--- title: "Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν" author: "Epictetus" translator: "Thomas Wentworth Higginson" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" section: 11 of 23 url: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/11/ cite: "Epictetus, tr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν, section 11. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/11/" --- # Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν *Epictetus, tr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson* A former slave’s lessons in Stoic freedom, taken down by his pupil Arrian. > Greek: ed. Heinrich Schenkl, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0557.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Thomas Wentworth Higginson, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0557.tlg001.perseus-eng4). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 11. Book II · chapters 19–22 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/11/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/11/#p-N [¶0] And in these matters, indeed, it is of no great consequence if you retain the story, without forming any principle of your own. > Greek: καὶ ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐδὲν μέγα τῆς ἱστορίας κρατεῖν, ἴδιον δὲ δόγμα μηδὲν πεποιῆσθαι. ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν δὲ πάσχομεν αὐτὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ τούτων. [¶1] But we commit this error much more in dealing with moral questions, than upon such subjects as these. “Talk to me concerning good and evil.” > Greek: εἰπέ μοι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ἄκουε· Ἰλιόθεν με φέρων ἄνεμος Κικόνεσσι πέλασσεν. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, [¶2] Hear:— “Winds blew from Ilium to Ciconian shores.” The expression became proverbial, signifying “from bad to worse.”—H. Some things are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good are the virtues, and whatever partakes of them; > Greek: τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δʼ ἀδιάφορα. ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν, κακὰ δὲ κακίαι καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα κακίας, ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ μεταξὺ τούτων, πλοῦτος, ὑγίεια, ζωή, θάνατος, ἡδονή, πόνος. [¶3] and the evil are vices, and what partakes of vice; the indifferent lie between these, as riches, health, life, death, pleasure, pain. “Whence do you know this?” [Suppose I say] Hellanicus says it, in his Egyptian History. > Greek: πόθεν οἶδας; Ἑλλάνικος λέγει ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπτιακοῖς. τί γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτο εἰπεῖν ἢ ὅτι Διογένης ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ ἢ Χρύσιππος ἢ Κλεάνθης; βεβασάνικας οὖν τι αὐτῶν καὶ δόγμα σεαυτοῦ πεποίησαι; [¶4] For what does it signify, whether one quotes the history of Hellanicus, or the ethics of Diogenes, or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes? Have you then examined any of these things, and formed convictions of your own? How, for instance, would you conduct yourself on shipboard? > Greek: δείκνυε πῶς εἴωθας ἐν πλοίῳ χειμάζεσθαι. μέμνησαι ταύτης τῆς διαιρέσεως, ὅταν ψοφήσῃ τὸ ἱστίον καὶ ἀνακραυγάσαντί σοι κακόσχολός πως παραστὰς εἴπῃ λέγε μοι τοὺς θεούς σοι ἃ πρῴην ἔλεγες· μή τι κακία[ς] ἐστὶ τὸ ναυαγῆσαι, μή τι κακίας μετέχον; [¶5] Remember these distinctions, when the mast rattles, and some idle fellow stands by you while you are screaming, and says: “For heaven’s sake! > Greek: οὐκ ἄρας ξύλον ἐνσείσεις αὐτῷ; τί ἡμῖν καὶ σοί, ἄνθρωπε; ἀπολλύμεθα καὶ σὺ ἐλθὼν παίζεις. [¶6] talk as you did a little while ago. Is it vice to suffer shipwreck; or does it partake of vice?” Would you not take up a log, and throw it at his head? “What have we to do with you, sir? We are perishing, and you come and jest.” Again, if Caesar should summon you to answer an accusation, remember these distinctions. > Greek: ἂν δέ σε ὁ Καῖσαρ μεταπέμψηται κατηγορούμενον, μέμνησαι τῆς διαιρέσεως, ἄν τίς σοι εἰσιόντι καὶ ὠχριῶντι ἅμα καὶ τρέμοντι προσελθὼν εἴπῃ τί τρέμεις, ἄνθρωπε; περὶ τίνων σοί ἐστιν ὁ λόγος; μή τι ἔσω ὁ Καῖσαρ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν τοῖς εἰσερχομένοις δίδωσι; [¶7] If, when you are going in, pale and trembling, any one should meet you and say, “Why do you tremble, sir? What is this affair you are engaged in? Does Caesar, within there, give virtue and vice to those who approach him?” “What, do you too insult me, and add to my evils?” > Greek: τί μοι ἐμπαίζεις καὶ σὺ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοῖς; ὅμως, φιλόσοφε, εἰπέ μοι, τί τρέμεις; οὐχὶ θάνατός ἐστι τὸ κινδυνευόμενον ἢ δεσμωτήριον ἢ πόνος τοῦ σώματος ἢ φυγὴ ἢ ἀδοξία; τί γὰρ ἄλλο; μή τι κακία, μή τι μέτοχον κακίας; σὺ οὖν τίνα ταῦτα ἔλεγες; [¶8] “Nay, but tell me, philosopher, why you tremble. Is there any other danger, but death, or a prison, or bodily pain, or exile, or slander?” “Why, what else should there be?” “Are any of these vice; or do they partake of vice? > Greek: τί ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί, ἄνθρωπε; ἀρκεῖ ἐμοὶ τὰ ἐμὰ κακά. καὶ καλῶς λέγεις. ἀρκεῖ γάρ σοι τὰ σὰ κακά, ἡ ἀγέννεια, ἡ δειλία, ἡ ἀλαζονεία, ἣν ἠλαζονεύου ἐν τῇ σχολῇ καθήμενος. τί τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἐκαλλωπίζου; τί Στωικὸν ἔλεγες σεαυτόν; [¶9] What, then, did you yourself use to say of these things?” “What have you to do with me, sir? My own evils are enough for me.” You say rightly. Your own evils are indeed enough for you; > Greek: Τηρεῖτε οὕτως ἑαυτοὺς ἐν οἷς ἐπράσσετε καὶ εὑρήσετε τίνος ἔσθʼ αἱρέσεως. τοὺς πλείστους ὑμῶν Ἐπικουρείους εὑρήσετε, ὀλίγους τινὰς Περιπατητικοὺς καὶ τούτους ἐκλελυμένους. [¶10] your baseness, your cowardice, and that arrogance by which you were elated, as you sat in the schools. Why did you assume plumage not your own? Why did you call yourself a Stoic? > Greek: ποῦ γὰρ ἵνʼ ὑμεῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσην ἢ καὶ κρείττονα ἔργῳ ὑπολάβητε; Στωικὸν δὲ δείξατέ μοι, εἴ τινα ἔχητε. [¶11] Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find of what sect you are. You will find that most of you are Epicureans; a few are Peripatetics, and those but loose ones. > Greek: ποῦ ἢ πῶς; ἀλλὰ τὰ λογάρια τὰ Στωικὰ λέγοντας μυρίους. τὰ γὰρ Ἐπικούρεια αὐτοὶ οὗτοι χεῖρον λέγουσι; τὰ γὰρ Περιπατητικὰ οὐ καὶ αὐτὰ ὁμοίως ἀκριβοῦσιν; [¶12] For by what action will you prove that you think virtue equal, and even superior, to all other things? Show me a Stoic, if you have one. Where? Or how should you? You can show, indeed, a thousand who repeat the Stoic reasonings. > Greek: τίς οὖν ἐστι Στωικός; ὡς λέγομεν ἀνδριάντα Φειδιακὸν τὸν τετυπωμένον κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὴν Φειδίου, οὕτως τινά μοι δείξατε κατὰ τὰ δόγματα ἃ λαλεῖ τετυπωμένον. [¶13] But do they repeat the Epicurean less well? Are they not just as perfect in the Peripatetic? Who then is a Stoic? As we call that a Phidian statue which is formed according to the art of Phidias, so show me some one person formed according to the principles which he professes. > Greek: δείξατέ μοί τινα νοσοῦντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, κινδυνεύοντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, ἀποθνῄσκοντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, πεφυγαδευμένον καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, ἀδοξοῦντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα. δείξατʼ· ἐπιθυμῶ τινα νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἰδεῖν Στωικόν. [¶14] Show me one who is sick, and happy; in danger, and happy; dying, and happy; exiled, and happy; disgraced, and happy. Show him to me; for, by Heaven! > Greek: ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔχετε τὸν τετυπωμένον δεῖξαι· τόν γε τυπούμενον δείξατε, τὸν ἐπὶ ταῦτα κεκλικότα. εὐεργετήσατέ με· μὴ φθονήσητε ἀνθρώπῳ γέροντι ἰδεῖν θέαμα, ὃ μέχρι νῦν οὐκ εἶδον. [¶15] I long to see a Stoic. But you have not one fully developed? Show me then one who is developing; one who is approaching towards this character. Do me this favor. Do not refuse an old man a sight which he has never yet seen. Do you suppose that you are to show the Zeus or Athena of Phidias, a work of ivory or gold? Let any of you show me a human soul desiring to be in unity with God; > Greek: οἴεσθε ὅτι τὸν Δία τὸν Φειδίου δείξετε ἢ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, ἐλεφάντινον καὶ χρυσοῦν κατασκεύασμα. ψυχὴν δειξάτω τις ὑμῶν ἀνθρώπου θέλοντος ὁμογνωμονῆσαι τῷ θεῷ καὶ μηκέτι μήτε θεὸν μήτʼ ἄνθρωπον μέμφεσθαι, μὴ ἀποτυχεῖν τινος, μὴ περιπεσεῖν τινι, μὴ ὀργισθῆναι, μὴ φθονῆσαι, μὴ ζηλοτυπῆσαι (τί γὰρ δεῖ περιπλέκειν; [¶16] not to accuse either God or man; not to be disappointed of its desire, nor incur its aversion; not to be angry; not to be envious; not to be jealous; in a word, desiring from a man to become a god; > Greek: ), θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιθυμοῦντα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ σωματίῳ τούτῳ τῷ νεκρῷ περὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν Δία κοινωνίας βουλευόμενον. δείξατε. ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἔχετε. τί οὖν αὑτοῖς ἐμπαίζετε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κυβεύετε; [¶17] and, in this poor mortal body, aiming to have fellowship with Zeus. Show him to me. But you cannot. Why then do you impose upon yourselves, and play tricks with others? > Greek: καὶ περιθέμενοι σχῆμα ἀλλότριον περιπατεῖτε κλέπται καὶ λωποδύται τούτων τῶν οὐδὲν προσηκόντων ὀνομάτων καὶ πραγμάτων; [¶18] Why do you put on a dress not your own, and walk about in it, mere thieves and pilferers of names and things which do not belong to you? I am now your preceptor, and you come to be instructed by me. And indeed my aim is to secure you from being restrained, compelled, hindered; to make you free, prosperous, happy; looking to God upon every occasion, great or small. > Greek: καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν παιδευτής εἰμι ὑμέτερος, ὑμεῖς δὲ παρʼ ἐμοὶ παιδεύεσθε. κἀγὼ μὲν ἔχω ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἀποτελέσαι ὑμᾶς ἀκωλύτους, ἀναναγκάστους, ἀπαραποδίστους, ἐλευθέρους, εὐροοῦντας, εὐδαιμονοῦντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφορῶντας ἐν παντὶ καὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ· ὑμεῖς δὲ ταῦτα μαθησόμενοι καὶ μελετήσοντες πάρεστε. [¶19] And you come to learn and study these things. Why then do you not finish your work, if you have the proper aims, and I, besides the aim, the proper qualifications? > Greek: διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀνύετε τὸ ἔργον, εἰ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἔχετʼ ἐπιβολὴν οἵαν δεῖ κἀγὼ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιβολῇ καὶ παρασκευὴν οἵαν δεῖ; [¶20] What is wanting? When I see an artificer, and the materials lying ready, I await the work. Now here is the artificer; here are the materials; what is it we want? > Greek: τί τὸ λεῖπόν ἐστιν; ὅταν ἴδω τέκτονα, ὅτῳ ὕλη πάρεστιν παρακειμένη, ἐκδέχομαι τὸ ἔργον. καὶ ἐνθάδε τοίνυν ὁ τέκτων ἐστίν, ἡ ὕλη ἐστίν· τί ἡμῖν λείπει; [¶21] Is not the thing capable of being taught? It is. Is it not in our own power, then? The only thing of all others that is so. Neither riches nor health nor fame nor, in short, anything else is in our power except a right use of the semblances of things. This alone is, by nature, not subject to restraint, not subject to hindrance. > Greek: οὐκ ἔστι διδακτὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα; διδακτόν. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν; μόνον μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. οὔτε πλοῦτός ἐστιν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν οὔθʼ ὑγίεια οὔτε δόξα οὔτε ἄλλο τι ἁπλῶς πλὴν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. τοῦτο ἀκώλυτον φύσει μόνον, τοῦτο ἀνεμπόδιστον. [¶22] Why then do not you finish it? Tell me the cause. It must be my fault, or yours, or from the nature of the thing. The thing itself is practicable, and the only thing in our power. The fault then must be either in me or in you, or, more truly, in both. > Greek: διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀνύετε; εἴπατέ μοι τὴν αἰτίαν. ἢ γὰρ παρʼ ἐμὲ γίνεται ἢ παρʼ ὑμᾶς ἢ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος. αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ μόνον ἐφʼ ἡμῖν. λοιπὸν οὖν ἢ παρʼ ἐμέ ἐστιν ἢ παρʼ ὑμᾶς ἤ, ὅπερ ἀληθέστερον, παρʼ ἀμφοτέρους. τί οὖν; [¶23] Well, then, shall we at length begin to carry such an aim with us? Let us lay aside all that is past. Let us begin. Only believe me, and you shall see. > Greek: θέλετε ἀρξώμεθά ποτε τοιαύτην ἐπιβολὴν κομίζειν ἐνταῦθα; τὰ μέχρι νῦν ἀφῶμεν. ἀρξώμεθα μόνον, πιστεύσατέ μοι, καὶ ὄψεσθε. [¶24] 20. Things true and evident must, of necessity, be recognized even by those who would contradict them. And perhaps one of the strongest proofs that there is such a thing as evidence is the necessity which compels even those who contradict it to make use of it. > Greek: 20. τοῖς ὑγιέσι καὶ ἐναργέσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες προσχρῶνται. καὶ σχεδὸν τοῦτο μέγιστον ἄν τις ποιήσαιτο τεκμήριον τοῦ ἐναργές τι εἶναι, τὸ ἐπάναγκες εὑρίσκεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἀντιλέγοντι συγχρήσασθαι αὐτῷ· [¶25] If a person, for instance, should deny that anything is universally true, he will be obliged to assert the contrary, that nothing is universally true. Foolish man, not so. > Greek: οἷον εἴ τις ἀντιλέγοι τῷ εἶναί τι καθολικὸν ἀληθές, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἐναντίαν ἀπόφασιν οὗτος ὀφείλει ποιήσασθαι· οὐδέν ἐστι καθολικὸν ἀληθές. ἀνδράποδον, οὐδὲ τοῦτο. [¶26] For what is this but an universal statement? > Greek: τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἢ οἷον εἴ τι ἔστι καθολικόν, ψεῦδός ἐστιν; [¶27] Again, suppose any one should come and say, “Know that there is nothing to be known; but all things are uncertain;” or another, “Believe me, for your good, that no man ought to be believed in anything;” or a third, “Learn from me that nothing is to be learned; I tell you this, and will teach the proof of it, if you please.” > Greek: πάλιν ἄν τις παρελθὼν λέγῃ γίγνωσκε, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι γνωστόν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀτέκμαρτα ἢ ἄλλος ὅτι πίστευσόν μοι καὶ ὠφεληθήσῃ· οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀνθρώπῳ πιστεύειν ἢ πάλιν ἄλλος μάθε παρʼ ἐμοῦ, ἄνθρωπε, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται μαθεῖν· ἐγώ σοι λέγω τοῦτο καὶ διδάξω σε, ἐὰν θέλῃς· [¶28] Now what difference is there between such as these, and those who call themselves Academics,—who say to us, “Be convinced that no one ever is convinced; believe us, that nobody believes anybody”? > Greek: τίνι οὖν τούτων διαφέρουσιν οὗτοι — τίνες ποτέ; — οἱ Ἀκαδημαικοὺς αὑτοὺς λέγοντες; ὦ ἄνθρωποι, συγκατάθεσθε ὅτι οὐδεὶς συγκατατίθεται· πιστεύσατε ἡμῖν ὅτι οὐδεὶς πιστεύει οὐδενί. [¶29] Thus also, when Epicurus would destroy the natural tie between mankind, he makes use of the very thing he is destroying. For what says he? > Greek: οὕτως καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, ὅταν ἀναιρεῖν θέλῃ τὴν φυσικὴν κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, αὐτῷ τῷ ἀναιρουμένῳ συγχρῆται. [¶30] “Be not deceived; be not seduced and mistaken. There is no natural tie between reasonable beings. Believe me. Those who say otherwise mislead and impose upon you.” Why are you concerned for us then? Let us be deceived. > Greek: τί γὰρ λέγει; μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθε, ἄνθρωποι, μηδὲ παράγεσθε μηδὲ διαπίπτετε· οὐκ ἔστι φυσικὴ κοινωνία τοῖς λογικοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους· πιστεύσατέ μοι. οἱ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ παραλογίζονται. [¶31] You will fare never the worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that there is a natural tie between mankind, and that it is by all means to be preserved. Nay, it will be much safer and better. Why do you give yourself any trouble about us, sir? > Greek: τί οὖν σοι μέλει; ἄφες ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατηθῆναι. μή τι χεῖρον ἀπαλλάξεις, ἂν πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι πεισθῶμεν, ὅτι φυσική ἐστιν ἡμῖν κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ταύτην δεῖ παντὶ τρόπῳ φυλάσσειν; καὶ πολὺ κρεῖσσον καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον. [¶32] Why do you break your rest for us? Why do you light your lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you compose so many volumes? Is it that none of us should be deceived concerning the gods, as if they took any care of men; or that we may not suppose the essence of good consists in anything but in pleasure? > Greek: ἄνθρωπε, τί ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν φροντίζεις, τί διʼ ἡμᾶς ἀγρυπνεῖς, τί λύχνον ἅπτεις, τί ἐπανίστασαι, τί τηλικαῦτα βιβλία συγγράφεις; μή τις ἡμῶν ἐξαπατηθῇ περὶ θεῶν ὡς ἐπιμελουμένων ἀνθρώπων ἢ μή τις ἄλλην οὐσίαν ὑπολάβῃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἡδονήν; [¶33] For if these things be so, lie down and sleep, and lead the life of which you judge yourself worthy,—that of a mere worm. Eat, drink, debauch, snore. > Greek: εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ταῦτα ἔχει, βαλὼν κάθευδε καὶ τὰ τοῦ σκώληκος ποίει, ὧν ἄξιον ἔκρινας σεαυτόν· ἔσθιε καὶ πῖνε καὶ συνουσίαζε καὶ ἀφόδευε καὶ ῥέγκε. [¶34] What is it to you, whether others think rightly or wrongly about these things? For what have you to do with us? You take care of sheep, because they afford their milk, their wool, and at last their flesh. > Greek: τί δὲ σοὶ μέλει, πῶς οἱ ἄλλοι ὑπολήψονται περὶ τούτων, πότερον ὑγιῶς ἢ οὐχ ὑγιῶς; τί γὰρ σοὶ καὶ ἡμῖν; τῶν γὰρ προβάτων σοι μέλει, ὅτι παρέχει ἡμῖν αὑτὰ καρησόμενα καὶ ἀμελχθησόμενα καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον κατακοπησόμενα; [¶35] And would it not be a desirable thing that men might be so lulled and enchanted by the Stoics as to give themselves up to be milked and fleeced by you, and such as you? Should not these doctrines be taught to your brother Epicureans only, and concealed from the rest of the world; > Greek: οὐχὶ δʼ εὐκταῖον ἦν, εἰ ἐδύναντο οἱ ἄνθρωποι κατακηληθέντες καὶ ἐπᾳσθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Στωικῶν ἀπονυστάζειν καὶ παρέχειν σοι καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις καρησομένους καὶ ἀμελχθησομένους ἑαυτούς; [¶36] who should by all means, above all things, be persuaded that we have a natural tie with each other, and that self-command is a good thing, in order that all may be kept safe for you? > Greek: πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς Συνεπικουρείους ἔδει σε ταῦτα λέγειν, οὐχὶ δὲ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, πολὺ μάλιστʼ ἐκείνους πρὸ πάντων ἀναπείθειν, ὅτι φύσει κοινωνικοὶ γεγόναμεν, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἐγκράτεια, ἵνα σοι πάντα τηρῆται; [¶37] Or is this tie to be preserved towards some and not towards others? Towards whom, then, is it to be preserved,—towards such as mutually preserve, or such as violate it? And who violate it more than you, who teach such doctrines? > Greek: ἢ πρός τινας μὲν δεῖ φυλάττειν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν, πρός τινας δʼ οὔ; πρὸς τίνας οὖν δεῖ τηρεῖν; πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιτηροῦντας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς παραβατικῶς αὐτῆς ἔχοντας; καὶ τίνες παραβατικώτερον αὐτῆς ἔχουσιν ὑμῶν τῶν ταῦτα διειληφότων; [¶38] What was it, then, that waked Epicurus from his sleep, and compelled him to write what he did; what else, but that which is of all influences the most powerful among mankind, Nature; which draws every one, however unwilling and reluctant, to its own purposes. > Greek: τί οὖν ἦν τὸ ἐγεῖρον αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων καὶ ἀναγκάζον γράφειν ἃ ἔγραφεν; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ τὸ πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἰσχυρότατον, ἡ φύσις ἕλκουσα ἐπὶ τὸ αὑτῆς βούλημα ἄκοντα καὶ στένοντα; [¶39] For since, she says, you think that there is no tie between mankind, write out this doctrine, and leave it for the use of others; and break your sleep upon that account; > Greek: ὅτι γὰρ δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα τὰ ἀκοινώνητα, γράψον αὐτὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀπόλιπε καὶ ἀγρύπνησον διʼ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργῳ κατήγορος γενοῦ τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων. [¶40] and by your own practice confute your own principles. Do we say that Orestes was roused from sleep because driven by the furies; and was not Epicurus waked by sterner furies and avengers, which would not suffer him to rest, but compelled him to utter his own ills, as wine and madness do the priests of Cybele? > Greek: εἶτα Ὀρέστην μὲν ὑπὸ Ἐρινύων ἐλαυνόμενον φῶμεν ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων ἐξεγείρεσθαι· τούτῳ δʼ οὐ χαλεπώτεραι αἱ Ἐρινύες καὶ Ποιναί; ἐξήγειρον καθεύδοντα καὶ οὐκ εἴων ἠρεμεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἠνάγκαζον ἐξαγγέλλειν τὰ αὑτοῦ κακὰ ὥσπερ τοὺς Γάλλους ἡ μανία καὶ ὁ οἶνος. [¶41] So strong and unconquerable a thing is human nature! For how can a vine have the properties not of a vine, but of an olivetree; or an olive-tree not those of an olive-tree, but of a vine? > Greek: οὕτως ἰσχυρόν τι καὶ ἀνίκητόν ἐστιν ἡ φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη. πῶς γὰρ δύναται ἄμπελος μὴ ἀμπελικῶς κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐλαικῶς, ἢ ἐλαία πάλιν μὴ ἐλαικῶς, ἀλλʼ ἀμπελικῶς; ἀμήχανον, ἀδιανόητον. [¶42] It is impossible. It is inconceivable. Neither, therefore, is it possible for a human creature entirely to lose human affections. > Greek: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδʼ ἄνθρωπον οἷόν τε παντελῶς ἀπολέσαι τὰς κινήσεις τὰς ἀνθρωπικὰς καὶ οἱ ἀποκοπτόμενοι τάς γε προθυμίας τὰς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀποκόψασθαι οὐ δύνανται. [¶43] But even those who have undergone a mutilation cannot have their inclinations also mutilated; and so Epicurus, when he had mutilated all the offices of a man, of a master of a family, of a citizen, and of a friend, did not mutilate the inclinations of humanity; for this he could not do, any more than the idle Academics can throw away or blind their own senses, though this be the point they chiefly labor. > Greek: οὕτως καὶ Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν ἀνδρὸς πάντʼ ἀπεκόψατο καὶ τὰ οἰκοδεσπότου καὶ πολίτου καὶ φίλου, τὰς δὲ προθυμίας τὰς ἀνθρωπικὰς οὐκ ἀπεκόψατο· οὐ γὰρ ἠδύνατο, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ ἀταλαίπωροι Ἀκαδημαικοὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις τὰς αὑτῶν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ ἀποτυφλῶσαι δύνανται καίτοι τοῦτο μάλιστα πάντων ἐσπουδακότες. [¶44] What a misfortune is it, when any one, after having received from Nature standards and rules for the knowledge of truth, does not strive to add to these, and make up their deficiencies; but, on the contrary, endeavors to take away and destroy whatever truth may be known even by them. > Greek: τίς ἢ ἀτυχίας; λαβών τις παρὰ τῆς φύσεως μέτρα καὶ κανόνας εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ προσφιλοτεχνεῖ τούτοις προσθεῖναι καὶ προσεξεργάσασθαι τὰ λείποντα, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον, εἴ τι καὶ ἔχει γνωριστικὸν τῆς ἀληθείας, ἐξαιρεῖν πειρᾶται καὶ ἀπολλύειν. [¶45] What say you, philosopher? What do you think of piety and sanctity? “If you please, I will prove that they are good.” Pray do prove it; that our citizens may be converted, and honor the Deity, and may no longer neglect what is of the highest importance. > Greek: τί λέγεις, φιλόσοφε; τὸ εὐσεβὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ποῖόν τί σοι φαίνεται; ἂν θέλῃς, κατασκευάσω ὅτι ἀγαθόν. ναὶ κατασκεύασον, ἵνʼ οἱ πολῖται ἡμῶν ἐπιστραφέντες τιμῶσι τὸ θεῖον καὶ παύσωνταί ποτε ῥᾳθυμοῦντες περὶ τὰ μέγιστα. ἔχεις οὖν τὰς κατασκευάς; ἔχω καὶ χάριν οἶδα. [¶46] “Do you accept these demonstrations, then?” I have, and I thank you. “Since you are so well pleased with this, then, learn these contrary propositions: that there are no gods, or, if there are, that they take no care of mankind, neither have we any concern with them; that this piety and sanctity, so much talked of by many, are only an imposition of boasting and sophistical men, or perhaps of legislators, for a terror and restraint to injustice.” > Greek: ἐπεὶ οὖν ταῦτά σοι λίαν ἀρέσκει, λάβε τὰ ἐναντία· ὅτι θεοὶ οὔτʼ εἰσίν, εἴ τε καὶ εἰσίν, οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ κοινόν τι ἡμῖν ἐστι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τό τʼ εὐσεβὲς τοῦτο καὶ ὅσιον παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις λαλούμενον κατάψευσμά ἐστιν ἀλαζόνων ἀνθρώπων καὶ σοφιστῶν ἢ νὴ Δία νομοθετῶν εἰς φόβον καὶ ἐπίσχεσιν τῶν ἀδικούντων. [¶47] Well done, philosopher. Our citizens are much the better for you. > Greek: εὖ, φιλόσοφε· ὠφέλησας ἡμῶν τοὺς πολίτας, ἀνεκτήσω τοὺς νέους ῥέποντας ἤδη πρὸς καταφρόνησιν τῶν θείων. [¶48] You have already brought back all the youth to a contempt of the Deity. “What! does not this please you, then? Learn next, that justice is nothing; > Greek: τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀρέσκει σοι ταῦτα; λάβε νῦν, πῶς ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐδέν ἐστιν, πῶς ἡ αἰδὼς μωρία ἐστίν, πῶς πατὴρ οὐδέν ἐστιν, πῶς ὁ υἱὸς οὐδέν ἐστιν. [¶49] that shame is folly; that the paternal relation is nothing; the filial, nothing.” Well said, philosopher; persist, convince the youth; that we may have many more to think and talk like you. By such doctrines as these, no doubt, have our well-governed states flourished! Upon these was Sparta founded! Lycurgus, by his laws and method of education, introduced such persuasions as these: that it is not base to be slaves, rather than honorable; nor honorable to be free, rather than base! They who died at Thermopylae, died from such principles as these! > Greek: εὖ, φιλόσοφε· ἐπίμενε, πεῖθε τοὺς νέους, ἵνα πλείονας ἔχωμεν ταὐτά σοι πεπονθότας καὶ λέγοντας. ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων ηὐξήθησαν ἡμῖν αἱ εὐνομούμεναι πόλεις, Λακεδαίμων διὰ τούτους τοὺς λόγους ἐγένετο, Λυκοῦργος ταῦτα τὰ πείσματα ἐνεποίησεν αὐτοῖς διὰ τῶν νόμων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς παιδείας, ὅτι οὔτε τὸ δουλεύειν αἰσχρόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ἢ καλὸν οὔτε τὸ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καλὸν μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχρόν, οἱ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις ἀποθανόντες διὰ ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα ἀπέθανον, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τὴν πόλιν διὰ ποίους ἄλλους λόγους ἀπέλιπον; [¶50] And from what other doctrines did the Athenians leave their city? And yet they who talk thus marry, and produce children, and engage in public affairs, and get themselves made priests and prophets. Of whom? Of gods that have no existence. And they consult the Pythian priestess, only to hear falsehoods, and interpret the oracles to others. > Greek: εἶτα οἱ λέγοντες ταῦτα γαμοῦσι καὶ παιδοποιοῦνται καὶ πολιτεύονται καὶ ἱερεῖς καθιστᾶσιν αὑτοὺς καὶ προφήτας. τίνων; τῶν οὐκ ὄντων· καὶ τὴν Πυθίαν ἀνακρίνουσιν αὐτοί, ἵνα τὰ ψευδῆ πύθωνται, καὶ ἄλλοις τοὺς χρησμοὺς ἐξηγοῦνται. ὦ μεγάλης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ γοητείας. [¶51] Oh, monstrous impudence and imposture! What are you doing, man? You contradict yourself every day; and you will not give up these paltry cavils. When you eat, where do you put your hand,—to your mouth, or to your eye? When you bathe, where do you go? > Greek: ἄνθρωπε, τί ποιεῖς; αὐτὸς σεαυτὸν ἐξελέγχεις καθʼ ἡμέραν καὶ οὐ θέλεις ἀφεῖναι τὰ ψυχρὰ ταῦτα ἐπιχειρήματα; ἐσθίων ποῦ φέρεις τὴν χεῖρα; εἰς τὸ στόμα ἢ εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμόν; λουόμενος ποῦ ἐμβαίνεις; πότε τὴν χύτραν εἶπες λο[υ]πάδα ἢ τὴν τορύνην ὀβελίσκον; [¶52] Do you ever call a kettle a dish, or a spoon a spit? If I were a servant to one of these gentlemen, were it at the hazard of being flayed every day, I would plague him. “Throw some oil into the bath, boy.” I would take pickle, and pour upon his head. “What is this?” Really, sir, I was impressed by a certain semblance so like oil as not to be distinguished from it. > Greek: εἴ τινος αὐτῶν δοῦλος ἤμην, εἰ καὶ ἔδει με καθʼ ἡμέραν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ ἐκδέρεσθαι, ἐγὼ ἂν αὐτὸν ἐστρέβλουν. βάλε ἐλάδιον, παιδάριον, εἰς τὸ βαλανεῖον. ἔβαλον ἂν γάριον καὶ ἀπελθὼν κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτοῦ κατέχεον. τί τοῦτο; φαντασία μοι ἐγένετο ἐλαίου ἀδιάκριτος, ὁμοιοτάτη, νὴ τὴν σὴν τύχην. [¶53] “Give me the soup.” I would carry him a dish full of vinegar. “Did I not ask for the soup?” Yes, sir; this is the soup. “Is not this vinegar?” Why so, more than soup? “Take it and smell it, take it and taste it.” How do you know, then, but our senses deceive us? > Greek: δὸς ὧδε τὴν πτισάνην. ἤνεγκα ἂν αὐτῷ γεμίσας παροψίδα ὀξογάρου. οὐκ ᾔτησα τὴν πτισάνην; ναὶ κύριε· τοῦτο πτισάνη ἐστίν. τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ὀξόγαρον; τί μᾶλλον ἢ πτισάνη; λάβε καὶ ὀσφράνθητι, λάβε καὶ γεῦσαι. πόθεν οὖν οἶδας, εἰ αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἡμᾶς ψεύδονται; [¶54] If I had three or four fellow-servants to join with me, I would make him either choke with passion and burst, or change his opinions. But now they insult us by making use of the gifts of nature, while in words they destroy them. > Greek: τρεῖς, τέσσαρας τῶν συνδούλων εἰ ἔσχον ὁμονοοῦντας, ἀπάγξασθαι ἂν αὐτὸν ἐποίησα ῥηγνύμενον ἢ μεταθέσθαι. νῦν δʼ ἐντρυφῶσιν ἡμῖν τοῖς μὲν παρὰ τῆς φύσεως διδομένοις πᾶσι χρώμενοι, λόγῳ δʼ αὐτὰ ἀναιροῦντες. [¶55] Those must be grateful and modest men, at least, who, while eating their daily bread, dare to say, “We do not know whether there be any such beings as Demeter, or Core, or Pluto.” > Greek: εὐχάριστοί γʼ ἄνθρωποι καὶ αἰδήμονες. εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο καθʼ ἡμέραν ἄρτους ἐσθίοντες τολμῶσι λέγειν ὅτι οὐκ οἴδαμεν, εἰ ἔστι τις Δημήτηρ ἢ Κόρη ἢ Πλούτων· [¶56] Not to mention that while they possess the blessings of night and day, of the annual seasons, of the stars, the earth, and the sea, they are not the last affected by any of these things; but only study to give out some idle problem, and when they have thus relieved themselves, go and bathe; > Greek: ἵνα μὴ λέγω, ὅτι νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἀπολαύοντες καὶ μεταβολῶν τοῦ ἔτους καὶ ἄστρων καὶ θαλάσσης καὶ γῆς καὶ τῆς παρʼ ἀνθρώπων συνεργ[ε]ίας ὑπʼ οὐδενὸς τούτων οὐδὲ κατὰ ποσὸν ἐπιστρέφονται, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐξεμέσαι τὸ προβλημάτιον ζητοῦσι καὶ τὸν στόμαχον γυμνάσαντες ἀπελθεῖν εἰς βαλανεῖον. [¶57] but take not the least care what they say, nor on what subjects, nor to whom, nor what may be the consequence of their talk,—whether any well-disposed young man, on hearing such doctrines, may not be affected by them, and so affected as entirely to lose the seeds of his good disposition; > Greek: τί δʼ ἐροῦσι καὶ περὶ τίνων ἢ πρὸς τίνας καὶ τί ἔσται αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν λόγων τούτων, οὐδὲ κατὰ βραχὺ πεφροντίκασι· μή τι νέος εὐγενὴς ἀκούσας τῶν λόγων τούτων πάθῃ τι ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἢ καὶ παθὼν πάντʼ ἀπολέσῃ τὰ τῆς εὐγενείας σπέρματα· [¶58] whether they may not furnish an adulterer with occasions of growing shameless in his guilt; whether a public plunderer may not find excuses from these doctrines; whether he, who neglects his parents, may not gain an additional confidence from them. > Greek: μή τινι μοιχεύοντι ἀφορμὰς παράσχωμεν τοῦ ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα· μή τις τῶν νοσφιζομένων τὰ δημόσια εὑρεσιλογίας τινὸς ἐπιλάβηται ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων τούτων· μή τις τῶν αὑτοῦ γονέων ἀμελῶν θράσος τι καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων προσλάβῃ. [¶59] “What things, then, in your opinion, are good and evil, fair and base,—such things, or such things?” But why should one argue any more with such as these, or interchange opinions, or endeavor to convince them? > Greek: τί οὖν κατὰ σὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλόν; ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα; τί οὖν; ἔτι τούτων τις ἀντιλέγει τινὶ ἢ λόγον δίδωσιν ἢ λαμβάνει ἢ μεταπείθειν πειρᾶται; [¶60] By Zeus! one might sooner hope to convince the most unnatural debauchees, than those who are thus deaf and blind to their own ills. > Greek: πολὺ νὴ Δία μᾶλλον τοὺς κιναίδους ἐλπίσαι τις ἂν μεταπείσειν ἢ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀποκεκωφωμένους καὶ ἀποτετυφλωμένους τῶν περὶ αὑτοὺς κακῶν. [¶61] 21. There are some things which men confess with ease, and others with difficulty. No one, for instance, will confess himself a fool or a blockhead; but, on the contrary, you will hear every one say, “wish my fortune were in proportion to my abilities.” But they easily confess themselves fearful, and say, “am somewhat timorous, I confess; but in other respects you will not find me a fool.” No one will easily confess himself intemperate in his desires, upon no account dishonest, nor indeed very envious or meddling; but many confess themselves to have the weakness of being compassionate. What is the reason of all this? The principal reason is an inconsistency and confusion in what relates to good and evil. But different people have different motives, and in general, whatever they imagine to be base, they do not absolutely confess. Fear and compassion they imagine to belong to a well-meaning disposition; but stupidity, to a slave. Offences against society they do not own; but in most faults they are brought to a confession chiefly from imagining that there is something involuntary in them, as in fear and compassion. And though a person should in some measure confess himself intemperate in his desires, he accuses his passion, and expects forgiveness, as for an involuntary fault. But dishonesty is not imagined to be, by any means, involuntary. In jealousy too there is something they suppose involuntary and this likewise, in some degree, they confess. Conversing therefore with such men, thus confused, thus ignorant what they say, and what are or are not their ills, whence they have them, and how they may be delivered from them, it is worth while, I think, to ask one’s self continually, “Am I too one of these? What do I imagine myself to be? How do I conduct myself,—as a prudent, as a temperate man? Do I, too, ever talk at this rate,—that I am sufficiently instructed for what may happen? Have I that persuasion that I know nothing which becomes one who knows nothing? Do I go to a master as to an oracle, prepared to obey; or do I also, like a mere driveller, enter the school only to learn and understand books which I did not understand before, or perhaps to explain them to others?” You have been fighting at home with your manservant; you have turned the house upside-down, and alarmed the neighborhood; and do you come to me with a pompous show of wisdom, and sit and criticise how I explain a sentence, how I prate whatever comes into my head? Do you come, envious and dejected that nothing has come from home for you, and in the midst of the disputations sit thinking on nothing but how your father or your brother may treat you? “What are they saying about me at home? Now they think I am improving, and say, He will come back with universal knowledge. I wish I could learn everything before my return; but this requires much labor, and nobody sends me anything. The baths are very bad at Nicopolis; and things go very ill both at home and here.” After all this, it is said, nobody is the better for the philosophic school. Why, who comes to the school? I mean, who comes to be reformed; who, to submit his principles to correction; who, with a sense of his wants? Why do you wonder, then, that you bring back from the school the very thing you carried there? For you do not come to lay aside, or correct, or change, your principles. How should you? Far from it. Rather consider this, therefore, whether you have not what you have come for. You have come to talk about theorems. Well; and are you not more impertinently talkative than you were? Do not these paltry theorems furnish you with matter for ostentation? Do you not solve convertible and hypothetical syllogisms? Why, then, are you still displeased, if you have the very thing for which you came? “Very true; but if my child or my brother should die; or if I must die or be tortured myself, what good will these things do me?” Why, did you come for this? Did you attend upon me for this? Was it upon any such account that you ever lighted your lamp, or sat up at night? Or did you, when you went into the walk, propose any delusive semblance to your own mind to be discussed, instead of a syllogism? Did any of you ever go through such a subject jointly? And after all, you say, theorems are useless. To whom? To such as apply them ill. For medicines for the eyes are not useless to those who apply them when and as they ought. Fomentations are not useless, dumb-bells are not useless: but they are useless to some, and on the contrary, useful to others. If you should ask me, now, are syllogisms useful? I should answer that they are useful; and, if you please, I will show you how. “Will they be of service to me, then?” Why, did you ask, man, whether they would be useful to you, or in general? If any one in a dysentery should ask me whether acids be useful, I should answer, they are. “Are they useful for me, then?” I say, no. First try to get the flux stopped, and the ulceration healed. Do you too first get your ulcers healed, your fluxes stopped. Quiet your mind, and bring it free from distraction to the school; and then you will know what force there is in reasoning. > Greek: 21. τὰ μὲν ῥᾳδίως ὁμολογοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τὰ δʼ οὐ ῥᾳδίως. οὐδεὶς οὖν ὁμολογήσει ὅτι ἄφρων ἐστὶν ἢ ἀνόητος, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον πάντων ἀκούσεις λεγόντων ὤφελον ὡς φρένας ἔχω οὕτως καὶ τύχην εἶχον. δειλοὺς δὲ ῥᾳδίως ἑαυτοὺς ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ λέγουσιν ἐγὼ δειλότερός εἰμι, ὁμολογῶ· τὰ δʼ ἄλλʼ οὐχ εὑρήσεις με μωρὸν ἄνθρωπον. ἀκρατῆ οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὁμολογήσει τις, ἄδικον οὐδʼ ὅλως, φθονερὸν οὐ πάνυ ἢ περίεργον, ἐλεήμονα οἱ πλεῖστοι. τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον; τὸ μὲν κυριώτατον ἀνομολογία καὶ ταραχὴ ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ἄλλοις δʼ ἄλλα αἴτια καὶ σχεδὸν ὅσα ἂν αἰσχρὰ φαντάζωνται, ταῦτα οὐ πάνυ ὁμολογοῦσι· τὸ δὲ δειλὸν εἶναι εὐγνώμονος ἤθους φαντάζονται καὶ τὸ ἐλεήμονα, τὸ δʼ ἠλίθιον εἶναι παντελῶς ἀνδραπόδου· καὶ τὰ περὶ κοινωνίαν δὲ πλημμελήματα οὐ πάνυ προσίενται. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἁμαρτημάτων κατὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα φέρονται ἐπὶ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν αὐτά, ὅτι φαντάζονταί τι ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἀκούσιον καθάπερ ἐν τῷ δειλῷ καὶ ἐλεήμονι. κἂν ἀκρατῆ που παρομολογῇ τις αὑτόν, ἔρωτα προσέθηκεν, ὥστε συγγνωσθῆναι ὡς ἐπʼ ἀκουσίῳ. τὸ δʼ ἄδικον οὐδαμῶς φαντάζονται ἀκούσιον. ἔνι τι καὶ τῷ ζηλοτύπῳ, ὡς οἴονται, τοῦ ἀκουσίου· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τούτου παρομολογοῦσιν. ἐν οὖν τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις ἀναστρεφόμενον, οὕτως τεταραγμένοις, οὕτως οὐκ εἰδόσιν οὔθʼ ὅ τι λέγουσιν οὔθʼ ὅ τι ἔχουσιν κακὸν ἢ εἰ ἔχουσιν ἢ παρὰ τί ἔχουσιν ἢ πῶς παύσονται αὐτῶν, καὶ αὐτὸν οἶμαι ἐφιστάνειν ἄξιον συνεχὲς μή που καὶ αὐτὸς εἷς εἰμι ἐκείνων; τίνα φαντασίαν ἔχω περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ; πῶς ἐμαυτῷ χρῶμαι; μή τι καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς φρονίμῳ, μή τι καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἐγκρατεῖ; μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς λέγω ποτὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι εἰς τὸ ἐπιὸν πεπαίδευμαι; ἔχω ἣν δεῖ συναίσθησιν τὸν μηδὲν εἰδότα, ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶδα; ἔρχομαι πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ χρηστήρια πείθεσθαι παρεσκευασμένος; ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς κορύζης μεστὸς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν εἰσέρχομαι μόνην τὴν ἱστορίαν μαθησόμενος καὶ τὰ βιβλία νοήσων, ἃ πρότερον οὐκ ἐνόουν, ἂν δʼ οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐξηγησόμενος; ἄνθρωπʼ, ἐν οἴκῳ διαπεπύκτευκας τῷ δουλαρίῳ, τὴν οἰκίαν ἀνάστατον πεποίηκας, τοὺς γείτονας συντετάραχας· καὶ ἔρχῃ μοι καταστολὰς ποιήσας ὡς σοφὸς καὶ καθήμενος κρίνεις, πῶς ἐξηγησάμην τὴν λέξιν, πῶς τί ποτʼ ἐφλυάρησα τὰ ἐπελθόντα μοι; φθονῶν ἐλήλυθας, τεταπεινωμένος, ὅτι σοι ἐξ οἴκου φέρεται οὐδέν, καὶ κάθῃ μεταξὺ λεγομένων τῶν λόγων αὐτὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐνθυμούμενος ἢ πῶς ὁ πατὴρ τὰ πρός σε ἢ πῶς ὁ ἀδελφός; τί λέγουσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ ἄνθρωποι περὶ ἐμοῦ; νῦν οἴονταί με προκόπτειν καὶ λέγουσιν ὅτι ἥξει ἐκεῖνος πάντα εἰδώς. ἤθελόν πώς ποτε πάντα μαθὼν ἐπανελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ πόνου χρεία καὶ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν πέμπει καὶ ἐν Νικοπόλει σαπρῶς λούει τὰ βαλανεῖα καὶ ἐν οἴκῳ κακῶς καὶ ὧδε κακῶς. εἶτα λέγουσιν οὐδεὶς ὠφελεῖται ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς. τίς γὰρ ἔρχεται εἰς σχολήν, τίς γάρ, ὡς θεραπευθησόμενος; τίς ὡς παρέξων αὑτοῦ τὰ δόγματα ἐκκαθαρθησόμενα, τίς συναισθησόμενος τίνων δεῖται; τί οὖν θαυμάζετʼ, εἰ ἃ φέρετʼ εἰς τὴν σχολήν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀποφέρετε πάλιν; οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἀποθησόμενοι ἢ ἐπανορθώσοντες ἢ ἄλλʼ ἀντʼ αὐτῶν ληψόμενοι ἔρχεσθε. πόθεν; οὐδʼ ἐγγύς. ἐκεῖνο γοῦν βλέπετε μᾶλλον, εἰ ἐφʼ ὃ ἔρχεσθε τοῦτο ὑμῖν γίνεται. θέλετε λαλεῖν περὶ τῶν θεωρημάτων. τί οὖν; οὐ φλυαρότεροι γίνεσθε; οὐχὶ δὲ παρέχει τινὰ ὕλην ὑμῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὰ θεωρημάτια; οὐ συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύετε, μεταπίπτοντας; οὐκ ἐφοδεύετε Ψευδομένου λήμματα, ὑποθετικούς; τί οὖν ἔτι ἀγανακτεῖτε εἰ ἐφʼ ἃ πάρεστε, ταῦτα λαμβάνετε; ναί· ἀλλʼ ἂν ἀποθάνῃ μου τὸ παιδίον ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἐμὲ ἀποθνῄσκειν δέῃ ἢ στρεβλοῦσθαι, τί με τὰ τ⟨οι⟩αῦτα ὠφελήσει; μὴ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἦλθες, μὴ γὰρ τούτου ἕνεκά μοι παρακάθησαι, μὴ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτό ποτε λύχνον ἧψας ἢ ἠγρύπνησας; ἢ εἰς τὸν περίπατον ἐξελθὼν προέβαλές ποτε σαυτῷ φαντασίαν τινὰ ἀντὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ταύτην κοινῇ ἐφωδεύσατε; ποῦ ποτε; εἶτα λέγετε ἄχρηστα τὰ θεωρήματα. τίσιν; τοῖς οὐχ ὡς δεῖ χρωμένοις. τὰ γὰρ κολλύρια οὐκ ἄχρηστα τοῖς ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ ἐγχριομένοις, τὰ μαλάγματα δʼ οὐκ ἄχρηστα, οἱ ἁλτῆρες οὐκ ἄχρηστοι, ἀλλὰ τισὶν ἄχρηστοι, τισὶν πάλιν χρήσιμοι. ἄν μου πυνθάνῃ νῦν χρήσιμοί εἰσιν οἱ συλλογισμοί; ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι χρήσιμοι, κἂν θέλῃς, ἀποδείξω, πῶς. ἐμὲ οὖν τι ὠφελήκασιν; ἄνθρωπε, μὴ γὰρ ἐπύθου, εἰ σοὶ χρήσιμοι, ἀλλὰ καθόλου; πυθέσθω μου καὶ ὁ δυσεντερικός, εἰ χρήσιμον ὄξος, ἐρῶ ὅτι χρήσιμον. ἐμοὶ οὖν χρήσιμον; ἐρῶ οὔ. ζήτησον πρῶτον σταλῆναί σου τὸ ῥεῦμα, τὰ ἑλκύδρια ἀπουλωθῆναι. καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἄνδρες, τὰ ἕλκη πρῶτον θεραπεύετε, τὰ ῥεύματα ἐπιστήσατε, ἠρεμήσατε τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἀπερίσπαστον αὐτὴν ἐνέγκατε εἰς τὴν σχολήν· καὶ γνώσεσθε οἵαν ἰσχὺν ὁ λόγος ἔχει. [¶62] 22. To whatever objects a person devotes his attention, these objects he probably loves. Do men ever devote their attention, then, to [what they think] evils? By no means. Or even to things indifferent? > Greek: 22. περὶ ἅ τις ἐσπούδακεν, φιλεῖ ταῦτα εἰκότως. μή τι οὖν περὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐσπουδάκασιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι; οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ μή τι περὶ τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς αὐτούς; οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα. [¶63] No, nor this. It remains, then, that good must be the sole object of their attention; and if of their attention, of their love too. > Greek: ὑπολείπεται τοίνυν περὶ μόνα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐσπουδακέναι αὐτούς· εἰ δʼ ἐσπουδακέναι, καὶ φιλεῖν ταῦτα. [¶64] Whoever, therefore, understands good, is capable likewise of love; and he who cannot distinguish good from evil, and things indifferent from both, how is it possible that he can love? The wise person alone, then, is capable of loving. “How so? > Greek: ὅστις οὖν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, οὗτος ἂν καὶ φιλεῖν εἰδείη· ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος διακρῖναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τὰ οὐδέτερα ἀπʼ ἀμφοτέρων πῶς ἂν ἔτι οὗτος φιλεῖν δύναιτο; τοῦ φρονίμου τοίνυν ἐστὶ μόνου τὸ φιλεῖν. [¶65] I am not this wise person, yet I love my child.” > Greek: καὶ πῶς; φησίν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἄφρων ὢν ὅμως φιλῶ μου τὸ παιδίον. [¶66] I protest it surprises me that you should, in the first place, confess yourself unwise. For in what are you deficient? Have not you the use of your senses? Do you not distinguish the semblances of things? Do you not provide such food and clothing and habitation as are suitable to you? > Greek: — θαυμάζω μὲν νὴ τοὺς θεούς, πῶς καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡμολόγηκας ἄφρονα εἶναι σεαυτόν. τί γάρ σοι λείπει; οὐ χρῇ αἰσθήσει, οὐ φαντασίας διακρίνεις, οὐ τροφὰς προσφέρῃ τὰς ἐπιτηδείους τῷ σώματι, οὐ σκέπην, οὐκ οἴκησιν; [¶67] Why then do you confess that you want wisdom? In truth, because you are often struck and disconcerted by semblances, and their speciousness gets the better of you; and hence you sometimes suppose the very same things to be good, then evil, and lastly, neither; and, in a word, you grieve, you fear, you envy, you are disconcerted, you change. > Greek: πόθεν οὖν ὁμολογεῖς ἄφρων εἶναι; ὅτι νὴ Δία πολλάκις ἐξίστασαι ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ ταράττῃ καὶ ἡττῶσίν σε αἱ πιθανότητες αὐτῶν· καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ὑπολαμβάνεις, εἶτα ἐκεῖνα αὐτὰ κακά, ὕστερον δʼ οὐδέτερα· καὶ ὅλως λυπῇ, φοβῇ, φθονεῖς, ταράσσῃ, μεταβάλλῃ· διὰ ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖς ἄφρων εἶναι. [¶68] Is it from this that you confess yourself unwise? And are you not changeable too in love? Riches, pleasure, in short, the very same things, you sometimes esteem good, and at other times evil. And do you not esteem the same persons too alternately as good and bad, at one time treating them with kindness, at another with enmity; at one time commending, and at another censuring them? > Greek: ἐν δὲ τῷ φιλεῖν οὐ μεταβάλλῃ; ἀλλὰ πλοῦτον μὲν καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ ἁπλῶς αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ὑπολαμβάνεις εἶναι, ποτὲ δὲ κακά· ἀνθρώπους δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς οὐχὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθούς, ποτὲ δὲ κακοὺς καὶ ποτὲ μὲν οἰκείως ἔχεις, ποτὲ δʼ ἐχθρῶς αὐτοῖς καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐπαινεῖς, ποτὲ δὲ ψέγεις; — ναὶ καὶ ταῦτα πάσχω. [¶69] “Yes. This too is the case with me.” Well, then; can he who is deceived in another be his friend, think you? “No, surely.” Or does he who loves him with a changeable affection bear him genuine good-will? “Nor he, neither.” > Greek: — τί οὖν; ὁ ἐξηπατημένος περί τινος δοκεῖ σοι φίλος εἶναι αὐτοῦ; — οὐ πάνυ. — οὐδʼ ὁ μεταπτώτως ἑλόμενος αὐτὸν εἶναι εὔνους αὐτῷ; — οὐδʼ οὗτος. — ὁ δὲ νῦν λοιδορῶν μέν τινα, ὕστερον δὲ θαυμάζων; [¶70] Or he who now vilifies, then admires him? “Nor he.” Do you not often see little dogs caressing and playing with each other, so that you would say nothing could be more friendly? But to learn what this friendship is, throw a bit of meat between them, and you will see. > Greek: — οὐδʼ οὗτος. — τί οὖν; κυνάρια οὐδέποτʼ εἶδες σαίνοντα καὶ προσπαίζοντα ἀλλήλοις, ἵνʼ εἴπῃς οὐδὲν φιλικώτερον; ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἴδῃς, τί ἐστι φιλία, βάλε κρέας εἰς μέσον καὶ γνώσῃ. [¶71] Do you too throw a bit of an estate betwixt you and your son, and you will see that he will quickly wish you under ground, and you him; and then you, no doubt, on the other hand will exclaim, What a son have I brought up! > Greek: βάλε καὶ σοῦ καὶ τοῦ παιδίου μέσον ἀγρίδιον καὶ γνώσῃ, πῶς σὲ τὸ παιδίον ταχέως κατορύξαι θέλει καὶ σὺ τὸ παιδίον εὔχῃ ἀποθανεῖν. εἶτα σὺ πάλιν οἷον ἐξέθρεψα τεκνίον· πάλαι ἐκφέρει. [¶72] He would bury me alive! Throw in a pretty girl, and the old fellow and the young one will both fall in love with her; or let fame or danger intervene, the words of the father of Admetus will be yours:— You love to see the light. Doth not your father? > Greek: βάλε κορασίδιον κομψὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ὁ γέρων φίλει κἀκεῖνος ὁ νέος· ἂν δέ, δοξάριον. ἂν δὲ κινδυνεῦσαι δέῃ, ἐρεῖς τὰς φωνὰς τὰς τοῦ Ἀδμήτου πατρός· [χαίρεις ὁρῶν φῶς, πατέρα δʼ οὐ χαίρειν δοκεῖς;] θέλεις βλέπειν φῶς, πατέρα δʼ οὐ θέλειν δοκεῖς; [¶73] You fain would still behold it. Would not he? The second line, as quoted by Epictetus, is not found in the received editions. Pheres, the father of Admetus, is defending himself for not consenting to die in place of his son.—H. > Greek: οἴει ὅτι ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐφίλει τὸ ἴδιον παιδίον, ὅτε μικρὸν ἦν, οὐδὲ πυρέσσοντος αὐτοῦ ἠγωνία οὐδʼ ἔλεγεν πολλάκις ὅτι ὤφελον ἐγὼ μᾶλλον ἐπύρεσσον; εἶτα ἐλθόντος τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἐγγίσαντος ὅρα οἵας φωνὰς ἀφιᾶσιν. [¶74] Do you suppose that he did not love his own child when it was little; that he was not in agonies when it had a fever, and often wished to undergo that fever in its stead? But, after all, when the trial comes home, you see what expressions he uses. Were not Eteocles and Polynices born of the same mother and of the same father? Were they not brought up, and did they not live and eat and sleep, together? > Greek: ὁ Ἐτεοκλῆς καὶ ὁ Πολυνείκης οὐκ ἦσαν ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς μητρὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρός; οὐκ ἦσαν συντεθραμμένοι, συμβεβιωκότες, συμπεπωκότες, συγκεκοιμημένοι, πολλάκις ἀλλήλους καταπεφιληκότες; ὥστʼ εἴ τις οἶμαι εἶδεν αὐτούς, κατεγέλασεν ἂν τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐφʼ οἷς περὶ φιλίας παραδοξολογοῦσιν. [¶75] Did not they kiss and fondle each other? So that any one, who saw them, would have laughed at all the paradoxes which philosophers utter about love. And yet when a kingdom, like a bit of meat, was thrown betwixt them, see what they say,— Polynices: Where wilt thou stand before the towers? > Greek: ἀλλʼ ἐμπεσούσης εἰς τὸ μέσον ὥσπερ κρέως τῆς τυραννίδος ὅρα οἷα λέγουσι· ποῦ ποτε στήσῃ πρὸ πύργων; — ὡς τί μʼ ἐρωτᾷς τῷδʼ; — ἀντιτάξομαι κτενῶν σε. — κἀμὲ τοῦδʼ ἔρως ἔχει. καὶ εὔχονται εὐχὰς τοιάσδε. [¶76] Eteocles: Why askest thou this of me? Pol.: I will oppose myself to thee, to slay thee. Et.: Me too the desire of this seizes. Such are the prayers they offer. Be not therefore deceived. No living being is held by anything so strongly as by its own needs. > Greek: καθόλου γὰρ — μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθε — πᾶν ζῷον οὐδενὶ οὕτως ᾠκείωται ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ συμφέροντι. ὅ τι ἂν οὖν πρὸς τοῦτο φαίνηται αὐτῷ ἐμποδίζειν, ἄν τʼ ἀδελφὸς ᾖ τοῦτο ἄν τε πατὴρ ἄν τε τέκνον ἄν τʼ ἐρώμενος ἄν τʼ ἐραστής, μισεῖ, προβάλλεται, καταρᾶται. [¶77] Whatever therefore appears a hindrance to these, be it brother or father or child or mistress or friend, is hated, abhorred, execrated; > Greek: οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως φιλεῖν πέφυκεν ὡς τὸ αὑτοῦ συμφέρον· τοῦτο πατὴρ καὶ ἀδελφὸς καὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ πατρὶς καὶ θεός. [¶78] for by nature it loves nothing like its own needs. This motive is father and brother and family and country and God. Whenever, therefore, the gods seem to hinder this, we vilify even them, and throw down their statues, and burn their temples; > Greek: ὅταν γοῦν εἰς τοῦτο ἐμποδίζειν ἡμῖν οἱ θεοὶ δοκῶσιν, κἀκείνους λοιδοροῦμεν καὶ τὰ ἱδρύματα αὐτῶν καταστρέφομεν καὶ τοὺς ναοὺς ἐμπιπρῶμεν, ὥσπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐκέλευσεν ἐμπρησθῆναι τὰ Ἀσκλήπεια ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἐρωμένου. [¶79] as Alexander ordered the temple of Esculapius to be burnt, because he had lost the man he loved. When, therefore, any one identifies his interest with those of sanctity, virtue, country, parents, and friends, all these are secured; but whenever he places his interest in anything else than friends, country, family, and justice, then these all give way, borne down by the weight of self-interest. > Greek: διὰ τοῦτο ἂν μὲν ἐν ταὐτῷ τις θῇ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ πατρίδα καὶ γονεῖς καὶ φίλους, σῴζεται ταῦτα πάντα· ἂν δʼ ἀλλαχοῦ μὲν τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον, οἴχεται πάντα ταῦτα καταβαρούμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος.