---
title: "Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν"
author: "Epictetus"
translator: "Thomas Wentworth Higginson"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 2 of 23
url: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/2/
cite: "Epictetus, tr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν, section 2. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/2/"
---

# Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν

*Epictetus, tr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson*

A former slave’s lessons in Stoic freedom, taken down by his pupil Arrian.

> Greek: ed. Heinrich Schenkl, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0557.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Thomas Wentworth Higginson, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0557.tlg001.perseus-eng4). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 2. Book I · chapters 1–6

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/2/#p-N

[¶0] 1. Of human faculties in general, you will find that each is unable to contemplate itself, and therefore to approve or disapprove itself. How far does the proper sphere of grammar extend? As far as the judging of language. Of music? As far as the judging of melody. Does either of them contemplate itself, then? By no means. Thus, for instance, when you are to write to your friend, grammar will tell you what to write; but whether you are to write to your friend at all, or no, grammar will not tell you. Thus music, with regard to tunes; but whether it be proper or improper, at any particular time, to sing or play, music will not tell you. What will tell, then? That faculty which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is that? The Reasoning Faculty; for that alone is found able to place an estimate upon itself,—what it is, what are its powers, what its value and likewise all the rest. For what is it else that says, gold is beautiful? since the gold itself does not speak. Evidently, that faculty which judges of the appearances of things. What else distinguishes music, grammar, the other faculties, proves their uses, and shows their proper occasions? Nothing but this. As it was fit, then, this most excellent and superior faculty alone, a right use of the appearances of things, the gods have placed in our own power; but all other matters they have not placed in our power. What, was it because they would not? I rather think that, if they could, they had granted us these too; but they certainly could not. For, placed upon earth, and confined to such a body and to such companions, how was it possible that, in these respects, we should not be hindered by things outside of us? But what says Zeus? “Epictetus, if it had been possible, I had made this little body and property of thine free, and not liable to hindrance. But now do not mistake; it is not thy own, but only a finer mixture of clay. Since, then, I could not give thee this, I have given thee a certain portion of myself; this faculty of exerting the powers of pursuit and avoidance, of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the use of the appearances of things. Taking care of this point, and making what is thy own to consist in this, thou wilt never be restrained, never be hindered; thou wilt not groan, wilt not complain, wilt not flatter any one. How, then? Do all these advantages seem small to thee? Heaven forbid! Let them suffice thee, then, and thank the gods.” But now, when it is in our power to take care of one thing, and to apply ourselves to one, we choose rather to take care of many, and to encumber ourselves with many,—body, property, brother, friend, child, and slave,—and, by this multiplicity of encumbrances, we are burdened and weighed down. Thus, when the weather does not happen to be fair for sailing, we sit in distress and gaze out perpetually. Which way is the wind? North. What good will that do us? When will the west blow? When it pleases friend, or when Aeolus pleases; for Zeus has not made you dispenser of the winds, but Aeolus. What, then, is to be done? To make the best of what is in our power, and take the rest as it occurs. And how does it occur? As it pleases God. What, then, must I be the only one to lose my head? Why, would you have all the world, then, lose their heads for your consolation? Why are not you willing to stretch out your neck, like Lateranus, when he was commanded by Nero to be beheaded? For, shrinking a little after receiving a weak blow, he stretched it out again. And before this, when Epaphroditus, the freedman of Nero, interrogated him about the conspiracy, “If I have a mind to say anything,” replied he, “will tell it to your master.” What resource have we, then, upon such occasions? Why, what else but to distinguish between what is ours, and what not ours,—what is right, and what is wrong? I must die, and must I die groaning too? I must be fettered; must I be lamenting too? I must be exiled; and what hinders me, then, but that I may go smiling, and cheerful, and serene? “Betray a secret.” I will not betray it, for this is in my own power. “Then I will fetter you.” What do you say, man? Fetter me? You will fetter my leg, but not Zeus himself can get the better of my free will. “I will throw you into prison; I will behead that paltry body of yours.” Did I ever tell you that I alone had a head not liable to be cut off? These things ought philosophers to study; these ought they daily to write, and in these to exercise themselves. Thraseas used to say, “had rather be killed today than banished to-morrow.” But how did Rufus answer him? “If you prefer it as a heavier misfortune, how foolish a preference! If as a lighter, who has put it in your power? Why do you not study to be contented with what is allotted you?” Well, and what said Agrippinus upon this account? “will not be a hindrance to myself.” Word was brought him, “Your cause is pending in the senate.” “Good luck attend it; but it is eleven o’clock” (the hour when he used to exercise before bathing),—“let us go to our exercise.” This being over, a messenger tells him, “You are condemned.” “To banishment,” says he, “or to death?” “To banishment.” “What of my estate?” “It is not taken away.” “Well, then, let us go as far as Aricia, and dine there.” This it is to have studied what ought to be studied; to have placed our desires and aversions above tyranny and above chance. I must die,—if instantly, I will die instantly; if in a short time, I will dine first, and when the hour comes, then will I die. How? As becomes one who restores what is not his own.

