---
title: "Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν"
author: "Epictetus"
translator: "Thomas Wentworth Higginson"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 7 of 23
url: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/7/
cite: "Epictetus, tr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν, section 7. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/7/"
---

# Discourses · Ἀρριανοῦ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβῶν

*Epictetus, tr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson*

A former slave’s lessons in Stoic freedom, taken down by his pupil Arrian.

> Greek: ed. Heinrich Schenkl, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0557.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Thomas Wentworth Higginson, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0557.tlg001.perseus-eng4). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 7. Book II · chapters 1–6

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/7/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/epictetus-discourses/7/#p-N

[¶0] 1. There is an assertion of the philosophers which may perhaps appear a paradox to many; yet let us fairly examine whether it be true,—that it is possible, in all things, to act at once with caution and courage.

> Greek: 1. παράδοξον μὲν τυχὸν φαίνεταί τισιν τὸ ἀξιούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὅμως δὲ σκεψώμεθα κατὰ δύναμιν, εἰ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ δεῖν ἅμα μὲν εὐλαβῶς ἅμα δὲ θαρρούντως πάντα ποιεῖν.

[¶1] For caution seems, in some measure, contrary to courage; and contraries are by no means consistent.

> Greek: ἐναντίον γάρ πως δοκεῖ τῷ θαρραλέῳ τὸ εὐλαβές, τὰ δʼ ἐναντία οὐδαμῶς συνυπάρχει.

[¶2] The appearance of a paradox in the present case seems to me to arise as follows. If indeed we assert that courage and caution are to be used in the same instances, we might justly be accused of uniting contradictions;

> Greek: τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον πολλοῖς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ παράδοξον δοκεῖ μοι τοιούτου τινὸς ἔχεσθαι· εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ταὐτὰ ἠξιοῦμεν χρῆσθαι τῇ τʼ εὐλαβείᾳ καὶ τῷ θάρσει, δικαίως ἂν ἡμᾶς ᾐτιῶντο ὡς τὰ ἀσύνακτα συνάγοντας.

[¶3] but in the way that we affirm it, where is the absurdity? For if what has been so often said, and so often demonstrated, be certain, that the essence of good and evil consists in the use of things as they appear, and that things inevitable are not to be classed either as good or evil, what paradox do the philosophers assert, if they say, “Where events are inevitable, meet them with courage, but otherwise with caution”?

> Greek: νῦν δὲ τί δεινὸν ἔχει τὸ λεγόμενον; εἰ γὰρ ὑγιῆ ταῦτʼ ἐστι τὰ πολλάκις μὲν εἰρημένα, πολλάκις δʼ ἀποδεδειγμένα, ὅτι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐν χρήσει φαντασιῶν καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὡσαύτως, τὰ δʼ ἀπροαίρετα οὔτε τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ δέχεται φύσιν οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
τί παράδοξον ἀξιοῦσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, εἰ λέγουσιν ὅπου μὲν τὰ ἀπροαίρετα, ἐκεῖ τὸ θάρσος ἔστω σοι, ὅπου δὲ τὰ προαιρετικά, ἐκεῖ ἡ εὐλάβεια;

[¶4] For in these last cases only, if evil lies in a perverted will, is caution to be used; and if things inevitable and uncontrollable are nothing to us, in these we are to make use of courage.

> Greek: εἰ γὰρ ἐν κακῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κακόν, πρὸς μόνα ταῦτα χρῆσθαι ἄξιον εὐλαβείᾳ· εἰ δὲ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα καὶ μὴ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, πρὸς ταῦτα τῷ θάρσει χρηστέον.

[¶5] Thus we shall be at once cautious and courageous, and, indeed, courageous on account of this very caution; for by using caution with regard to things really evil, we shall gain courage with regard to what are not so.

> Greek: καὶ οὕτως ἅμα μὲν εὐλαβεῖς ἅμα δὲ θαρραλέοι ἐσόμεθα καὶ νὴ Δία διὰ τὴν εὐλάβειαν θαρραλέοι. διὰ γὰρ τὸ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντως κακὰ συμβήσεται θαρρεῖν ἡμῖν πρὸς τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα.

[¶6] But we are in the same condition with deer; when these in a fright fly from the plumes [which hunters wave], whither do they turn, and to what do they retire for safety? To the nets. And thus they are undone, by inverting the objects of fear and confidence.

> Greek: λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς τὸ τῶν ἐλάφων πάσχομεν· ὅτε φοβοῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν αἱ ἔλαφοι τὰ πτερά, ποῦ τρέπονται καὶ πρὸς τίνα ἀναχωροῦσιν ὡς ἀσφαλῆ; πρὸς τὰ δίκτυα· καὶ οὕτως ἀπόλλυνται ἐναλλάξασαι τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα.

[¶7] Thus we, too. When do we yield to fear? About things inevitable. When, on the other hand, do we behave with courage, as if there were nothing to be dreaded?

> Greek: οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ποῦ χρώμεθα τῷ φόβῳ; πρὸς τὰ ἀπροαίρετα. ἐν τίσιν πάλιν θαρροῦντες ἀναστρεφόμεθα ὡς οὐδενὸς ὄντος δεινοῦ; ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς.

[¶8] About things that might be controlled by will. To be deceived, then, or to act rashly or imprudently, or to indulge a scandalous desire, we treat as of no importance, in our effort to bring about things which we cannot, after all, control.

> Greek: ἐξαπατηθῆναι ἢ προπεσεῖν ἢ ἀναίσχυντόν τι ποιῆσαι ἢ μετʼ ἐπιθυμίας αἰσχρᾶς ὀρεχθῆναί τινος οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἡμῖν, ἂν μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀπροαιρέτ[ικ]οις εὐστοχῶμεν. ὅπου δὲ θάνατος ἢ φυγὴ ἢ πόνος ἢ ἀδοξία, ἐκεῖ τὸ ἀναχωρητικόν, ἐκεῖ τὸ σεσοβημένον.

[¶9] But where death, or exile, or pain, or ignominy, is concerned, then comes the retreat, the flutter, and the fright. Hence, as it must be with those who err in matters of the greatest importance, we turn what should be courage into rashness, desperation, recklessness, effrontery;

> Greek: τοιγαροῦν ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς περὶ τὰ μέγιστα διαμαρτάνοντας τὸ μὲν φύσει θαρραλέον θρασὺ κατασκευάζομεν, ἀπονενοημένον, ἰταμόν, ἀναίσχυντον, τὸ δʼ εὐλαβὲς φύσει καὶ αἰδῆμον δειλὸν καὶ ταπεινόν, φόβων καὶ ταραχῶν μεστόν.

[¶10] and what should be caution becomes timid, base, and full of fears and perturbations. Let one apply his spirit of caution to things within the reach of his own will, then he will have the subject of avoidance within his own control; but if he transfers it to that which is inevitable, trying to shun that which he cannot control and others can, then he must needs fear, be harassed, and be disturbed.

> Greek: ἂν γάρ τις ἐκεῖ μεταθῇ τὸ εὐλαβές, ὅπου προαίρεσις καὶ ἔργα προαιρέσεως, εὐθὺς ἅμα τῷ θέλειν εὐλαβεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ κειμένην ἕξει τὴν ἔκκλισιν· ἂν δʼ ὅπου τὰ μὴ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ ἀπροαίρετα, πρὸς τὰ ἐπʼ ἄλλοις ὄντα τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἔχων ἀναγκαίως φοβήσεται, ἀκαταστατήσει, ταραχθήσεται.

[¶11] For it is not death or pain that is to be dreaded, but the fear of pain or death.

> Greek: οὐ γὰρ θάνατος ἢ πόνος φοβερόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι πόνον ἢ θάνατον. διὰ τοῦτο ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν εἰπόντα ὅτι οὐ κατθανεῖν γὰρ δεινόν, ἀλλʼ αἰσχρῶς θανεῖν.

[¶12] Hence we commend him who says:
Death is no ill, but shamefully to die. Courage, then, ought to be opposed to death, and caution to the fear of death; whereas we, on the contrary, oppose to death, flight; and to these our false convictions concerning it, recklessness, and desperation, and assumed indifference.

> Greek: ἔδει οὖν πρὸς μὲν τὸν θάνατον τὸ θάρσος ἐστράφθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φόβον τοῦ θανάτου τὴν εὐλάβειαν· νῦν δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον πρὸς μὲν τὸν θάνατον τὴν φυγήν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ δόγμα τὴν ἀνεπιστρεψίαν καὶ τὸ ἀφειδὲς καὶ τὸ ἀδιαφορητικόν.

[¶13] Socrates used, very properly, to call these things masks; for as masks appear shocking and formidable to children from their inexperience, so we are thus affected with regard to things for no other reason. For what constitutes a child?

> Greek: ταῦτα δʼ ὁ Σωκράτης καλῶς ποιῶν μορμολύκεια ἐκάλει. ὡς γὰρ τοῖς παιδίοις τὰ προσωπεῖα φαίνεται δεινὰ καὶ φοβερὰ διʼ ἀπειρίαν, τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἡμεῖς πάσχομεν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα διʼ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ παιδία πρὸς τὰς μορμολυκείας.

[¶14] Ignorance. What constitutes a child? Want of instruction; for they are our equals, so far as their degree of knowledge permits.

> Greek: τί γάρ ἐστι παιδίον; ἄγνοια. τί ἐστι παιδίον; ἀμαθία. ἐπεὶ ὅπου οἶδεν, κἀκεῖνα οὐδὲν ἡμῶν ἔλαττον ἔχει.

[¶15] What is death? A mask. Turn it on the other side and be convinced. See, it doth not bite. This little body and spirit must be again, as once, separated, either now or hereafter; why, then, are you displeased if it be now?

> Greek: θάνατος τί ἐστιν; μορμολύκειον. στρέψας αὐτὸ κατάμαθε· ἰδοῦ, πῶς οὐ δάκνει. τὸ σωμάτιον δεῖ χωρισθῆναι τοῦ πνευματίου, ὡς πρότερον ἐκεχώριστο, ἢ νῦν ἢ ὕστερον. τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς, εἰ νῦν; εἰ γὰρ μὴ νῦν, ὕστερον.

[¶16] For if not now it will be hereafter. Why? To fulfil the course of the universe; for that hath need of some things present, others to come, and others already completed.

> Greek: διὰ τί; ἵνα ἡ περίοδος ἀνύηται τοῦ κόσμου· χρείαν γὰρ ἔχει τῶν μὲν ἐνισταμένων, τῶν δὲ μελλόντων, τῶν δʼ ἠνυσμένων.

[¶17] What is pain? A mask. Turn it and be convinced. This weak flesh is sometimes affected by harsh, sometimes by smooth impressions. If suffering be beyond endurance, the door is open;

> Greek: πόνος τί ἐστιν; μορμολύκειον. στρέψον αὐτὸ καὶ κατάμαθε. τραχέως κινεῖται τὸ σαρκίδιον, εἶτα πάλιν λείως. ἄν σοι μὴ λυσιτελῇ, ἡ θύρα ἤνοικται· ἂν λυσιτελῇ, φέρε.

[¶18] till then, bear it.

> Greek: πρὸς πάντα γὰρ ἠνοῖχθαι δεῖ τὴν θύραν· καὶ πρᾶγμα οὐκ ἔχομεν.

[¶19] It is fit that the final door should be open against all accidents, since thus we escape all trouble. What, then, is the fruit of these principles? What it ought to be;

> Greek: τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν δογμάτων καρπός; ὅνπερ δεῖ κάλλιστόν τʼ εἶναι καὶ πρεπωδέστατον τοῖς τῷ ὄντι παιδευομένοις, ἀταραξία ἀφοβία ἐλευθερία.

[¶20] the most noble, and the most suitable to the wise,—tranquillity, security, freedom. For in this case we are not to give credit to the many, who say that none ought to be educated but the free;

> Greek: οὐ γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ τούτων πιστευτέον, οἳ λέγουσιν μόνοις ἐξεῖναι παιδεύεσθαι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις μᾶλλον, οἳ λέγουσι μόνους τοὺς παιδευθέντας ἐλευθέρους εἶναι.

[¶21] but rather to the philosophers, who say that the wise alone are free. “How so?” Thus: is freedom anything else than the power of living as we like? “Nothing else.” Well; tell me then, do you like to live in error? “We do not. No one who lives in error is free.”

> Greek: — πῶς τοῦτο; — οὕτως· νῦν ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐλευθερία ἢ τὸ ἐξεῖναι ὡς βουλόμεθα διεξάγειν; οὐδέν. λέγετε δή μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, βούλεσθε ζῆν ἁμαρτάνοντες; οὐ βουλόμεθα. οὐδεὶς τοίνυν ἁμαρτάνων ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν.

[¶22] Do you like to live in fear? Do you like to live in sorrow? Do you like to live in perturbation? “By no means.” No one, therefore, in a state of fear, or sorrow, or perturbation, is free; but whoever is delivered from sorrow, fear, and perturbation, by the same means is delivered likewise from slavery.

> Greek: βούλεσθε ζῆν φοβούμενοι, βούλεσθε λυπούμενοι, βούλεσθε ταρασσόμενοι; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδεὶς ἄρα οὔτε φοβούμενος οὔτε λυπούμενος οὔτε ταρασσόμενος ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν, ὅστις δʼ ἀπήλλακται λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ ταραχῶν, οὗτος τῇ αὐτῇ ὁδῷ καὶ τοῦ δουλεύειν ἀπήλλακται.

[¶23] How shall we believe you, then, good legislators, when you say, “We allow none to be educated but the free”? For the philosophers say, “We allow none to be free but the wise;” that is, God doth not allow it. “What, then;

> Greek: πῶς οὖν ἔτι ὑμῖν πιστεύσομεν, ὦ φίλτατοι νομοθέται; οὐκ ἐπιτρέπομεν παιδεύεσθαι, εἰ μὴ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις; οἱ φιλόσοφοι γὰρ λέγουσιν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιτρέπομεν ἐλευθέροις εἶναι εἰ μὴ τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις, τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει.

[¶24] when any person hath turned his slave about before the consul, has he done nothing?” Yes, he has. “What?” He has turned his slave about before the consul. “Nothing more?” Yes. He pays a fine for him. “Well, then;

> Greek: — ὅταν οὖν στρέψῃ τις ἐπὶ στρατηγοῦ τὸν αὑτοῦ δοῦλον, οὐδὲν ἐποίησεν; — ἐποίησεν. — τί; — ἔστρεψεν τὸν αὑτοῦ δοῦλον ἐπὶ στρατηγοῦ. — ἄλλο οὐδέν; — ναί· καὶ εἰκοστὴν αὐτοῦ δοῦναι ὀφείλει.

[¶25] is not the man who has gone through this ceremony rendered free?” Only so far as he is emancipated from perturbation.

> Greek: — τί οὖν; ὁ ταῦτα παθὼν οὐ γέγονεν ἐλεύθερος; — οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀτάραχος.

[¶26] Pray, have you, who are able to give this freedom to others, no master of your own? Are you not a slave to money; to a girl; to a boy; to a tyrant; to some friend of a tyrant? Else why do you tremble when any one of these is in question?

> Greek: ἐπεὶ σὺ ὁ ἄλλους στρέφειν δυνάμενος οὐδένα ἔχεις κύριον; οὐκ ἀργύριον, οὐ κοράσιον, οὐ παιδάριον, οὐ τὸν τύραννον, οὐ φίλον τινὰ τοῦ τυράννου; τί οὖν τρέμεις ἐπί τινα τοιαύτην ἀπιὼν περίστασιν;

[¶27] Therefore, I so often repeat to you, let this be your study and constant pursuit, to learn in what it is necessary to be courageous, and in what cautious;

> Greek: διὰ τοῦτο λέγω πολλάκις· ταῦτα μελετᾶτε καὶ ταῦτα πρόχειρα ἔχετε, πρὸς τίνα δεῖ τεθαρρηκέναι καὶ πρὸς τίνα εὐλαβῶς διακεῖσθαι, ὅτι πρὸς τὰ ἀπροαίρετα θαρρεῖν, εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὰ προαιρετικά.

[¶28] courageous against the inevitable, cautious so far as your will can control.

> Greek: — ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνέγνων σοι οὐδʼ ἔγνως τί ποιῶ.

[¶29] “But have I not read my essay to you? Do not you know what I am doing?” In what? “In my essays.” Show me in what state you are as to desires and aversions; whether you do not fail of what you wish, and incur what you would avoid;

> Greek: — ἐν τίνι; ἐν λεξειδίοις. ἔχε σου τὰ λεξείδια· δεῖξον, πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ὄρεξιν καὶ ἔκκλισιν, εἰ μὴ ἀποτυγχάνεις ὧν θέλεις, εἰ μὴ περιπίπτεις οἷς οὐ θέλεις. ἐκεῖνα δὲ τὰ περιόδια, ἂν νοῦν ἔχῃς, ἄρας πού ποτε ἀπαλείψεις.

[¶30] but, as to these commonplace essays, if you are wise, you will take them, and destroy them. “Why? Did not Socrates write?” Yes; who so much? But how? As he had not always one at hand to argue against his principles, or be argued against in his turn, he argued with and examined himself, and always made practical application of some one great principle at least.

> Greek: — τί οὖν; Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔγραφεν; — καὶ τίς τοσαῦτα; ἀλλὰ πῶς; ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐδύνατο ἔχειν ἀεὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα αὐτοῦ τὰ δόγματα ἢ ἐλεγχθησόμενον ἐν τῷ μέρει, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἤλεγχεν καὶ ἐξήταζεν καὶ ἀεὶ μίαν γέ τινα πρόληψιν ἐγύμναζεν χρηστικῶς.

[¶31] These are the things which a philosopher writes; but such commonplaces as those of which I speak he leaves to the foolish, or to the happy creatures whom idleness furnishes with leisure, or to such as are too weak to regard consequences.

> Greek: ταῦτα γράφει φιλόσοφος· λεξείδια δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁδός, ἣν λέγω, ἄλλοις ἀφίησι, τοῖς ἀναισθήτοις ἢ τοῖς μακαρίοις, τοῖς σχολὴν ἄγουσιν ὑπὸ ἀταραξίας ἢ τοῖς μηδὲν τῶν ἑξῆς ὑπολογιζομένοις διὰ μωρίαν.
καὶ νῦν καιροῦ καλοῦντος ἐκεῖνα δείξεις ἀπελθὼν καὶ ἀναγνώσῃ καὶ ἐμπερπερεύσῃ; ἰδοῦ, πῶς διαλόγους συντίθημι.

[¶32] And yet will you, when opportunity offers, come forward to exhibit and read aloud such things, and take a pride in them? “Pray, see how I compose dialogues.” Talk not of that, man, but rather be able to say, See how I accomplish my purposes;

> Greek: μή, ἄνθρωπε, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον ἰδοῦ, πῶς ὀρεγόμενος οὐκ ἀποτυγχάνω. ἰδοῦ, πῶς ἐκκλίνων οὐ περιπίπτω. φέρε θάνατον καὶ γνώσῃ· φέρε πόνους, φέρε δεσμωτήριον, φέρε ἀδοξίαν, φέρε καταδίκην.

[¶33] see how I avert what I wish to shun. Set death before me; set pain, a prison, disgrace, doom, and you will know me? This should be the pride of a young man come out from the schools. Leave the rest to others.

> Greek: αὕτη ἐπίδειξις νέου ἐκ σχολῆς ἐληλυθότος. τἆλλα δʼ ἄλλοις ἄφες, μηδὲ φωνήν τις ἀκούσῃ σου περὶ αὐτῶν ποτε μηδʼ, ἂν ἐπαινέσῃ τις ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς, ἀνέχου, δόξον δὲ μηδεὶς εἶναι καὶ εἰδέναι μηδέν.

[¶34] Let no one ever hear you waste a word upon them, nor suffer it, if any one commends you for them;

> Greek: μόνον τοῦτο εἰδὼς φαίνου, πῶς μήτʼ ἀποτύχῃς ποτὲ μήτε περιπέσῃς.

[¶35] but admit that you are nobody, and that you know nothing. Appear to know only this, never to fail nor fall.

> Greek: ἄλλοι μελετάτωσαν δίκας, ἄλλοι προβλήματα, ἄλλοι συλλογισμούς· σὺ ἀποθνῄσκειν, σὺ δεδέσθαι, σὺ στρεβλοῦσθαι, σὺ ἐξορίζεσθαι.

[¶36] Let others study cases, problems, and syllogisms. Do you rather contemplate death, change, torture, exile; and all these with courage, and reliance upon Him who hath called you to them, and judged you worthy a post in which you may show what reason can do when it encounters the inevitable.

> Greek: πάντα ταῦτα θαρρούντως, πεποιθότως τῷ κεκληκότι σε ἐπʼ αὐτά, τῷ ἄξιον τῆς χώρας ταύτης κεκρικότι, ἐν ᾗ καταταχθεὶς ἐπιδείξεις, τίνα δύναται λογικὸν ἡγεμονικὸν πρὸς τὰς ἀπροαιρέτους δυνάμεις ἀντιταξάμενον.

[¶37] And thus this paradox ceases to be a paradox, that we must be at once cautious and courageous; courageous against the inevitable, and cautious when events are within our own control.

> Greek: καὶ οὕτως τὸ παράδοξον ἐκεῖνο οὐκέτι οὔτʼ ἀδύνατον φανεῖται οὔτε παράδοξον, ὅτι ἅμα μὲν εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ ἅμα δὲ θαρρεῖν, πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀπροαίρετα θαρρεῖν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς εὐλαβεῖσθαι.

[¶38] 2. Consider, you who are going to take your trial, what you wish to preserve, and in what to succeed. For if you wish to preserve a mind in harmony with nature, you are entirely safe; everything goes well; you have no trouble on your hands. While you wish to preserve that freedom which belongs to you, and are contented with that, for what have you longer to be anxious? For who is the master of things like these? Who can take them away? If you wish to be a man of modesty and fidelity, who shall prevent you? If you wish not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desires contrary to your principles; to aversions contrary to your opinion? The judge, perhaps, will pass a sentence against you, which he thinks formidable; but can he likewise make you receive it with shrinking? Since, then, desire and aversion are in your own power, for what have you to be anxious? Let this be your introduction; this your narration; this your proof; this your conclusion; this your victory; and this your applause. Thus said Socrates to one who put him in mind to prepare himself for his trial: “Do you not think that I have been preparing myself for this very thing my whole life long?” By what kind of preparation? “have attended to my own work.” What mean you? “have done nothing unjust, either in public or in private life.” But if you wish to retain possession of outward things too, your body, your estate, your dignity, I advise you immediately to prepare yourself by every possible preparation; and besides, to consider the disposition of your judge and of your adversary. If it be necessary to embrace his knees, do so; if to weep, weep; if to groan, groan For when you have once made yourself a slave to externals, be a slave wholly; do not struggle, and be alternately willing and unwilling, but be simply and thoroughly the one or the other, _ —free, or a slave; instructed, or ignorant; a game-cock, or a craven; either bear to be beaten till you die, or give out at once; and do not be soundly beaten first, and then give out at last. If both alternatives be shameful, learn immediately to distinguish where good and evil lie. They lie where truth likewise lies. Where truth and nature dictate, there exercise caution or courage. Why, do you think that if Socrates had concerned himself about externals, he would have said, when he appeared at his trial, “Anytus and Melitus may indeed kill me, but hurt me they cannot”? Was he so foolish as not to see that this way did not lead to safety, but the contrary? What, then, is the reason that he not only disregarded, but defied, his judges? Thus my friend Heraclitus, in a trifling suit about a little estate at Rhodes, after having proved to the judges that his cause was good, when he came to the conclusion of his speech, “will not entreat you,” said he; “nor be anxious as to what judgment you give; for it is rather you who are to be judged, than I.” And thus he lost his suit. What need was there of this? Be content not to entreat; yet do not proclaim that you will not entreat; unless it be a proper time to provoke the judges designedly, as in the case of Socrates. But if you too are preparing such a speech as his, what do you wait for? Why do you consent to be tried? For if you wish to be hanged, have patience, and the gibbet will come. But if you choose rather to consent, and make your defence as well as you can, all the rest is to be. ordered accordingly, with a due regard, however, to the preservation of your own proper character. For this reason it is absurd to call upon me for specific advice. How should I know what to advise you? Ask me rather to teach you to accommodate yourself to whatever may be the event. The former is just as if an illiterate person should say; “Tell me how to write down some name that is proposed to me;” and I show him how to write the name of Dion; and then another comes, and asks him to write the name, not of Dion, but of Theon. What will be the consequence? What will he write? Whereas, if you make writing your study, you are ready prepared for whatever word may occur; if not, how can I advise you? For if the actual case should suggest something else, what will you say, or how will you act? Remember, then, the general rule, and you will need no special suggestions; but if you are absorbed in externals, you must necessarily be tossed up and down, according to the inclination of your master. Who is your master? Whosoever controls those things which you seek or shun.

> Greek: 2. ὅρα σὺ ὁ ἀπιὼν ἐπὶ τὴν δίκην, τί θέλεις τηρῆσαι καὶ ποῦ θέλεις ἀνύσαι. εἰ γὰρ προαίρεσιν θέλεις τηρῆσαι κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν, πᾶσά σοι ἀσφάλεια, πᾶσά σοι εὐμάρεια, πρᾶγμα οὐκ ἔχεις. τὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ σοὶ αὐτεξούσια καὶ φύσει ἐλεύθερα θέλων τηρῆσαι καὶ τούτοις ἀρκούμενος τίνος ἔτι ἐπιστρέφῃ; τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν κύριος, τίς αὐτὰ δύναται ἀφελέσθαι; εἰ θέλεις αἰδήμων εἶναι καὶ πιστός, τίς οὐκ ἐάσει σε; εἰ θέλεις μὴ κωλύεσθαι μηδʼ ἀναγκάζεσθαι, τίς σε ἀναγκάσει ὀρέγεσθαι ὧν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, τίς ἐκκλίνειν ἃ μὴ φαίνεταί σοι; ἀλλὰ τί; πράξει μέν σοί τινα ἃ δοκεῖ φοβερὰ εἶναι· ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἐκκλίνων αὐτὰ πάθῃς, πῶς δύναται ποιῆσαι; ὅταν οὖν ἐπὶ σοὶ ᾖ τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκκλίνειν, τίνος ἔτι ἐπιστρέφῃ; τοῦτό σοι προοίμιον, τοῦτο διήγησις, τοῦτο πίστις, τοῦτο νίκη, τοῦτο ἐπίλογος, τοῦτο εὐδοκίμησις. διὰ τοῦτο ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸν ὑπομιμνῄσκοντα, ἵνα παρασκευάζηται πρὸς τὴν δίκην, ἔφη οὐ δοκῶ οὖν σοι ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ πρὸς τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι; — ποίαν παρασκευήν; — τετήρηκα, φησίν, τὸ ἐπʼ ἐμοί. — πῶς οὖν; — οὐδὲν οὐδέποτʼ ἄδικον οὔτʼ ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ ἔπραξα. εἰ δὲ θέλεις καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς τηρῆσαι, τὸ σωμάτιον καὶ τὸ οὐσίδιον καὶ τὸ ἀξιωμάτιον, λέγω σοι· ἤδη αὐτόθεν παρασκευάζου τὴν δυνατὴν παρασκευὴν πᾶσαν καὶ λοιπὸν σκέπτου καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ δικαστοῦ καὶ τὸν ἀντίδικον. εἰ γονάτων ἅψασθαι δεῖ, γονάτων ἅψαι· εἰ κλαῦσαι, κλαῦσον· εἰ οἰμῶξαι, οἴμωξον. ὅταν γὰρ ὑποθῇς τὰ σὰ τοῖς ἐκτός, δούλευε τὸ λοιπὸν καὶ μὴ ἀντισπῶ καὶ ποτὲ μὲν θέλε δουλεύειν, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ θέλε, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς διανοίας ἢ ταῦτα ἢ ἐκεῖνα· ἢ ἐλεύθερος ἢ δοῦλος, ἢ πεπαιδευμένος ἢ ἀπαίδευτος, ἢ γενναῖος ἀλεκτρυὼν ἢ ἀγεννής, ἢ ὑπόμενε τυπτόμενος, μέχρις ἂν ἀποθάνῃς, ἢ ἀπαγόρευσον εὐθύς. μή σοι γένοιτο πληγὰς πολλὰς λαβεῖν καὶ ὕστερον ἀπαγορεῦσαι. εἰ δʼ αἰσχρὰ ταῦτα, αὐτόθεν ἤδη δίελε ποῦ φύσις κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν; οὗ καὶ ἀλήθεια. ὅπου ἀλήθεια καὶ οὗ φύσις, ἐκεῖ τὸ εὐλαβές· ὅπου ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἐκεῖ τὸ θαρραλέον, ὅπου ἡ φύσις. ἐπεί τ οι δοκεῖς, ὅτι τὰ ἐκτὸς τηρῆσαι θέλων Σωκράτης παρελθὼν ἂν ἔλεγε ἐμὲ δʼ Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύνανται, βλάψαι δʼ οὔ; οὕτω μωρὸς ἦν, ἵνα μὴ ἴδῃ ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ὁδὸς ἐνταῦθα οὐ φέρει, ἀλλʼ ἄλλῃ; τί οὖν ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον καὶ προσερεθίζει; ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς Ἡράκλειτος περὶ ἀγριδίου πραγμάτιον ἔχων ἐν Ῥόδῳ καὶ ἀποδείξας τοῖς δικασταῖς ὅτι δίκαια λέγει ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐπίλογον ἔφη ὅτι ἀλλʼ οὔτε δεήσομαι ὑμῶν οὔτʼ ἐπιστρέφομαι, τί μέλλετε κρίνειν· ὑμεῖς τε μᾶλλον οἱ κρινόμενοί ἐστε ἢ ἐγώ. καὶ οὕτως κατέστρεψε τὸ πραγμάτιον. τίς χρεία; μόνον μὴ δέου, μὴ προστίθει δʼ ὅτι καὶ οὐ δέομαι. εἰ μή τι καιρός ἐστιν ἐπίτηδες ἐρεθίσαι τοὺς δικαστὰς ὡς Σωκράτει. καὶ σὺ εἰ τοιοῦτον ἐπίλογον παρασκευάζῃ, τί ἀναβαίνεις, τί ὑπακούεις; εἰ γὰρ σταυρωθῆναι θέλεις, ἔκδεξαι καὶ ἥξει ὁ σταυρός· εἰ δʼ ὑπακοῦσαι λόγος αἱρεῖ καὶ πεῖσαι τό γε παρʼ αὐτόν, τὰ ἑξῆς τούτῳ ποιητέον τηροῦντι μέντοι τὰ ἴδια. ταύτῃ καὶ γελοῖόν ἐστι τὸ λέγειν ὑπόθου μοι. τί σοι ὑποθῶμαι; ἀλλὰ ποίησόν μου τὴν διάνοιαν ὅ τι ἂν ἀποβαίνῃ πρὸς τοῦτο ἁρμόσασθαι. ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνό γε ὅμοιόν ἐστιν οἷον εἰ ἀγράμματος λέγοι εἰπέ μοι τί γράψω, ὅταν μοι προβληθῇ τι ὄνομα. ἂν γὰρ εἴπω ὅτι Δίων, εἶτα παρελθὼν ἐκεῖνος αὐτῷ προβάλῃ μὴ τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ Θέωνος, τί γένηται; τί γράψῃ; ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν μεμελέτηκας γράφειν, ἔχεις καὶ παρασκευάσασθαι πρὸς πάντα τὰ ὑπαγορευόμενα· εἰ δὲ μή, τί σοι ἐγὼ νῦν ὑποθῶμαι; ἂν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ὑπαγορεύῃ τὰ πράγματα, τί ἐρεῖς ἢ τί πράξεις; τούτου οὖν τοῦ καθολικοῦ μέμνησο καὶ ὑποθήκης οὐκ ἀπορήσεις. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἔξω χάσκῃς, ἀνάγκη σε ἄνω καὶ κάτω κυλίεσθαι πρὸς τὸ βούλημα τοῦ κυρίου. τίς δʼ ἐστὶ κύριος; ὁ τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τινος σπουδαζομένων ἢ ἐκκλινομένων ἔχων ἐξουσίαν.

[¶39] 3. Diogenes rightly answered one who desired letters of recommendation from him: “At first sight he will know you to be a man; and whether you are a good or a bad man, if he has any skill in distinguishing, he will know likewise; and if he has not, he will never know it, though I should write a thousand times.” Just as if you were a piece of coin, and should desire to be recommended to any person as good, in order to be tried; if it be to an assayer, he will know your value, for you will recommend yourself. We ought, therefore, in life also to have something analogous to this skill in gold; that one may be able to say, like the assayer, Bring me whatever piece you will, and I will find out its value; or, as I would say with regard to syllogisms, Bring me whomsoever you will, and I will distinguish for you whether he knows how to solve syllogisms, or not. Why? Because I can do that myself, and have that faculty which is necessary for one who can discern persons skilled in such solutions. But how do I act in life? I sometimes call a thing good, at other times bad. What is the cause of this? Something contrary to whit occurs to me in syllogisms,—ignorance and inexperience.

> Greek: 3. καλῶς ὁ Διογένης πρὸς τὸν ἀξιοῦντα γράμματα παρʼ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν συστατικὰ ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος, φησίν, εἶ, καὶ ἰδὼν γνώσεται· εἰ δʼ ἀγαθὸς ἢ κακός, εἰ μὲν ἔμπειρός ἐστι διαγνῶναι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ κακούς, γνώσεται, εἰ δʼ ἄπειρος, οὐδʼ ἂν μυριάκις γράψω αὐτῷ. ὅμοιον γὰρ ὥσπερ εἰ δραχμὴ συσταθῆναί τινι ἠξίου, ἵνα δοκιμασθῇ. εἰ ἀργυρογνωμονικός ἐστιν, σὺ σαυτὴν συστήσεις. ἔδει οὖν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐν τῷ βίῳ οἷον ἐπʼ ἀργυρίου, ἵνʼ εἰπεῖν δύνωμαι καθάπερ ὁ ἀργυρογνώμων λέγει φέρε ἣν θέλεις δραχμὴν καὶ διαγνώσομαι. ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ συλλογισμῶν φέρε ὃν θέλεις καὶ διακρινῶ σοι τὸν ἀναλυτικόν τε καὶ μή. διὰ τί; οἶδα γὰρ ἀναλύειν συλλογισμούς· ἔχω τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν ἐπιγνωστικὸν τῶν περὶ συλλογισμοὺς κατορθούντων. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ βίου τί ποιῶ; νῦν μὲν λέγω ἀγαθόν, νῦν δὲ κακόν. τί τὸ αἴτιον; τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἀμαθία καὶ ἀπειρία.

[¶40] 4. Just as he was once saying that man is made for fidelity, and that whoever subverts this subverts the peculiar property of man, there entered one of the so-called literary men, who had been found guilty of adultery in that city. But, continued Epictetus, if, laying aside that fidelity for which we were born, we form designs against the wife of our neighbor, what do we? What else but destroy and ruin—what? Fidelity, honor, and sanctity of manners. Only these? And do not we ruin neighborhood, friendship, our country? In what rank do we then place ourselves? How am I to consider you, sir,—as a neighbor; a friend? What sort of one? As a citizen? How shall I trust you? Indeed, if you were some potsherd, so noisome that no use could be made of you, you might be thrown on a dunghill, and no mortal would take the trouble to pick you up; but if, being a man, you cannot fill any one place in human society, what shall we do with you? For, suppose you cannot hold the place of a friend, can you hold even that of a slave? And who will trust you? Why, then, should not you also be contented to be thrown upon some dunghill, as a useless vessel, and indeed as worse than that? Will you say, after this, Has no one any regard for me, a man of letters? Why, you are wicked, and fit for no use. Just as if wasps should take it ill that no one has any regard for them, but all shun, and whoever can, beats them down. You have such a sting that whoever you strike with it is thrown into troubles and sorrows. What would you have us do with you? There is nowhere to place you. “What, then; are not women made by nature accessible to all?” I admit it; and so is food at table accessible to those who are invited. But, after it is distributed, will you go and snatch away the share of him who sits next you; or slyly steal it, or stretch out your hand, and taste; and if you cannot tear away any of the meat, dip your fingers and lick them? A fine companion! A Socratic guest indeed! Again, is not the theatre common to all the citizens? Therefore come, when all are seated, if you dare, and turn any one of them out of his place. In this sense only are women accessible by nature; but when the laws, like a good host, have distributed them, cannot you, like the rest of the company, be contented with your own share, but must you pilfer, and taste what belongs to another? “But I am a man of letters, and understand Archedemus.” With all your understanding of Archedemus, then, you will be an adulterer and a rogue; and instead of a man, a wolf or an ape. For where is the difference?

> Greek: 4. λέγοντος αὐτοῦ ὅτι Ὁ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς πίστιν γέγονεν καὶ τοῦτο ὁ ἀνατρέπων ἀνατρέπει τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπεισῆλθέν τις τῶν δοκούντων φιλολόγων, ὃς κατείληπτό ποτε μοιχὸς ἐν τῇ πόλει. ὁ δʼ Ἀλλʼ ἄν, φησίν, ἀφέντες τοῦτο τὸ πιστόν, πρὸς ὃ πεφύκαμεν, ἐπιβουλεύωμεν τῇ γυναικὶ τοῦ γείτονος, τί ποιοῦμεν; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ ἀπόλλυμεν καὶ ἀναιροῦμεν; τίνα; τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν ὅσιον. ταῦτα μόνα; γειτνίασιν δʼ οὐκ ἀναιροῦμεν, φιλίαν δʼ οὔ, πόλιν δʼ οὔ; εἰς τίνα δὲ χώραν αὑτοὺς κατατάσσομεν; ὡς τίνι σοι χρῶμαι, ἄνθρωπε; ὡς γείτονι, ὡς φίλῳ; ποίῳ τινί; ὡς πολίτῃ; τί σοι πιστεύσω; εἶτα σκευάριον μὲν εἰ ἦς οὕτως σαπρόν, ὥστε σοι πρὸς μηδὲν δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι, ἔξω ἂν ἐπὶ τὰς κοπρίας ἐρρίπτου καὶ οὐδʼ ἐκεῖθεν ἄν τίς σε ἀνῃρεῖτο· εἰ δʼ ἄνθρωπος ὢν οὐδεμίαν χώραν δύνασαι ἀποπληρῶσαι ἀνθρωπικήν, τί σε ποιήσομεν; ἔστω γάρ, φίλου οὐ δύνασαι τόπον ἔχειν· δούλου δύνασαι; καὶ τίς σοι πιστεύσει; οὐ θέλεις οὖν ῥιφῆναί που καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ κοπρίαν ὡς σκεῦος ἄχρηστον, ὡς κόπριον; εἶτα ἐρεῖς οὐδείς μου ἐπιστρέφεται, ἀνθρώπου φιλολόγου; κακὸς γὰρ εἶ καὶ ἄχρηστος. οἷον εἰ οἱ σφῆκες ἠγανάκτουν, ὅτι οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἐπιστρέφεται, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσι πάντες κἄν τις δύνηται, πλήξας κατέβαλεν. σὺ κέντρον ἔχεις τοιοῦτον, ὥστε ὃν ἂν πλήξῃς εἰς πράγματα καὶ ὀδύνας ἐμβάλλειν. τί σε θέλεις ποιήσωμεν; οὐκ ἔχεις ποῦ τεθῇς. τί οὖν; οὐκ εἰσὶν αἱ γυναῖκες κοιναὶ φύσει; κἀγὼ λέγω. καὶ γὰρ τὸ χοιρίδιον κοινὸν τῶν κεκλημένων· ἀλλʼ ὅταν μέρη γένηται, ἄν σοι φανῇ, ἀνάρπασον ἀπελθὼν τὸ τοῦ παρακατακειμένου μέρος, λάθρᾳ κλέψον ἢ παρακαθεὶς τὴν χεῖρα λίχνευε, κἂν μὴ δύνῃ τοῦ κρέως ἀποσπάσαι, λίπαινε τοὺς δακτύλους καὶ περίλειχε. καλὸς συμπότης καὶ σύνδειπνος Σωκρατικός. ἄγε, τὸ δὲ θέατρον οὐκ ἔστι κοινὸν τῶν πολιτῶν; ὅταν οὖν καθίσωσιν, ἐλθών, ἄν σοι φανῇ, ἔκβαλέ τινα αὐτῶν. οὕτως καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες φύσει κοιναί. ὅταν δʼ ὁ νομοθέτης ὡς ἑστιάτωρ διέλῃ αὐτάς, οὐ θέλεις καὶ αὐτὸς ἴδιον μέρος ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀλλότριον ὑφαρπάζεις καὶ λιχνεύεις; ἀλλὰ φιλόλογός εἰμι καὶ Ἀρχέδημον νοῶ. Ἀρχέδημον τοίνυν νοῶν μοιχὸς ἴσθι καὶ ἄπιστος καὶ ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου λύκος ἢ πίθηκος. τί γὰρ κωλύει;

[¶41] 5. The materials of action are variable, but the use we make of them should be constant. How, then, shall one combine composure and tranquillity with energy; doing nothing rashly, nothing carelessly? By imitating those who play at games. The dice are variable; the pieces are variable. How do I know what will fall out? But it is my business to manage carefully and dexterously, whatever happens. Thus in life too, this is the chief business, to consider and discriminate things, and say, “Externals are not in my power; choice is. Where shall I seek good and evil? Within; in what is my own.” But in what is controlled by others, count nothing good or evil, profitable or hurtful, or any such thing. What, then; are we to treat these in a careless way? By no means; for this, on the other hand, would be a perversion of the will, and so contrary to nature. But we are to act with care, because the use of our materials is not indifferent; and at the same time with calmness and tranquillity, because the materials themselves are uncertain. For where a thing is not uncertain, there no one can restrain or compel me. Where I am capable of being restrained or compelled, the acquisition does not depend upon me; nor is it either good or evil. The use of it, indeed, is either good or evil; but that does depend upon me. It is difficult, I own, to blend and unite tranquillity in accepting, and energy in using, the facts of life; but it is not impossible; if it be, it is impossible to be happy. How do we act in a voyage? What is in my power? To choose the pilot, the sailors, the day, the hour. Afterwards comes a storm. What have I to care for? My part is performed. This matter belongs to another, to the pilot. But the ship is sinking; what then have I to do? That which alone I can do; I submit to being drowned, without fear, without clamor, or accusing God; but as one who knows that what is born must likewise die. For I am not eternity, but a man,—a part of the whole, as an hour is of the day. I must come like an hour, and like an hour must pass away. What signifies it whether by drowning or by a fever? For, in some way or other, pass I must. This you may see to be the practice of those who play skilfully at ball. No one strives for the ball itself, as either a good or an evil; but how he may throw and catch it again. Here lies the address, here the art, the nimbleness, the skill; lest I fail to catch it, even when I open my breast for it, while another catches it whenever I throw it. But if we catch or throw it in fear and trembling, what kind of play will this be? How shall we keep ourselves steady, or how see the order of the game? One will say, throw; another, do not throw; a third, you have thrown once already. This is a mere quarrel, not a play. Therefore Socrates well understood playing at ball. “What do you mean?” When he joked at his trial. “Tell me,” said he, “Anytus, how can you say that I do not believe in a God? What do you think demons are? Are they not either the offspring of the gods, or compounded of gods and men?” Yes. “Do you think, then, that one can believe there are mules, and not believe that there are asses?” This was just as if he had been playing at ball. And what was the ball he had to play with? Life, chains, exile, a draught of poison, separation from a wife, and leaving his children orphans. These were what he had to play with; and yet he did play, and threw the ball with address. Thus we should be careful as to the play, but indifferent as to the ball. We are by all means to manage our materials with art,—not taking them for the best, but showing our art about them, whatever they may happen to be. Thus a weaver does not make the wool, but employs his art upon what is given him. It is another who gives you food and property, and may take them away, and your paltry body too. Do you, however, work upon the materials you have received; and then, if you come off unhurt, others, no doubt, who meet you, will congratulate you on your escape. But he who has a clearer insight into such things will praise and congratulate you if he sees you to have done well; but if you owe your escape to any unbecoming action, he will do the contrary. For where there is a reasonable cause for rejoicing, there is cause likewise for congratulation. How, then, are some external circumstances said to be according to nature; others contrary to it? Only when we are viewed as isolated individuals. I will allow that it is natural for the foot (for instance) to be clean. But if you take it as a foot, and not as a mere isolated thing, it will be fit that it should walk in the dirt, and tread upon thorns; and sometimes that it should even be cut off, for the good of the whole; otherwise it is no longer a foot. We should reason in some such manner concerning ourselves. Who are you? A man. If then, indeed, you consider yourself isolatedly, it is natural that you should live to old age, should be prosperous and healthy; but if you consider yourself as a man, and as a part of the whole, it will be fit, in view of that whole, that you should at one time be sick; at another, take a voyage, and be exposed to danger; sometimes be in want; and possibly die before your time. Why, then, are you displeased? Do not you know that otherwise, just as the other ceases to be a foot, so you are no longer a man? For what is a man? A part of a commonwealth; first and chiefly of that which includes both gods and men; and next, of that to which you immediately belong, which is a miniature of the universal city. What, then; must I, at one time, go before a tribunal; must another, at another time, be scorched by a fever; another be exposed to the sea; another die; another be condemned? Yes; for it is impossible, in such a body, in such a world, and among such companions, but that some one or other of us must meet with such circumstances. Your business, then, is simply to say what you ought, to order things as the case requires. After this comes some one and says, “pronounce that you have acted unjustly.” Much good may it do you; I have done my part. You are to look to it, whether you have done yours; for you may as well understand that there is some danger in that quarter also.

> Greek: 5. αἱ ὗλαι ἀδιάφοροι, ἡ δὲ χρῆσις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀδιάφορος. πῶς οὖν τηρήσῃ τις ἅμα μὲν τὸ εὐσταθὲς καὶ ἀτάραχον, ἅμα δὲ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς καὶ μὴ εἰκαῖον μηδʼ ἐπισεσυρμένον; ἂν μιμῆται τοὺς κυβεύοντας. αἱ ψῆφοι ἀδιάφοροι, οἱ κύβοι ἀδιάφοροι· πόθεν οἶδα, τί μέλλει πίπτειν; τῷ πεσόντι δʼ ἐπιμελῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτο ἤδη ἐμὸν ἔργον ἐστίν. οὕτως τοίνυν τὸ μὲν προηγούμενον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου ἔργον ἐκεῖνο· δίελε τὰ πράγματα καὶ διάστησον καὶ εἰπὲ τὰ ἔξω οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐμοί· προαίρεσις ἐπʼ ἐμοί. ποῦ ζητήσω τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; ἔσω ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις μηδέποτε μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν ὀνομάσῃς μήτε κακὸν μήτʼ ὠφέλειαν μήτε βλάβην μήτʼ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. τί οὖν; ἀμελῶς τούτοις χρηστέον; οὐδαμῶς. τοῦτο γὰρ πάλιν τῇ προαιρέσει κακόν ἐστι καὶ ταύτῃ [τὴν] παρὰ φύσιν. ἀλλʼ ἅμα μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις οὐκ ἀδιάφορον, ἅμα δʼ εὐσταθῶς καὶ ἀταράχως, ὅτι ἡ ὕλη οὐ διαφέρουσα. ὅπου γὰρ τὸ διαφέρον, ἐκεῖ οὔτε κωλῦσαί μέ τις δύναται οὔτʼ ἀναγκάσαι. ὅπου κωλυτὸς καὶ ἀναγκαστός εἰμι, ἐκείνων ἡ μὲν τεῦξις οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ οὐδʼ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἡ χρῆσις δʼ ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἐμοί. δύσκολον δὲ μῖξαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν ταῦτα, ἐπιμέλειαν τοῦ προσπεπονθότος ταῖς ὕλαις καὶ εὐστάθειαν τοῦ ἀνεπιστρεπτοῦντος, πλὴν οὐκ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον τὸ εὐδαιμονῆσαι. ἀλλʼ οἷόν τι ἐπὶ τοῦ πλοῦ ποιοῦμεν. τί μοι δύναται; τὸ ἐκλέξασθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, τοὺς ναύτας, τὴν ἡμέραν, τὸν καιρόν. εἶτα χειμὼν ἐμπέπτωκεν. τί οὖν ἔτι μοι μέλει; τὰ γὰρ ἐμὰ ἐκπεπλήρωται. ἄλλου ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, τοῦ κυβερνήτου. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ναῦς καταδύεται. τί οὖν ἔχω ποιῆσαι; ὃ δύναμαι, τοῦτο μόνον ποιῶ· μὴ φοβούμενος ἀποπνίγομαι οὐδὲ κεκραγὼς οὐδʼ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλʼ εἰδώς, ὅτι τὸ γενόμενον καὶ φθαρῆναι δεῖ. οὐ γάρ εἰμι αἰών, ἀλλʼ ἄνθρωπος, μέρος τῶν πάντων ὡς ὥρα ἡμέρας. ἐνστῆναί με δεῖ ὡς τὴν ὥραν καὶ παρελθεῖν ὡς ὥραν. τί οὖν μοι διαφέρει πῶς παρέλθω, πότερον πνιγεὶς ἢ πυρέξας; διὰ γὰρ τοιούτου τινὸς δεῖ παρελθεῖν με. τοῦτο ὄψει ποιοῦντας καὶ τοὺς σφαιρίζοντας ἐμπείρως. οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν διαφέρεται περὶ τοῦ ἁρπαστοῦ ὡς περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ βάλλειν καὶ δέχεσθαι. λοιπὸν ἐν τούτῳ ἡ εὐρυθμία, ἐν τούτῳ ἡ τέχνη, τὸ τάχος, ἡ εὐγνωμοσύνη, ἵνʼ ἐγώ, μηδʼ ἂν τὸν κόλπον ἐκτείνω, δύναμαι λαβεῖν αὐτό, ὁ δέ, ἂν βάλω, λαμβάνει. ἂν δὲ μετὰ ταραχῆς καὶ φόβου δεχώμεθα ἢ βάλλωμεν αὐτό, ποία ἔτι παιδιά, ποῦ δέ τις εὐσταθήσει, ποῦ δέ τις τὸ ἑξῆς ὄψεται ἐν αὐτῇ; ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν ἐρεῖ βάλε, ὁ δὲ μὴ βάλῃς, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀνέβαλες. τοῦτο δὴ μάχη ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ παιδιά. τοιγαροῦν Σωκράτης ᾔδει σφαιρίζειν. πῶς; παίζειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. λέγε μοι, φησίν, Ἄνυτε, πῶς με φῂς θεὸν οὐ νομίζειν; οἱ δαίμονές σοι τίνες εἶναι δοκοῦσιν; οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεῶν παῖδές εἰσιν ἢ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν μεμιγμένοι τινές; ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ τίς οὖν σοι δοκεῖ δύνασθαι ἡμιόνους μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι, ὄνους δὲ μή; ὡς ἁρπαστίῳ παίζων. καὶ τί ἐκεῖ ἐν μέσῳ ἁρπάστιον τότʼ ἦν; τὸ δεδέσθαι, τὸ φυγαδευθῆναι, τὸ πιεῖν φάρμακον, τὸ γυναικὸς ἀφαιρεθῆναι, τὸ τέκνα ὀρφανὰ καταλιπεῖν. ταῦτα ἦν ἐν μέσῳ οἷς ἔπαιζεν, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔπαιζεν καὶ ἐσφαίριζεν εὐρύθμως. οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς τὴν μὲν ἐπιμέλειαν σφαιριστικωτάτην, τὴν δʼ ἀδιαφορίαν ὡς ὑπὲρ ἁρπαστίου. δεῖ γὰρ πάντως περί τινα τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑλῶν φιλοτεχνεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκείνην ἀποδεχόμενον, ἀλλʼ οἵα ἂν ᾖ ἐκείνη, τὴν περὶ αὐτὴν φιλοτεχνίαν ἐπιδεικνύοντα. οὕτως καὶ ὁ ὑφάντης οὐκ ἔρια ποιεῖ, ἀλλʼ οἷα ἂν παραλάβῃ περὶ αὐτὰ φιλοτεχνεῖ. ἄλλος σοι δίδωσι τροφὰς καὶ κτῆσιν καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δύναται ἀφελέσθαι καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον αὐτό. σὺ λοιπὸν παραλαβὼν τὴν ὕλην ἐργάζου. εἶτα ἂν ἐξέλθῃς μηδὲν παθών, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἀπαντῶντές σοι συγχαρήσονται ὅτι ἐσώθης, ὁ δʼ εἰδὼς βλέπειν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἂν μὲν ἴδῃ ὅτι εὐσχημόνως ἀνεστράφης ἐν τούτῳ, ἐπαινέσει καὶ συνησθήσεται· ἂν δὲ διʼ ἀσχημοσύνην τινὰ διασεσωσμένον, τὰ ἐναντία. ὅπου γὰρ τὸ χαίρειν εὐλόγως, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν. πῶς οὖν λέγεται τῶν ἐκτός τινα κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἀπόλυτοι ἦμεν. τῷ γὰρ ποδὶ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι ἐρῶ τὸ καθαρῷ εἶναι, ἀλλʼ, ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς πόδα λάβῃς καὶ ὡς μὴ ἀπόλυτον, καθήξει αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς πηλὸν ἐμβαίνειν καὶ ἀκάνθας πατῆσαι καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε ἀποκοπῆναι ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὅλου· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκέτι ἔσται πούς. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐφʼ ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν δεῖ. τί εἶ; ἄνθρωπος. εἰ μὲν ὡς ἀπόλυτον σκοπεῖς, κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ ζῆσαι μέχρι γήρως, πλουτεῖν, ὑγιαίνειν. εἰ δʼ ὡς ἄνθρωπον σκοπεῖς καὶ μέρος ὅλου τινός, διʼ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὅλον νῦν μέν σοι νοσῆσαι καθήκει, νῦν δὲ πλεῦσαι καὶ κινδυνεῦσαι, νῦν δʼ ἀπορηθῆναι, πρὸ ὥρας δʼ ἔστιν ὅτʼ ἀποθανεῖν. τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς; οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι ὡς ἐκεῖνος οὐκέτι ἔσται πούς, οὕτως οὐδὲ σὺ ἄνθρωπος; τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; μέρος πόλεως, πρώτης μὲν τῆς ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τῆς ὡς ἔγγιστα λεγομένης, ἥ τί ἐστι μικρὸν τῆς ὅλης μίμημα. νῦν οὖν ἐμὲ κρίνεσθαι; νῦν οὖν ἄλλον πυρέσσειν, ἄλλον πλεῖν, ἄλλον ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἄλλον κατακεκρίσθαι; ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐν τοιούτῳ σώματι, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ περιέχοντι, τούτοις τοῖς συζῶσιν μὴ συμπίπτειν ἄλλοις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. σὸν οὖν ἔργον ἐλθόντα εἰπεῖν ἃ δεῖ, διαθέσθαι ταῦτα ὡς ἐπιβάλλει. εἶτα ἐκεῖνος λέγει κρίνω σε ἀδικεῖν. εὖ σοι γένοιτο. ἐποίησα ἐγὼ τὸ ἐμόν, εἰ δὲ καὶ σὺ τὸ σὸν ἐποίησας, ὄψει αὐτός. ἔστι γάρ τις κἀκείνου κίνδυνος, μή σε λανθανέτω.

[¶42] 6. A process of reasoning may be an indifferent thing; but our judgment concerning it is not indifferent; for it is either knowledge, or opinion, or mistake. So the events of life occur indifferently, but the use of it is not indifferent. When you are told, therefore, that these things are indifferent, do not, on that account, ever be careless; nor yet, when you are governed by prudence, be abject, and dazzled by externals. It is good to know your own qualifications and powers; that, where you are not qualified, you may be quiet, and not angry that others have there the advantage of you. For you too will think it reasonable, that you should have the advantage in the art of reasoning; and, if others should be angry at it, you will tell them, by way of consolation, “This I have learned, and you have not.” Thus too, wherever practice is necessary, do not pretend to what can only be attained by practice; but leave the matter to those who are practised, and do you be contented in your own serenity. “Go, for instance, and pay your court to such a person.” How? I will not do it abjectly. So I find myself shut out; for I have not learned to get in at the window, and finding the door shut, I must necessarily either go back, or get in at the window. “But speak to him at least.” I am willing. “In what manner?” Not basely at any rate. “Well, you have failed.” This is not your business, but his. Why do you claim what belongs to another? Always remember what is your own, and what is another’s, and you will never be disturbed. Hence Chrysippus rightly says: While consequences are uncertain, I will keep to those things which will bring me most in harmony with nature; for God himself hath formed me to choose this. If I knew that it was inevitable for me to be sick, I would conform my inclinations that way; for even the foot, if it had understanding, would be inclined to get into the dirt. For why are ears of corn produced, if it be not to ripen? And why do they ripen, if not to be reaped? For they are not isolated, individual things. If they were capable of sense, do you think they would wish never to be reaped? It would be a curse upon ears of corn not to be reaped, and we ought to know that it would be a curse upon man not to die; like that of not ripening, and not being reaped. Since, then, it is necessary for us to be reaped, and we have at the same time understanding to know it, are we angry at it? This is only because we neither know what we are, nor have we studied what belongs to man, as jockeys do what belongs to horses. Yet Chrysantas, when he was about to strike an enemy, on hearing the trumpet sound a retreat, drew back his hand; for he thought it more eligible to obey the command of his general, than his own inclination. But not one of us, even when necessity calls, is ready and willing to obey it; but we weep and groan over painful events, calling them our “circumstances.” What circumstances, man? For if you call what surrounds you circumstances, everything is a circumstance; but if by this you mean hardships, where is the hardship, that whatever is born must die? The instrument is either a sword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant; and what does it signify to you by what way you descend to Hades? All are equal; but, if you would hear the truth, the shortest is that by which a tyrant sends you. No tyrant was ever six months in cutting any man’s throat; but a fever often takes a year. All these things are mere sound, and the tumor of empty names. “My life is in danger from Caesar.” And am I not in danger, who dwell at Nicopolis, where there are so many earthquakes? And when you yourself recross the Adriatic, what is then in danger? Is it not your life? “Ay, and my convictions also.” What, your own? How so? Can any one compel you to have any convictions contrary to your own inclination? “But the convictions of others too.” And what danger is it of yours, if others have false convictions? “But I am in danger of being banished.” What is it to be banished? Only to be somewhere else than at Rome. “Yes; but what if I should be sent to Gyaros?” If it be thought best for you, you will go; if not, there is another place than Gyaros whither you are sure to go,—where he who now sends you to Gyaros must go likewise, whether he will or not. Why, then, do you come to these, as to great trials? They are not equal to your powers. So that an ingenuous young man would say, it was not worth while for this to have read and written so much, and to have sat so long listening to this old man. Only remember the distinction between what is your own and what is not your own, and you will never claim what belongs to others. Judicial bench or dungeon, each is but a place,—one high, the other low; but your will is equal to either condition, and if you have a mind to keep it so, it may be so kept. We shall then become imitators of Socrates, when, even in a prison, we are able to write hymns of praise; but as we now are, consider whether we could even bear to have another say to us in prison, “Shall I read you a hymn of praise?” “Why do you trouble me; do you not know my sad situation? In such circumstances, am I able to hear hymns?” What circumstances? “I am going to die.” And are all other men to be immortal?

> Greek: 6. τὸ συνημμένον ἀδιάφορον· ἡ κρίσις ἡ περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀδιάφορος, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ ἀπάτη. οὕτως τὸ ζῆν ἀδιάφορον, ἡ χρῆσις οὐκ ἀδιάφορος. μή ποτʼ οὖν, ὅταν εἴπῃ τις ὑμῖν ἀδιαφορεῖν καὶ ταῦτα, ἀμελεῖς γίνεσθε, μήθʼ ὅταν εἰς ἐπιμέλειάν τις ὑμᾶς παρακαλῇ, ταπεινοὶ καὶ τᾶς ὕλας τεθαυμακότες. καλὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν αὑτοῦ παρασκευὴν καὶ δύναμιν, ἵνʼ ἐν οἷς μὴ παρεσκεύασαι, ἡσυχίαν ἄγῃς μηδʼ ἀγανακτῇς, εἴ τινες ἄλλοι πλεῖόν σου ἔχουσιν ἐν ἐκείνοις. καὶ γὰρ σὺ ἐν συλλογισμοῖς πλεῖον ἀξιώσεις σεαυτὸν ἔχειν κἂν ἀγανακτῶσιν ἐπὶ τούτῳ, παραμυθήσῃ αὐτούς· ἐγὼ ἔμαθον, ὑμεῖς δʼ οὔ. οὕτως καί, ὅπου τινὸς χρεία τριβῆς, μὴ ζήτει τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς χρείας περιγινόμενον, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνου μὲν παραχώρει τοῖς περιτετριμμένοις, σοὶ δʼ ἀρκείτω τὸ εὐσταθεῖν. ἄπελθε καὶ ἄσπασαι τὸν δεῖνα. ἀσπάζομαι. πῶς; οὐ ταπεινῶς. ἀλλʼ ἐξεκλείσθης. διὰ θυρίδος γὰρ οὐκ ἔμαθον εἰσέρχεσθαι. ὅταν δὲ κεκλειμένην εὕρω τὴν θύραν, ἀνάγκη μʼ ἢ ἀποχωρῆσαι ἢ διὰ τῆς θυρίδος εἰσελθεῖν. ἀλλὰ καὶ λάλησον αὐτῷ. λαλῶ. τίνα τρόπον; οὐ ταπεινῶς. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐπέτυχες. μὴ γὰρ σὸν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ἦν; ἀλλʼ ἐκείνου. τί οὖν ἀντιποιῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου; ἀεὶ μεμνημένος ὅ τι σὸν καὶ τί ἀλλότριον [καὶ] οὐ ταραχθήσῃ. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὁ Χρύσιππος λέγει ὅτι μέχρις ἂν ἄδηλά μοι ᾖ τὰ ἑξῆς, ἀεὶ τῶν εὐφυεστέρων ἔχομαι πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· αὐτὸς γάρ μʼ ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν τούτων ἐκλεκτικόν. εἰ δέ γε ᾔδειν ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι καθείμαρται νῦν, καὶ ὥρμων ἂν ἐπʼ αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πούς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὥρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλοῦσθαι. ἐπεί τοι τίνος ἕνεκα γίνονται στάχυες; οὐχ ἵνα καὶ ξηρανθῶσιν; ἀλλὰ ξηραίνονται μέν, οὐχ ἵνα δὲ καὶ θερισθῶσιν; οὐ γὰρ ἀπόλυτοι γίνονται. εἰ οὖν αἴσθησιν εἶχον, εὔχεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἔδει, ἵνα μὴ θερισθῶσιν μηδέποτε; τοῦτο δὲ κατάρα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ σταχύων τὸ μηδέποτε θερισθῆναι. οὕτως ἴστε ὅτι καὶ ἐπʼ ἀνθρώπων κατάρα ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν· ὅμοιον τῷ μὴ πεπανθῆναι, μὴ θερισθῆναι. ἡμεῖς δʼ ἐπειδὴ οἱ αὐτοί ἐσμεν, ἅμα μὲν οὓς δεῖ θερισθῆναι, ἅμα δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ παρακολουθοῦντες ὅτι θεριζόμεθα, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγανακτοῦμεν. οὔτε γὰρ ἴσμεν τίνες ἐσμὲν οὔτε μεμελετήκαμεν τὰ ἀνθρωπικὰ ὡς ἱππικοὶ τὰ ἱππικά. ἀλλὰ Χρυσάντας μὲν παίειν μέλλων τὸν πολέμιον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς σάλπιγγος ἤκουσεν ἀνακαλούσης, ἀνέσχεν· οὕτως προυργιαίτερον ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ τὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πρόσταγμα ἢ τὸ ἴδιον ποιεῖν· ἡμῶν δʼ οὐδεὶς θέλει οὐδὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης καλούσης εὐλύτως ὑπακοῦσαι αὐτῇ, ἀλλὰ κλάοντες καὶ στένοντες πάσχομεν ἃ πάσχομεν καὶ περιστάσεις αὐτὰ καλοῦντες. ποίας περιστάσεις, ἄνθρωπε; εἰ περιστάσεις λέγεις τὰ περιεστηκότα, πάντα περιστάσεις εἰσίν· εἰ δʼ ὡς δύσκολα καλεῖς, ποίαν δυσκολίαν ἔχει τὸ γενόμενον φθαρῆναι; τὸ δὲ φθεῖρον ἢ μάχαιρά ἐστιν ἢ τροχὸς ἢ θάλασσα ἢ κεραμὶς ἢ τύραννος. τί σοι μέλει, ποίᾳ ὁδῷ καταβῇς εἰς Ἅιδου; ἴσαι πᾶσαί εἰσιν. εἰ δὲ θέλεις ἀκοῦσαι τἀληθῆ, συντομωτέρα ἣν πέμπει ὁ τύραννος. οὐδέποτʼ οὐδεὶς τύραννος ἓξ μησίν τινα ἔσφαξεν, πυρετὸς δὲ καὶ ἐνιαυτῷ πολλάκις. ψόφος ἐστὶ πάντα ταῦτα καὶ κόμπος κενῶν ὀνομάτων. τῇ κεφαλῇ κινδυνεύω ἐπὶ Καίσαρος. ἐγὼ δʼ οὐ κινδυνεύω, ὃς οἰκῶ ἐν Νικοπόλει, ὅπου σεισμοὶ τοσοῦτοι; σὺ δʼ αὐτὸς ὅταν διαπλέῃς τὸν Ἀδρίαν, τί κινδυνεύεις; οὐ τῇ κεφαλῇ; ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ὑπολήψει κινδυνεύω. τῇ σῇ; πῶς; τίς γάρ σε ἀναγκάσαι δύναται ὑπολαβεῖν τι ὧν οὐ θέλεις; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ; καὶ ποῖός ἐστι κίνδυνος σὸς ἄλλους τὰ ψεύδη ὑπολαβεῖν; ἀλλʼ ἐξορισθῆναι κινδυνεύω. τί ἐστιν ἐξορισθῆναι; ἀλλαχοῦ εἶναι ἢ ἐν Ῥώμῃ; ναί. τί οὖν; ἂν εἰς Γύαρα πεμφθῶ; ἄν σοι ποιῇ, ἀπελεύσῃ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔχεις ποῦ ἀντὶ Γυάρων ἀπέλθῃς, ὅπου κἀκεῖνος ἐλεύσεται, ἄν τε θέλῃ ἄν τε μή, ὁ πέμπων σε εἰς Γύαρα. τί λοιπὸν ὡς ἐπὶ μεγάλα ἀνέρχῃ; μικρότερά ἐστι τῆς παρασκευῆς, ἵνʼ εἴπῃ νέος εὐφυὴς ὅτι οὐκ ἦν τοσούτου τοσούτων μὲν ἀκηκοέναι, τοσαῦτα δὲ γεγραφέναι, τοσούτῳ δὲ χρόνῳ παρακεκαθικέναι γεροντίῳ οὐ πολλοῦ ἀξίῳ. μόνον ἐκείνης τῆς διαιρέσεως μέμνησο, καθʼ ἣν διορίζεται τὰ σὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ σά. μή ποτʼ ἀντιποιήσῃ τινὸς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. βῆμα καὶ φυλακὴ τόπος ἐστὶν ἑκάτερον, ὁ μὲν ὑψηλός, ὁ δὲ ταπεινός· ἡ προαίρεσις δʼ ἴση, ἂν ἴσην αὐτὴν ἐν ἑκατέρῳ φυλάξαι θέλῃς, δύναται φυλαχθῆναι. καὶ τότʼ ἐσόμεθα ζηλωταὶ Σωκράτους, ὅταν ἐν φυλακῇ δυνώμεθα παιᾶνας γράφειν. μέχρι δὲ νῦν ὡς ἔχομεν, ὅρα εἰ ἠνεσχόμεθʼ ἂν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ ἄλλου τινὸς ἡμῖν λέγοντος θέλεις ἀναγνῶ σοι παιᾶνας; τί μοι πράγματα παρέχεις; οὐκ οἶδας τὰ ἔχοντά με κακά; ἐν τούτοις γάρ μοι ἔστιν — ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἀποθνῄσκειν μέλλω. ἄνθρωποι δʼ ἄλλοι ἀθάνατοι ἔσονται;