγῆναι δεῖ εἰς χρόνον τὸ σπέρμα, κρυφθῆναι, κατὰ μικρὸν αὐξηθῆναι, ἵνα τελεσφορήσῃ. ἂν δὲ πρὸ τοῦ γόνυ φῦσαι τὸν στάχυν ἐξενέγκῃ, ἀτελές ἐστιν, ἐκ κήπου Ἀδωνιακοῦ.

[¶77] See what countrymen say about seeds of any sort, when the warm weather comes too early.

> Greek: τοιοῦτον εἶ καὶ σὺ φυτάριον· θᾶττον τοῦ δέοντος ἤνθηκας, ἀποκαύσει σε ὁ χειμών.

[¶78] They are in great anxiety for fear the seeds should shoot out too luxuriantly; and then one frost taking them may show how prejudicial their forwardness was. Beware you, too, O man.

> Greek: ἰδοῦ, τί λέγουσιν οἱ γεωργοὶ περὶ τῶν σπερμάτων, ὅταν πρὸ ὥρας θερμασίαι γένωνται. ἀγωνιῶσιν, μὴ ἐξυβρίσῃ τὰ σπέρματα, εἶτα αὐτὰ πάγος εἷς λαβὼν ἐξελέγξῃ.

[¶79] You have shot out luxuriantly; you have sprung forth towards a trifling fame, before the proper season. You seem to be somebody, as a fool may among fools. You will be taken by the frost; or rather, you are already frozen downward at the root;

> Greek: ὅρα καὶ σύ, ἄνθρωπε· ἐξύβρικας, ἐπιπεπήδηκας δοξαρίῳ πρὸ ὥρας· δοκεῖς τις εἶναι, μωρὸς παρὰ μωροῖς· ἀποπαγήσῃ, μᾶλλον δʼ ἀποπέπηγας ἤδη ἐν τῇ ῥίζῃ κάτω, τὰ δʼ ἄνω σου μικρὸν ἔτι ἀνθεῖ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖς ἔτι ζῆν καὶ θάλλειν.

[¶80] you still blossom, indeed, a little at the top, and therefore you think you are still alive and flourishing. Let us, at least, ripen naturally. Why do you lay us open? Why do you force us? We cannot yet bear the air. Suffer the root to grow; then the first, then the second, then the third joint of the stalk to spring from it;

> Greek: ἄφες ἡμᾶς γε κατὰ φύσιν πεπανθῆναι. τί ἡμᾶς ἀποδύεις, τί βιάζῃ; οὔπω δυνάμεθα ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἀέρα. ἔασον τὴν ῥίζαν αὐξηθῆναι, εἶτα γόνυ λαβεῖν τὸ πρῶτον, εἶτα τὸ δεύτερον, εἶτα τὸ τρίτον· εἶθʼ οὕτως ὁ καρπὸς ἐκβιάσεται τὴν φύσιν, κἂν ἐγὼ μὴ θέλω.

[¶81] and thus Nature will force out the fruit, whether I will or not. For who that is charged with such principles, but must perceive, too, his own powers, and strive to put them in practice.

> Greek: τίς γὰρ ἐγκύμων γενόμενος καὶ πλήρης τηλικούτων δογμάτων οὐχὶ αἰσθάνεταί τε τῆς αὑτοῦ παρασκευῆς καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ κατάλληλα ἔργα ὁρμᾷ;

[¶82] Not even a bull is ignorant of his own powers, when any wild beast approaches the herd, nor waits he for any one to encourage him; nor does a dog when he spies any game.

> Greek: ἀλλὰ ταῦρος μὲν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν καὶ παρασκευήν, ὅταν ἐπιφανῇ τι θηρίον, οὐδʼ ἀναμένει τὸν προτρεψόμενον, οὐδὲ κύων, ὅταν ἴδῃ τι τῶν ἀγρίων ζῴων·

[¶83] And if I have the powers of a good man, shall I wait for you to qualify me for my own proper actions? But believe me, I have them not quite yet. Why, then, would you wish me to be withered before my time, as you are?

> Greek: ἐγὼ δʼ ἂν ἴσχω τὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ παρασκευήν, ἐκδέξομαι, ἵνα με σὺ παρασκευάσῃς ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα; νῦν δʼ οὔπω ἔχω, πίστευσόν μοι. τί οὖν με πρὸ ὥρας ἀποξηρᾶναι θέλεις, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐξηράνθης;

[¶84] 9. When you see another in power, set this against it, that you have the advantage of not needing power. When you see another rich, see what you have instead of riches; for if you have nothing in their stead, you are miserable. But if you have the advantage of not needing riches, know that you have something more than he has, and of far greater value. Another possesses a handsome woman; you the happiness of not desiring a handsome woman. Do you think these are little matters? And what would not those very persons give, who are rich and powerful, and possess handsome women, if they were only able to despise riches and power, and those very women whom they love and whom they possess! Do not you know of what nature the thirst of one in a fever is? It has no resemblance to that of a person in health. The latter drinks and is satisfied. But the other, after being delighted a very little while, is nauseated, the water becomes bile, he is sick at his stomach, and becomes more thirsty than ever. It is the same with avarice, ambition, lust. Presently comes jealousy, fear of loss, unbecoming words, designs, and actions. “And what,” say you, “do I lose?” You were modest, man, and are so no longer. Have you lost nothing? Instead of Chrysippus and Zeno, you read Aristides and Euenus. Have you lost nothing, then? Instead of Socrates and Diogenes, you admire him who can corrupt and seduce most women. You would be handsome, by decking your person, when you are not really so. You love to appear in fine clothes, to attract female eyes; and if you anywhere meet with a good perfumer, you esteem yourself a happy man. But formerly you did not so much as think of any of these things; but only where you might find a decent discourse, a worthy person, a noble design. For this reason, you used to appear like a man both at home and abroad; to wear a manly dress; to hold discourses worthy of a man. And after this, do you tell me you have lost nothing? What, then; do men lose nothing but money? Is not modesty to be lost? Is not decency to be lost? Or can he who loses these suffer no injury? You indeed perhaps no longer think anything of this sort to be an injury. But there was once a time when you accounted this to be the only injury and hurt; when you were anxiously afraid lest any one should shake your regard from such discourses and actions. See, it is not shaken by another, but by yourself. Fight against yourself, recover yourself to decency, to modesty, to freedom. If you had formerly been told any of these things of me, that one prevailed on me to commit adultery, to wear such a dress as yours, or to be perfumed, would you not have gone and laid violent hands on the man who thus abused me? And will you not now help yourself? For how much easier is that sort of assistance? You need not kill, or fetter, or affront, or go to law with any one; but merely talk with yourself, the person who will most readily be persuaded by you, and with whom no one has greater weight than you. And, in the first place, condemn your actions; but when you have condemned them, do not despair of yourself, nor be like those poor-spirited people who, when they have once given way, abandon themselves entirely, and are carried along as by a torrent. Take example from the wrestling-masters. Has the boy fallen down? Get up again, they say; wrestle again, till you have acquired strength. Be you affected in the same manner. For be assured that there is nothing more tractable than the human mind. You need but will, and it is done, it is set right; as, on the contrary, you need but nod over the work, and it is ruined. For both ruin and recovery are from within. “And, after all, what good will this do me?” What greater good do you seek? From being impudent, you will become modest; from indecent, decent; from dissolute, sober. But if you seek any greater things than these, do as you are doing. It is no longer in the power of any God to save you.

> Greek: 9. ὅταν ἄλλον ἴδῃς ἄρχοντα, ἀντίθες, ὅτι σὺ ἔχεις τὸ μὴ δεῖσθαι ἀρχῆς· ὅταν ἄλλον πλουτοῦντα, ἰδοῦ, τί ἀντὶ τούτου ἔχεις. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν ἔχεις ἀντʼ αὐτοῦ, ἄθλιος εἶ· εἰ δʼ ἔχεις τὸ μὴ χρείαν ἔχειν πλούτου, γίγνωσκε, ὅτι πλεῖον ἔχεις καὶ πολλῷ πλείονος ἄξιον. ἄλλος γυναῖκα εὔμορφον, σὺ τὸ μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν εὐμόρφου γυναικός. μικρά σοι δοκεῖ ταῦτα; καὶ πόσου ἂν τιμήσαιντο οὗτοι αὐτοὶ οἱ πλουτοῦντες καὶ ἄρχοντες καὶ μετʼ εὐμόρφων διαιτώμενοι δύνασθαι πλούτου καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τῶν γυναικῶν, ὧν ἐρῶσιν καὶ ὧν τυγχάνουσιν; ἀγνοεῖς οἷόν τί ἐστι δίψος πυρέσσοντος; οὐδὲν ὅμοιον ἔχει τῷ τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος. ἐκεῖνος πιὼν ἀποπέπαυται· ὁ δὲ πρὸς ὀλίγον ἡσθεὶς ναυτιᾷ, χολὴν αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ἀντὶ ὕδατος, ἐμεῖ, στροφοῦται, διψῇ σφοδρότερον. τοιοῦτόν ἐστι μετʼ ἐπιθυμίας πλουτεῖν, μετʼ ἐπιθυμίας ἄρχειν, μετʼ ἐπιθυμίας καλῇ συγκαθεύδειν· ζηλοτυπία πρόσεστιν, φόβος τοῦ στερηθῆναι, αἰσχροὶ λόγοι, αἰσχρὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ἔργα ἀσχήμονα. καὶ τί, φησίν, ἀπολλύω;— ἄνθρωπε, ὑπῆρχες αἰδήμων καὶ νῦν οὐκέτι εἶ· οὐδὲν ἀπολώλεκας; ἀντὶ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ζήνωνος Ἀριστείδην ἀναγιγνώσκεις καὶ Εὐηνόν· οὐδὲν ἀπολώλεκας; ἀντὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Διογένους τεθαύμακας τὸν πλείστας διαφθεῖραι καὶ ἀναπεῖσαι δυνάμενον. καλὸς εἶναι θέλεις καὶ πλάσσεις σεαυτὸν μὴ ὢν καὶ ἐσθῆτα ἐπιδεικνύειν θέλεις στιλπνήν, ἵνα τὰς γυναῖκας ἐπιστρέφῃς, κἄν που μυραφίου ἐπιτύχῃς, μακάριος εἶναι δοκεῖς. πρότερον δʼ οὐδὲ ἐνεθυμοῦ τι τούτων, ἀλλὰ ποῦ εὐσχήμων λόγος, ἀνὴρ ἀξιόλογος, ἐνθύμημα γενναῖον. τοιγαροῦν ἐκάθευδες ὡς ἀνήρ, προῄεις ὡς ἀνήρ, ἐσθῆτα ἐφόρεις ἀνδρικήν, λόγους ἐλάλεις πρέποντας ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ· εἶτά μοι λέγεις οὐδὲν ἀπώλεσα; οὕτως οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κέρμα ἀπολλύουσιν ἄνθρωποι; αἰδὼς οὐκ ἀπόλλυται, εὐσχημοσύνη οὐκ ἀπόλλυται; ἢ οὐκ ἔστι ζημιωθῆναι ταῦτα ἀπολέσαντα; σοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ τάχα τούτων οὐδὲν οὐκέτι εἶναι ζημία· ἦν δέ ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε μόνην αὐτὴν ὑπελογίζου καὶ ζημίαν καὶ βλάβην, ὅτε ἠγωνίας, μή τις ἐκσείσῃ σε τούτων τῶν λόγων καὶ ἔργων. ἰδού, ἐκσέσεισαι ὑπʼ ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενός, ὑπὸ σαυτοῦ δέ. μαχέσθητι σαυτῷ, ἀφελοῦ σαυτὸν εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην, εἰς αἰδῶ, εἰς ἐλευθερίαν. εἴ σοί τίς που ἔλεγεν περὶ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα, ὅτι μέ τις μοιχεύειν ἀναγκάζει, ὅτι ἐσθῆτα φορεῖν τοιαύτην, ὅτι μυρίζεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀπελθὼν αὐτόχειρ ἐγένου τούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ οὕτως μοι παραχρωμένου; νῦν οὖν οὐ θέλεις σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι; καὶ πόσῳ ῥᾴων αὕτη ἡ βοήθεια; οὐκ ἀποκτεῖναί τινα δεῖ, οὐ δῆσαι, οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, οὐκ εἰς ἀγορὰν προελθεῖν, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ λαλῆσαι, τῷ μάλιστα πεισθησομένῳ, πρὸς ὃν οὐδείς ἐστί σου πιθανώτερος. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν κατάγνωθι τῶν γιγνομένων, εἶτα καταγνοὺς μὴ ἀπογνῷς σεαυτοῦ μηδὲ πάθῃς τὸ τῶν ἀγεννῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ ἅπαξ ἐνδόντες εἰσάπαν ἐπέδωκαν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ὡς ὑπὸ ῥεύματος παρεσύρησαν, ἀλλὰ μάθε τὸ τῶν παιδοτριβῶν. πέπτωκε τὸ παιδίον· ἀναστάς, φησίν, πάλιν πάλαιε, μέχρις ἂν ἰσχυροπο⟨ι⟩ηθῇς. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ σὺ πάθε· ἴσθι γάρ, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν εὐαγωγότερον ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς. θελῆσαι δεῖ καὶ γέγονεν, διώρθωται· ὡς πάλιν ἀπονυστάσαι καὶ ἀπόλωλεν. ἔσωθεν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀπώλεια καὶ βοήθεια. — εἶτα τί μοι ἀγαθόν; — καὶ τί ζητεῖς τούτου μεῖζον; ἐξ ἀναισχύντου αἰδήμων ἔσῃ, ἐξ ἀκόσμου κόσμιος, ἐξ ἀπίστου πιστός, ἐξ ἀκολάστου σώφρων. εἴ τινα ἄλλα τούτων μείζονα ζητεῖς, ποίει ἃ ποιεῖς· οὐδὲ θεῶν σέ τις ἔτι σῶσαι δύναται.

[¶85] 10. The doubts and perplexities of all men are concerning externals,—what they shall do; how it will be; what will be the event; whether this thing will happen, or that.

> Greek: 10. ἀπορία πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς γίνεται, ἀμηχανία περὶ τὰ ἐκτός. τί ποιήσω; πῶς γένηται; πῶς ἀποβῇ; μὴ τόδε ἀπαντήσῃ, μὴ τόδε.

[¶86] All this is the talk of persons engaged in things uncontrollable by will. For who says, How shall I do, not to assent to what is false; how, not to dissent from what is true?

> Greek: πᾶσαι αὗται αἱ φωναὶ περὶ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα στρεφομένων εἰσίν· τίς γὰρ λέγει πῶς μὴ συγκατατιθῶμαι τῷ ψεύδει; πῶς μὴ ἀπονεύσω ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς;

[¶87] If any one is of such a good disposition as to be anxious about these things, I will remind him: “Why are you anxious? It is in your own power. Be assured. Do not hastily give your assent before you have applied those tests prescribed by nature.”

> Greek: ἐὰν οὕτως ᾖ εὐφυής, ὥστε περὶ τούτων ἀγωνιᾶν, ὑπομνήσω αὐτὸν ὅτι τί ἀγωνιᾷς; ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν· ἀσφαλὴς ἴσθι· μὴ πρὸ τοῦ ἐπάγειν τὸν φυσικὸν κανόνα προπήδα ἐν τῷ συγκατατίθεσθαι.
πάλιν ἂν περὶ ὀρέξεως [μὴ] ἀγωνιᾷ, μὴ ἀτελὴς γένηται καὶ ἀποτευκτική,

[¶88] Again, if he be anxious, for fear lest he should fail of what he seeks or incur what he shuns, I will first embrace him, because, slighting what others are fluttered and terrified about, he takes care of what is his own, where his very being is;

> Greek: περὶ ἐκκλίσεως, μὴ περιπτωτική, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸν καταφιλήσω, ὅτι ἀφεὶς περὶ ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπτόηνται καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνων φόβους περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων πεφρόντικεν, ὅπου αὐτός ἐστιν·

## 23. Book IV · chapters 10–13

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/23/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/23/#p-N

[¶0] then I will say to him: “If you would not fail of what you seek, or incur what you shun, desire nothing that belongs to others; shun nothing that lies beyond your own control; otherwise you must necessarily be disappointed in what you seek, and incur what you shun.” Where is the doubt here?

> Greek: εἶτα ἐρῶ αὐτῷ εἰ μὴ θέλῃς ὀρέγεσθαι ἀποτευκτικῶς μηδʼ ἐκκλίνειν περιπτωτικῶς, μηδενὸς ὀρέγου τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, μηδὲν ἔκκλινε τῶν μὴ ἐπὶ σοί. εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ ἀποτυχεῖν καὶ περιπεσεῖν ἀνάγκη.

[¶1] Where the room for, How will it be? What will be the event? And fill this happen, or that?

> Greek: ποία ἐνθάδʼ ἀπορία; ποῦ τόπον ἔχει πῶς γένηται; καὶ πῶς ἀποβῇ; καὶ μὴ ἀπαντήσῃ τόδε ἢ τόδε;

[¶2] Is not the event uncontrollable by will? “Yes.” And does not the essence of good and evil consist in what is within the control of will? It is in your power, then, to treat every event conformably to Nature? Can any one restrain you? “No one.” Then do not say to me any more, How will it be?

> Greek: νῦν οὐχὶ τὸ ἐκβησόμενον ἀπροαίρετον;— ναί. — ἡ δʼ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς; — ναί. — ἔξεστιν οὖν σοι παντὶ τῷ ἀποβάντι χρῆσθαι κατὰ φύσιν; μή τις σε κωλῦσαι δύναται;

[¶3] For, however it be, you will set it right, and the event to you will be auspicious.

> Greek: — οὐδείς. — μηκέτι οὖν μοι λέγε πῶς γένηται; ὅπως γὰρ ἂν γένηται, σὺ αὐτὸ θήσεις καλῶς καὶ ἔσται σοι τὸ ἀποβὰν εὐτύχημα.

[¶4] Pray what would Hercules have been, if he had said, “What can be done to prevent a great lion, or a large boar, or savage men, from coming in my way?” Why, what is that to you? If a large boar should come in your way, you will fight the greater combat; if wicked men, you will deliver the world from wicked men.

> Greek: ἢ τίς ἂν ἦν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς λέγων πῶς μοι μὴ μέγας λέων ἐπιφανῇ μηδὲ μέγας σῦς μηδὲ θηριώδεις ἄνθρωποι; καὶ τί σοι μέλει; ἂν μέγας σῦς ἐπιφανῇ, μεῖζον ἆθλον ἀθλήσεις· ἂν κακοὶ ἄνθρωποι, κακῶν ἀπαλλάξεις τὴν οἰκουμένην.

[¶5] “But then if I should die by this means?” You will die as a good man, in the performance of a gallant action. For since, at all events, one must die, one must necessarily be found doing something, either tilling, or digging, or trading, or serving a consulship, or sick with indigestion or dysentery.

> Greek: — ἂν οὖν οὕτως ἀποθάνω; — ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἀποθανῇ, γενναίαν πρᾶξιν ἐπιτελῶν ἐπεὶ γὰρ δεῖ πάντως ἀποθανεῖν, ἀνάγκη τί ποτε ποιοῦντα εὑρεθῆναι, ἢ γεωργοῦντα ἢ σκάπτοντα ἢ ἐμπορευόμενον ἢ ὑπατεύοντα ἢ ἀπεπτοῦντα ἢ διαρροιζόμενον.

[¶6] At what employment, then, would you have death find you? For my part, I would have it to be some humane, beneficent, public-spirited, noble action.

> Greek: τί οὖν θέλεις ποιῶν εὑρεθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ θανάτου; ἐγὼ μὲν τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος ἔργον τί ποτε ἀνθρωπικόν, εὐεργετικόν, κοινωφελές, γενναῖον.

[¶7] But if I cannot be found doing any such great things, yet, at least, I would be doing what I am incapable of being restrained from, what is given me to do,—correcting myself, improving that faculty which makes use of the phenomena of existence to procure tranquillity, and render to the several relations of life their due; and if I am so fortunate, advancing still further to the security of judging right.

> Greek: εἰ δὲ μὴ δύναμαι τὰ τηλικαῦτα ποιῶν εὑρεθῆναι, ἐκεῖνό γε τὸ ἀκώλυτον, τὸ διδόμενον, ἐμαυτὸν ἐπανορθῶν, ἐξεργαζόμενος τὴν δύναμιν τὴν χρηστικὴν τῶν φαντασιῶν, ἀπάθειαν ἐκπονῶν, ταῖς σχέσεσι τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀποδιδούς· εἰ οὕτως εὐτυχής εἰμι, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου τόπου παραπτόμενος, τοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν κριμάτων ἀσφάλειαν.

[¶8] If death overtakes me in such a situation, it is enough for me if I can stretch out my hands to God, and say, “The opportunities which I have received from thee of comprehending and obeying thy administration, I have not neglected. As far as in me lay, I have not dishonored thee.

> Greek: ἂν μετὰ τούτων με ὁ θάνατος καταλάβῃ, ἀρκεῖ μοι ἂν δύνωμαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀνατεῖναι τὰς χεῖρας, εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἃς ἔλαβον ἀφορμὰς παρὰ σοῦ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθέσθαι σου τῆς διοικήσεως καὶ ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῇ, τούτων οὐκ ἠμέλησα· οὐ κατῄσχυνά σε τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος.

[¶9] See how I have used my perceptions; how my convictions. Have I at any time found fault with thee? Have I been discontented at thy dispensations, or wished them otherwise? Have I transgressed the relations of life? I thank thee that thou hast brought me into being.

> Greek: ἰδοῦ, πῶς κέχρημαι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, ἰδοῦ, πῶς ταῖς προλήψεσιν. μή ποτέ σε ἐμεμψάμην, μή τι τῶν γινομένων τινὶ δυσηρέστησα ἢ ἄλλως γενέσθαι ἠθέλησα, μή τι τὰς σχέσεις παρέβην[αι];

[¶10] I am satisfied with the time that I have enjoyed the things which thou hast given me. Receive them back again, and distribute them as thou wilt; for they were all thine, and thou gavest them to me.”

> Greek: ὅ με σὺ ἐγέννησας, χάριν ἔχω, ὧν ἔδωκας· ἐφʼ ὅσον ἐχρησάμην τοῖς σοῖς, ἀρκεῖ μοι. πάλιν αὐτὰ ἀπόλαβε καὶ κατάταξον εἰς ἣν θέλεις χώραν. σὰ γὰρ ἦν πάντα, σύ μοι αὐτὰ δέδωκας.

[¶11] Is it not enough to depart in this mood of mind? And what life is better and more becoming than that of such a one; or what conclusion happier?

> Greek: οὐκ ἀρκεῖ οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐξελθεῖν; καὶ τίς βίων κρείττων ἢ εὐσχημονέστερος τοῦ οὕτως ἔχοντος, ποία δὲ καταστροφὴ εὐδαιμονεστέρα;

[¶12] But in order to attain these advantages, there are no inconsiderable risks to be encountered. You cannot seek a consulship and these things too, nor toil for an estate and these things too, nor take charge of your slaves and yourself too.

> Greek: ἵνα δὲ ταῦτα γένηται, οὐ μικρὰ δέξασθαι οὐδὲ μικρῶν ἀποτυχεῖν. οὐ δύνασαι καὶ ὑπατεῦσαι θέλειν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἀγροὺς ἔχειν ἐσπουδακέναι καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν δουλαρίων φροντίζειν καὶ σεαυτοῦ.

[¶13] But if you insist on anything of what belongs to others, then what is your own is lost. This is the nature of the affair. Nothing is to be had for nothing.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἄν τι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων θέλῃς, τὰ σὰ ἀπώλετο. αὕτη τοῦ πράγματος ἡ φύσις· προῖκα οὐδὲν γίνεται.

[¶14] And where is the wonder? If you would be consul, you must watch, run about, kiss hands, be wearied down with waiting at the doors of others, must say and do many slavish things, send gifts to many, daily presents to some. And for what result? Twelve bundles of rods; to sit three or four times on the tribunal;

> Greek: καὶ τί θαυμαστόν; ἂν ὑπατεῦσαι θέλῃς, ἀγρυπνῆσαί σε δεῖ, περιδραμεῖν, τὰς χεῖρας καταφιλῆσαι, πρὸς ταῖς ἀλλοτρίαις θύραις κατασαπῆναι, πολλὰ μὲν εἰπεῖν, πολλὰ δὲ πρᾶξαι ἀνελεύθερα, δῶρα πέμψαι πολλοῖς, ξένια καθʼ ἡμέραν ἐνίοις· καὶ τί τὸ γινόμενόν ἐστιν;

[¶15] to give the games of the circus, and suppers in baskets to all the world; or let any one show me what there is in it more than this.

> Greek: δώδεκα δεσμὰ ῥάβδων καὶ τρὶς ἢ τετράκις ἐπὶ βῆμα καθίσαι καὶ κιρκήσια δοῦναι καὶ σπυρίσιν δειπνίσαι. ἢ δειξάτω μοί τις, τί ἐστι παρὰ ταῦτα.

[¶16] Will you, then, employ no expense and no pains to acquire peace and tranquillity, to sleep sound while you do sleep, to be thoroughly awake while you are awake, to fear nothing, to be anxious for nothing?

> Greek: ὑπὲρ ἀπαθείας οὖν, ὑπὲρ ἀταραξίας, ὑπὲρ τοῦ καθεύδοντα καθεύδειν, ἐγρηγορότα ἐγρηγορέναι, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι μηδέν, μὴ ἀγωνιᾶν ὑπὲρ μηδενὸς οὐδὲν ἀναλῶσαι θέλεις, οὐδὲν πονῆσαι;

[¶17] But if anything belonging to you be lost or idly wasted, while you are thus engaged, or another gets what you ought to have had, will you immediately begin fretting at what has happened? Will you not compare the exchange you have made,—how much for how much?

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἄν τι ἀπόληταί σου περὶ ταῦτα γινομένου ἢ ἀναλωθῇ κακῶς ἢ ἄλλος τύχῃ ὧν ἔδει σε τυχεῖν, εὐθὺς [μὴ] δηχθήσῃ ἐπὶ τῷ γενομένῳ;

[¶18] But you would have such great things for nothing, I suppose. And how can you? Two trades cannot be combined;

> Greek: οὐκ ἀντιθήσεις, τί ἀντὶ τίνος λαμβάνεις, πόσον ἀντὶ πόσου; ἀλλὰ προῖκα θέλεις τὰ τηλικαῦτα λαβεῖν; καὶ πῶς δύνασαι;

[¶19] you cannot bestow your care both upon externals and your own ruling faculty. But if you would have the former, let the latter alone; or you will succeed in neither, while you are drawn in different ways by the two. On the other hand, if you would have the latter, let the former alone.

> Greek: ἔργον ἔργῳ. οὐ δύνασαι καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἔχειν ἐπιμελείας τετυχηκότα καὶ τὸ σαυτοῦ ἡγεμονικόν. εἰ δʼ ἐκεῖνα θέλεις, τοῦτο ἄφες· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔτε τοῦτο ἕξεις οὔτʼ ἐκεῖνα, περισπώμενος ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα. εἰ τοῦτο θέλεις, ἐκεῖνά σε ἀφεῖναι δεῖ.

[¶20] “The oil will be spilled, the furniture will be spoiled;” but still I shall be free from passion. “There will be a fire when I am out of the way, and the books will be destroyed;” but still I shall make a right use of the phenomena of existence.

> Greek: ἐκχεθήσεται τὸ ἔλαιον, ἀπολεῖται τὰ σκευάρια, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ ἀπαθὴς ἔσομαι. ἐμπρησμὸς ἔσται ἐμοῦ μὴ παρόντος καὶ ἀπολεῖται τὰ βιβλία, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ χρήσομαι ταῖς φαντασίαις κατὰ φύσιν. ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἕξω φαγεῖν.

[¶21] “But I shall have nothing to eat.” If I am so unlucky, dying is a safe harbor. That is the harbor for all,—death; that is the refuge; and for that reason there is nothing difficult in life.

> Greek: εἰ οὕτως τάλας εἰμί, λιμὴν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν. οὗτος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ λιμὴν πάντων, ὁ θάνατος, αὕτη ἡ καταφυγή. διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χαλεπόν ἐστιν.

[¶22] You may go out of doors when you please, and be troubled with smoke no longer. Why, then, are you anxious? Why break your rest? Why do you not calculate where your good and evil lie, and say, “They are both in my own power; nor can any deprive me of the one, nor involve me against my will in the other.”

> Greek: ὅταν θέλῃς, ἐξῆλθες καὶ οὐ καπνίζῃ. τί οὖν ἀγωνιᾷς, τί ἀγρυπνεῖς; οὐχὶ δὲ εὐθὺς ἀναλογισάμενος, ποῦ σου τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ κακόν, λέγεις ὅτι ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ ἀμφότερα· οὔτε τούτου τις ἀφελέσθαι με δύναται οὔτʼ ἐκείνῳ ἄκοντα περιβαλεῖν.

[¶23] Why, then, do not I lay myself down and sleep? What is my own is safe. Let what belongs to others look to itself, who carries it off, how it is distributed by him who hath the disposal of it.

> Greek: τί οὖν οὐ ῥέγχω βαλών; τὰ ἐμὰ ἀσφαλῶς ἔχει· τὰ ἀλλότρια ὄψεται αὐτὰ ὃς ἂν φέρῃ, ὡς ἂν διδῶται παρὰ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐξουσίαν.

[¶24] Who am I, to will that it should be so and so? For is the option given to me? Has any one made me the dispenser of it? What I have in my own disposal is enough for me. I must make the best I can of this. Other things must be as their master pleases.

> Greek: τίς εἰμι ὁ θέλων αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἢ οὕτως; μὴ γάρ μοι δέδοται ἐκλογὴ αὐτῶν; μὴ γὰρ ἐμέ τις αὐτῶν διοικητὴν πεποίηκεν; ἀρκεῖ μοι ὧν ἔχω ἐξουσίαν. ταῦτά με δεῖ κάλλιστα παρασκευάσαι, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα ὡς ἂν θέλῃ ὁ ἐκείνων κύριος.

[¶25] Does any one who has these things before his eyes lie sleepless, and shift from side to side? What would he have, or what needs he,—Patroclus, or Antilochus, or Menelaus? Why, did he ever think any one of his friends immortal? When was it not obvious that on the morrow, or the next day, he himself or that friend might die?

> Greek: ταῦτά τις ἔχων πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἀγρυπνεῖ, καὶ στρέφεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα; τί θέλων ἢ τί ποθῶν; Πάτροκλον ἢ Ἀντίλοχον ἢ Μενέλαον; πότε γὰρ ἡγήσατο ἀθάνατόν τινα τῶν φίλων; πότε γὰρ οὐκ εἶχεν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν, ὅτι αὔριον ἢ εἰς τρίτην δεῖ ἢ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἢ ἐκεῖνον;

[¶26] “Ay, very true,” he says; “but I reckoned that he would survive me, and bring up my son.” Because you were a fool, and reckoned upon uncertainties. Why, then, do you not blame yourself, instead of sitting in tears, like a girl?

> Greek: ναί, φησίν, ἀλλʼ ᾤμην, ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἐπιβιώσεταί μοι καὶ αὐξήσει μου τὸν υἱόν. μωρὸς γὰρ ἦς καὶ τὰ ἄδηλα ᾤου. τί οὖν οὐκ ἐγκαλεῖς σεαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ κλαίων κάθησαι ὡς τὰ κοράσια;

[¶27] “But he used to set my dinner before me.” Because he was alive, foolish man; but now he cannot. But Automedon will set it before you; and if he should die, you will find somebody else.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνός μοι φαγεῖν παρετίθει. ἔζη γάρ, μωρέ· νῦν δʼ οὐ δύναται. ἀλλʼ Αὐτομέδων σοι παραθήσει· ἂν δὲ καὶ Αὐτομέδων ἀποθάνῃ, ἄλλον εὑρήσεις.

[¶28] What if the vessel in which your meat used to be cooked should happen to be broken; must you die with hunger because you have not your old vessel? Do you not send and buy a new one?

> Greek: ἂν δʼ ἡ χύτρα, ἐν ᾗ ἥψετό σοι τὸ κρέας, καταγῇ, λιμῷ σε δεῖ ἀποθανεῖν, ὅτι μὴ ἔχεις τὴν συνήθη χύτραν; οὐ πέμπεις καὶ ἄλλην καινὴν ἀγοράζεις; οὐ μὲν γάρ τι,

[¶29] “What greater evil could afflict my breast?” Is this your evil, then? And, instead of removing it, do you accuse your mother, that she did not foretell it to you, that you might have spent your whole life in grieving from that time forward?

> Greek: φησίν, κακώτερον ἄλλο πάθοιμι. τοῦτο γάρ σοι κακόν ἐστιν; εἶτʼ ἀφεὶς τοῦτο ἐξελεῖν αἰτιᾷ τὴν μητέρα, ὅτι σοι οὐ προεῖπεν, ἵνʼ ὀδυνώμενος ἐξ ἐκείνου διατελῇς;

[¶30] Do you not think now that Homer composed all this on purpose to show us that the noblest, the strongest, the richest, the handsomest of men may nevertheless be the most unfortunate and wretched, if they have not the principles they need?

> Greek: τί δοκεῖτε; μὴ ἐπίτηδες ταῦτα συνθεῖναι Ὅμηρον, ἵνʼ ἴδωμεν, ὅτι οἱ εὐγενέστατοι, οἱ ἰσχυρότατοι, οἱ πλουσιώτατοι, οἱ εὐμορφότατοι, ὅταν οἷα δεῖ δόγματα μὴ ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν κωλύονται ἀθλιώτατοι εἶναι καὶ δυστυχέστατοι;

[¶31] 11. Some doubt whether the love of society be comprehended in the nature of man; and yet these very persons do not seem to me to doubt but that purity is by all means comprehended in it; and that by this, if by anything, it is distinguished from brute animals.

> Greek: 11. ἀμφισβητοῦσί τινες, εἰ ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου περιέχεται τὸ κοινωνικόν· ὅμως δʼ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ὅτι τό γε καθάριον πάντως περιέχεται καὶ εἴ τινι ἄλλῳ καὶ τούτῳ τῶν ζῴων χωρίζεται.

[¶32] When, therefore, we see any animal cleaning itself, we are apt to cry, with wonder, that it is like a human being: On the contrary, if an animal is censured, we are presently apt to say, by way of excuse, that it is not a human being.

> Greek: ὅταν οὖν ἄλλο τι ζῷον ἴδωμεν ἀποκαθαῖρον ἑαυτό, ἐπιλέγειν εἰώθαμεν θαυμάζοντες ὅτι ὡς ἄνθρωπος. καὶ πάλιν ἄν τις ἐγκαλῇ τινι ζῴῳ, εὐθὺς εἰώθαμεν ὥσπερ ἀπολογούμενοι λέγειν ὅτι οὐ δήπου ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν.

[¶33] Such excellence do we suppose to be in man, which we first received from the gods. For as they are by nature pure and uncorrupt, in proportion as men approach to them by reason, they are tenacious of purity and incorruption.

> Greek: οὕτως ἐξαίρετόν τι περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι οἰόμεθα ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν αὐτὸ πρῶτον λαμβάνοντες. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι φύσει καθαροὶ καὶ ἀκήρατοι, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἠγγίκασιν αὐτοῖς οἱ ἄνθρωποι κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ καθαροῦ καὶ τοῦ καθαρίου εἰσὶν ἀνθεκτικοί.

[¶34] But since it is impracticable that their essence, composed of such materials, should be absolutely pure, it is the office of reason to endeavor to render it as pure as possible. The first and highest purity or impurity, then, is that which is formed in the soul.

> Greek: ἐπεὶ δʼ ἀμήχανον τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν παντάπασιν εἶναι καθαρὰν ἐκ τοιαύτης ὕλης κεκραμένην, ὁ λόγος παραληφθεὶς εἰς τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ταύτην καθάριον ἀποτελεῖν πειρᾶται.

[¶35] But you will not find the impurity of the soul and body to be alike. For what stain can you find in the soul, unless it be something which renders it impure in its operations? Now, the operations of the soul are its pursuits and avoidances, its desires, aversions, preparations, intentions, assents.

> Greek: πρώτη οὖν καὶ ἀνωτάτω καθαρότης ἡ ἐν ψυχῇ γενομένη καὶ ὁμοίως ἀκαθαρσία. ψυχῆς δʼ ὡς σώματος μὲν ἀκαθαρσίαν οὐκ ἂν εὕροις, ὡς ψυχῆς δὲ τί ἂν ἄλλο εὕροις ἢ τὸ παρέχον αὐτὴν ῥυπαρὰν πρὸς τὰ ἔργα τὰ αὑτῆς;

[¶36] What, then, is that which renders it defiled and impure in these operations?

> Greek: ἔργα δὲ ψυχῆς ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, παρασκευάζεσθαι, ἐπιβάλλεσθαι, συγκατατίθεσθαι.

[¶37] Nothing else than its perverse judgments. So that the impurity of the soul consists in wicked principles, and its purification in forming right principles;

> Greek: τί ποτʼ οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις ῥυπαρὰν παρέχον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκάθαρτον; οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὰ μοχθηρὰ κρίματα αὐτῆς.

[¶38] and that is pure which has right principles, for that alone is unmixed and undefiled in its operations. Now we should, as far as possible, endeavor after something like this in the body, too.

> Greek: ὥστε ψυχῆς μὲν ἀκαθαρσία δόγματα πονηρά, κάθαρσις δʼ ἐμποίησις οἵων δεῖ δογμάτων. καθαρὰ δʼ ἡ ἔχουσα οἷα δεῖ δόγματα· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς αὑτῆς ἀσύγχυτος καὶ ἀμόλυντος.

[¶39] It is impossible but that in such a composition as man, there must be a discharge of superfluous phlegm. For this reason Nature has made hands, and the nostrils themselves as channels to let out the moisture; nor can this be neglected with propriety. It was impossible but that the feet should be bemired and soiled from what they pass through.

> Greek: δεῖ δέ τι ἐοικὸς τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ σώματος φιλοτεχνεῖν κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. ἀμήχανον ἦν μύξας μὴ ῥεῖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοιοῦτον ἔχοντος τὸ σύγκραμα· διὰ τοῦτο χεῖρας ἐποίησεν ἡ φύσις καὶ αὐτὰς τὰς ῥῖνας ὡς σωλῆνας πρὸς τὸ ἐκδιδόναι τὰ ὑγρά. ἂν οὖν ἀναρροφῇ τις αὐτάς, λέγω ὅτι οὐ ποιεῖ ἔργον ἀνθρωπικόν.

[¶40] Therefore Nature has prepared water and hands. It was impossible but that some uncleanness must cleave to the teeth from eating. Therefore, she says, rinse your teeth.

> Greek: ἀμήχανον ἦν μὴ πηλοῦσθαι τοὺς πόδας μηδὲ ὅλως μολύνεσθαι διὰ τοιούτων τινῶν πορευομένους· διὰ τοῦτο ὕδωρ παρεσκεύασεν, διὰ τοῦτο χεῖρας.

[¶41] Why? That you may be a man, and not a wild beast, or a swine. It was impossible but that, from perspiration and the pressure of the clothes, something dirty and necessary to be cleaned should remain upon the body.

