1. On the origin of the term terra Italia, or “the land of Italy”; of that fine which is called “supreme”; concerning the reason for the name and on the Aternian law; and in what words the “smallest” fine used to be pronounced in ancient days. TIMAEUS, in the History which he composed in the Greek language about the affairs of the Roman people, and Marcus Varro in his Human Antiquities, wrote that the land of Italy derived its name from a Greek word, oxen in the old Greek tongue being called i)taloi/; for in Italy there was a great abundance of cattle, and in that land pastures are numerous and grazing is a frequent employment. Furthermore, we may infer that it was for the same reason—namely, since Italy at that time so abounded in cattle—that the fine was established which is called “supreme,” consisting of two sheep and thirty oxen each day, obviously proportionate to the abundance of oxen and the scarcity of sheep. But when a fine of that sort, consisting of cattle and sheep, was pronounced by a magistrate, oxen and sheep were brought, now of small, again of greater value; and this made the penalty of the fine unequal. Therefore later, by the Aternian law, the value of a sheep was fixed at ten pieces of brass, of the cattle at a hundred apiece. Now the “smallest” fine is that of one sheep. The “supreme” fine is of that number which we have mentioned, beyond which it is not lawful to impose a fine for a period of successive days; and for that reason it is called “supreme,” that is, greatest and heaviest. When therefore even now, according to ancient usage, either the “smallest” or the “supreme” fine is pronounced by Roman magistrates, it is regularly observed that oves (“sheep”) be given the masculine gender; and Marcus Varro has thus recorded the words of the law by which the smallest fine was pronounced: “Against Marcus Terentius, since, though summoned, he has neither appeared nor been excused, I pronounce a fine of one sheep (unum ovem)”; and they declared that the fine did not appear to be legal unless that gender was used. Furthermore, Marcus Varro, in the twenty-first book of his Human Antiquities, also says that the word for fine (multa) is itself not Latin, but Sabine, and he remarks that it endured even to within his own memory in the speech of the Samnites, who are sprung from the Sabines. But the upstart herd of grammarians have asserted that this word, like some others, is used on the principle of opposites. Furthermore, since it is a usage and custom in language for us to say even now, as the greater number of the early men did, multam dixit and multa dicta est, I have thought it not out of place to note that Marcus Cato spoke otherwise. For in the fourth book of his Origins are these words: “Our commander, if anyone has gone to battle out of order, imposes (facit) a fine upon him.” But it may seem that Cato changed the word with an eye to propriety, since the fine was imposed in camp and in the army, not pronounced in the comitium or in the presence of the people.
1. De origine vocabuli “terrae Italiae”; deque ea multa quae suprema appellatur deque eius nominis ratione ac de lege Aternia; et quibus verbis antiquitus multa minima dici solita sit. TIMAEUS in Historiis quas oratione Graeca de rebus populi Romani composuit, et M. Varro in Antiquitatibus Rerum Humanarum,terram Italiam de Graeco vocabulo appellatam scripserunt, quoniam boves Graeca vetere lingua ἰταλοί vocitati sint, quorum in Italia magna copia fuerit, bucetaque in ea terra gigni pascique solita sint complurima. Coniectare autem possumus ob eandem causam, quod Italia tunc esset armentosissima multam, quae appellatur “suprema” institutam in dies singulos duarum ovium, boum triginta, pro copia scilicet boumbourn proque ovium penuria. Sed cum eiusmodi multa pecoris armentique a magistratibus dicta erat, adigebantur boves ovesque alias pretii parvi, alias maioris, eaque res faciebat inaequalem multae poenitionem. Idcirco postea lege Aternia constituti sunt in oves singulas aeris deni, in boves aeris centeni. “Minima” autem multa est ovis unius. “Suprema” multa est eius numeri cuius diximus, ultra quem multam dicere in dies singulos ius non est, et propterea “suprema” appellatur, id est summa et maxima. Quando igitur nunc quoque a magistratibus populi Romani more maiorum multa dicitur vel minima vel suprema, observari solet ut “oves” genere virili appellentur; atque ita M. Varro verba haec legitima, quibus minima multa diceretur, concepit: “M. Terentio, quando citatus neque respondit neque excusatus est, ego ei unum ovem multam dico”; ac nisi eo genere diceretur, negaverunt iustam videri multam. Vocabulum autem ipsum “multae” idem M. Varro in uno vicesimo Rerum Humanarum non Latinum, sed Sabinum esse dicit, idque ad suam memoriam mansisse ait in lingua Samnitium, qui sunt a Sabinis orti. Sed turba grammaticorum novicia κατʼ ἀντίφρασιν, ut quaedam alia, hoc quoque dici tradiderunt. Cum autem usus et mos sermonum is sit, ut ita et nunc loquamur, ut plerique veterum locuti sunt: “multam dixit” et “multa dicta est,” non esse abs re putavi notare quod M. Cato aliter dixit. Nam in quarto Originum verba haec sunt: “Imperator noster, si quis extra ordinem depugnatum ivit, ei multam facit.” Potest autem videri consulta elegantia mutasse verbum, cum in castris et in exercitu multa fieret, non in comitio nec ad populum diceretur.
2. That the word elegantia in earlier days was not used of a more refined nature, but of excessive fastidiousness in dress and mode of life, and was a term of reproach. IT was not customary to call a man elegans, or “elegant,” by way of praise, but up to the time of Marcus Cato that word as a rule was a reproach, not a compliment. And this we may observe both in some other writers, and also in the work of Cato entitled Carmen de Moribus. In this book is the following passage: “They thought that avarice included all the vices; whoever was considered extravagant, ambitious, elegant, vicious or good-fornothing received praise.” It is evident from these words that in days of old the “elegant” man was so called, not because of refinement of character, but because he was excessively particular and extravagant in his attire and mode of life. Later, the “elegant” man ceased indeed to be reproached, but he was deemed worthy of no commendation, unless his elegance was very moderate. Thus Marcus Tullius commended Lucius Crassus and Quintus Scaevola, not for mere elegance, but for elegance combined with great frugality. “Crassus,” he says, “was the most frugal of elegant men; Scaevola the most elegant of the frugal.” Besides this, in the same work of Cato, I recall also these scattered and cursory remarks: “It was the custom,” says he, “to dress becomingly in the forum, at home to cover their nakedness. They paid more for horses than for cooks. The poetic art was not esteemed. If anyone devoted himself to it, or frequented banquets, he was called a 'ruffian.'” This sentiment too, of conspicuous truthfulness, is to be found in the same work: “Indeed, human life is very like iron. If you use it, it wears out; if you do not, it is nevertheless consumed by rust. In the same way we see men worn out by toil; if you toil not, sluggishness and torpor are more injurious than toil.”
2. Quod “elegantia” apud antiquiores, non de amoeniore ingenio, sed de nitidiore cultu atque victu dicebatur, eaque in vitio ponebatur. “ELEGANS” homo non dicebatur cum laude, set id fere verbum ad aetatem M. Catonis vitii, non laudis fuit. Est namque hoc animadvertere, cum in quibusdam aliis, tum in libro Catonis qui inscriptus est Carmen De Moribus. Ex quo libro verba haec sunt: “Avaritiam omnia vitia habere putabant; sumptuosus, cupidus, elegans, vitiosus, inritus qui habebatur, is laudabatur”; ex quibus verbis apparet, “elegantem” dictum antiquitus non ab ingenii elegantia, sed qui nimis lecto amoenoque cultu victuque esset. Postea “elegans” reprehendi quidem desiit, sed laude nulla dignabatur, nisi cuius elegantia erat moderatissima. Sic M. Tullius L. Crasso et Q. Scaevolae non meram elegantiam, set multa parsimonia mixtam, laudi dedit: “Crassus,” inquit, “erat parcissimus elegantium, Scaevola parcorum elegantissimus.” Praeterea ex eodem libro Catonis haec etiam sparsim et intercise commeminimus: “Vestiri,” inquit, “in foro honeste mos erat, domi quod satis erat. Equos carius quam coquos emebant. Poeticae artis honos non erat. Si quis in ea re studebat aut sese ad convivia adplicabat, ‘crassator’ vocabatur.” Illa quoque ex eodem libro praeclarae veritatis sententia est: “Nam vita,” inquit, “humana prope uti ferrum est. Si exerceas, conteritur; si non exerceas, tamen robigo interficit. Item homines exercendo videmus conteri; si nihil exerceas, inertia atque torpedo plus detrimenti facit quam exercitio.”
3. The nature and degree of the variety of usage in the particle pro; and some examples of the differences. WHEN I have leisure from legal business, and walk or ride for the sake of bodily exercise, I have the habit sometimes of silently meditating upon questions that are trifling indeed and insignificant, even negligible in the eyes of the uneducated, but are nevertheless highly necessary for a thorough understanding of the early writers and a knowledge of the Latin language. For example, lately in the retirement of Praeneste, as I was taking my evening walk alone, I began to consider the nature and degree of variety in the use of certain particles in the Latin language; for instance, in the preposition pro. For I saw that we had one use in “the priests passed a decree in the name of their order,” and another in “that a witness who had been called in said by way of testimony”; that Marcus Cato used it in still another way in the fourth book of his Origins: “The battle was fought and ended before the camp,” and also in the fifth book: “That all the islands and cities were in favour of the Illyrian land.” Also “before the temple of Castor” is one form of expression, “on the rostra” another, “before, or on, the tribunal” another, “in presence of the assembly” another, and “the tribune of the commons interposed a veto in view of his authority” still another. Now, I thought that anyone who imagined that all these expressions were wholly alike and equal, or were entirely different, was in error; for I was of the opinion that this variety came from the same origin and source, but yet that its end was not the same. And this surely anyone will easily understand, if he attentively considers the question and has a somewhat extensive use and knowledge of the early language.
3. Qualis quantaque sit “pro” particulae varietas; deque exemplis eius varietatis. QUANDO ab arbitriis negotiisque otium est et motandi corporis gratia aut spatiamur aut vectamur, quaerere nonnumquam aput memet ipsum soleo res eiusmodi, parvas quidem minutasque et hominibus non bene eruditis aspernabiles, sed ad veterum scripta penitus noscenda et ad scientiam linguae Latinae cumprimis necessarias; velut est, quod forte nuper in Praenestino recessu vespertina ambulatione solus ambulans, considerabam qualis quantaque esset particularum quarundam in oratione Latina varietas. Quod genus est praepositio “pro.” Aliter enim dici videbam “pontifices pro conlegio decrevisse,” aliter “quempiam testem introductum pro testimonio dixisse,” aliter M. Catonem in Originum quarto: “Proelium factum depugnatumque pro castris” scripsisse et item in quinto: “Urbes insulasque omnis pro agro Illyrio esse,” aliter etiam dici “pro aede Castoris,” aliter “pro rostris,” aliter “pro tribunali,” aliter “pro contione” atque aliter “tribunum plebis pro potestate intercessisse.” Sed has omnes dictiones qui aut omnino similes et pares aut usquequaque diversas existimaret, errare arbitrabar; nam varietatem istam eiusdem quidem fontis et capitis, non eiusdem tamen esse finis putabam. Quod profecto facile intelleget, si quis adhibeat ad meditationem suam intentionem et habeat veteris orationis usum atque notitiam celebriorem.
4. How Quintus Ennius rivalled certain verses of Euripides. IN the Hecuba of Euripides there are some verses remarkable and brilliant in their diction, their thought and their terseness. Hecuba is speaking to Ulysses:Thine high repute, how ill soe'er thou speak'st,Shall sway them; for the same speech carrieth notLike weight from men contemned and men revered.These verses Quintus Ennius, when he translated that tragedy, rivalled with no little success. The verses of Ennius are the same in number, as follows:Though thou speak'st ill, thou wilt the Achivi sway;The selfsame words and speech have other weightWhen spoken by the great and by the obscure.Ennius, as I have said, did well; but yet ignobiles and opulenti do not seem to express the full force of a)docou/ntwn and dokou/ntwn; for not all who are obscure are contemned, nor are the great all revered.
4. Quem in modum Q. Ennius versus Euripidi aemulatus sit. EURIPIDIS versus sunt in Hecuba verbis, sententia, brevitate insignes inlustresque; Hecuba est ad Ulixen dicens:Τὸ δʼ ἀξίωμα, κἂν κακῶς λέγῃ, τὸ σὸνΝικᾷ· λόγος γὰρ ἔκ τʼ ἀδοξούντων ἰὼνΚἀκ τῶν δοκούντων αὐτός, οὐ ταὐτὸν σθένει Hos versus Q. Ennius, cum eam tragoediam verteret, non sane incommode aemulatus est. Versus totidem Enniani hi sunt:Haéc tu etsi pervérse dices, fácile Achivos fléxeris;Nám opulenti cúm locuntur páriter atque ignóbiles,Éadem dicta eadémque oratio aéqua non aequé valet.Bene, sicuti dixi, Ennius; sed “ignobiles” tamen et “opulenti” ἀντὶ ἀδοξούντων καὶ δοκούντων satisfacere sententiae non videntur; nam neque omnes ignobiles ἀδοξοῦσι neque omnes opulenti εὐδοξοῦσιν.
5. Some brief notes about the Pyrronian philosophers and the Academics; and of the difference between them. THOSE whom we call the Pyrronian philosophers are designated by the Greek name skeptikoi/, or “sceptics,” which means about the same as “inquirers” and “investigators.” For they decide nothing and determine nothing, but are always engaged in inquiring and considering what there is in all nature concerning which it is possible to decide and determine. And moreover they believe that they do not see or hear anything clearly, but that they undergo and experience something like seeing and hearing; but they are in doubt as to the nature and character of those very things which cause them those experiences, and they deliberate about them: and they declare that in everything assurance and absolute truth seem so beyond our grasp, owing to the mingling and confusing of the indications of truth and falsehood, that any man who is not rash and precipitate in his judgment ought to use the language which they say was used by Pyrro, the founder of that philosophy: “Does not this matter stand so, rather than so, or is it neither?” For they deny that proofs of anything and its real qualities can be known and understood, and they try in many ways to point this out and demonstrate it. On this subject Favorinus too with great keenness and subtlety has composed ten books, which he entitled Purrwnei=oi Tro/poi, or The Pyrronian Principles. It is besides a question of long standing, which has been discussed by many Greek writers, whether the Pyrronian and Academic philosophers differ at all, and to what extent. For both are called “sceptics, inquirers and doubters,” since both affirm nothing and believe that nothing is understood. But they say that appearances, which they call fantasi/ai, are produced from all objects, not according to the nature of the objects themselves, but according to the condition of mind or body of those to whom those appearances come. Therefore they call absolutely all things that affect men's senses ta\ pro/s ti. This expression means that there is nothing at all that is self-dependent or which has its own power and nature, but that absolutely all things have “reference to something else” and seem to be such as their appearance is while they are seen, and such as they are formed by our senses, to which they come, not by the things themselves, from which they have proceeded. But although the Pyrronians and the Academics express themselves very much alike about these matters, yet they are thought to differ from each other both in certain other respects and especially for this reason—because the Academics do, as it were, “comprehend” the very fact that nothing can be comprehended, and, as it were, decide that nothing can be decided, while the Pyrronians assert that not even that can by any means be regarded as true, because nothing is regarded as true.
5. De Pyrronis philosophis quaedam deque Academicis strictim notata; deque inter eos differentia. Quos Pyrronios philosophos vocamus, hi Graeco cognomento σκεπτικοί appellantur; id ferme significat quasi “quaesitores” et “consideratores.” Nihil enim decernunt, nihil constituunt, sed in quaerendo semper considerandoque sunt quidnam sit omnium rerum de quo decerni constituique possit. Ac ne videre quoque plane quicquam neque audire sese putant, sed ita pati adficique quasi videant vel audiant, eaque ipsa quae adfectiones istas in sese efficiant, qualia et cuiusmodi sint cunctantur atque insistunt, omniumque rerum fidem veritatemque mixtis confusisque signis veri atque falsi ita inprensibilem videri aiunt, ut quisquis homo est non praeceps neque iudicii sui prodigus his uti verbis debeat quibus auctorem philosophiae istius Pyrronem esse usum tradunt: οὐ μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει τόδε ἢ ἐκείνως ἢ οὐθετέρως. Indicia enim rei cuiusque et sinceras proprietates negant posse nosci et percipi, idque ipsum docere atque ostendere multis modis conantur. Super qua re Favorinus quoque subtilissime argutissimeque decem libros composuit, quos Πυρρωνείων Τρόπων inscribit. Vetus autem quaestio et a multis scriptoribus Graecis tractata, an quid et quantum Pyrronios et Academicos philosophos intersit. Utrique enim σκεπτικοί, ἐφεκτικοί, ἀπορητικοί dicuntur, quoniam utrique nihil adfirmant nihilque comprehendi putant. Sed ex omnibus rebus proinde visa dicunt fieri, quas φαντασίας appellant, non ut rerum ipsarum natura est, sed ut adfectio animi corporisve est eorum, ad quos ea visa perveniunt. Itaque omnes omnino res quae sensus hominum movent, τῶν πρός τι esse dicunt. Id verbum significat nihil esse quicquam quod ex sese constet nec quod habeat vim propriam et naturam, sed omnia prorsum ad aliquid referri taliaque videri qualis sit eorum species dum videntur, qualiaque apud sensus nostros, quo pervenerunt, creantur, non apud sese, unde profecta sunt. Cum haec autem consimiliter tam Pyrronii dicant quam Academici, differre tamen inter sese et propter alia quaedam et vel maxime propterea existimati sunt, quod Academici quidem ipsum illud nihil posse comprehendi quasi comprehendunt, et nihil posse decerni quasi decernunt, Pyrronii ne id quidem ullo pacto verum videri dicunt, quod nihil esse verum videtur.
6. That at Rome women did not swear by Hercules nor men by Castor. IN our early writings neither do Roman women swear by Hercules nor the men by Castor. But why the women did not swear by Hercules is evident, since they abstain from sacrificing to Hercules. On the other hand, why the men did not name Castor in oaths is not easy to say. Nowhere, then, is it possible to find an instance, among good writers, either of a woman saying “by Hercules” or a man, “by Castor”; but edepol, which is an oath by Pollux, is common to both man and woman. Marcus Varro, however, asserts that the earliest men were wont to swear neither by Castor nor by Pollux, but that this oath was used by women alone and was taken from the Eleusinian initiations; that gradually, however, through ignorance of ancient usage, men began to say edepol, and thus it became a customary expression; but that the use of “by Castor” by a man appears in no ancient writing.
6. Quod mulieres Romae per Herculem non iuraverint neque viri per Castorem. IN veteribus scriptis neque mulieres Romanae per Herculem deiurant neque viri per Castorem. Sed cur illae non iuraverint Herculem non obscurum est, nam Herculaneo sacrificio abstinent. Cur autem viri Castorem iurantes non appellaverint non facile dictu est. Nusquam igitur scriptum invenire est, apud idoneos quidem scriptores, aut “me hercle” feminam dicere aut “me castor” virum; “edepol” autem, quod iusiurandum per Pollucem est, et viro et feminae commune est. Sed M. Varro adseverat antiquissimos viros neque per Castorem neque per Pollucem deiurare solitos, sed id iusiurandum fuisse tantum feminarum, ex initiis Eleusinis acceptum; paulatim tamen inscitia antiquitatis viros dicere “edepol” coepisse factumque esse ita dicendi morem, sed “me castor” a viro dici in nullo vetere scripto inveniri.
7. That very old words which have become antiquated and obsolete ought not to be used. To use words that are too antiquated and worn out, or those which are unusual and of a harsh and unpleasant novelty, seems to be equally faulty. But for my own part I think it more offensive and censurable to use words that are new, unknown and unheard of, than those that are trite and mean. Furthermore, I maintain that those words also seem new which are out of use and obsolete, even though they are of ancient date. In fact, it is a common fault of lately acquired learning, or o)yimaqi/a as the Greeks call it, to make a great point anywhere and everywhere, and in connection with any subject whatever, to talk about what you have never learned and of which you were long ignorant, when at last you have begun to know something about it. For instance, at Rome in my presence a man of experience and celebrated as a pleader, who had acquired a sudden and, so to speak, haphazard kind of education, was speaking before the prefect of the city and wished to say that a certain man lived upon poor and wretched food, ate bread made from bran, and drank flat and spoiled wine: “This Roman knight,” said he, “eats apluda and drinks flocces.” All who were present looked at one another, at first somewhat seriously, with a disturbed and inquiring aspect, wondering what in the world the two words meant; then presently they all burst into a laugh, as if he had said something in Etruscan or Gallic. Now that man had read that the farmers of ancient days called the chaff of grain apluda, and that the word was used by Plautus in the comedy entitled Astraba, if that play be the work of Plautus. He had also heard that flocces in the early language meant the lees of wine pressed from the skins of grapes, corresponding to the dregs of oil from olives. This he had read in the Polumeni of Caecilius, and he had saved up those two words as ornaments for his speeches. Another Einfaltspinsel also, after some little reading of that kind, when his opponent requested that a case be postponed, said: “I pray you, praetor, help me, aid me! How long, pray, shall this bovinator delay me?” And he bawled it out three or four times in a loud voice: “He is a bovinator.” A murmur began to arise from many of those who were present, as if in wonder at this monster of a word. But he, waving his arms and gesticulating, cried: “What, haven't you read Lucilius, who calls a shuffler bovinator?” And, in fact, this verse occurs in Lucilius' eleventh book: If trifling shuffler (bovinator) with abusive tongue.
