---
title: "Attic Nights · Noctes Atticae"
author: "Aulus Gellius"
translator: "John C. Rolfe"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Classical Latin"
section: 13 of 46
url: https://scriptura.si/works/gellius-attic-nights/13/
cite: "Aulus Gellius, tr. John C. Rolfe, Attic Nights · Noctes Atticae, section 13. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/gellius-attic-nights/13/"
---

# Attic Nights · Noctes Atticae

*Aulus Gellius, tr. John C. Rolfe*

Notes made on winter nights near Athens: grammar, law, philosophy and stories, Androclus and the lion among them.

> Latin: ed. John C. Rolfe, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi1254.phi001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: John C. Rolfe, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi1254.phi001.perseus-eng1). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 13. Book V · chapters 13–21

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/gellius-attic-nights/13/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/gellius-attic-nights/13/#p-N

[¶0] 13. On the rank and order of obligations established by the usage of the Roman people. THERE was once a discussion, in my presence and hearing, of the rank and order of obligations, carried on by a company of men of advanced age and high position at Rome, who were also eminent for their knowledge and command of ancient usage and conduct. And when the question was asked to whom we ought first and foremost to discharge those obligations, in case it should be necessary to prefer some to others in giving assistance or showing attention, there was a difference of opinion. But it was readily agreed and accepted, that in accordance with the usage of the Roman people the place next after parents should be held by wards entrusted to our honour and protection; that second to them came clients, who also had committed themselves to our honour and guardianship; that then in the third place were guests; and finally relations by blood and by marriage. Of this custom and practice there are numerous proofs and illustrations in the ancient records, of which, because it is now at hand, I will cite only this one at present, relating to clients and kindred. Marcus Cato in the speech which he delivered before the censors Against Lentulus wrote thus: “Our forefathers regarded it as a more sacred obligation to defend their wards than not to deceive a client. One testifies in a client's behalf against one's relatives; testimony against a client is given by no one. A father held the first position of honour; next after him a patron.” Masurius Sabinus, however, in the third book of his Civil Law assigns a higher place to a guest than to a client. The passage from that book is this: “In the matter of obligations our forefathers observed the following order: first to a ward, then to a guest, then to a client, next to a blood relation, finally to a relation by marriage. Other things being equal, women were given preference to men, but a ward who was under age took precedence of one who was a grown woman. Also those who were appointed by will to be guardians of the sons of a man against whom they had appeared in court, appeared for the ward in the same case.” Very clear and strong testimony on this subject is furnished by the authority of Gaius Caesar, when he was high priest; for in the speech which he delivered In Defence of the Bithynians he made use of this preamble: “In consideration either of my guest-friendship with king Nicomedes or my relationship to those whose case is on trial, O Marcus Iuncus, I could not refuse this duty. For the remembrance of men ought not to be so obliterated by their death as not to be retained by those nearest to them, and without the height of disgrace we cannot forsake clients to whom we are bound to render aid even against our kinsfolk.”

> Latin: 13. De officiorum gradu atque ordineordme moribus populi Romani observato. SENIORUM hominum et Romae nobilium atque in morum disciplinarumque veterum doctrina memoriaque praestantium disceptatio quaedam fuit, praesentepraesentc et audiente me, de gradu atque ordine officiorum. Cumque quaereretur quibus nos ea prioribus potioribusque facere oporteret, si necesse esset in opera danda faciendoque officio alios aliis anteferre, non consentiebatur. Conveniebat autem facile constabatque, ex moribus populi Romani primum iuxta parentes locum tenere pupillos debere,fidei tutelaeque nostrae creditos; secundum eos proximum locum clientes habere, qui sese itidem in fidem patrociniumque nostrum dediderunt; tum in tertio loco esse hospites; postea esse cognatos adfinesque. Huius moris observationisque multa sunt testimonia atque documenta in antiquitatibus perscripta, ex quibus unum hoc interim de clientibus cognatisque, quod prae manibus est, ponemus. M. Cato in oratione, quam dixit apud censores In Lentulum, ita scripsit: “Quod maiores sanctius; habuere, defendi pupillos quam clientem non fallere. Adversus cognatos pro cliente testatur, testimonium adversus clientem nemo dicit. Patrem primum, postea patronum proximum nomenniomen habuere.” Masurius autem Sabinus in libro luris Civilis tertio antiquiorem locum hospiti tribuit quam clienti. Verba ex eo libro haec sunt: “In officiis apud maiores ita observatum est, primum tutelae, deinde hospiti, deinde clienti, tum cognato, postea adfini. Aequa causa feminae viris potiores habitae pupillarisque tutela muliebri praelata. Etiam adversus quem adfuissent, eius filiis tutores relicti, in eadem causa pupillo aderant.” Firmum atque clarum isti rei testimonium perhibet auctoritas C. Caesaris pontificis maximi, qui in oratione quam Pro Bithynis dixit hoc principio usus est: “Vel pro hospitio regis Nicomedis vel pro horum necessitate quorum res agitur, refugere hoc munus, M. Iunce, non potui. Nam neque hominum morte memoria deleri debet quin a proximis retineatur, neque clientes sine summa infamia deseri possunt, quibus etiam a propinquis nostris opem ferre instituimus.”

[¶1] 14. The account of Apion, a learned man who was surnamed Plistonices, of the mutual recognition, due to old acquaintance, that he had seen at Rome between a man and a lion. APION, who was called Plistonices, was a man widely versed in letters, and possessing an extensive and varied knowledge of things Greek. In his works, which are recognized as of no little repute, is contained an account of almost all the remarkable things which are to be seen and heard in Egypt. Now, in his account of what he professes either to have heard or read he is perhaps too verbose through a reprehensible love of display—for he is a great self-advertiser in parading his learning; but this incident, which he describes in the fifth book of his Wonders of Egypt, he declares that he neither heard nor read, but saw himself with his own eyes in the city of Rome. “In the Great Circus,” he says, “a battle with wild beasts on a grand scale was being exhibited to the people. Of that spectacle, since I chanced to be in Rome, I was,” he says, “an eye-witness. There were there many savage wild beasts, brutes remarkable for their huge size, and all of uncommon appearance or unusual ferocity. But beyond all others,” says he, “did the vast size of the lions excite wonder, and one of these in particular surpassed all the rest. This one lion had drawn to himself the attention and eyes of all because of the activity and huge size of his body, his terrific and deep roar, the development of his muscles, and the mane streaming over his shoulders. There was brought in, among many others who had been condemned to fight with the wild beasts, the slave of an ex-consul; the slave's name was Androclus. When that lion saw him from a distance,” says Apion, “he stopped short as if in amazement, and then approached the man slowly and quietly, as if he recognized him. Then, wagging his tail in a mild and caressing way, after the manner and fashion of fawning dogs, he came close to the man, who was now half dead from fright, and gently licked his feet and hands. The man Androclus, while submitting to the caresses of so fierce a beast, regained his lost courage and gradually turned his eyes to look at the lion. Then,” says Apion, “you might have seen man and lion exchange joyful greetings, as if they had recognized each other.” He says that at this sight, so truly astonishing, the people broke out into mighty shouts; and Gaius Caesar called Androclus to him and inquired the reason why that fiercest of lions had spared him alone. Then Androclus related a strange and surprising story. “My master,” said he, “was governing Africa with proconsular authority. While there, I was forced by his undeserved and daily floggings to run away, and that my hiding-places might be safer from my master, the ruler of that country, I took refuge in lonely plains and deserts, intending, if food should fail me, to seek death in some form. Then,” said he, “when the midday sun was fierce and scorching, finding a remote and secluded cavern, I entered it, and hid myself. Not long afterwards this lion came to the same cave with one paw lame and bleeding, making known by groans and moans the torturing pain of his wound.” And then, at the first sight of the approaching lion, Androclus said that his mind was overwhelmed with fear and dread. “But when the lion,” said he, “had entered what was evidently his own lair, and saw me cowering at a distance, he approached me mildly and gently, and lifting up his foot, was evidently showing it to me and holding it out as if to ask for help. Then,” said he, “I drew out a huge splinter that was embedded in the sole of the foot, squeezed out the pus that had formed in the interior of the wound, wiped away the blood, and dried it thoroughly, being now free from any great feeling of fear. Then, relieved by that attention and treatment of mine, the lion, putting his paw in my hand, lay down and went to sleep, and for three whole years from that day the lion and I lived in the same cave, and on the same food as well. For he used to bring for me to the cave the choicest parts of the game which he took in hunting, which I, having no means of making a fire, dried in the noonday sun and ate. But,” said he, “after I had finally grown tired of that wild life, I left the cave when the lion had gone off to hunt, and after travelling nearly three days, I was seen and caught by some soldiers and taken from Africa to Rome to my master. He at once had me condemned to death by being thrown to the wild beasts. But,” said he, “I perceive that this lion was also captured, after I left him, and that he is now requiting me for my kindness and my cure of him.” Apion records that Androclus told this story, and that when it had been made known to the people by being written out in full on a tablet and carried about the Circus, at the request of all Androclus was freed, acquitted and presented with the lion by vote of the people. “Afterwards,” said he, “we used to see Androclus with the lion, attached to a slender leash, making the rounds of the shops throughout the city; Androclus was given money, the lion was sprinkled with flowers, and everyone who met them anywhere exclaimed: 'This is the lion that was a man's friend, this is the man who was physician to a lion.'”

> Latin: 14. Quod Apion, doctus homo, qui Plistonices appellatus est, vidisse se Romae scripsit recognitionem inter sese mutuam ex vetere notitia hominis et leonis. APION, qui Plistonices appellatus est, litteris homo multis praeditus rerumque Graecarum plurimaplurrima atque varia scientia fuit. Eius libri non incelebres feruntur, quibus omnium ferme quae mirifica in Aegypto visuntur audiunturque historia comprehenditur. Sed in his quae vel audisse vel legisse sese dicit, fortassean vitio studioque ostentationis sit loquacior—est enim sane quam in praedicandis doctrinis sui venditator—hoc autem, quod in libro Aegyptiacorum quinto scripsit, neque audisse neque legisse, sed ipsum sese in urbe Roma vidisse oculis suis confirmat. “In Circo Maximo,” inquit, “venationis amplissimae pugna populo dabatur.” “Eius rei, Romae cum forte essem, spectator,” inquit, “fui.” “Multae ibi saevientes ferae, magnitudines bestiarum excellentes omniumque invisitata aut forma erat aut ferocia. Sed praeter alia omnia leonum,” inquit, “immanitas admirationi fuit praeterque omnis ceteros unus.” “Is unus leo corporis impetu et vastitudine terrificoque fremitu et sonoro, toris comisque cervicum fluctuantibus, animos oculosque omnium in sese converterat.” “Introductus erat inter compluris ceteros ad pugnam bestiarum datos servus viri consularis; ei servo Androclus nomen fuit.” “Hunc ille leo ubi vidit procul, repente,” inquit, “quasi admirans stetit ac deinde sensim atque placide, tamquam noscitabundus, ad hominem accedit.” “tumTurn caudam more atque ritu adulantium canum clementer et blande movet hominisque se corpori adiungit cruraque eius et manus, prope iam exanimati metu, lingua leniter demulcet.” “Homo Androclus inter illa tam atrocis ferae blandimenta amissum animum recuperat, paulatim oculos ad contuendum leonem refert.” “Tum quasi mutua recognitione facta laetos,” inquit, “et gratulabundos videres hominem et leonem.” Ea re prorsus tam admirabili maximos populi clamores excitatos dicit, accersitumque a C. Caesare Androclum quaesitamque causam cur illi atrocissimus leo uni parsisset. Ibi Androclus rem mirificam narrat atque admirandam. “Cum provinciam,” inquit, “Africam proconsulari imperio meus dominus obtineret, ego ibi iniquis eius et cotidianis verberibus ad fugam sum coactus et, ut mihi a domino, terrae illius praeside, tutiores latebrae forent, in camporum et arenarum solitudines concessi ac, si defuisset cibus, consilium fuit mortem aliquo pacto quaerere.” “Tum sole medio,” inquit, “rabido et flagranti specum quandam nanctus remotam latebrosamque, in eamearn me penetro et recondo.” “Neque multo post ad eandem specum venit hic leo, debili uno et cruento pede, gemitus edens et murmura, dolorem cruciatumque vulneris commiserantia.” Atque illic primo quidem conspectu advenientis leonis territum sibi et pavefactum animum dixit. “Sed postquam introgressus,” inquit, “leo, uti re ipsa apparuit, in habitaculum illud suum, videt me procul delitescentem, mitis et mansues accessit et sublatum pedem ostendere mihi et porgere quasi opis petendae gratia visus est.” “Ibi,” inquit, “ego stirpem ingentem, vestigio pedis eius haerentem, revelli conceptamque saniem volnere intimo expressi accuratiusque sine magna iam formidine siccavi penitus atque detersi cruorem.” “Illa tunc mea opera et medella levatus, pede in manibus meis posito, recubuit et quievit atque ex eo” “die triennium totum ego et leo in eadem specu eodemque et victu viximus.” “Nam, quas venabatur feras, membra opimiora ad specum mihi subgerebat, quae ego, ignis copiam non habens, meridiano sole torrens edebam.” “Sed ubi me,” inquit, “vitae illius ferinae iam pertaesum est, leone in venatum profecto, reliqui specum et viam ferme tridui permensus a militibus visus adprehensusque sum et ad dominum ex Africa Romam deductus.” “Is me statim rei capitalis damnandum dandumque ad bestias curavit.” “Intellego autem,” inquit, “hunc quoque leonem, me tunc separato captum, gratiam mihi nunc beneficii et medicinae referre.” Haec Apion dixisse Androclum tradit, eaque omnia scripta circumlataque tabula populo declarata, atque ideo cunctis petentibus dimissum Androclum et poena solutum leonemque ei suffragiis populi donatum. “Postea,” inquit, “videbamus Androclum et leonem, loro tenui revinctum, urbe tota circum tabernas ire, donari aere Androclum, floribus spargi leonem, omnes ubique obvios dicere: ‘Hic est leo hospes hominis, hic est homo medicus leonis.’”

[¶2] 15. That it is a disputed question among philosophers whether voice is corporeal or incorporeal. A QUESTION that has been argued long and continuously by the most famous philosophers is whether voice has body or is incorporeal; for the word incorporeus has been coined by some of them, corresponding exactly to the Greek a)sw/matos. Now a body is that which is either active or passive: this in Greek is defined as to\ h)/toi poiou=n h)\ pa/sxon, or “that which either acts or is acted upon.” Wishing to reproduce this definition the poet Lucretius wrote:
Naught save a body can be touched or touch.
The Greeks also define body in another way, as to\ trixh= dia/staton, or “that which has three dimensions.” But the Stoics maintain that voice is a body, and say that it is air which has been struck; Plato, however, thinks that voice is not corporeal: “for,” says he, “not the air which is struck, but the stroke and the blow themselves are voice.” Democritus, and following him Epicurus, declare that voice consists of individual particles, and they call it, to use their own words, r(eu=ma a)to/mwn, or “a stream of atoms.” When I heard of these and other sophistries, the result of a self-satisfied cleverness combined with lack of employment, and saw in these subtleties no real advantage affecting the conduct of life, and no end to the inquiry, I agreed with Ennius' Neoptolemus, who rightly says:
Philosophizing there must be, but by the few;
Since for all men it's not to be desired.

> Latin: 15. Corpusne sit vox an ἀσώματον varias esse philosophorum sententias. VETUS atque perpetua quaestio inter nobilissimos philosophorum agitata est, corpusne sit vox an incorporeum. Hoc enim vocabulum quidam finxerunt proinde quod Graece dicitur ἀσώματον. Corpus autem est quod aut efficient est aut patiens; id Graece definitur τὸ ἤτοι ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον. Quam definitionem significare volens, Lucretius poeta ita scripsit:
Tangere enim aut tangi, nisi corpus, nulla potest res. Alio quoque modo corpus esse Graeci dicunt τὸ τριχῆ διάστατον. Sed vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt eamque esse dicunt ictum aera, Plato autem non esse vocem corpus putat: “Non enim percussus,” inquit, “aer, sed plaga ipsa atque percussio, id vox est.” Democritus ac deinde Epicurus ex individuis corporibus vocem constare dicunt eamque, ut ipsis eorum verbis utar, ῥεῦμα ἀτόμων appellant. Hos aliosque talis argutae delectabilisque desidiae aculeos cum audiremus vel lectitaremus neque in his scrupulis aut emolumentum aliquod solidum ad rationem vitae pertinens aut finem ullum quaerendi videremus, Ennianum Neoptolemum probabamus, qui profecto ita ait:
Philósophandum est paúcis; nam omnino haút placet.

[¶3] 16. On the function of the eye and the process of vision. I HAVE observed that the philosophers have varying opinions about the method of seeing and the nature of vision. The Stoics say that the causes of sight are the emission of rays from the eyes to those objects which can be seen, and the simultaneous expansion of the air. Epicurus believes that there is a constant flow from all bodies of images of those bodies themselves, and that these impinge upon the eyes and hence the sensation of seeing arises. Plato is of the opinion that a kind of fire or light issues from the eyes, and that this, being united and joined either with the light of the sun or with that of some other fire, by means of its own and the external force makes us see whatever it has struck and illumined. But here too we must not dally longer, but follow the advice of that Neoptolemus in Ennius, of whom I have just written, who advises having a “taste” of philosophy, but not “gorging oneself with it.”

> Latin: 16. De vi oculorum deque videndi rationibus. DE videndi ratione deque cernendi natura diversas esse opiniones philosophorum animadvertimus. Stoici causas esse videndi dicunt radiorum ex oculis in ea quae videri queunt emissionem aerisque simul intentionem. Epicurus afluere semper ex omnibus corporibus simulacra quaedam corporum ipsorum eaque sese in oculos inferre atque ita fieri sensum videndi putat. Plato existimat, genus quoddam ignis lucisque de oculis exire idque, coniunctum continuatumque vel cum luce solis vel cum alterius ignis lumine, sua vi et externa nixum efficere ut quaecumque offenderit inlustraveritque cernamus. Set hic aeque non diutius muginandum, eiusdemque illius Enniani Neoptolemi, de quo supra scripsimus, consilio utendum est, qui “degustandum” ex philosophia censet, “non in eamearn ingurgitandum.”

[¶4] 17. Why the first days after the Kalends, Nones and Ides are considered unlucky; and why many avoid also the fourth day before the Kalends, Nones or Ides, on the ground that it is ill-omened. VERRIUS FLACCUS, in the fourth book of his work On the Meaning of Words, writes that the days immediately following the Kalends, Nones and Ides, which the common people ignorantly call “holidays,” are properly called, and considered, “ill-omened,” for this reason:—“When the city,” he says, “had been recovered from the Senonian Gauls, Lucius Atilius stated in the senate that Quintus Sulpicius, tribune of the soldiers, when on the eve of fighting against the Gauls at the Allia, offered sacrifice in anticipation of that battle on the day after the Ides; that the army of the Roman people was thereupon cut to pieces, and three days later the whole city, except the Capitol, was taken. Also many other senators said that they remembered that whenever with a view to waging war a magistrate of the Roman people had sacrificed on the day after the Kalends, Nones or Ides, in the very next battle of that war the State had suffered disaster. Then the senate referred the matter to the pontiffs, that they might take what action they saw fit. The pontiffs decreed that no offering would properly be made on those days.” Many also avoid the fourth day before the Kalends, Nones and Ides, as ill-omened. It is often inquired whether any religious reason for that observance is recorded. I myself have found nothing in literature pertaining to that matter, except that Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius, in the fifth book of his Annals, says that the prodigious slaughter of the battle of Cannae occurred on the fourth day before the Nones of August.

> Latin: 17. Quam ob causam dies primi post Kalendas, Nonas, Idus atri habeantur; et cur diem quoque quartum ante Kalendas vel Nonas vel Idus quasi religiosum plerique vitent. VERRIUS FLACCUS, in quarto De Verborum Significatu, dies qui sunt postridie Kalendas, Nonas, Idus, quos vulgus imperite “nefastos” dicit, propter hanc causam dictos habitosque “atros” esse scribit. “Urbe,” inquit, “a Gallis Senonibus recuperata, L. Atilius in senatu verba fecit, Q. Sulpicium tribunum militum, ad Alliam adversus Gallos pugnaturum, rem divinam dimicandi gratia postridie Idus fecisse; tum exercitum populi Romani occidione occisum et post diem tertium eius diei urbem praeter Capitolium captam esse: compluresque alii senatores recordari sese dixerunt, quotiens belli gerendi gratia res divina postridie Kalendas, Nonas, Idus a magistratu populi Romani facta esset, eius belli proximo deinceps proelio rem publicam male gestam esse. Tum senatus eamearn rem ad pontifices reiecit, ut ipsi quod videretur statuerent. Pontifices decreverunt nullum his diebus sacrificium recte futurum.” Ante diem quoque quartum Kalendas vel Nonas vel Idus tamquam inominalem diem plerique vitant. Eius observationis an religio ulla sit tradita, quaeri solet. nihilNillil nos super ea re scriptum invenimus, nisi quod Q. Claudius Annaliun quinto cladem illam pugnae Cannensis vastissimam factam dicit ante diem quartum Nonas Sextiles.

[¶5] 18. In what respect, and how far, history differs from annals; and a quotation on that subject from the first book of the Histories of Sempronius Asellio. SOME think that history differs from annals in this particular, that while each is a narrative of events, yet history is properly an account of events in which the narrator took part; and that this is the opinion of some men is stated by Verrius Flaccus in the fourth book of his treatise On the Meaning of Words. He adds that he for his part has doubts about the matter, but he thinks that the view may have some appearance of reason, since i(stori/a in Greek means a knowledge of current events. But we often hear it said that annals are exactly the same as histories, but that histories are not exactly the same as annals; just as a man is necessarily an animal, but an animal is not necessarily a man. Thus they say that history is the setting forth of events or their description, or whatever term may be used; but that annals set down the events of many years successively, with observance of the chronological order. When, however, events are recorded, not year by year, but day by day, such a history is called in Greek e)fhmeri/s, or “a diary,” a term of which the Latin interpretation is found in the first book of Sempronius Asellio. I have quoted a passage of some length from that book, in order at the same time to show what his opinion is of the difference between history and chronicle. “But between those,” he says, “who have desired to leave us annals, and those who have tried to write the history of the Roman people, there was this essential difference. The books of annals merely made known what happened and in what year it happened, which is like writing a diary, which the Greeks call e)fhmeri/s. For my part, I realize that it is not enough to make known what has been done, but that one should also show with what purpose and for what reason things were done.” A little later in the same book Asellio writes: “For annals cannot in any way make men more eager to defend their country, or more reluctant to do wrong. Further-more, to write over and over again in whose consulship a war was begun and ended, and who in consequence entered the city in a triumph, and in that book not to state what happened in the course of the war, what decrees the senate made during that time, or what law or bill was passed, and with what motives these things were done—that is to tell stories to children, not to write history.”

> Latin: 18. In quid et quantum differat historia ab annalibus; superque ea re verba posita ex libro Rerum Gestarum Sempronii Asellionis primo. HISTORIAM ab annalibus quidam differre eo putant, quod, cum utrumque sit rerum gestarum narratio, earum tamen proprie rerum sit historiabistoria, quibus rebus gerendis interfuerit is qui narret; eamque esse opinionem quorundam, Verrius Flaccus refert in libro De Significatu verborumVerborun quarto. Ac se quidem dubitare super ea re dicit, posse autem videri putat nonnihil esse rationis in ea opinione, quod ἱστορία Graece significet rerum cognitionem praesentium. Sed nos audire soliti sumus annales omnino id esse quod historiae sint; historias non omnino esse id quod annales sint: sicuti, quod est homo, id necessario animal esse; quod est animal, non id necesse est hominem esse. Ita historias quidem esse aiunt rerum gestarum vel expositionem vel demonstrationem vel quo alio nomine id dicendum est; annales vero esse, cum res gestae plurium annorum, observato cuiusque anni ordine, deinceps componuntur. Cum vero non per annos, sed per dies singulos res gestae scribuntur, ea historia Graeco vocabulo ἐφημερὶς dicitur, cuius Latinum interpretamentum scriptum est in libro Semproni Asellionis primo, ex quo libro plura verba ascripsimus, ut simul ibidem quid ipse inter res gestas et annales esse dixerit ostenderemus. “Verum inter eos,” inquit, “qui annales relinquere voluissent, et eos qui res gestas a Romanis perscribere conati essent, omnium rerum hoc interfuit. Annales libri tantummodo quod factum quoque anno gestum sit, ea demonstrabant, id est quasi qui diarium scribunt, quam Graeci ἐφημερίδα vocant. Nobis non modo satis esse video, quod factum esset, id pronuntiare, sed etiam quo consilio quaque ratione gesta essent demonstrare.” Paulo post idem Asellio in eodem libro: “Nam neque alacriores,” inquit, “ad rempublicam defendundam, neque segniores ad rem perperam faciundam annales libri commovere quicquam possunt. Scribere autem bellum initum quo consule et quo confectum sit et quis triumphans introierit ex eo, et eo libro quae in bello gesta sint non praedicare aut interea quid senatus decreverit aut quae lex rogatiove lata sit neque quibus consiliis ea gesta sint iterare: id fabulas pueris est narrare, non historias scribere.”

[¶6] 19. The meaning of adoptatio and also of adrogatio, and how they differ; and the formula used by the official who, when children are adopted, brings the business before the people. WHEN outsiders are taken into another's family and given the relationship of children, it is done either through a praetor or through the people. If done by a praetor, the process is called adoptatio; if through the people, arrogatio. Now, we have adoptatio, when those who are adopted are surrendered in court through a thrice repeated sale by the father under whose control they are, and are claimed by the one who adopts them in the presence of the official before whom the legal action takes place. The process is called adrogatio, when persons who are their own masters deliver themselves into the control of another, and are themselves responsible for the act. But arrogations are not made without due consideration and investigation; for the so-called comitia curiata are summoned under the authority of the pontiffs, and it is inquired whether the age of the one who wishes to adopt is not rather suited to begetting children of his own; precaution is taken that the property of the one who is being adopted is not being sought under false pretences; and an oath is administered which is said to have been formulated for use in that ceremony by Quintus Mucius, when he was pontifex maxinus. But no one may be adopted by adrogatio who is not yet ready to assume the gown of manhood. The name adrogatio is due to the fact that this kind of transfer to another's family is accomplished through a rogatio or “request,” put to the people. The language of this request is as follows: “Express your desire and ordain that Lucius Valerius be the son of Lucius Titius as justly and lawfully as if he had been born of that father and the mother of his family, and that Titius have that power of life and death over Valerius which a father has over a son. This, just as I have stated it, I thus ask of you, fellow Romans.” Neither a ward nor a woman who is not under the control of her father may be adopted by adrogatio; since women have no part in the comitia, and it is not right that guardians should have so much authority and power over their wards as to be able to subject to the control of another a free person who has been committed to their protection. Freedmen, however, may legally be adopted in that way by freeborn citizens, according to Masurius Sabinus. But he adds that it is not allowed, and he thinks it never ought to be allowed, that men of the condition of freedmen should by process of adoption usurp the privileges of the freeborn. “Furthermore,” says he, “if that ancient law be maintained, even a slave may be surrendered by his master for adoption through the agency of a praetor.” And he declares that several authorities on ancient law have written that this can be done. I have observed in a speech of Publius Scipio On Morals, which he made to the people in his censorship, that among the things that he criticized, on the ground that they were done contrary to the usage of our forefathers, he also found fault with this, that an adopted son was of profit to his adoptive father in gaining the rewards for paternity. The passage in that speech is as follows: “A father votes in one tribe, the son in another, an adopted son is of as much advantage as if one had a son of his own; orders are given to take the census of absentees, and hence it is not necessary for anyone to appear in person at the census.”

> Latin: 19. Quid sit adoptatio, quid item sit adrogatio, quantumque haec inter se differant; verbaque eius quae qualiaque sint, qui in liberis adrogandis super ea re populum rogat. CUM in alienam familiam inque liberorum locum extranei sumuntur, aut per praetorem fit aut per populum. Quod per praetorem fit, “adoptatio” dicitur, quod per populum, “arrogatio.” Adoptantur autem, cum a parente in cuius potestate sunt tertia mancipatione in iure ceduntur atque ab eo qui adoptat apud eum apud quem legis actio est vindicantur; adrogantur hi qui, cum sui iuris sunt, in alienam sese potestatem tradunt eiusque rei ipsi auctores fiunt. Sed adrogationes non temere nec inexplorate committuntur; nam comitia arbitris pontificibus praebentur, quae “curiata” appellantur, aetasque eius qui adrogare vult, an liberislileris potius gignundis idonea sit, bonaque eius qui adrogatur ne insidiose adpetita sint consideratur, iusque iurandum a Q. Mucio pontifice maximo conceptum dicitur, quod in adrogando iuraretur. Sed adrogari non potest nisi iam vesticeps. “Adrogatio” autem dicta, quia genus hoc in alienam familiam transitus per populi rogationem fit. Eius rogationis verba haec sunt: “Velitis, iubeatis, uti L. Valerius L. Titio tam iure legeque filius siet, quam si ex eo patre matreque familias eius natus esset, utique ei vitae necisque in eum potestas siet, uti patri endo filio est. Haec ita uti dixi, ita vos, Quirites, rogo.” Neque pupillus autem neque mulier quae in parentis potestate non est adrogari possunt; quoniam et cum feminis nulla comitiorum communio est et tutoribus in pupillos tantam esse auctoritatem potestatemque fas non est, ut caput liberum fidei suae commissum alienae dicioni subiciant. Libertinos vero ab ingenuis adoptari quidem iure posse, Masurius Sabinus scripsit. Sed id neque permitti dicit, neque permittendum esse umquam putat, ut homines libertini ordinis per adoptiones in iura ingenuorum invadant. “Alioquin,” inquit, “si iuris ista antiquitas servetur, etiam servus a domino per praetorem dari in adoptionem potest.” Idque ait plerosque iuris veteris auctores posse fieri scripsisse. Animadvertimus in oratione P. Scipionis, quam censor habuit ad populum De Moribus, inter ea quae reprehendebat, quod contra maiorum instituta fierent, id etiam eum culpavisse, quod filius adoptivos patri adoptatori inter praemia patrum prodesset. Verba ex ea oratione haec sunt: “In alia tribu patrempattern, in alia filium suffragium ferre, filium adoptivum tam procedere quam si se natum habeat; absentis censeri iubere, ut ad censum nemini necessus sit venire.”

[¶7] 20. The Latin word coined by Sinnius Capito for “solecism,” and what the early writers of Latin called that same fault: and also Sinnius Capito's definition of a solecism. A solecism, which by Sinnius Capito and other lien of his time was called in Latin inparilitas, or “inequality,” the earlier Latin writers termed stribiligo, evidently meaning the improper use of an inverted form of expression, a sort of twist as it were. This kind of fault is thus defined by Sinnius Capito, in a letter which lie wrote to Clodius Tuscus: “A solecism,” he says, “is an irregular and incongruous joining together of the parts of speech.” Since “soloecismus” is a Greek word, the question is often asked, whether it was used by the men of Attica who spoke most elegantly. But I have as yet found neither soloecismus nor barbarismus in good Greek writers; for just as they used ba/rbaros, so they used so/loikos. So too our earlier writers used soloecus regularly, soloecismus never, I think. But if that be so, soloecismus is proper usage neither in Greek nor in Latin.

> Latin: 20. Quod vocabulum Latinum soloecismo fecerit Capito Sinnius, quid autem id ipsum appellaverint veteres Latini; quibusque verbis soloecismum definierit idem Capito Sinnius. “SOLOECISMUS,” Latino vocabulo a Sinnio Capitone eiusdemque aetatis aliis “inparilitas” appellatus, vetustioribus Latinis “stribiligo” dicebatur, a versura videlicet et pravitate tortuosae orationis, tamquam “strobiligo” quaedam. Quod vitium Sinnius Capito in litteris, quas ad Clodium Tuscum dedit, hisce verbis definit: “‘Soloecismus.’ est,” inquit, “impar atque inconveniens compositura partium orationis.” Cum Graecum autem vocabulum sit “soloecismus,” an Attici homines qui elegantius locuti sunt usi eo sint quaeri solet. Sed nos neque “soloecismum” neque “barbarismumarbbarismum” apud Graecorum idoneos adhuc invenimus; nam sicut βάρβαρον ita σόλοικοι dixerunt. Nostri quoque antiquiores “soloecum” facile, “soloecismum” haut scio an umquam, dixerunt. Quod si ita est, neque in Graeca neque in Latina lingua “soloecismus” probe dicitur.

[¶8] 21. One who says pluria, compluria and compluriens speaks good Latin, and not incorrectly. AN extremely learned man, a friend of mine, chanced in the course of conversation to use the word pluria, not at all with a desire to show off, or because he thought that plura ought not to be used. For he is a man of serious scholarship and devoted to the duties of life, and not at all meticulous in the use of words. But, I think, from constant perusal of the early writers a word which he had often met in books had become second nature to his tongue. There was present when he said this a very audacious critic of language, who had read very little and that of the most ordinary sort; this fellow had some trifling instruction in the art of grammar, which was partly ill-digested and confused and partly false, and this he used to cast like dust into the eyes of any with whom he had entered into discussion. Thus on that occasion he said to my friend: “You were incorrect in saying pluria; for that form has neither justification nor authorities.” Thereupon that friend of mine rejoined with a smile: “My: good sir, since I now have leisure from more serious affairs, I wish you would please explain to me why pluria and compluria—for they do not differ-are used barbarously and incorrectly by Marcus Cato, Quintus Claudius, Valerius Antias, Lucius Aelius, Publius Nigidius, and Marcus Varro, whom we have as endorsers and sanctioners of this form, to say nothing of a great number of the early poets and orators.” And the fellow answered with excessive arrogance: “You are welcome to those authorities of yours, dug up from the age of the Fauns and Aborigines, but what is your answer to this rule? No neuter comparative in the nominative plural has an i before its final a; for example, meliora, maiora, graviora. Accordingly, then, it is proper to say plura, not pluria, in order that there be no i before final a in a comparative, contrary to the invariable rule.” Then that friend of mine, thinking that the self-confident fellow deserved few words, said: “There are numerous letters of Sinnius Capito, a very learned man, collected in a single volume and deposited, I think, in the Temple of Peace. The first letter is addressed to Pacuvius Labeo, and it is prefixed by the title, 'Pluria, not plura, should be used.' In that letter he has collected the grammatical rules to show that pluria, and not plura, is good Latin. Therefore I refer you to Capito. From him you will learn at the same time, provided you can comprehend what is written in that letter, that pluria, or plura, is the positive and simple form, not, as it seems to you, a comparative.” It also confirms that view of Sinnius, that when we say complures or “several,” we are not using a comparative. Moreover, from the word compluria is derived the adverb compluriens, “often.” Since this is not a common word, I have added a verse of Plautus, from the comedy entitled The Persian:
What do you fear?—By Heaven! I am afraid;
I've had the feeling many a time and oft (compluriens).
Marcus Cato too, in the fourth book of his Origins, has used this word three times in the same passage: “Often (compluriens) did their mercenary soldiers kill one another in large numbers in the camp; often (compluriens) did many together desert to the enemy; often (compluriens) did they attack their general.”

> Latin: 21. “Pluria” qui dicat et “compluria” et “compluriens” non barbare dicere, sed Latine. “PLURIA” forte quis dixit sermocinans vir adprime doctus, meus amicus, non hercle studio se ferens ostentandi neque quo “plura” non dicendum putaret. Est enim doctrina homo seria et ad vitae officia devincta ac nihil de verbis laborante. Sed, opinor, assidua veterum scriptorum tractatione inoleverat linguae illius vox quam in libris saepe offenderat. Aderat, cum ille hoc dicit, reprehensor audaculus verborum, qui perpauca eademque a volgo protrita legerat habebatque nonnullas disciplinae grammaticae inauditiunculas, partim rudes inchoatasque, partim non probas, easque quasi pulverem ob oculos, cum adortus quemque fuerat, adspergebat. Sicut tunc amico nostro “Barbare,” inquit, “dixisti ‘pluria’; nam neque rationem verbum hoc neque auctoritates habet.” Ibi ille amicus ridens, “Amabo te,” inquit, “vir bone, quia nunc mihi a magis seriis rebus otium est, velim doceas nos cur ‘pluria’ sive ‘compluria,’ nihil enim differt, non Latine sed barbare dixerint M. Cato, Q. Claudius, Valerius Antias, L. Aelius, P. Nigidius, M. Varro, quos subscriptores approbatoresque huius verbi habemus praeter poetarum oratorumque veterum multam copiam.” Atque ille nimis arroganter “Tibi,” inquit, “habeas auctoritates istas, ex Faunorum et Aboriginum saeculo repetitas, atque huic rationi respondeas.” “Nullum enim vocabulum neutrum comparativum numero plurativo, recto casu, ante extremum ‘a’ habet ‘i’ litteram, sicuti ‘meliora, maiora, graviora.’ Proinde igitur ‘plura,’ non ‘pluria,’ dici convenit, ne contra formam perpetuam in comparativo ‘i’ littera sit ante extremum ‘a’.” Tum ille amicus noster, cum hominem confidentem pluribus verbis non dignum existimaret, “Sinni,” inquit, “Capitonis, doctissimi viri, epistulae sunt uno in libro multae positae, opinor, in templo Pacis.” “Prima epistula scripta est ad Pacuvium Labeonem, cui titulus praescriptus est ‘Pluria, non plura dici debere.’” “In ea epistula rationes grammaticas posuit per quas docet ‘pluria’ Latinum esse, ‘plura’ barbarum. Ad Capitonem igitur te dimittimus.” “Ex eo id quoque simul disces, si modo assequi poteris quod in ea epistula scriptum est,” “‘pluria’ sive ‘plura’ absolutum esse et simplex, non, ut tibi videtur, comparativum.” Huius opinionis Sinnianae id quoque adiumentum est, quod “complures” cum dicimus, non comparative dicimus. Ab eo autem quod est “compluria” adverbium est factum “compluriens.” Id quoniam minus usitatum est, versum Plauti subscripsi ex comoedia quae Persa inscribitur:
Quid metuis?–Metuo hércle vero; sénsi ego
Complúriens. Item M. Cato in IV. Originum eodem in loco ter hoc verbum posuit: “Compluriens eorum milites mercennarii inter se multi alteri alteros in castris occidere, compluriens multi simul ad hostis transfugere, compluriens in imperatorem impetum facere.”