> Greek: 1. τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων οὐδεμίαν εὑρήσετε αὐτὴν αὑτῆς θεωρητικήν, οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ δοκιμαστικὴν ἢ ἀποδοκιμαστικήν. ἡ γραμματικὴ μέχρι τίνος κέκτηται τὸ θεωρητικόν; μέχρι τοῦ διαγνῶναι τὰ γράμματα. ἡ μουσική; μέχρι τοῦ διαγνῶναι τὸ μέλος. αὐτὴ οὖν αὑτὴν θεωρεῖ τις αὐτῶν; οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλʼ ὅτε μέν, ἄν τι γράφῃς τῷ ἑταίρῳ, δεῖ τούτων τῶν γραπτέων, ἡ γραμματικὴ ἐρεῖ· πότερον δὲ γραπτέον τῷ ἑταίρῳ ἢ οὐ γραπτέον, ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐκ ἐρεῖ. καὶ περὶ τῶν μελῶν ὡσαύτως ἡ μουσική· πότερον δʼ ᾀστέον νῦν καὶ κιθαριστέον ἢ οὔτε ᾀστέον οὔτε κιθαριστέον οὐκ ἐρεῖ. τίς οὖν ἐρεῖ; ἡ καὶ αὑτὴν θεωροῦσα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα. αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶ τίς; ἡ δύναμις ἡ λογική· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη καὶ αὑτὴν κατανοήσουσα παρείληπται, τίς τέ ἐστι καὶ τί δύναται καὶ πόσου ἀξία οὖσα ἐλήλυθεν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο τὸ λέγον ὅτι χρυσίον καλόν ἐστιν; αὐτὸ γὰρ οὐ λέγει. δῆλον ὅτι ἡ χρηστικὴ δύναμις ταῖς φαντασίαις. τί ἄλλο τὸ μουσικήν, γραμματικήν, τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις διακρῖνον, δοκιμάζον τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς παραδεικνύον; οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ὥσπερ οὖν ἦν ἄξιον, τὸ κράτιστον ἁπάντων καὶ κυριεῦον οἱ θεοὶ μόνον ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐποίησαν, τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν ὀρθὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν. ἆρά γε ὅτι οὐκ ἤθελον; ἐγὼ μὲν δοκῶ ὅτι, εἰ ἠδύναντο, κἀκεῖνα ἂν ἡμῖν ἐπέτρεψαν· ἀλλὰ πάντως οὐκ ἠδύναντο. ἐπὶ γῆς γὰρ ὄντας καὶ σώματι συνδεδεμένους τοιούτῳ καὶ κοινωνοῖς τοιούτοις πῶς οἷόν τʼ ἦν εἰς ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐμποδίζεσθαι; ἀλλὰ τί λέγει ὁ Ζεύς; Ἐπίκτητε, εἰ οἷόν τε ἦν, καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον ἄν σου καὶ τὸ κτησίδιον ἐποίησα ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστον. νῦν δέ, μή σε λανθανέτω, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν σόν, ἀλλὰ πηλὸς κομψῶς πεφυραμένος. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ ἠδυνάμην, ἐδώκαμέν σοι μέρος τι ἡμέτερον, τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην τὴν ὁρμητικήν τε καὶ ἀφορμητικὴν καὶ ὀρεκτικήν τε καὶ ἐκκλιτικὴν καὶ ἁπλῶς τὴν χρηστικὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἧς ἐπιμελούμενος καὶ ἐν ᾗ τὰ σαυτοῦ τιθέμενος οὐδέποτε κωλυθήσῃ, οὐδέποτʼ ἐμποδισθήσῃ, οὐ στενάξεις, οὐ μέμψῃ, οὐ κολακεύσεις οὐδένα. τί οὖν; μή τι μικρά σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα; μὴ γένοιτο. ἀρκῇ οὖν αὐτοῖς; εὔχομαι δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς. νῦν δʼ ἑνὸς δυνάμενοι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἑνὶ προσηρτηκέναι ἑαυτοὺς μᾶλλον θέλομεν πολλῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ πολλοῖς προσδεδέσθαι καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ κτήσει καὶ ἀδελφῷ καὶ φίλῳ καὶ τέκνῳ καὶ δούλῳ. ἅτε οὖν πολλοῖς προσδεδεμένοι βαρούμεθα ὑπʼ αὐτῶν καὶ καθελκόμεθα. διὰ τοῦτο, ἂν ἄπλοια ᾖ, καθήμεθα σπώμενοι καὶ παρακύπτομεν συνεχῶς· τίς ἄνεμος πνεῖ; βορέας. τί ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτῷ; πότε ὁ ζέφυρος πνεύσει; ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἢ τῷ Αἰόλῳ. σὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ταμίαν τῶν ἀνέμων, ἀλλὰ τὸν Αἴολον. τί οὖν; δεῖ τὰ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν βέλτιστα κατασκευάζειν, τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι ὡς πέφυκεν. πῶς οὖν πέφυκεν; ὡς ἂν ὁ θεὸς θέλῃ. ἐμὲ οὖν νῦν τραχηλοκοπεῖσθαι μόνον; τί οὖν; ἤθελες πάντας τραχηλοκοπηθῆναι, ἵνα σὺ παραμυθίαν ἔχῃς; οὐ θέλεις οὕτως ἐκτεῖναι τὸν τράχηλον, ὡς Λατερανός τις ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ κελευσθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Νέρωνος ἀποκεφαλισθῆναι; ἐκτείνας γὰρ τὸν τράχηλον καὶ πληγεὶς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πληγὴν ἀσθενῆ γενομένην ἐπʼ ὀλίγον συνελκυσθεὶς πάλιν ἐξέτεινεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτι πρότερον προσελθόντι τις Ἐπαφροδίτῳ τῷ κυρίῳ τοῦ Νέρωνος καὶ ἀνακρίνοντι αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ συγκρουσθῆναι ἄν τί θέλω, φησίν, ἐρῶ σου τῷ κυρίῳ. τί οὖν δεῖ πρόχειρον ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ τί ἐμὸν καὶ τί οὐκ ἐμὸν καὶ τί μοι ἔξεστιν καὶ τί μοι οὐκ ἔξεστιν; ἀποθανεῖν με δεῖ· μή τι οὖν καὶ στένοντα; δεθῆναι· μή τι καὶ θρηνοῦντα; φυγαδευθῆναι· μή τις οὖν κωλύει γελῶντα καὶ εὐθυμοῦντα καὶ εὐροοῦντα; εἰπὲ τὰ ἀπόρρητα. οὐ λέγω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπʼ ἐμοί ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δήσω σε. ἄνθρωπε. τί λέγεις; ἐμέ; τὸ σκέλος μου δήσεις, τὴν προαίρεσιν δὲ οὐδʼ ὁ Ζ⟨εὺς νι⟩κῆσαι δύναται. εἰς φυλακήν σε βαλῶ. τὸ ⟨σω⟩μάτιον. ἀποκεφαλίσω σε. πότε οὖν σοὶ εἶπον, ὅτι μόνου ἐμοῦ ὁ τράχηλος ἀναπότμητός ἐστιν; ταῦτα ἔδει μελετᾶν τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας, ταῦτα καθʼ ἡμέραν γράφειν, ἐν τούτοις γυμνάζεσθαι. Θρασέας εἰώθει λέγειν σήμερον ἀναιρεθῆναι θέλω μᾶλλον ἢ αὔριον φυγαδευθῆναι τί οὖν αὐτῷ Ῥοῦφος εἶπεν; εἰ μὲν ὡς βαρύτερον ἐκλέγῃ, τίς ἡ μωρία τῆς ἐκλογῆς; εἰ δʼ ὡς κουφότερον, τίς σοι δέδωκεν; οὐ θέλεις μελετᾶν ἀρκεῖσθαι τῷ δεδομένῳ; διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ Ἀγριππῖνος τί ἔλεγεν; ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐμαυτῷ ἐμπόδιος οὐ γίνομαι. ἀπηγγέλη αὐτῷ ὅτι κρίνῃ ἐν συγκλήτῳ. — ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ. ἀλλὰ ἦλθεν ἡ πέμπτη (ταύτῃ δʼ εἰώθει γυμνασάμενος ψυχρολουτρεῖν)· ἀπέλθωμεν καὶ γυμνασθῶμεν. γυμνασαμένῳ λέγει τις, αὐτῷ ἐλθὼν ὅτι Κατακέκρισαι. — φυγῇ,, φησίν, ἢ θανάτῳ; — φυγῇ. — τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τί; — οὐκ ἀφῃρέθη. — εἰς Ἀρίκειαν οὖν ἀπελθόντες ἀριστήσωμεν. — τοῦτʼ ἔστι μεμελετηκέναι ἃ δεῖ μελετᾶν, ὄρεξιν ἔκκλισιν ἀκώλυτα ἀπερίπτωτα παρεσκευακέναι. ἀποθανεῖν με δεῖ. εἰ ἤδη, ἀποθνῄσκω· κἂν μετʼ ὀλίγον, νῦν ἀριστῶ τῆς ὥρας ἐλθούσης, εἶτα τότε τεθνήξομαι. πῶς; ὡς προσήκει τὸν τὰ ἀλλότρια ἀποδιδόντα.