7. Verbis antiquissimis relictisque iam et desitis minime utendum. VERBIS uti aut nimis obsoletis exculcatisque aut insolentibus novitatisque durae et inlepidae, par esse delictum videtur. Sed molestius equidem culpatiusque esse arbitror verba nova, incognita, inaudita dicere quam involgata et sordentia. Nova autem videri dico etiam ea quae sunt inusitata et desita, etsi sunt vetusta. Est adeo id vitium plerumque serae eruditionis, quam Graeci ὀψιμαθίαν appellant, ut quod numquam didiceris, diu ignoraveris, cum id scire aliquando coeperis, magni facias quo in loco cumque et quacumque in re dicere. Veluti Romae, nobis praesentibus, vetus celebratusque homo in causis, sed repentina et quasi tumultuaria doctrina praeditus, cum apud praefectum urbi verba faceret et dicere vellet inopi quendam miseroque victu vivere et furfureum panem esitare, vinumque eructum et fetidum potare, “Hic,” inquit, “eques Romanus apludam edit et flocces bibit.” Aspexerunt omnes qui aderant alius alium, primo tristiores turbato et requirente voltu, quidnam illud utriusque verbi foret; post deinde, quasi nescio quid Tusce aut Gallice dixisset, universi riserunt. Legerat autem ille “apludam” veteres rusticos frumenti furfurem dixisse idque a Plauto in comoedia, si ea Plauti est, quae Astraba inscripta est, positum esse. Item “flocces” audierat prisca voce significare vini faecem e vinaceis expressam, sicuti fraces ex oleis, idque aput Caecilium in Polumenis legerat, eaque sibi duo verba ad orationum ornamenta servaverat. Alter quoque a lectionibus id genus paucis apirocalus, cum adversarius causam differri postularet: “Rogo, praetor,” inquit, “subveni, succurre! quonam usque nos bovinator hic demoratur?” Atque id voce magna ter quaterve inclamavit: “bovinator est.” Commurmuratio fieri coepta est a plerisque qui aderant, quasi monstrum verbi admirantibus. At ille iactans et gestiens: “Non enim Lucilium,” inquit, “legistis, qui tergiversatorem ‘bovinatorem’ dicit?” Est autem in Lucili XI. versus hic:Si tricosus bovinatorque ore improbus duro.
8. What Marcus Cato thought and said of Albinus, who, though a Roman, wrote a history of Rome in the Greek language, having first asked indulgence for his lack of skill in that tongue. MARCUS CATO is said to have rebuked Aulus Albinus with great justice and neatness. Albinus, who had been consul with Lucius Lucullus, composed a Roman History in the Greek language. In the introduction to his work he wrote to this effect: that no one ought to blame him if he had written anything then in those books that was incorrect or inelegant; “for” he continues, “I am a Roman, born in Latium, and the Greek language is quite foreign to me”; and accordingly he asked indulgence and freedom from adverse criticism in case he had made any errors. When Marcus Cato had read this, “Surely, Aulus,” said he, “you are a great trifler in preferring to apologize for a fault rather than avoid it. For we usually ask pardon either when we have erred through inadvertence or done wrong under compulsion. But tell me, I pray you,” said he, “who compelled you to do that for which you ask pardon before doing it.” This is told in the thirteenth book of Cornelius Nepos' work On Famous Men.
8. Quid senserit dixeritque M. Cato de Albino, qui homo Romanus Graeca oratione res Romanas, venia sibi ante eius imperitiae petita, composuit. IUSTE venusteque admodum reprehendisse dicitur Aulum Albinum M. Cato. Albinus, qui cum L. Lucullo consul fuit, res Romanas oratione Graeca scriptitavit. In eius Historiae principio scriptum est ad hanc sententiam: neminem suscensere sibi convenire, si quid in his libris parum composite aut minus eleganter tum scriptum foret; “nam sum,” inquit, “homo Romanus natus in Latio, Graeca oratio a nobis alienissima est,” ideoque veniam gratiamque malae existimationis, si quid esset erratum, postulavit. Ea cum legisset M. Cato: “Ne tu,” inquit, “Aule, nimium nugator es, cum maluisti culpam deprecari quam culpa vacare. Nam petere veniam solemus, aut cum inprudentes erravimus aut cum compulsi peccavimus. Dic,” inquit, “oro te, quis perpulit ut id committeres, quod, priusquam faceres, peteres ut ignosceretur?” Scriptum hoc est in libro Corneli Nepotis De Inlustribus Viris XIII.
9. The story of the Milesian envoys and the orator Demosthenes, found in the works of Critolaus. CRITOLAUS has written that envoys came from Miletus to Athens on public business, perhaps for the purpose of asking aid. Then they engaged such advocates as they chose, to speak for them, and the advocates, according to their instructions, addressed the people in behalf of the Milesians. Demosthenes vigorously opposed the demands of the Milesians, maintaining that the Milesians did not deserve aid, nor was it to the interest of the State to grant it. The matter was postponed to the next day. The envoys came to Demosthenes and begged him earnestly not to speak against them; he asked for money, and received the amount which he demanded. On the following day, when the case was taken up again, Demosthenes, with his neck and shoulders wrapped in thick wool, came forward before the people and said that he was suffering from quinsy and hence could not speak against the Milesians. Then one of the populace cried out that it was, not quinsy, but “silverinsy” from which Demosthenes was suffering. Demosthenes himself too, as Critolaus also relates, did not afterwards conceal that matter, but actually made a boast of it. For when he had asked Aristodemus, the player, what sum he had received for acting, and Aristodemus had replied, “a talent,” Demosthenes rejoined: “Why, I got more than that for holding my tongue.”
9. Historia de legatis Mileti ac Demosthene rhetore in libris Critolai reperta. CRITOLAUS scripsit legatos Mileto publicae rei causa venisse Athenas, fortasse an auxilii petendi gratia. Tum qui pro sese verba facerent quos visum erat advocavisse, aduocatosadvocates, uti erat mandatum, verba pro Milesiis ad populum fecisse, Demosthenen Milesiorum postulatis acriter respondisse, neque Milesios auxilio dignos neque ex republica id esse contendisse; rem in posterum diem prolatam. Legatos ad Demosthenen venisse magnoque opere orasse uti contra ne diceret; eum pecuniam petivisse et quantam petiverat abstulisse. Postridie, cum res agi denuo coepta esset, Demosthenen, lana multa collum cervicesque circumvolutum, ad populum prodisse et dixisse se synanchen pati, eo contra Milesios loqui non quire. Tum e populo unum exclamasse, non “synanchen,” quod Demosthenes pateretur, sed “argyranchen” esse. Ipse etiam Demosthenes, ut idem Critolaus refert, non id postea concelavit, quin gloriae quoque hoc sibi adsignavit. Nam cum interrogasset Aristodemum, actorem fabularum, quantum mercedis, uti ageret, accepisset, et Aristodemus “talentum” respondisset, “At ego plus,” inquit, “accepi, ut tacerem.”
10. That Gaius Gracchus in a speech of his applied the story related above to the orator Demades, and not to Demosthenes; and a quotation of Gracchus' words. THE story which in the preceding chapter we said was told by Critolaus about Demosthenes, Gaius Gracchus, in the speech Against the Aufeian Law, applied to Demades in the following words: “For you, fellow citizens, if you wish to be wise and honest, and if you inquire into the matter, will find that none of us comes forward here without pay. All of us who address you are after something, and no one appears before you for any purpose except to carry something away. I myself, who am now recommending you to increase your taxes, in order that you may the more easily serve your own advantage and administer the government, do not come here for nothing; but I ask of you, not money, but honour and your good opinion. Those who come forward to persuade you not to accept this law, do not seek honour from you, but money from Nicomedes; those also who advise you to accept it are not seeking a good opinion from you, but from Mithridates a reward and an increase of their possessions; those, however, of the same rank and order who are silent are your very bitterest enemies, since they take money from all and are false to all. You, thinking that they are innocent of such conduct, give them your esteem; but the embassies from the kings, thinking it is for their sake that they are silent, give them great gifts and rewards. So in the land of Greece, when a Greek tragic actor boasted that he had received a whole talent for one play, Demades, the most eloquent man of his country, is said to have replied to him: 'Does it seem wonderful to you that you have gained a talent by speaking? I was paid ten talents by the king for holding my tongue.' Just so, these men now receive a very high price for holding their tongues.”
10. Quod C. Gracchus in oratione sua historiam supra scriptam Demadi rhetori, non DemostheniDemostlleni, adtribuit; verbaque ipsius C. Gracchi relata. QUOD in capite superiore a Critolao scriptum esse diximus super Demosthene, id C. Gracchus in oratione, Qua legem Aufeiam dissuasit, in Demaden contulit verbis hisce: “Nam vos, Quirites, si velitis sapientia atque virtute uti, etsi quaeritis, neminem nostrum invenietis sine pretio huc prodire. Omnes nos qui verba facimus aliquid petimus, neque ullius rei causa quisquam ad vos prodit, nisi ut aliquid auferat.” “Ego ipse, qui aput vos verba facio uti vectigalia vestra augeatis, quo facilius vestra commoda et rempublicam administrare possitis, non gratis prodeo; verum peto a vobis, non pecuniam, sed bonam existimationem atque honorem.” “Qui prodeunt dissuasuri ne hanc legem accipiatis, petunt non honorem a vobis, verum a Nicomede pecuniam; qui suadent ut accipiatis, hi quoque petunt non a vobis bonam existimationem, verum a Mitridate rei familiari suae pretium et praemium; qui autem ex eodem loco atque ordine tacent, hi vel acerrimi sunt, nam ab omnibus pretium accipiunt et omnis fallunt.” “Vos, cum putatis eos ab his rebus remotos esse, inpertitis bonam existimationem;” “legationes autem a regibus, cum putant eos sua causa reticere, sumptus atque pecunias maximas praebent, item uti in terra Graecia, quo in tempore Graecus tragoedus gloriae sibi ducebat talentum magnum ob unam fabulam datum esse, homo eloquentissimus civitatis suae Demades ei respondisse dicitur: ‘Mirum tibi videtur, si tu loquendo talentum quaesisti? Ego, ut tacerem, decem talenta a rege accepi.’ Item nunc isti pretia maxima ob tacendum accipiunt.”
11. The words of Publius Nigidius, in which he says that there is a difference between “lying” and “telling a falsehood.” THESE are the very words of Publius Nigidius, a man of great eminence in the pursuit of the liberal arts, whom Marcus Cicero highly respected because of his talent and learning: “There is a difference between telling a falsehood and lying. One who lies is not himself deceived, but tries to deceive another; he who tells a falsehood is himself deceived.” He also adds this: “One who lies deceives, so far as he is able; but one who tells a falsehood does not himself deceive, any more than he can help.” He also had this on the same subject: “A good man,” says he, “ought to take pains not to lie, a wise man, not to tell what is false; the former affects the man himself, the latter does not.” With variety, by Heaven! and neatness has Nigidius distinguished so many opinions relating to the same thing, as if he were constantly saying something new.
11. Verba P. Nigidii, quibus differre dicit “mentiri” et “mendacium dicere.” VERBA sunt ipsa haec P. Nigidii, hominis in studiis bonarum artium praecellentis, quem M. Cicero ingenii doctrinarumque nomine summe reveritus est: “Inter mendacium dicere et mentiri distat. Qui mentitur ipse non fallitur, alterum fallere conatur; qui mendacium dicit, ipse fallitur.” Item hoc addidit: “Qui mentitur,” inquit, “fallit, quantum in se est; at qui mendacium dicit, ipse non fallit, quantum in se est.” Item hoc quoque super eadem re dicit: “Vir bonus,” inquit, “praestare debet ne mentiatur, prudens, ne mendacium dicat; alterum incidit in hominem, alterum non.” Varie me hercule et lepide Nigidius tot sententias in eandem rem, quasi aliud atque aliud diceret, disparavit.