> Greek: ἀμήχανον ἦν ἀπὸ τοῦ τρώγειν μὴ ῥυπαρόν τι προσμένειν τοῖς ὀδοῦσι· διὰ τοῦτο πλῦνον, φησίν, τοὺς ὀδόντας. διὰ τί; ἵνʼ ἄνθρωπος ᾖς καὶ μὴ θηρίον μηδὲ συίδιον.

[¶42] For this there is water, oil, hands, towels, brushes, soap, and other necessary apparatus for its purification. But no; a smith indeed will get the rust off his iron, and have proper instruments for that purpose;

> Greek: ἀμήχανον μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱδρῶτος καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐσθῆτα συνοχῆς ὑπολείπεσθαί τι περὶ τὸ σῶμα ῥυπαρὸν καὶ δεόμενον ἀποκαθάρσεως· διὰ τοῦτο ὕδωρ, ἔλαιον, χεῖρες, ὀθόνιον, ξύστρα, νίτρον, ἔσθʼ ὅθʼ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα παρασκευὴ πρὸς τὸ καθῆραι αὐτό.

[¶43] and you yourself will have your plates washed before you eat, unless you are quite dirty and slovenly; but you will not wash nor purify your body. “Why should I?” say you. I tell you again, in the first place, that you may be like a man; and, in the next, that you may not offend those with whom you converse.

> Greek: οὔ· ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν χαλκεὺς [ὡς χαλκεὺς] ἐξιώσει τὸ σιδήριον καὶ ὄργανα πρὸς τοῦτο ἕξει κατεσκευασμένα καὶ τὸ πινάκιον αὐτὸς σὺ πλυνεῖς, ὅταν μέλλῃς ἐσθίειν, ἐὰν μὴ ᾖς παντελῶς ἀκάθαρτος καὶ ῥυπαρός· τὸ σωμάτιον δʼ οὐ πλυνεῖς οὐδὲ καθαρὸν ποιήσεις;

[¶44] Do you think it fitting to smell offensively? Be it so. But is it fitting as regards those who sit near you; who are placed at the table with you;

> Greek: — διὰ τί; φησίν. — πάλιν ἐρῶ σοι· πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα τὰ ἀνθρώπου ποιῇς, εἶτα ἵνα μὴ ἀνιᾷς τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας.

[¶45] who salute you? Either go into a desert, as you deserve, or live solitary at home, and be the only sufferer. But to what sort of character does it belong to live in a city, and behave so carelessly and inconsiderately?

> Greek: τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐνθάδε ποιεῖς καὶ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ. σαυτὸν ἄξιον ἡγῇ τοῦ ὄζειν· ἔστω, ἴσθι ἄξιος. μή τι καὶ τοὺς παρακαθίζοντας, μή τι καὶ τοὺς συγκατακλινομένους, μή τι καὶ τοὺς καταφιλοῦντας;

[¶46] If Nature had trusted even a horse to your care, would you have overlooked and neglected him? Yet now, without being sensible of it, you do something like this. Consider your body as committed to you, instead of a horse.

> Greek: ἢ ἄπελθʼ εἰς ἐρημίαν πού ποτε, ἧς ἄξιος εἶ, καὶ μόνος δίαγε κατόζων σεαυτοῦ. δίκαιον γάρ ἐστι τῆς σῆς ἀκαθαρσίας σὲ μόνον ἀπολαύειν. ἐν πόλει δʼ ὄντα οὕτως ἀπερισκέπτως καὶ ἀγνωμόνως ἀναστρέφεσθαι τίνος σοι φαίνεται;

[¶47] Wash it, rub it, take care that it may not be any one’s aversion, nor disgust any one. Who is not more disgusted at a foul, unwholesome-looking sloven, than at a person who has been accidentally rolled in filth? The stench of the one is adventitious, from without;

> Greek: εἰ δʼ ἵππον σοι πεπιστεύκει ἡ φύσις, περιεώρας αὐτὸν καὶ ἀτημέλητον; καὶ νῦν οἴου σου τὸ σῶμα ὡς ἵππον ἐγκεχειρίσθαι· πλῦνον αὐτό, ἀπόσμηξον, ποίησον, ἵνα σε μηδεὶς ἀποστρέφηται, μηδεὶς ἐκτρέπηται.

[¶48] but that which arises from want of care is a kind of inward putrefaction. “But Socrates bathed but seldom.”

> Greek: τίς δʼ οὐκ ἐκτρέπεται ῥυπαρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὄζοντα, κακόχρουν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν κεκοπρωμένον; ἐκείνη ἡ ὀσμὴ ἔξωθέν ἐστιν ἐπίθετος, ἡ δʼ ἐξ ἀθεραπευσίας ἔσωθεν καὶ οἱονεὶ διασεσηπότος.

[¶49] Yet his person looked clean, and was so agreeable and pleasing, that the most beautiful and noble youths were fond of him, and desired rather to sit by him than by those who had the finest persons. He might have omitted both bathing and washing, if he had pleased; and yet his amount of bathing had its effect. Cold water may supply the place of the warm bath. “But Aristophanes calls him one of the pallid, barefooted philosophers.”

> Greek: ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης ὀλιγάκις ἐλούετο.— ἀλλὰ ἔστιλβεν αὐτοῦ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλʼ ἦν οὕτως ἐπίχαρι καὶ ἡδύ, ὥστʼ ἤρων αὐτοῦ οἱ ὡραιότατοι καὶ εὐγενέστατοι καὶ ἐπεθύμουν ἐκείνῳ παρακατακλίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς εὐμορφοτάτοις. ἐξῆν ἐκείνῳ μήτε λούεσθαι μήτε πλύνεσθαι, εἰ ἤθελεν· καίτοι καὶ τὸ ὀλιγάκις ἰσχὺν εἶχεν. κἂν θερμῷ μὴ θέλῃς, ψυχρῷ.

[¶50] Why, so he says, too, that he walked in the air, and stole clothes from the Palaestra. Besides, all who have written of Socrates affirm quite the contrary; that he was not only agreeable in his conversation, but in his person too.

> Greek: — ἀλλὰ λέγει Ἀριστοφάνης τοὺς ὠχριῶντας, τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους λέγω. — Λέγει γὰρ καὶ ἀεροβατεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκ τῆς παλαίστρας κλέπτειν τὰ ἱμάτια.

[¶51] And, again, they write the same of Diogenes. For we ought not to frighten the world from philosophy by the appearance of our persons;

> Greek: ἐπεί τοι πάντες οἱ γεγραφότες περὶ Σωκράτους πάντα τἀναντία αὐτῷ προσμαρτυροῦσιν, ὅτι ἡδὺς οὐ μόνον ἀκοῦσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδεῖν ἦν. πάλιν περὶ Διογένους ταὐτὰ γράφουσι.

[¶52] but to show our serenity of mind, as in all other ways, so in the care of our persons. “See, all of you, that I have nothing; that I want nothing. Without house, without city, and an exile (if that happens to be the case), and without a home, I live more easily and prosperously than the noble and rich.

> Greek: δεῖ γὰρ μηδὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἔμφασιν ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας ἀποσοβεῖν τοὺς πολλούς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα εὔθυμον καὶ ἀτάραχον ἐπιδεικνύειν αὑτὸν οὕτως καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος.

[¶53] Look upon my person, too, that it is not injured by coarse fare.” But if any one should tell me this, bearing the habit and the visage of a condemned criminal, what god should persuade me to come near philosophy, while it renders men such figures?

> Greek: ἴδετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔχω, οὐδενὸς δέομαι· ἴδετε, πῶς ἄοικος ὢν καὶ ἄπολις καὶ φυγάς, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ἀνέστιος πάντων τῶν εὐπατριδῶν καὶ πλουσίων ἀταραχώτερον διάγω καὶ εὐρούστερον. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον ὁρᾶτε ὅτι οὐ κακοῦται ὑπὸ τῆς αὐστηρᾶς διαίτης.

[¶54] Heaven forbid! I would not do it, even if I was sure to become a wise man for my pains. I declare, for my own part, I would rather that a young man, on his first inclination to philosophy, should come to me finically dressed, than with his hair spoiled and dirty.

> Greek: ἂν δέ μοι ταῦτα λέγῃ τις ἀνθρώπου σχῆμα καταδίκου ἔχων καὶ πρόσωπον, τίς με πείσει θεῶν προσελθεῖν φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἥ γε τοιούτους ποιεῖ; μὴ γένοιτο· οὐδʼ, εἰ σοφὸς ἔμελλον εἶναι, ἤθελον.

[¶55] For there appears in him some idea of beauty and desire of decency; and where he imagines it to be, there he applies his endeavors. One has nothing more to do but to point it out to him, and say, “You seek beauty, young man, and you do well.

> Greek: ἐγὼ μὲν νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς τὸν νέον τὸν πρώτως κινούμενον θέλω μᾶλλον ἐλθεῖν πρός με πεπλασμένον τὴν κόμην ἢ κατεφθινηκότα καὶ ῥυπαρόν. βλέπεται γάρ τις ἐν ἐκείνῳ τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασία, ἔφεσις δὲ τοῦ εὐσχήμονος. ὅπου δʼ αὐτὸ[ν] εἶναι φαντάζεται, ἐκεῖ καὶ φιλοτεχνεῖ.

[¶56] Be assured, then, that it springs from the rational part of you. Seek it there, where the pursuits and avoidances, the desires and aversions, are concerned. Herein consists your excellence; but the paltry body is by nature clay. Why do you trouble yourself, to no purpose, about it?

> Greek: λοιπὸν ὑποδεῖξαι μόνον αὐτῷ δεῖ καὶ εἰπεῖν νεανίσκε, τὸ καλὸν ζητεῖς καὶ εὖ ποιεῖς. ἴσθι οὖν, ὅτι ἐκεῖ φύεται, ὅπου τὸν λόγον ἔχεις· ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ ζήτει, ὅπου τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ τὰς ἀφορμάς, ὅπου τὰς ὀρέξεις, τὰς ἐκκλίσεις.

[¶57] You will be convinced by time, if not otherwise, that it is nothing.” But if he should come to me soiled and dirty, with mustaches drooping to his knees, what can I say to him;

> Greek: τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχεις ἐν σεαυτῷ ἐξαίρετον, τὸ σωμάτιον δὲ φύσει πηλός ἐστιν. τί πονεῖς εἰκῇ περὶ αὐτό; εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, τῷ χρόνῳ γνώσῃ, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν.

[¶58] by what similitude allure him? For what has he studied which has any resemblance to beauty, that I may transfer his attention, and say that beauty is not there, but here?

> Greek: ἂν δέ μοι ἔλθῃ κεκοπρωμένος, ῥυπαρός, μύστακα ἔχων μέχρι τῶν γονάτων, τί αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ἔχω, ἀπὸ ποίας αὐτὸν ὁμοιότητος ἐπαγαγεῖν;

[¶59] Would you have me tell him that beauty consists not in filth, but in reason? For has he any desire of beauty? Has he any appearance of it? Go, and argue with a hog not to roll in the mire. It was in the quality of a young man who loved beauty, that Polemo was touched by the discourses of Xenocrates.

> Greek: περὶ τί γὰρ ἐσπούδακεν ὅμοιον τῷ καλῷ, ἵνʼ αὐτὸν μεταθῶ καὶ εἴπω οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθάδε τὸ καλόν, ἀλλʼ ἐνθάδε; θέλεις αὐτῷ λέγω οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ κεκοπρῶσθαι τὸ καλόν, ἀλλʼ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ; ἐφίεται γὰρ τοῦ καλοῦ; ἔμφασιν γάρ τινα αὐτοῦ ἔχει; ἄπελθε καὶ χοίρῳ διαλέγου, ἵνʼ ἐν βορβόρῳ μὴ κυλίηται.

[¶60] For he entered with some incentives to the study of beauty, though he sought in the wrong place. And, indeed, Nature has not made the very brutes dirty which live with man.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο καὶ Πολέμωνος ἥψαντο οἱ λόγοι οἱ Ξενοκράτους ὡς φιλοκάλου νεανίσκου· εἰσῆλθεν γὰρ ἔχων ἐναύσματα τῆς περὶ τὸ καλὸν σπουδῆς, ἀλλαχοῦ δʼ αὐτὸ ζητῶν.

[¶61] Does a horse wallow in the mire; or a good dog? But swine, and dirty geese, and worms, and spiders, which are banished to the greatest distance from human society. Will you, then, who are a man, choose not to be even one of the animals that are conversant with man; but rather a worm or a spider?

> Greek: ἐπεί τοι οὐδὲ τὰ ζῷα τὰ ἀνθρώποις σύντροφα ῥυπαρὰ ἐποίησεν ἡ φύσις. μή τι ἵππος κυλίεται ἐν βορβόρῳ, μή τι κύων γενναῖος; ἀλλʼ ὁ ὗς καὶ τὰ σαπρὰ χηνίδια καὶ σκώληκες καὶ ἀράχναι, τὰ μακροτάτω τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης συναναστροφῆς ἀπεληλασμένα.

[¶62] Will you not bathe sometimes, be it in whatever manner you please? Will you never use water to wash yourself? Will you not come clean, that they who converse with you may have some pleasure in you? But will you accompany us, in your uncleanness, even to the temples, where all unclean ways are forbidden? What, then; would anybody have you adorn yourself to the utmost?

> Greek: σὺ οὖν ἄνθρωπος ὢν οὐδὲ ζῷον εἶναι θέλεις τῶν ἀνθρώποις συντρόφων, ἀλλὰ σκώληξ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀράχνιον; οὐ λούσῃ πού ποτε ὡς θέλεις, οὐκ ἀποπλυνεῖς σεαυτόν, οὐχ ἥξεις καθαρός, ἵνα σοι χαίρωσιν οἱ συνόντες; ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἡμῖν συνέρχῃ τοιοῦτος, ὅπου πτῦσαι οὐ νενόμισται οὐδʼ ἀπομύξασθαι, ὅλος ὢν πτύσμα καὶ μύξα;

[¶63] By no means, except in those things where our nature requires it,—in reason, principles, actions; but in our persons only so far as neatness requires; so far as not to give offence.

> Greek: τί οὖν; καλλωπίζεσθαί τις ἀξιοῖ; μὴ γένοιτο, εἰ μὴ ἐκεῖνο ὃ πεφύκαμεν, τὸν λόγον, τὰ δόγματα, τὰς ἐνεργείας, τὸ δὲ σῶμα μέχρι τοῦ καθαρίου, μέχρι τοῦ μὴ προσκόπτειν.

[¶64] But if you hear that it is not right to wear purple, you must go, I suppose, and roll your cloak in the mud, or tear it. “But how can I have a fine cloak?” You have water, man; wash it.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ἂν ἀκούσῃς, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ φορεῖν κόκκινα, ἀπελθὼν κόπρωσόν σου τὸν τρίβωνα ἢ κατάρρηξον. — ἀλλὰ πόθεν ἔχω καλὸν τρίβωνα; — ἄνθρωπε, ὕδωρ ἔχεις, πλῦνον αὐτόν.

[¶65] What an amiable youth is here! How worthy this old man to love and be loved! A fit person to be trusted with the instruction of our sons and daughters, and attended by young people as occasion may require,—to read them lectures from a dunghill!

> Greek: ἰδοὺ νέος ἀξιέραστος, ἰδοὺ πρεσβύτης ἄξιος τοῦ ἐρᾶν καὶ ἀντερᾶσθαι, ᾧ τις υἱον αὑτοῦ παραδῷ … θησόμενον, ᾧ θυγατέρες, ᾧ νέοι προσελεύσονται, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, ἵνα ἐν κοπρῶνι λέγῃ τὰς σχολάς.

[¶66] Every deterioration takes its origin from something human; but this almost dehumanizes a man.

> Greek: μὴ γένοιτο. πᾶσα ἐκτροπὴ ἀπό τινος ἀνθρωπικοῦ γίνεται, αὕτη ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ μὴ ἀνθρωπικὴ εἶναι.

[¶67] 12. When you cease to take pains for a little while, do not fancy that you may recommence whenever you please; but remember this, that by means of the fault of to-day, your affairs must necessarily be in a worse condition for the future. The first and worst evil is that there arises a habit of neglect; and then a habit of postponing effort, and constantly procrastinating as to one’s successes and good behavior and orderly thought and action. Now, if procrastination as to anything is advantageous, it must be still more advantageous to omit it altogether; but if it be not advantageous, why do you not take pains all the time? “would play to-day.” What then? Ought you not to take proper pains about it? “would sing.” But why not take proper pains about it? For there is no part of life exempted, about which pains are not needed. For will you do anything the worse by taking pains, and the better by neglect? What else in life is best performed by heedless people? Does a smith forge the better by heedlessness? Does a pilot steer more safely by heedlessness? Or is any other, even of the minutest operations, best performed heedlessly? Do you not perceive that, when you have let your mind loose, it is no longer in your power to call it back, either to propriety, or modesty, or moderation? But you do everything at haphazard; you merely follow your inclinations. “To what, then, am I to direct my pains?” Why, in the first place, to those universal maxims which you must always have at hand; and not sleep, or arise, or drink, or eat, or converse without them: that no one is the master of another’s will; and that it is in the will alone that good and evil lie. No one, therefore, is my master, either to procure me any good, or to involve me in any evil; but 1 alone have the disposal of myself with regard to these things. Since these, then, are secured to me, what need have I to be troubled about externals? What tyrant is formidable? What disease? What poverty? What offence? “I have not pleased such a one.” Is he my concern then? Is he my conscience? “No.” Why, then, do I trouble myself any further about him? “But he is thought to be of some consequence.” Let him look to that; and they who think him so. But I have One whom I must please, to whom I must submit, whom I must obey,—God, and those who surround him. He has intrusted me with myself, and made my will subject to myself alone, having given me rules for the right use of it. If I follow the proper rules in syllogisms, in convertible propositions, I do not heed or regard any one who says anything contrary to them. Why, then, am I vexed at being censured in matters of greater consequence? What is the reason of this perturbation? Nothing else, but that in this instance I want practice. For every science despises ignorance and the ignorant; and not only the sciences, but even the arts. Take any shoemaker, take any smith you will, and he may laugh at the rest of the world, so far as his own business is concerned. In the first place, then, these are the maxims we must have ready, and do nothing without them, but direct the soul to this mark; to pursue nothing external, nothing that belongs to others, but as he who has the power has appointed. Things controllable by will are to be pursued always; and the rest as may be permitted. Besides this, we must remember who we are, and what name we bear, endeavoring to use all the circumstances of life in their proper relations: what is the proper time for singing, what for play, and in what company; what will be the consequence of our performance; whether our companions will despise us, or we ourselves; when to employ raillery, and whom to ridicule; upon what occasions to comply, and with whom; and then, in complying, how to preserve our own character. Wherever you deviate from any of these rules, the damage is immediate; not from anything external, but from the very action itself. “What, then; is it possible by these means to be faultless?” Impracticable; but this is possible, to use a constant endeavor to be faultless. For we shall have cause to be satisfied, if, by never remitting our pains, we shall be exempt at least from a few faults. But now, when you say you will begin to take pains to-morrow, be assured that it is the same thing as if you said, “Today I will be shameless, impertinent, base, it shall be in the power of others to grieve me; I will be passionate, I will be envious to-day.” See to how many evils you give yourself up. “But all will be well tomorrow.” How much better to-day? If it be for your interest to-morrow, how much more to-day, that it may be in your power to-morrow too, and that you may not again deter it until the third day.

> Greek: 12. ὅταν ἀφῇς πρὸς ὀλίγον τὴν προσοχήν, μὴ τοῦτο φαντάζου, ὅτι, ὁπόταν θέλῃς, ἀναλήψῃ αὐτήν, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο πρόχειρον ἔστω σοι, ὅτι παρὰ τὸ σήμερον ἁμαρτηθὲν εἰς τἆλλα χεῖρον ἀνάγκη σοι τὰ πράγματα ἔχειν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάντων χαλεπώτατον ἔθος τοῦ μὴ προσέχειν ἐγγίνεται, εἶτα ἔθος τοῦ ἀναβάλλεσθαι τὴν προσοχήν· ἀ[ι]εὶ δʼ εἰς ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον χρόνον εἴωθας ὑπερτίθεσθαι τὸ εὐροεῖν, τὸ εὐσχημονεῖν, τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν λυσιτελὴς ἡ ὑπέρθεσίς ἐστιν, ἡ παντελὴς ἀπόστασις αὐτῆς ἐστι λυσιτελεστέρα· εἰ δʼ οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, τί οὐχὶ διηνεκῆ τὴν προσοχὴν φυλάσσεις; σήμερον παῖξαι θέλω. τί οὖν κωλύει προσέχοντα; ᾆσαι. τί οὖν κωλύει προσέχοντα; μὴ γὰρ ἐξαιρεῖταί τι μέρος τοῦ βίου, ἐφʼ ὃ οὐ διατείνει τὸ προσέχειν; χεῖρον γὰρ αὐτὸ προσέχων ποιήσεις, βέλτιον δὲ μὴ προσέχων; καὶ τί ἄλλο τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ κρεῖσσον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ προσεχόντων γίνεται; ὁ τέκτων μὴ προσέχων …; ⟨ὁ κυβερνήτης μὴ προσέχων⟩ κυβερνᾷ ἀσφαλέστερον; ἄλλο δέ τι τῶν μικροτέρων ἔργων ὑπὸ ἀπροσεξίας ἐπιτελεῖται κρεῖσσον; οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ, ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν ἀφῇς τὴν γνώμην, οὐκ ἔτι ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν ἀνακαλέσασθαι αὐτήν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ εὔσχημον, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰδῆμον, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κατεσταλμένον; ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἐπελθὸν ποιεῖς, ταῖς προθυμίαις ἐπακολουθεῖς. τίσιν οὖν δεῖ με προσέχειν;— πρῶτον μὲν ἐκείνοις τοῖς καθολικοῖς καὶ ἐκεῖνα πρόχειρα ἔχειν καὶ χωρὶς ἐκείνων μὴ καθεύδειν, μὴ ἀνίστασθαι, μὴ πίνειν, μὴ ἐσθίειν, μὴ συμβάλλειν ἀνθρώποις· ὅτι προαιρέσεως ἀλλοτρίας κύριος οὐδείς, ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ μόνῃ τἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. οὐδεὶς οὖν κύριος οὔτʼ ἀγαθόν μοι περιποιῆσαι οὔτε κακῷ με περιβαλεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἐμαυτοῦ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐξουσίαν ἔχω μόνος. ὅταν οὖν ταῦτα ἀσφαλῆ μοι ᾖ, τί ἔχω περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ταράσσεσθαι; ποῖος τύραννος φοβερός, ποία νόσος, ποία πενία, ποῖον πρόσκρουσμα; — ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἤρεσα τῷ δεῖνι. — μὴ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἐμόν ἐστιν ἔργον, μή τι ἐμὸν κρίμα; — οὔ. — τί οὖν ἔτι μοι μέλει; — ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ τις εἶναι. — ὄψεται αὐτὸς καὶ οἷς δοκεῖ, ἐγὼ δʼ ἔχω, τίνι με δεῖ ἀρέσκειν, τίνι ὑποτετάχθαι, τίνι πείθεσθαι· τῷ θεῷ καὶ μετʼ ἐκεῖνον … ἐμὲ ἐκεῖνος συνέστησεν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν προαίρεσιν ὑπέταξεν ἐμοὶ μόνῳ δοὺς κανόνας εἰς χρῆσιν αὐτῆς τὴν ὀρθήν, οἷς ὅταν κατακολουθήσω, ἐν συλλογισμοῖς οὐκ ἐπιστρέφομαι οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλο τι λεγόντων, ἐν μεταπίπτουσιν οὐ φροντίζω οὐδενός. διὰ τί οὖν ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν ἀνιῶσί με οἱ ψέγοντες; τί τὸ αἴτιον ταύτης τῆς ταραχῆς; οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἀγύμναστός εἰμι. ἐπεί τοι πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη καταφρονητική ἐστι τῆς ἀγνοίας καὶ τῶν ἀγνοούντων καὶ οὐ μόνον αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ τέχναι. φέρε ὃν θέλεις σκυτέα καὶ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελᾷ περὶ τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον· φέρε ὃν θέλεις τέκτονα. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἔχειν πρόχειρα καὶ μηδὲν δίχα τούτων ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τετάσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν σκοπόν, μηδὲν τῶν ἔξω διώκειν, μηδὲν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀλλʼ ὡς διέταξεν ὁ δυνάμενος, τὰ προαιρετικὰ ἐξ ἅπαντος, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα ὡς ἂν διδῶται. ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ μεμνῆσθαι, τίνες ἐσμὲν καὶ τί ἡμῖν ὄνομα, καὶ πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν σχέσεων πειρᾶσθαι τὰ καθήκοντα ἀπευθύνειν· τίς καιρὸς ᾠδῆς, τίς καιρὸς παιδ[ε]ιᾶς, τίνων παρόντων· τί ἔσται ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος· μή τι καταφρονήσωσιν ἡμῶν οἱ συνόντες, μή τι ἡμεῖς αὐτῶν· πότε σκῶψαι καὶ τίνας ποτὲ καταγελάσαι καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι ποτὲ συμπεριενεχθῆναι καὶ τίνι, καὶ λοιπὸν ἐν τῇ συμπεριφορᾷ πῶς τηρῆσαι τὸ αὑτοῦ. ὅπου δʼ ἂν ἀπονεύσῃς ἀπό τινος τούτων, εὐθὺς ζημία, οὐκ ἔξωθέν ποθεν, ἀλλʼ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ἐνεργείας. τί οὖν; δυνατὸν ἀναμάρτητον ἤδη εἶναι; ἀμήχανον, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο δυνατὸν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν τετάσθαι διηνεκῶς. ἀγαπητὸν γάρ, εἰ μηδέποτʼ ἀνιέντες ταύτην τὴν προσοχὴν ὀλίγων γε ἁμαρτημάτων ἐκτὸς ἐσόμεθα. νῦν δʼ ὅταν εἴπῃς ἀπαύριον προσέξω, ἴσθι ὅτι τοῦτο λέγεις σήμερον ἔσομαι ἀναίσχυντος, ἄκαιρος, ταπεινός· ἐπʼ ἄλλοις ἔσται τὸ λυπεῖν με· ὀργισθήσομαι σήμερον, φθονήσω. βλέπε, ὅσα κακὰ σεαυτῷ ἐπιτρέπεις. ἀλλʼ εἴ σοι αὔριον καλῶς ἔχει, πόσῳ κρεῖττον σήμερον· εἰ αὔριον συμφέρει, πολὺ μᾶλλον σήμερον, ἵνα καὶ αὔριον δυνηθῇς καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβάλῃ εἰς τρίτην.

[¶68] 13. When any one appears to us to discourse frankly of his own affairs, we too are somehow tempted to disclose our secrets to him; and we consider this to be acting with frankness,—first, because it seems unfair that when we have heard the affairs of our neighbor, we should not in return communicate ours to him; and besides, we think that we shall not appear of a frank character, in concealing what belongs to ourselves. Indeed it is often said, “have told you all my affairs; and will you tell me none of yours? How happens this?” Lastly, it is supposed that we may safely trust him who has already trusted us; for we imagine that he will never discover our affairs, for fear we should in turn discover his. It is thus that the inconsiderate are caught by the soldiers at Rome. A soldier sits by you in a civilian’s dress, and begins to speak ill of Caesar. Then you, as if you had received a pledge of his fidelity, by his first beginning the abuse, say likewise what you think; and so you are led away in chains to execution. Something like this is the case with us in general. But when one has safely intrusted his secrets to me, shall I, in imitation of him, trust mine to any one who comes in my way? The case is different. I indeed hold my tongue (supposing me to be of such a disposition); but he goes and discovers them to everybody; and then, when I come to find it out, if I happen to be like him, from a desire of revenge, I discover his, and asperse and am aspersed. But if I remember that one man does not hurt another, but that every one is hurt or profited by his own actions, I may indeed keep to this, not to do anything like him; yet, by my own talkative folly, I suffer what I do suffer. “Ay; but it is unfair, when you have heard the secrets of your neighbor, not to communicate anything to him in return.” Why, did I ask you to do it, sir? Did you tell me your affairs upon condition that I should tell you mine in return? If you are a gossip, and take all you meet for friends, would you have me too become like you? But what if the case be this; that you did right in trusting your affairs to me, but it is not right that I should trust you? Would you have me run headlong, and fall? This is just as if I had a sound barrel, and you a leaky one; and you should come and deposit your wine with me, to be put into my barrel; and then should take it ill that, in my turn, I did not trust you with my wine. No. You have a leaky barrel. How, then, are we any longer upon equal terms? You have intrusted your affairs to an honest man, and a man of honor; one who finds his help or harm in his own actions alone, and in nothing external. Would you have me intrust mine to you, who have dishonored your own will, and who would get a paltry sum, or a post of power or preferment at court, even if it required you to kill your own children, like Medea? Where is the fairness in this? But show me that you are faithful, honorable, steady; show me that you have principles conducive to friendship; show me that your vessel is not leaky, and you shall see that I will not wait for you to intrust your affairs to me, but I will come and entreat you to hear mine. For who would not make use of a good vessel? Who despises a benevolent and friendly adviser? Who will not gladly receive one to share the burden, as it were, of his difficulties; and by sharing, to make it lighter? “Well, but I trust you, and you do not trust me.” In the first place, you do not really trust me; but you are a gossip, and therefore can keep nothing in. For if the former be the case, trust only me. But now, whenever you see a man at leisure, you sit down by him and say: “My dear friend, there is not a man in the world who wishes me better, or has more kindness for me, than you; I entreat you to hear my affairs.” And this you do to those with whom you have not the least acquaintance. But if you do trust me, it is plainly as a man of fidelity and honor, and not because I have told you my affairs. Let me alone, then, till I reciprocate this opinion. Convince me that if a person has told his affairs to any one, it is a proof of his being a man of fidelity and honor. For if this were the case, I would go about and tell my affairs to the whole world, if I could thus become a man of fidelity and honor. But that is no such matter; for it demands of a man to have no ordinary principles. If, then, you see any one taking pains for things that belong to others, and subjecting his will to them, be assured that this man has a thousand things to compel and restrain him. He has no need of burning pitch, or the torturing wheel, to make him tell what he knows; but the nod of a girl, for instance, will shake his purpose; the good-will of a courtier; the desire of an office, of an inheritance; ten thousand other things of that sort. It must therefore be remembered, in general, that confidential discourses require fidelity and a certain sort of principles. And where, at this time, are these easily to be found? Pray let any one show me a person of such a disposition as to say, I concern myself only for those things which are my own, incapable of restraint, and by nature free. This I esteem the essence of good. Let the rest be as it may happen; it makes no difference to me.

> Greek: 13. ὅταν τις ἡμῖν ἁπλῶς δόξῃ διειλέχθαι περὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πραγμάτων, πώς ποτε ἐξαγόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐκφέρειν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἀπόρρητα καὶ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν οἰόμεθα εἶναι· πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἄνισον εἶναι δοκεῖ αὐτὸν μὲν ἀκηκοέναι τὰ τοῦ πλησίον, μὴ μέντοι μεταδιδόναι κἀκείνῳ ἐν τῷ μέρει τῶν ἡμετέρων. εἶθʼ ὅτι οἰόμεθα οὐχ ἁπλῶν ἀνθρώπων παρέξειν αὐτοῖς φαντασίαν σιωπῶντες τὰ ἴδια. ἀμέλει πολλάκις εἰώθασιν λέγειν ἐγώ σοι πάντα τἀμαυτοῦ εἴρηκα, σύ μοι οὐδὲν τῶν σῶν εἰπεῖν θέλεις; ποῦ γίνεται τοῦτο; πρόσεστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀσφαλῶς πιστεύειν τῷ ἤδη τὰ αὑτοῦ πεπιστευκότι· ὑπέρχεται γὰρ ἡμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὗτος ἐξείποι τὰ ἡμέτερα εὐλαβούμενος, μήποτε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐξείπωμεν τὰ ἐκείνου. οὕτως καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐν Ῥώμῃ οἱ προπετεῖς λαμβάνονται. παρακεκάθικέ σοι στρατιώτης ἐν σχήματι ἰδιωτικῷ καὶ ἀρξάμενος κακῶς λέγει τὸν Καίσαρα, εἶτα σὺ ὥσπερ ἐνέχυρον παρʼ αὐτοῦ λαβὼν τῆς πίστεως τὸ αὐτὸν τῆς λοιδορίας κατῆρχθαι λέγεις καὶ αὐτὸς ὅσα φρονεῖς, εἶτα δεθεὶς ἀπάγῃ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐν τῷ καθόλου πάσχομεν. οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖνος ἀσφαλῶς πεπίστευκεν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, οὕτως κἀγὼ τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι· ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ μὲν ἀκούσας σιωπῶ, ἄν γε ὦ τοιοῦτος, ὁ δʼ ἐξελθὼν ἐκφέρει πρὸς πάντας. εἶτʼ ἂν γνῶ τὸ γενόμενον, ἂν μὲν ὦ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκείνῳ ὅμοιος, ἀμύνασθαι θέλων ἐκφέρω τὰ ἐκείνου καὶ φύρω καὶ φύρομαι. ἂν δὲ μνημονεύω, ὅτι ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐ βλάπτει, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἔργα ἕκαστον καὶ βλάπτει καὶ ὠφελεῖ, τούτου μὲν κρατῶ τοῦ μὴ ὅμοιόν τι ποιῆσαι ἐκείνῳ, ὅμως δʼ ὑπὸ φλυαρίας τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ πέπονθα ἃ πέπονθα. ναί· ἀλλʼ ἄνισόν ἐστιν ἀκούσαντα τὰ τοῦ πλησίον ἀπόρρητα αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ μέρει μηδενὸς μεταδιδόναι αὐτῷ. — μὴ γάρ σε παρεκάλουν, ἄνθρωπε; μὴ γὰρ ἐπὶ συνθήκαις τισὶν ἐξήνεγκας τὰ σαυτοῦ, ἵνʼ ἀκούσῃς ἐν τῷ μέρει καὶ τὰ ἐμά; εἰ σὺ φλύαρος εἶ καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἀπαντήσαντας φίλους εἶναι δοκεῖς, θέλεις καὶ ἐμὲ ὅμοιόν σοι γενέσθαι; τί δʼ, εἰ σὺ καλῶς μοι πεπίστευκας τὰ σαυτοῦ, σοὶ δʼ οὐκ ἔστι καλῶς πιστεῦσαι, θέλεις με προ[σ]πεσεῖν; οἷον εἰ πίθον εἶχον ἐγὼ μὲν στεγνόν, σὺ δὲ τετρυπημένον καὶ ἐλθὼν παρακατέθου μοι τὸν σαυτοῦ οἶνον, ἵνα βάλω εἰς τὸν ἐμὸν πίθον, εἶτʼ ἠγανάκτεις ὅτι μὴ κἀγὼ σοὶ πιστεύω τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ οἶνον· σὺ γὰρ τετρυπημένον ἔχεις τὸν πίθον. πῶς οὖν ἔτι ἴσον γίνεται; σὺ πιστῷ παρακατέθου, σὺ αἰδήμονι, τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργείας μόνας βλαβερὰς ἡγουμένῳ καὶ ὠφελίμους, τῶν δʼ ἐκτὸς οὐδέν· ἐγὼ σοὶ θέλεις παρακαταθῶμαι, ἀνθρώπῳ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἠτιμακότι, θέλοντι δὲ κερματίου τυχεῖν ἢ ἀρχῆς τινος ἢ προαγωγῆς ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ, κἂν μέλλῃς τὰ τέκνα σου κατασφάζειν, ὡς ἡ Μήδεια; ποῦ τοῦτο ἴσον ἐστίν; ἀλλὰ δεῖξόν μοι σαυτὸν πιστόν, αἰδήμονα, βέβαιον, δεῖξον, ὅτι δόγματα ἔχεις φιλικά, δεῖξόν σου τὸ ἀγγεῖον ὅτι οὐ τέτρηται καὶ ὄψει, πῶς οὐκ ἀναμένω ἵνα μοι σὺ πιστεύσῃς τὰ σαυτοῦ, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ἐλθὼν σὲ παρακαλῶ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν ἐμῶν. τίς γὰρ οὐ θέλει χρήσασθαι ἀγγείῳ καλῷ, τίς ἀτιμάζει σύμβουλον εὔνουν καὶ πιστόν, τίς οὐκ ἄσμενος δέξηται τὸν ὥσπερ φορτίου μεταληψόμενον τῶν αὐτοῦ περιστάσεων καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ κουφιοῦντα αὐτὸν τῷ μεταλαβεῖν; ναί· ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ σοὶ πιστεύω, σὺ ἐμοὶ οὐ πιστεύεις. — πρῶτον μὲν οὐδὲ σὺ ἐμοὶ πιστεύεις, ἀλλὰ φλύαρος εἶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν δύνασαι κατασχεῖν. ἐπεί τοι εἰ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐμοὶ μόνῳ αὐτὰ πίστευσον· νῦν δʼ ὃν ἂν εὐσχολοῦντα ἴδῃς, παρακαθίσας αὐτῷ λέγεις ἀδελφέ, οὐδένα σου ἔχω εὐνούστ[οτ]ερον οὐδὲ φίλτερον, παρακαλῶ σε ἀκοῦσαι τὰ ἐμά· καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τοὺς οὐδέ τι ὀλίγον ἐγνωσμένους ποιεῖς. εἰ δὲ καὶ πιστεύεις ἐμοί, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πιστῷ καὶ αἰδήμονι, οὐχ ὅτι σοὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐξεῖπον. ἄφες οὖν, ἵνα κἀγὼ ταὐτὰ ὑπολάβω. δεῖξόν μοι, ὅτι, ἄν τις τινὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἐξείπῃ, ἐκεῖνος πιστός ἐστι καὶ αἰδήμων. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἦν, ἐγὼ περιερχόμενος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ ἂν ἔλεγον, εἰ τούτου ἕνεκα ἔμελλον πιστὸς καὶ αἰδήμων ἔσεσθαι. τὸ δʼ ἐστὶν οὐ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ δογμάτων δεῖ οὐχ ὧν ἔτυχεν. ἂν γοῦν τινα ἴδῃς περὶ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα ἐσπουδακότα καὶ τούτοις ὑποτεταχότα τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν, ἴσθι ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος μυρίους ἔχει τοὺς ἀναγκάζοντας, τοὺς κωλύοντας. οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ χρεία πίσσης ἢ τροχοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἐξειπεῖν ἃ οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ παιδισκαρίου νευμάτιον, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, ἐκσείσει αὐτόν, Καισαριανοῦ φιλοφροσύνη, ἀρχῆς ἐπιθυμία, κληρονομίας, ἄλλα τούτοις ὅμοια τρισμύρια. μεμνῆσθαι οὖν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου, ὅτι οἱ ἀπόρρητοι λόγοι πίστεως χρείαν ἔχουσι καὶ δογμάτων τοιούτων· ταῦτα δὲ ποῦ νῦν εὑρεῖν ῥᾳδίως; ἢ δειξάτω μοί τις τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ὥστε λέγειν ἐμοὶ μόνων μέλει τῶν ἐμῶν, τῶν ἀκωλύτων, τῶν φύσει ἐλευθέρων. ταύτην οὐσίαν ἔχω τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα γινέσθω ὡς ἂν διδῶται· οὐ διαφέρομαι.