[¶1] 2. To a reasonable creature, that alone is insupportable which is unreasonable, but everything reasonable may be supported. Stripes are not in themselves insupportable. “How so?” See how the Spartans bear whipping, after they have learned that it is a reasonable thing. Hanging is not insupportable; for, as soon as a man has taken it into his head that it is reasonable, he goes and hangs himself. In short, we shall find by observation that no creature is oppressed so much by anything as by what is unreasonable; nor on the other hand, attracted to anything so strongly, as to what is reasonable. But it happens that different things are reasonable and unreasonable, as well as good and bad, advantageous and disadvantageous, to different persons. On this account, chiefly, we stand in need of a liberal education, to teach us to adapt the preconceptions of reasonable and unreasonable to particular cases, conformably to nature. But to judge of reasonable and unreasonable, we make use not only of a due estimation of things without us, but of what relates to each person’s particular character. Thus, it is reasonable for one man to submit to a menial office, who considers this only, that if he does not submit to it he shall be whipt and lose his dinner, but that if he does, he has nothing hard or disagreeable to suffer; whereas to another it appears insupportable, not only to submit to such an office himself, but to respect any one else who does. If you ask me, then, whether you shall do this menial office or not, I will tell you it is a pleasanter thing to get a dinner than not, and a greater disgrace to be whipt than not to be whipt; so that, if you measure yourself by these things, go and do your office. “Ay, but this is not suitable to my character.” It is you who are to consider that, not I; for it is you who know yourself, what value you set upon yourself, and at what rate you sell yourself; for different people sell themselves at different prices. Hence Agrippinus, when Florus was deliberating whether he should go to Nero’s shows, and perform some part in them himself, bid him go. “But why do not you go, then?” says Florus. “Because,” replied Agrippinus, “do not deliberate about it.” For he who once sets himself about such considerations, and goes to calculating the worth of external things, approaches very near to those who forget their own character. Why, then, do you ask me whether death or life be the more eligible? I answer, life. Pain or pleasure? I answer, pleasure. “But if I do not act a part, I shall lose my head.” Go and act it, then, but I will not. “Why?” Because you esteem yourself only as one thread of many that make up the piece. “What then?” You have nothing to care for, but how to be like the rest of mankind, as one thread desires not to be distinguished from the others. But I would be the purple, that small and brilliant part, which gives a lustre and beauty to the rest. Why, then, do you bid me resemble the multitude? At that rate, how shall I be the purple? This Priscus Helvidius, too, saw, and acted accordingly; for when Vespasian had sent to forbid his going to the Senate, he answered, “It is in your power to prevent my continuing a senator; but while I am one I must go.”—“Well, then, at least be silent there.” “Do not ask my opinion and I will be silent.”—“But I must ask it.” “And I must speak what appears to me to be right.”—“But if you do, I will put you to death.” “When did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You will do your part, and I mine; it is yours to kill, and mine to die intrepid; fours to banish, mine to depart untroubled.” What good, then, did Priscus do, who was but a single person?, Why, what good does the purple do to the garment? What, but to be beautiful in itself, and to set a good example to the rest? Another, perhaps, if in such circumstances Caesar had forbidden his going to the Senate, would have answered, “am obliged to you for excusing me.” But such a one he would not have forbidden to go,—well knowing that he would either sit like a statue, or, if he spoke, would say what he knew to be agreeable to Caesar, and would overdo it by adding still more. Thus acted even a wrestler, who was in danger of death, unless he consented to an ignominious amputation. His brother, who was a philosopher, coming to him, and saying “Well, brother, what do you design to do? Let us cut away this part, and return again to the field.” He refused, and courageously died. When it was asked whether he acted thus as a wrestler, or a philosopher, I answer, as a man, said Epictetus; but as a man who had been proclaimed a champion at the Olympic games; who had been used to such places, and not exercised merely in the school of Bato. Another would have had his very head cut off, if he could have lived without it. This is that regard to character, so powerful with those who are accustomed to introduce it, from their own breasts, into their deliberations. “Come now, Epictetus, take off your beard.” If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not take it off.—“Then I will take off your head.” If that will do you any good, take it. It was asked, How shall each of us perceive what belongs to his character? Whence, replied Epictetus, does a bull, when the lion approaches, alone recognize his own qualifications, and expose himself alone for the whole herd? It is evident that with the qualifications occurs, at the same time, the consciousness of being indued with them. And in the same manner, whoever of us hath such qualifications will not be ignorant of them. But neither is a bull nor a gallant-spirited man formed all at once. We are to exercise, and qualify ourselves, and not to run rashly upon what doth not concern us. Only consider at what price you sell your own free will, O man!—if only that you may not sell it for a trifle. The highest greatness and excellence perhaps seem to belong to others, to such as Socrates. Why, then, as we are born with a like nature, do not all, or the greater number, become such as he? Why, are all horses swift? Are all dogs sagacious? What, then, because my gifts are humble shall I neglect all care of myself? Heaven forbid! Epictetus may not surpass Socrates,—granted; but could I overtake him it might be enough for me. I shall never be Milo, and yet I do not neglect my body; nor Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor should we omit any effort from a despair of arriving at the highest.

> Greek: 2. τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ μόνον ἀφόρητόν ἐστι τὸ ἄλογον, τὸ δʼ εὔλογον φορητόν. πληγαὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀφόρητοι τῇ φύσει. — τίνα τρόπον; — ὅρα πῶς· Λακεδαιμόνιοι μαστιγοῦνται μαθόντες ὅτι εὔλογόν ἐστιν. — τὸ δʼ ἀπάγξα⟨σθαι οὐ⟩κ ἔστιν ἀφόρητον; — ὅταν γοῦν πάθῃ τις ὅτι εὔ⟨λογ⟩ον, ἀπελθὼν ἀπήγξατο. ἁπλῶς ἐὰν προσέχωμεν, ὑπʼ οὐδενὸς οὕτως εὑρήσομεν τὸ ζῷον θλιβόμενον ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ πάλιν ἐπʼ οὐδὲν οὕτως ἑλκόμενον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ εὔλογον. ἄλλῳ δʼ ἄλλο προσπίπτει τὸ εὔλογον καὶ ἄλογον, καθάπερ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ καὶ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον. διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα παιδείας δεόμεθα, ὥστε μαθεῖν τοῦ εὐλόγου καὶ ἀλόγου πρόληψιν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρο⟨υ⟩ς οὐσίαις ἐφαρμόζειν συμφώνως τῇ φύσει. εἰς δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὐλόγου καὶ ἀλόγου κρίσιν οὐ μόνον ταῖς τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξίαις συγχρώμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸ πρόσωπον ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος. τῷ ⟨μὲν⟩ γάρ τινι εὔλογον τὸ ἀμίδα παρακρατεῖν αὐτὸ μόνον βλέποντι, ὅτι μὴ παρακρατήσας μὲν πληγὰς λήψεται καὶ τροφὰς οὐ λήψεται, παρακρατήσας δʼ οὐ πείσεταί τι τραχὺ ἢ ἀνιαρόν· ἄλλῳ δέ τινι οὐ μόνον τὸ αὐτὸν παρακρατῆσαι ἀφόρητον δοκεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἄλλου παρακρατοῦντος ἀνασχέσθαι. ἂν οὖν μου πυνθάνῃ παρακρατήσω τὴν ἀμίδα ἢ μή;, ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι μείζονα ἀξίαν ἔχει τὸ λαβεῖν τροφὰς τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν καὶ μείζονα ἀπαξίαν τὸ δαρῆναι τοῦ μὴ δαρῆναι· ὥστʼ εἰ τούτοις παραμετρεῖς τὰ σαυτοῦ, ἀπελθὼν παρακράτει. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἂν κατʼ ἐμέ. τοῦτο σὲ δεῖ συνεισφέρειν εἰς τὴν σκέψιν, οὐκ ἐμέ. σὺ γὰρ εἶ ὁ σαυτὸν εἰδώς, πόσου ἄξιος εἶ σεαυτῷ καὶ πόσου σεαυτὸν πιπράσκεις· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλων πιπράσκουσιν. διὰ τοῦτο Ἀγριππῖνος Φλώρῳ σκεπτομένῳ, εἰ καταβατέον αὐτῷ ἐστιν εἰς Νέρωνος θεωρίας, ὥστε καὶ αὐτόν τι λειτουργῆσαι, ἔφη κατάβηθι. πυθομένου δʼ αὐτοῦ διὰ τί σὺ οὐ καταβαίνεις; ἔφη ὅτι ἐγὼ οὐδὲ βουλεύομαι. ὁ γὰρ ἅπαξ εἰς τὴν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σκέψιν καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξίας συγκαθεὶς καὶ ψηφίζων ἐγγύς ἐστι τῶν ἐπιλελησμένων τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου. τί γάρ μου πυνθάνῃ; θάνατος αἱρετώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ ζωή; λέγω ζωή. πόνος ἢ ἡδονή; λέγω ἡδονή. ἀλλά, ἂν μὴ τραγῳδήσω, τραχηλοκοπηθήσομαι. ἄπελθε τοίνυν καὶ τραγῴδει, ἐγὼ δʼ οὐ τραγῳδήσω. διὰ τί; ὅτι σὺ σεαυτὸν ἡγῇ μίαν τινὰ εἶναι κρόκην τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χιτῶνος. τί οὖν; σὲ ἔδει φροντίζειν πῶς ἀνόμοιος ᾖς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἡ κρόκη πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας κρόκας θέλει τι ἔχειν ἐξαίρετον. ἐγὼ δὲ πορφύρα εἶναι βούλομαι, τὸ ὀλίγον ἐκεῖνο καὶ στιλπνὸν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον τοῦ εὐπρεπῆ φαίνεσθαι καὶ καλά. τί οὖν μοι λέγεις ὅτι ἐξομοιώθητι τοῖς πολλοῖς; καὶ πῶς ἔτι πορφύρα ἔσομαι; ταῦτα εἶδεν καὶ Πρῖσκος Ἑλουίδιος καὶ ἰδὼν ἐποίησε. προσπέμψαντος αὐτῷ Οὐεσπασιανοῦ, ἵνα μὴ εἰσέλθῃ εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον, ἀπεκρίνατο ἐπὶ σοί ἐστι μὴ ἐᾶσαί με εἶναι συγκλητικόν· μέχρι δὲ ἂν ὦ, δεῖ με εἰσέρχεσθαι. ἄγε ἀλλʼ εἰσελθών, φησίν, σιώπησον. μή μʼ ἐξέταζε καὶ σιωπήσω. ἀλλὰ δεῖ με ἐξετάσαι. κἀμὲ εἰπεῖν τὸ φαινόμενον δίκαιον. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν εἴπῃς, ἀποκτενῶ σε. πότε οὖν σοι εἶπον, ὅτι ἀθάνατός εἰμι; καὶ σὺ τὸ σὸν ποιήσεις κἀγὼ τὸ ἐμόν. σόν ἐστιν ἀποκτεῖναι, ἐμὸν ἀποθανεῖν μὴ τρέμοντα· σὸν φυγαδεῦσαι, ἐμὸν ἐξελθεῖν μὴ λυπούμενον. τί οὖν ὠφέλησε Πρῖσκος εἷς ὤν; τί δʼ ὠφελεῖ ἡ πορφύρα τὸ ἱμάτιον; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ διαπρέπει ἐν αὐτῷ ὡς πορφύρα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ καλὸν παράδειγμα ἔκκειται; ἄλλος δʼ ἂν εἰπόντος αὐτῷ Καίσαρος ἐν τοιαύτῃ περὶ στάσει μὴ ἐλθεῖν εἰς σύγκλητον εἶπεν ἔχω χάριν, ὅτι μου φείδῃ. τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐδʼ ἂν ἐκώλυεν εἰσελθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ᾔδει, ὅτι ἢ καθεδεῖται ὡς κεράμιον ἢ λέγων ἐρεῖ, ἃ οἶδεν ὅτι ὁ Καῖσαρ θέλει, καὶ προσεπισωρεύσει ἔτι πλείονα. τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ἀθλητής τις κινδυνεύων ἀποθανεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἀπεκόπη τὸ αἰδοῖον, ἐπελθόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ (ἦν δʼ ἐκεῖνος φιλόσοφος) καὶ εἰπόντος ἄγε, ἀδελφέ, τί μέλλεις ποιεῖν; ἀποκόπτομεν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος καὶ ἔτι εἰς γυμνάσιον προερχόμεθα; οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν, ἀλλʼ ἐγκαρτερήσας ἀπέθανεν. πυθομένου δέ τινος· πῶς τοῦτο ἐποίησεν; ὡς ἀθλητὴς ἢ ὡς φιλόσοφος; ⟨ὡς⟩ ἀνήρ, ἔφη, ἀνὴρ δʼ Ὀλύμπια κεκηρυγμένος καὶ ἠγωνισμένος, ἐν τοιαύτῃ τινὶ χώρᾳ ἀνεστραμμένος, οὐχὶ παρὰ τῷ Βάτω⟨ν⟩ι ἀλειφόμενος. ἄλλος δὲ κἂν τὸν τράχηλον ἀπετμήθη, εἰ ζῆν ἠδύνατο δίχα τοῦ τραχήλου. τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ κατὰ πρόσωπον· οὕτως ἰσχυρὸν παρὰ τοῖς εἰθισμένοις αὐτὸ συνεισφέρειν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσιν. ἄγε οὖν, Ἐπίκτητε, διαξύρησαι. ἂν ὦ φιλόσοφος, λέγω οὐ διαξυρῶμαι. ἀλλʼ ἀφελῶ σου τὸν τράχηλον. εἰ σοὶ ἄμεινον, ἄφελε. ἐπύθετό τις· πόθεν οὖν αἰσθησόμεθα τοῦ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἕκαστος; — πόθεν δʼ ὁ ταῦρος, ἔφη, λέοντος ἐπελθόντος μόνος αἰσθάνεται τῆς αὑτοῦ παρασκευῆς καὶ προβέβληκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀγέλης πάσης; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι εὐθὺς ἅμα τῷ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἔχειν ἀπαντᾷ καὶ συναίσθησις αὐτῆς; καὶ ἡμῶν τοίνυν ὅστις ἂν ἔχῃ τοιαύτην παρασκευήν, οὐκ ἀγνοήσει αὐτήν. ἄφνω δὲ ταῦρος οὐ γίνεται οὐδὲ γενναῖος ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ χειμασκῆσαι, παρασκευάσασθαι καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ προσπηδᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ μηδὲν προσήκοντα. μόνον σκέψαι, πόσου πωλεῖς τὴν σεαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν. ἄνθρωπε, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, μὴ ὀλίγου αὐτὴν πωλήσῃς. τὸ δὲ μέγα καὶ ἐξαίρετον ἄλλοις τάχα προσήκει, Σωκράτει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. — διὰ τί οὖν, εἰ πρὸς τοῦτο πεφύκαμεν, οὐ πάντες ἢ πολλοὶ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι; — ἵπποι γὰρ ὠκεῖς ἅπαντες γίνονται, κύνες γὰρ ἰχνευτικοὶ πάντες; τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ ἀφυής εἰμι, ἀποστῶ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τούτου ἕνεκα; μὴ γένοιτο. Ἐπίκτητος κρείσσων Σωκράτους οὐκ ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ χείρων, τοῦτό μοι ἱκανόν ἐστιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ Μίλων ἔσομαι καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἀμελῶ τοῦ σώματος· οὐδὲ Κροῖσος καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἀμελῶ τῆς κτήσεως· οὐδʼ ἁπλῶς ἄλλου τινὸς τῆς ἐπιμελείας διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῶν ἄκρων ἀφιστάμεθα.

[¶2] 3. If a person could be persuaded of this principle as he ought, that we are all originally descended from God, and that he is the father of men and gods, I conceive he never would think of himself meanly or ignobly. Suppose Caesar were to adopt you, there would be no bearing your haughty looks; and will you not feel ennobled on knowing yourself to be the son of God? Yet, in fact, we are not ennobled. But having two things united in our composition, a body in common with the brutes, and reason in common with the gods, many incline to this unhappy and mortal kindred, and only some few to that which is happy and divine. And, as of necessity every one must treat each particular thing according to the notions he forms about it, so those few who suppose that they are made for faith and honor and a wise use of things will never think meanly or ignobly concerning themselves. But with the multitude the case is contrary. “For what am I? A poor contemptible man, with this miserable flesh of mine?” Miserable indeed; but you have likewise something better than this poor flesh. Why, then, overlooking that, do you pine away in attention to this? By means of this [animal] kindred some of us, deviating towards it, become like wolves, faithless, and crafty, and mischievous; others, like lions, wild and savage and untamed; but most of us foxes, and disgraceful even among brutes. For what else is a slanderous and ill-natured man but a fox, or something yet more wretched and mean? Watch and take heed, then, that you do not sink thus low.

> Greek: 3. εἴ τις τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθῆσαι κατʼ ἀξίαν δύναιτο, ὅτι γεγόναμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντες προηγουμένως καὶ ὁ θεὸς πατήρ ἐστι τῶν τʼ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν θεῶν, οἶμαι ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀγεννὲς οὐδὲ ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσεται περὶ ἑαυτοῦ. ἀλλʼ ἂν μὲν Καῖσαρ εἰσποιήσηταί σε, οὐδείς σου τὴν ὀφρῦν βαστάσει· ἂν δὲ γνῷς, ὅτι τοῦ Διὸς υἱὸς εἶ, οὐκ ἐπαρθήσῃ; νῦν δʼ οὐ ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ δύο ταῦτα ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἡμῶν ἐγκαταμέμικται, τὸ σῶμα μὲν κοινὸν πρὸς τὰ ζῷα, ὁ λόγος δὲ καὶ ἡ γνώμη κοινὸν πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἄλλοι μὲν ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀποκλίνουσιν τὴν συγγένειαν τὴν ἀτυχῆ καὶ νεκράν, ὀλίγοι δέ τινες ἐπὶ τὴν θείαν καὶ μακαρίαν. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη πάνθʼ ὁντινοῦν οὕτως ἑκάστῳ χρῆσθαι ὡς ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπολάβῃ, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οἱ ὀλίγοι, ὅσοι πρὸς πίστιν οἴονται γεγονέναι καὶ πρὸς αἰδῶ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τῆς χρήσεως τῶν φαντασιῶν, οὐδὲν ταπεινὸν οὐδʼ ἀγε⟨ν⟩νὲς ἐνθυμοῦνται περὶ αὑτῶν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τἀναντία. τί γὰρ εἰμί; ταλαίπωρον ἀνθρωπάριον καὶ τὰ δύστηνά μου σαρκίδια. τῷ μὲν ὄντι δύστηνα, ἀλλὰ ἔχεις τι καὶ κρεῖσσον τῶν σαρκιδίων. τί οὖν ἀφεὶς ἐκεῖνο τούτοις προστέτηκας; διὰ ταύτην τὴν συγγένειαν οἱ μὲν ἀποκλίναντες λύκοις ὅμοιοι γινόμεθα, ἄπιστοι καὶ ἐπίβουλοι καὶ βλαβεροί, οἱ δὲ λέουσιν, ἄγριοι καὶ θηριώδεις καὶ ἀνήμεροι, οἱ πλείους δʼ ἡμῶν ἀλώπεκες καὶ ὡς ἐν ζῴοις ἀτυχήματα. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο λοίδορος καὶ κακοήθης ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἀλώπηξ ἢ τί ἄλλο ἀτυχέστερον καὶ ταπεινότερον; ὁρᾶτε οὖν καὶ προσέχετε, μή τι τούτων ἀποβῆτε τῶν ἀτυχημάτων.

[¶3] 4. He who is entering on a state of progress, having learned from the philosophers that good should be sought and evil shunned, and having learned, too, that prosperity and peace are no otherwise attainable by man than in not missing what he seeks, nor incurring what he shuns,—such a one totally extirpates and banishes all wayward desire, and shuns only those things over which he can have control. For if he should attempt to shun those things over which he has no control, he knows that he must sometimes incur that which he shuns, and be unhappy. Now if virtue promises happiness, prosperity, and peace, then progress in virtue is certainly progress in each of these. For to whatever point the perfection of anything absolutely brings us, progress is always an approach towards it. How happens it, then, that when we confess virtue to be such, yet we seek, and make an ostentatious show of progress in other things! What is the business of virtue? A life truly prosperous. Who is in a state of progress, then? He who has best studied Chrysippus? Why, does virtue consist in having read Chrysippus through? If so, progress is confessedly nothing else than understanding a great deal of Chrysippus; otherwise we confess virtue to consist in one thing, and declare progress, which is an approach to it, to be quite another thing. This person, they say, is already able to understand Chrysippus, by himself. “Certainly, sir, you have made a vast improvement!” What improvement? Why do you delude him? Why do you withdraw him from a sense of his real needs? Why do not you show him the real function of virtue, that he may know where to seek progress? Seek it there, O unfortunate, where your work lies. And where does your work lie? In learning what to seek and what to shun, that you may neither be disappointed of the one nor incur the other; in practising how to pursue and how to avoid, that you may not be liable to fail; in practising intellectual assent and doubt, that you may not be liable to be deceived. These are the first and most necessary things. But if you merely seek, in trembling and lamentation, to keep away all possible ills, what real progress have you made? Show me then your progress in this point. As if I should say to a wrestler, Show me your muscle; and he should answer me, “See my dumb-bells.” Your dumb-bells are your own affair; I desire to see the effect of them. “Take the treatise on the active powers, and see how thoroughly I have perused it.” I do not inquire into this, O slavish man, but how you exert those powers, how you manage your desires and aversions, your intentions and purposes, how you meet events,—whether in accordance with nature’s laws or contrary to them. If in accordance, give me evidence of that, and I will say you improve; if the contrary, you may go your way, and not only comment on these treatises, but write such yourself; and yet what service will it do you? Do not you know that the whole volume is sold for five denarii? Does he who comments upon it, then, value himself at more than that sum? Never make your life to lie in one thing and yet seek progress in another. Where is progress, then? If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will, to train, and perfect, and render it conformable to nature,—noble, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, humble;—if he has learned, too, that whoever desires or shuns things beyond his own power can neither be faithful nor free, but must necessarily take his chance with them, must necessarily too be subject to others, to such as can procure or prevent what he desires or shuns; if, rising in the morning, he observes and keeps to these rules; bathes regularly, eats frugally, and to every subject of action applies the same fixed principles,—if a racer to racing, if an orator to oratory,—this is he who truly makes progress; this is he who has not labored in vain. But if he is wholly intent on reading books, and has labored that point only, and travelled for that, I bid him go home immediately and do his daily duties; since that which he sought is nothing. The only real thing is to study how to rid life of lamentation, and complaint, and Alas! and I am undone, and misfortune, and failure; and to learn what death, what exile, what a prison, what poison is; that he may be able to say in a prison, like Socrates, “My dear Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be;” and not, “Wretched old man, have I kept my gray hairs for this!” [Do you ask] who speaks thus? Do you think I quote some mean and despicable person? Is it not Priam who says it? Is it not Oedipus? Nay, how many kings say it? For what else is tragedy but the dramatized sufferings of men, bewildered by an admiration of externals? If one were to be taught by fictions that things beyond our will are nothing to us, I should rejoice in such a fiction, by which I might live prosperous and serene. But what your own aims are, it is your business to consider. Of what service, then, is Chrysippus to us? To teach you that those things are not false on which true prosperity and peace depend. “Take my books, and you will see how true and conformable to nature those things are which give me peace.” How great a happiness! And how great the benefactor who shows the way! To Triptolemus all men have raised temples and altars, because he gave us a milder kind of food; but to him who has discovered and brought to light and communicated the truth to all,—the means, not merely of living, but of living well,—who among you ever raised an altar or a temple, or dedicated a statue; or who worships God in his name? We offer sacrifices in memory of those who have given us corn and the vine; and shall we not give thanks to God for those who have nurtured such fruit in the human breast,—even the truth which makes us blessed?

> Greek: 4. ὁ προκόπτων μεμαθηκὼς παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὄρεξις ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν, ἡ δʼ ἔκκλισις πρὸς κακά, μεμαθηκὼς δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως τὸ εὔρουν καὶ ἀπαθὲς περιγίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ ἐν ὀρέξει μὲν μὴ ἀποτυγχάνοντι, ἐν ἐκκλίσει ⟨δὲ⟩ μὴ περιπίπτοντι, τὴν μὲν ὄρεξιν ἦρκεν ἐξ αὑτοῦ εἰσάπαν καὶ ὑπερτέθειται, τῇ ἐκκλίσει δὲ πρὸς μόνα χρῆται τὰ προαιρετικά. τῶν γὰρ ἀπροαιρέτων ἄν τι ἐκκλίνῃ, οἶδεν ὅτι περιπεσεῖταί ποτέ τινι παρὰ τὴν ἔκκλισιν τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ δυστυχήσει. εἰ δʼ ἡ ἀρετὴ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν εὐδαιμονίαν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπάθειαν καὶ εὔροιαν, πάντως καὶ ἡ προκοπὴ ⟨ἡ⟩ πρὸς αὐτὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον τούτων ἐστὶ προκοπή. ἀεὶ γὰρ πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἡ τελειότης τινὸς καθάπαξ ἄγῃ, πρὸς αὐτὸ ἡ προκοπὴ συνεγγισμός ἐστιν. πῶς οὖν τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν τοιοῦτόν τι ὁμολογοῦμεν, τὴν προκοπὴν δʼ ἐν ἄλλοις ζητοῦμεν καὶ ἐπιδείκνυμεν; τί ἔργον ἀρετῆς; εὔροια. τίς οὖν προκόπτει; ὁ πολλὰς Χρυσίππου συντάξεις ἀνεγνωκώς; μὴ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦτʼ ἔστι Χρύσιππον νενοηκέναι; εἰ γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ὁμολογουμένως ἡ προκοπὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ πολλὰ τῶν Χρυσίππου νοεῖν. νῦν δʼ ἄλλο μέν τι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιφέρειν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἄλλο[ν] δὲ τὸν συνεγγισμόν, τὴν προκοπὴν ἀποφαίνομεν. οὗτος, φησίν, ἤδη καὶ διʼ αὑτοῦ δύναται Χρύσιππον ἀναγιγνώσκειν. εὖ, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, προκόπτεις, ἄνθρωπε· ποίαν προκοπήν. τί ἐμπαίζεις αὐτῷ; τί δʼ ἀπάγεις αὐτὸν τῆς συναισθήσεως τῶν αὑτοῦ κακῶν; οὐ θέλεις δεῖξαι αὐτῷ τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἵνα μάθῃ ποῦ τὴν προκοπὴν ζητῇ; ἐκεῖ ζήτησον αὐτήν, ταλαίπωρε, ὅπου σου τὸ ἔργον. ποῦ δέ σου τὸ ἔργον; ἐν ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει, ἵνʼ ἀναπότευκτος ᾖς καὶ ἀπερίπτωτος, ἐν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ἀφορμαῖς, ἵνʼ ἀναμάρτητος, ἐν προ⟨ς⟩θέσει καὶ ἐποχῇ, ἵνʼ ἀνεξαπάτητος. πρῶτοι δʼ εἰσὶν οἱ πρῶτοι τόποι καὶ ἀναγκαιότατοι. ἂν δὲ τρέμων καὶ πενθῶν ζητῇς ἀπερίπτωτος εἶναι, ἄρα πῶς προκόπτεις; σὺ οὖν ἐνταῦθά μοι δεῖξόν σου τὴν προκοπήν. καθάπερ εἰ ἀθλητῇ διελεγόμην δεῖξόν μοι τοὺς ὤμους, εἶτα ἔλεγεν ἐκεῖνος ἴδε μου τοὺς ἁλτῆρας. ὄψει σὺ καὶ οἱ ἁλτῆρες, ἐγὼ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τῶν ἁλτήρων ἰδεῖν βούλομαι. λάβε τὴν περὶ ὁρμῆς σύνταξιν καὶ γνῶθι πῶς αὐτὴν ἀνέγνωκα. ἀνδράποδον, οὐ τοῦτο ζητῶ, ἀλλὰ πῶς ὁρμᾷς καὶ ἀφορμᾷς, πῶς ὀρέγῃ καὶ ἐκκλίνεις, πῶς ἐπιβάλλῃ καὶ προ[σ]τίθεσαι καὶ παρασκευάζῃ, πότερα συμφώνως τῇ φύσει ἢ ἀσυμφώνως. εἰ γὰρ συμφώνως, τοῦτό μοι δείκνυε καὶ ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι προκόπτεις· εἰ δʼ ἀσυμφώνως, ἄπελθε καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐξηγοῦ τὰ βιβλία, ἀλλὰ καὶ γράφε αὐτὸς τοιαῦτα. καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος; οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι ὅλον τὸ βιβλίον πέντε δηναρίων ἐστίν; ὁ οὖν ἐξηγούμενος αὐτὸ δοκεῖ ὅτι πλείονος ἄξιός ἐστιν ἢ πέντε δηναρίων; μηδέποτε οὖν ἀλλαχοῦ τὸ ἔργον ζητεῖτε, ἀλλαχοῦ τὴν προκοπήν. ποῦ οὖν προκοπή; εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἀποστὰς τῶν ἐκτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐπέστραπται τὴν αὑτοῦ, ταύτην ἐξεργάζεσθαι καὶ ἐκπονεῖν, ὥστε σύμφωνον ἀποτελέσαι τῇ φύσει, ὑψηλὴν ἐλευθέραν ἀκώλυτον ἀνεμπόδιστον πιστὴν αἰδήμονα· μεμάθηκέν τε, ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ποθῶν ἢ φεύγων οὔτε πιστὸς εἶναι δύναται οὔτʼ ἐλεύθερος, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη μεταπίπτειν καὶ μεταρριπίζεσθαι ἅμα ἐκείνοις καὶ αὐτόν, ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ὑποτεταχέναι ἄλλοις ἑαυτόν, τοῖς ἐκεῖνα περιποιεῖν ἢ κωλύειν δυναμένοις· καὶ λοιπὸν ἕωθεν ἀνιστάμενος ταῦτα τηρεῖ καὶ φυλάσσει, λούεται ὡς πιστός, ὡς αἰδήμων ἐσθίει, ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τῆς ἀεὶ παραπιπτούσης ὕλης τὰ προηγούμενα ἐκπονῶν, ὡς ὁ δρομεὺς δρομικῶς καὶ ὁ φώνασκος φωνασκικῶς· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ προκόπτων ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ ὁ μὴ εἰκῇ ἀποδεδημηκὼς οὗτός ἐστιν. εἰ δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις ἕξιν τέταται καὶ ταύτην ἐκπονεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐκδεδήμηκε, λέγω αὐτῷ αὐτόθεν πορεύεσθαι εἰς οἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀμελεῖν τῶν ἐκεῖ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐφʼ ὃ ἀποδεδήμηκεν οὐδέν ἐστιν· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο, με⟨λε⟩τᾶν ἐξελεῖν τοῦ αὑτοῦ βίου πένθη καὶ οἰμωγὰς καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ οἴμοι καὶ τὸ τάλας ἐγὼ καὶ δυστυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν καὶ μαθεῖν, τί ἐστι θάνατος, τί φυγή, τί δεσμωτήριον, τί [νοσ]κών⟨ε⟩ιον, ἵνα δύνηται λέγειν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ γινέσθω καὶ μὴ ἐκεῖνα τάλας ἐγώ, γέρων ἄνθρωπος, ἐπὶ ταῦτά μου τὰς πολιὰς ἐτήρησα. τίς λέγει ταῦτα; δοκεῖτε ὅτι ὑμῖν ἄδοξόν τινα ἐρῶ καὶ ταπεινόν; Πρίαμος αὐτὰ οὐ λέγει; Οἰδίπους οὐ λέγει; ἀλλʼ ὁπόσοι βασιλεῖς λέγουσιν; τί γάρ εἰσιν ἄλλο τραγῳδίαι ἢ ἀνθρώπων πάθη τεθαυμακότων τὰ ἐκτὸς διὰ μέτρου τοιοῦδʼ ἐπιδεικνύμενα; εἰ γὰρ ἐξαπατηθέντα τινὰ ἔδει μαθεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ ἀπροαιρέτων οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐγὼ μὲν ἤθελον τὴν ἀπάτην ταύτην, ἐξ ἧς ἤμελλον εὐρόως καὶ ἀταράχως βιώσεσθαι, ὑμεῖς δʼ ὄψεσθʼ αὐτοὶ τί θέλετε. τί οὖν ἡμῖν παρέχει Χρύσιππος; ἵνα γνῷς, φησίν, ὅτι οὐ ψευδῆ ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἐξ ὧν ἡ εὔροιά ἐστι καὶ ἀπάθεια ἀπαντᾷ, λάβε μου τὰ βιβλία καὶ γνώσῃ ὡς … τε καὶ σύμφωνά ἐστι τῇ φύσει τὰ ἀπαθῆ με ποιοῦντα. ὦ μεγάλης εὐτυχίας, ὦ μεγάλου εὐεργέτου τοῦ δεικνύοντος τὴν ὁδόν. εἶτα Τριπτολέμῳ μὲν ἱερὰ καὶ βωμοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἀνεστάκασιν, ὅτι τὰς ἡμέρους τροφὰς ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν, τῷ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὑρόντι καὶ φωτίσαντι καὶ εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐξενεγκόντι, οὐ τὴν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν, τίς ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τούτῳ βωμὸν ἱδρύσατο ἢ ναὸν ἢ ἄγαλμα ἀνέθηκεν ἢ τὸν θεὸν ἐπὶ τούτῳ προσκυνεῖ; ἀλλʼ ὅτι μὲν ἄμπελον ἔδωκαν ἢ πυρούς, ἐπιθύομεν τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐξήνεγκαν καρπὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ, διʼ οὗ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας δείξειν ἡμῖν ἤμελλον, τούτου δʼ ἕνεκα οὐκ εὐχαριστήσωμεν τῷ θεῷ;

[¶4] 5. It is said that there are those who will oppose very evident truths, and yet it is not easy to find a reason which may persuade such an one to alter his opinion. This may arise neither from his own strength nor from the weakness of his teacher; but when a man becomes obstinate in error, reason cannot always reach him. Now there are two sorts of obstinacy: the one, of the intellect; the other, of the will. A man may obstinately set himself not to assent to evident truths, nor to quit the defence of contradictions. We all dread a bodily paralysis, and would make use of every contrivance to avoid it; but none of us is troubled about a paralysis of the soul. And yet, indeed, even with regard to the soul, when a person is so affected as not to apprehend or understand anything, we think him in a sad condition; but where the emotions of shame and modesty are under an absolute paralysis, we go so far as even to call this strength of mind! Are you certain that you are awake? “am not,” replies such a person, “for neither am I certain when in dreaming I appear to myself to be awake.” Is there no difference, then, between these appearances? “None.” Shall I argue with this man any longer? For what steel or what caustic can I apply, to make him sensible of his paralysis? If he is sensible of it, and pretends not to be so, he is even worse than dead. He sees not his inconsistency, or, seeing it, holds to the wrong. He moves not, makes no progress; he rather falls back. His sense of shame is gone; his reasoning faculty is not gone, but brutalized. Shall I call this strength of mind? By no means,—unless we allow it to be such in the vilest debauchees publicly to speak and act out their worse impulses.

> Greek: 5. ἄν τις, φησίν, ἐνίστηται πρὸς τὰ ἄγαν ἐκφανῆ, πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εὑ⟨ρεῖν λόγ⟩ον, διʼ οὗ μεταπείσει τις αὐτόν. τοῦτο δʼ οὔτε παρὰ ⟨τὴν ἐκεί⟩νου γίνεται δύναμιν οὔτε παρὰ τὴν τοῦ διδάσκοντος ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἀπαχθεὶς ἀπολιθωθῇ, πῶς ἔτι χρήσηταί τις αὐτῷ διὰ λόγου; Ἀπολιθώσεις δʼ εἰσὶ διτταί· ἡ μὲν τοῦ νοητικοῦ ἀπολίθωσις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐντρεπτικοῦ, ὅταν τις παρατεταγμένος ᾖ μὴ ἐπινεύειν τοῖς ἐναργέσι μηδʼ ἀπὸ τῶν μαχομένων ἀφίστασθαι. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τὴν μὲν σωματικὴν ἀπονέκρωσιν φοβούμεθα καὶ πάντʼ ἂν μηχανησαίμεθα ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ περιπεσεῖν τοιούτῳ τινί, τῆς ψυχῆς δʼ ἀπονεκρουμένης οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει. καὶ νὴ Δία ἐπὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἂν μὲν ᾖ οὕτως διακείμενος, ὥστε μηδενὶ παρακολουθεῖν μηδὲ συνιέναι μηδέν, καὶ τοῦτον κακῶς ἔχειν οἰόμεθα· ἂν δέ τινος τὸ ἐντρεπτικὸν καὶ αἰδῆμον ἀπονεκρωθῇ, τοῦτο ἔτι καὶ δύναμιν καλοῦμεν. Καταλαμβάνεις ὅτι ἐγρήγορας; οὔ, φησίν· οὐδὲ γάρ, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις φαντάζωμαι, ὅτι ἐγρήγορα. οὐδὲν οὖν διαφέρει αὕτη ἡ φαντασία ἐκείνης; οὐδέν. ἔτι τούτῳ διαλέγομαι; καὶ ποῖον αὐτῷ πῦρ ἢ ποῖον σίδηρον προσαγάγω, ἵνʼ αἴσθηται ὅτι νενέκρωται; αἰσθανόμενος οὐ προσποιεῖται· ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ. μάχην οὗτος οὐ συνορᾷ· κακῶς ἔχει. συνορῶν οὗτος οὐ κινεῖται οὐδὲ προκόπτει· ἔτι ἀθλιώτερον ἔχει. ἐκτέτμηται τὸ αἰδῆμον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐντρεπτικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται, ἀλλʼ ἀποτεθηρίωται. ταύτην ἐγὼ δύναμιν εἴπω; μὴ γένοιτο, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν τῶν κιναίδων, καθʼ ἣν πᾶν τὸ ἐπελθὸν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι.

[¶5] 6. For every event that happens in the world it is easy to give thanks to Providence, if a person has but these two qualities in himself: a habit of closely considering what happens to each individual, and a grateful temper.

> Greek: 6. ἀφʼ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἐγκωμιάσαι τὴν πρόνοιαν, ἂν δύο ἔχῃ τις ταῦτα ἐν ἑαυτῷ, δύναμίν τε συνορατικὴν τῶν γεγονότων ἑκάστῳ καὶ τὸ εὐχάριστον.

[¶6] Without the first, he will not perceive the usefulness of things which happen;

> Greek: εἰ δὲ μή, ὁ μὲν οὐκ ὄψεται τὴν εὐχρηστίαν τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δʼ οὐκ εὐχαριστήσει ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς οὐδʼ ἂν ἴδῃ.

[¶7] and without the other, he will not be thankful for them. If God had made colors, and had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use?

> Greek: χρώματα ὁ θεὸς εἰ πεποιήκει, δύναμιν δὲ θεατικὴν αὐτῶν μὴ πεποιήκει, τί ἂν ἦν ὄφελος;

[¶8] None. On the other hand, if he had made the faculty of observation, without objects to observe, what would have been the use of that?

> Greek: — οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν. — ἀλλʼ ἀνάπαλιν εἰ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν πεποιήκει, τὰ ὄντα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα οἷα ὑποπίπτειν τῇ δυνάμει τῇ ὁρατικῇ, καὶ οὕτως τί ὄφελος;

[¶9] None.

> Greek: — οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν.

[¶10] Again, if he had formed both the faculty and the objects, but had not made the light of day? Neither in that case would they have been of any use. Who is it, then, that has fitted each of these to the other? Who is it that has fitted the sword to the scabbard, and the scabbard to the sword?

> Greek: — τί δʼ, εἰ καὶ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα πεποιήκει, φῶς δὲ μὴ πεποιήκει; — οὐδʼ οὕτως τι ὄφελος. — τίς οὖν ὁ ἁρμόσας τοῦτο πρὸς ἐκεῖνο κἀκεῖνο πρὸς τοῦτο; τίς δʼ ὁ ἁρμόσας τὴν μάχαιραν πρὸς τὸ κολεὸν καὶ τὸ κολεὸν πρὸς τὴν μάχαιραν;

[¶11] Is there no such Being? From the very construction of a complete work, we are used to declare positively that it must be the operation of some artificer, and not the effect of mere chance.

> Greek: οὐδείς; καὶ μὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς κατασκευῆς τῶν ἐπιτετελεσμένων ἀποφαίνεσθαι εἰώθαμεν, ὅτι τεχνίτου τινὸς πάντως τὸ ἔργον, οὐχὶ δʼ εἰκῇ κατεσκευασμένον.

[¶12] Does every such work, then, demonstrate an artificer, and do not visible objects, and the sense of seeing, and light, demonstrate one?

> Greek: ἆρʼ οὖν τούτων μὲν ἕκαστον ἐμφαίνει τὸν τεχνίτην, τὰ δʼ ὁρατὰ καὶ ὅρας[ε]ις καὶ φῶς οὐκ ἐμφαίνει;

[¶13] Do not the difference of the sexes, and their inclination to each other, and the use of their several powers,—do not these things demonstrate an artificer?

> Greek: τὸ δʼ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ ἡ προθυμία ἡ πρὸς τὴν συνουσίαν ἑκατέρου καὶ δύναμις ἡ χρηστικὴ τοῖς μορίοις τοῖς κατεσκευασμένοις οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐμφαίνει τὸν τεχνίτην;

[¶14] Most certainly they do. But further; this constitution of understanding, by which we are not simply impressed by sensible objects, but take and subtract and add and combine, and pass from point to point by inference,—is not all this sufficient to prevail on some men, and make them ashamed of leaving an artificer out of their scheme?

> Greek: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν· ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη τῆς διανοίας κατασκευή, καθʼ ἣν οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὑποπίπτοντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τυπούμεθα ὑπʼ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκλαμβάνομέν τι καὶ ἀφαιροῦμεν καὶ προστίθεμεν καὶ συντίθεμεν τάδε τινὰ διʼ αὐτῶν καὶ νὴ Δία μεταβαίνομεν ἀπʼ ἄλλων ἐπʼ ἄλλα τινὰ οὕτω πως παρακείμενα, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ κινῆσαί τινας καὶ διατρέψαι πρὸς τὸ ἀπολιπεῖν τὸν τεχνίτην;

[¶15] If not, let them explain to us what the power is that effects each of these, and how it is possible that chance should produce things so wonderful, and which carry such marks of design. What, then, do these things belong to us alone?

> Greek: ἢ ἐξηγησάσθωσαν ἡμῖν τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τούτων ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε τὰ οὕτω θαυμαστὰ καὶ τεχνικὰ εἰκῇ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίνεσθαι.

[¶16] Many, indeed,—such as are peculiarly necessary for a reasonable creature; but you will find many which are common to us with mere animals.

> Greek: τί οὖν; ἐφʼ ἡμῶν μόνων γίνεται ταῦτα; πολλὰ μὲν ἐπὶ μόνων, ὧν ἐξαιρέτως χρείαν εἶχεν τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον, πολλὰ δὲ κοινὰ εὑρήσεις ἡμῖν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα.

[¶17] Then, do they too understand what happens? Not at all; for use is one affair, and understanding another. But God had need of animals to make use of things, and of us to understand that use.

> Greek: ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ παρακολουθεῖ τοῖς γινομένοις ἐκεῖνα; οὐδαμῶς. ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι χρῆσις καὶ ἄλλο παρακολούθησις. ἐκείνων χρείαν εἶχεν ὁ θεὸς χρωμένων ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἡμῶν δὲ παρακολουθούντων τῇ χρήσει.

[¶18] It is sufficient, therefore, for them to eat, and drink, and sleep, and continue their species, and perform other such offices as belong to each of them; but to us, to whom He has given likewise a faculty of understanding, these offices are not sufficient.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο ἐκείνοις μὲν ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ὀχεύειν καὶ τἆλλʼ ὅσα ἐπιτελεῖ τῶν αὑτῶν ἕκαστον, ἡμῖν δʼ, οἷς καὶ τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκεν,

[¶19] For if we do not proceed in a wise and systematic manner, and suitably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our end.

> Greek: οὐκέτι ταῦτʼ ἀπαρκεῖ, ἀλλʼ ἂν μὴ κατὰ τρόπον καὶ τεταγμένως καὶ ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑκάστου φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ πράττωμεν, οὐκέτι τοῦ τέλους τευξόμεθα τοῦ ἑαυτῶν.

[¶20] For where the constitution of beings is different, their offices and ends are different likewise.

> Greek: ὧν γὰρ αἱ κατασκευαὶ διάφοροι, τούτων καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ τέλη.

[¶21] Thus where the constitution is adapted only to use, there use is alone sufficient; but where understanding is added to use, unless that too be duly exercised the end of such a being will never be attained.

> Greek: οὗ τοίνυν ἡ κατασκευὴ μόνον χρηστική, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι ὁπωσοῦν ἀπαρκεῖ· οὗ δὲ καὶ παρακολουθητικὴ τῇ χρήσει, τούτῳ τὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν μὴ προσῇ οὐδέποτε τεύξεται τοῦ τέλους.

[¶22] Well, then, each of the animals is constituted either for food, or husbandry, to produce milk, or for some other like use; and for these purposes what need is there of understanding things, and being able to discriminate concerning them? But God has introduced man, as a spectator of Himself and of his works;

> Greek: τί οὖν; ἐκείνων ἕκαστον κατασκευάζει τὸ μὲν ὥστʼ ἐσθίεσθαι, τὸ δʼ ὥστε ὑπηρετεῖν εἰς γεωργίαν, τὸ δʼ ὥστε τυρὸν φέρειν, τὸ δʼ ἄλλο ἐπʼ ἄλλῃ χρείᾳ παραπλησίῳ, πρὸς ἃ τίς χρεία τοῦ παρακολουθεῖν ταῖς φαντασίαις καὶ ταύτας διακρίνειν δύνασθαι;

[¶23] and not only as a spectator, but an interpreter of them. It is therefore shameful that man should begin and end where irrational creatures do.

> Greek: τὸν δʼ ἄνθρωπον θεατὴν εἰσήγαγεν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον θεατήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν.

[¶24] He is indeed to begin there, but to end where nature itself has fixed our end; and that is, in contemplation and understanding, and in a scheme of life conformable to nature.

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο αἰσχρόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ καταλήγειν ὅπου καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔνθεν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, καταλήγειν δὲ ἐφʼ ὃ κατέληξεν ἐφʼ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ φύσις.

[¶25] Take care, then, not to die without the contemplation of these things.

> Greek: κατέληξεν δʼ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν καὶ παρακολούθησιν καὶ σύμφωνον διεξαγωγὴν τῇ φύσει.
ὁρᾶτε οὖν, μὴ ἀθέατοι τούτων ἀποθάνητε.

[¶26] You take a journey to Olympia to behold the work of Phidias, and each of you thinks it a misfortune to die without a knowledge of such things;

> Greek: ἀλλʼ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν μὲν ἀποδημεῖτε, ἵνʼ [ε]ἴδητε τὸ ἔργον τοῦ Φειδίου, καὶ ἀτύχημα ἕκαστος ὑμῶν οἴεται τὸ ἀνιστόρητος τούτων ἀποθανεῖν·

[¶27] and will you have no inclination to see and understand those works for which there is no need to take a journey, but which are ready and at hand even to those who bestow no pains!

> Greek: ὅπου δʼ οὐδʼ ἀποδημῆσαι χρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ ἐστὲ ἤδη καὶ πάρεστε τοῖς ἔργοις, ταῦτα δὲ θεάσασθαι καὶ κατανοῆσαι οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσετε;

[¶28] Will you never perceive what you are, or for what you were born, or for what purpose you are admitted to behold this spectacle? “But there are in life some things unpleasant and difficult.”

> Greek: οὐκ αἰσθήσεσθε τοίνυν, οὔτε τίνες ἐστὲ οὔτʼ ἐπὶ τί γεγόνατε οὔτε [ἐπὶ] τί τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐφʼ οὗ τὴν θέαν παρείληφθε;

[¶29] And are there none at Olympia? Are you not heated? Are you not crowded? Are you not without good conveniences for bathing? Are you not wet through when it happens to rain? Do you not have uproar, and noise, and other disagreeable circumstances?

> Greek: — ἀλλὰ γίνεταί τινα ἀηδῆ καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ. — ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ δʼ οὐ γίνεται; οὐ καυματίζεσθε; οὐ στενοχωρεῖσθε; οὐ κακῶς λούεσθε; οὐ καταβρέχεσθε, ὅταν βρέχῃ; θορύβου δὲ καὶ βοῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χαλεπῶν οὐκ ἀπολαύετε;

[¶30] But, I suppose, by comparing all these with the merit of the spectacle, you support and endure them.

> Greek: ἀλλʼ οἶμαι ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα ἀντιτιθέντες πρὸς τὸ ἀξιόλογον τῆς θέας φέρετε καὶ ἀνέχεσθε.

[¶31] Well, and have you not received faculties by which you may support every event [of life]? Have you not received greatness of soul?

> Greek: ἄγε δυνάμεις δʼ οὐκ εἰλήφατε, καθʼ ἃς οἴσετε πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον; μεγαλοψυχίαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε; ἀνδρείαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε;

[¶32] Have you not received a manly spirit? Have you not received patience? What signifies to me anything that happens, while my soul is above it? What shall disconcert or trouble or appear grievous to me? Shall I neglect to use my powers to that purpose for which I received them;

> Greek: καρτερίαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε; καὶ τί ἔτι μοι μέλει μεγαλοψύχῳ ὄντι τῶν ἀποβῆναι δυναμένων; τί μʼ ἐκστήσει ἢ ταράξει ἢ τί ὀδυνηρὸν φανεῖται; οὐ χρήσομαι τῇ δυνάμει πρὸς ἃ εἴληφα αὐτήν, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀποβαίνουσιν πενθήσω καὶ στενάξω;

[¶33] and shall I lament and groan at every casualty? “True, no doubt; but I have such a disagreeable catarrh!”

> Greek: ναί· ἀλλʼ αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσιν. τίνος οὖν ἕνεκα χεῖρας ἔχεις, ἀνδράποδον; οὐχ ἵνα καὶ ἀπομύσσῃς σεαυτόν;