---
title: "Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν"
author: "Epictetus"
translator: "Thomas Wentworth Higginson"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 13 of 23
url: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/13/
cite: "Epictetus, tr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν, section 13. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/13/"
---

# Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν

*Epictetus, tr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson*

A former slave’s lessons in Stoic freedom, taken down by his pupil Arrian.

> Greek: ed. Heinrich Schenkl, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0557.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Thomas Wentworth Higginson, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0557.tlg001.perseus-eng4). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 13. Book III · chapters 1–5

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/13/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/13/#p-N

[¶0] 1. A certain young rhetorician coming to him with his hair too elaborately ornamented, and his dress very fine, Tell me, said Epictetus, whether you do not think some horses and dogs beautiful and so of all other animals. “I do.” Are some men, then, likewise beautiful, and others deformed?

> Greek: 1. εἰσιόντος τινὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν νεανίσκου ῥητορικοῦ περιεργότερον ἡρμοσμένου τὴν κόμην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην περιβολὴν κατακοσμοῦντος Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, εἰ οὐ δοκοῦσίν σοι κύνες τʼ εἶναι καλοί τινες καὶ ἵπποι καὶ οὕτως τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἕκαστον;

[¶1] “Certainly.” Do we pronounce all these beautiful the same way, then, or each in some way peculiar to itself? You will judge of it by this;

> Greek: — δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ μὲν καλοί, οἱ δʼ αἰσχροί; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — πότερον οὖν κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἕκαστα τούτων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει καλὰ προσαγορεύομεν ἢ ἰδίως ἕκαστον; οὕτως δʼ ὄψει αὐτό.

[¶2] since we see a dog naturally formed for one thing, a horse for another, and a nightingale, for instance, for another, therefore, in general, it will be correct to pronounce each of them beautiful so far as it is developed suitably to its own nature; but since the nature of each is different, I think each of them must be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so? “Agreed.” Then what makes a dog beautiful makes a horse deformed, and what makes a horse beautiful makes a dog deformed, if their natures are different.

> Greek: ἐπειδὴ πρὸς ἄλλο μὲν ὁρῶμεν κύνα πεφυκότα, πρὸς ἄλλο[ν] δʼ ἵππον, πρὸς ἄλλο δʼ εἰ οὕτως τύχοι ἀηδόνα, καθόλου μὲν οὐκ ἀτόπως ἀποφήναιτʼ ἄν τις ἕκαστον τηνικαῦτα καλὸν εἶναι, ὁπότε κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν κράτιστʼ ἔχοι· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ φύσις ἑκάστου διάφορός ἐστιν, διαφόρως εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν καλόν· ἢ γὰρ οὔ;

[¶3] “So it seems.” For, I suppose, what makes a good Pancratiast makes no good wrestler, and a very ridiculous racer;

> Greek: — ὡμολόγει. — οὐκ οὖν ὅπερ κύνα ποιεῖ καλόν, τοῦτο ἵππον αἰσχρόν, ὅπερ δʼ ἵππον καλόν, τοῦτο κύνα αἰσχρόν, εἴ γε διάφοροι αἱ φύσεις εἰσὶν αὐτῶν;

[¶4] and the very same person who appears well as a Pentathlete might make a very ill figure in wrestling. “Very true.” What, then, makes a man beautiful? Is it on the same principle that a dog or a horse is beautiful?

> Greek: — ἔοικεν. — καὶ γὰρ τὸ παγκρατιαστὴν οἶμαι ποιοῦν καλὸν τοῦτο παλαιστὴν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ, δρομέα δὲ καὶ γελοιότατον· καὶ ὁ πρὸς πενταθλίαν καλὸς ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος πρὸς πάλην αἴσχιστος; — οὕτως, ἔφη.

[¶5] “The same.” What is it, then, that makes a dog beautiful? “That excellence which belongs to a dog.” What a horse? “The excellence of a horse.” What a man? Must it not be the excellence belonging to a man? If, then, you would appear beautiful, young man, strive for human excellence.

> Greek: — τί οὖν ποιεῖ ἄνθρωπον καλὸν ἢ ὅπερ τῷ γένει καὶ κύνα καὶ ἵππον; — τοῦτο, ἔφη. — τί οὖν ποιεῖ κύνα καλόν; ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ κυνὸς παροῦσα. τί ἵππον; ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἵππου παροῦσα. τί οὖν ἄνθρωπον; μή ποθʼ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἀνθρώπου παροῦσα;

[¶6] “What is that?” Consider whom you praise, when unbiassed by partiality;

> Greek: καὶ σὺ οὖν εἰ θέλεις καλὸς εἶναι, νεανίσκε, τοῦτο ἐκπόνει, τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἀνθρωπικήν.

[¶7] is it the honest or dishonest? “The honest.” The sober or the dissolute? “The sober.” The temperate or the intemperate? “The temperate.” Then, if you make yourself such a character, you know that you will make yourself beautiful; but while you neglect these things, though you use every contrivance to appear beautiful, you must necessarily be deformed.

> Greek: — τίς δʼ ἐστὶν αὕτη; — ὅρα, τίνας αὐτὸς ἐπαινεῖς, ὅταν δίχα πάθους τινὰς ἐπαινῇς· πότερα τοὺς δικαίους ἢ τοὺς ἀδίκους; — τοὺς δικαίους. — πότερον τοὺς σώφρονας ἢ τοὺς ἀκολάστους; — τοὺς σώφρονας. — τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς δʼ ἢ τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς; — τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς.

[¶8] I know not how to say anything further to you; for if I speak what I think, you will be vexed, and perhaps go away and return no more.

> Greek: — οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτόν τινα ποιῶν σαυτὸν ἴσθι ὅτι καλὸν ποιήσεις· μέχρις δʼ ἂν τούτων ἀμελῇς, αἰσχρόν σʼ εἶναι ἀνάγκη, κἂν πάντα μηχανᾷ ὑπὲρ τοῦ φαίνεσθαί σε καλόν.

[¶9] And if I do not speak, consider what I am doing. You come to me to be improved, and I do not improve you; and you come to me as to a philosopher, and I do not speak like a philosopher. Besides, how could it be consistent with my duty towards yourself, to pass you by as incorrigible?

> Greek: ἐντεῦθεν οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι πῶς εἴπω· ἄν τε γὰρ λέγω ἃ φρονῶ, ἀνιάσω σε καὶ ἐξελθὼν τάχα οὐδʼ εἰσελεύσῃ· ἄν τε μὴ λέγω, ὅρα οἷον ποιήσω, εἰ σὺ μὲν ἔρχῃ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὠφεληθησόμενος, ἐ[ρ]γὼ δʼ οὐκ ὠφελήσω σʼ οὐδέν, καὶ σὺ μὲν ὡς πρὸς φιλόσοφον, ἐγὼ δʼ οὐδὲν ἐρῶ σοι ὡς φιλόσοφος.

[¶10] If, hereafter, you should come to have sense, you will accuse me with reason: “What did Epictetus observe in me, that, when he saw me come to him in such a shameful condition, he overlooked it, and never said so much as a word about it?

> Greek: πῶς δὲ καὶ ὠμόν ἐστι πρὸς αὐτόν σε τὸ περιιδεῖν ἀνεπανόρθωτον ἄν ποθʼ ὕστερον φρένας σχῇς, εὐλόγως μοι ἐγκαλέσεις·

[¶11] Did he so absolutely despair of me? Was I not young? Was I not able to hear reason?

> Greek: τί εἶδεν ἐν ἐμοὶ ὁ Ἐπίκτητος, ἵνα βλέπων με τοιοῦτον εἰσερχόμενον πρὸς αὐτὸν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἔχοντα περιίδῃ καὶ μηδέποτε μηδὲ ῥῆμα εἴπῃ;

[¶12] How many young men, at that age, are guilty of many such errors! I am told of one Polemo, who, from a most dissolute youth, became totally changed.

> Greek: οὕτως μου ἀπέγνω; νέος οὐκ ἤμην; οὐκ ἤμην λόγου ἀκουστικός; πόσοι δʼ ἄλλοι νέοι ἐφʼ ἡλικίας πολλὰ τοιαῦτα διαμαρτάνουσιν;

[¶13] Suppose he did not think I should become a Polemo, he might nevertheless have set my locks to rights, he might have stripped off my bracelets and rings, he might have prevented my depilating my person. But when he saw me dressed like a—what shall I say?-he was silent.” I do not say like what;

> Greek: τινά ποτʼ ἀκούω Πολέμωνα ἐξ ἀκολαστοτάτου νεανίσκου τοσαύτην μεταβολὴν μεταβαλεῖν. ἔστω, οὐκ ᾤετό με Πολέμωνα ἔσεσθαι· τὴν μὲν κόμην ἠδύνατό μου διορθῶσαι, τὰ μὲν περιάμματά μου περιελεῖν, ψιλούμενόν με παῦσαι ἠδύνατο, ἀλλὰ βλέπων με — τίνος εἴπω; — σχῆμα ἔχοντα ἐσιώπα.

[¶14] when you come to your senses, you will say it yourself, and will know what it is, and who they are who adopt such a dress. If you should hereafter lay this to my charge, what excuse could I make? “Ay;

> Greek: ἐγὼ οὐ λέγω, τίνος ἐστὶ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦτο· σὺ δʼ αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς τόθʼ, ὅταν εἰς σαυτὸν ἔλθῃς, καὶ γνώσει, οἷόν ἐστι καὶ τίνες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι.

[¶15] but if I do speak, he will not regard me.” Why, did Laius regard Apollo Did not he go and get intoxicated, and bid farewell to the oracle? What then? Did this hinder Apollo from telling him the truth? Now, I am uncertain whether you will regard me or not;

> Greek: τοῦτό μοι ὕστερον ἂν ἐγκαλῇς, τί ἕξω ἀπολογήσασθαι; ναί· ἀλλʼ ἐρῶ καὶ οὐ πεισθήσεται. τῷ γὰρ Ἀπόλλωνι ἐπείσθη ὁ Λάιος; οὐκ ἀπελθὼν καὶ μεθυσθεὶς χαίρειν εἶπεν τῷ χρησμῷ; τί οὖν; παρὰ τοῦτο οὐκ εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀπόλλων τὰς ἀληθείας;

[¶16] but Apollo positively knew that Laius would not regard him, and yet he spoke. And why did he speak? You may as well ask, why is he Apollo; why doth he deliver oracles;

> Greek: καίτοι ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα οὔτʼ εἰ πεισθήσῃ μοι οὔτʼ εἰ μή· ἐκεῖνος δʼ ἀκριβέστατα ᾔδει, ὅτι οὐ πεισθήσεται, καὶ ὅμως εἶπεν.

[¶17] why hath he placed himself in such a post as a prophet, and the fountain of truth, to whom the inhabitants of the world should resort? Why is “know thyself” inscribed on the front of his temple, when no one heeds it? Did Socrates prevail upon all who came to him, to take care of themselves? Not upon the thousandth part;

> Greek: — διὰ τί δʼ εἶπεν; — διὰ τί δὲ Ἀπόλλων ἐστίν; διὰ τί δὲ χρησμῳδεῖ; διὰ τί δʼ εἰς ταύτην τὴν χώραν ἑαυτὸν κατατέταχεν, ὥστε μάντις εἶναι καὶ πηγὴ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔρχεσθαι τοὺς ἐκ τῆς οἰκουμένης; διὰ τί δὲ προγέγραπται τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν μηδενὸς αὐτὸ νοοῦντος;

[¶18] but being, as he himself declares, divinely appointed to such a post, he never deserted it. What said he even to his judges? “If you would acquit me, on condition that I should no longer act as I do now, I would not accept it, nor desist;

> Greek: Σωκράτης πάντας ἔπειθε τοὺς προσιό ντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἑαυτῶν; οὐδὲ τὸ χιλιοστὸν μέρος. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐπειδὴ εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου, ὥς φησιν αὐτός, κατετάχθη, μηκέτι ἐξέλιπεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς τί λέγει;

[¶19] but I will accost all I meet, whether young or old, and interrogate them in just the same manner; but particularly you, my fellow-citizens, since you are more nearly related to me.” “Are you so curious and officious, Socrates? What is it to you, how we act?” “What say you?

> Greek: ἄν μʼ ἀφῆτε, φησίν, ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἵνα μηκέτι ταῦτα πράσσω ἃ νῦν, οὐκ ἀνέξομαι οὐδʼ ἀνήσω· ἀλλὰ καὶ νέῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ τῷ ἐντυγχάνοντι προσελθὼν πεύσομαι ταῦτα ἃ καὶ νῦν πυνθάνομαι, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ὑμῶν, φησί, τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅτι ἐγγυτέρω μου γένει ἐστέ.

[¶20] While you are of the same community and the same kindred with me, will you be careless of yourself, and show yourself a bad citizen to the city, a bad kinsman to your kindred, and a bad neighbor to your neighborhood?” “Why, who are you?” Here one ought nobly to say, “am he who ought to take care of mankind.”

> Greek: οὕτως περίεργος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ πολυπράγμων; τί δέ σοι μέλει, τί ποιοῦμεν; οἷον καὶ λέγεις; κοινωνός μου ὢν καὶ συγγενὴς ἀμελεῖς σεαυτοῦ καὶ τῇ πόλει παρέχεις πολίτην κακὸν καὶ τοῖς συγγενέσι συγγενῆ καὶ τοῖς γείτοσι γείτονα.

[¶21] For it is not every little paltry heifer that dares resist the lion; but if the bull should come up, and resist him, would you say to him, “Who are you? What business is it of yours?” In every species, man, there is some one quality which by nature excels,—in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses.

> Greek: σὺ οὖν τίς εἶ; ἐνταῦθα μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὗτός εἰμι, ᾧ δεῖ μέλειν ἀνθρώπων. οὐδὲ γὰρ λέοντι τὸ τυχὸν βοίδιον τολμᾷ ἀντιστῆναι αὐτῷ· ἂν δʼ ὁ ταῦρος προσελθὼν ἀνθίστηται, λέγε αὐτῷ, ἄν σοι δόξῃ[ς], σὺ δὲ τίς εἶ; καὶ τί σοὶ μέλει;

[¶22] Do not say to whatever excels, “Who are you?” If you do, it will, somehow or other, find a voice to tell you, “am like the purple thread in a garment. Do not expect me to be like the rest; nor find fault with my nature, which has distinguished me from others.” “What, then; am I such a one? How should I be?” Indeed, are you such a one as to be able to hear the truth? I wish you were.

> Greek: ἄνθρωπε, ἐν παντὶ γένει φύεταί τι ἐξαίρετον· ἐν βουσίν, ἐν κυσίν, ἐν μελίσσαις, ἐν ἵπποις. μὴ δὴ λέγε τῷ ἐξαιρέτῳ σὺ οὖν τί εἶ; εἰ δὲ μή, ἐρεῖ σοι φωνήν ποθεν λαβὸν ἐγώ εἰμι τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐν ἱματίῳ πορφύρα· μή μʼ ἀξίου ὅμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἢ τῇ φύσει μου μέμφου, ὅτι με διαφέροντα παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐποίησεν.

[¶23] But, however, since I am condemned to wear a gray beard and a cloak, and you come to me as a philosopher, I will not treat you cruelly, nor as if I despaired of you; but will ask you, Who is it, young man, whom you would render beautiful? Know, first, who you are; and then adorn yourself accordingly. You are a human being; that is, a mortal animal, capable of a rational use of things as they appear.

> Greek: τί οὖν; ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος; πόθεν; σὺ γὰρ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἀκούειν τἀληθῆ; ὤφελεν. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐπεί πως κατεκρίθην πώγωνα ἔχειν πολιὸν καὶ τρίβωνα καὶ σὺ εἰσέρχῃ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὡς πρὸς φιλόσοφον, οὐ χρήσομαί σοι ὠμῶς οὐδʼ ἀπογνωστικῶς, ἀλλʼ ἐρῶ· νεανίσκε, τίνα θέλεις καλὸν ποιεῖν; γνῶθι πρῶτον τίς εἶ καὶ οὕτως κόσμει σεαυτόν.

[¶24] And what is this rational use? A perfect conformity to Nature. What have you, then, particularly excellent? Is it the animal part? No. The mortal? No. That which is capable of the mere use of these things? No.

> Greek: ἄνθρωπος εἶ· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ θνητὸν ζῷον χρηστικὸν φαντασίαις λογικῶς. τὸ δὲ λογικῶς τί ἐστιν; φύσει ὁμολογουμένως καὶ τελέως. τί οὖν ἐξαίρετον ἔχεις; τὸ ζῷον; οὔ. τὸ θνητόν; οὔ. τὸ χρηστικὸν φαντασίαις;

[¶25] The excellence lies in the rational part. Adorn and beautify this; but leave your hair to him who formed it as he thought good.

> Greek: οὔ. τὸ λογικὸν ἔχεις ἐξαίρετον· τοῦτο κόσμει καὶ καλλώπιζε· τὴν κόμην δʼ ἄφες τῷ πλάσαντι ὡς αὐτὸς ἠθέλησεν.

[¶26] Well, what other appellations have you? Are you a man or a woman? A man. Then adorn yourself as a man, not as a woman. A woman is naturally smooth and delicate, and if hairy, is a monster, and shown among the monsters at Rome.

> Greek: ἄγε, τίνας ἄλλας ἔχεις προσηγορίας; ἀνὴρ εἶ ἢ γυνή; — ἀνήρ. — ἄνδρα οὖν καλλώπιζε, μὴ γυναῖκα. ἐκείνη φύσει λεία γέγονε καὶ τρυφερά· κἂν ἔχῃ τρίχας πολλάς, τέρας ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέρασιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ δείκνυται.

[¶27] It is the same thing in a man not to be hairy; and if he is by nature not so, he is a monster. But if he depilates himself, what shall we do with him? Where shall we show him, and how shall we advertise him? “man to be seen, who would rather be a woman.” What a scandalous show!

> Greek: τοῦτο δʼ ἐπʼ ἀνδρός ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἔχειν· κἂν μὲν φύσει μὴ ἔχῃ, τέρας ἐστίν, ἂν δʼ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἐκκόπτῃ καὶ ἀποτίλλῃ, τί αὐτὸν ποιήσωμεν; ποῦ αὐτὸν δείξωμεν καὶ τί προγράψωμεν; δείξω ὑμῖν ἄνδρα, ὃς θέλει μᾶλλον γυνὴ εἶναι ἢ ἀνήρ.

[¶28] Who would not wonder at such an advertisement? I believe, indeed, that these very persons themselves would; not apprehending that it is the very thing of which they are guilty. Of what have you to accuse your nature, sir, that it has made you a man?

> Greek: ὦ δεινοῦ θεάματος· οὐδεὶς οὐχὶ θαυμάσει τὴν προγραφήν· νὴ τὸν Δία, οἶμαι ὅτι αὐτοὶ οἱ τιλλόμενοι οὐ παρακολουθοῦντες, ὅτι τοῦτʼ αὐτό ἐστιν, ὃ ποιοῦσιν, ποιοῦσιν. ἄνθρωπε, τί ἔχεις ἐγκαλέσαι σου τῇ φύσει;

[¶29] Why, were all to be born women, then? In that case what would have been the use of your finery? For whom would you have made yourself fine, if all were women?

> Greek: ὅτι σε ἄνδρα ἐγέννησεν; τί οὖν; πάσας ἔδει γυναῖκας γεννῆσαι; καὶ τί ἂν ὄφελος ἦν σοι τοῦ κοσμεῖσθαι; τίνι ἂν ἐκοσμοῦ, εἰ πάντες ἦσαν γυναῖκες;

[¶30] But the whole affair displeases you. Go to work upon the whole, then. Remove your manhood itself and make yourself a woman entirely, that we may be no longer deceived, nor you be half man, half woman. To whom would you be agreeable,—to the women? Be agreeable to them as a man.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀρέσκει σοι τὸ πραγμάτιον· ὅλον διʼ ὅλων αὐτὸ ποίησον· ἆρον — τί ποτʼ ἐκεῖνο; — τὸ αἴτιον τῶν τριχῶν· ποίησον εἰς ἅπαντα σαυτὸν γυναῖκα, ἵνα μὴ πλανώμεθα, μὴ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ ἀνδρός, τὸ δʼ ἥμισυ γυναικός.

[¶31] “Ay; but they are pleased with fops.” Go hang yourself. Suppose they were pleased with every debauchery, would you consent? Is this your business in life?

> Greek: τίνι θέλεις ἀρέσαι; τοῖς γυναικαρίοις; ὡς ἀνὴρ αὐτοῖς ἄρεσον. ναί· ἀλλὰ τοῖς λείοις χαίρουσιν. οὐκ ἀπάγξῃ; καὶ εἰ τοῖς κιναίδοις ἔχαιρον, ἐγένου ἂν κίναιδος;

[¶32] Were you born to please dissolute women?

> Greek: τοῦτό σοι τὸ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐγεννήθης, ἵνα σοι αἱ γυναῖκες αἱ ἀκόλαστοι χαίρωσιν;

[¶33] Shall we make such a one as you, in the Corinthian republic for instance, governor of the city, master of the youth, commander of the army, or director of the public games? Will you pursue the same practices when you are married?

> Greek: τοιοῦτόν σε θῶμεν πολίτην Κορινθίων, κἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, ἀστυνόμον ἢ ἐφήβαρχον ἢ στρατηγὸν ἢ ἀγωνοθέτην;

[¶34] For whom, and for what? Will you be the father of children, and introduce them into the state, such as yourself? Oh, what a fine citizen, and senator, and orator! Surely, young man, we ought to pray for a succession of young men disposed and bred like you!

> Greek: ἄγε καὶ γαμήσας τίλλεσθαι μέλλεις; τίνι καὶ ἐπὶ τί; καὶ παιδία ποιήσας εἶτα κἀκεῖνα τιλλόμενα ἡμῖν εἰσάξεις εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα; καλὸς πολίτης καὶ βουλευτὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ. τοιούτους δεῖ νέους εὔχεσθαι ἡμῖν φύεσθαι καὶ ἀνατρέφεσθαι;

[¶35] Now, when you have once heard this discourse, go home and say to yourself, It is not Epictetus who has told me all these things,—for how should he?—but some propitious god through him; for it would never have entered the head of Epictetus, who is not used to dispute with any one. Well, let us obey God then, that we may not incur the Divine displeasure.

> Greek: μή, τοὺς θεούς σοι, νεανίσκε· ἀλλʼ ἅπαξ ἀκούσας τῶν λόγων τούτων ἀπελθὼν σαυτῷ εἰπὲ ταῦτά μοι Ἐπίκτητος οὐκ εἴρηκεν· πόθεν γὰρ ἐκείνῳ; ἀλλὰ θεός τίς ποτʼ εὐμενὴς διʼ ἐκείνου. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐπῆλθεν Ἐπικτήτῳ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν οὐκ εἰωθότι λέγειν πρὸς οὐδένα. ἄγε οὖν τῷ θεῷ πεισθῶμεν, ἵνα μὴ θεοχόλωτοι ὦμεν.

[¶36] If a crow has signified anything to you by his croaking, it is not the crow that signifies it, but God through him. And if you have anything signified to you through the human voice, doth he not cause that man to tell it to you, that you may know the Divine power which acts thus variously, and signifies the greatest and principal things through the noblest messenger?

> Greek: οὔ· ἀλλʼ ἂν μὲν κόραξ κραυγάζων σημαίνῃ σοί τι, οὐχ ὁ κόραξ ἐστὶν ὁ σημαίνων, ἀλλʼ ὁ θεὸς διʼ αὐτοῦ· ἂν δὲ διʼ ἀνθρωπίνης φωνῆς σημαίνῃ τι, τὸν ἄνθρωπον ποιήσει λέγειν σοι ταῦτα, ἵνʼ ἀγνοῇς τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ δαιμονίου, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν οὕτως, τοῖς δʼ ἐκείνως σημαίνει, περὶ δὲ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ κυριωτάτων διὰ καλλίστου ἀγγέλου σημαίνει;

[¶37] What else does the poet mean, when he says,—
Since we forewarned him,
Sending forth Hermes. watchful Argicide,
Neither to slay, nor woo another’s wife.
Hermes, descending from heaven, was to warn him.

> Greek: τί ἐστιν ἄλλο, ὃ λέγει ὁ ποιητής; ἐπεὶ πρό οἱ εἴπομεν ἡμεῖς, Ἑρμείαν πέμψαντες ἐύσκοπον ἀργειφόντην, μήτʼ αὐτὸν κτείνειν μήτε μνάασθαι ἄκοιτιν.

[¶38] and the gods now, likewise, send a Hermes the Argicide as messenger to warn you not to invert the well-appointed order of things, nor be absorbed in fopperies; but suffer a man to be a man, and a woman to be a woman; a beautiful man to be beautiful as a man; a deformed man to be deformed as a man; for your personality lies not in flesh and hair, but in the Will.

> Greek: ὁ Ἑρμῆς καταβὰς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ λέγειν ταῦτα καὶ σοὶ νῦν λέγουσιν οἱ θεοὶ ταῦτα Ἑρμείαν πέμψαντες διάκτορον ἀργειφόντην μὴ ἐκστρέφειν τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα μηδὲ περιεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀφεῖναι τὸν ἄνδρα ἄνδρα, τὴν γυναῖκα γυναῖκα, τὸν καλὸν ἄνθρωπον ὡς καλὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν αἰσχρὸν ὡς ἄνθρωπον αἰσχρόν. ὅτι οὐκ εἶ κρέας οὐδὲ τρίχες, ἀλλὰ προαίρεσις·

[¶39] If you take care to have this beautiful, you will be beautiful.

> Greek: ταύτην ἂν σχῇς καλήν, τότʼ ἔστι καλός.

[¶40] But all this while, I dare not tell you that you are deformed; for I fancy you would rather hear anything than this.

> Greek: μέχρι δὲ νῦν οὐ τολμῶ σοι λέγειν, ὅτι αἰσχρὸς εἶ· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι πάντα θέλειν ἀκοῦσαι ἢ τοῦτο.

[¶41] But consider what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of all men, Alcibiades. “Endeavor to make yourself beautiful.” What does he mean to say to him,—“Curl your locks, and depilate your legs”? Heaven forbid! But rather, “Regulate your Will;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ ὅρα, τί λέγει Σωκράτης τῷ καλλίστῳ πάντων καὶ ὡραιοτάτῳ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ· πειρῶ οὖν καλὸς εἶναι. τί αὐτῷ λέγει; πλάσσε σου τὴν κόμην καὶ τίλλε σου τὰ σκέλη; μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ κόσμει σου τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἔξαιρε τὰ φαῦλα δόγματα.

[¶42] throw away your wrong principles.” “What is to be done with the poor body, then?” Leave it to nature.

> Greek: τὸ σωμάτιον οὖν πῶς; ὡς πέφυκεν. ἄλλῳ τούτων ἐμέλησεν· ἐκείνῳ ἐπί[σ]τρεψον.

[¶43] Another hath taken care of such things. Give them up to him. “What, then; must one be a sloven?” By no means; but act in conformity to your nature. A man should care for his body, as a man;

> Greek: — τί οὖν; ἀκάθαρτον δεῖ εἶναι; — μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλʼ ὃς εἶ καὶ πέφυκας, τοῦτον κάθαιρε, ἄνδρα ὡς ἄνδρα καθάριον εἶναι, γυναῖκα ὡς γυναῖκα, παιδίον ὡς παιδίον.

[¶44] a woman, as a woman; a child, as a child. If not, let us pick out the mane of a lion, that he may not be slovenly; and the comb of a cock, for he too should be tidy. Yes, but let it be as a cock: and a lion, as a lion; and a hound. as a hound.

> Greek: οὔ· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ λέοντος ἐκτίλωμεν τὴν κόμην, ἵνα μὴ ἀκάθαρτος ᾖ, καὶ τοῦ ἀλεκτρυόνος τὸν λόφον· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτον καθάριον εἶναι. ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀλεκτρυόνα καὶ ἐκεῖνον ὡς λέοντα καὶ τὸν κυνηγετικὸν κύνα ὡς κυνηγετικόν.

[¶45] 2. There are three topics in philosophy, in which he who would be wise and good must be exercised: that of the desires and aversions, that he may not be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other; that of the pursuits and avoidances, and, in general, the duties of life, that he may act with order and consideration, and not carelessly; the third includes integrity of mind and prudence, and, in general, whatever belongs to the judgment. Of these points the principal and most urgent is that which reaches the passions; for passion is produced no otherwise than by a disappointment of one’s desires and an incurring of one’s aversions. It is this which introduces perturbations, tumults, misfortunes, and calamities; this is the spring of sorrow, lamentation, and envy; this renders us envious and emulous, and incapable of hearing reason. The next topic regards the duties of life. For I am not to be undisturbed by passions, in the same sense as a statue is; but as one who preserves the natural and acquired relations,—as a pious person, as. son, as a brother, as a father, as a citizen. The third topic belongs to those scholars who are now somewhat advanced; and is a security to the other two, that no bewildering semblance may surprise us, either in sleep, or wine, or in depression. This, say you, is beyond us. Yet our present philosophers, leaving the first and second topics, employ themselves wholly about the third; dealing in the logical subtilties. For they say that we must, by engaging in these subjects, take care to guard against deception. Who must? A wise and good man. Is this really, then, the thing you need? Have you mastered the other points? Are you not liable to be deceived by money? When you see a fine girl, do you oppose the seductive influence? If your neighbor inherits an estate, do you feel no vexation? Is it not steadfastness which you chiefly need? You learn even these very things, slave, with trembling, and a solicitous dread of contempt; and are inquisitive to know what is said of you. And if any one comes and tells you that, in a dispute as to which was the best of the philosophers, one of the company named a certain person as the only philosopher, that little soul of yours grows to the size of two cubits instead of an inch. But if another comes and says, “You are mistaken, he is not worth hearing; for what does he know? He has the first rudiments, but nothing more,” you are thunderstruck; you presently turn pale, and cry out, “will show what I am; that I am a great philosopher.” You exhibit by these very things what you are aiming to show in other ways. Do not you know that Diogenes exhibited some sophist in this manner, by pointing with his middle finger; and when the man was mad with rage, “This,” said Diogenes, “is the very man; I have exhibited him to you.” For a man is not shown by the finger in the same sense as a stone or a piece of wood, but whoever points out his principles shows him as a man. Let us see your principles too. For is it not evident that you consider your own Will as nothing, but are always aiming at something beyond its reach? As, what such a one will say of you, and what you shall be thought,—whether a man of letters; whether to have read Chrysippus or Antipater; and if Archedemus too, you have everything you wish. Why are you still solicitous, lest you should not show us what you are? Shall I tell you what you have shown yourself? A mean, discontented, passionate, cowardly person, complaining of everything, accusing everybody, perpetually restless, good for nothing. This you have shown us. Go now and read Archedemus; and then, if you hear but the noise of a mouse, you are a dead man; for you will die some such kind of death as—Who was it? Crinis; who valued himself extremely too, that he understood Archedemus. Wretch, why do you not let alone things that do not belong to you? These things belong to such as are able to learn them without perturbation; who can say, “am not subject to anger, or grief, or envy. I am not restrained; I am not compelled. What remains for me to do? I am at leisure; I am at ease. Let us now see how logical inversions are to be treated; let us consider, when an hypothesis is laid down, how we may avoid a contradiction.” To such persons do these things belong. They who are safe may light a fire, go to dinner if they please, and sing and dance; but you are for spreading sail just when your ship is going down.

> Greek: 2. τρεῖς εἰσι τόποι, περὶ οὓς ἀσκηθῆναι δεῖ τὸν ἐσόμενον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν· ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις, ἵνα μήτʼ ὀρεγόμενος ἀποτυγχάνῃ μήτʼ ἐκκλίνων περιπίπτῃ· ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον, ἵνα τάξει, ἵνα εὐλογίστως, ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶς· τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀνεξαπατησίαν καὶ ἀνεικαιότητα καὶ ὅλως ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. τούτων κυριώτατος καὶ μάλιστα ἐπείγων ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη· πάθος γὰρ ἄλλως οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ ὀρέξεως ἀποτυγχανούσης ἢ ἐκκλίσεως περιπιπτούσης. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ταραχάς, θορύβους, ἀτυχίας, ὁ δυστυχίας ἐπιφέρων, ὁ πένθη, οἰμωγάς, φθόνους, ὁ φθονερούς, ὁ ζηλοτύπους ποιῶν, διʼ ὧν οὐδʼ ἀκοῦσαι λόγου δυνάμεθα. δεύτερός ἐστιν ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον· οὐ δεῖ γάρ με εἶναι ἀπαθῆ ὡς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰς σχέσεις τηροῦντα τὰς φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους ὡς εὐσεβῆ, ὡς υἱόν, ὡς ἀδελφόν, ὡς πατέρα, ὡς πολίτην. τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ ἤδη τοῖς προκόπτουσιν ἐπιβάλλων, ὁ περὶ τὴν αὐτῶν τούτων ἀσφάλειαν, ἵνα μηδʼ ἐν ὕπνοις λάθῃ τις ἀνεξέταστος παρελθοῦσα φαντασία μηδʼ ἐν οἰνώσει μηδὲ μελαγχολῶντος. — τοῦτο ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, φησίν, ἐστίν. — οἱ δὲ νῦν φιλόσοφοι ἀφέντες τὸν πρῶτον τόπον καὶ τὸν δεύτερον καταγίνονται περὶ τὸν τρίτον· μεταπίπτοντας, ἠρωτῆσθαι περαίνοντας, ὑποθετικούς, ψευδομένους. — δεῖ γάρ, φησίν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὕλαις ταύταις γενόμενον διαφυλάξαι τὸ ἀνεξαπάτητον. — τίνα; τὸν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. σοὶ οὖν τοῦτο λείπει; τὰς ἄλλας ἐκπεπόνηκας; περὶ κερμάτιον ἀνεξαπάτητος εἶ; ἐὰν ἴδῃς κοράσιον καλόν, ἀντέχεις τῇ φαντασίᾳ; ἂν ὁ γείτων σου κληρονομήσῃ, οὐ δάκνῃ; νῦν οὐδὲν ἄλλο σοι λείπει ἢ ἀμεταπτωσία; τάλας, αὐτὰ ταῦτα τρέμων μανθάνεις καὶ ἀγωνιῶν, μή τίς σου καταφρονήσῃ, καὶ πυνθανόμενος, μή τίς τι περὶ σοῦ λέγει. κἄν τις ἐλθὼν εἴπῃ σοι ὅτι λόγου γινομένου, τίς ἄριστός ἐστι τῶν φιλοσόφων, παρών τις ἔλεγεν, ὅτι εἷς φιλόσοφος ὁ δεῖνα, γέγονέ σου τὸ ψυχάριον ἀντὶ δακτυλιαίου δίπηχυ. ἂν δʼ ἄλλος παρὼν εἴπῃ οὐδὲν εἴρηκας, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄξιον τοῦ δεῖνος ἀκροᾶσθαι· τί γὰρ οἶδεν; τὰς πρώτας ἀφορμὰς ἔχει, πλέον δʼ οὐδέν, ἐξέστηκας, ὠχρίακας, εὐθὺς κέκραγας ἐγὼ αὐτῷ δείξω, τίς εἰμι, ὅτι μέγας φιλόσοφος. βλέπεται ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων. τί θέλεις ἐξ ἄλλων δεῖξαι; οὐκ οἶδας, ὅτι Διογένης τῶν σοφιστῶν τινα οὕτως ἔδειξεν ἐκτείνας τὸν μέσον δάκτυλον, εἶτα ἐκμανέντος αὐτοῦ οὗτός ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὁ δεῖνα· ἔδειξα ὑμῖν αὐτόν; ἄνθρωπος γὰρ δακτύλῳ οὐ δείκνυται ὡς λίθος ἢ ὡς ξύλον, ἀλλʼ ὅταν τις τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ δείξῃ, τότε αὐτὸν ὡς ἄνθρωπον ἔδειξεν. βλέπωμεν καὶ σοῦ τὰ δόγματα. μὴ γὰρ οὐ δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι σὺ τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σαυτοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ τίθεσαι, ἔξω δὲ βλέπεις εἰς τὰ ἀπροαίρετα, τί ἐρεῖ ὁ δεῖνα καὶ τίς εἶναι δόξεις, εἰ φιλόλογος, εἰ Χρύσιππον ἀνεγνωκὼς ἢ Ἀντίπατρον; εἰ μὲν γὰρ καὶ Ἀρχέδημον, ἀπέχεις ἅπαντα. τί ἔτι ἀγωνιᾷς, μὴ οὐ δείξῃς ἡμῖν, τίς εἶ; θέλεις σοι εἴπω, τίνα ἡμῖν ἔδειξας; ἄνθρωπον παριόντα ταπεινόν, μεμψίμοιρον, ὀξύθυμον, δειλόν, πάντα μεμφόμενον, πᾶσιν ἐγκαλοῦντα, μηδέποτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, πέρπερον· ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἔδειξας. ἄπελθε νῦν καὶ ἀναγίγνωσκε Ἀρχέδημον· εἶτα μῦς ἂν καταπέσῃ καὶ ψοφήσῃ, ἀπέθανες. τοιοῦτος γάρ σε μένει θάνατος, οἷον καὶ τὸν — τίνα ποτʼ ἐκεῖνον; — τὸν Κρῖνιν. καὶ ἐκεῖνος μέγα ἐφρόνει, ὅτι ἐνόει Ἀρχέδημον. τάλας, οὐ θέλεις ἀφεῖναι ταῦτα τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς σέ; πρέπει ταῦτα τοῖς δυναμένοις δίχα ταραχῆς αὐτὰ μανθάνειν, οἷς ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ὀργίζομαι, οὐ λυποῦμαι, οὐ φθονῶ, οὐ κωλύομαι, οὐκ ἀναγκάζομαι. τί μοι λοιπόν; εὐσχολῶ, ἡσυχίαν ἄγω. ἴδωμεν, πῶς περὶ τὰς μεταπτώσεις τῶν λόγων δεῖ ἀναστρέφεσθαι· ἴδωμεν, πῶς ὑπόθεσίν τις λαβὼν εἰς οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἀπαχθήσεται. ἐκείνων ἐστὶ ταῦτα. τοῖς εὖ παθοῦσι πρέπει πῦρ καίειν, ἀριστᾶν, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ᾁδειν καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι· βυθιζομένου δὲ τοῦ πλοίου σύ μοι παρελθὼν ἐπαίρεις τοὺς σιφάρους.

[¶46] 3. The chief concern of a wise and good man is his own Reason. The body is the concern of a physician, and of a gymnastic trainer; and the fields, of the husbandman. The business of a wise and good man is to use the phenomena of existence conformably to Nature. Now, every soul, as it is naturally formed for an assent to truth, a dissent from falsehood, and a suspense of judgment with regard to things uncertain, so it is moved by a desire of good, an aversion from evil, and an indifference to what is neither good nor evil. For as a money-changer, or a gardener, is not at liberty to reject Caesar’s coin, but when once it is shown is obliged, whether he will or not, to deliver his wares in exchange for it, so is it with the soul. Apparent good at first sight attracts, and evil repels. Nor will the soul any more reject an evident appearance of good, than Caesar’s coin. Hence depends every movement, both of God and man; and hence good is preferred to every obligation, however near. My connection is not with my father; but with good. Are you so hard-hearted? Such is my nature, and such is the coin which God hath given me. If therefore good is interpreted to be anything but what is fair and just, away go father and brother and country and everything. What! Shall I overlook my own good, and give it up to you? For what? “am your father.” But not my good. “I am your brother.” But not my good. But if we place it in a rightly trained Will, good must then consist in an observance of the several relations of life; and then he who gives up mere externals acquires good. Your father deprives you of your money; but he does not hurt you. He will possess more land than you, as much more as he pleases; but will he possess more honor, more fidelity, more affection? Who can deprive you of this possession? Not even Zeus; for he did not will it so, since he has put this good into my own power, and given it me, like his own, uncompelled, unrestrained, and unhindered. But when any one deals in, coin different from this, then whoever shows it to him, may have whatever is sold for it in return. A thievish proconsul comes into the province. What coin does he use? Silver. Show it him, and carry off what you please. An adulterer comes. What coin does he use? Women. Take the coin, says one, and give me this trifle. “Give it me, and it is yours.” Another is addicted to other debauchery; give him but his coin, and take what you please. Another is fond of hunting; give him a fine pony or puppy, and he will sell you for it what you will, though it be with sighs and groans. For there is that within which controls him, and assumes this to be current coin. In this manner ought every one chiefly to train himself. When you go out in the morning, examine whomsoever you see or hear; and answer as if to a question. What have you seen? A handsome person. Apply the rule. Is this a thing controllable by Will or uncontrollable? Uncontrollable. Then discard it. What have you seen? One in agony for the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death is inevitable. Banish this despair, then. Has a consul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is the consular office,—controllable by Will or uncontrollable? Uncontrollable. Throw aside this too. It will not pass. Cast it away; it is nothing to you. If we acted thus, and practised in this manner from morning till night, by Heaven! something would be done. Whereas now, on the contrary, we are allured by every semblance, half-asleep; and if we ever awake, it is only a little in the school; but as soon as we go out, if we meet any one grieving, we say, “He is undone.” If a consul, “How happy is he!” If an exile, “How miserable!” If a poor man, “How wretched he has nothing to eat!” These miserable prejudices, then, are to be lopped off; and here is our whole strength to be applied. For what is weeping and groaning? Prejudice. What is misfortune? Prejudice. What is sedition, discord, complaint, accusation, impiety, levity? All these are prejudices, and nothing more; and prejudices concerning things uncontrollable by Will, as if they could be either good or evil. Let any one transfer these convictions to things controllable by Will, and I will engage that he will preserve his constancy, whatever be the state of things about him. The soul is like a vase filled with water; while the semblances of things fall like rays upon its surface. If the water is moved, the ray will seem to be moved likewise, though it is in reality without motion. When, therefore, any one is seized with a giddiness in his head, it is not the arts and virtues that are bewildered, but the mind in which they lie; when this recovers its composure, so will they likewise.

> Greek: 3. ὕλη τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικόν, τὸ σῶμα δʼ ἰατροῦ καὶ [ἀπ]ἀλείπτου, ὁ ἀγρὸς γεωργοῦ ὕλη· ἔργον δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ χρῆσθαι ταῖς φαντασίαις κατὰ φύσιν. πέφυκεν δὲ πᾶσα ψυχὴ ὥσπερ τῷ ἀληθεῖ ἐπινεύειν, πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος ἀνανεύειν, πρὸς τὸ ἄδηλον ἐπέχειν, οὕτως πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀρεκτικῶς κινεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἐκκλιτικῶς, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν οὐδετέρως. ὡς γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος νόμισμα οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἀποδοκιμάσαι τῷ τραπεζίτῃ οὐδὲ τῷ λαχανοπώλῃ, ἀλλʼ ἂν δείξῃς, θέλει οὐ θέλει, προέσθαι αὐτὸν δεῖ τὸ ἀντʼ αὐτοῦ πωλούμενον, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. τὸ ἀγαθὸν φανὲν εὐθὺς ἐκίνησεν ἐφʼ αὑτό, τὸ κακὸν ἀφʼ αὑτοῦ. οὐδέποτε δʼ ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίαν ἐναργῆ ἀποδοκιμάσει ψυχή, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ Καίσαρος νόμισμα. ἔνθεν ἐξήρτηται πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ θεοῦ. διὰ τοῦτο πάσης οἰκειότητος προκρίνεται τὸ ἀγαθόν. οὐδὲν ἐμοὶ καὶ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. οὕτως εἶ σκληρός; οὕτως γὰρ πέφυκα· τοῦτό μοι τὸ νόμισμα δέδωκεν ὁ θεός. διὰ τοῦτο, εἰ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, οἴχεται καὶ πατὴρ καὶ ἀδελφὸς καὶ πατρὶς καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ τὸ ἐμὸν ἀγαθὸν ὑπερίδω, ἵνα σὺ σχῇς, καὶ παραχωρήσω σοι; ἀντὶ τίνος; πατήρ σου εἰμί. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀγαθόν. ἀδελφός σου εἰμί. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀγαθόν. ἐὰν δʼ ἐν ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει θῶμεν, αὐτὸ τὸ τηρεῖν τὰς σχέσεις ἀγαθὸν γίνεται· καὶ λοιπὸν ὁ τῶν ἐκτός τινων ἐκχωρῶν, οὗτος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τυγχάνει. αἴρει τὰ χρήματα ὁ πατήρ. ἀλλʼ οὐ βλάπτει. ἕξει τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἀγροῦ ὁ ἀδελφός. ὅσον καὶ θέλει. μή τι οὖν τοῦ αἰδήμονος, μή τι τοῦ πιστοῦ, μή τι τοῦ φιλαδέλφου; ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας τίς δύναται ἐκβαλεῖν; οὐδʼ ὁ Ζεύς. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἠθέλησεν, ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸ ἐποίησεν καὶ ἔδωκεν οἷον εἶχεν αὐτός, ἀκώλυ[σ]τον, ἀνανάγκαστον, ἀπαραπόδιστον. ὅταν οὖν ἄλλῳ ἄλλο τὸ νόμισμα ᾖ, ἐκεῖνό τις δείξας ἔχει τὸ ἀντʼ αὐτοῦ πιπρασκόμενον. ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τὴν ἐπαρχίαν κλέπτης ἀνθύπατος. τίνι νομίσματι χρῆται; ἀργυρίῳ. δεῖξον καὶ ἀπόφερε ὃ θέλεις. ἐλήλυθεν μοιχός. τίνι νομίσματι χρῆται; κορασιδίοις. λάβε, φησίν, τὸ νόμισμα καὶ πώλησόν μοι τὸ πραγμάτιον. δὸς καὶ ἀγόραζε. ἄλλος περὶ παιδάρια ἐσπούδακεν. δὸς αὐτῷ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ λάβε ὃ θέλεις. ἄλλος φιλόθηρος. δὸς ἱππάριον καλὸν ἢ κυνάριον· οἰμώζων καὶ στένων πωλήσει ἀντʼ αὐτοῦ ὃ θέλεις. ἄλλος γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀναγκάζει ἔσωθεν, ὁ τὸ νόμισμα τοῦτο τεταχώς. πρὸς τοῦτο μάλιστα τὸ εἶδος αὑτὸν γυμναστέον. εὐθὺς ὄρθρου προελθὼν ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς, ὃν ἂν ἀκούσῃς, ἐξέταζε, ἀποκρίνου ὡς πρὸς ἐρώτημα. τί εἶδες; καλὸν ἢ καλήν; ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα. ἀπροαίρετον ἢ προαιρετικόν; ἀπροαίρετον· αἶρε ἔξω. τί εἶδες; πενθοῦντʼ ἐπὶ τέκνου τελευτῇ; ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα. ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν ἀπροαίρετον· αἶρε ἐκ τοῦ μέσου. ἀπήντησέ σοι ὕπατος; ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα. ὑπατεία ποῖόν τι ἐστίν; ἀπροαίρετον ἢ προαιρετικόν; ἀπροαίρετον· αἶρε καὶ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι δόκιμον· ἀπόβαλε, οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ. καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἐποιοῦμεν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἠσκούμεθα καθʼ ἡμέραν ἐξ ὄρθρου μέχρι νυκτός, ἐγίνετο ἄν τι, νὴ τοὺς θεούς. νῦν δʼ εὐθὺς ὑπὸ πάσης φαντασίας κεχηνότες λαμβανόμεθα καὶ μόνον, εἴπερ ἄρα, ἐν τῇ σχολῇ μικρόν τι διεγειρόμεθα· εἶτʼ ἐξελθόντες ἂν ἴδωμεν πενθοῦντα, λέγομεν ἀπώλετο· ἂν ὕπατον, μακάριος· ἂν ἐξωρισμένον, ταλαίπωρος· ἂν πένητα, ἄθλιος, οὐκ ἔχει πόθεν φάγῃ. ταῦτʼ οὖν ἐκκόπτειν δεῖ τὰ πονηρὰ δόγματα, περὶ τοῦτο συντετάσθαι. τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ κλαίειν καὶ οἰμώζειν; δόγμα. τί δυστυχία; δόγμα. τί στάσις, τί διχόνοια, τί μέμψις, τί κατηγορία, τί ἀσέβεια, τί φλυαρία; ταῦτα πάντα δόγματά ἐστι καὶ ἄλλο οὐδὲν καὶ δόγματα περὶ τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων ὡς ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ταῦτά τις ἐπὶ τὰ προαιρετικὰ μεταθέτω, κἀγὼ αὐτὸν ἐγγυῶμαι ὅτι εὐσταθήσει, ὡς ἂν ἔχῃ τὰ περὶ αὐτόν. οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ λεκάνη τοῦ ὕδατος, τοιοῦτον ἡ ψυχή, οἷον ἡ αὐγὴ ἡ προσπίπτουσα τῷ ὕδατι, τοιοῦτον αἱ φαντασίαι. ὅταν οὖν τὸ ὕδωρ κινηθῇ, δοκεῖ μὲν καὶ ἡ αὐγὴ κινεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι κινεῖται. καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν σκοτωθῇ τις, οὐχ αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ συγχέονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα, ἐφʼ οὗ εἰσιν· καταστάντος δὲ καθίσταται κἀκεῖνα.

[¶47] 4. When the Governor of Epirus had exerted himself with improper eagerness in favor of a comedian, and was upon that account publicly railed at, and, when he came to hear it, was highly displeased with those who railed at him, Why, what harm, said Epictetus, have these people done? They have shown favoritism; which is just what you did. “Is this a proper manner, then, of expressing their favor?” Seeing you, their governor, and the friend and vicegerent of Caesar, express it thus, was it not to be expected that they would express it thus too? For if this zealous favoritism is not right, do not show it yourself; and if it is, why are you angry at them for imitating you? For whom have the many to imitate, but you, their superiors? From whom are they to take example, when they come into the theatre, but from you? “Do but look how Caesar’s vicegerent sees the play! Has he cried out? I will cry out too. Has he leaped up from his seat? I too will leap up from mine. Do his slaves sit in different parts of the house, making an uproar? I indeed have no slaves; but I will make as much uproar as I can unaided.” You ought to consider, then, that when you appear in the theatre, you appear as a rule and example to others, how they ought to see the play. Why is it that they have railed at you? Because every man hates what hinders him. They would have one actor crowned; you, another. They hindered you, and you them. You proved the stronger. They have done what they could; they have railed at the person who hindered them. What would you have, then? Would you do as you please, and not have them even talk as they please? Where is the wonder of all this? Does not the husbandman rail at Zeus when he is hindered by him? Does not the sailor? Do men ever cease railing at Caesar? What, then; is Zeus ignorant of this? Are not the things that are said reported to Caesar? How then does he act? He knows that, if he were to punish all railers, he would have nobody left to command. When you enter the theatre, then, ought you to say, “Come, let Sophron be crowned”? No. But rather, “Come, let me at this time regulate my Will in a manner conformable to Nature. No one is dearer to me than myself. It is ridiculous, then, that because another man gains the victory as a player, I should be hurt. Whom do I wish to gain the victory? Him who does gain it; and thus he will always be victorious whom I wish to be so.” “But I would have Sophron crowned.” Why, celebrate as many games as you will at your own house, Nemean, Pythian, Isthmian, Olympic, and proclaim him victor in all; but in public do not arrogate more than your due, nor seek to monopolize what belongs to all; or if otherwise, bear to be railed at, for if you act like the mob, you reduce yourself co an equality with them.

> Greek: 4. τοῦ δʼ ἐπιτρόπου τῆς Ἠπείρου ἀκοσμότερον σπουδάσαντος κωμῳδῷ τινι καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δημοσίᾳ λοιδορηθέντος, εἶτα ἑξῆς ἀπαγγείλαντος πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐλοιδορήθη, καὶ ἀγανακτοῦντος πρὸς τοὺς λοιδορήσαντας Καὶ τί κακόν, ἔφη, ἐποίουν; ἐσπούδαζον καὶ οὗτοι ὡς καὶ σύ. εἰπόντος δʼ ἐκείνου Οὕτως οὖν τις σπουδάζει; σέ, ἔφη, βλέποντες τὸν αὐτῶν ἄρχοντα, τοῦ Καίσαρος φίλον καὶ ἐπίτροπον, οὕτως σπουδάζοντα οὐκ ἔμελλον καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτως σπουδάζειν; εἰ γὰρ μὴ δεῖ οὕτως σπουδάζειν, μηδὲ σὺ σπούδαζε· εἰ δὲ δεῖ, τί χαλεπαίνεις, εἴ σε ἐμιμήσαντο; τίνας γὰρ ἔχουσιν μιμήσασθαι οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ὑμᾶς; εἰς τίνας ἀπίδωσιν ἐλθόντες εἰς τὰ θέατρα ἢ ὑμᾶς; ὅρα πῶς ὁ ἐπίτροπος τοῦ Καίσαρος θεωρεῖ· κέκραγεν· κἀγὼ τοίνυν κραυγάσω. ἀναπηδᾷ· κἀγὼ ἀναπηδήσω. οἱ δοῦλοι αὐτοῦ διακάθηνται κραυγάζοντες· ἐγὼ δʼ οὐκ ἔχω δούλους· ἀντὶ πάντων αὐτὸς ὅσον δύναμαι κραυγάσω. εἰδέναι σε οὖν δεῖ, ὅταν εἰσέρχῃ εἰς τὸ θέατρον, ὅτι κανὼν εἰσέρχῃ καὶ παράδειγμα τοῖς ἄλλοις, πῶς αὐτοὺς δεῖ θεωρεῖν. τί οὖν σε ἐλοιδόρουν; ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος μισεῖ τὸ ἐμποδίζον. ἐκεῖνοι στεφανωθῆναι ἤθελον τὸν δεῖνα, σὺ ἕτερον· ἐκεῖνοι σοὶ ἐνεπόδιζον καὶ σὺ ἐκείνοις. σὺ εὑρίσκου ἰσχυρότερος· ἐκεῖνοι ὃ ἐδύναντο ἐποίουν, ἐλοιδόρουν τὸ ἐμποδίζον. τί οὖν θέλεις; ἵνα σὺ μὲν ποιῇς ὃ θέλεις, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ μηδʼ εἴπωσιν ἃ θέλουσιν; καὶ τί θαυμαστόν; οἱ γεωργοὶ τὸν Δία οὐ λοιδοροῦσιν, ὅταν ἐμποδίζωνται ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ; οἱ ναῦται οὐ λοιδοροῦσι; τὸν Καίσαρα παύονται λοιδοροῦντες; τί οὖν; οὐ γιγνώσκει ὁ Ζεύς; τῷ Καίσαρι οὐκ ἀπαγγέλλονται τὰ λεγόμενα; τί οὖν ποιεῖ; οἶδεν ὅτι, ἂν πάντας τοὺς λοιδοροῦντας κολάζῃ, οὐχ ἕξει τίνων ἄρξει. τί οὖν; ἔδει εἰσερχόμενον εἰς τὸ θέατρον τοῦτο εἰπεῖν ἄγε ἵνα Σώφρων στεφανωθῇ; ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο ἄγε ἵνα τηρήσω τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ὕλης κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν. ἐμοὶ παρʼ ἐμὲ φίλτερος οὐδείς· γελοῖον οὖν, ἵνʼ ἄλλος νικήσῃ κωμῳδῶν, ἐμὲ βλάπτεσθαι. — τίνα οὖν θέλω νικῆσαι; — τὸν νικῶντα· καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ νικήσει, ὃν θέλω. — ἀλλὰ θέλω στεφανωθῆναι Σώφρονα. — ἐν οἴκῳ ὅσους θέλεις ἀγῶνας ἄγων ἀνακήρυξον αὐτὸν Νέμεα, Πύθια, Ἴσθμια, Ὀλύμπια· ἐν φανερῷ δὲ μὴ πλεονέκτει μηδʼ ὑφάρπαζε τὸ κοινόν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνέχου λοιδορούμενος· ὡς, ὅταν ταὐτὰ ποιῇς τοῖς πολλοῖς, εἰς ἴσον ἐκείνοις καθιστᾷς σαυτόν.

[¶48] 5. “I am ill here,” said one of the scholars. “I will return home.” Were you never ill at home, then? Consider whether you are doing anything here conducive to the regulation of your Will; for if you make no improvement, it was to no purpose that you came. Go home, then, and take care of your domestic affairs. For if your Reason cannot be brought into conformity to nature, your land may. You may increase you: money, support the old age of your father, mix in the public assemblies, and rule as badly as you have lived, and do other such things. But if you are conscious to yourself that you are casting off some of your wrong principles, and taking up different ones in their room; and that you have transferred your scheme of life from things not controllable by will to those controllable; and that if you do sometimes cry alas, it is not for what concerns your father or your brother, but yourself,—why do you any longer plead illness? Do not you know that both illness and death must overtake us? At what employment? The husbandman at his plough, the sailor on his voyage. At what employment would you be taken? For, indeed, at what employment ought you to be taken? If there is any better employment at which you can be taken, follow that. For my own part, I would be found engaged in nothing but in the regulation of my own Will; how to render it undisturbed, unrestrained, uncompelled, free. I would be found studying this, that I may be able to say to God, “Have I transgressed thy commands? Have I perverted the powers, the senses, the instincts which thou hast given me? Have I ever accused thee, or censured thy dispensations? I have been ill, because it was thy pleasure, like others; but I willingly. I have been poor, it being thy will; but with joy. I have not been in power, because it was not thy will; and power I have never desired. Hast thou ever seen me saddened because of this? Have I not always approached thee with a cheerful countenance, prepared to execute thy commands and the indications of thy will? Is it thy pleasure that I should depart from this assembly? I depart. I give thee all thanks that thou hast thought me worthy to have a snare in it with thee; to behold thy works, and to join with thee in comprehending thy administration.” Let death overtake me while I am thinking, while I am writing, while I am reading such things as these. “But I shall not have my mother to hold my head when I am ill.” Get home then to your mother; for you are most fit to have your head held when you are ill. “But I used at home to lie on a fine couch.” Get to this couch of yours; for you are fit to lie upon such a one, even in health; so do not miss doing that for which you are qualified. But what says Socrates? “As one man rejoices in the improvement of his estate, another of his horse, so do I daily rejoice in perceiving myself to grow better.” “In what,—in pretty speeches?” Use courteous words, man. “In trifling theorems? What do they signify? Yet, indeed, I do not see that the philosophers are employed in anything else.” Do you think it nothing, to accuse and censure no one, God nor man; always to carry abroad and bring home the same countenance? These were the things which Socrates knew; and yet he never professed to know, or to teach anything; but if any one wanted pretty speeches, or little theorems, he brought him to Protagoras, to Hippias; just as, if any one had come for potherbs, he would have taken him to a gardener. Which of you, then, earnestly sets his heart on this? If you had, you would bear illness and hunger and death with cheerfulness. If any one of you has truly loved, he knows that I speak truth.

> Greek: 5. νοσῶ, φησίν, ἐνθάδε καὶ βούλομαι ἀπιέναι εἰς οἶκον. — ἐν οἴκῳ γὰρ ἄνοσος ἦς σύ; οὐ σκοπεῖς, εἴ τι ποιεῖς ἐνθάδε τῶν πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σαυτοῦ φερόντων, ἵνʼ ἐπανορθωθῇ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν ἀνύεις, περισσῶς καὶ ἦλθες. ἄπιθι, ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν ἐν οἴκῳ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ δύναταί σου τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν σχεῖν κατὰ φύσιν, τό γʼ ἀγρίδιον δυνήσεται· τό γε κερμάτιον αὐξήσεις, τὸν πατέρα γηροκομήσεις, ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἀναστραφήσῃ, ἄρξεις· κακὸς κακῶς τί ποτε ποιήσεις τῶν ἑξῆς. εἰ δὲ παρακολουθεῖς σαυτῷ, ὅτι ἀποβάλλεις τινὰ δόγματα φαῦλα καὶ ἄλλʼ ἀντʼ αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβάνεις καὶ τὴν σαυτοῦ στάσιν μετατέθεικας ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων ἐπὶ τὰ προαιρετικά, κἄν ποτʼ εἴπῃς οἴμοι, οὐ λέγεις διὰ τὸν πατέρα, τὸν ἀδελφόν, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐμέ, ἔτι ὑπολογίζῃ νόσον; οὐκ οἶδας, ὅτι καὶ νόσος καὶ θάνατος καταλαβεῖν ἡμᾶς ὀφείλουσίν τί ποτε ποιοῦντας; τὸν γεωργὸν γεωργοῦντα καταλαμβάνουσι, τὸν ναυτικὸν πλέοντα. σὺ τί θέλεις ποιῶν καταληφθῆναι; τί ποτε μὲν γὰρ ποιοῦντά σε δεῖ καταληφθῆναι. εἴ τι ἔχεις τούτου κρεῖσσον ποιῶν καταληφθῆναι, ποίει ἐκεῖνο. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καταληφθῆναι γένοιτο μηδενὸς ἄλλου ἐπιμελουμένῳ ἢ τῆς προαιρέσεως τῆς ἐμῆς, ἵνʼ ἀπαθής, ἵνʼ ἀκώλυτος, ἵνʼ ἀνανάγκαστος, ἵνʼ ἐλεύθερος. ταῦτα ἐπιτηδεύων θέλω εὑρεθῆναι, ἵνʼ εἰπεῖν δύνωμαι τῷ θεῷ μή τι παρέβην σου τὰς ἐντολάς; μή τι πρὸς ἄλλα ἐχρησάμην ταῖς ἀφορμαῖς ἃς ἔδωκας; μή τι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἄλλως, μή τι ταῖς προλήψεσιν; μή τί σοί ποτʼ ἐνεκάλεσα; μή τι ἐμεμψάμην σου τὴν διοίκησιν; ἐνόσησα, ὅτε ἠθέλησας· καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ ἑκών. πένης ἐγενόμην σου θέλοντος, ἀλλὰ χαίρων. οὐκ ἦρξα, ὅτι σὺ οὐκ ἠθέλησας· οὐδέποτʼ ἐπεθύμησα ἀρχῆς. μή τί με τούτου ἕνεκα στυγνότερον εἶδες; μὴ οὐ προσῆλθόν σοί ποτε φαιδρῷ τῷ προσώπῳ, ἕτοιμος εἴ τι ἐπιτάσσεις, εἴ τι σημαίνεις; νῦν με θέλεις ἀπελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς πανηγύρεως· ἄπειμι, χάριν σοι ἔχω πᾶσαν, ὅτι ἠξίωσάς με συμπανηγυρίσαι σοι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἔργα τὰ σὰ καὶ τῇ διοικήσει σου συμπαρακολουθῆσαι [σοί]. ταῦτά με ἐνθυμούμενον, ταῦτα γράφοντα, ταῦτα ἀναγιγνώσκοντα καταλάβοι ὁ θάνατος. ἀλλʼ ἡ μήτηρ μου τὴν κεφαλὴν νοσοῦντος οὐ κρατήσει. — ἄπιθι τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν μητέρα· ἄξιος γὰρ εἶ τὴν κεφαλὴν κρατούμενος νοσεῖν. — ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ κλιναρίου κομψοῦ ἐν οἴκῳ κατεκείμην. — ἄπιθί σου ἐπὶ τὸ κλινάριον· ἢ ὑγιαίνων ἄξιος εἶ ἐπὶ τοιούτου κατακεῖσθαι. μὴ τοίνυν ἀπόλλυε, ἃ δύνασαι ἐκεῖ ποιεῖν. ἀλλʼ ὁ Σωκράτης τί λέγει; ὥσπερ ἄλλος τις, φησίν, χαίρει[ν] τὸν ἀγρὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ ποιῶν κρείσσονα, ἄλλος τὸν ἵππον, οὕτως ἐγὼ καθʼ ἡμέραν χαίρω παρακολουθῶν ἐμαυτῷ βελτίονι γινομένῳ. — πρὸς τί; μή τι πρὸς λεξείδια; — ἄνθρωπε, εὐφήμει. — μή τι πρὸς θεωρημάτια; — τί ποιεῖς; — καὶ μὴν οὐ βλέπω, τί ἐστιν ἄλλο, περὶ ὃ ἀσχολοῦνται οἱ φιλόσοφοι. — οὐδέν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ μηδέποτε ἐγκαλέσαι τινί, μὴ θεῷ, μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ· μὴ μέμψασθαι μηδένα· τὸ αὐτὸ πρόσωπον ἀεὶ καὶ ἐκφέρειν καὶ εἰσφέρειν; ταῦτα ἦν, ἃ ᾔδει ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ ὅμως οὐδέποτε εἶπεν, ὅτι οἶδέν τι ἢ διδάσκει. εἰ δέ τις λεξείδια ᾔτει ἢ θεωρημάτια, ἀπῆγεν πρὸς Πρωταγόραν, πρὸς Ἱππίαν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ λάχανά τις ζητῶν ἐλήλυθεν, πρὸς τὸν κηπουρὸν ἂν αὐτὸν ἀπήγαγεν· τίς οὖν ὑμῶν ἔχει ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολήν; ἐπεί τοι εἰ εἴχετε, καὶ ἐνοσεῖτε ἂν ἡδέως καὶ ἐπεινᾶτε καὶ ἀπεθνῄσκετε. εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἠράσθη κορασίου κομψοῦ, οἶδεν ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω.