SCRIPTURA

Epictetus · Discourses · 6 of 23

Book I · chapters 27–30

Translated by Thomas Wentworth Higginson

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27. Appearances to the mind are of four kinds. Things either are what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Rightly to aim, in all these cases, is the wise man’s task. Whatever unduly constrains us, to that a remedy must be applied. If the sophistries of Pyrrhonism, or the Academy, constrain us, the remedy must be applied there; if specious appearances, by which things seem to be good which are not so, let us seek for a remedy there. If it be custom which constrains us, we must endeavor to find a remedy against that. “What remedy is to be found against custom?” Establish a contrary custom. You hear the vulgar say, “Such a one, poor soul! is dead.” Well, his father died; his mother died. “Ay, but he was cut off in the flower of his age, and in a foreign land.” Observe these contrary ways of speaking; and abandon such expressions. Oppose to one custom a contrary custom; to sophistry the art of reasoning, and the frequent use and exercise of it. Against specious appearances we must set clear convictions, bright and ready for use. When death appears as an evil, we ought immediately to remember that evils are things to be avoided, but death is inevitable. For what can I do, or where can I fly from it? Let me suppose myself to be Sarpedon, the son of Jove, that I may speak as nobly. “I go either to excel, or to give another the occasion to excel.” If I can achieve nothing myself, I will not grudge another his achievement. But suppose this to be a strain too high for us; do not these following thoughts befit us? Whither shall I fly from death? Show me the place, show me the people, to whom I may have recourse, whom death does not overtake. Show me the charm to avoid it. If there be none, what would you have me do? I cannot escape death; but cannot I escape the dread of it? Must I die trembling and lamenting? For the very origin of the disease lies in wishing for something that is not obtained. Under the influence of this, if I can make outward things conform to my own inclination, I do it; if not, I feel inclined to tear out the eyes of whoever hinders me. For it is the nature of man not to endure the being deprived of good; not to endure the falling into evil. And so, at last, when I can neither control events, nor tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down, and groan, and revile him whom I can,—Zeus, and the rest of the gods; for what are they to me, if they take no care of me? “Oh! but then you will be impious.” What then? Can I be in a worse condition than I am now? In general, remember this, that unless we make our religion and our treasure to consist in the same thing, religion will always be sacrificed. Have these things no weight? Let a Pyrrhonist, or an Academic, come and oppose them. For my part, I have neither leisure nor ability to stand up as an advocate for common-sense. Even if the business were concerning an estate, I should call in another advocate. To what advocate, then, shall I now appeal? I will leave it to any one who may be upon the spot. Thus, I may not be able to explain how sensation takes place, whether it be diffused universally, or reside in a particular part; for I find perplexities in either case; but that you and I are not the same person, I very exactly know. “How so?” Why, I never, when I have a mind to swallow anything, carry it to your mouth, but my own. I never, when I wanted bread, seized a broom instead, but went directly to the bread as I needed it. You who deny all evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise? Which of you, when he wished to go into a bath, ever went into a mill? “Why, then, must not we, to the utmost, defend these points; stand by common-sense; be fortified against everything that opposes it?” Who denies that? But it must be done by him who has ability and leisure to spare; but he who is full of trembling and perturbation and inward disorders of heart must first employ his time about something else.

27. τετραχῶς αἱ φαντασίαι γίνονται ἡμῖν· ἢ γὰρ ἔστι τινὰ καὶ οὕτως φαίνεται ἢ οὐκ ὄντα οὐδὲ φαίνεται ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ ἔστι καὶ οὐ φαίνεται ἢ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. λοιπὸν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις εὐστοχεῖν ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου. ὅ τι δʼ ἂν ᾖ τὸ θλῖβον, ἐκείνῳ δεῖ προσάγειν τὴν βοήθειαν. εἰ σοφίσματα ἡμᾶς Πυρρώνεια καὶ Ἀκαδημαικὰ τὰ θλίβοντά ἐστιν, ἐκείνοις προσάγωμεν τὴν βοήθειαν· εἰ αἱ τῶν πραγμάτων πιθανότητες, καθʼ ἃς φαίνεταί τινα ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ὄντα, ἐκεῖ τὴν βοήθειαν ζητῶμεν· εἰ ἔθος ἐστὶ τὸ θλῖβον, πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὴν βοήθειαν ἀνευρίσκειν πειρατέον. τί οὖν πρὸς ἔθος ἔστιν εὑρίσκειν βοήθημα; τὸ ἐναντίον ἔθος. ἀκούεις τῶν ἰδιωτῶν λεγόντων τάλας ἐκεῖνος, ἀπέθανεν· ἀπώλετο ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἡ μήτηρ· ἐξεκόπη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄωρος καὶ ἐπὶ ξένης. ἄκουσον τῶν ἐναντίων λόγων, ἀπόσπασον σεαυτὸν τούτων τῶν φωνῶν, ἀντίθες τῷ ἔθει τὸ ἐναντίον ἔθος. πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστικοὺς λόγους τὰ λογικὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις γυμνασίαν καὶ τριβήν, πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων πιθανότητας τὰς προλήψεις ἐναργεῖς ἐσμηγμένας καὶ προχείρους ἔχειν δεῖ. ὅταν θάνατος φαίνηται κακόν, πρόχειρον ἔχειν ὅτι τὰ κακὰ ἐκκλίνειν καθήκει καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ὁ θάνατος. τί γὰρ ποιήσω; ποῦ γὰρ αὐτὸν φύγω; ἔστω ἐμὲ εἶναι Σαρπηδόνα τὸν τοῦ Διός, ἵνʼ οὕτως γενναίως εἴπω ἀπελθὼν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀριστεῦσαι θέλω ἢ ἄλλῳ παρασχεῖν ἀφορμὴν τοῦ ἀριστεῦσαι· εἰ μὴ δύναμαι κατορθῶσαί τι αὐτός, οὐ φθονήσω ἄλλῳ τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι γενναῖον· ἔστω ταῦτα ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, ἐκεῖνο οὐ πίπτει εἰς ἡμᾶς; καὶ ποῦ φύγω τὸν θάνατον; μηνύσατέ μοι τὴν χώραν, μηνύσατε ἀνθρώπους, εἰς οὓς ἀπέλθω, εἰς οὓς οὐ παραβάλλει, μηνύσατε ἐπαοιδήν· εἰ μὴ ἔχω, τί με θέλετε ποιεῖν; οὐ δύναμαι τὸν θάνατον ἀποφυγεῖν· τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὸν μὴ ἀποφύγω, ἀλλʼ ἀποθάνω πενθῶν καὶ τρέμων; αὕτη γὰρ γένεσις πάθους θέλειν τι καὶ μὴ γίνεσθαι. ἔνθεν ἂν μὲν δύνωμαι τὰ ἐκτὸς μετατιθέναι πρὸς τὴν βούλησιν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ, μετατίθημι· εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν ἐμποδίζοντα ἐκτυφλῶσαι θέλω. πέφυκε γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος μὴ ὑπομένειν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, μὴ ὑπομένειν περιπίπτειν τῷ κακῷ. εἶτα τὸ τελευταῖον, ὅταν μήτε τὰ πράγματα μεταθεῖναι δυνηθῶ μήτε τὸν ἐμποδίζοντα ἐκτυφλῶσαι, κάθημαι καὶ στένω καὶ ὃν δύναμαι λοιδορῶ, τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς ἄλλους· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιστρέφονταί μου, τί ἐμοὶ καὶ αὐτοῖς; ναί· ἀλλʼ ἀσεβὴς ἔσῃ. τί οὖν μοι χεῖρον ἔσται, ὧν ἔστι μοι νῦν; τὸ σύνολον ἐκείνου μεμνῆσθαι, ὅτι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ᾖ τὸ εὐσεβὲς καὶ συμφέρον, οὐ δύναται σωθῆναι τὸ εὐσεβὲς ἔν τινι. ταῦτα οὐ δοκεῖ ἐπείγοντα; ἐρχέσθω καὶ ἀπαντάτω Πυρρώνειος καὶ Ἀκαδημαικός. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος οὐκ ἄγω σχολὴν πρὸς ταῦτα οὐδὲ δύναμαι συνηγορῆσαι τῇ συνηθείᾳ. εἰ καὶ περὶ ἀγριδίου πραγμάτιον εἶχον, ἄλλον ἂν παρεκάλεσα τὸν συνηγορήσοντα· τίνι οὖν ἀρκοῦμαι κατὰ τὸν τόπον; πῶς μὲν αἴσθησις γίνεται, π[ρ]ότερον διʼ ὅλων ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους, ἴσως οὐκ οἶδα ἀπολογίσασθαι, ταράσσει δέ με ἀμφότερα. ὅτι δʼ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ οὐκ ἐσμὲν οἱ αὐτοί, λίαν ἀκριβῶς οἶδα. πόθεν τοῦτο; οὐδέποτε καταπίνειν τι θέλων ἐκεῖ φέρω τὸν ψωμόν, ἀλλʼ ὧδε· οὐδέποτʼ ἄρτον θέλων λαβεῖν τὸ σάρον ἔλαβον, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄρτον ἔρχομαι ὡς πρὸς σκοπόν. ὑμεῖς δʼ αὐτοὶ οἱ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀναιροῦντες ἄλλο τι ποιεῖτε; τίς ὑμῶν εἰς βαλανεῖον ἀπελθεῖν θέλων εἰς μυλῶνα ἀπῆλθεν; — τί οὖν; οὐ δεῖ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τούτων ἀντέχεσθαι, τοῦ τηρῆσαι τὴν συνήθειαν, τοῦ πεφράχθαι πρὸς τὰ κατʼ αὐτῆς; — καὶ τίς ἀντιλέγει; ἀλλὰ τὸν δυνάμενον, τὸν σχολάζοντα· τὸν δὲ τρέμοντα καὶ ταρασσόμενον καὶ ῥηγνύμενον ἔσωθεν τὴν καρδίαν ἄλλῳ τινὶ δεῖ προσευκαιρεῖν.

28. What is the basis of assent to anything? Its appearing to be true. It is not possible, therefore, to assent to what appears to be not true. Why? Because it is the very nature of the understanding to agree to truth, to be dissatisfied with falsehood, and to suspend its belief in doubtful cases. “What is the proof of this?” Persuade yourself, if you can, that it is now night. Impossible. Dissuade yourself from the belief that it 1 This seems to be said by one of the hearers, who wanted to have the absurdities of the sceptics confuted and guarded against by regular argument. Epictetus allows this to be right, for such as have abilities and leisure; but recommends in others the more necessary task of curing their own moral disorders, and insinuates that the mere common occurences of life are sufficient to overthrow the notions of the Pyrrhonists.—C. is day. Impossible. Persuade yourself that the number of the stars is even or odd. Impossible. When any one, then, assents to what is false, be assured that he does not wilfully assent to it as false,—for, as Plato affirms, the soul is unwillingly deprived of truth, —but what is false appears to him to be true. Well, then; have we, in actions, anything correspondent to this distinction between true and false? There are right and wrong; advantageous and disadvantageous; desirable and undesirable, and the like. “A person, then, cannot think a thing truly advantageous to him, and not choose it?” He cannot. But how says Medea?—I know what evils wait upon my purpose;But wrath is stronger than this will of mine. Was it that she thought the very indulgence of her rage, and the punishing her husband, more advantageous than the preservation of her children? Yes; but she is deceived. Show clearly to her that she is deceived, and she will forbear; but, till you have shown it, what has she to follow but what appears to herself? Nothing. Why, then, are you angry with her, that the unhappy woman is deceived in the most important points, and instead of a human creature, becomes a viper? Why do you not rather, as we pity the blind and lame, so likewise pity those who are blinded.and lamed in their superior faculties? Whoever, therefore, duly remembers, that the appearance of things to the mind is the standard of every action to man,—that this is either right or wrong, and if right, he is without fault; if wrong, he himself suffers punishment; for that one man cannot be the person deceived, and another the only sufferer,—such a person will not be outrageous and angry at any one; will not revile, or reproach, or hate, or quarrel with any one. “So, then, have all the great and dreadful deeds that have been done in the world no other origin than semblances?” Absolutely no other. The Iliad consists of nothing but such semblances and their results. It seemed to Paris that he should carry off the wife of Menelaus. It seemed to Helen that she should follow him. If, then, it had seemed to Menelaus that it was an advantage to be robbed of such a wife, what could have happened? Not only the Iliad had been lost, but the Odyssey too. “Do such great events, then, depend on so small a cause?” What events, then, call you great? “Wars and seditions, the destruction of numbers of men, and the overthrow of cities.” And what in all this is great? Nothing. What is great in the death of numbers of oxen, numbers of sheep, or in the burning or pulling down numbers of nests of storks or swallows? “Are these things then similar?” They are. The bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of sheep and oxen. The houses of men are burnt, and the nests of storks. What is there so great or fearful in all this? Pray, show me what difference there is between the house of a man and the nest of a stork, considered as a habitation, except that houses are built with beams and tiles and bricks, and nests with sticks and clay? “What, then; are a stork and a man similar? What do you mean?” Similar in body. “Is there no difference, then, between a man and a stork?” Yes, surely; but not in these things. “In what, then?” Inquire; and you will find, that the difference lies in something else. See whether it be not in rationality of action, in social instincts, fidelity, honor, providence, judgment. “Where, then, is the real good or evil of man?” Just where this difference lies. If this distinguishing trait is preserved, and remains well fortified, and neither honor, fidelity, nor judgment is destroyed, then he himself is likewise saved; but when any one of these is lost or demolished, he himself is lost also. In this do all great events consist. Paris, they say, was undone, because the Greeks invaded Troy, and laid it waste, and his family were slain in battle. By no means; for no one is undone by an action not his own. All that was only like laying waste the nests of storks. But his true undoing was when he lost modesty, faith, honor, virtue. When was Achilles undone,—when Patroclus died? By no means. But when he gave himself up to rage; when he wept over a girl; when he forgot that he came there, not to win mistresses, but to fight. This is human undoing; this is the siege, this the overthrow, when right principles are ruined and destroyed. “But when wives and children are led away captives, and the men themselves killed, are not these evils?” Whence do you conclude them such? Pray inform me, in my turn. “Nay; but whence do you affirm that they are not evils?” Recur to the rules. Apply your principles. One cannot sufficiently wonder at what happens among men. When we would judge of light and heavy, we do not judge by guess, nor when we judge of straight and crooked; and, in general, when it concerns us to know the truth on any special point, no one of us will do anything by guess. But where the first and principal source of right or wrong action is concerned, of being prosperous or unprosperous, happy or unhappy,—there only do we act rashly, and by guess. Nowhere anything like a balance; nowhere anything like a rule; but something seems thus or so to me, and I at once act accordingly. For am I better than Agamemnon or Achilles; that they, by following what seemed best to them, should do and suffer so many things, and yet that seeming should not suffice me? And what tragedy hath any other origin? The Atreus of Euripides, what is it? Seeming. The Oedipus of Sophocles? Seeming. The Phoenix? The Hippolytus? All seeming. Who then, think you, can escape this influence? What are they called who follow every seeming? Madmen. Yet do we, then, behave otherwise?

28. τί ἐστιν αἴτιον τοῦ συγκατατίθεσθαί τινι; τὸ φαίνεσθαι ὅτι ὑπάρχει. τῷ οὖν φαινομένῳ ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει συγκατατίθεσθαι οὐχ οἷόν τε. διὰ τί; ὅτι ἡ φύσις αὕτη ἐστὶ τῆς διανοίας τοῖς μὲν ἀληθέσιν ἐπινεύειν, τοῖς δὲ ψευδέσι δυσαρεστεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἄδηλα ἐπέχειν. τίς τούτου πίστις; πάθε, εἰ δύνασαι, νῦν ὅτι νύξ ἐστιν. οὐχ οἷόν τε. ἀπόπαθε ὅτι ἡμέρα ἐστίν. οὐχ οἷόν τε. πάθε ἢ ἀπόπαθε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας. οὐχ οἷόν τε. ὅταν οὖν τις συγκατατίθηται τῷ ψεύδει, ἴσθι ὅτι οὐκ ἤθελεν ψεύδει συγκαταθέσθαι· πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ ἄκουσα στέρεται τῆς ἀληθείας, ὡς λέγει Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀληθές. ἄγε ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων τί ἔχομεν τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐνθάδε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ ψεῦδος; τὸ καθῆκον καὶ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀσύμφορον, τὸ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ οὐ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὅμοια. οὐ δύναται οὖν τις δοκεῖν μέν, ὅτι συμφέρει αὐτῷ, μὴ αἱρεῖσθαι δʼ αὐτό; οὐ δύναται. πῶς ἡ λέγουσα καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων; ὅτι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τῷ θυμῷ χαρίσασθαι καὶ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἄνδρα, συμφορώτερον ἡγεῖται τοῦ σῶσαι τὰ τέκνα. ναί· ἀλλʼ ἐξηπάτηται. δεῖξον αὐτῇ ἐναργῶς ὅτι ἐξηπάτηται καὶ οὐ ποιήσει· μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ μὴ δεικνύῃς, τίνι ἔχει ἀκολουθῆσαι ἢ τῷ φαινομένῳ; οὐδενί. τί οὖν χαλεπαίνεις αὐτῇ, ὅτι πεπλάνηται ἡ ταλαίπωρος περὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ ἔχις ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου γέγονεν; οὐχὶ δʼ, εἴπερ ἄρα, μᾶλλον ἐλεεῖς, ὡς τοὺς τυφλοὺς ἐλεοῦμεν, ὡς τοὺς χωλούς, οὕτως τοὺς τὰ κυριώτατα τετυφλωμένους καὶ ἀποκεχωλωμένους; ὅστις οὖν τούτου μέμνηται καθαρῶς ὅτι ἀνθρώπῳ μέτρον πάσης πράξεως τὸ φαινόμενον (λοιπὸν ἢ καλῶς φαίνεται ἢ κακῶς· εἰ καλῶς, ἀνέγκλητός ἐστιν· εἰ κακῶς, αὐτὸς ἐζημίωται· οὐ δύναται γὰρ ἄλλος μὲν εἶναι ὁ πεπλανημένος, ἄλλος δʼ ὁ βλαπτόμενος), οὐδενὶ ὀργισθήσεται, οὐδενὶ χαλεπανεῖ, οὐδένα λοιδορήσει, οὐδένα μέμψεται, οὐ μισήσει, οὐ προσκόψει οὐδενί. ὥστε καὶ τὰ οὕτω μεγάλα καὶ δεινὰ ἔργα ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν, τὸ φαινόμενον; ταύτην οὐδʼ ἄλλην. ἡ Ἰλιὰς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἢ φαντασία καὶ χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. ἐφάνη τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἀπάγειν τοῦ Μενελάου τὴν γυναῖκα, ἐφάνη τῇ Ἑλένῃ ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῷ. εἰ οὖν ἐφάνη τῷ Μενελάῳ παθεῖν ὅτι κέρδος ἐστὶ τοιαύτης γυναικὸς στερηθῆναι, τί ἂν ἐγένετο; ἀπολώλει ἡ Ἰλιὰς οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια. — ἐκ τοιούτου οὖν μικροῦ πράγματος ἤρτηται τὰ τηλικαῦτα; — τίνα δὲ καὶ λέγεις τὰ τηλικαῦτα; πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ ἀπωλείας πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατασκαφὰς πόλεων; καὶ τί μέγα ἔχει ταῦτα; — οὐδέν; — τί δʼ ἔχει μέγα πολλοὺς βοῦς ἀποθανεῖν καὶ πολλὰ πρόβατα καὶ πολλὰς καλιὰς χελιδόνων ἢ πελαργῶν ἐμπρησθῆναι καὶ κατασκαφῆναι; — ὅμοια οὖν ἐστι ταῦτα ἐκείνοις; — ὁμοιότατα. σώματα ἀπώλετο ἀνθρώπων· καὶ βοῶν καὶ προβάτων. οἰκημάτια ἐνεπρήσθη ἀνθρώπων· καὶ πελαργῶν νεοσσιαί. τί μέγα ἢ δεινόν; ἢ δεῖξόν μοι τί διαφέρει οἰκία ἀνθρώπου καὶ νεοσσιὰ πελαργοῦ ὡς οἴκησις. — ὅμοιον οὖν ἐστι πελαργὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος; — τί λέγεις; κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ὁμοιότατον. [πλὴν ὅτι μὲν ἐκ δοκῶν καὶ κεραμίδων καὶ πλίνθων οἰκοδομεῖται τὰ οἰκίδια, ἡ δʼ ἐκ ῥάβδων καὶ πηλοῦ.] οὐδενὶ οὖν διαφέρει ἄνθρωπος πελαργοῦ;— μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ τούτοις οὐ διαφέρει. — τίνι οὖν διαφέρει; — ζήτει καὶ εὑρήσεις, ὅτι ἄλλῳ διαφέρει. ὅρα μὴ τῷ παρακολουθεῖν οἷς ποιεῖ, ὅρα μὴ τῷ κοινωνικῷ, μὴ τῷ πιστῷ, τῷ αἰδήμονι, τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, τῷ συνετῷ. ποῦ οὖν τὸ μέγα ἐν ἀνθρώποις κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν; ὅπου ἡ διαφορά. ἂν σῴζηται τοῦτο καὶ περιτετειχισμένον μένῃ καὶ μὴ διαφθείρηται τὸ αἰδῆμον μηδὲ τὸ πιστὸν μηδὲ τὸ συνετόν, τότε σῴζεται καὶ αὐτός· ἂν δʼ ἀπολλύηταί τι τούτων καὶ ἐκπολιορκῆται, τότε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόλλυται. καὶ τὰ μεγάλα πράγματα ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν. ἔπταισεν μεγάλα ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, ὅτʼ ἐπῆλθον φασιν οἱ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὅτε ἐπόρθουν τὴν Τροίαν καὶ ὅτε οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ ἀπώλλυντο; οὐδαμῶς· διʼ ἀλλότριον γὰρ ἔργον πταίει οὐδείς· ἀλλὰ τότε πελαργῶν νεοσσιαὶ ἐπορθοῦντο. πταῖσμα δʼ ἦν, ὅτε ἀπώλεσε τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν πιστόν, τὸν φιλόξενον, τὸν κόσμιον. πότʼ ἔπταισεν ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς; ὅτε ἀπέθανεν ὁ Πάτροκλος; μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλʼ ὅτε ὠργίζετο, ὅτε κορασίδιον ἔκλαεν, ὅτʼ ἐπελάθετο ὅτι πάρεστιν οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐρωμένας κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τὸ πολεμεῖν. ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀνθρωπικὰ πταίσματα, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ πολιορκία, τοῦτό ἐστι κατασκαφή, ὅταν τὰ δόγματα τὰ ὀρθὰ καθαιρῆται, ὅταν ἐκεῖνα διαφθείρηται. — ὅταν οὖν γυναῖκες ἄγωνται καὶ παιδία αἰχμαλωτίζηται καὶ ὅταν αὐτοὶ κατασφάζωνται, ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι κακά; — πόθεν τοῦτο προσδοξάζεις; κἀμὲ δίδαξον. — οὔ· ἀλλὰ πόθεν σὺ λέγεις ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κακά; — ἔλθωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς κανόνας, φέρε τὰς προλήψεις. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἱκανῶς θαυμάσαι τὸ γινόμενον. ὅπου βάρη κρῖναι θέλομεν, οὐκ εἰκῇ κρίνομεν· ὅπου τὰ εὐθέα καὶ στρεβλά, οὐκ εἰκῇ· ἁπλῶς ὅπου διαφέρει ἡμῖν γνῶναι τὸ κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἀληθές, οὐδέποθʼ ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν εἰκῇ ποιήσει. ὅπου δὲ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ μόνον αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ κατορθοῦν ἢ ἁμαρτάνειν, τοῦ εὐροεῖν ἢ δυσροεῖν, τοῦ ἀτυχεῖν ἢ εὐτυχεῖν, ἐνθάδε μόνον εἰκαῖοι καὶ προπετεῖς. οὐδαμοῦ ὅμοιόν τι ζυγῷ, οὐδαμοῦ ὅμοιόν τι κανόνι, ἀλλά τι ἐφάνη καὶ εὐθὺς ποιῶ τὸ φανέν. κρείσσων γάρ εἰμι τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἢ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, ἵνʼ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθῆσαι τοῖς φαινομένοις τοιαῦτα κακὰ ποιήσωσι καὶ πάθωσιν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ ἀρκῇ τὸ φαινόμενον; καὶ ποία τραγῳδία ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἔχει; Ἀτρεὺς Εὐριπίδου τί ἐστιν; τὸ φαινόμενον. Οἰδίπους Σοφοκλέους τί ἐστιν; τὸ φαινόμενον. Φοῖνιξ; τὸ φαινόμενον. Ἱππόλυτος; τὸ φαινόμενον. τούτου οὖν μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι τίνος ὑμῖν δοκεῖ; τίνες δὲ λέγονται οἱ παντὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀκολουθοῦντες; — μαινόμενοι. — ἡμεῖς οὖν ἄλλο τι ποιοῦμεν;

29. The essence of good and evil is a certain disposition of the will.

29. οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ προαίρεσις ποιά, τοῦ κακοῦ προαίρεσις ποιά.

What are things outward, then? Materials on which the will may act, in attaining its own good or evil. How, then, will it attain good?

τί οὖν τὰ ἐκτός; ὗλαι τῇ προαιρέσει, περὶ ἃς ἀναστρεφομένη τεύξεται τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ. πῶς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τεύξεται;

If it be not dazzled by its own materials; for right principles concerning these materials keep the will in a good state; but perverse and distorted principles, in a bad one.

ἂν τὰς ὕλας μὴ θαυμάσῃ. τὰ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὑλῶν δόγματα ὀρθὰ μὲν ὄντα ἀγαθὴν ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν, στρεβλὰ δὲ καὶ διεστραμμένα κακήν.

This law hath God ordained, who says, “If you wish for good, receive it from yourself.” You say, No; but from another. “Nay; but from yourself.”

τοῦτον τὸν νόμον ὁ θεὸς τέθεικεν καὶ φησίν εἰ τι ἀγαθὸν θέλεις, παρὰ σεαυτοῦ λάβε. σὺ λέγεις οὔ· ἀλλὰ παρʼ ἄλλου. μή, ἀλλὰ παρὰ σεαυτοῦ.

Accordingly, when a tyrant threatens, and sends for me, I say, Against what is your threatening pointed? If he says, “will chain you,” I answer, It is my hands and feet that you threaten.

λοιπὸν ὅταν ἀπειλῇ ὁ τύραννος καὶ μὴ καλῇ, λέγω τίνι ἀπειλεῖ; ἂν λέγῃ δήσω σε, φημὶ ὅτι ταῖς χερσὶν ἀπειλεῖ καὶ τοῖς ποσίν.

If he says, “will cut off your head,” I answer, It is my head that you threaten. If he says, “will throw you into prison,” I answer, It is the whole of this paltry body that you threaten;

ἂν λέγῃ τραχηλοκοπήσω σε, λέγω τῷ τραχήλῳ ἀπειλεῖ. ἂν λέγῃ εἰς φυλακήν σε βαλῶ, ὅλῳ τῷ σαρκιδίῳ· κἂν ἐξορισμὸν ἀπειλῇ, τὸ αὐτό.

and if he threatens banishment, just the same. “Does he not threaten you, then?”

— σοὶ οὖν οὐδὲν ἀπειλεῖ; — εἰ πέπονθα ὅτι ταῦτα οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἐμέ, οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ φοβοῦμαί τι τούτων, ἐμοὶ ἀπειλεῖ.

If I am persuaded that these things are nothing to me, he does not; but if I fear any of them, it is me that he threatens. Who is it, after all, that I fear?

τίνα λοιπὸν δέδοικα; τὸν τίνων ὄντα κύριον; τῶν ἐπʼ ἐμοί; οὐδὲ εἷς ἐστιν. τῶν οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐμοί; καὶ τί μοι αὐτῶν μέλει;

The master of what? Of things in my own power? Of these no one is the master. Of things not in my power? And what are these to me? “What, then! do you philosophers teach us a contempt of kings?”

ὑμεῖς οὖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι διδάσκετε καταφρονεῖν τῶν βασιλέων; — μὴ γένοιτο. τίς ἡμῶν διδάσκει ἀντιποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν;

By no means. Which of us teaches any one to contend with them about things of which they have the command? Take my body; take my possessions;

τὸ σωμάτιον λάβε, τὴν κτῆσιν λάβε, τὴν φήμην λάβε, τοὺς περὶ ἐμὲ λάβε. ἄν τινας τούτων ἀναπείθω ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, τῷ ὄντι ἐγκαλείτω μοι.

take my reputation; take away even my friends. If I persuade any one to claim these things as his own, you may justly accuse me.

ναί· ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δογμάτων ἄρχειν θέλω. καὶ τίς σοι ταύτην τὴν ἐξουσίαν δέδωκεν;

“Ay; but I would command your principles too.” And who hath given you that power? How can you conquer the principle of another? “By applying terror, I will conquer it.” Do not you see that what conquers itself.is not conquered by another?

ποῦ δύνασαι νικῆσαι δόγμα ἀλλότριον; προσάγων, φησίν, αὐτῷ φόβον νικήσω. ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸ αὑτὸ ἐνίκησεν, οὐχ ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἐνικήθη· προαίρεσιν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο νικῆσαι δύναται, πλὴν αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν.

And nothing but itself can conquer the will.

διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ νόμος κράτιστός ἐστι καὶ δικαιότατος· τὸ κρεῖσσον ἀεὶ περιγινέσθω τοῦ χείρονος.

Hence, too, the most excellent and equitable law of God, that the better should always prevail over the worse. Ten are better than one. “For what purpose?” For chaining, killing, dragging where they please; for taking away an estate. Thus ten conquer one, in the cases wherein they are better.

κρείττονές εἰσιν οἱ δέκα τοῦ ἑνός. πρὸς τί; πρὸς τὸ δῆσαι, πρὸς τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι, πρὸς τὸ ἀπαγαγεῖν ὅπου θέλουσιν, πρὸς τὸ ἀφελέσθαι τὰ ὄντα. νικῶσιν τοίνυν οἱ δέκα τὸν ἕνα ἐν τούτῳ, ἐν ᾧ κρείσσονές εἰσιν.

“In what, then, are they worse?” When the one has right principles, and the others have not. For can they conquer in this case? How should they? If we were weighed in a scale, must not the heavier outweigh?

ἐν τίνι οὖν χείρονές εἰσιν; ἂν ὁ μὲν ἔχῃ δόγματα ὀρθά, οἱ δὲ μή. τί οὖν; ἐν τούτῳ δύνανται νικῆσαι; πόθεν; εἰ δʼ ἱστάμεθα ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ, οὐκ ἔδει τὸν βαρύτερον καθελκύσαι;

“How then came Socrates to suffer such things from the Athenians?” O foolish man! what mean you by Socrates? Express the fact as it is. Are you surprised that the mere body of Socrates should be carried away, and dragged to prison, by such as were stronger; that it should be poisoned by hemlock and die?

Σωκράτης οὖν ἵνα πάθῃ ταῦτα ὑπʼ Ἀθηναίων;— ἀνδράποδον, τί λέγεις τὸ Σωκράτης; ὡς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγε· ἵνʼ οὖν τὸ Σωκράτους σωμάτιον ἀπαχθῇ καὶ συρῇ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων εἰς δεσμωτήριον καὶ κώνειόν τις δῷ τῷ σωματίῳ τῷ Σωκράτους κἀκεῖνο ἀποψυγῇ;

Do these things appear wonderful to you; these things unjust? Is it for such things as these that you accuse God? Had Socrates, then, no compensation for them?

ταῦτά σοι φαίνεται θαυμαστά, ταῦτα ἄδικα, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγκαλεῖς τῷ θεῷ; οὐδὲν οὖν εἶχε Σωκράτης ἀντὶ τούτων; ποῦ ἦν ἡ οὐσία αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ;

In what, then, to him, did the essence of good consist? Whom shall we regard, you or him? And what says he? “Anytus and Melitus may indeed kill; but hurt me they cannot.” And again, “If it so pleases God, so let it be.”

τίνι προσσχῶμεν; σοὶ ἢ αὐτῷ; καὶ τί λέγει ἐκεῖνος; ἐμὲ δʼ Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύνανται, βλάψαι δʼ οὔ. καὶ πάλιν εἰ ταύτῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ γινέσθω.

But show me that he who has the worse principles can get the advantage over him who has the better. You never will show it, nor anything like it; for the Law of Nature and of God is this,—let the better always prevail over the worse. “In what?”

ἀλλὰ δεῖξον ὅτι χείρονα ἔχων δόγματα κρατεῖ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐν δόγμασιν. οὐ δείξεις· οὐδʼ ἐγγύς. νόμος γὰρ τῆς φύσεως. καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ οὗτος τὸ κρεῖσσον ἀεὶ περιγινέσθω τοῦ χείρονος. ἐν τίνι; ἐν ᾧ κρεῖσσόν ἐστιν.

In that wherein it is better. One body may be stronger than another; many, than one;

σῶμα σώματος ἰσχυρότερον, οἱ πλείονες τοῦ ἑνός, ὁ κλέπτης τοῦ μὴ κλέπτου.

and a thief, than one who is not a thief. Thus I, for instance, lost my lamp, because the thief was better at keeping awake than I. But for that lamp he paid the price of becoming a thief; for that lamp he lost his virtue and became like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain;

διὰ τοῦτο κἀγὼ τὸν λύχνον ἀπώλεσα, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγρυπνεῖν μου κρείσσων ἦν ὁ κλέπτης. ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνος τοσούτου ὠνήσατο λύχνον· ἀντὶ λύχνου κλέπτης ἐγένετο, ἀντὶ λύχνου ἄπιστος, ἀντὶ λύχνου θηριώδης. τοῦτο ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ λυσιτελεῖν.

and so let it be! But some one takes me by the collar, and drags me to the forum; and then all the rest cry out, “Philosopher, what good do your principles do you? See, you are being dragged to prison; see, you are going to lose your head!”

ἔστω· ἀλλʼ εἴληπταί μού τις τοῦ ἱματίου καὶ ἕλκει μʼ εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν, εἶτα ἐπικραυγάζουσιν ἄλλοι φιλόσοφε, τί σε ὠφέληκε τὰ δόγματα; ἰδοὺ σύρῃ εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον, ἰδοὺ μέλλεις τραχηλοκοπεῖσθαι.

And, pray, what rule of philosophy could I contrive, that when a stronger than myself lays hold on my collar, I should not be dragged; or that, when ten men pull me at once, and throw me into prison, I should not be thrown there?

καὶ ποίαν ἔπραξα ἂν εἰσαγωγήν, ἵνʼ, ἂν ἰσχυρότερος ἐπιλάβηταί μου τοῦ ἱματίου, μὴ σύρωμαι; ἵνα, ἄν με δέκα περισπάσαντες εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐμβάλωσιν, μὴ ἐμβληθῶ;

But have I learned nothing, then? I have learned to know, whatever happens, that if it concerns not my will, it is nothing to me.

ἄλλο οὖν οὐδὲν ἔμαθον; ἔμαθον, ἵνα· πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἴδω ὅτι, ἂν ἀπροαίρετον ᾖ, οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἐμέ.

Have my principles, then, done me no good? What then;

πρὸς τοῦτο οὖν οὐκ ὠφέλησαι; τί οὖν ἐν ἄλλῳ ζητεῖς τὴν ὠφέλειαν ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἔμαθες;

do I seek for anything else to do me good, but what I have learned? Afterwards, as I sit in prison, I say, He who has made all this disturbance neither recognizes any guidance, nor heeds any teaching, nor is it any concern to him to know what philosophers say or do.

καθήμενος λοιπὸν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ λέγω οὗτος ὁ ταῦτα κραυγάζων οὔτε τοῦ σημαινομένου ἀκούει οὔτε τῷ λεγομένῳ παρακολουθεῖ οὔτε ὅλως μεμέληκεν αὐτῷ εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τί λέγουσιν ἢ τί ποιοῦσιν. ἄφες αὐτόν.

Let him alone. “Come forth again from prison.” If you have no further need for me in prison, I will come out; if you want me again, I will return.

ἀλλʼ ἔξελθε πάλιν ἀπὸ τῆς φυλακῆς. εἰ μηκέτι χρείαν ἔχητέ μου ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ, ἐξέρχομαι· ἂν πάλιν σχῆτε, εἰσελεύσομαι.

“For how long?” Just so long as reason requires I should continue in this body; when that is over, take it, and fare ye well.

μέχρι τίνος; μέχρις ἂν οὗ λόγος αἱρῇ συνεῖναί με τῷ σωματίῳ· ὅταν δὲ μὴ αἱρῇ, λάβετε αὐτὸ καὶ ὑγιαίνετε.

Only let us not act inconsiderately, nor from cowardice, nor on slight grounds, since that would be contrary to the will of God; for he hath need of such a world, and such beings to live on earth. But, if he sounds a retreat, as he did to Socrates, we are to obey him when he sounds it, as our General.

μόνον μὴ ἀλογίστως, μόνον μὴ μαλακῶς, μὴ ἐκ τῆς τυχούσης προφάσεως. πάλιν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐ βούλεται· χρείαν γὰρ ἔχει κόσμου τοιούτου, τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἀναστρεφομένων τοιούτων. ἐὰν δὲ σημήνῃ τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν ὡς τῷ Σωκράτει, πείθεσθαι δεῖ τῷ σημαίνοντι ὡς στρατηγῷ.

“Well; but can these things be explained to the multitude?”

τί οὖν; λέγειν δεῖ ταῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς; — ἵνα τί;

To what purpose? Is it not sufficient to be convinced one’s self? When children come to us clapping their hands, and saying, “To-morrow is the good feast of Saturn;” do we tell them that good doth not consist in such things?

οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ τὸ αὐτὸν πείθεσθαι; τοῖς γὰρ παιδίοις, ὅταν προσελθόντα κροτῇ καὶ λέγῃ σήμερον Σατορνάλια ἀγαθά, λέγομεν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα; οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπικροτοῦμεν.

By no means; but we clap our hands also. Thus, when you are unable to convince any one, consider hint as a child, and clap your hands with him;

καὶ σὺ τοίνυν, ὅταν μεταπεῖσαί τινα μὴ δύνῃ, γίγνωσκε ὅτι παιδίον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπικρότει αὐτῷ· ἂν δὲ μὴ τοῦτο θέλῃς, σιώπα λοιπόν.

or, ii you will not do that, at least hold your tongue. These things we ought to remember; and when we are called to any trial, to know that an opportunity is come of showing whether we have been well taught.

τούτων δεῖ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ κληθέντα εἴς τινα τοιαύτην περίστασιν εἰδέναι, ὅτι ἐλήλυθεν ὁ καιρὸς τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι, εἰ πεπαιδεύμεθα.

For he who goes from a philosophical lecture to a difficult point of practice is like a young man who has been studying to solve syllogisms. If you propose an easy one, he says, “Give me rather a fine intricate one, that I may try my strength.”

νέος γὰρ ἀπὸ σχολῆς ἀπιὼν εἰς περίστασιν ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ μεμελετηκότι συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν, κἄν τις εὔλυτον αὐτῷ προτείνῃ, λέγει μᾶλλόν μοι πεπλεγμένον κομψῶς προτείνατε, ἵνα γυμνασθῶ. καὶ οἱ ἀθληταὶ τοῖς κούφοις νεανίσκοις δυσαρεστοῦσιν·

Thus athletic champions are displeased with a slight antagonist. “He cannot lift me,” says one. Is this a youth of spirit? No; for when the occasion calls upon him, he may begin crying, and say, “wanted to learn a little longer first.”

οὐ βαστάζει με, φησίν. οὗτός ἐστιν εὐφυὴς νέος. οὔ· ἀλλὰ καλέσαντος τοῦ καιροῦ κλάειν δεῖ καὶ λέγειν ἤθελον ἔτι μανθάνειν. τίνα; εἰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔμαθες [οὐχ] ὥστʼ ἔργῳ δεῖξαι, πρὸς τί αὐτὰ ἔμαθες;

Learn what? If you did not learn these things to show them in practice, why did you learn them? I trust there must be some one among you, sitting here, who feels secret pangs of impatience, and says, “When will such a trial come to my share, as hath now fallen to his? Must I sit wasting my life in a corner, when I might be crowned at Olympia?

ἐγώ τινα οἶμαι τῶν καθημένων ἐνταῦθα ὠδίνειν αὐτὸν ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ λέγειν ἐμοὶ νῦν περίστασιν μὴ ἔρχεσθαι τοιαύτην, ὁποία τούτῳ ἐλήλυθεν; ἐμὲ νῦν κατατριβῆναι καθήμενον ἐν γωνίᾳ δυνάμενον στεφανωθῆναι Ὀλύμπια; πότε τις ἐμοὶ καταγγελεῖ τοιοῦτον ἀγῶνα; οὕτως ἔχειν ἔδει πάντας ὑμᾶς.

When will any one bring the news of such a combat for me?” Such should be the disposition of you all. Even among the gladiators of Caesar, there are some who bear it very ill that they are not brought upon the stage and matched; and who offer vows to God, and address the officers, begging to fight.

ἀλλʼ ἐν μὲν τοῖς Καίσαρος μονομάχοις εἰσί τινες οἱ ἀγανακτοῦντες ὅτι οὐδεὶς αὐτοὺς προάγει οὐδὲ ζευγνύει καὶ εὔχονται τῷ θεῷ καὶ προσέρχονται τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις δεόμενοι μονομαχῆσαι, ἐξ ὑμῶν δʼ οὐδεὶς φανήσεται τοιοῦτος;

And will none among you appear such? I would willingly take a voyage on purpose to see how a champion of mine acts;

ἤθελον πλεῦσαι ἐπʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδεῖν, τί μου ποιεῖ ὁ ἀθλητής, πῶς μελετᾷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

how he meets his occasion. This is not the contest I would choose, say you. Is it in your power, then, to make the selection? Such a body is given you, such parents, such brothers, such a country, and such a rank in it; and then you come to me, to change the conditions!

οὐ θέλω, φησίν, τοιαύτην. ἐπὶ σοὶ γάρ ἐστι λαβεῖν ἣν θέλεις ὑπόθεσιν; δέδοταί σοι σῶμα τοιοῦτον, γονεῖς τοιοῦτοι, ἀδελφοὶ τοιοῦτοι, πατρὶς τοιαύτη, τάξις ἐν αὐτῇ τοιαύτη· εἶτά μοι λέγεις ἐλθὼν ἄλλαξόν μοι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. εἶτα οὐκ ἔχεις ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὸ χρήσασθαι τοῖς δοθεῖσιν;

Have you not abilities to manage that which is given you You should say to me, “It is your business to propose; mine, to treat the subject well.” No; but you say, “Do not meet me with such a perplexity, but such a one;

σόν ἐστι προτεῖναι, ἐμὸν μελετῆσαι καλῶς. οὔ· ἀλλὰ μὴ τοιοῦτό μοι προβάλῃς τροπικόν, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον· μὴ τοιαύτην ἐπενέγκῃς τὴν ἐπιφοράν, ἀλλὰ τοιαύτην.

do not offer such an obstacle to me, but such a one.” There will be a time, I suppose, when tragedians will fancy themselves to be mere masks, and buskins, and long train.

ἔσται χρόνος τάχα, ἐν ᾧ οἱ τραγῳδοὶ οἰήσονται ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι προσωπεῖα καὶ ἐμβάδας καὶ τὸ σύρμα. ἄνθρωπε, ταῦτα ὕλην ἔχεις καὶ ὑπόθεσιν.

These things are your materials, man, and your stage-properties. Speak something;

φθέγξαι τι, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν πότερον τραγῳδὸς εἶ ἢ γελωτοποιός· κοινὰ γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ ἄλλα ἀμφότεροι.

that we may know whether you are a tragedian or a buffoon; for both have all the rest in common. Suppose any one should take away his buskins and his mask, and bring him upon the stage in his common dress, is the tragedian lost, or does he remain?

διὰ τοῦτο ἂν ἀφέλῃ τις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐμβάδας καὶ τὸ προσωπεῖον καὶ ἐν εἰδώλῳ αὐτὸν προαγάγῃ, ἀπώλετο ὁ τραγῳδὸς ἢ μένει; ἂν φωνὴν ἔχῃ, μένει.

If he has a voice, he remains. “Here, this instant, take upon you the command.”

καὶ ἐνθάδε. λάβε ἡγεμονίαν. λαμβάνω καὶ λαβὼν δεικνύω, πῶς ἄνθρωπος ἀναστρέφεται πεπαιδευμένος.

I take it; and taking it, I show how a skilful man performs the part. “Now lay aside your robe; put on rags, and come upon the stage in that character.”

θὲς τὴν πλατύσημον καὶ ἀναλαβὼν ῥάκη πρόσελθε ἐν προσώπῳ τοιούτῳ. τί οὖν; οὐ δέδοταί μοι καλὴν φωνὴν εἰσενεγκεῖν;

What then? Is it not in my power to express the character by a suitable voice?

πῶς οὖν ἀναβαίνεις νῦν; ὡς μάρτυς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κεκλημένος.

“In what character do you now appear?” As a witness summoned by God. “Come you, then, and bear witness for me; for you are a fit witness to be produced by me. Is anything which is inevitable to be classed as either good or evil?

ἔρχου σὺ καὶ μαρτύρησόν μοι· σὺ γὰρ ἄξιος εἶ προαχθῆναι μάρτυς. ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ. μή τι τῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς προαιρέσεως ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ κακόν; μή τινα βλάπτω; μή τι ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ τὴν ὠφέλειαν ἐποίησα τὴν ἑκάστου ἢ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ;

Do I hurt any one? Have I made the good of each individual to rest on any one but himself? What evidence do you give for God?” “I am in a miserable condition, O Lord;

τίνα μαρτυρίαν δίδως τῷ θεῷ; ἐν δεινοῖς εἰμι, κύριε, καὶ δυστυχῶ, οὐδείς μου ἐπιστρέφεται, οὐδείς μοι δίδωσιν οὐδέν, πάντες ψέγουσιν, κακολογοῦσιν.

I am undone: no mortal cares for me; no mortal gives me anything; all blame me; all speak ill of me.” Is this the evidence you are to give?

ταῦτα μέλλεις μαρτυρεῖν καὶ καταισχύνειν τὴν κλῆσιν ἣν κέκληκεν, ὅτι σε ἐτίμησεν ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν καὶ ἄξιον ἡγήσατο προσαγαγεῖν εἰς μαρτυρίαν τηλικαύτην;

And will you bring disgrace upon his summons, who hath conferred such an honor upon you, and thought you worthy of being produced as a witness in such a cause? But some one in authority has given a sentence.

ἀλλʼ ἀπεφήνατο ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἐξουσίαν κρίνω σε ἀσεβῆ καὶ ἀνόσιον εἶναι. τί σοι γέγονεν; ἐκρίθην ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἀνόσιος εἶναι.

“I judge you to be impious and profane.” What has befallen you?—I have been judged to be impious and profane.—Anything else?—Nothing.—Suppose he had passed his judgment upon any process of reasoning, and had questioned the conclusion that, if it be day, it is light;

ἄλλο οὐδέν; οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ περὶ συνημμένου τινὸς ἐπικεκρίκει καὶ ἐδεδώκει ἀπόφασιν τὸ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἐστιν κρίνω ψεῦδος εἶναι, τί ἐγεγόνει τῷ συνημμένῳ; τίς ἐνθάδε κρίνεται, τίς κατακέκριται; τὸ συνημμένον ἢ ὁ ἐξαπατηθεὶς περὶ αὐτοῦ;

what would have befallen the proposition? In this case, who is judged, who is condemned,—the proposition, or he who cannot understand it? Does he know, who claims the power of ruling in your case, what pious or impious means?

οὗτος οὖν τίς ποτε ὁ ἔχων ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ἀποφήνασθαί τι περὶ σοῦ; οἶδεν τί ἐστι τὸ εὐσεβὲς ἢ τὸ ἀσεβές; μεμελέτηκεν αὐτό; μεμάθηκεν; ποῦ; παρὰ τίνι;

Has he made it his study or learned it? Where? From whom? A musician would not regard him, if he pronounced bass to be treble; nor a mathematician, if he passed sentence, that lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are not equal.

εἶτα μουσικὸς μὲν οὐκ ἐπιστρέφεται αὐτοῦ ἀποφαινομένου περὶ τῆς νήτης ὅτι ἐστὶν ὑπάτη οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός, ἂν ἐπικρίνῃ τὰς ἀπὸ κέντρου πρὸς τὸν κύκλον προσπιπτούσας μὴ εἶναι ἴσας·

And shall he who is instructed in the truth respect an ignorant man, when he pronounces upon pious and impious, just and unjust? “Oh, the persecutions to which the wise are exposed!”

ὁ δὲ ταῖς ἀληθείαις πεπαιδευμένος ἀνθρώπου ἀπαιδεύτου ἐπιστραφήσεται ἐπικρίνοντός τι περὶ ὁσίου καὶ ἀνοσίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ δικαίου; ὦ πολλῆς ἀδικίας τῶν πεπαιδευμένων. ταῦτα οὖν ἔμαθες ἐνταῦθα;

Is it here that you have learned this talk? Why do not you leave such pitiful discourse to idle, pitiful fellows; and let them sit in a corner, and receive some little mean pay, or grumble that nobody gives them anything? But do you come, and make some use of what you have learned.

οὐ θέλεις τὰ μὲν λογάρια τὰ περὶ τούτων ἄλλοις ἀφεῖναι, ἀταλαιπώροις ἀνθρωπαρίοις, ἵνʼ ἐν γωνίᾳ καθεζόμενοι μισθάρια λαμβάνωσιν ἢ γογγ[ρ]ύζωσιν, ὅτι οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς παρέχει οὐδέν, σὺ δὲ χρῆσθαι παρελθὼν οἷς ἔμαθες;

It is not reasonings that are wanted now, for there are books stuffed full of stoical reasonings. “What is wanted, then?” The man who shall apply them;

οὐ γὰρ λογάριά ἐστι τὰ λείποντα νῦν, ἀλλὰ γέμει τὰ βιβλία τῶν Στωικῶν λογαρίων. τί οὖν τὸ λεῖπόν ἐστιν; ὁ χρησόμενος, ὁ ἔργῳ μαρτυρήσων τοῖς λόγοις.

whose actions may bear testimony to his doctrines. Assume this character for me, that we may no longer make use in the schools of the examples of the ancients, but may have some examples of our own.

τοῦτό μοι τὸ πρόσωπον ἀνάλαβε, ἵνα μηκέτι παλαιοῖς ἐν τῇ σχολῇ παραδείγμασι χρώμεθα, ἀλλὰ ἔχωμέν τι καὶ καθʼ ἡμᾶς παράδειγμα.

“To whom, then, does the contemplation of these abstractions belong?”

ταῦτα οὖν τίνος ἐστὶ θεωρεῖν; τοῦ σχολάζοντος. ἔστι γὰρ φιλοθέωρόν τι ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

To any one who has leisure for them; for man is a being fond of contemplation. But it is shameful to take only such view of things as truant slaves take of a play. We ought to sit calmly, and listen, whether to the actor or to the musician; and not do like those poor fellows, who come in and admire the actor, constantly glancing about them, and then, if any one happens to mention their master, run frightened away.

ἀλλʼ αἰσχρόν ἐστι θεωρεῖν ταῦτα οὕτως ὡς οἱ δραπέται· ἀλλʼ ἀπερισπάστως καθῆσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν νῦν μὲν τραγῳδοῦ νῦν δὲ κιθαρῳδοῦ, οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖνοι ποιοῦσιν. ἅμα μὲν ἐπέστη καὶ ἐπῄνεσεν τὸν τραγῳδόν, ἅμα δὲ περιεβλέψατο· εἶτα ἄν τις φθέγξηται κύριον, εὐθὺς σεσόβηνται, ταράσσονται.

It is shameful for a philosopher thus to contemplate the works of nature. What, in this parallel case, stands for the master?

αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οὕτως καὶ τοὺς φιλοσόφους θεωρεῖν τὰ ἔργα τῆς φύσεως. τί γάρ ἐστι κύριος; ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου κύριος οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ θάνατος καὶ ζωὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ πόνος.

Man is not the master of man; but death is, and life, and pleasure, and pain; for without these, bring even Caesar to me, and you will see how intrepid I shall be.

ἐπεὶ χωρὶς τούτων ἄγαγέ μοι τὸν Καίσαρα καὶ ὄψει πῶς εὐσταθῶ. ὅταν δὲ μετὰ τούτων ἔλθῃ βροντῶν καὶ ἀστράπτων, ἐγὼ δὲ ταῦτα φοβῶμαι, τί ἄλλο ἢ ἐπέγνωκα τὸν κύριον ὡς ὁ δραπέτης;

But, if he comes thundering and lightening with these, and these are the objects of my terror, what do I else but, like the truant slave, acknowledge my master? While I have any respite from these, as the truant comes into the theatre, so I bathe, drink, sing;

μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ τινα ἀνοχὴν ἀπὸ τούτων ἔχω, ὡς δραπέτης ἐφίσταται θεάτρῳ οὕτως κἀγώ· λούομαι, πίνω, ᾁδω, πάντα δὲ μετὰ φόβου καὶ ταλαιπωρίας.

but all with terror and anxiety. But if I free myself from my masters, that is, from such things as render a master terrible, what trouble, what master have I remaining?

ἐὰν δʼ ἐμαυτὸν ἀπολύσω τῶν δεσποτῶν, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἐκείνων, διʼ ἃ οἱ δεσπόται εἰσὶ φοβεροί, ποῖον ἔτι πρᾶγμα ἔχω, ποῖον ἔτι κύριον;

“Shall we then insist upon these things with all men?” No. But make allowance for the ignorant, and say, This poor man. advises me to what he thinks good for himself.

τί οὖν; κηρύσσειν δεῖ ταῦτα πρὸς πάντας; — οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰδιώταις συμπεριφέρεσθαι καὶ λέγειν οὗτος ὃ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν οἴεται τοῦτο κἀμοὶ συμβουλεύει· συγγιγνώσκω αὐτῷ.

I excuse him; for Socrates, too, excused the jailer, who wept when he was to drink the poison, and said, “How heartily he sheds tears for us!”

καὶ γὰρ Σωκράτης συνεγίγνωσκεν τῷ ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς κλάοντι, ὅτι ἔμελλεν πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον, καὶ λέγει ὡς γενναίως ἡμᾶς ἀποδεδάκρυκεν.

Was it to him that Socrates said, “For this reason we sent the women out of the way”? No, but to his friends,—to such as were capable of hearing it; while he humored the other, as a child.

μή τι οὖν ἐκείνῳ λέγει ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπελύσαμεν; ἀλλὰ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, τοῖς δυναμένοις αὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι· ἐκείνῳ δὲ συμπεριφέρεται ὡς παιδίῳ.

30. When you are going before any of the great, remember that there is another who sees from above what passes, and whom you ought to please, rather than man. He therefore asks you,— “In the schools, what did you use to call exile, and prison, and chains, and death, and calumny?” I? Indifferent things. “What, then, do you call them now? Are they at all changed?” No. “Are you changed, then?” No. “Tell me, then, what things are indifferent.” Things not dependent on our own will. “What is the inference?” Things not dependent on my own will are nothing to me. “Tell me, likewise, what appeared to be the good of man.” Rectitude of will, and to understand the appearances of things. “What his end?” To follow Thee. “Do you say the same things now, too?” Yes. I do say the same things, even now. Well, go in then boldly, and mindful of these things; and you will show the difference between the instructed and the ignorant. I protest, I think you will then have such thoughts as these: “Why do we provide so many and great resources for nothing? Is the power, the antechamber, the attendants, the guards, no more than this? Is it for these that I have listened to so many dissertations? These are nothing; and yet I had qualified myself as for some great encounter.”

30. ὅταν εἰσίῃς πρός τινα τῶν ὑπερεχόντων, μέμνησο ὅτι καὶ ἄλλος ἄνωθεν βλέπει τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ὅτι ἐκείνῳ σε δεῖ μᾶλλον ἀρέσκειν ἢ τούτῳ. ἐκεῖνος οὖν σου πυνθάνεται φυγὴν καὶ φυλακὴν καὶ δεσμὰ καὶ θάνατον καὶ ἀδοξίαν τί ἔλεγες ἐν τῇ σχολῇ; ἐγὼ ἀδιάφορα. νῦν οὖν τίνα αὐτὰ λέγεις; μή τι ἐκεῖνα ἠλλάγη; οὔ. σὺ οὖν ἠλλάγης; οὔ. λέγε οὖν τίνα ἐστὶν ἀδιάφορα. τὰ ἀπροαίρετα. λέγε καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. ἀπροαίρετα οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ. λέγε καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τίνα ὑμῖν ἐδόκει; προαίρεσις οἵα δεῖ καὶ χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. τέλος δὲ τί; τὸ σοὶ ἀκολουθεῖν. ταῦτα καὶ νῦν λέγεις; ταὐτὰ καὶ νῦν λέγω. ἄπ[ε]ιθι λοιπὸν ἔσω θαρρῶν καὶ μεμνημένος τούτων καὶ ὄψει τί ἐστι νέος μεμελετηκὼς ἃ δεῖ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀμελετήτοις. ἐγὼ μὲν νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς φαντάζομαι ὅτι πείσῃ τὸ τοιοῦτον τί οὕτως μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ παρασκευαζόμεθα πρὸς τὸ μηδέν; τοῦτο ἦν ἡ ἐξουσία; τοῦτο τὰ πρόθυρα, οἱ κοιτωνῖται, οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς μαχαίρας; τούτων ἕνεκα τοὺς πολλοὺς λόγους ἤκουον; ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἦν, ἐγὼ δʼ ὡς μεγάλα παρεσκευαζόμην.