* * * other more entertaining writings may be found, in order that like recreation might be provided for my children, when they should have some respite from business affairs and could unbend and divert their minds.
… iucundiora alia reperiri queunt, ad hoc ut liberis quoque meis partae istiusmodi remissiones essent, quando animus eorum interstitione aliqua negotiorum data laxari indulgerique potuisset.
But in the arrangement of my material I have adopted the same haphazard order that I had previously followed in collecting it. For whenever I had taken in hand any Greek or Latin book, or had heard anything worth remembering, I used to jot down whatever took my fancy, of any and every kind, without any definite plan or order; and such notes I would lay away as an aid to my memory, like a kind of literary storehouse, so that when the need arose of a word or a subject which I chanced for the moment to have forgotten, and the books from which I had taken it were not at hand, I could readily find and produce it.
Usi autem sumus ordine rerum fortuito, quem antea in excerpendo feceramus. Nam proinde ut librum quemque in manus ceperam seu Graecum seu Latinum vel quid memoratu dignum audieram, ita quae libitum erat, cuius generis cumque erant, indistincte atque promisce annotabam eaque mihi ad subsidium memoriae quasi quoddam litterarum penus recondebam, ut quando usus venisset aut rei aut verbi, cuius me repens forte oblivio tenuisset, et libri ex quibus ea sumpseram non adessent, facile inde nobis inventu atque depromptu foret.
It therefore follows, that in these notes there is the same variety of subject that there was in those former brief jottings which I had made without order or arrangement, as the fruit of instruction or reading in various lines.
Facta igitur est in his quoque commentariis eadem rerum disparilitas quae fuitfruit in illis annotationibus pristinis, quas breviter et indigeste et incondite ex eruditionibus lectionibusque variis feceramus.
And since, as I have said, I began to amuse myself by assembling these notes during the long winter nights which I spent on a country-place in the land of Attica, I have therefore given them the title of Attic Nights, making no attempt to imitate the witty captions which many other writers of both languages have devised for works of the kind. For since they had laboriously gathered varied, manifold, and as it were indiscriminate learning, they therefore invented ingenious titles also, to correspond with that idea.
Sed quoniam longinquis per hiemem noctibus in agro, sicuti dixi, terrae Atticae commentationes hasce ludere ac facere exorsi sumus, idcirco eas inscripsimus Noctium esse Atticarum, nihil imitati festivitates inscriptionum quas plerique alii utriusque linguae scriptores in id genus libris fecerunt.Nam quia variam et miscellam et quasi confusaneam doctrinam conquisiverant, eo titulos quoque ad eam sententiam exquisitissimos indiderunt.
Thus some called their books “The Muses,” others “Woods” one used the title “Athena's Mantle,” another “The Horn of Amaltheia,” still another “Honeycomb,” several “Meads,” one “Fruits of my Reading,” another “Gleanings from Early Writers,” another “The Nosegay,” still another “Discoveries.” Some have used the name “Torches,” others “Tapestry,” others “Repertory,” others “Helicon,” “Problems,” “Handbooks” and “Daggers.”
Namque alii Musarum inscripserunt, alii Silvarum, ille Πείπλον, hic Ἀμαλθείας Κέρας, alius Κηρία, partim Λειμῶνας quidam Lectionis Suae, alius antiquarumAntiquarm Lectionum atque alius Ἀνθηρῶν et item alius Εὑρημάτων.
One man called his book “Memorabilia,” one “Principia,” one “Incidentals,” another “Instructions.”
Sunt etiam qui Λὔχνους inscripserint, sunt item qui Στρωματεις,, sunt adeo qui Πανδέκτας et Ἑλικῶνα et qui Προβλήματα et Ἐγχειρίδια et Παραξιφίδας.
Other titles are “Natural History,” “Universal History,” “The Field,” “The Fruit-basket,” or “Topics.” Many have termed their notes “Miscellanies,” some “Moral Epistles,” “Questions in Epistolary Form,” or “Miscellaneous Queries,” and there are some other titles that are exceedingly witty and redolent of extreme refinement.
Est qui Memoriales titulum fecerit, est qui Πραγματικὰ et Πάρεργα et Διδασκαλικά, est item qui Historiae Naturalis, et Παντοδαπῆς Ἱστορίας, est praeterea qui Pratum, est itidem qui Πάγκαρπον, est qui Τόπων scripserit; sunt item multi qui Coniectanea,
But I, bearing in mind my limitations, gave my work off-hand, without premeditation, and indeed almost in rustic fashion, the caption of Attic Nights, derived merely from the time and place of my winter's vigils; I thus fall as far short of all other writers in the dignity too even of my title, as I do in care and in elegance of style.
neque item non sunt qui indices libris suis fecerint aut Epistularum Moralium aut Epistolicarum Quaestionum aut Confusarum et quaedam alia inscripta nimis lepida multasque prorsum concinnitates redolentia.
Neither had I in making my excerpts and notes the same purpose as many of those whom I have mentioned. For all of them, and in particular the Greeks, after wide and varied reading, with a white line, as the saying goes, that is with no effort to discriminate, swept together whatever they had found, aiming at mere quantity.
Nos vero, ut captus noster est, incuriose et inmeditate ac prope etiam subrustice ex ipso loco ac tempore hibernarum vigiliarum Atticas Noctes inscripsimus, tantum ceteris omnibus in ipsius quoque inscriptionis laude cedentes, quantum cessimus in cura et elegantia scriptionis.
The perusal of such collections will exhaust the mind through weariness or disgust, before it finds one or two notes which it is a pleasure to read, or inspiring to have read, or helpful to remember. I myself, on the contrary, having at heart that well-known saying of the famous Ephesian, “Much learning does not make a scholar,” did it is true busy and even weary myself in unrolling and running through many a scroll, working without cessation in all the intervals of business whenever I could steal the leisure;
Sed ne consilium quidem in excerpendis notandisque rebus idem mihi, quod plerisque illis, fuit. Namque illi omnes et eorum maxime Graeci, multa et varia lectitantes, in quas res cumque inciderant, “alba,” ut dicitur, “linea” sine cura discriminis solam copiam sectati converrebant, quibus in legendis ante animus senio ac taedio languebit quam unum alterumve reppererit quod sit aut voluptati legere aut cultui legisse aut usui meminisse.
but I took few items from them, confining myself to those which, by furnishing a quick and easy short-cut, might lead active and alert minds to a desire for independent learning and to the study of the useful arts, or would save those who are already fully occupied with the other duties of life from an ignorance of words and things which is assuredly shameful and boorish. Now just because there will be found in these notes some few topics that are knotty and troublesome, either from Grammar or Dialectics or even from Geometry, and because there will also be some little material of a somewhat recondite character about augural or pontifical law, one ought not therefore to avoid such topics as useless to know or difficult to comprehend.
Ego vero, cum illud Ephesii viri summe nobilis verbum cordi haberem, quod profecto ita est πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει, ipse quidem volvendis transeundisque multis admodum voluminibus per omnia semper negotiorum intervalla in quibus furari otium potui exercitus defessusque sum, sed modica ex his eaque sola accepi quae aut ingenia prompta expeditaque ad honestae eruditionis cupidinem utiliumque artium contemplationem celeri facilique compendio ducerent aut homines aliis iam vitae negotiis occupatos a turpi certe agrestique rerum atque verborum imperitia vindicarent.
For I have not made an excessively deep and obscure investigation of the intricacies of these questions, but I have presented the first fruits, so to say, and a kind of foretaste of the liberal arts; and never to have heard of these, or come in contact with them, is at least unbecoming, if not positively harmful, for a man with even an ordinary education. Of those then, if such there be, who may perhaps sometimes have leisure and inclination to acquaint themselves with these lucubrations, I should like to ask and be granted the favour, that in reading of matters which they have known for a long time they shall not scorn them as commonplace and trite;
Quod erunt autem in his commentariis pauca quaedam scrupulosa et anxia, vel ex grammatica vel ex dialectica vel etiam ex geometrica, quodque erunt item paucula remotiora super augurio iure et pontificio, non oportet ea defugere, quasi aut cognitu non utilia aut perceptu difficilia. Non enim fecimus altos nimis et obscuros in his rebus quaestionum sinus, sed primitias quasdam et quasi libamenta ingenuarum artium dedimus, quae virum civiliter eruditum neque audisse umquam neque attigisse, si non inutile, at quidem certe indecorum est.
for is there anything in literature so recondite as not to be known to a goodish many? In fact, I am sufficiently flattered if these subjects have not been repeated over and over again in the schools and become the common stock of commentaries.
Ab his igitur, si cui forte nonnumquam tempus voluptasque erit lucubratiunculas istas cognoscere, petitum impetratumque volumus, ut in legendo quae pridem scierint non aspernentur quasi nota invulgataque.
Furthermore, if my readers find anything new and unknown to them, I think it fair that they should not indulge in useless criticism, but should ask themselves whether these observations, slight and trifling though they be, are after all not without power to inspire study, or too dull to divert and stimulate the mind;
Nam ecquid tam remotum in litteris est quin id tamen complusculi sciant? Et satis hoc blandum est, non esse haec neque in scholis decantata neque in commentariis protrita.
whether on the contrary they do not contain the germs and the quality to make men's minds grow more vigorous, their memory more trustworthy, their eloquence more effective, their diction purer, or the pleasures of their hours of leisure and recreation more refined.
Quae porro nova sibi ignotaque offenderint, aequum esse puto ut sine vano obtrectatu considerent an minutae istae admonitiones et pauxillulae nequaquam tamen sint vel ad alendum studium vescae vel ad oblectandum fovendumque animum frigidae, sed eius seminis generisque sint ex quo facile adolescent aut ingenia hominum vegetiora aut memoria adminiculatior aut oratio sollertior aut sermo incorruptior aut delectatio in otio atque in ludo liberalior.
But as to matters which seem too obscure, or not presented in full enough detail, I beg once again that my readers may consider them written, not so much to instruct, as to give a hint, and that content with my, so to speak, pointing out of the path, they may afterwards follow up those subjects, if they so desire, with the aid either of books or of teachers. But if they find food for criticism, let them, if they have the courage, blame those from whom I drew my material;
Quae autem parum plana videbuntur aut minus plena in structaque, petimus, inquam, ut ea non docendi magis quam admonendi gratia scripta existiment et, quasi demonstratione vestigiorum contenti, persequantur ea post, si libebit, vel libris repertis vel magistris.
or if they discover that different statements are made by someone else, let them not at once give way to hasty censure, but rather let them weigh the reasons for the statements and the value of the authorities which those other writers and which I have followed.
Quae vero putaverint reprehendenda, his, si audebunt, succenseant, unde ea nos accepimus; sed enim, si quae aliter apud alium scripta legerint, ne iam statim temere obstrepant, sed et rationes rerum et auctoritates hominum pensitent, quos illi quosque nos secuti sumus.
For those, however, who have never found pleasure nor busied themselves in reading, inquiring, writing and taking notes, who have never spent wakeful nights in such employments, who have never improved themselves by discussion and debate with rival followers of the same Muse, but are absorbed in the turmoil of business affairs—for such men it will be by far the best plan to hold wholly aloof from these “Nights” and seek for themselves other diversion. There is an old saying:The daw knows naught of the lyre, the hog naught of marjoram ointment.
Erit autem id longe optimum, ut qui in lectitando, percontando, scribendo, commentando, numquam voluptates, numquam labores ceperunt, nullas hoc genus vigilias vigilarunt neque ullis inter eiusdem Musae aemulos certationibus disceptationibusque elimati sunt, sed intemperiarum negotiorumque pleni sunt, abeant a “Noctibus” his procul, atque alia sibi oblectamenta quaerant. Vetus adagium est:Nil cum fidibus graculost, nihil cum amaracino sui.
Moreover, in order that the perversity and envy of certain half-educated men may be the more aroused, I shall borrow a few anapaests from a chorus of Aristophanes, and the conditions which that wittiest of men imposed for the viewing of his play, I shall lay down for the reading of these notes of mine: namely, that the profane and uninitiate throng, averse to the Muses' play, shall neither touch nor approach them.
Atque etiam, quo sit quorundam male doctorum hominum scaevitas et invidentia irritatior, mutuabor ex Aristophanae choro anapaesta pauca et quam ille homo festivissimus fabulae suae spectandae legem dedit, eandem ego commentariis his legendis dabo, ut ea ne attingat neve adeat profestum et profanum vulgus, a ludo musico diversum.
The verses which contain those conditions run as follows:All evil thought and profane be still:far hence, far hence from our choirs depart,Who knows not well what the Mystics tell,or is not holy and pure of heart;Who ne'er has the noble revelry learned,or danced the dance of the Muses high;* * * * *I charge them once, I charge them twice,I charge them thrice, that they draw not nighTo the sacred dance of the Mystic choir.But YE, my comrades, awake the song,The night-long revels of joy and mirthwhich ever of right to our feast belong.
Versus legis datae hi sunt:Εὐφημεῖν χρὴ κἀξίστασθαι τοῖς ἡμετέροισι χοροῖσινὍστις ἄπειρος τοιῶνδε λόλων ἢ γνώμῃ μὴ καθαρεύειἪ γενναίων ὄργια Μουσῶν μήτʼ εἶδεν μήτʼ ἐχόρευσεν,Τούτοις αὐδῶ, καὖθις ἀπαυδῶ, καὖις τὸ ρρίτον μάλʼ ἀπαυδῶἘξίστασθαι μύσταισι χοροις, ὑμεῖς δʼ ἀνεγείρετε μολπὴνΚαὶ παννυχίδας τὰς ἡμετέρας, αἳ τῇδε πρέπουσιν ἑορτῇ.
Up to the present day I have already completed twenty books of notes.
Volumina commentariorum ad hunc diem viginti iam facta sunt.
As much longer life as the Gods' will shall grant me, and as much respite as is given me from managing my affairs and attending to the education of my children, every moment of that remaining and leisure time I shall devote to collecting similar brief and entertaining memoranda.
Quantum autem vitae mihi deinceps deum voluntate erit quantumque a tuenda re familiari procurandoque cultu liberorum meorum dabitur otium, ea omnia subsiciva et subsecundaria tempora ad colligendas huiuscemodi memoriarum delectatiunculas conferam.
Thus the number of books, given the Gods' gracious help, will keep pace with the years of life itself, however many or few they may be, nor have I any desire to be allotted a longer span of existence than so long as I retain my present ability to write and take notes.
Progredietur ergo numerus librorum, diis bene iuvantibus, cum ipsius vitae quantuli quomque fuerint progressibus, neque longiora mihi dari spatia vivendi volo quam dum ero ad hanc quoque facultatem scribendi commentandique idoneus.
Summaries of the material to be found in each book of my Commentaries I have here placed all together, in order that it may at once be clear what is to be sought and found in every book.
Capita rerum quae cuique commentario insunt, exposuimus hic universa, ut iam statim declaretur quid quo in libro quaeri invenirique possit.
1. Plutarch's account of the method of comparison and the calculations which the philosopher Pythagoras used in determining the great height of Hercules, while the hero was living among men. In the treatise which he wrote on the mental and physical endowment and achievements of Hercules while he was among men, Plutarch says that the philosopher Pythagoras reasoned sagaciously and acutely in determining and measuring the hero's superiority in size and stature. For since it was generally agreed that Hercules paced off the racecourse of the stadium at Pisae, near the temple of Olympian Zeus, and made it six hundred feet long, and since the other courses in the land of Greece, constructed later by other men, were indeed six hundred feet in length, but yet were somewhat shorter than that at Olympia, he readily concluded by a process of comparison that the measured length of Hercules' foot was greater than that of other men in the same proportion as the course at Olympia was longer than the other stadia. Then, having ascertained the size of Hercules' foot, he made a calculation of the bodily height suited to that measure, based upon the natural proportion of all parts of the body, and thus arrived at the logical conclusion that Hercules was as much taller than other men as the course at Olympia exceeded the others that had been constructed with the same number of feet.
1. Quali proportione quibusque collectionibus Plutarchus ratiocinatum esse Pythagoram philosophum dixerit de comprehendenda corporis proceritate qua fuit Hercules, cum vitam inter homines viveret. Plutarchus in libro quem de Herculis quam diu inter homines fuit animi corporisque ingenio atque virtutibus conscripsit, scite subtiliterque ratiocinatum Pythagoram philosophum dicit in reperienda modulandaque status longitudinisque eius praestantia. Nam cum fere constaret, curriculum stadii quod est Pisis apud Iovem Olympium Herculem pedibus suis metatum idque fecisse longum pedes sescentos, cetera quoque stadia in terra Graecia ab aliis postea instituta pedum quidem esse numero sescentum, sed tamen esse aliquantulum breviora, facile intellexit, modum spatiumque plantae Herculis, ratione proportionis habita, tanto fuisse quam aliorum procerius, quanto Olympicum stadium longius esset quam cetera. Comprehensa autem mensura Herculani pedis, quanta longinquitas corporis ei mensurae conveniret secundum naturalem membrorum omnium inter se competentiam modificatus est atque ita id collegit, quod erat consequens, tanto fuisse Herculem corpore excelsiorem quam alios, quanto Olympicum stadium ceteris pari numero factis anteiret.
2. The apt use made by Herodes Atticus, the ex-consul, in reply to an arrogant and boastful young fellow, a student of philosophy in appearance only, of the passage in which Epictetus the Stoic humorously set apart the true Stoic from the mob of prating triflers who called themselves Stoics. While we were students at Athens, Herodes Atticus, a man of consular rank and of true Grecian eloquence, often invited me to his country houses near that city, in company with the honourable Servilianus and several others of our countrymen who had withdrawn from Rome to Greece in quest of culture. And there at that time, while we were with him at the villa called Cephisia, both in the heat of summer and under the burning autumnal sun, we protected ourselves against the trying temperature by the shade of its spacious groves, its long, soft promenades, the cool location of the house, its elegant baths with their abundance of sparkling water, and the charm of the villa as a whole, which was everywhere melodious with plashing waters and tuneful birds. There was with us there at the time a young student of philosophy, of the Stoic school according to his own account, but intolerably loquacious and presuming. In the course of the conversations which are commonly carried on at table after dinner, this fellow often used to prattle unseasonably, absurdly, and at immoderate length, on the principles of philosophy, maintaining that compared with himself all the Greek-speaking authorities, all wearers of the toga, and the Latin race in general were ignorant boors. As he spoke, he rattled off unfamiliar terms, the catchwords of syllogisms and dialectic tricks, declaring that no one but he could unravel the “master,” the “resting,” and the “heap” arguments, and other riddles of the kind. Furthermore, as to ethics, the nature of the human intellect, and the origin of the virtues with their duties and limits, or on the other hand the ills caused by disease and sin, and the wasting and destruction of the soul, he stoutly maintained that absolutely no one else had investigated, understood and mastered all these more thoroughly than himself. Further, he believed that torture, bodily pain and deadly peril could neither injure nor detract from the happy state and condition of life which, in his opinion, he had attained, and that no sorrow could even cloud the serenity of the Stoic's face and expression. Once when he was puffing out these empty boasts, and already all, weary of his prating, were thoroughly disgusted and longing for an end, Herodes, speaking in Greek as was his general custom, said: “Allow me, mightiest of philosophers, since we, whom you call laymen, cannot answer you, to read from a book of Epictetus, greatest of Stoics, what he thought and said about such big talk as that of yours.” And he bade them bring the first volume of the Discourses of Epictetus, arranged by Arrian, in which that venerable old man with just severity rebukes those young men who, though calling themselves Stoics, showed neither virtue nor honest industry, but merely babbled of trifling propositions and of the fruits of their study of such elements as are taught to children. Then, when the book was brought, there was read the passage which I have appended, in which Epictetus with equal severity and humour set apart and separated from the true and genuine Stoic, who was beyond question without restraint or constraint, unembarrassed, free, prosperous and happy, that other mob of triflers who styled themselves Stoics, and casting the black soot of their verbiage before the eves of their hearers, laid false claim to the name of the holiest of sects:"'Speak to me of good and evil.'—Listen:The wind, bearing me from Ilium, drove me to the Cicones.“Of all existing things some are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good things are virtues and what partakes of them, the evil are vice and what partakes of vice, and the indifferent lie between these: wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, pain. —'How do you know this?'—Hellanicus says so in his Egyptian Histoy. For what difference does it make whether you say that, or that it was Diogenes in his Ethics or Chrysippus or Cleanthes? Have you then investigated any of these matters and formed an opinion of your own? Let me see how you are accustomed to act in a storm at sea. Do you recall this classification when the sail cracks and you cry aloud? If some idle fellow should stand beside you and say: 'Tell me, for Heaven's sake, what you told me before. It isn't a vice to suffer shipwreck, is it? It doesn't partake of vice, does it?' Would you not hurl a stick of wood at him and cry: 'What have we to do with you, fellow? We perish and you come and crack jokes.' But if Caesar should summon you to answer an accusation...” On hearing these words, that most arrogant of youths was mute, just as if the whole diatribe had been pronounced, not by Epictetus against others, but against himself by Herodes.
2. Ab Herode Attico C. V. tempestive deprompta in quondam iactantem et gloriosum adulescentem, specie tantum philosophiae sectatorem, verba Epicteti Stoici, quibus festiviter a vero Stoico seiunxit vulgus loquaciumloquliciuin nebulonum qui se Stoicos nuncuparent. HERODES ATTICUS, vir et Graeca facundia et consulari honore praeditus, accersebat saepe, nos cum apud magistros Athenis essemus, in villas ei urbi proximas me et clarissimum virum Servilianum compluresque alios nostrates qui Roma in Graeciam ad capiendum ingenii cultum concesserant. Atque ibi tunc, cum essemus apud eum in villa cui nomen est Cephisia, et aestu anni et sidere autumni flagrantissimo, propulsabamus incommoda caloris lucorum umbra ingentium, longis ambulacris et mollibus, medium positu refrigeranti, lavacris nitidisnlitidis et abundis et collucentibus totiusquetotiusqiue villae venustate, aquis undique canoris atque avibus personante. Erat ibidem nobiscum simul adulescens philosophiae sectator, “disciplinae,” ut ipse dicebat, “stoicae,” sed loquacior inpendio et promptior. Is plerumque in convivio sermonibus, qui post epulas haberi solent, multa atque inmodica de philosophiae doctrinis intempestive atque insubide disserebat praeque se uno ceteros omnes linguae Atticae principes gentemque omnem togatam, quodcumque nomen Latinum rudes esse et agrestes praedicabat atque interea vocabulis haut facile cognitis, syllogismorum captionumque dialecticarum laqueis strepebat, χυριεύοντας et σωρείτας aliosque id genus griphos neminem posse dicens nisi se dissolvere. Rem vero ethicam naturamque humani ingenii virtutumque origines officiaque earum et confinia, aut contra morborum vitiorumque fraudes animorumque labes et pestilentias, asseverabat nulli esse ulli magis ea omnia explorata, comperta meditataque. Cruciatibus autem doloribusque corporis et periculis mortem minitantibus habitum statumque vitae beatae, quem se esse adeptum putabat, neque laedi neque inminui existimabat, ac ne oris quoque et vultus serenitatem stoici hominis umquam ulla posse aegritudine obnubilari. Has ille inanes glorias cum flaret iamque omnes finem cuperent verbisque eius defetigati pertaeduissent, tum Herodes Graeca, uti plurimus ei mos fuitfruit, oratione utens, “Permitte,” inquit, “philosophorum amplissime, quoniam respondere nos tibi, quos vocas idiotas, non quimus, recitari ex libro quid de huiuscemodi magniloquentia vestra senserit dixeritque Epictetus, Stoicorum maximus,” iussitque proferri Dissertationum Epicteti digestarum ab Arriano primum librum, in quo ille venerandus senex iuvenes qui se “Stoicos” appellabant, neque frugis neque operae probae, sed theorematis tantum nugalibus et puerilium isagogarum commentationibus deblaterantes, obiurgatione iusta incessuit. Lecta igitur sunt ex libro qui prolatus est ea quae addidi; quibus verbis Epictetus severe simul et festiviter seiunxit atque divisit a vero atque sincero Stoico, qui esset procul dubio ἀκώλυτος, ἀνανάγκαστος, ἀπαραπόδιστος, ἐλεύθερος, εὐπορῶν, εὐδαιμονῶν, vulgus κακῶν. Ἄκουε. aliud nebulonum hominum qui se “Stoicos” nuncuparent, atraque verborum et argutiarum fuligine ob oculos audientium iacta sanctissimae disciplinae nomen ementirentur:Εἰπέ μοι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. Ἄκουε.Ἰλιόθεν με φέρων ἄνεμος Κικόνεσσι πέλασσεν. Τῶν ὅντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα. Ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν ἀρεταὶ τὰ μετέχοιτα αὐτῶν, κακὰ δὲ κακία καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα κακίας, ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ μεταξὺ τούων, πλοῦτος, ὑγεία, ζωή, θάνατος, ἡδονή, πόνος. Πόθεν οἶδας; Ἑλλάνικος λέγει ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπτιακοῖς. Τι γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ἢ ὅτι Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἠθικῇ ἢ Χρύσιππος ἢ Κλεάνθης; βεβασάνικας οὖν τι αὐτῶν καὶ δόγμα σαυτοῦ πεποίησαι. Δείκνυε πῶς εἴωθας ἐν πλοίῳ χειμάζεσθαι· μέμνησαι ταύτης τῆς διαιρέσεως, ὅταν ψοφήσῃ τὸ ἱστίον καὶ ἀνακραυγάσῃς. Ἄν σοί τις κακόσχολός πως παραστὰς εἴπῃ, λέγε μοι, τοὺς θεούς σοι, ἃ πρῴην ἔλεγες, μή τι κακία ἐστὶν τὸ ναυαγῆσαι; μήτι κακίας μετέχον; οὐκ ἄρα ξύλον ἐνσείσεις αὐτῷ; τί ἡμῖν καὶ σοί, ἄνθρωπε; ἀπολλύμεθα, καὶ σὺ ἐλθὼν παίζεις. Ἐὰν δέ σε ὁ Καῖσαρ μεταπέμψηται κατηγορούμενον … His ille auditis insolentissimus adulescens obticuit, tamquam si ea omnia non ab Epicteto in quosdamquosdan alios, sed ab Herode in eum dicta essent.
