---
title: "Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν"
author: "Epictetus"
translator: "Thomas Wentworth Higginson"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 14 of 23
url: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/14/
cite: "Epictetus, tr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν, section 14. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/14/"
---

# Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν

*Epictetus, tr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson*

A former slave’s lessons in Stoic freedom, taken down by his pupil Arrian.

> Greek: ed. Heinrich Schenkl, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0557.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Thomas Wentworth Higginson, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0557.tlg001.perseus-eng4). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 14. Book III · chapters 6–12

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/14/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/14/#p-N

[¶0] 6. When he was asked how it came to pass, that though the art of reasoning might be now more studied, yet the improvements made were formerly greater? In what instance, answered he, is it now more studied; and in what were the improvements greater? For in what now is most studied, in that will be found likewise the improvements. The present study is the solution of syllogisms, and in this improvements are made. But formerly the study was to harmonize the Reason with Nature; and improvement was made in that. Therefore do not confound things, nor, when you study one thing, expect improvement in another; but see whether any one of us who applies himself to think and act conformably to Nature ever fails of improvement. Depend upon it, you will not find one. A good man is invincible; for he does not contend where he is not superior. If you would have his land, take it; take his servants, take his office, take his body. But you will never frustrate his desire, nor make him incur his aversion. He engages in no combat but what concerns objects within his own control. How then can he fail to be invincible? Being asked what common-sense was, he answered: As that may be called a common ear which distinguishes only sounds, but that which distinguishes notes, an artistic one; so there are some things which men, not totally perverted, discern by their common natural powers; and such a disposition is called common-sense. It is not easy to gain the attention of effeminate young men,—for you cannot take up custard by a hook,—but the ingenuous, even if you discourage them, are the more eager for learning. Hence Rufus, for the most part, did discourage them; and made use of that as a criterion of the ingenuous and disingenuous. For, he used to say, as a stone, even if you throw it up, will by its own propensity be carried downward, so an ingenuous mind, the more it is forced from its natural bent, will incline towards it the more strongly.

> Greek: 6. πυθομένου δέ τινος, πῶς νῦν μᾶλλον ἐκπεπονημένου τοῦ λόγου πρότερον μείζονες προκοπαὶ ἦσαν, κατὰ τί, ἔφη, ἐκπεπόνηται καὶ κατὰ τί μείζους αἱ προκοπαὶ τότε ἦσαν; καθὸ γὰρ νῦν ἐκπεπόνηται, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ προκοπαὶ νῦν εὑρεθήσονται. καὶ νῦν μὲν ὥστε συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν ἐκπεπόνηται καὶ προκοπαὶ γίνονται· τότε δʼ ὥστε τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον τηρῆσαι καὶ ἐξεπονεῖτο καὶ προκοπαὶ ἦσαν. μὴ οὖν ἐνάλλασσε μηδὲ ζήτει, ὅταν ἄλλο ἐκπονῇς, ἐν ἄλλῳ προκόπτειν. ἀλλʼ ἴδε, εἴ τις ἡμῶν πρὸς τούτῳ ὤν, ὥστε κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν, οὐ προκόπτει. οὐδένα γὰρ εὑρήσεις. ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀήττητος· ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἀγωνίζεται, ὅπου μὴ κρείσσων, εἰ μὴ ὅπου κρείσσων ἐστίν. εἰ κατὰ τὸν ἀγρὸν θέλεις, λάβε· λάβε τοὺς οἰκέτας, λάβε τὴν ἀρχήν, λάβε τὸ σωμάτιον. τὴν δʼ ὄρεξιν οὐ ποιήσεις ἀποτευκτικὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἔκκλισιν περιπτωτικήν. εἰς τοῦτον μόνον τὸν ἀγῶνα καθίησιν τὸν περὶ τῶν προαιρετικῶν· πῶς οὖν οὐ μέλλει ἀήττητος εἶναι; πυθομένου δέ τινος, τί ἐστιν ὁ κοινὸς νοῦς, Ὥσπερ, φησίν, κοινή τις ἀκοὴ λέγοιτʼ ἂν ἡ μόνον φωνῶν διακριτική, ἡ δὲ τῶν φθόγγων οὐκέτι κοινή, ἀλλὰ τεχνική, οὕτως ἐστί τινα, ἃ οἱ μὴ παντάπασιν διεστραμμένοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἀφορμὰς ὁρῶσιν. ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις κοινὸς νοῦς καλεῖται. τῶν νέων τοὺς μαλακοὺς οὐκ ἔστι προτρέψαι ῥᾴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τυρὸν ἀγκίστρῳ λαβεῖν· οἱ δʼ εὐφυεῖς, κἂν ἀποτρέπῃς, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἔχονται τοῦ λόγου. διὸ καὶ ὁ Ῥοῦφος τὰ πολλὰ ἀπέτρεπεν τούτῳ δοκιμαστηρίῳ χρώμενος τῶν εὐφυῶν καὶ ἀφυῶν. ἔλεγε γὰρ ὅτι ὡς ὁ λίθος, κἂν ἀναβάλῃς, ἐνεχθήσεται κάτω ἐπὶ γῆν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ κατασκευήν, οὕτως καὶ ὁ εὐφυής, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἀποκρούεταί τις αὐτόν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον νεύει ἐφʼ ὃ πέφυκεν.

[¶1] 7. When the Governor, who was an Epicurean, came to him, “It is fit,” said he, “that we ignorant people should inquire of you philosophers what is the most valuable thing in the world; as those who come into a strange city do of the citizens and such as are acquainted with it; that after this inquiry we may go and take a view of it, as they do in cities. Now, almost every one admits that there are three things belonging to man,—soul, body, and externals. It belongs to such as you to answer which is the best. What shall we tell mankind? Is it the flesh?” And was it for this that Maximus took a voyage in winter as far as Cassiope to accompany his son? Was it to gratify the flesh? “No, surely.” Is it not fit, then, to study what is best? “Yes, beyond all other things.” What have we, then, better than flesh? “The soul.” Are we to prefer the good of the better, or of the worse? “Of the better.” Does the good of the soul consist in things controllable by Will or uncontrollable? “In things controllable.” Does the pleasure of the soul, then, depend on the Will? “It does.” And whence does this pleasure arise,—from itself? This is unintelligible. For there must exist some principal essence of good, in the attainment of which we shall enjoy this pleasure of the soul. “This too is granted.” In what, then, consists this pleasure of the soul? If it be in mental objects, the essence of good is found. For it is impossible that good should lie in one thing, and rational enjoyment in another; or that, if the cause is not good, the effect should be good. For, to make the effect reasonable, the cause must be good. But this you cannot reasonably allow; for it would be to contradict both Epicurus and the rest of your principles. It remains, then, that the pleasures of the soul must consist in bodily objects; and that there must be the cause and the essence of good. Maximus, therefore, did foolishly, if he took a voyage for the sake of anything but his body; that is, for the sake of what is best. A man does foolishly too, if he refrains from what is another’s, when he is a judge and able to take it. We should consider only this, if you please, how it may be done secretly and safely, and so that no one may know it. For Epicurus himself does not pronounce stealing to be evil, only the being found out in it; and prohibits it for no other reason, but because it is impossible to insure ourselves against discovery. But I say to you that, if it be done dexterously and cautiously, we shall not be discovered. Besides, we have powerful friends of both sexes at Rome; and the Greeks are weak; and nobody will dare to go up to Rome on such an affair. Why do you refrain from your own proper good? It is madness; it is folly. But if you were to tell me that you do refrain, I would not believe you. For, as it is impossible to assent to an apparent falsehood, or to deny an apparent truth, so it is impossible to abstain from an apparent good. Now, riches are a good, and, indeed, the chief instrument of pleasures. Why do not you acquire them? And why do not we corrupt the wife of our neighbor, if it can be done secretly? And if the husband should happen to be impertinent, why not cut his throat too, if you have a mind to be such a philosopher as you ought to be,—a complete one,—to be consistent with your own principles. Otherwise you will not differ from us who are called Stoics. For we, too, say one thing and do another; we talk well and act ill; but you will be perverse in a contrary way, teaching bad principles, and acting well. For Heaven’s sake represent to yourself a city of Epicureans. “I do not marry.” “Nor I; for we are not to marry nor have children, nor to engage in public affairs.” What will be the consequence of this? Whence are the citizens to come? Who will educate them? Who will be the governor of the youth? Who the master of their exercises? What then will he teach them? Will it be what used to be taught at Athens, or Lacedemon? Take a young man; bring him up according to your principles. These principles are wicked, subversive of a state, pernicious to families, not becoming even to women. Give them up, sir. You live in a capital city. You are to govern and judge uprightly, and to refrain from what belongs to others. No one’s wife or child, or silver or gold plate, is to have any charms for you, except your own. Provide yourself with principles consonant to these truths; and setting out thence, you will with pleasure refrain from things so persuasive to mislead and conquer. But if to their own persuasive force we can add such a philosophy as hurries us upon them and confirms us in them, what will be the consequence? In a sculptured vase, which is the best,—the silver, or the workmanship? In the hand the substance is flesh; but its operations are the principal thing. Accordingly, its functions are threefold,—relating to its existence, to the manner of its existence, and to its principal operations. Thus, likewise, do not set a value on the mere materials of man, the flesh; but on the principal operations which belong to him. “What are these?” Engaging in public business, marrying, the production of children, the worship of God, the care of parents, and, in general, the regulation of our desires and aversions, our pursuits and avoidances, in accordance with our nature. “What is our nature?” To be free, noble-spirited, modest. For what other animal blushes? What other has the idea of shame? But pleasure must be subjected to these, as an attendant and handmaid, to call forth our activity, and to keep us constant in natural operations. “But I am rich and want nothing.” Then why do you pretend to philosophize? Your gold and silver plate is enough for you. What need have you of principles? “Besides, I am Judge of the Greeks.” Do you know how to judge? Who has imparted this knowledge to you? “Caesar has given me a commission.” Let him give you a commission to judge of music; what good will it do you? But how were you made a Judge? Whose hand have you kissed,—that of Symphorus, or Numenius? Before whose door have you slept? To whom have you sent presents? After all, do you not perceive that the office of Judge puts you in the same rank with Numenius? “But I can throw whom I please into a prison.” So you may a stone. “But I can beat whom I will too.” So you may an ass. This is not a government over men. Govern us like reasonable creatures. Show us what is best for us, and we will pursue it; show us what is otherwise, and we will avoid it. Like Socrates, make us imitators of yourself. He was properly a governor of men, who controlled their desires and aversions, their pursuits, their avoidances. “Do this; do not that, or I will throw you into prison.” This is not a government for reasonable creatures. But “Do as Zeus has commanded, or you will be punished, and be a loser.” “What shall I lose?” Simply your own right action, your fidelity, honor, decency. You can find no losses greater than these.

> Greek: 7. τοῦ δὲ διορθωτοῦ εἰσελθόντος πρὸς αὐτὸν (ἦν δʼ οὗτος Ἐπικούρειος) ἄξιον, ἔφη, τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἡμᾶς παρʼ ὑμῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων πυνθάνεσθαι, καθάπερ τοὺς εἰς ξένην πόλιν ἐλθόντας παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ εἰδότων, τί κράτιστόν ἐστιν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἱστορήσαντες μετίωμεν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ θεώμεθα. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τρία ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, σχεδὸν οὐδεὶς ἀντιλέγει· λοιπὸν ὑμέτερόν ἐστιν ἀποκρίνασθαι, τί ἐστι τὸ κράτιστον. τί ἐροῦμεν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; τὴν σάρκα; καὶ διὰ ταύτην Μάξιμος ἔπλευσεν μέχρι Κασσιόπης χειμῶνος μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ προπέμπων, ἵνʼ ἡσθῇ τῇ σαρκί; ἀρνησαμένου δʼ ἐκείνου καὶ εἰπόντος Μὴ γένοιτο· οὐ προσήκει περὶ τὸ κράτιστον ἐσπουδακέναι; — πάντων μάλιστα προσήκει. — τί οὖν κρεῖσσον ἔχομεν τῆς σαρκός; — τὴν ψυχήν, ἔφη. — ἀγαθὰ δὲ τὰ τοῦ κρατίστου κρείττονά ἐστιν ἢ τὰ τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; — τὰ τοῦ κρατίστου. — ψυχῆς δὲ ἀγαθὰ πότερον προαιρετικά ἐστιν ἢ ἀπροαίρετα; — προαιρετικά. — προαιρετικὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονὴ ἡ ψυχική; — ἔφη. — αὕτη δʼ ἐπὶ τίσιν γίνεται; πότερον ἐφʼ αὑτῇ; ἀλλʼ ἀδιανόητόν ἐστιν· προηγουμένην γάρ τινα ὑφεστάναι δεῖ οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἧς τυγχάνοντες ἡσθησόμεθα κατὰ ψυχήν. — ὡμολόγει καὶ τοῦτο. — ἐπὶ τίνι οὖν ἡσθησόμεθα ταύτην τὴν ψυχικὴν ἡδονήν; εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ψυχικοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, εὕρηται ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. οὐ γὰρ δύναται ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δʼ ἐφʼ ᾧ εὐλόγως ἐπαιρόμεθα, οὐδὲ τοῦ προηγουμένου μὴ ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἐπιγέννημα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἵνα γὰρ εὔλογον ᾖ τὸ ἐπιγέννημα, τὸ προηγούμενον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴ εἴπητε φρένας ἔχοντες· ἀνακόλουθα γὰρ ἐρεῖτε καὶ Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑμῶν δόγμασιν. ὑπολείπεται λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἥδεσθαι τὴν κατὰ ψυχὴν ἡδονήν· πάλιν ἐκεῖνα γίνεται προηγούμενα καὶ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. διὰ τοῦτο ἀφρόνως ἐποίησε Μάξιμος, εἰ διʼ ἄλλο τι ἔπλευσεν ἢ διὰ τὴν σάρκα, τοῦτʼ ἔστι διὰ τὸ κράτιστον. ἀφρόνως δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ εἰ ἀπέχεται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων δικαστὴς ὢν καὶ δυνάμενος λαμβάνειν. ἀλλʼ ἄν σοι δόξῃ, ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκεπτώμεθα, ἵνα κεκρυμμένως, ἵνʼ ἀσφαλῶς, ἵνα μή τις γνῷ. τὸ γὰρ κλέψαι οὐδʼ αὐτὸς Ἐπίκουρος ἀποφαίνει κακόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμπεσεῖν· καὶ ὅτι πίστιν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν λαβεῖν ἀδύνατον, διὰ τοῦτο λέγει μὴ κλέπτετε. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν κομψῶς καὶ περιεσταλμένως γίνηται, λησόμεθα· εἶτα καὶ φίλους ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ ἔχομεν δυνατοὺς καὶ φίλ[ι]ας καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀδρανεῖς εἰσιν· οὐδεὶς τολμήσει ἀναβῆναι τούτου ἕνεκα. τί ἀπέχῃ τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ; ἄφρον ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ἠλίθιόν ἐστιν. ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἂν λέγῃς μοι, ὅτι ἀπέχῃ, πιστεύσω σοι. ὡς γὰρ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τῷ ψευδεῖ φαινομένῳ συγκαταθέσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπονεῦσαι, οὕτως ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ ἀποστῆναι. ὁ πλοῦτος δʼ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οἱονανεὶ τὸ ποιητικώτατόν γε τῶν ἡδονῶν. διὰ τί μὴ περιποιήσῃ αὐτόν; διὰ τί δὲ μὴ τὴν τοῦ γείτονος γυναῖκα διαφθείρωμεν, ἂν δυνώμεθα λαθεῖν, ἂν δὲ φλυαρῇ ὁ ἀνήρ, καὶ αὐτὸν προσεκτραχηλίσωμεν; εἰ θέλεις εἶναι φιλόσοφος οἷος δεῖ, εἴ γε τέλειος, εἰ ἀκολουθῶν σου τοῖς δόγμασιν· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδὲν διοίσεις ἡμῶν τῶν λεγομένων Στωικῶν· καὶ αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἄλλα λέγομεν, ἄλλα δὲ ποιοῦμεν. ἡμεῖς λέγομεν τὰ καλά, ποιοῦμεν τὰ αἰσχρά· σὺ τὴν ἐναντίαν διαστροφὴν ἔσῃ διεστραμμένος δογματίζων τὰ αἰσχρά, ποιῶν τὰ καλά. τὸν θεόν σοι, ἐπινοεῖς Ἐπικουρείων πόλιν; ἐγὼ οὐ γαμῶ. οὐδʼ ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ γαμητέον. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ παιδοποιητέον, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ πολιτευτέον. τί οὖν γένηται; πόθεν οἱ πολῖται; τίς αὐτοὺς παιδεύσει; τίς ἐφήβαρχος, τίς γυμνασίαρχος; τί δὲ καὶ παιδεύσει αὐτούς; ἃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπαιδεύοντο ἢ Ἀθηναῖοι; λάβε μοι νέον, ἄγαγε κατὰ τὰ δόγματά σου. πονηρά ἐστι τὰ δόγματα, ἀνατρεπτικὰ πόλεως, λυμαντικὰ οἴκων, οὐδὲ γυναιξὶ πρέποντα. ἄφες ταῦτʼ, ἄνθρωπε. ζῇς ἐν ἡγεμονούσῃ πόλει· ἄρχειν σε δεῖ, κρίνειν δικαίως, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, σοὶ καλὴν γυναῖκα φαίνεσθαι μηδεμίαν ἢ τὴν σήν, καλὸν παῖδα μηδένα, καλὸν ἀργύρωμα μηδέν, χρύσωμα μηδέν. τούτοις σύμφωνα δόγματα ζήτησον, ἀφʼ ὧν ὁρμώμενος ἡδέως ἀφέξῃ πραγμάτων οὕτως πιθανῶν πρὸς τὸ ἀγαγεῖν καὶ νικῆσαι. ἂν δὲ πρὸς τῇ πιθανότητι τῇ ἐκείνων καὶ φιλοσοφίαν τινά ποτε ταύτην ἐξευρηκότες ὦμεν συνεπωθοῦσαν ἡμᾶς ἐπʼ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐπιρρωννύουσαν, τί γένηται; ἐν τορεύματι τί κράτιστόν ἐστιν, ὁ ἄργυρος ἢ ἡ τέχνη; χειρὸς οὐσία μὲν ἡ σάρξ, προηγούμενα δὲ τὰ χειρὸς ἔργα. οὐκοῦν καὶ καθήκοντα τρισσά· τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ποιὰ εἶναι, τὰ δʼ αὐτὰ τὰ προηγούμενα. οὕτως καὶ ἀνθρώπου οὐ τὴν ὕλην δεῖ τιμᾶν, τὰ σαρκίδια, ἀλλὰ τὰ προηγούμενα. τίνα ἐστὶ ταῦτα; πολιτεύεσθαι, γαμεῖν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι, θεὸν σέβειν, γονέων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθόλου ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὡς ἕκαστον τούτων δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς πεφύκαμεν. πεφύκαμεν δὲ πῶς; ὡς ἐλεύθεροι, ὡς γενναῖοι, ὡς αἰδήμονες. ποῖον γὰρ ἄλλο ζῷον ἐρυθριᾷ, ποῖον αἰσχροῦ φαντασίαν λαμβάνει; τὴν ἡδονὴν δʼ ὑπόταξαι τούτοις ὡς διάκονον, ὡς ὑπηρέτιν, ἵνα προθυμίας ἐκκαλέσηται, ἵνʼ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔργοις παρακρατῇ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ πλούσιός εἰμι καὶ οὐδενὸς χρεία μοί ἐστιν. — τί οὖν ἔτι προσποιῇ φιλοσοφεῖν; ἀρκεῖ τὰ χρυσώματα καὶ τὰ ἀργυρώματα· τί σοι χρεία δογμάτων; — ἀλλὰ καὶ κριτής εἰμι τῶν Ἑλλήνων. — οἶδας κρίνειν; τί σε ἐποίησεν εἰδέναι; — Καῖσάρ μοι κωδίκελλον ἔγραψεν. — Γραψάτω σοι, ἵνα κρίνῃς περὶ τῶν μουσικῶν· καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος; ὅμως δὲ πῶς κριτὴς ἐγένου; τὴν τίνος χεῖρα καταφιλήσας, τὴν Συμφόρου ἢ τὴν Νουμηνίου; τίνος πρὸ τοῦ κοιτῶνος κοιμηθείς; τίνι πέμψας δῶρα; εἶτα οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ, ὅτι τοσούτου ἄξιόν ἐστι κριτὴν εἶναι ὅσου Νουμήνιος; — ἀλλὰ δύναμαι ὃν θέλω εἰς φυλακὴν βαλεῖν. — ὡς λίθον. — ἀλλὰ δύναμαι ξυλοκοπῆσαι ὃν θέλω. — ὡς ὄνον. οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων ἀρχή. ὡς λογικῶν ἡμῶν ἄρξον δεικνὺς ἡμῖν τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ ἀκολουθήσομεν· δείκνυε τὰ ἀσύμφορα καὶ ἀποστραφησόμεθα. ζηλωτὰς ἡμᾶς κατασκεύασον σεαυτοῦ ὡς Σωκράτης ἑαυτοῦ. ἐκεῖνος ἦν ὁ ὡς ἀνθρώπων ἄρχων, ὁ κατεσκευακὼς ὑποτεταχότας αὐτῷ τὴν ὄρεξιν τὴν αὑτῶν, τὴν ἔκκλισιν, τὴν ὁρμήν, τὴν ἀφορμήν. τοῦτο ποίησον, τοῦτο μὴ ποιήσῃς· εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς φυλακήν σε βαλῶ. οὐκέτι ὡς λογικῶν ἡ ἀρχὴ γίνεται. ἀλλʼ ὡς ὁ Ζεὺς διέταξεν, τοῦτο ποίησον· ἂν δὲ μὴ ποιήσῃς, ζημιωθήσῃ, βλαβήσῃ. ποίαν βλάβην; ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ποιῆσαι ἃ δεῖ· ἀπολέσεις τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν κόσμιον. τούτων ἄλλας βλάβας μείζονας μὴ ζήτει.

[¶2] 8. In the same manner as we exercise ourselves against sophistical questions, we should exercise ourselves likewise in relation to such semblances as every day occur; for these, too, offer questions to us. Such a one’s son is dead. What think you of it? Answer: It is a thing inevitable, and therefore not an evil. Such a one is disinherited by his father. What think you of it? It is inevitable; and so not an evil. Caesar has condemned him. This is inevitable, and so not an evil. He has been afflicted by it. This is controllable by Will; it is an evil. He has supported it bravely. This is within the control of Will; it is a good. If we train ourselves in this manner we shall make improvement; for we shall never assent to anything but what the semblance itself includes. A son is dead. What then? A son is dead. Nothing more? Nothing. A ship is lost. What then? A ship is lost. He is carried to prison. What then? He is carried to prison. That he is unhappy is an addition which every one must make for himself. “But Zeus does not order these things rightly.” Why so? Because he has made you to be patient? Because he has made you to be brave? Because he has made them to be no evils? Because it is permitted you, while you suffer them, to be happy? Because he has opened you the door whenever they do not suit you? Go out, man, and do not complain! If you would know how the Romans treat philosophers, hear. Italicus, esteemed one of the greatest philosophers among them, being in a passion with his own people when I was by, said, as if he had suffered some intolerable evil, “cannot bear it; you are the ruin of me; you will make me just like him,” pointing to me.

> Greek: 8. ὡς πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτήματα τὰ σοφιστικὰ γυμναζόμεθα, οὕτως καὶ πρὸς τὰς φαντασίας καθʼ ἡμέραν ἔδει γυμνάζεσθαι· προτείνουσι γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ αὗται ἐρωτήματα. ὁ υἱὸς ἀπέθανε τοῦ δεῖνος. ἀπόκριναι ἀπροαίρετον, οὐ κακόν. ὁ πατὴρ τὸν δεῖνα ἀποκληρονόμον ἀπέλ[ε]ιπεν. τί σοι δοκεῖ; ἀπροαίρετον, οὐ κακόν. Καῖσαρ αὐτὸν κατέκρινεν. ἀπροαίρετον, οὐ κακόν. ἐλυπήθη ἐπὶ τούτοις. προαιρετικόν, κακόν. γενναίως ὑπέμεινεν. προαιρετικόν, ἀγαθόν. κἂν οὕτως ἐθιζώμεθα, προκόψομεν· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄλλῳ συγκαταθησόμεθα ἢ οὗ φαντασία καταληπτικὴ γίνεται. ὁ υἱὸς ἀπέθανε. τί ἐγένετο; ὁ υἱὸς ἀπέθανεν. ἄλλο οὐδέν; οὐδ[ε]έν. τὸ πλοῖον ἀπώλετο. τί ἐγένετο; τὸ πλοῖον ἀπώλετο. εἰς φυλακὴν ἀπήχθη. τί γέγονεν; εἰς φυλακὴν ἀπήχθη. τὸ δʼ ὅτι κακῶς πέπραχεν ἐξ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος προστίθησιν. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ταῦτα ὁ Ζεὺς ποιεῖ. διὰ τί; ὅτι σε ὑπομενητικὸν ἐποίησεν, ὅτι μεγαλόψυχον, ὅτι ἀφεῖλεν αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι κακά, ὅτι ἔξεστίν σοι πάσχοντι ταῦτα εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὅτι σοι τὴν θύραν ἤνοιξεν, ὅταν σοι μὴ ποιῇ; ἄνθρωπε, ἔξελθε καὶ μὴ ἐγκάλει. πῶς ἔχουσι Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς φιλοσόφους ἂν θέλῃς γνῶναι, ἄκουσον. Ἰταλικὸς ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν αὐτῶν φιλόσοφος εἶναι παρόντος ποτέ μου χαλεπήνας τοῖς ἰδίοις, ὡς ἀνήκεστα πάσχων, οὐ δύναμαι, ἔφη, φέρειν· ἀπόλλυτέ με, ποιήσετέ με τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι, δείξας ἐμέ.

[¶3] 9. A person came to him who was going to Rome on a lawsuit in which his dignity was concerned; and after telling him the occasion of his journey, asked him what he thought of the affair. If you ask me, says Epictetus, what will happen to you at Rome, and whether you shall gain or lose your cause, I have no suggestion as to that. But if you ask me how you shall fare, I can answer, If you have right principles, well; if wrong ones, ill. For every action turns upon its principle. What was the reason that you so earnestly desired to be chosen Governor of the Gnossians? Principle. What is the reason that you are now going to Rome? Principle. And in winter too, and with danger and expense? Why, because it is necessary. What tells you so? Your principle. If, then, principles are the source of all our actions, wherever any one has bad principles the effect will correspond to the cause. Well, then; are all our principles sound? Are both yours and your antagonist’s? How then do you differ? Or are yours better than his? Why? You think so, and so thinks he of his, and so do madmen. This is a bad criterion. But show me that you have given some attention and care to your principles. As you now take a voyage to Rome for the government of the Gnossians, and are not contented to stay at home with the honors you before enjoyed, but desire something greater and more illustrious, did you ever take such a voyage in order to examine your own principles and to throw away the bad ones, if you happened to have any? Did you ever apply to any one upon this account? What time did you ever appoint to yourself for it? What age? Run over your years. If you are ashamed of me, do it for yourself. Did you examine your principles when you were a child? Did not you act then as now? When you were a youth, and frequented the schools of the orators, and yourself made declamations, did you ever imagine that you were deficient in anything? And when you became a man and entered upon public business, pleaded causes, and acquired credit, whom did you then recognize as your equal? How would you have borne that any one should examine whether your principles were bad? What, then, would you have me say to you? “Assist me in this affair.” I have no suggestion to offer for that. Neither are you come to me, if it be upon that account you came, as to a philosopher; but as you would come to an herb-seller or a shoemaker. “For what purposes, then, can the philosophers give suggestions?” For preserving and conducting the Reason conformably to Nature, whatever happens. Do you think this a small thing? “No, but the greatest.” Well, and does it require but a short time, and may it be taken as you pass by? If you can, take it then; and so you will say, “have visited Epictetus.” Ay; just as you would visit a stone or a statue. For you have seen me, and nothing more. But he visits a man, as a man, who learns his principles, and, in return, shows his own. Learn my principles; show me yours. Then say you have visited me. Let us confute each other. If I have any bad principle, take it away. If you have any, bring it forth. This is visiting a philosopher. No, but “It lies in our way, and while we are about hiring a ship, we may call on Epictetus. Let us see what he says.” And then when you are gone, you say, “Epictetus is nothing. His language was inaccurate, was barbarous.” For what else did you come to criticise? “Well; but if I employ myself in these things, I shall be without an estate, like you,—without plate, without equipage, like you.” Nothing, perhaps, is necessary to be said to this, but that I do not want them. But if you possess many things, you still want others; so that whether you will or not, you are poorer than I. “What then do I need?” What you have not,—constancy, a mind conformable to Nature, and a freedom from perturbation. Patron or no patron, what care I? But you do. I am richer than you; I am not anxious what Caesar will think of me; I flatter no one on that account. This I have, instead of silver and gold plate. You have your vessels of gold; but your discourse, your principles, your opinions, your pursuits, your desires, are of mere earthen ware. When I have all these conformable to Nature, why should not I bestow some study upon my reasoning too? I am at leisure. My mind is under no distraction. In this freedom from distraction, what shall I do? Have I anything more becoming a man than this? You, when you have nothing to do, are restless; you go to the theatre, or perhaps to bathe. Why should not the philosopher polish his reasoning? You have fine crystal and myrrhine vases; I have acute forms of arguing. To you, all you have appears little; to me all I have seems great. Your appetite is insatiable; mine is satisfied. When children thrust their hand into a narrow jar of nuts and figs, if they fill it, they cannot get it out again; then they begin crying. Drop a few of them, and you will get out the rest. And do you too drop your desire; do not demand much, and you will attain.

> Greek: 9. εἰσελθόντος δέ τινος πρὸς αὐτόν, ὃς εἰς Ῥώμην ἀνῄει δίκην ἔχων περὶ τιμῆς τῆς αὑτοῦ, πυθόμενος τὴν αἰτίαν, διʼ ἣν ἄνεισιν, ἐπερωτήσαντος ἐκείνου, τίνα γνώμην ἔχει περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, εἴ μου πυνθάνῃ, τί πράξεις ἐν Ῥώμῃ, φησίν, πότερον κατορθώσεις ἢ ἀποτεύξῃ, θεώρημα πρὸς τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχω· εἰ δὲ πυνθάνῃ, πῶς πράξεις, τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὀρθὰ δόγματα ἔχεις, καλῶς, εἰ δὲ φαῦλα, κακῶς. παντὶ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ πράσσειν τι δόγμα. τί γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ ἐπεθύμησας προστάτης χειροτονηθῆναι Κνωσίων; τὸ δόγμα. τί ἐστιν, διʼ ὃ νῦν εἰς Ῥώμην ἀνέρχῃ; τὸ δόγμα. καὶ μετὰ χειμῶνος καὶ κινδύνου καὶ ἀναλωμάτων; — ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστιν. — τίς σοι λέγει τοῦτο; τὸ δόγμα. οὐκοῦν εἰ πάντων αἴτια τὰ δόγματα, φαῦλα δέ τις ἔχει δόγματα, οἷον ἂν ᾖ τὸ αἴτιον, τοιοῦτον καὶ τὸ ἀποτελούμενον. ἆρʼ οὖν πάντες ἔχομεν ὑγιῆ δόγματα καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἀντίδικός σου; καὶ πῶς διαφέρεσθε; ἀλλὰ σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖνος; διὰ τί; δοκεῖ σοι. κἀκείνῳ καὶ τοῖς μαινομένοις. τοῦτο πονηρὸν κριτήριον. ἀλλὰ δεῖξόν μοι, ὅτι ἐπίσκεψίν τινα καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν πεποίησαι τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων. καὶ ὡς νῦν εἰς Ῥώμην πλεῖς ἐπὶ τῷ προστάτης εἶναι Κνωσίων καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ σοι μένειν ἐν οἴκῳ τὰς τιμὰς ἔχοντι ἃς εἶχες, ἀλλὰ μείζονός τινος ἐπιθυμεῖς καὶ ἐπιφανεστέρου, πότε οὕτως ἔπλευσας ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰ δόγματα ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ σαυτοῦ καὶ εἴ τι φαῦλον ἔχεις, ἐκβαλεῖν; τίνι προσελήλυθας τούτου ἕνεκα; ποῖον χρόνον ἐπέταξας σαυτῷ, ποίαν ἡλικίαν; ἔπελθέ σου τοὺς χρόνους, εἰ ἐμὲ αἰσχύνῃ, αὐτὸς πρὸς σαυτόν. ὅτε παῖς ἦς, ἐξήταζες τὰ σαυτοῦ δόγματα; οὐχὶ δʼ ὡς πάντα ποιεῖς, ἐποίεις ἃ ἐποίεις; ὅτε δὲ μειράκιον ἤδη καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων ἤκουες καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμελέτας, τί σοι λείπειν ἐφαντάζου; ὅτε δὲ νεανίσκος καὶ ἤδη ἐπολιτεύου καὶ δίκας αὐτὸς ἔλεγες καὶ εὐδοκίμεις, τίς σοι ἔτι ἴσος ἐφαίνετο; ποῦ δʼ ἂν ἠνέσχου ὑπό τινος ἐξεταζόμενος, ὅτι πονηρὰ ἔχεις δόγματα; τί οὖν σοι θέλεις εἴπω; — βοήθησόν μοι εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα. — οὐκ ἔχω πρὸς τοῦτο θεωρήματα· οὐδὲ σύ, εἰ τούτου ἕνεκα ἐλήλυθας πρὸς ἐμέ, ὡς πρὸς φιλόσοφον ἐλήλυθας, ἀλλʼ ὡς πρὸς λαχανοπώλην, ἀλλʼ ὡς πρὸς σκυτέα. — πρὸς τί οὖν ἔχουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι θεωρήματα; — πρὸς τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἂν ἀποβῇ, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἡμῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν. μικρόν σοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο; — οὔ· ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγιστον. — τί οὖν; ὀλίγου χρόνου χρείαν ἔχει καὶ ἔστι παρερχόμενον αὐτὸ λαβεῖν; εἰ δύνασαι, λάμβανε. εἶτʼ ἐρεῖς συνέβαλ[λ]ον Ἐπικτήτῳ ὡς λίθῳ, ὡς ἀνδριάντι. εἶδες γάρ με καὶ πλέον οὐδέν. ἀνθρώπῳ δʼ ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ συμβάλλει ὁ τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ καταμανθάνων καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει τὰ ἴδια δεικνύων. κατάμαθέ μου τὰ δόγματα, δεῖξόν μοι τὰ σὰ καὶ οὕτως λέγε συμβεβληκέναι μοι. ἐλέγξωμεν ἀλλήλους· εἴ τι ἔχω κακὸν δόγμα, ἄφελε αὐτό· εἴ τι ἔχεις, θὲς εἰς τὸ μέσον. τοῦτό ἐστι φιλοσόφῳ συμβάλλειν. οὔ· ἀλλὰ πάροδός ἐστι καὶ ἕως τὸ πλοῖον μισθούμεθα, δυνάμεθα καὶ Ἐπίκτητον ἰδεῖν· ἴδωμεν, τί ποτε λέγει. εἶτʼ ἐξελθὼν οὐδὲν ἦν ὁ Ἐπίκτητος, ἐσολοίκιζεν, ἐβαρβάριζεν. τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου κριταὶ εἰσέρχεσθε; ἀλλʼ ἂν πρὸς τούτοις, φησίν, ὦ, ἀγρὸν οὐχ ἕξω ὡς οὐδὲ σύ, ποτήρια ἀργυρᾶ οὐχ ἕξω ὡς οὐδὲ σύ, κτήνη καλὰ ὡς οὐδὲ σύ. πρὸς ταῦτα ἴσως ἀρκεῖ ἐκεῖνο εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἀλλὰ χρείαν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔχω· σὺ δʼ ἂν πολλὰ κτήσῃ, ἄλλων χρείαν ἔχεις, θέλεις οὐ θέλεις, πτωχότερός μου. — τίνος οὖν ἔχω χρείαν; — τοῦ σοὶ μὴ παρόντος· τοῦ εὐσταθεῖν, τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν, τοῦ μὴ ταράττεσθαι. πάτρων, οὐ πάτρων, τί μοι μέλει; σοὶ μέλει. πλουσιώτερός σου εἰμί· οὐκ ἀγωνιῶ, τί φρονήσει περὶ ἐμοῦ ὁ Καῖσαρ· οὐδένα κολακεύω τούτου ἕνεκα. ταῦτα ἔχω ἀντὶ τῶν ἀργυρωμάτων, ἀντὶ τῶν χρυσωμάτων. σὺ χρυσᾶ σκεύη, ὀστράκινον τὸν λόγον, τὰ δόγματα, τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, τὰς ὁρμάς, τὰς ὀρέξεις. ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα ἔχω κατὰ φύσιν, διὰ τί μὴ φιλοτεχνήσω καὶ περὶ τὸν λόγον; εὐσχολῶ γάρ· οὐ περισπᾶταί μου ἡ διάνοια. τί ποιήσω μὴ περισπώμενος; τούτου τί ἀνθρωπικώτερον ἔχω; ὑμεῖς ὅταν μηδὲν ἔχητε, ταράσσεσθε, εἰς θέατρον εἰσέρχεσθε ἢ ἀναλύετε· διὰ τί ὁ φιλόσοφος μὴ ἐξεργάσηται τὸν αὑτοῦ λόγον; σὺ κρυστάλλινα, ἐγὼ τὰ τοῦ Ψευδομένου· σὺ μούρρινα, ἐγὼ τὰ τοῦ Ἀποφάσκοντος. σοὶ πάντα μικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἔχεις, ἐμοὶ τὰ ἐμὰ πάντα μεγάλα. ἀπλήρωτός σου ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ἡ ἐμὴ πεπλήρωται. τοῖς παιδίοις εἰς στενόβρογχον κεράμιον καθιεῖσιν τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἐκφέρουσιν ἰσχαδοκάρυα τοῦτο συμβαίνει· ἂν πληρώσῃ τὴν χεῖρα, ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐ δύναται, εἶτα κλάει. ἄφες ὀλίγα ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξοίσεις. καὶ σὺ ἄφες τὴν ὄρεξιν· μὴ πολλῶν ἐπιθύμει καὶ οἴσεις.

[¶4] 10. We should have all our principles ready for use on every occasion,—at dinner, such as relate to dinner; in the bath, such as relate to the bath; in the bed, such as relate to the bed.
Let not the stealing god of sleep surprise,
Nor creep in slumbers on thy weary eyes,
Ere every action of the former day
Strictly thou dost, and righteously survey.
What have I done? In what have I transgressed?
What good, or ill, has this day’s life expressed?
Where have I failed in what I ought to do?
If evil were thy deeds, repent and mourn;
If good, rejoice. We should retain these verses so as to apply them to our use; not merely to say them by rote, as we do with verses in honor of Apollo. Again, in a fever we should have such principles ready as relate to a fever; and not, as soon as we are taken ill, forget all. Provided I do but act like a philosopher, let what will happen. Some way or other I depart must from this frail body, whether a fever comes or not. What is it to be a philosopher? Is it not to be prepared against events? Do you not comprehend that you then say, in effect, “If I am but prepared to bear all events with calmness, let what will happen?” Otherwise you are like an athlete, who, after receiving a blow, should quit the combat. In that case, indeed, you might leave off without a penalty. But what shall we get by leaving off philosophy? What, then; ought each of us to say upon every difficult occasion, “It was for this that I exercised; it was for this that I trained myself”? God says to you, Give me a proof if you have gone through the preparatory combats according to rule; if you have followed a proper diet and proper exercise; if you have obeyed your master; and after this, do you faint at the very time of action? Now is your time for a fever. Bear it well. For thirst; bear it well. For hunger; bear it well. Is it not in your power? Who shall restrain you? A physician may restrain you from drinking, but he cannot restrain you from bearing your thirst well. He may restrain you from eating, but he cannot restrain you from bearing hunger well. “But I cannot follow my studies.” And for what end do you follow them, slave? Is it not that you may be prosperous, that you may be constant, that you may think and act conformably to Nature? What restrains you, but that, in a fever, you may keep your Reason in harmony with Nature? Here is the test of the matter. Here is the trial of the philosopher; for a fever is a part of life, as is a walk, a voyage, or a journey. Do you read when you are walking? No, nor in a fever. But when you walk well, you attend to what belongs to a walker; so, if you bear a fever well, you have everything belonging to one in a fever. What is it to bear a fever well? Not to blame either God or man, not to be afflicted at what happens, to await death in a right and becoming manner, and to do what is to be done. When the physician enters, not to dread what he may say; nor, if he should tell you that you are doing well, to be too much rejoiced; for what good has he told you? When you were in health, what good did it do you? Not to be dejected when he tells you that you are very ill; for what is it to be very ill? To be near the separation of soul and body. What harm is there in this, then? If you are not near it now, will you not be near it hereafter? What, will the world be quite overturned when you die? Why, then, do you flatter your physician? Why do you say, “If you please, sir, I shall do well”? Why do you furnish an occasion to his pride? Why do not you treat a physician, with regard to an insignificant body,—which is not yours, but by nature mortal,—as you do a shoemaker about your foot, or a carpenter about a house? It is the season for these things, to one in a fever. If he fulfils these, he has what belongs to him. For it is not the business of a philosopher to take care of these mere externals,—of his wine, his oil, or his body,—but of his Reason. And how with regard to externals? Not to behave inconsiderately about them. What occasion is there, then, for fear; what occasion for anger, for desire, about things that belong to others, or are of no value? For two rules we should always have ready,—that there is nothing good or evil save in the Will; and that we are not to lead events, but to follow them. “My brother ought not to have treated me so.” Very true; but he must see to that. However he treats me, I am to act rightly with regard to him; for the one is my own concern, the other is not; the one cannot be restrained, the other may.

> Greek: 10. ἑκάστου δόγματος ὅταν ἡ χρεία παρῇ, πρόχειρον αὐτὸ ἔχειν δεῖ· ἐπʼ ἀρίστῳ τὰ περὶ ἀρίστου, ἐν βαλανείῳ τὰ περὶ βαλανείου, ἐν κοίτῃ τὰ περὶ κοίτης. μηδʼ ὕπνον μαλακοῖσιν ἐπʼ ὄμμασι προσδέξασθαι, πρὶν τῶν ἡμερινῶν ἔργων λογίσασθαι ἕκαστα· πῇ παρέβην; τί δʼ ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐ τετέλεσται; ἀρξάμενος δʼ ἀπὸ τοῦδε ἐπέξιθι· καὶ μετέπειτα δειλὰ μὲν ῥέξας ἐπιπλήσσεο, χρηστὰ δὲ τέρπου. καὶ τούτους τοὺς στίχους κατέχειν χρηστικῶς, οὐχ ἵνα διʼ αὐτῶν ἀναφωνῶμεν, ὡς διὰ τοῦ Παιὰν Ἄπολλον. πάλιν ἐν πυρετῷ τὰ πρὸς τοῦτο· μή, ἂν πυρέξωμεν, ἀφιέναι πάντα καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι· ἂν ἐγὼ ἔτι φιλοσοφήσω, ὃ θέλει γινέσθω. πού ποτʼ ἀπελθόντα τοῦ σωματίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εἴ τε καὶ πυρετὸς οὐκ ἔρχεται. τὸ δὲ φιλοσοφῆσαι τί ἐστιν; οὐχὶ παρασκευάσασθαι πρὸς τὰ συμβαίνοντα; οὐ παρακολουθεῖς οὖν, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι λέγεις ἂν ἔτι ἐγὼ παρασκευάσωμαι πρὸς τὸ πρᾴως φέρειν τὰ συμβαίνοντα, ὃ θέλει γινέσθω; οἷον εἴ τις πληγὰς λαβὼν ἀποσταίη τοῦ παγκρατιάζειν. ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖ μὲν ἔξεστι καταλῦσαι καὶ μὴ δέρεσθαι, ἐνθάδε δʼ ἂν καταλύσωμεν φιλοσοφοῦντες, τί ὄφελος; τί οὖν δεῖ λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐφʼ ἑκάστου τῶν τραχέων; ὅτι ἕνεκα τούτου ἐγυμναζόμην, ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἤσκουν. ὁ θεός σοι λέγει δός μοι ἀπόδειξιν, εἰ νομίμως ἤθλησας, εἰ ἔφαγες ὅσα δεῖ, εἰ ἐγυμνάσθης, εἰ τοῦ ἀλείπτου ἤκουσας· εἶτʼ ἐπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου καταμαλακίζῃ; νῦν τοῦ πυρέττειν καιρός ἐστιν, τοῦτο καλῶς γινέσθω· τοῦ διψᾶν, δίψα καλῶς· τοῦ πεινᾶν, πείνα καλῶς. οὐκ [ἐξ]ἔστιν ἐπὶ σοί; τίς σε κωλύσει; ἀλλὰ πιεῖν μὲν κωλύσει ὁ ἰατρός, καλῶς δὲ διψᾶν οὐ δύναται· καὶ φαγεῖν μὲν κωλύσει, πεινᾶν δὲ καλῶς οὐ δύναται. ἀλλʼ οὐ φιλολογῶ;— τίνος δʼ ἕνεκα φιλολογεῖς; ἀνδράποδον, οὐχ ἵνα εὐροῇς; οὐχ ἵνα εὐσταθῇς; οὐχ ἵνα κατὰ φύσιν ἔχῃς καὶ διεξάγῃς; τί κωλύει πυρέσσοντα κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν; ἐνθάδʼ ὁ ἔλεγχος τοῦ πράγματος, ἡ δοκιμασία τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος. μέρος γάρ ἐστι καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ βίου, ὡς περίπατος, ὡς πλοῦς, ὡς ὁδοιπορία, οὕτως καὶ πυρετός. μή τι περιπατῶν ἀναγιγνώσκεις; — οὔ. — οὕτως οὐδὲ πυρέσσων. ἀλλʼ ἂν καλῶς περιπατῇς, ἔχεις τὸ τοῦ περιπατοῦντος· ἂν καλῶς πυρέξῃς, ἔχεις τὰ τοῦ πυρέσσοντος. τί ἐστι καλῶς πυρέσσειν; μὴ θεὸν μέμψασθαι, μὴ ἄνθρωπον, μὴ θλιβῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν γινομένων, εὖ καὶ καλῶς προσδέχεσθαι τὸν θάνατον, ποιεῖν τὰ προστασσόμενα· ὅταν ὁ ἰατρὸς εἰσέρχηται, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι, τί εἴπῃ, μηδʼ ἂν εἴπῃ κομψῶς ἔχεις, ὑπερχαίρειν· τί γάρ σοι ἀγαθὸν εἶπεν; ὅτε γὰρ ὑγίαινες, τί σοι ἦν ἀγαθόν; μηδʼ ἂν εἴπῃ κακῶς ἔχεις, ἀθυμεῖν· τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ κακῶς ἔχειν; ἐγγίζειν τῷ διαλυθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος. τί οὖν δεινόν ἐστιν; ἐὰν νῦν μὴ ἐγγίσῃς, ὕστερον οὐκ ἐγγιεῖς; ἀλλὰ ὁ κόσμος μέλλει ἀνατρέπεσθαι σοῦ ἀποθανόντος; τί οὖν κολακεύεις τὸν ἰατρόν; τί λέγεις ἐὰν σὺ θέλῃς, κύριε, καλῶς ἕξω; τί παρέχεις αὐτῷ ἀφορμὴν τοῦ ἐπᾶραι ὀφρῦν; οὐχὶ δὲ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀξίαν αὐτῷ ἀποδίδως, ὡς σκυτεῖ περὶ τὸν πόδα, ὡς τέκτονι περὶ τὴν οἰκίαν, οὕτως καὶ τῷ ἰατρῷ περὶ τὸ σωμάτιον, τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν, τὸ φύσει νεκρόν; τούτων ὁ καιρός ἐστι τῷ πυρέσσοντι· ἂν ταῦτα ἐκπληρώσῃ, ἔχει τὰ αὑτοῦ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσόφου ταῦτα ⟨τὰ⟩ ἐκτὸς τηρεῖν, οὔτε ⟨τὸ⟩ οἰνάριον οὔτε τὸ ἐλάδιον οὔτε τὸ σωμάτιον, ἀλλὰ τί; τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικόν. τὰ δʼ ἔξω πῶς; μέχρι τοῦ μὴ ἀλογίστως κατὰ ταῦτα ἀναστρέφεσθαι. ποῦ οὖν ἔτι καιρὸς τοῦ φοβεῖσθαι; ποῦ οὖν ἔτι καιρὸς ὀργῆς; ποῦ φόβου περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, περὶ τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων; δύο γὰρ ταῦτα πρόχειρα ἔχειν δεῖ· ὅτι ἔξω τῆς προαιρέσεως οὐδέν ἐστιν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ προηγεῖσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλʼ ἐπακολουθεῖν. οὐκ ἔδει οὕτως μοι προσενεχθῆναι τὸν ἀδελφόν. οὔ· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἐκεῖνος ὄψεται. ἐγὼ δʼ, ὡς ἂν προσενεχθῇ, αὐτὸς ὡς δεῖ χρήσομαι τοῖς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμόν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἀλλότριον· τοῦτο οὐδεὶς κωλῦσαι δύναται, ἐκεῖνο κωλύεται.

[¶5] 11. There are some punishments appointed, as by a law, for such as disobey the Divine admnistration. Whoever shall esteem anything good, except what depends on the Will, let him envy, let him covet, let him flatter, let him be full of perturbation. Whoever esteems anything else to be evil, let him grieve, let him mourn, let him lament, let him be wretched. And yet, though thus severely punished, we cannot desist. Remember what the poet says of a guest,—
It were not lawful to affront a guest,
Even did the worst draw nigh. This too you should be prepared to say with regard to a father, It is not lawful for me to affront you, father, even if a worse than you had come; for all are from paternal Zeus. And so of a brother; for all are from kindred Zeus. And thus we shall find Zeus to be the superintendent of all the other relations.

> Greek: 11. εἰσί τινες ὡς ἐκ νόμου διατεταγμέναι κολάσεις τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει· ὃς ἂν ἄλλο τι ἡγήσηται ἀγαθὸν παρὰ τὰ προαιρετικά, φθονείτω, ἐπιθυμείτω, κολακευέτω, ταρασσέσθω· ὃς ἂν ἄλλο κακόν, λυπείσθω, πενθείτω, θρηνείτω, δυστυχείτω. καὶ ὅμως οὕτως πικρῶς κολαζόμενοι ἀποστῆναι οὐ δυνάμεθα. μέμνησο, τί λέγει ὁ ποιητὴς περὶ τοῦ ξένου· ξεῖνʼ, οὔ μοι θέμις ἔστʼ[ι καὶ], οὐδʼ εἰ κακίων σέθεν ⟨ἔλθοι,⟩ ⟨ξεῖνον ἀτιμῆσαι· πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἅπα⟩ντες ξεῖνοί τε πτωχοί τε. τοῦτο οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ πατρὸς πρόχειρον ἔχειν· οὔ μοι θέμις ἔστʼ οὐδʼ εἰ κακίων σέθεν ἔλθοι, πατέρʼ ἀτιμῆσαι· πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἅπαντες τοῦ Πατρῴου· καὶ ἐπʼ ἀδελφῷ· πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἅπαντες τοῦ Ὁμογνίου. καὶ οὕτως κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας σχέσεις εὑρήσομεν ἐπόπτην τὸν Δία.

[¶6] 12. We are not to carry our training beyond Nature and Reason; for thus we, who call ourselves philosophers, shall not differ from jugglers. For it is no doubt difficult to walk upon a rope, and not only difficult, but dangerous. Ought we too, for that reason, to make it our study to walk upon a rope, or balance a pole, or grasp a statue? By no means. It is not everything difficult or dangerous that is a proper training, but such things as are conducive to what lies before us to do. “And what is it that lies before us to do?” To have our desires and aversions free from restraint. “How is that?” Not to be disappointed of our desire, nor incur our aversion. To this ought our training to be directed. For without vigorous and steady training, it is not possible to preserve our desire undisappointed and our aversion unincurred; and therefore, if we suffer it to be externally employed on things uncontrollable by Will, be assured that your desire will neither gain its object, nor your aversion avoid it. And because habit has a powerful influence, and we are habituated to apply our desire and aversion to externals only. we must oppose one habit to another: and where the semblances are most treacherous, there oppose the force of training. I am inclined to pleasure. I will bend myself, even unduly, to the other side, as a matter of training. I am averse to pain. I will strive and wrestle with these semblances, that I may cease to shrink from any such object. For who is truly in training? He who endeavors totally to control desire, and to apply aversion only to things controllable by Will, and strives for it most in the most difficult cases. Hence different persons are to be trained in different ways. What signifies it, to this purpose, to balance a pole, or to go about with tent and implements [of exhibition]? If you are hasty, man, let it be your training to bear ill language patiently; and when you are affronted, not to be angry. Thus, at length, you may arrive at such a proficiency as, when any one strikes you, to say to yourself, “Let me suppose this to be like grasping a statue.” Next train yourself to make but a moderate use of wine,—not to drink a great deal, to which some are so foolish as to train themselves,—but to abstain from this first; and then to abstain from women and from gluttony. Afterwards you will venture into the lists at some proper season, by way of trial, if at all, to see whether these semblances get the better of you as much as they used to do. But at first flee from what is stronger than you. The contest between a fascinating woman and a young man just initiated into philosophy is unequal. The brass pot and the earthen pitcher, as the fable says, are an unfair match. Next to the desires and aversions is the second class, of the pursuits and avoidances; that they may be obedient to reason; that nothing may be done improperly, in point of time and place, or in any other respect. The third class relates to the faculty of assent and to what is plausible and persuasive. As Socrates said that we are not to lead a life which is not tested, so neither are we to admit an untested semblance; but to say, “Stop, let me see what you are and whence you come,” just as the police say, “Show me your pass.” “Have you that indorsement from Nature which is necessary to the acceptance of every semblance?” In short, whatever things are applied to the body by those who train it, so may these be used in our training if they any way affect desire or aversion. But if this be done for mere ostentation, it belongs to one who looks and seeks for something external, and strives for spectators to exclaim, “What a great man!” Hence Apollonius said well, “If you have a mind to train yourself for your own benefit, when you are choking with heat, take a little cold water in your mouth, and spit it out again, and hold your tongue.”

> Greek: 12. τὰς ἀσκήσεις οὐ δεῖ διὰ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ παραδόξων ποιεῖσθαι, ἐπεί τοι τῶν θαυματοποιῶν οὐδὲν διοίσομεν οἱ λέγοντες φιλοσοφεῖν. δύσκολον γάρ ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ σχοινίου περιπατεῖν καὶ οὐ μόνον δύσκολον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπικίνδυνον. τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς μελετᾶν ἐπὶ σχοινίου περιπατεῖν ἢ φοίνικα ἱστάνειν ἢ ἀνδριάντας περιλαμβάνειν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δύσκολον πᾶν καὶ ἐπικίνδυνον ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς ἄσκησιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσφορον τῷ προκειμένῳ ἐκπονηθῆναι. τί δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἐκπονηθῆναι; ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει ἀκωλύτως ἀναστρέφεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἐστιν, μήτε ὀρεγόμενον ἀποτυγχάνειν μήτʼ ἐκκλίνοντα περιπίπτειν. πρὸς τοῦτο οὖν καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν ῥέπειν δεῖ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναπότευκτον σχεῖν τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἀπερίπτωτον ἄνευ μεγάλης καὶ συνεχοῦς ἀσκήσεως, ἴσθι ὅτι, ἐὰν ἔξω ἐάσῃς ἀποστρέφεσθαι αὐτὴν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα, οὔτε τὴν ὄρεξιν ἐπιτευκτικὴν ἕξεις οὔτε τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἀπερίπτωτον. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔθος ἰσχυρὸν προηγῆται πρὸς μόνα ταῦτα εἰθισμένων ἡμῶν χρῆσθαι ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει, δεῖ τῷ ἔθει τούτῳ ἐναντίον ἔθος ἀντιθεῖναι καὶ ὅπου ὁ πολὺς ὄλισθος τῶν φαντασιῶν, ἐκεῖ ἀντιτιθέναι τὸ ἀσκητικόν. Ἑτεροκλινῶς ἔχω πρὸς ἡδονήν· ἀνατοιχήσω ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον τῆς ἀσκήσεως ἕνεκα. ἐκκλιτικῶς ἔχω πόνου· τρίψω μου καὶ γυμνάσω πρὸς τοῦτο τὰς φαντασίας ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποστῆναι τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ τοιούτου. τίς γάρ ἐστιν ἀσκητής; ὁ μελετῶν ὀρέξει μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι, ἐκκλίσει δὲ πρὸς μόνα τὰ προαιρετικὰ χρῆσθαι καὶ μελετῶν μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς δυσκαταπονήτοις. καθʼ ὃ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἀσκητέον. τί οὖν ὧδε ποιεῖ τὸ φοίνικα στῆσαι ἢ τὸ στέγην δερματίνην καὶ ὅλμον καὶ ὕπερον περιφέρειν; ἄνθρωπε, ἄσκησον, εἰ γοργὸς εἶ, λοιδορούμενος ἀνέχεσθαι, ἀτιμασθεὶς μὴ ἀχθεσθῆναι. εἶθʼ οὕτως προ[σ]βήσῃ, ἵνα, κἂν πλήξῃ σέ τις, εἴπῃς αὐτὸς πρὸς αὑτὸν ὅτι δόξον ἀνδριάντα περιειληφέναι. εἶτα καὶ οἰναρίῳ κομψῶς χρῆσθαι, μὴ εἰς τὸ πολὺ πίνειν (καὶ γὰρ περὶ τοῦτο ἐπαρίστεροι ἀσκηταί εἰσιν), ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εἰς τὸ ἀποσχέσθαι, καὶ κορασιδίου ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ πλακουνταρίου. εἶτά ποτε ὑπὲρ δοκιμασίας, εἰ ἄρα, καθήσεις εὐκαίρως αὐτὸς σαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γνῶναι, εἰ ὁμοίως ἡττῶσίν σε αἱ φαντασίαι. τὰ πρῶτα δὲ φεῦγε μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων. ἄνισος ἡ μάχη κορασιδίῳ κομψῷ πρὸς νέον ἀρχόμενον φιλοσοφεῖν· χύτρα, φασί, καὶ πέτρα οὐ συμφωνεῖ. μετὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τὴν ἔκκλισιν δεύτερος τ[ρ]όπος ὁ περὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ ἀφορμήν· ⟨ἵνʼ⟩ εὐπειθὴς τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα μὴ παρὰ καιρόν, μὴ παρὰ τόπον, μὴ παρὰ ἄλλην τινὰ τοιαύτην [ἀ]συμμετρίαν. τρίτος ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, ὁ πρὸς τὰ πιθανὰ καὶ ἑλκυστικά. ὡς γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν ἀνεξέταστον βίον μὴ ζῆν, οὕτως ἀνεξέταστον φαντασίαν μὴ παραδέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λέγειν ἔκδεξαι, ἄφες ἴδω, τίς εἶ καὶ πόθεν ἔρχῃ, ὡς οἱ νυκτοφύλακες δεῖξόν μοι τὰ συνθήματα. ἔχεις τὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως σύμβολον, ὃ δεῖ τὴν παραδεχθησομένην ἔχειν φαντασίαν; καὶ λοιπὸν ὅσα τῷ σώματι προσάγεται ὑπὸ τῶν γυμναζόντων αὐτό, ἂν μὲν ὧδέ που ῥέπῃ πρὸς ὄρεξιν καὶ ἔκκλισιν, εἴη ἂν καὶ αὐτὰ ἀσκητικά· ἂν δὲ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν, ἔξω νενευκότος ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλο τι θηρωμένου καὶ θεατὰς ζητοῦντος τοὺς ἐροῦντας ὦ[ς] μεγάλου ἀνθρώπου. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὅταν θέλῃς σαυτῷ ἀσκῆσαι, διψῶν ποτε καύματος ἐφέλκυσαι βρόγχον ψυχροῦ καὶ ἔκπτυσον καὶ μηδενὶ εἴπῃς.