SCRIPTURA

Epictetus · Discourses · 23 of 23

Book IV · chapters 10–13

Translated by Thomas Wentworth Higginson

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then I will say to him: “If you would not fail of what you seek, or incur what you shun, desire nothing that belongs to others; shun nothing that lies beyond your own control; otherwise you must necessarily be disappointed in what you seek, and incur what you shun.” Where is the doubt here?

εἶτα ἐρῶ αὐτῷ εἰ μὴ θέλῃς ὀρέγεσθαι ἀποτευκτικῶς μηδʼ ἐκκλίνειν περιπτωτικῶς, μηδενὸς ὀρέγου τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, μηδὲν ἔκκλινε τῶν μὴ ἐπὶ σοί. εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ ἀποτυχεῖν καὶ περιπεσεῖν ἀνάγκη.

Where the room for, How will it be? What will be the event? And fill this happen, or that?

ποία ἐνθάδʼ ἀπορία; ποῦ τόπον ἔχει πῶς γένηται; καὶ πῶς ἀποβῇ; καὶ μὴ ἀπαντήσῃ τόδε ἢ τόδε;

Is not the event uncontrollable by will? “Yes.” And does not the essence of good and evil consist in what is within the control of will? It is in your power, then, to treat every event conformably to Nature? Can any one restrain you? “No one.” Then do not say to me any more, How will it be?

νῦν οὐχὶ τὸ ἐκβησόμενον ἀπροαίρετον;— ναί. — ἡ δʼ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς; — ναί. — ἔξεστιν οὖν σοι παντὶ τῷ ἀποβάντι χρῆσθαι κατὰ φύσιν; μή τις σε κωλῦσαι δύναται;

For, however it be, you will set it right, and the event to you will be auspicious.

— οὐδείς. — μηκέτι οὖν μοι λέγε πῶς γένηται; ὅπως γὰρ ἂν γένηται, σὺ αὐτὸ θήσεις καλῶς καὶ ἔσται σοι τὸ ἀποβὰν εὐτύχημα.

Pray what would Hercules have been, if he had said, “What can be done to prevent a great lion, or a large boar, or savage men, from coming in my way?” Why, what is that to you? If a large boar should come in your way, you will fight the greater combat; if wicked men, you will deliver the world from wicked men.

ἢ τίς ἂν ἦν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς λέγων πῶς μοι μὴ μέγας λέων ἐπιφανῇ μηδὲ μέγας σῦς μηδὲ θηριώδεις ἄνθρωποι; καὶ τί σοι μέλει; ἂν μέγας σῦς ἐπιφανῇ, μεῖζον ἆθλον ἀθλήσεις· ἂν κακοὶ ἄνθρωποι, κακῶν ἀπαλλάξεις τὴν οἰκουμένην.

“But then if I should die by this means?” You will die as a good man, in the performance of a gallant action. For since, at all events, one must die, one must necessarily be found doing something, either tilling, or digging, or trading, or serving a consulship, or sick with indigestion or dysentery.

— ἂν οὖν οὕτως ἀποθάνω; — ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἀποθανῇ, γενναίαν πρᾶξιν ἐπιτελῶν ἐπεὶ γὰρ δεῖ πάντως ἀποθανεῖν, ἀνάγκη τί ποτε ποιοῦντα εὑρεθῆναι, ἢ γεωργοῦντα ἢ σκάπτοντα ἢ ἐμπορευόμενον ἢ ὑπατεύοντα ἢ ἀπεπτοῦντα ἢ διαρροιζόμενον.

At what employment, then, would you have death find you? For my part, I would have it to be some humane, beneficent, public-spirited, noble action.

τί οὖν θέλεις ποιῶν εὑρεθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ θανάτου; ἐγὼ μὲν τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος ἔργον τί ποτε ἀνθρωπικόν, εὐεργετικόν, κοινωφελές, γενναῖον.

But if I cannot be found doing any such great things, yet, at least, I would be doing what I am incapable of being restrained from, what is given me to do,—correcting myself, improving that faculty which makes use of the phenomena of existence to procure tranquillity, and render to the several relations of life their due; and if I am so fortunate, advancing still further to the security of judging right.

εἰ δὲ μὴ δύναμαι τὰ τηλικαῦτα ποιῶν εὑρεθῆναι, ἐκεῖνό γε τὸ ἀκώλυτον, τὸ διδόμενον, ἐμαυτὸν ἐπανορθῶν, ἐξεργαζόμενος τὴν δύναμιν τὴν χρηστικὴν τῶν φαντασιῶν, ἀπάθειαν ἐκπονῶν, ταῖς σχέσεσι τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀποδιδούς· εἰ οὕτως εὐτυχής εἰμι, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου τόπου παραπτόμενος, τοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν κριμάτων ἀσφάλειαν.

If death overtakes me in such a situation, it is enough for me if I can stretch out my hands to God, and say, “The opportunities which I have received from thee of comprehending and obeying thy administration, I have not neglected. As far as in me lay, I have not dishonored thee.

ἂν μετὰ τούτων με ὁ θάνατος καταλάβῃ, ἀρκεῖ μοι ἂν δύνωμαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀνατεῖναι τὰς χεῖρας, εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἃς ἔλαβον ἀφορμὰς παρὰ σοῦ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθέσθαι σου τῆς διοικήσεως καὶ ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῇ, τούτων οὐκ ἠμέλησα· οὐ κατῄσχυνά σε τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος.

See how I have used my perceptions; how my convictions. Have I at any time found fault with thee? Have I been discontented at thy dispensations, or wished them otherwise? Have I transgressed the relations of life? I thank thee that thou hast brought me into being.

ἰδοῦ, πῶς κέχρημαι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, ἰδοῦ, πῶς ταῖς προλήψεσιν. μή ποτέ σε ἐμεμψάμην, μή τι τῶν γινομένων τινὶ δυσηρέστησα ἢ ἄλλως γενέσθαι ἠθέλησα, μή τι τὰς σχέσεις παρέβην[αι];

I am satisfied with the time that I have enjoyed the things which thou hast given me. Receive them back again, and distribute them as thou wilt; for they were all thine, and thou gavest them to me.”

ὅ με σὺ ἐγέννησας, χάριν ἔχω, ὧν ἔδωκας· ἐφʼ ὅσον ἐχρησάμην τοῖς σοῖς, ἀρκεῖ μοι. πάλιν αὐτὰ ἀπόλαβε καὶ κατάταξον εἰς ἣν θέλεις χώραν. σὰ γὰρ ἦν πάντα, σύ μοι αὐτὰ δέδωκας.

Is it not enough to depart in this mood of mind? And what life is better and more becoming than that of such a one; or what conclusion happier?

οὐκ ἀρκεῖ οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐξελθεῖν; καὶ τίς βίων κρείττων ἢ εὐσχημονέστερος τοῦ οὕτως ἔχοντος, ποία δὲ καταστροφὴ εὐδαιμονεστέρα;

But in order to attain these advantages, there are no inconsiderable risks to be encountered. You cannot seek a consulship and these things too, nor toil for an estate and these things too, nor take charge of your slaves and yourself too.

ἵνα δὲ ταῦτα γένηται, οὐ μικρὰ δέξασθαι οὐδὲ μικρῶν ἀποτυχεῖν. οὐ δύνασαι καὶ ὑπατεῦσαι θέλειν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἀγροὺς ἔχειν ἐσπουδακέναι καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν δουλαρίων φροντίζειν καὶ σεαυτοῦ.

But if you insist on anything of what belongs to others, then what is your own is lost. This is the nature of the affair. Nothing is to be had for nothing.

ἀλλʼ ἄν τι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων θέλῃς, τὰ σὰ ἀπώλετο. αὕτη τοῦ πράγματος ἡ φύσις· προῖκα οὐδὲν γίνεται.

And where is the wonder? If you would be consul, you must watch, run about, kiss hands, be wearied down with waiting at the doors of others, must say and do many slavish things, send gifts to many, daily presents to some. And for what result? Twelve bundles of rods; to sit three or four times on the tribunal;

καὶ τί θαυμαστόν; ἂν ὑπατεῦσαι θέλῃς, ἀγρυπνῆσαί σε δεῖ, περιδραμεῖν, τὰς χεῖρας καταφιλῆσαι, πρὸς ταῖς ἀλλοτρίαις θύραις κατασαπῆναι, πολλὰ μὲν εἰπεῖν, πολλὰ δὲ πρᾶξαι ἀνελεύθερα, δῶρα πέμψαι πολλοῖς, ξένια καθʼ ἡμέραν ἐνίοις· καὶ τί τὸ γινόμενόν ἐστιν;

to give the games of the circus, and suppers in baskets to all the world; or let any one show me what there is in it more than this.

δώδεκα δεσμὰ ῥάβδων καὶ τρὶς ἢ τετράκις ἐπὶ βῆμα καθίσαι καὶ κιρκήσια δοῦναι καὶ σπυρίσιν δειπνίσαι. ἢ δειξάτω μοί τις, τί ἐστι παρὰ ταῦτα.

Will you, then, employ no expense and no pains to acquire peace and tranquillity, to sleep sound while you do sleep, to be thoroughly awake while you are awake, to fear nothing, to be anxious for nothing?

ὑπὲρ ἀπαθείας οὖν, ὑπὲρ ἀταραξίας, ὑπὲρ τοῦ καθεύδοντα καθεύδειν, ἐγρηγορότα ἐγρηγορέναι, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι μηδέν, μὴ ἀγωνιᾶν ὑπὲρ μηδενὸς οὐδὲν ἀναλῶσαι θέλεις, οὐδὲν πονῆσαι;

But if anything belonging to you be lost or idly wasted, while you are thus engaged, or another gets what you ought to have had, will you immediately begin fretting at what has happened? Will you not compare the exchange you have made,—how much for how much?

ἀλλʼ ἄν τι ἀπόληταί σου περὶ ταῦτα γινομένου ἢ ἀναλωθῇ κακῶς ἢ ἄλλος τύχῃ ὧν ἔδει σε τυχεῖν, εὐθὺς [μὴ] δηχθήσῃ ἐπὶ τῷ γενομένῳ;

But you would have such great things for nothing, I suppose. And how can you? Two trades cannot be combined;

οὐκ ἀντιθήσεις, τί ἀντὶ τίνος λαμβάνεις, πόσον ἀντὶ πόσου; ἀλλὰ προῖκα θέλεις τὰ τηλικαῦτα λαβεῖν; καὶ πῶς δύνασαι;

you cannot bestow your care both upon externals and your own ruling faculty. But if you would have the former, let the latter alone; or you will succeed in neither, while you are drawn in different ways by the two. On the other hand, if you would have the latter, let the former alone.

ἔργον ἔργῳ. οὐ δύνασαι καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἔχειν ἐπιμελείας τετυχηκότα καὶ τὸ σαυτοῦ ἡγεμονικόν. εἰ δʼ ἐκεῖνα θέλεις, τοῦτο ἄφες· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔτε τοῦτο ἕξεις οὔτʼ ἐκεῖνα, περισπώμενος ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα. εἰ τοῦτο θέλεις, ἐκεῖνά σε ἀφεῖναι δεῖ.

“The oil will be spilled, the furniture will be spoiled;” but still I shall be free from passion. “There will be a fire when I am out of the way, and the books will be destroyed;” but still I shall make a right use of the phenomena of existence.

ἐκχεθήσεται τὸ ἔλαιον, ἀπολεῖται τὰ σκευάρια, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ ἀπαθὴς ἔσομαι. ἐμπρησμὸς ἔσται ἐμοῦ μὴ παρόντος καὶ ἀπολεῖται τὰ βιβλία, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ χρήσομαι ταῖς φαντασίαις κατὰ φύσιν. ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἕξω φαγεῖν.

“But I shall have nothing to eat.” If I am so unlucky, dying is a safe harbor. That is the harbor for all,—death; that is the refuge; and for that reason there is nothing difficult in life.

εἰ οὕτως τάλας εἰμί, λιμὴν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν. οὗτος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ λιμὴν πάντων, ὁ θάνατος, αὕτη ἡ καταφυγή. διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χαλεπόν ἐστιν.

You may go out of doors when you please, and be troubled with smoke no longer. Why, then, are you anxious? Why break your rest? Why do you not calculate where your good and evil lie, and say, “They are both in my own power; nor can any deprive me of the one, nor involve me against my will in the other.”

ὅταν θέλῃς, ἐξῆλθες καὶ οὐ καπνίζῃ. τί οὖν ἀγωνιᾷς, τί ἀγρυπνεῖς; οὐχὶ δὲ εὐθὺς ἀναλογισάμενος, ποῦ σου τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ κακόν, λέγεις ὅτι ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ ἀμφότερα· οὔτε τούτου τις ἀφελέσθαι με δύναται οὔτʼ ἐκείνῳ ἄκοντα περιβαλεῖν.

Why, then, do not I lay myself down and sleep? What is my own is safe. Let what belongs to others look to itself, who carries it off, how it is distributed by him who hath the disposal of it.

τί οὖν οὐ ῥέγχω βαλών; τὰ ἐμὰ ἀσφαλῶς ἔχει· τὰ ἀλλότρια ὄψεται αὐτὰ ὃς ἂν φέρῃ, ὡς ἂν διδῶται παρὰ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐξουσίαν.

Who am I, to will that it should be so and so? For is the option given to me? Has any one made me the dispenser of it? What I have in my own disposal is enough for me. I must make the best I can of this. Other things must be as their master pleases.

τίς εἰμι ὁ θέλων αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἢ οὕτως; μὴ γάρ μοι δέδοται ἐκλογὴ αὐτῶν; μὴ γὰρ ἐμέ τις αὐτῶν διοικητὴν πεποίηκεν; ἀρκεῖ μοι ὧν ἔχω ἐξουσίαν. ταῦτά με δεῖ κάλλιστα παρασκευάσαι, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα ὡς ἂν θέλῃ ὁ ἐκείνων κύριος.

Does any one who has these things before his eyes lie sleepless, and shift from side to side? What would he have, or what needs he,—Patroclus, or Antilochus, or Menelaus? Why, did he ever think any one of his friends immortal? When was it not obvious that on the morrow, or the next day, he himself or that friend might die?

ταῦτά τις ἔχων πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἀγρυπνεῖ, καὶ στρέφεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα; τί θέλων ἢ τί ποθῶν; Πάτροκλον ἢ Ἀντίλοχον ἢ Μενέλαον; πότε γὰρ ἡγήσατο ἀθάνατόν τινα τῶν φίλων; πότε γὰρ οὐκ εἶχεν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν, ὅτι αὔριον ἢ εἰς τρίτην δεῖ ἢ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἢ ἐκεῖνον;

“Ay, very true,” he says; “but I reckoned that he would survive me, and bring up my son.” Because you were a fool, and reckoned upon uncertainties. Why, then, do you not blame yourself, instead of sitting in tears, like a girl?

ναί, φησίν, ἀλλʼ ᾤμην, ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἐπιβιώσεταί μοι καὶ αὐξήσει μου τὸν υἱόν. μωρὸς γὰρ ἦς καὶ τὰ ἄδηλα ᾤου. τί οὖν οὐκ ἐγκαλεῖς σεαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ κλαίων κάθησαι ὡς τὰ κοράσια;

“But he used to set my dinner before me.” Because he was alive, foolish man; but now he cannot. But Automedon will set it before you; and if he should die, you will find somebody else.

ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνός μοι φαγεῖν παρετίθει. ἔζη γάρ, μωρέ· νῦν δʼ οὐ δύναται. ἀλλʼ Αὐτομέδων σοι παραθήσει· ἂν δὲ καὶ Αὐτομέδων ἀποθάνῃ, ἄλλον εὑρήσεις.

What if the vessel in which your meat used to be cooked should happen to be broken; must you die with hunger because you have not your old vessel? Do you not send and buy a new one?

ἂν δʼ ἡ χύτρα, ἐν ᾗ ἥψετό σοι τὸ κρέας, καταγῇ, λιμῷ σε δεῖ ἀποθανεῖν, ὅτι μὴ ἔχεις τὴν συνήθη χύτραν; οὐ πέμπεις καὶ ἄλλην καινὴν ἀγοράζεις; οὐ μὲν γάρ τι,

“What greater evil could afflict my breast?” Is this your evil, then? And, instead of removing it, do you accuse your mother, that she did not foretell it to you, that you might have spent your whole life in grieving from that time forward?

φησίν, κακώτερον ἄλλο πάθοιμι. τοῦτο γάρ σοι κακόν ἐστιν; εἶτʼ ἀφεὶς τοῦτο ἐξελεῖν αἰτιᾷ τὴν μητέρα, ὅτι σοι οὐ προεῖπεν, ἵνʼ ὀδυνώμενος ἐξ ἐκείνου διατελῇς;

Do you not think now that Homer composed all this on purpose to show us that the noblest, the strongest, the richest, the handsomest of men may nevertheless be the most unfortunate and wretched, if they have not the principles they need?

τί δοκεῖτε; μὴ ἐπίτηδες ταῦτα συνθεῖναι Ὅμηρον, ἵνʼ ἴδωμεν, ὅτι οἱ εὐγενέστατοι, οἱ ἰσχυρότατοι, οἱ πλουσιώτατοι, οἱ εὐμορφότατοι, ὅταν οἷα δεῖ δόγματα μὴ ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν κωλύονται ἀθλιώτατοι εἶναι καὶ δυστυχέστατοι;

11. Some doubt whether the love of society be comprehended in the nature of man; and yet these very persons do not seem to me to doubt but that purity is by all means comprehended in it; and that by this, if by anything, it is distinguished from brute animals.

11. ἀμφισβητοῦσί τινες, εἰ ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου περιέχεται τὸ κοινωνικόν· ὅμως δʼ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ὅτι τό γε καθάριον πάντως περιέχεται καὶ εἴ τινι ἄλλῳ καὶ τούτῳ τῶν ζῴων χωρίζεται.

When, therefore, we see any animal cleaning itself, we are apt to cry, with wonder, that it is like a human being: On the contrary, if an animal is censured, we are presently apt to say, by way of excuse, that it is not a human being.

ὅταν οὖν ἄλλο τι ζῷον ἴδωμεν ἀποκαθαῖρον ἑαυτό, ἐπιλέγειν εἰώθαμεν θαυμάζοντες ὅτι ὡς ἄνθρωπος. καὶ πάλιν ἄν τις ἐγκαλῇ τινι ζῴῳ, εὐθὺς εἰώθαμεν ὥσπερ ἀπολογούμενοι λέγειν ὅτι οὐ δήπου ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν.

Such excellence do we suppose to be in man, which we first received from the gods. For as they are by nature pure and uncorrupt, in proportion as men approach to them by reason, they are tenacious of purity and incorruption.

οὕτως ἐξαίρετόν τι περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι οἰόμεθα ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν αὐτὸ πρῶτον λαμβάνοντες. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι φύσει καθαροὶ καὶ ἀκήρατοι, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἠγγίκασιν αὐτοῖς οἱ ἄνθρωποι κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ καθαροῦ καὶ τοῦ καθαρίου εἰσὶν ἀνθεκτικοί.

But since it is impracticable that their essence, composed of such materials, should be absolutely pure, it is the office of reason to endeavor to render it as pure as possible. The first and highest purity or impurity, then, is that which is formed in the soul.

ἐπεὶ δʼ ἀμήχανον τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν παντάπασιν εἶναι καθαρὰν ἐκ τοιαύτης ὕλης κεκραμένην, ὁ λόγος παραληφθεὶς εἰς τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ταύτην καθάριον ἀποτελεῖν πειρᾶται.

But you will not find the impurity of the soul and body to be alike. For what stain can you find in the soul, unless it be something which renders it impure in its operations? Now, the operations of the soul are its pursuits and avoidances, its desires, aversions, preparations, intentions, assents.

πρώτη οὖν καὶ ἀνωτάτω καθαρότης ἡ ἐν ψυχῇ γενομένη καὶ ὁμοίως ἀκαθαρσία. ψυχῆς δʼ ὡς σώματος μὲν ἀκαθαρσίαν οὐκ ἂν εὕροις, ὡς ψυχῆς δὲ τί ἂν ἄλλο εὕροις ἢ τὸ παρέχον αὐτὴν ῥυπαρὰν πρὸς τὰ ἔργα τὰ αὑτῆς;

What, then, is that which renders it defiled and impure in these operations?

ἔργα δὲ ψυχῆς ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, παρασκευάζεσθαι, ἐπιβάλλεσθαι, συγκατατίθεσθαι.

Nothing else than its perverse judgments. So that the impurity of the soul consists in wicked principles, and its purification in forming right principles;

τί ποτʼ οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις ῥυπαρὰν παρέχον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκάθαρτον; οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὰ μοχθηρὰ κρίματα αὐτῆς.

and that is pure which has right principles, for that alone is unmixed and undefiled in its operations. Now we should, as far as possible, endeavor after something like this in the body, too.

ὥστε ψυχῆς μὲν ἀκαθαρσία δόγματα πονηρά, κάθαρσις δʼ ἐμποίησις οἵων δεῖ δογμάτων. καθαρὰ δʼ ἡ ἔχουσα οἷα δεῖ δόγματα· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς αὑτῆς ἀσύγχυτος καὶ ἀμόλυντος.

It is impossible but that in such a composition as man, there must be a discharge of superfluous phlegm. For this reason Nature has made hands, and the nostrils themselves as channels to let out the moisture; nor can this be neglected with propriety. It was impossible but that the feet should be bemired and soiled from what they pass through.

δεῖ δέ τι ἐοικὸς τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ σώματος φιλοτεχνεῖν κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. ἀμήχανον ἦν μύξας μὴ ῥεῖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοιοῦτον ἔχοντος τὸ σύγκραμα· διὰ τοῦτο χεῖρας ἐποίησεν ἡ φύσις καὶ αὐτὰς τὰς ῥῖνας ὡς σωλῆνας πρὸς τὸ ἐκδιδόναι τὰ ὑγρά. ἂν οὖν ἀναρροφῇ τις αὐτάς, λέγω ὅτι οὐ ποιεῖ ἔργον ἀνθρωπικόν.

Therefore Nature has prepared water and hands. It was impossible but that some uncleanness must cleave to the teeth from eating. Therefore, she says, rinse your teeth.

ἀμήχανον ἦν μὴ πηλοῦσθαι τοὺς πόδας μηδὲ ὅλως μολύνεσθαι διὰ τοιούτων τινῶν πορευομένους· διὰ τοῦτο ὕδωρ παρεσκεύασεν, διὰ τοῦτο χεῖρας.

Why? That you may be a man, and not a wild beast, or a swine. It was impossible but that, from perspiration and the pressure of the clothes, something dirty and necessary to be cleaned should remain upon the body.

ἀμήχανον ἦν ἀπὸ τοῦ τρώγειν μὴ ῥυπαρόν τι προσμένειν τοῖς ὀδοῦσι· διὰ τοῦτο πλῦνον, φησίν, τοὺς ὀδόντας. διὰ τί; ἵνʼ ἄνθρωπος ᾖς καὶ μὴ θηρίον μηδὲ συίδιον.

For this there is water, oil, hands, towels, brushes, soap, and other necessary apparatus for its purification. But no; a smith indeed will get the rust off his iron, and have proper instruments for that purpose;

ἀμήχανον μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱδρῶτος καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐσθῆτα συνοχῆς ὑπολείπεσθαί τι περὶ τὸ σῶμα ῥυπαρὸν καὶ δεόμενον ἀποκαθάρσεως· διὰ τοῦτο ὕδωρ, ἔλαιον, χεῖρες, ὀθόνιον, ξύστρα, νίτρον, ἔσθʼ ὅθʼ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα παρασκευὴ πρὸς τὸ καθῆραι αὐτό.

and you yourself will have your plates washed before you eat, unless you are quite dirty and slovenly; but you will not wash nor purify your body. “Why should I?” say you. I tell you again, in the first place, that you may be like a man; and, in the next, that you may not offend those with whom you converse.

οὔ· ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν χαλκεὺς [ὡς χαλκεὺς] ἐξιώσει τὸ σιδήριον καὶ ὄργανα πρὸς τοῦτο ἕξει κατεσκευασμένα καὶ τὸ πινάκιον αὐτὸς σὺ πλυνεῖς, ὅταν μέλλῃς ἐσθίειν, ἐὰν μὴ ᾖς παντελῶς ἀκάθαρτος καὶ ῥυπαρός· τὸ σωμάτιον δʼ οὐ πλυνεῖς οὐδὲ καθαρὸν ποιήσεις;

Do you think it fitting to smell offensively? Be it so. But is it fitting as regards those who sit near you; who are placed at the table with you;

— διὰ τί; φησίν. — πάλιν ἐρῶ σοι· πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα τὰ ἀνθρώπου ποιῇς, εἶτα ἵνα μὴ ἀνιᾷς τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας.

who salute you? Either go into a desert, as you deserve, or live solitary at home, and be the only sufferer. But to what sort of character does it belong to live in a city, and behave so carelessly and inconsiderately?

τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐνθάδε ποιεῖς καὶ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ. σαυτὸν ἄξιον ἡγῇ τοῦ ὄζειν· ἔστω, ἴσθι ἄξιος. μή τι καὶ τοὺς παρακαθίζοντας, μή τι καὶ τοὺς συγκατακλινομένους, μή τι καὶ τοὺς καταφιλοῦντας;

If Nature had trusted even a horse to your care, would you have overlooked and neglected him? Yet now, without being sensible of it, you do something like this. Consider your body as committed to you, instead of a horse.

ἢ ἄπελθʼ εἰς ἐρημίαν πού ποτε, ἧς ἄξιος εἶ, καὶ μόνος δίαγε κατόζων σεαυτοῦ. δίκαιον γάρ ἐστι τῆς σῆς ἀκαθαρσίας σὲ μόνον ἀπολαύειν. ἐν πόλει δʼ ὄντα οὕτως ἀπερισκέπτως καὶ ἀγνωμόνως ἀναστρέφεσθαι τίνος σοι φαίνεται;

Wash it, rub it, take care that it may not be any one’s aversion, nor disgust any one. Who is not more disgusted at a foul, unwholesome-looking sloven, than at a person who has been accidentally rolled in filth? The stench of the one is adventitious, from without;

εἰ δʼ ἵππον σοι πεπιστεύκει ἡ φύσις, περιεώρας αὐτὸν καὶ ἀτημέλητον; καὶ νῦν οἴου σου τὸ σῶμα ὡς ἵππον ἐγκεχειρίσθαι· πλῦνον αὐτό, ἀπόσμηξον, ποίησον, ἵνα σε μηδεὶς ἀποστρέφηται, μηδεὶς ἐκτρέπηται.

but that which arises from want of care is a kind of inward putrefaction. “But Socrates bathed but seldom.”

τίς δʼ οὐκ ἐκτρέπεται ῥυπαρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὄζοντα, κακόχρουν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν κεκοπρωμένον; ἐκείνη ἡ ὀσμὴ ἔξωθέν ἐστιν ἐπίθετος, ἡ δʼ ἐξ ἀθεραπευσίας ἔσωθεν καὶ οἱονεὶ διασεσηπότος.

Yet his person looked clean, and was so agreeable and pleasing, that the most beautiful and noble youths were fond of him, and desired rather to sit by him than by those who had the finest persons. He might have omitted both bathing and washing, if he had pleased; and yet his amount of bathing had its effect. Cold water may supply the place of the warm bath. “But Aristophanes calls him one of the pallid, barefooted philosophers.”

ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης ὀλιγάκις ἐλούετο.— ἀλλὰ ἔστιλβεν αὐτοῦ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλʼ ἦν οὕτως ἐπίχαρι καὶ ἡδύ, ὥστʼ ἤρων αὐτοῦ οἱ ὡραιότατοι καὶ εὐγενέστατοι καὶ ἐπεθύμουν ἐκείνῳ παρακατακλίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς εὐμορφοτάτοις. ἐξῆν ἐκείνῳ μήτε λούεσθαι μήτε πλύνεσθαι, εἰ ἤθελεν· καίτοι καὶ τὸ ὀλιγάκις ἰσχὺν εἶχεν. κἂν θερμῷ μὴ θέλῃς, ψυχρῷ.

Why, so he says, too, that he walked in the air, and stole clothes from the Palaestra. Besides, all who have written of Socrates affirm quite the contrary; that he was not only agreeable in his conversation, but in his person too.

— ἀλλὰ λέγει Ἀριστοφάνης τοὺς ὠχριῶντας, τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους λέγω. — Λέγει γὰρ καὶ ἀεροβατεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκ τῆς παλαίστρας κλέπτειν τὰ ἱμάτια.

And, again, they write the same of Diogenes. For we ought not to frighten the world from philosophy by the appearance of our persons;

ἐπεί τοι πάντες οἱ γεγραφότες περὶ Σωκράτους πάντα τἀναντία αὐτῷ προσμαρτυροῦσιν, ὅτι ἡδὺς οὐ μόνον ἀκοῦσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδεῖν ἦν. πάλιν περὶ Διογένους ταὐτὰ γράφουσι.

but to show our serenity of mind, as in all other ways, so in the care of our persons. “See, all of you, that I have nothing; that I want nothing. Without house, without city, and an exile (if that happens to be the case), and without a home, I live more easily and prosperously than the noble and rich.

δεῖ γὰρ μηδὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἔμφασιν ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας ἀποσοβεῖν τοὺς πολλούς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα εὔθυμον καὶ ἀτάραχον ἐπιδεικνύειν αὑτὸν οὕτως καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος.

Look upon my person, too, that it is not injured by coarse fare.” But if any one should tell me this, bearing the habit and the visage of a condemned criminal, what god should persuade me to come near philosophy, while it renders men such figures?

ἴδετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔχω, οὐδενὸς δέομαι· ἴδετε, πῶς ἄοικος ὢν καὶ ἄπολις καὶ φυγάς, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ἀνέστιος πάντων τῶν εὐπατριδῶν καὶ πλουσίων ἀταραχώτερον διάγω καὶ εὐρούστερον. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον ὁρᾶτε ὅτι οὐ κακοῦται ὑπὸ τῆς αὐστηρᾶς διαίτης.

Heaven forbid! I would not do it, even if I was sure to become a wise man for my pains. I declare, for my own part, I would rather that a young man, on his first inclination to philosophy, should come to me finically dressed, than with his hair spoiled and dirty.

ἂν δέ μοι ταῦτα λέγῃ τις ἀνθρώπου σχῆμα καταδίκου ἔχων καὶ πρόσωπον, τίς με πείσει θεῶν προσελθεῖν φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἥ γε τοιούτους ποιεῖ; μὴ γένοιτο· οὐδʼ, εἰ σοφὸς ἔμελλον εἶναι, ἤθελον.

For there appears in him some idea of beauty and desire of decency; and where he imagines it to be, there he applies his endeavors. One has nothing more to do but to point it out to him, and say, “You seek beauty, young man, and you do well.

ἐγὼ μὲν νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς τὸν νέον τὸν πρώτως κινούμενον θέλω μᾶλλον ἐλθεῖν πρός με πεπλασμένον τὴν κόμην ἢ κατεφθινηκότα καὶ ῥυπαρόν. βλέπεται γάρ τις ἐν ἐκείνῳ τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασία, ἔφεσις δὲ τοῦ εὐσχήμονος. ὅπου δʼ αὐτὸ[ν] εἶναι φαντάζεται, ἐκεῖ καὶ φιλοτεχνεῖ.

Be assured, then, that it springs from the rational part of you. Seek it there, where the pursuits and avoidances, the desires and aversions, are concerned. Herein consists your excellence; but the paltry body is by nature clay. Why do you trouble yourself, to no purpose, about it?

λοιπὸν ὑποδεῖξαι μόνον αὐτῷ δεῖ καὶ εἰπεῖν νεανίσκε, τὸ καλὸν ζητεῖς καὶ εὖ ποιεῖς. ἴσθι οὖν, ὅτι ἐκεῖ φύεται, ὅπου τὸν λόγον ἔχεις· ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ ζήτει, ὅπου τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ τὰς ἀφορμάς, ὅπου τὰς ὀρέξεις, τὰς ἐκκλίσεις.

You will be convinced by time, if not otherwise, that it is nothing.” But if he should come to me soiled and dirty, with mustaches drooping to his knees, what can I say to him;

τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχεις ἐν σεαυτῷ ἐξαίρετον, τὸ σωμάτιον δὲ φύσει πηλός ἐστιν. τί πονεῖς εἰκῇ περὶ αὐτό; εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, τῷ χρόνῳ γνώσῃ, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν.

by what similitude allure him? For what has he studied which has any resemblance to beauty, that I may transfer his attention, and say that beauty is not there, but here?

ἂν δέ μοι ἔλθῃ κεκοπρωμένος, ῥυπαρός, μύστακα ἔχων μέχρι τῶν γονάτων, τί αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ἔχω, ἀπὸ ποίας αὐτὸν ὁμοιότητος ἐπαγαγεῖν;

Would you have me tell him that beauty consists not in filth, but in reason? For has he any desire of beauty? Has he any appearance of it? Go, and argue with a hog not to roll in the mire. It was in the quality of a young man who loved beauty, that Polemo was touched by the discourses of Xenocrates.

περὶ τί γὰρ ἐσπούδακεν ὅμοιον τῷ καλῷ, ἵνʼ αὐτὸν μεταθῶ καὶ εἴπω οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθάδε τὸ καλόν, ἀλλʼ ἐνθάδε; θέλεις αὐτῷ λέγω οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ κεκοπρῶσθαι τὸ καλόν, ἀλλʼ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ; ἐφίεται γὰρ τοῦ καλοῦ; ἔμφασιν γάρ τινα αὐτοῦ ἔχει; ἄπελθε καὶ χοίρῳ διαλέγου, ἵνʼ ἐν βορβόρῳ μὴ κυλίηται.

For he entered with some incentives to the study of beauty, though he sought in the wrong place. And, indeed, Nature has not made the very brutes dirty which live with man.

διὰ τοῦτο καὶ Πολέμωνος ἥψαντο οἱ λόγοι οἱ Ξενοκράτους ὡς φιλοκάλου νεανίσκου· εἰσῆλθεν γὰρ ἔχων ἐναύσματα τῆς περὶ τὸ καλὸν σπουδῆς, ἀλλαχοῦ δʼ αὐτὸ ζητῶν.

Does a horse wallow in the mire; or a good dog? But swine, and dirty geese, and worms, and spiders, which are banished to the greatest distance from human society. Will you, then, who are a man, choose not to be even one of the animals that are conversant with man; but rather a worm or a spider?

ἐπεί τοι οὐδὲ τὰ ζῷα τὰ ἀνθρώποις σύντροφα ῥυπαρὰ ἐποίησεν ἡ φύσις. μή τι ἵππος κυλίεται ἐν βορβόρῳ, μή τι κύων γενναῖος; ἀλλʼ ὁ ὗς καὶ τὰ σαπρὰ χηνίδια καὶ σκώληκες καὶ ἀράχναι, τὰ μακροτάτω τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης συναναστροφῆς ἀπεληλασμένα.

Will you not bathe sometimes, be it in whatever manner you please? Will you never use water to wash yourself? Will you not come clean, that they who converse with you may have some pleasure in you? But will you accompany us, in your uncleanness, even to the temples, where all unclean ways are forbidden? What, then; would anybody have you adorn yourself to the utmost?

σὺ οὖν ἄνθρωπος ὢν οὐδὲ ζῷον εἶναι θέλεις τῶν ἀνθρώποις συντρόφων, ἀλλὰ σκώληξ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀράχνιον; οὐ λούσῃ πού ποτε ὡς θέλεις, οὐκ ἀποπλυνεῖς σεαυτόν, οὐχ ἥξεις καθαρός, ἵνα σοι χαίρωσιν οἱ συνόντες; ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἡμῖν συνέρχῃ τοιοῦτος, ὅπου πτῦσαι οὐ νενόμισται οὐδʼ ἀπομύξασθαι, ὅλος ὢν πτύσμα καὶ μύξα;

By no means, except in those things where our nature requires it,—in reason, principles, actions; but in our persons only so far as neatness requires; so far as not to give offence.

τί οὖν; καλλωπίζεσθαί τις ἀξιοῖ; μὴ γένοιτο, εἰ μὴ ἐκεῖνο ὃ πεφύκαμεν, τὸν λόγον, τὰ δόγματα, τὰς ἐνεργείας, τὸ δὲ σῶμα μέχρι τοῦ καθαρίου, μέχρι τοῦ μὴ προσκόπτειν.

But if you hear that it is not right to wear purple, you must go, I suppose, and roll your cloak in the mud, or tear it. “But how can I have a fine cloak?” You have water, man; wash it.

ἀλλʼ ἂν ἀκούσῃς, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ φορεῖν κόκκινα, ἀπελθὼν κόπρωσόν σου τὸν τρίβωνα ἢ κατάρρηξον. — ἀλλὰ πόθεν ἔχω καλὸν τρίβωνα; — ἄνθρωπε, ὕδωρ ἔχεις, πλῦνον αὐτόν.

What an amiable youth is here! How worthy this old man to love and be loved! A fit person to be trusted with the instruction of our sons and daughters, and attended by young people as occasion may require,—to read them lectures from a dunghill!

ἰδοὺ νέος ἀξιέραστος, ἰδοὺ πρεσβύτης ἄξιος τοῦ ἐρᾶν καὶ ἀντερᾶσθαι, ᾧ τις υἱον αὑτοῦ παραδῷ … θησόμενον, ᾧ θυγατέρες, ᾧ νέοι προσελεύσονται, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, ἵνα ἐν κοπρῶνι λέγῃ τὰς σχολάς.

Every deterioration takes its origin from something human; but this almost dehumanizes a man.

μὴ γένοιτο. πᾶσα ἐκτροπὴ ἀπό τινος ἀνθρωπικοῦ γίνεται, αὕτη ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ μὴ ἀνθρωπικὴ εἶναι.

12. When you cease to take pains for a little while, do not fancy that you may recommence whenever you please; but remember this, that by means of the fault of to-day, your affairs must necessarily be in a worse condition for the future. The first and worst evil is that there arises a habit of neglect; and then a habit of postponing effort, and constantly procrastinating as to one’s successes and good behavior and orderly thought and action. Now, if procrastination as to anything is advantageous, it must be still more advantageous to omit it altogether; but if it be not advantageous, why do you not take pains all the time? “would play to-day.” What then? Ought you not to take proper pains about it? “would sing.” But why not take proper pains about it? For there is no part of life exempted, about which pains are not needed. For will you do anything the worse by taking pains, and the better by neglect? What else in life is best performed by heedless people? Does a smith forge the better by heedlessness? Does a pilot steer more safely by heedlessness? Or is any other, even of the minutest operations, best performed heedlessly? Do you not perceive that, when you have let your mind loose, it is no longer in your power to call it back, either to propriety, or modesty, or moderation? But you do everything at haphazard; you merely follow your inclinations. “To what, then, am I to direct my pains?” Why, in the first place, to those universal maxims which you must always have at hand; and not sleep, or arise, or drink, or eat, or converse without them: that no one is the master of another’s will; and that it is in the will alone that good and evil lie. No one, therefore, is my master, either to procure me any good, or to involve me in any evil; but 1 alone have the disposal of myself with regard to these things. Since these, then, are secured to me, what need have I to be troubled about externals? What tyrant is formidable? What disease? What poverty? What offence? “I have not pleased such a one.” Is he my concern then? Is he my conscience? “No.” Why, then, do I trouble myself any further about him? “But he is thought to be of some consequence.” Let him look to that; and they who think him so. But I have One whom I must please, to whom I must submit, whom I must obey,—God, and those who surround him. He has intrusted me with myself, and made my will subject to myself alone, having given me rules for the right use of it. If I follow the proper rules in syllogisms, in convertible propositions, I do not heed or regard any one who says anything contrary to them. Why, then, am I vexed at being censured in matters of greater consequence? What is the reason of this perturbation? Nothing else, but that in this instance I want practice. For every science despises ignorance and the ignorant; and not only the sciences, but even the arts. Take any shoemaker, take any smith you will, and he may laugh at the rest of the world, so far as his own business is concerned. In the first place, then, these are the maxims we must have ready, and do nothing without them, but direct the soul to this mark; to pursue nothing external, nothing that belongs to others, but as he who has the power has appointed. Things controllable by will are to be pursued always; and the rest as may be permitted. Besides this, we must remember who we are, and what name we bear, endeavoring to use all the circumstances of life in their proper relations: what is the proper time for singing, what for play, and in what company; what will be the consequence of our performance; whether our companions will despise us, or we ourselves; when to employ raillery, and whom to ridicule; upon what occasions to comply, and with whom; and then, in complying, how to preserve our own character. Wherever you deviate from any of these rules, the damage is immediate; not from anything external, but from the very action itself. “What, then; is it possible by these means to be faultless?” Impracticable; but this is possible, to use a constant endeavor to be faultless. For we shall have cause to be satisfied, if, by never remitting our pains, we shall be exempt at least from a few faults. But now, when you say you will begin to take pains to-morrow, be assured that it is the same thing as if you said, “Today I will be shameless, impertinent, base, it shall be in the power of others to grieve me; I will be passionate, I will be envious to-day.” See to how many evils you give yourself up. “But all will be well tomorrow.” How much better to-day? If it be for your interest to-morrow, how much more to-day, that it may be in your power to-morrow too, and that you may not again deter it until the third day.

12. ὅταν ἀφῇς πρὸς ὀλίγον τὴν προσοχήν, μὴ τοῦτο φαντάζου, ὅτι, ὁπόταν θέλῃς, ἀναλήψῃ αὐτήν, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο πρόχειρον ἔστω σοι, ὅτι παρὰ τὸ σήμερον ἁμαρτηθὲν εἰς τἆλλα χεῖρον ἀνάγκη σοι τὰ πράγματα ἔχειν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάντων χαλεπώτατον ἔθος τοῦ μὴ προσέχειν ἐγγίνεται, εἶτα ἔθος τοῦ ἀναβάλλεσθαι τὴν προσοχήν· ἀ[ι]εὶ δʼ εἰς ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον χρόνον εἴωθας ὑπερτίθεσθαι τὸ εὐροεῖν, τὸ εὐσχημονεῖν, τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν λυσιτελὴς ἡ ὑπέρθεσίς ἐστιν, ἡ παντελὴς ἀπόστασις αὐτῆς ἐστι λυσιτελεστέρα· εἰ δʼ οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, τί οὐχὶ διηνεκῆ τὴν προσοχὴν φυλάσσεις; σήμερον παῖξαι θέλω. τί οὖν κωλύει προσέχοντα; ᾆσαι. τί οὖν κωλύει προσέχοντα; μὴ γὰρ ἐξαιρεῖταί τι μέρος τοῦ βίου, ἐφʼ ὃ οὐ διατείνει τὸ προσέχειν; χεῖρον γὰρ αὐτὸ προσέχων ποιήσεις, βέλτιον δὲ μὴ προσέχων; καὶ τί ἄλλο τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ κρεῖσσον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ προσεχόντων γίνεται; ὁ τέκτων μὴ προσέχων …; ⟨ὁ κυβερνήτης μὴ προσέχων⟩ κυβερνᾷ ἀσφαλέστερον; ἄλλο δέ τι τῶν μικροτέρων ἔργων ὑπὸ ἀπροσεξίας ἐπιτελεῖται κρεῖσσον; οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ, ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν ἀφῇς τὴν γνώμην, οὐκ ἔτι ἐπὶ σοί ἐστιν ἀνακαλέσασθαι αὐτήν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ εὔσχημον, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰδῆμον, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κατεσταλμένον; ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἐπελθὸν ποιεῖς, ταῖς προθυμίαις ἐπακολουθεῖς. τίσιν οὖν δεῖ με προσέχειν;— πρῶτον μὲν ἐκείνοις τοῖς καθολικοῖς καὶ ἐκεῖνα πρόχειρα ἔχειν καὶ χωρὶς ἐκείνων μὴ καθεύδειν, μὴ ἀνίστασθαι, μὴ πίνειν, μὴ ἐσθίειν, μὴ συμβάλλειν ἀνθρώποις· ὅτι προαιρέσεως ἀλλοτρίας κύριος οὐδείς, ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ μόνῃ τἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. οὐδεὶς οὖν κύριος οὔτʼ ἀγαθόν μοι περιποιῆσαι οὔτε κακῷ με περιβαλεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἐμαυτοῦ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐξουσίαν ἔχω μόνος. ὅταν οὖν ταῦτα ἀσφαλῆ μοι ᾖ, τί ἔχω περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ταράσσεσθαι; ποῖος τύραννος φοβερός, ποία νόσος, ποία πενία, ποῖον πρόσκρουσμα; — ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἤρεσα τῷ δεῖνι. — μὴ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἐμόν ἐστιν ἔργον, μή τι ἐμὸν κρίμα; — οὔ. — τί οὖν ἔτι μοι μέλει; — ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ τις εἶναι. — ὄψεται αὐτὸς καὶ οἷς δοκεῖ, ἐγὼ δʼ ἔχω, τίνι με δεῖ ἀρέσκειν, τίνι ὑποτετάχθαι, τίνι πείθεσθαι· τῷ θεῷ καὶ μετʼ ἐκεῖνον … ἐμὲ ἐκεῖνος συνέστησεν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν προαίρεσιν ὑπέταξεν ἐμοὶ μόνῳ δοὺς κανόνας εἰς χρῆσιν αὐτῆς τὴν ὀρθήν, οἷς ὅταν κατακολουθήσω, ἐν συλλογισμοῖς οὐκ ἐπιστρέφομαι οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλο τι λεγόντων, ἐν μεταπίπτουσιν οὐ φροντίζω οὐδενός. διὰ τί οὖν ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν ἀνιῶσί με οἱ ψέγοντες; τί τὸ αἴτιον ταύτης τῆς ταραχῆς; οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἀγύμναστός εἰμι. ἐπεί τοι πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη καταφρονητική ἐστι τῆς ἀγνοίας καὶ τῶν ἀγνοούντων καὶ οὐ μόνον αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ τέχναι. φέρε ὃν θέλεις σκυτέα καὶ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελᾷ περὶ τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον· φέρε ὃν θέλεις τέκτονα. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἔχειν πρόχειρα καὶ μηδὲν δίχα τούτων ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τετάσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν σκοπόν, μηδὲν τῶν ἔξω διώκειν, μηδὲν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀλλʼ ὡς διέταξεν ὁ δυνάμενος, τὰ προαιρετικὰ ἐξ ἅπαντος, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα ὡς ἂν διδῶται. ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ μεμνῆσθαι, τίνες ἐσμὲν καὶ τί ἡμῖν ὄνομα, καὶ πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν σχέσεων πειρᾶσθαι τὰ καθήκοντα ἀπευθύνειν· τίς καιρὸς ᾠδῆς, τίς καιρὸς παιδ[ε]ιᾶς, τίνων παρόντων· τί ἔσται ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος· μή τι καταφρονήσωσιν ἡμῶν οἱ συνόντες, μή τι ἡμεῖς αὐτῶν· πότε σκῶψαι καὶ τίνας ποτὲ καταγελάσαι καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι ποτὲ συμπεριενεχθῆναι καὶ τίνι, καὶ λοιπὸν ἐν τῇ συμπεριφορᾷ πῶς τηρῆσαι τὸ αὑτοῦ. ὅπου δʼ ἂν ἀπονεύσῃς ἀπό τινος τούτων, εὐθὺς ζημία, οὐκ ἔξωθέν ποθεν, ἀλλʼ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ἐνεργείας. τί οὖν; δυνατὸν ἀναμάρτητον ἤδη εἶναι; ἀμήχανον, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο δυνατὸν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν τετάσθαι διηνεκῶς. ἀγαπητὸν γάρ, εἰ μηδέποτʼ ἀνιέντες ταύτην τὴν προσοχὴν ὀλίγων γε ἁμαρτημάτων ἐκτὸς ἐσόμεθα. νῦν δʼ ὅταν εἴπῃς ἀπαύριον προσέξω, ἴσθι ὅτι τοῦτο λέγεις σήμερον ἔσομαι ἀναίσχυντος, ἄκαιρος, ταπεινός· ἐπʼ ἄλλοις ἔσται τὸ λυπεῖν με· ὀργισθήσομαι σήμερον, φθονήσω. βλέπε, ὅσα κακὰ σεαυτῷ ἐπιτρέπεις. ἀλλʼ εἴ σοι αὔριον καλῶς ἔχει, πόσῳ κρεῖττον σήμερον· εἰ αὔριον συμφέρει, πολὺ μᾶλλον σήμερον, ἵνα καὶ αὔριον δυνηθῇς καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβάλῃ εἰς τρίτην.

13. When any one appears to us to discourse frankly of his own affairs, we too are somehow tempted to disclose our secrets to him; and we consider this to be acting with frankness,—first, because it seems unfair that when we have heard the affairs of our neighbor, we should not in return communicate ours to him; and besides, we think that we shall not appear of a frank character, in concealing what belongs to ourselves. Indeed it is often said, “have told you all my affairs; and will you tell me none of yours? How happens this?” Lastly, it is supposed that we may safely trust him who has already trusted us; for we imagine that he will never discover our affairs, for fear we should in turn discover his. It is thus that the inconsiderate are caught by the soldiers at Rome. A soldier sits by you in a civilian’s dress, and begins to speak ill of Caesar. Then you, as if you had received a pledge of his fidelity, by his first beginning the abuse, say likewise what you think; and so you are led away in chains to execution. Something like this is the case with us in general. But when one has safely intrusted his secrets to me, shall I, in imitation of him, trust mine to any one who comes in my way? The case is different. I indeed hold my tongue (supposing me to be of such a disposition); but he goes and discovers them to everybody; and then, when I come to find it out, if I happen to be like him, from a desire of revenge, I discover his, and asperse and am aspersed. But if I remember that one man does not hurt another, but that every one is hurt or profited by his own actions, I may indeed keep to this, not to do anything like him; yet, by my own talkative folly, I suffer what I do suffer. “Ay; but it is unfair, when you have heard the secrets of your neighbor, not to communicate anything to him in return.” Why, did I ask you to do it, sir? Did you tell me your affairs upon condition that I should tell you mine in return? If you are a gossip, and take all you meet for friends, would you have me too become like you? But what if the case be this; that you did right in trusting your affairs to me, but it is not right that I should trust you? Would you have me run headlong, and fall? This is just as if I had a sound barrel, and you a leaky one; and you should come and deposit your wine with me, to be put into my barrel; and then should take it ill that, in my turn, I did not trust you with my wine. No. You have a leaky barrel. How, then, are we any longer upon equal terms? You have intrusted your affairs to an honest man, and a man of honor; one who finds his help or harm in his own actions alone, and in nothing external. Would you have me intrust mine to you, who have dishonored your own will, and who would get a paltry sum, or a post of power or preferment at court, even if it required you to kill your own children, like Medea? Where is the fairness in this? But show me that you are faithful, honorable, steady; show me that you have principles conducive to friendship; show me that your vessel is not leaky, and you shall see that I will not wait for you to intrust your affairs to me, but I will come and entreat you to hear mine. For who would not make use of a good vessel? Who despises a benevolent and friendly adviser? Who will not gladly receive one to share the burden, as it were, of his difficulties; and by sharing, to make it lighter? “Well, but I trust you, and you do not trust me.” In the first place, you do not really trust me; but you are a gossip, and therefore can keep nothing in. For if the former be the case, trust only me. But now, whenever you see a man at leisure, you sit down by him and say: “My dear friend, there is not a man in the world who wishes me better, or has more kindness for me, than you; I entreat you to hear my affairs.” And this you do to those with whom you have not the least acquaintance. But if you do trust me, it is plainly as a man of fidelity and honor, and not because I have told you my affairs. Let me alone, then, till I reciprocate this opinion. Convince me that if a person has told his affairs to any one, it is a proof of his being a man of fidelity and honor. For if this were the case, I would go about and tell my affairs to the whole world, if I could thus become a man of fidelity and honor. But that is no such matter; for it demands of a man to have no ordinary principles. If, then, you see any one taking pains for things that belong to others, and subjecting his will to them, be assured that this man has a thousand things to compel and restrain him. He has no need of burning pitch, or the torturing wheel, to make him tell what he knows; but the nod of a girl, for instance, will shake his purpose; the good-will of a courtier; the desire of an office, of an inheritance; ten thousand other things of that sort. It must therefore be remembered, in general, that confidential discourses require fidelity and a certain sort of principles. And where, at this time, are these easily to be found? Pray let any one show me a person of such a disposition as to say, I concern myself only for those things which are my own, incapable of restraint, and by nature free. This I esteem the essence of good. Let the rest be as it may happen; it makes no difference to me.

13. ὅταν τις ἡμῖν ἁπλῶς δόξῃ διειλέχθαι περὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πραγμάτων, πώς ποτε ἐξαγόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐκφέρειν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἀπόρρητα καὶ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν οἰόμεθα εἶναι· πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἄνισον εἶναι δοκεῖ αὐτὸν μὲν ἀκηκοέναι τὰ τοῦ πλησίον, μὴ μέντοι μεταδιδόναι κἀκείνῳ ἐν τῷ μέρει τῶν ἡμετέρων. εἶθʼ ὅτι οἰόμεθα οὐχ ἁπλῶν ἀνθρώπων παρέξειν αὐτοῖς φαντασίαν σιωπῶντες τὰ ἴδια. ἀμέλει πολλάκις εἰώθασιν λέγειν ἐγώ σοι πάντα τἀμαυτοῦ εἴρηκα, σύ μοι οὐδὲν τῶν σῶν εἰπεῖν θέλεις; ποῦ γίνεται τοῦτο; πρόσεστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀσφαλῶς πιστεύειν τῷ ἤδη τὰ αὑτοῦ πεπιστευκότι· ὑπέρχεται γὰρ ἡμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὗτος ἐξείποι τὰ ἡμέτερα εὐλαβούμενος, μήποτε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐξείπωμεν τὰ ἐκείνου. οὕτως καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐν Ῥώμῃ οἱ προπετεῖς λαμβάνονται. παρακεκάθικέ σοι στρατιώτης ἐν σχήματι ἰδιωτικῷ καὶ ἀρξάμενος κακῶς λέγει τὸν Καίσαρα, εἶτα σὺ ὥσπερ ἐνέχυρον παρʼ αὐτοῦ λαβὼν τῆς πίστεως τὸ αὐτὸν τῆς λοιδορίας κατῆρχθαι λέγεις καὶ αὐτὸς ὅσα φρονεῖς, εἶτα δεθεὶς ἀπάγῃ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐν τῷ καθόλου πάσχομεν. οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖνος ἀσφαλῶς πεπίστευκεν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, οὕτως κἀγὼ τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι· ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ μὲν ἀκούσας σιωπῶ, ἄν γε ὦ τοιοῦτος, ὁ δʼ ἐξελθὼν ἐκφέρει πρὸς πάντας. εἶτʼ ἂν γνῶ τὸ γενόμενον, ἂν μὲν ὦ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκείνῳ ὅμοιος, ἀμύνασθαι θέλων ἐκφέρω τὰ ἐκείνου καὶ φύρω καὶ φύρομαι. ἂν δὲ μνημονεύω, ὅτι ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐ βλάπτει, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἔργα ἕκαστον καὶ βλάπτει καὶ ὠφελεῖ, τούτου μὲν κρατῶ τοῦ μὴ ὅμοιόν τι ποιῆσαι ἐκείνῳ, ὅμως δʼ ὑπὸ φλυαρίας τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ πέπονθα ἃ πέπονθα. ναί· ἀλλʼ ἄνισόν ἐστιν ἀκούσαντα τὰ τοῦ πλησίον ἀπόρρητα αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ μέρει μηδενὸς μεταδιδόναι αὐτῷ. — μὴ γάρ σε παρεκάλουν, ἄνθρωπε; μὴ γὰρ ἐπὶ συνθήκαις τισὶν ἐξήνεγκας τὰ σαυτοῦ, ἵνʼ ἀκούσῃς ἐν τῷ μέρει καὶ τὰ ἐμά; εἰ σὺ φλύαρος εἶ καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἀπαντήσαντας φίλους εἶναι δοκεῖς, θέλεις καὶ ἐμὲ ὅμοιόν σοι γενέσθαι; τί δʼ, εἰ σὺ καλῶς μοι πεπίστευκας τὰ σαυτοῦ, σοὶ δʼ οὐκ ἔστι καλῶς πιστεῦσαι, θέλεις με προ[σ]πεσεῖν; οἷον εἰ πίθον εἶχον ἐγὼ μὲν στεγνόν, σὺ δὲ τετρυπημένον καὶ ἐλθὼν παρακατέθου μοι τὸν σαυτοῦ οἶνον, ἵνα βάλω εἰς τὸν ἐμὸν πίθον, εἶτʼ ἠγανάκτεις ὅτι μὴ κἀγὼ σοὶ πιστεύω τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ οἶνον· σὺ γὰρ τετρυπημένον ἔχεις τὸν πίθον. πῶς οὖν ἔτι ἴσον γίνεται; σὺ πιστῷ παρακατέθου, σὺ αἰδήμονι, τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργείας μόνας βλαβερὰς ἡγουμένῳ καὶ ὠφελίμους, τῶν δʼ ἐκτὸς οὐδέν· ἐγὼ σοὶ θέλεις παρακαταθῶμαι, ἀνθρώπῳ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἠτιμακότι, θέλοντι δὲ κερματίου τυχεῖν ἢ ἀρχῆς τινος ἢ προαγωγῆς ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ, κἂν μέλλῃς τὰ τέκνα σου κατασφάζειν, ὡς ἡ Μήδεια; ποῦ τοῦτο ἴσον ἐστίν; ἀλλὰ δεῖξόν μοι σαυτὸν πιστόν, αἰδήμονα, βέβαιον, δεῖξον, ὅτι δόγματα ἔχεις φιλικά, δεῖξόν σου τὸ ἀγγεῖον ὅτι οὐ τέτρηται καὶ ὄψει, πῶς οὐκ ἀναμένω ἵνα μοι σὺ πιστεύσῃς τὰ σαυτοῦ, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ἐλθὼν σὲ παρακαλῶ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν ἐμῶν. τίς γὰρ οὐ θέλει χρήσασθαι ἀγγείῳ καλῷ, τίς ἀτιμάζει σύμβουλον εὔνουν καὶ πιστόν, τίς οὐκ ἄσμενος δέξηται τὸν ὥσπερ φορτίου μεταληψόμενον τῶν αὐτοῦ περιστάσεων καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ κουφιοῦντα αὐτὸν τῷ μεταλαβεῖν; ναί· ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ σοὶ πιστεύω, σὺ ἐμοὶ οὐ πιστεύεις. — πρῶτον μὲν οὐδὲ σὺ ἐμοὶ πιστεύεις, ἀλλὰ φλύαρος εἶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν δύνασαι κατασχεῖν. ἐπεί τοι εἰ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐμοὶ μόνῳ αὐτὰ πίστευσον· νῦν δʼ ὃν ἂν εὐσχολοῦντα ἴδῃς, παρακαθίσας αὐτῷ λέγεις ἀδελφέ, οὐδένα σου ἔχω εὐνούστ[οτ]ερον οὐδὲ φίλτερον, παρακαλῶ σε ἀκοῦσαι τὰ ἐμά· καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τοὺς οὐδέ τι ὀλίγον ἐγνωσμένους ποιεῖς. εἰ δὲ καὶ πιστεύεις ἐμοί, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πιστῷ καὶ αἰδήμονι, οὐχ ὅτι σοὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐξεῖπον. ἄφες οὖν, ἵνα κἀγὼ ταὐτὰ ὑπολάβω. δεῖξόν μοι, ὅτι, ἄν τις τινὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἐξείπῃ, ἐκεῖνος πιστός ἐστι καὶ αἰδήμων. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἦν, ἐγὼ περιερχόμενος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ ἂν ἔλεγον, εἰ τούτου ἕνεκα ἔμελλον πιστὸς καὶ αἰδήμων ἔσεσθαι. τὸ δʼ ἐστὶν οὐ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ δογμάτων δεῖ οὐχ ὧν ἔτυχεν. ἂν γοῦν τινα ἴδῃς περὶ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα ἐσπουδακότα καὶ τούτοις ὑποτεταχότα τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν, ἴσθι ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος μυρίους ἔχει τοὺς ἀναγκάζοντας, τοὺς κωλύοντας. οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ χρεία πίσσης ἢ τροχοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἐξειπεῖν ἃ οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ παιδισκαρίου νευμάτιον, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, ἐκσείσει αὐτόν, Καισαριανοῦ φιλοφροσύνη, ἀρχῆς ἐπιθυμία, κληρονομίας, ἄλλα τούτοις ὅμοια τρισμύρια. μεμνῆσθαι οὖν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου, ὅτι οἱ ἀπόρρητοι λόγοι πίστεως χρείαν ἔχουσι καὶ δογμάτων τοιούτων· ταῦτα δὲ ποῦ νῦν εὑρεῖν ῥᾳδίως; ἢ δειξάτω μοί τις τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ὥστε λέγειν ἐμοὶ μόνων μέλει τῶν ἐμῶν, τῶν ἀκωλύτων, τῶν φύσει ἐλευθέρων. ταύτην οὐσίαν ἔχω τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα γινέσθω ὡς ἂν διδῶται· οὐ διαφέρομαι.