3. The difficult decision which the Lacedaemonian Chilo made to save a friend; and that one should consider scrupulously and anxiously whether one ought ever to do wrong in the interest of friends, with notes and quotations on that subject from the writings of Theophrastus and Marcus Cicero.
3. Quod Chilo Lacedaemonius consilium anceps pro salute amici cepit; quodque est circumspecte et anxie considerandum an pro utilitatibus amicorum delinquendum aliquando sit; notataque inibi et relata quae et Theophrastus et M. Cicero super ea re scripserunt.
OF Chilo the Lacedaemonian, one of that famous group of sages, it is written in the books of those who have recorded the lives and deeds of distinguished men, that he, Chilo, at the close of his life, when death was already close upon him, thus addressed the friends about his bedside: "That very little of what I have said and done in the course of a long life calls for repentance, you yourselves may perhaps know.
LACEDAEMONIUM Chilonem, virum ex illo incluto numero sapientium, scriptum est in libris eorum qui vitas resque gestas clarorum hominum memoriae mandaverunt, eum Chilonem in vitae suae postremo, cum iam inibi mors occuparet, ad circumstantis amicos sic locutum:“Dicta,” inquit, “mea factaque in aetate longa pleraque omnia fuisse non paenitenda, fors sit ut vos etiam sciatis.”
I, at any rate, at such a time as this do not deceive myself in believing that I have done nothing that it troubles me to remember, except for just one thing; and as to that it is not even now perfectly clear to me whether I did right or wrong. “I was judge with two others, and a friend's life was at stake.
“Ego quidem in hoc certe tempore non fallo me, nihil esse quicquam commissum a me cuius memoria mihi aegritudini sit, ni illud profecto unum sit, quod rectene an perperam fecerim nondum mihi plane liquet.”
The law was such that the man must be found guilty. Therefore, either my friend must suffer capital punishment or violence must be done to the law. I considered for a long time how to remedy so difficult a situation.
“Super amici capite index cum duobus aliis fui. Ita lex fuit uti eum hominem condemnari necessum esset. Aut amicus igitur capitis perdendus aut adhibenda fraus legi fuit.”
The course which I adopted seemed, in comparison with the alternative, the less objectionable;
“Multa cum animo meo ad casum tam ancipitem medendum consultavi. Visum est esse id quod feci praequam erant alia toleratu facilius:”
I myself secretly voted for conviction, but I persuaded my fellow judges to vote for acquittal. Thus I myself in a matter of such moment did my duty both as a judge and as a friend.
“ipse tacitus ad condemnandum sententiam tuli, is qui simul iudicabant ut absolverent persuasi.”
But my action torments me with the fear that there may be something of treachery and guilt in having recommended to others, in the same case, at the same time, and in a common duty, a course for them contrary to what I thought best for myself.”
“Sic mihi et iudicis et amici officium in re tanta salvum fuit. Hanc capio ex eo facto molestiam, quod metuo ne a perfidia et culpa non abhorreat, in eadem re eodemque tempore inque communi negotio, quod mihi optimum factu duxerim, diversum eius aliis suasisse.”
This Chilo, then, though a man of surpassing wisdom, was in doubt how far he ought to have gone counter to law and counter to equity for the sake of a friend, and that question distressed him even at the very end of his life.
Et hic autem Chilo, praestabilis homo sapientiae, quonam usque debuerit contra legem contraque ius pro amico progredi dubitavit, eaque res in fine quoque vitae ipso animum eius anxit,
So too many subsequent students of philosophy, as appears in their works, have inquired very carefully and very anxiously, to use their own language, ei) dei= bohqei=n tw=| fi/lw| para\ to\ di/kaion kai\ me/xri po/sou kai\ poi=a. That is to say, they inquired “whether one may sometimes act contrary to law or contrary to precedent in a friend's behalf, and under what circumstances and to what extent.”
et alii deinceps multi philosophiae sectatores, ut in libris eorum scriptum est, satis inquisite satisque sollicite quaesiverunt, ut verbis quae scripta sunt ipsis utar,εἰ δεῖ βοηθεῖν τῷ φίλῳ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ μέχρι πόσου καὶ ποῖα. Ea verba significant, quaesisse eos an nonnumquam contra ius contrave morem faciendum pro amico sit et in qualibus causis et quemnam usque ad modum.
This problem has been discussed, as I have said, not only by many others, but also with extreme thoroughness by Theophrastus, the most conscientious and learned of the Peripatetic school; the discussion is found, if I remember correctly, in the first book of his treatise On Friendship. That work Cicero evidently read when he too was composing a work On Friendship.
Super hac quaestione cum ab aliis, sicuti dixi, multis, tum vel diligentissime a Theophrasto disputatur, viro in philosophia peripatetica modestissimo doctissimoque, eaque disputatio scripta est, si recte meminimus, in libro eius De Amicitia primo.
Now, the other material that Cicero thought proper to borrow from Theophrastus his talent and command of language enabled him to take and to translate with great taste and pertinence;
Eum librum M. Cicero videtur legisse, cum ipse quoque librum De Amicitia componeret. Et cetera quidem quae sumenda a Theophrasto existimavit, ut ingenium facundiaque eius fuit, sumpsit et transposuit commodissime aptissimeque;
but this particular topic which, as I have said, has been the object of much inquiry, and is the most difficult one of all, he passed over briefly and hurriedly, not reproducing the thoughtful and detailed argument of Theophrastus, but omitting his involved and as it were over-scrupulous discussion and merely calling attention in a few words to the nature of the problem.
hunc autem locum de quo satis quaesitum esse dixi, omnium rerum aliarum difficillimum, strictim atque cursim transgressus est, neque ea quae a Theophrasto pensiculate atque enucleate scripta sunt exsecutusexecutus est, sed anxietate illa et quasi morositate disputationis praetermissa, genus ipsum rei tantum paucis verbis notavit.
I have added Cicero's words, in case anyone should wish to verify my statement: “Therefore these are the limits which I think ought to be observed, namely: when the characters of friends are blameless, then there should be complete harmony of opinions and inclinations in everything without any exception; and, even if by some chance the wishes of a friend are not altogether honourable and require to be forwarded in matters which involve his life or reputation, we should turn aside from the straight path, provided, however, utter disgrace does not follow. For there are limits to the indulgence which can be allowed to friendship.”
Ea verba Ciceronis, si recensere quis vellet, apposui: “His igitur finibus utendum esse arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorumainicorum sunt, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas, ut etiam, si qua fortuna accident, ut minus iustae voluntates amicorum adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur; est enim quatenus amicitiae venia dari possit.”
“When it is a question,” he says, “either of a friend's life or good name, we must turn aside from the straight path, to further even his dis-honourable desire.”
“Cum agetur,” inquit, “aut caput amici aut fama, declinandum est de via, ut etiam iniquam voluntatem illius adiutemus.”
But he does not tell us what the nature of that deviation ought to be, how far we may go to help him, and how dis-honourable tile nature of the friend's desire may be.
Sed cuiusmodi declinatio esse ista debeat qualisque ad adiuvandum digressio et in quanta voluntatis amici iniquitate, non dicit.
But what does it avail me to know that I must turn aside from the straight path in the event of such dangers to my friends, provided I commit no act of utter disgrace, unless he also informs me what he regards as utter disgrace and, once having turned from the path of rectitude, how far I ought to go? “For,” he says, “there are limits to the indulgence which can be allowed to friendship.”
Quid autem refert scire me in eiusmodi periculis amicorum, si non magna me turpitudo insecutura est, de via esse recta declinandum, nisi id quoque me docuerit, quam putet magnam turpitudinem, et cum decessero de via, quousque degredi debeam? “Est enim,” inquit, “quatenus dari amicitiae venia possit.”
But that is the very point on which we most need instruction, but which the teachers make least clear, namely, how far and to what degree indulgence must be allowed to friendship.
Hoc immo ipsum est quod maxime discendum est quodque ab his qui docent minime dicitur, quatenus quaque fini dari amicitiaeanicitiae venia debeat.
The sage Chilo, whom I mentioned above, turned from the path to save a friend. But I can see how far lie went; for he gave unsound advice to save his friend.
Chilo ille sapiens, de quo paulo ante dixi, conservandi amici causa de via declinavit. Sed video quousque progressus sit; falsum enim pro amici salute consilium dedit.
Yet even as to that he was in doubt up to his last hour whether he deserved criticism and censure.
Id ipsum tamen in fine quoque vitae an iure posset reprehendi culparique dubitavit.
“Against one's fatherland,” says Cicero, “one must not take up arms for a friend.”
“Contra patriam,” inquit Cicero, “arma Pro amico sumenda non sunt.”
That of course everybody knew, and “before The ognis was born,” as Lucilius says. But what I ask and wish to know is this: when it is that one must act contrary to law and contrary to equity in a friend's behalf, albeit without doing violence to the public liberty and peace; and when it is necessary to turn aside from the path, as he himself puts it, in what way and how much, under what circumstances, and to what extent that ought to be done.
Hoc profecto nemo ignoravit, et “priusquam Theognis,” quod Lucilius ait, “nasceretur.” Set id quaero, id desidero: cum pro amico contra ius, contra quam licet, salva tamen libertate atque pace, faciendum est et cum de via, sicut ipse ait, declinandum est, quid et quantum et in quali causa et quonam usque id fieri debeat.
Pericles, the great Athenian, a man of noble character and endowed with all honourable accomplishments, declared his opinion— in a single instance, it is true, but yet very clearly. For when a friend asked him to perjure himself in court for his sake, he replied in these words: “One ought to aid one's friends, but only so far as the gods allow.”
Pericles ille Atheniensis, vir egregio ingenio bonisque omnibus disciplinis ornatus, in una quidem specie, set planius tamen quid existimaret professus est. Nam cum amicus eum rogaret ut pro re causaque eius falsum deiuraret, his ad eum verbis usus est: “Δεῖ μὲν συμπράττειν τοῖς φίλοις, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τῶν φεῶν.”
Theophrastus, however, in the book that I have mentioned, discusses this very question more exhaustively and with more care and precision than Cicero.
Theophrastus autem in eo quo dixi libro inquisitius quidem super hac ipsa re et exactius expressiusque quam Cicero disserit.
But even he in his exposition does not express an opinion about separate and individual action, nor with the corroborative evidence of examples, but treats classes of actions briefly and generally, in about the following terms: “A small and trifling amount of disgrace or infamy,” he says, "should be incurred, if thereby great advantage may be gained for a friend;
Set is quoque in docendo non de unoquoque facto singillatim existimat neque certis exemplorum documentis, set generibus rerum summatim universimque utitur ad hunc ferme modum:
for the insignificant loss from impairment of honour is repaid and made good by the greater and more substantial honour gained by aiding a friend, and that slight break or rift, so to speak, in one's reputation is repaired by the buttress formed by the advantages gained for one's friend.
“Parva,” inquit, “et tenuis vel turpitudo vel infamiainfamnia subeunda est, si ea re magna utilitas amico quaeri potest. Rependitur quippe et compensatur leve damnum delibatae honestatis maiore alia gravioreque in adiuvando amico honestate, minimaque illa labes et quasi lacuna famae munimentis partarum amico utilitatium solidatur.”
Nor ought we," says he, “to be influenced by mere terms, because my fair fame and the advantage of a friend under accusation are not of the same class. For such things must be estimated by their immediate weight and importance, not by verbal terms and the merits of the classes to which they belong.
“Neque nominibus,” inquit, “moveri nos oportet, quod paria genere ipso non sunt honestas meae famae et rei amici utilitas. Ponderibus haec enim potestatibusque praesentibus, non vocabulorum appellationibus neque dignitatibus generum diiudicanda sunt.”
For when the interests of a friend are put into the balance with our own honour in matters of equal importance, or nearly so, our own honour unquestionably turns the scale; but when the advantage of a friend is far greater, but our sacrifice of reputation in a matter of no great moment is insignificant, then what is advantageous to a friend gains in importance in comparison with what is honourable for us, exactly as a great weight of bronze is more valuable than a tiny shred of gold.”
“Nam cum in rebus aut paribus aut non longe secus utilitas amici aut honestas nostra consistit, honestas procul dubio praeponderat; cum vero amici utilitas nimio est amplior, honestatis autem nostrae in re non gravi levis iactura est, tunc quod utile amico est, id prae illo quod honestum nobis est fit plenius, sicuti est magnum pondus aeris parva lamna auri pretiosius.”Verba adeo ipsa Theophrasti super ea re adscripsi:
On this point I append Theophrastus' own words: “If such and such a thing belongs to a more valuable class, yet it is not true that some part of it, compared with a corresponding part of something else, will be preferable. This is not the case, for example, if gold is more valuable than bronze, and a portion of gold, compared with a portion of bronze of corresponding size, is obviously of more worth;
Οὐκ, εἰ δή που τοῦτο τῷ γένει τιμιώτερον, ἤδη καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ᾖ μέρος τούτου πρὸς τ ὸ τηλίκον θατέρου συγκρινόμενον αἱρετὸν ἔσται. Λέγω δὲ οἷον, οὐκ, εἰ χρυσίον τιμιώτερον χαλκοῦ, καὶ τηλίκον τοῦ χρυσίου πρὸς τὸ τηλίκον χαλκοῦ μέγεθος ἀντιπαραβαλλόμενον πλέον δόξει· ἀλλὰ ποιήσει τινὰ ῥοπὴν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος.