1. Some remarkable stories about the elder Publius Africanus, drawn from the annals. The tale which in Grecian history is told of Olympias, wife of king Philip and mother of Alexander, is also recorded of the mother of that Publius Scipio who was the first to be called Africanus. For both Gaius Oppius and Julius Hyginus, as well as others who have written of the life and deeds of Africanus, declare that his mother was for a long time thought to be barren, and that Publius Scipio, her husband, had also given up hope of offspring; that afterwards, in her own room and bed, when she was lying alone in the absence of her husband and had fallen asleep, of a sudden a huge serpent was seen lying by her side; and that when those who had seen it were frightened and cried out, the snake glided away and could not be found. It is said that Publius Scipio himself consulted soothsayers about the occurrence; that they, after offering sacrifice, declared that he would have children, and not many days after that serpent had been seen in her bed, the woman began to experience the indications and sensation of conception. Afterwards, in the tenth month, she gave birth to that Publius Scipio who conquered Hannibal and the Carthaginians in Africa in the second Punic war. But it was far more because of his exploits than because of that prodigy that he too was believed to be a man of godlike excellence. This too I venture to relate, which the same writers that I mentioned before have put on record: This Scipio Africanus used often to go to the Capitolium in the latter part of the night, before the break of day, give orders that the shrine of Jupiter be opened, and remain there a long time alone, apparently consulting Jupiter about matters of state; and the guardians of the temple were often amazed that on his coming to the Capitolium alone at such an hour the dogs, that flew at all other intruders, neither barked at him nor molested him. These popular beliefs about Scipio seemed to be confirmed and attested by many remarkable actions and sayings of his. Of these the following is a single example: He was engaged in the siege of a town in Spain, which was strongly fortified and defended, protected by its position, and also well provisioned; and there was no prospect of taking it. One day he sat holding court in his camp, at a point from which there was a distant view of the town. Then one of the soldiers who were on trial before him asked in the usual way on what day and in what place he bade them give bail for their appearance. Then Scipio, stretching forth his hand towards the very citadel of the town which he was besieging, said: “Appear the day after to-morrow in yonder place.” And so it happened; on the third day, the day on which he had ordered them to appear, the town was captured, and on that same day he held court in the citadel of the place.
1. Admiranda quaedam ex annalibus sumpta de P. Africano superiore. QUOD de Olympiade, Philippi regis uxore, Alexandri matre, in historia Graeca scriptum est, id de P. quoque Scipionis matre qui prior Africanus appellatus est memoriae datum est. Nam et C. Oppius et Iulius Hyginus, aliique qui de vita et rebus Africani scripserunt, matrem eius diu sterilem existimatam tradunt, P. quoque Scipionem, cum quo nupta erat, liberos desperavisse. Postea in cubiculo atque in lecto mulieris, cum absente marito cubans sola condormisset, visum repente esse iuxta eam cubare ingentem anguem eumque, his qui viderant territis et clamantibus, elapsum inveniri non quisse. Id ipsum P. Scipionem ad haruspices retulisse; eos, sacrificio facto, respondisse fore ut liberi gignerentur, neque multis diebus postquam ille anguis in lecto visus est, mulierem coepisse concepti fetus signa atque sensumsensurn pati; exinde mense decimo peperisse natumque esse hunc P. Africanum qui Hannibalem et Carthaginienses in Africa bello Poenico secundo vicit. Sed et eum inpendio magis ex rebus gestis quam ex illo ostento virum esse virtutis divinae creditum est. Id etiam dicere haut piget, quod idem illi quos supra nominavi litteris mandaverint, Scipionem hunc Africanum solitavisse noctis extreme, priusquam dilucularet, in Capitolium ventitare ac iubere aperiri cellam Iovislovis atque ibi solum diu demorari, quasi consultantem de republica cum Iove, aeditumosque eius templi saepe esse demiratos, quod solum id temporis in Capitolium ingredientem canes semper in alios saevientes neque latrarent eum neque incurrerent. Has volgi de Scipione opiniones confirmare atque approbare videbantur dicta factaque eius pleraque admiranda. Ex quibus est unumunurm huiuscemodiuiuscemodi: Assidebat oppugnabatque oppidum in Hispania, situ, moenibus, defensoribus validum et munitum, re etiam cibaria copiosum, nullaque eius potiundi spes erat, et quodam die ius in castris sedens dicebat atque ex eo loco id oppidum procul visebatur, Tum e militibus, qui in iure apud eum stabant, interrogavit quispiam ex more in quem diem locumque vadimonium promitti iuberet; et Scipio, manum ad ipsam oppidi quod obsidebatur arcem protendens, “Perendie,” inquit, “sese sistant illo in loco.” Atque ita factum; die tertio, in quem vadari iusserat, oppidum captum est eodemque eo die in arce eius oppidi ius dixit.
2. Of a disgraceful blunder of Caesellius Vindex, which we find in his work entitled Archaic Terms. IN those highly celebrated notes of Caesellius Vindex On Archaic Terms we find a shameful oversight, although in fact the man is seldom caught napping. This error has escaped the notice of many, in spite of their diligent search for opportunities to find fault with Caesellius, even through misrepresentation. Now, Caesellius wrote that Quintus Ennius, in the thirteenth book of his Annals, used cor in the masculine gender. I add Caesellius' own words: “Ennius used cor, like many other words, in the masculine gender; for in Annals xiii. he wrote quem cor.” He then quoted two verses of Ennius:While Hannibal, of bold breast, did me exhortNot to make war, what heart thought he was mine?The speaker is Antiochus, king of Asia. He is surprised and indignant that Hannibal, the Carthaginian, discourages his desire to make war on the people of Rome. Now, Caesellius understands the lines to mean that Antiochus says: “Hannibal dissuades me from making war. In so doing, what kind of heart does he think I have, and how foolish does he believe me to be, when he gives me such advice?” So Caesellius; but Ennius' meaning was quite different. For there are three verses, not two, which belong to this utterance of the poet's, and Caesellius overlooked the third verse:Through valour war's great advocate and friend.The meaning and arrangement of these three verses I believe to be this:Hannibal, that boldest and most valiant of men, who I believed (for that is the meaning of cor meum credidit, exactly as if he had said “who l, foolish man, believed”) would strongly advise war, discourages and dissuades me from making war.Caesellius, however, somewhat carelessly misled as to the connection of the words, assumed that Ennius said quem cor, reading quem with an acute accent, as if it belonged with cor and not with Hannibal. But I am well aware that one might, if anyone should have so little understanding, defend Caesellius' masculine cor by maintaining that the third verse should be read apart from the others, as if Antiochus had exclaimed in broken and abrupt language “a mighty adviser!” But those who would argue thus do not deserve a reply.
2. De Caeselli Vindicis pudendo errore, quem offendimus in libris eius quos inscripsit Lectionum antiquarumAntiquairum. TURPE erratum offendimus in illis celebratissimis commentariis Lectionum Antiquarum Caeselli Vindicis, hominis hercle pleraque haut indiligentis. Quod erratum multos fugit, quamquam multa in Caesellio reprehendendo etiam per calumnias rimarentur. Scripsit autem Caesellius Q. Ennium in XIII. Annali “cor” dixisse genere masculino. Verba Caeselli subiecta sunt: “Masculino genere, ut multa alia, enuntiavit Ennius. Nam in XIII. Annali ‘quem cor’ dixit.” Ascripsit deinde versus Ennii duo:Hannibal audaci dum pectore de me hortaturNe bellum faciam, quem credidit esse meum cor?Antiochus est qui hoc dixit, Asiae rex. Is admiratur et permovetur, quod Hannibal Carthaginiensis bellum se facere populo Romano volentem dehortetur. Hos autem versus Caesellius sic accipit, tamquam si Antiochus sic dicat: “Hannibal me ne bellum geram dehortatur; quod cum facit, ecquale putat cor habere me et quam stultum esse me credit, cum id mihi persuadere vult?” Hoc Caesellius quidem, sed aliud longe Ennius. Nam tres versus sunt, non duo, ad hanchance Ennii sententiam pertinentes, ex quibus tertium versum Caesellius non respexit:Hannibal audaci dum pectore de me hortaturNe bellum faciam, quem credidit esse meum corSuasorem summum et studiosum robore belli. Horum versuum sensus atque ordo sic, opinor, est: “Hannibal ille audentissimus atque fortissimus, quem ego credidi”—hoc est enim: “cor meum credidit,” proinde atque diceret “quem ego stultus homo credidi”—“summum fore suasorem ad bellandum, is me dehortatur dissuadetque ne bellum faciam.” Caesellius autem forte ῥαθυμότερον iunctura ista verborum captus “quem cor” dictum putavit et “quem” accentu acuto legit, quasi ad “cor” referretur, non ad “Hannibalem.” Sed non fugit me, si aliquis sit tam inconditus, sic posse defendi “cor” Caeselli masculinum, ut videatur tertius versus separatim atque divise legendus, proinde quasi praecisis interruptisque verbis exclamet Antiochus: “suasorem summum!” Sed non dignum est eis qui hoc dixerint responderi.
3. What Tullius Tiro, Cicero's freedman, criticized in the speech which Marcus Cato delivered in the senate in defence of the Rhodians; and our answer to his strictures.
3. Quid Tiro Tullius, Ciceronis libertus, reprehenderit in M. Catonis oratione quam pro Rodiensibus in senatu dixit; et quid ad ea, quae reprehenderat, responderimus.
THE State of Rhodes is famed for the happy situation of the island, its celebrated works of art, its skill in seamanship and its naval victories.
CIVITAS Rodiensis et insulae opportunitate et operum nobilitatibus et navigandi sollertia navalibusque victoriis celebrata est.
Although a friend and ally of the Roman people, that State was on cordial terms with Perses, son of Philip and king of Macedon, with whom the Romans were at war; accordingly, the Rhodians often sent envoys to Rome and tried to reconcile the contending parties.
Ea civitas, cum amica atque socia populi Romani foret, Persa tamen, Philippi filio, Macedonum rege, cum quo bellum populo Romano fuit, amico usa est, conixique sunt Rodienses legationibus Romam saepe missis id bellum inter eos componere.
But when their attempts at peace-making failed, many of the Rhodians harangued the people in their assemblies, urging that if peace were not made, the Rhodians should aid the king in his contest with the people of Rome; but as to that question no official action was taken.
Sed, ubi ista pacificatio perpetrari nequivit, verba a plerisque Rodiensibus in contionibus eorum ad populum facta sunt, ut, si pax non fieret, Rodienses regem adversus populum Romanum adiutarent.
When, however, Perses was defeated and taken prisoner, the Rhodians were in great fear because of what had been said and done on many occasions in the popular assemblies;
Sed nullum super ea re publicum decretum factum est.
and they sent envoys to Rome, to apologize for the hastiness of some of their fellow-citizens and vindicate their loyalty as a community. When the envoys reached Rome and were admitted to the senate, after having humbly pleaded their cause they left the House, and the senators were called upon for their opinions.
At ubi Perses victus captusque est, Rodienses pertimuere ob ea quae conpluriens in coetibus populi acta dictaque erant, legatosque Romam miserunt, qui temeritatem quorundam popularium suorum deprecarentur et fidem consiliumque publicum expurgarent.
When some of the members complained of the Rhodians, declaring that they had been disloyal, and recommended that war be declared upon them, then Marcus Cato arose.
Legati postquam Romam venerunt et in senatum intromissi sunt, verbisque suppliciter pro causa sua factis e curia excesserunt, sententiae rogari coeptae;
He endeavoured to defend and save our very good and faithful allies, to whom many of the most distinguished senators were hostile through a desire to plunder and possess their wealth; and he delivered that famous speech entitled For the Rhodians, which is included in the fifth book of his Origins and is also in circulation as a separate publication. Now Tullius Tiro, Marcus Cicero's freedman, was unquestionably a man of refined taste and by no means unacquainted with our early history and literature.
cumque partim senatorum de Rodiensibus quererentur maleque animatos eos fuisse dicerent bellumque illis faciendum censerent, tum M. Cato exsurgitexurgit et optimos fidissimosque socios, quorum opibus diripiendis possidendisque non pauci ex summatibus viris intenti infensique erant, defensum conservatumque pergit orationemque inclutam dicit, quae et seorsum fertur inscriptaque est Pro Rodiensibus et in quintae Originis libro scripta est.
He had been liberally educated from his earliest years, and Cicero found in him an assistant, and in a sense a partner, in his literary work. But surely Tiro showed more presumption than can be tolerated or excused.
Tiro autem Tullius, M. Ciceronis libertus, sane quidem fuit ingenio homo eleganti hautquaquam rerum litterarumque veterum indoctus, eoque ab ineunte aetate liberaliter institute adminiculatore et quasi administro in studiis litterarum Cicero usus est.
For he wrote a letter to Quintus Axius, a friend of his patron, with excessive assurance and warmth, in which, as he imagined, he criticized that speech For the Rhodians with keen and fine judgment.
Sed profecto plus ausus est quam ut tolerari ignoscique possit.
It chanced to take my fancy to touch upon certain of the animadversions which he makes in that letter, and I shall doubtless be the more readily pardoned for finding fault with Tiro, because he took Cato to task.
Namque epistulam conscripsit ad Q. Axium, familiarem patroni sui, confidenter nimis et calide, in qua sibimet visus est orationem istam Pro Rodiensibus acri subtilique iudicio percensuisse.Ex ea epistula lubitum forte nobis est reprehensiones eius quasdam attingere, maiore scilicet venia reprehensuri Tironem, cum ille reprehenderit Catonem.
His first charge was that Cato, “ignorantly and absurdly,” to use Tiro's own language, made use of a preamble which was excessively arrogant and excessively severe and fault-finding, in which he declared that he feared lest the fathers, having their minds upset by joy and exultation at their success, might act unwisely and be in no state of mind for understanding and deliberating aright. Tiro says: “Advocates who are pleading for clients ought in their opening remarks to win over and propitiate the jurors with complimentary and respectful language;
Culpavit autem primum hoc, quod Cato “inerudite et ἀναγώγως,” ut ipse ait, principio nimis insolenti nimisque acri et obiurgatorio usus sit, cum vereri sese ostendit ne patres, gaudio atque laetitia rerum prospere gestarum de statu mentis suae deturbati, non satis consiperent neque ad recte intellegendum consulendumque essent idonei.
they ought, while their minds, as they wait to hear the case, are still in suspense and cool, to render them complacent, and not to arouse contradiction by insults and arrogant threats.” Then he has given us Cato's own preamble, which runs as follows: “I am aware that in happy, successful and prosperous times the minds of most men are wont to be puffed up, and their arrogance and self-confidence to wax and swell.
“In principiis autem,” inquit, “patroni, qui pro reis dicunt, conciliare sibi et complacare iudices debent sensusque eorum expectatione causae suspensos rigentesque honorificis verecundisque sententiis commulcere, non iniuriis atque imperiosis minationibus confutare.”
Therefore I am now gravely concerned, since this enterprise has gone on so successfully, lest something adverse may happen in our deliberations, to bring to naught our good fortune, and lest this joy of ours may become too extravagant. Adversity subdues and shows what ought to be done; prosperity, since it inspires joy, commonly turns men aside from wise counsel and right understanding. Therefore it is with the greater emphasis that I advise and urge that this matter be put off for a few days, until we regain our self-command after so great rejoicing.” “Then what Cato says next,” continues Tiro, “amounts to a confession rather than a defence;
Ipsum deinde principium apposuit, cuius verba haec sunt: “Scio solere plerisque hominibus rebus secundis atque prolixis atque prosperis animum excellere atque superbiam atque ferociam augescere atque crescere. Quo mihi nunc magnae curae est, quod haec res tam secunde processit, ne quid in consulendo advorsi eveniat, quod nostras secundas res confutet, neve haec laetitia nimis luxuriose eveniat. Advorsae res edomant et docent quid opus siet facto, secundae res laetitia transvorsum trudere solent a recte consulendo atque intellegendo. Quo maiore opere dico suadeoque uti haec res aliquot dies proferatur, dum ex tanto gaudio in potestatem nostram redeamus.”
for it does not contain a refutation or shifting of the charge, but the sharing of it with many others, which of course amounts to nothing in the way of excuse. Moreover,” says Tiro, “he also acknowledges that the Rhodians, who were accused of favouring the king's cause against the Roman people and wishing him success, did so from motives of self-interest, for fear that the Romans, already proud and self-confident, with the addition of a victory over king Perses might become immoderately insolent.” And he gives Cato's own words, as follows: “And I really think that the Rhodians did not wish us to end the war as we did, with a victory over king Perses.
“Quae deinde Cato iuxta dicit, ea,” inquit, “confessionem faciunt, non defensionem, neque propulsationem translationemve criminis habent, sed cum pluribus aliis communicationem, quod scilicet nihili ad purgandum est. Atque etiam,” inquit, “insuper profitetur Rodienses, qui accusabantur quod adversus populum Romanum regi magis cupierint faverintque, id eos cupisse atque favisse utilitatis suae gratia, ne Romani Perse quoque rege victo ad superbiam ferociamque et inmodicum modum insolescerent.”
But it was not the Rhodians alone who had that feeling, but I believe that many peoples and many nations agreed with them. And I am inclined to think that some of them did not wish us success, not in order that we might be disgraced, but because they feared that if there were no one of whom we stood in dread, we would do whatsoever we chose. I think, then, that it was with an eye to their own freedom that they held that opinion, in order not to be under our sole dominion and enslaved to us. But for all that, the Rhodians never publicly aided Perses. Reflect how much more cautiously we deal with one another as individuals. For each one of us, if he thinks that anything is being done contrary to his interests, strives with might and main to prevent it; but they in spite of all permitted this very thing to happen.” Now as to his criticism of Cato's introduction, Tiro ought to have known that although Cato defended the Rhodians, he did so as a senator who had been consul and censor and was recommending what he thought was best for the public welfare, not as an advocate pleading the cause of the accused.
Eaque ipsa verba ponit, ita ut infra scriptum: “Atque ego quidem arbitror Rodienses noluisse nos ita depugnare, uti depugnatumdepugnaturm est, neque regem Persen vinci. Sed non Rodienses modo id noluere, sed multos populos atque multas nationes idem noluisse arbitror atque haut scio an partim eorum fuerint, qui non nostrae contumeliae causa id noluerint evenire; sed enim id metuere, ne si nemo esset homo quem vereremur, quidquid luberet faceremus. Ne sub solo imperio nostro in servitute nostra essent, libertatis suae causa in ea sententia fuisse arbitror. Atque Rodienses tamen Persen publice numquam adiuvere. Cogitate quanto nos inter nos privatim cautius facimus. Nam unusquisque nostrum, si quis advorsus rem suam quid fieri arbitrantur, summa vi contraeontra nititur, ne advorsus eam fiat; quod illi tamen perpessi.”
For one kind of introduction is appropriate for a man who is defending clients before jurors and striving in every way to excite pity and compassion;
Sed, quod ad principium reprehensum attinet, scire oportuit Tironem, defensos esse Rodienses a Catone, sed ut a senatore et consulari et censorio viro, quidquid optimum esse publicum existimabat suadente, non ut a patrono causam pro reis dicente.
quite another for a man of eminent authority, when the senate is asked for its opinion on a matter of State, and when, indignant at the highly unjust opinions of some of the members, he gives plain and emphatic expression at once to his indignation and his sorrow, speaking in behalf of the public welfare and the safety of our allies.
Alia namque principia conducunt reos apud indices defendenti et clementiam misericordiamque undique indaganti, alia, cum senatus de republica consulitur, viro auctoritate praestanti, sententiis quorundam iniquissimis permoto et pro utilitatibus publicis ac pro salute sociorum graviter ac libere indignanti simul ac dolenti.
Indeed, it is a proper and salutary rule of the schools of rhetoric, that jurors who are to pass judgment on the person of a stranger and on a case which does not personally concern them (so that apart from the duty of acting as jurors no danger or emolument will come to them) ought to be conciliated and induced by mild and soothing language to have regard for the reputation and safety of the prisoner at the bar.
Quippe recte et utiliter in disciplinis rhetorum praecipitur, iudices de capite alieno deque causa ad sese non pertinenti cognituros, ex qua praeter officium iudicandi nihil ad eos vel periculi vel emolumenti redundaturum est, conciliandos esse ac propitiandos placabiliter et leniter existimationi salutique eius qui apud eos accusatus est.
But when the common prestige, honour and advantage of all are involved, and therefore one must advise what is to be done, or what must be put off that has already been begun, then one who busies oneself with an introduction designed to make his hearers friendly and kindly disposed towards himself wastes his efforts in needless talk. For the common interests and dangers have themselves already disposed the jurors to listen to advice, and it is rather they themselves that demand good-will on the part of their counsellor.
At cum dignitas et fides et utilitas omnium communis agitur, ob eamque rem aut suadendum quid ut fiat, aut, fieri iam coepto, differendum est, tum qui se in eiusmodi principiis occupat, ut benivolos benignosque sibi auditores paret, otiosam operam in non necessariis verbis sumit.Iamdudum enim negotia, pericula ipsa rerum communia consiliis eos capiendis conciliant et ipsi potius sibi exposcunt consultoris benivolentiam.
But when Tiro says that Cato admitted that the Rhodians did not wish the Romans to fight as successfully as they did, and king Perses to be conquered by the Roman people, and when he asserts that he declared that not the Rhodians alone, but many other nations too, had the same feeling, but that this availed nothing in excuse or extenuation of their fault—in this very first point Tiro is guilty of a shameless lie. He quotes Cato's words, yet misrepresents him by giving them a false interpretation.
Sed quod ait confessum Catonem noluisse Rodiensis ita depugnari, ut depugnatum est, neque regem Persem a populo Romano vinci, atque id eum dixisse non Rodienses modo, sed multas quoque alias nationes noluisse, sed id nihil ad purgandum extenuandumve crimen valere, iam hoc primum Tiro inprobe mentitur.Verba ponit Catonis et aliis tamen eum verbis calumniatur.
For Cato does not admit that the Rhodians did not wish the Roman people to be victorious, but said that he thought they did not; and this was unquestionably an expression of his own opinion, not an concession of the guilt of the Rhodians.
Non enim Cato confitetur noluisse Rodienses victoriam esse populi Romani, sed sese arbitrari dixit id eos noluisse, quod erat procul dubio opinionis suae professio, non Rodiensium culpae confessio.
On this point, in my judgment at least, Cato is not only free from reproach, but is even deserving of praise and admiration. For he apparently expressed a frank and conscientious opinion adverse to the Rhodians; but then, having established confidence in his candour, he so changed and shifted that very statement which seemed to militate against them, that on that account alone it seemed right that they should be more highly esteemed and beloved by the people of Rome; inasmuch as they took no steps to aid the king, although they wished him to succeed and although his success would have been to their advantage.
In qua re, ut meum quidem iudicium est, non culpa tantum vacat, sed dignus quoque laude admirationeque est, cum et ingenue ac religiose dicere visus est contra Rodienses quod sentiebat et, parta sibi veritatis fide, ipsum illud tamen, quod contrarium putabatur, flexit et transtulit, ut eos idcirco vel maximemaxine aequum esset acceptiores carioresque fieri populo Romano, quod cum et utile iis esset et vellent regi esse factum, nihil tamen adiuvandi eius gratia fecerunt.
Later on, Tiro quotes the following words from the same speech: “Shall we, then, of a sudden abandon these great services given and received and this strong friendship? Shall we be the first to do what we say they merely wished to do?”
Postea verba haec ex eadem oratione ponit: “Ea nunc derepente tanta beneficia ultro citroque, tantam amicitiam relinquemus? quod illos dicimus voluisse facere, id nos priores facere occupabimus?”
“This,” says Tiro, “is a worthless and faulty argument. For it might be replied: 'Certainly we shall anticipate them, for if we do not, we shall be caught unawares and must fall into the snares against which we failed to guard in advance.'
“Hoc,” inquit, “enthymema nequam et vitiosum est. Responderi enim potuit: ‘Occupabimus certe; nam, si non occupaverimusoccupaverimnus, opprimemur incidendumque erit in insidias a quibus ante non caverimus.’”
Lucilius,” he says,justly criticizes the poet Euripides for this reason, that when king Polyphontes declared that he had killed his brother, because his brother had previously planned to slay him, Meropa, his brother's wife, confuted the king with these words:If, as you say, my husband planned your death,You too should only plan, till that time came.
“Recteque,” inquit, “hoc vitio dat Lucilius poetae Euripidae, quod, cum Polyphontes rex propterea se interfecisse fratrem diceret, quod ipse ante de nece eius consilium cepisset, Meropa fratris uxor hisce adeo eum verbis eluserit:Εἰ γάρ γάρ σʼ ἔμελλεν, ὡς σὺ φής, κτείνειν πόσις,Χρὴ καὶ σὲ μέλλειν, ὡς χρόνος παρήλυθεν.”
But that,says Tiro, “is altogether full of absurdity, to wish to do something, and yet have the design and purpose of never doing what you wish to do.”
“At hoc enim,” inquit, “plane stultitiae plenum est, eo consilio atque ea fini facere velle aliquid, uti numquam id facias quod velis.”
But, as a matter of fact, Tiro failed to observe that the reason for taking precautions is not the same in all cases, and that the occupations and actions of human life, and the obligations of anticipation or postponement or even of taking vengeance or precautions, are not like a combat of gladiators. For to a gladiator ready to fight the fortune of battle offers the alternative, either to kill, if he should conquer, or to die, if he should yield.
Sed videlicet Tiro animum non advertit non esse in omnibus rebus cavendis eandem causam, neque humanae vitae negotia et actiones et officiaofiicia vel occupandi vel differendi vel etiam ulciscendi vel cavendi similia esse pugnae gladiatoriae.
But the life of men in general is not restricted by such unfair or inevitable necessities that one must be first to commit an injury in order to avoid suffering injury.
Nam gladiatori composito ad pugnandum pugnae haec proposita sors est, aut occidere, si occupaverit, aut occumbere, si cessaverit.
In fact, such conduct was so alien to the humanity of the Roman people that they often forbore to avenge the wrongs inflicted upon them.
Hominum autem vita non tam iniquis neque tam indomitisindoimitis necessitatibus conscripta est, ut idcirco prior iniuriam facere debeas, quam nisi feceris pati possis.Quod tantum aberat a populi Romani mansuetudine, ut saepe iam in sese factas iniurias ulcisci neglexerit.
Then Tiro says that later in that same speech Cato used arguments that were disingenuous and excessively audacious, not suited to the character which Cato showed at other times, but cunning and deceitful, resembling the subtleties of the Greek sophists. “For although,” says he, “he charged the Rhodians with having wished to make war on the Roman people, he declared that they did not deserve punishment, because they had not made war in spite of their strong desire to do so.”
Post deinde usum esse Catonem dicit in eadem oratione argumentisargutnentis parum honestis et nimis audacibus ac non viri qui alioqui fuit, sed vafris ac fallaciosis et quasi Graecorum sophistarum sollertiis.
He says that Cato introduced what the logicians call an e)pagwgh/, a most treacherous and sophistical device. designed not so much for the truth as for cavil, since by deceptive examples he tried to establish and prove that no one who wished to do wrong deserved to be punished, unless he actually accomplished his desire. Now Cato's words in that speech are as follows: “He who uses the strongest language against them says that they wished to be our enemies.
“Nam cum obiceretur,” inquit, “Rodiensibus quod bellum populo Romano facere voluissent, negavit poena esse dignos, quia id non fecissent, etsi maxime voluissent,” induxisseque eum dicit quam dialectici ἐπαγωγήν appellant, rem admodum insidiosam et sophisticam neque ad veritates magis quam ad captiones repertam, cum conatus sit exemplis decipientibus conligere confirmareque, neminem qui male facere voluit plecti aequum esse, nisi quod factum voluit etiam fecerit.
Pray is there any one of you who, so far as he is concerned, would think it fair to suffer punishment because he is accused of having wished to do wrong? No one, I think; for so far as I am concerned, I should not.” Then a little farther on he says: “What? Is there any law so severe as to provide that if anyone wish to do so and so, he be fined a thousand sesterces, provided that be less than half his property;
Verba autem ex ea oratione M. Catonis haec sunt; “Qui acerrime adversus eos dicit, ita dicit ‘hostes voluisse fieri.’ Ecquis est tandem, qui vestrorum, quod ad sese attineat, aequum censeat poenas dare ob eam rem, quod arguatur male facere voluisse? Nemo, opinor; nam ego, quod ad me attinet, nolim.”
if anyone shall desire to have more than five hundred acres, let the fine be so much; if anyone shall wish to have a greater number of cattle, let the fine be thus and so. In fact, we all wish to have more, and we do so with impunity.” Later he continues: “But if it is not right for honour to be conferred because anyone says that he wished to do well, but yet did not do so, shall the Rhodians suffer, not because they did wrong, but because they are said to have wished to do wrong?”
Deinde paulo infra dicit: “Quid nunc? Ecqua tandem lex est tam acerba, quae dicat ‘si quis illud facere voluerit, mille, minus dimidium familiae, multa esto; si quis plus quingenta iugera habere voluerit, tanta poena esto; si quis maiorem pecuum numerum habere voluerit, tantum damnas esto?’ Atqui nos omnia plura habere volumus et id nobis impune est.”
With such arguments Tullius Tiro says that Marcus Cato strove to show that the Rhodians also ought not to be punished, because although they had wished to be enemies of the Roman people, they had actually not been such.
Postea ita dicit: “Sed si honorem non aequum est haberi ob eam rem, quod bene facere voluisse quis dicit neque fecit tamen, Rodiensibus oberit, quod non male fecerunt, sed quia voluisse dicuntur facere?”
Furthermore, he says that it cannot be denied that to wish to have more than five hundred acres, which was forbidden by Stolo's bill, is not exactly the same thing as to wish to make an unjust and unrighteous war upon the Roman people;
His argumentis Tiro Tullius M. Catonem contendere et conficere dicit Rodiensibus quoque impune esse debere, quod hostes quidem esse populi Romani voluissent, ut qui maxime non fuissent.
also that it could not be denied that rewards and punishments belong to different categories. “For services,” he says, “that are promised should be awaited, and not rewarded until they are performed; but in the case of threatening injuries, it is fair to guard against them rather than wait for them.
Dissimulari autem non posse ait quin paria et consimilia non sint, plus quingenta iugera habere velle, quod plebiscito Stolonis prohibitum fuit, et bellum iniustum atque impium populo Romano facere velle, neque item infitiari posse quin alia causa in praemio sit, alia in poenis.
For it is an admission of the greatest folly,” he declares, “not to go to meet wickedness that is planned, but to await and expect it, and then, when it has been committed and accomplished, at last to inflict punishment, when what is done cannot be undone.”
“Nam beneficia,” inquit, “promissa opperiri oportet neque ante remunerari quam facta sint, iniurias autem imminentis praecavisse iustum est quam expectavisse.”
These are the criticisms which Tiro passed upon Cato, not altogether pointless or wholly unreasonable;
“Summa enim professio stultitiae,” inquit, “est, non ire obviam sceleribus cogitatis, sed manere opperirique ut, cum admissa et perpetrata fuerint, tum denique, ubi quae facta sunt infecta fieri non possunt, poeniantur.”
but as a matter of fact, Cato did not leave this e)pagwgh/ bare, isolated and unsupported, but he propped it up in various ways and clothed it with many other arguments.
Haec Tiro in Catonem non nimis frigide neque sane inaniter;
Furthermore, since lie had an eye as much to the interests of the State as to those of the Rhodians, he regarded nothing that he said or did in that matter as discreditable, provided he strove by every kind of argument to save our allies. And first of all, he very cleverly sought to find actions which are prohibited, not by natural or by international law, but by statutes passed to remedy some evil or meet an emergency;
sed enim Cato non nudam nec solitariam nec inprotectam hanc ἐπαγωγήν facit, sed multis eam modis praefulcit multisque aliis argumentis convelat et, quia non Rodiensibus magis quam reipublicae consultabat, nihil sibi dictu factuque in ea re turpe duxit, quin omni sententiarum via servatum ire socios niteretur.
such for example as the one which limited the number of cattle or the amount of land. In such cases that which is forbidden cannot lawfully be done; but to wish to do it, if it should be allowed, is not dishonourable.
Ac primum ea non incallide conquisivit, quae non iure naturae aut iure gentium fieri prohibentur, sed iure legum rei alicuius medendae aut temporis causa iussarum; sicut est de numero pecoris et de modo agri praefinito.
And then he gradually compared and connected such actions as these with that which in itself it is neither lawful to do nor to wish to do.
In quibus rebus quod prohibitum est fieri quidem per leges non licet; velle id tamen facere, si liceat, inhonestum non est.
Then finally, in order that the impropriety of the comparison may not become evident, he defends it by numerous bulwarks, not laying great stress on those trivial and ideal censures of unlawful desires, such as form the arguments of philosophers in their leisure moments, but striving with might and main for one single end, namely, that the cause of the Rhodians, whose friendship it was to the interests of the commonwealth to retain, should be shown either to be just, or in any event, at least pardonable. Accordingly, he now affirms that the Rhodians did not make war and did not desire to do so; but again he declares that only acts should be considered and judged, and that mere empty wishes are liable neither to laws nor punishment; sometimes, however, as if admitting their guilt, he asks that they be pardoned and shows that forgiveness is expedient in human relations, arousing fear of popular outbreaks, if pardon is not granted, and on the other hand showing that if they forgive, the greatness of the Roman people will be maintained.
Atque eas res contulit sensim miscuitque cum eo, quod neque facere neque velle per sese honestum est; tum deinde, ne disparilitas conlationis evidens fieret, pluribus id propugnaculis defensat, neque tenues istas et enucleatas voluntatum in rebus illicitis reprehensiones, qualia in philosophorum otio disputantur, magni facit, sed id solum summa ope nititur, ut causa Rodiensium, quorum amicitiam retineri ex republica fuit, aut aequa iudicaretur aut quidem certe ignoscenda. Atque interim neque fecisse Rodienses bellum neque facere voluisse dicit, interim autem facta sola censenda dicit atque in iudicium vocanda, sed voluntates nudas inanesque neque legibus neque poenis fieri obnoxias; interdum tamen, quasi deliquisse eos concedat, ignosci postulat et ignoscentias utiles esse rebus humanis docet ac, nisi ignoscant, metus in republica rerum novarum movet; sed enim contra, si ignoscatur, conservatum iri ostendit populi Romani magnitudinem.