1. A discourse of the philosopher Favorinus, in which he urged a lady of rank to feed with her own milk, and not with that of other nurses, the children whom she had borne.
1. Dissertatio Favorini philosophi, qua suasit nobili feminae uti liberos quos peperisset, non nutricum aliarum, sed sibi suo lacte aleret.
WORD was once brought in my presence to the philosopher Favorinus that the wife of an auditor and disciple of his had been brought to bed a short time before, and that his pupil's family had been increased by the birth of a son.
NUNTIATUM quondam est Favorino philosopho, nobis praesentibus, uxorem auditoris sectatorisque sui paululum ante enixam auctumque eum esse nato filio.“Eamus,” inquit, “et puerum visum et patri gratulatum.”
“Let us go,” said he, “both to see the child and to congratulate the father.” The father was of senatorial rank and of a family of high nobility.
Is erat loci senatorii, ex familia nobiliore. Imus una qui tum aderamus prosecutique eum sumus ad domum quo pergebat, et cum eo simul introgressi sumus.
We who were present at the time went with Favorinus, attended him to the house to which he was bound, and entered it with him. Then the philosopher, having embraced and congratulated the father immediately upon entering, sat down. And when he had asked how long the labour had been and how difficult, and had learned that the young woman, overcome with fatigue and wakefulness, was sleeping, he began to talk at greater length and said: “I have no doubt she will suckle her son herself!”
Tum in primis aedibus complexus hominem congratulatusque adsedit. Atque ubi percontatus est quam diutinum puerperium et quam laboriosi nixus fuissent, puellamque defessam labore ac vigilia somnum capere cognovit, fabulari instituit prolixius et: “Nihil,” inquit, “dubito quin filium lacte suo nutritura sit.”
But when the young woman's mother said to him that she must spare her daughter and provide nurses for the child, in order that to the pains which she had suffered in childbirth there might not be added the wearisome and difficult task of nursing, he said: “I beg you, madam, let her be wholly and entirely the mother of her own child.
Sed cum mater puellae parcendum esse ei diceret adhibendasque puero nutrices, ne ad dolores quos in enitendo tulisset munus quoque nutricationis grave ac difficile accederet, “Oro te,” inquit, “mulier, sine eam totam integram matrem esse filii sui.”
For what kind of unnatural, imperfect and half-motherhood is it to bear a child and at once send it away from her?
“Quod est enim hoc contra naturam inperfectum atque dimidiatum matris genus, peperisse ac statim a sese abiecisse? aluisse in utero sanguine suo nescio quid quod non videret, non alere nunc suo lacte quod videat, iam viventem, iam hominem, iam matris officia inplorantem?”
to have nourished in her womb with her own blood something which she could not see, and not to feed with her own milk what she sees, now alive, now human, now calling for a mother's care?
“An tu quoque,” inquit, “putas naturam feminis mammarum ubera quasi quosdam venustiores naevulos, non liberum alendorum, sed ornandi pectoris causa dedisse?”
Or do you too perhaps think,” said he, "that nature gave women nipples as a kind of beauty-spot, not for the purpose of nourishing their children, but as an adornment of their breast? For it is for that reason though such a thing is of course far from your thoughts) that many of those unnatural women try to dry up and check that sacred fount of the body, the nourisher of mankind, regardless of the danger of diverting and spoiling the milk, because they think it disfigures the charms of their beauty. In so doing they show the same madness as those who strive by evil devices to cause abortion of the fetus itself which they have conceived, in order that their beauty may not be spoiled by the weight of the burden they bear and by the labour of parturition.
“Sic enim, quod a vobis scilicet abest, pleraeque istae prodigiosae mulieres fontem illum sanctissimum corporis, generis humani educatorem, arefacere et extinguere cum periculo quoque aversi corruptique lactis laborant, tamquam pulcritudinis sibi insignia devenustet, quod quidem faciunt eadem vecordia, qua quibusdam commenticiis fraudibus nituntur ut fetus quoque ipsi, in corpore suo concepti, aboriantur, ne aequor illud ventris inrugetur ac de gravitate oneris et labore partus fatiscat.”
But since it is an act worthy of public detestation and general abhorrence to destroy a human being in its inception, while it is being fashioned and given life and is still in the hands of Dame Nature, how far does it differ from this to deprive a child, already perfect, already brought into the world, already a son, of the nourishment of its own familiar and kindred blood?"
“Quod cum sit publica detestatione communique odio dignum, in ipsis hominem primordiis, dum fingitur, dum animatur, inter ipsas artificis naturae manus interfectum ire, quantulum hinc abest, iam perfectum, iam genitum, iam filium proprii atque consueti atque cogniti sanguinis alimonia privare?”“‘Sed nihil interest,’ hoc enim dicitur, ‘dum alatur et vivat, cuius id lacte fiat.’”
"'But it makes no difference,' for so they say, 'provided it be nourished and live, by whose milk that is effected.'
“Cur igitur iste qui hoc dicit, si in capessendis naturae sensibus tam obsurduit, non id quoque nihil interesse putat, cuius in corpore cuiusque ex sanguine concretus homo et coalitus sit?”
Why then does not he who affirms this, if he is so dull in comprehending natural feeling, think that it also makes no difference in whose body and from whose blood a human being is formed and fashioned?
“an quia spiritu multo et calore exalbuit, non idem sanguis est nunc in uberibus, qui in utero fuit?”
Is the blood which is now in the breasts not the same that it was in the womb, merely because it has become white from abundant air and warmth? Is not the wisdom of nature evident also in this, that as soon as the blood, the artificer, has fashioned the whole human body within its secret precincts, when the time for birth comes, it rises into the upper parts, is ready to cherish the first beginnings of life and of light, and supplies the newborn children with the familiar and accustomed food?
“Nonne hac quoque in re sollertia naturae evidens est, quod, postquam sanguis ille opifex in penetralibus suis omne corpus hominis finxit, adventante iam partus tempore, in supernas se partis perfert, ad fovenda vitae atque lucis rudimenta praesto est et recens natis notum et familiarem victum offert?”“Quamobrem non frustra creditum est, sicut valeat ad fingendas corporis atque animi similitudines vis et natura seminis, non secus ad eandem rem lactis quoque ingenia et proprietates valere.”
Therefore it is believed not without reason that, just as the power and nature of the seed are able to form likenesses of body and mind, so the qualities and properties of the milk have the same effect. And this is observed not only in human beings, but in beasts also;
“Neque in hominibus id solum, sed in pecudibus quoque animadversum. Nam si ovium lacte haedi aut caprarum agni alantur, constat ferme in his lanam duriorem, in illis capillum gigni teneriorem.”
for if kids are fed on the milk of ewes, or lambs on that of goats, it is a fact that as a rule the wool is harsher in the former and the hair softer in the latter. In trees too and grain the power and strength of the water and earth which nourish them have more effect in retarding or promoting their growth than have those of the seed itself which is sown;
“In arboribus etiam et frugibus maior plerumque vis et potestas est ad earum indolem vel detrectandam vel augendam aquarum atque terrarum quae alunt, quam ipsius quod iacitur seminis, ac saepe videas arborem laetam et nitentem, in locum alium transpositam, deterioris terrae suco deperisse.”
and you often see a strong and flourishing tree, when transplanted to another spot, die from the effect of an inferior soil. What the mischief, then, is the reason for corrupting the nobility of body and mind of a newly born human being, formed from gifted seeds, by the alien and degenerate nourishment of another's milk? Especially if she whom you employ to furnish the milk is either a slave or of servile origin and, as usually happens, of a foreign and barbarous nation, if she is dishonest, ugly, unchaste and a wine-bibber; for as a rule anyone who has milk at the time is employed and no distinction made."
“Quae, malum, igitur ratio est, nobilitatem istam nati modo hominis corpusque et animum, bene ingeniatis primordiis inchoatum, insitivo degenerique alimento lactis alieni corrumpere? praesertim si ista quam ad praebendum lactem adhibebitis, aut serva aut servilis est et, ut plerumque solet, externae et barbarae nationis est, si inproba, si informis, si inpudica, si temulenta est; nam plerumque sine discrimine, quaecumque id temporis lactans est adhiberi solet.”
"Shall we then allow this child of ours to be infected with some dangerous contagion and to draw a spirit into its mind and body from a body and mind of the worst character?
“Patiemurne igitur infantem hunc nostrum pernicioso contagio infici et spiritum ducere in animum atque in corpus suum ex corpore et animo deterrimo?”
This, by Heaven! is the very reason for what often excites our surprise, that some children of chaste women turn out to be like their parents neither in body nor in mind.
“Id hercle ipsum est quod saepenumero miramur, quosdam pudicarum mulierum liberos parentum suorum neque corporibus neque animis similes existere.”
Wisely then and skilfully did our Maro make use of these lines of Homer:The horseman Peleus never was thy sire,Nor Thetis gave thee birth; but the gray seaBegat thee, and the hard and flinty rocks;So savage is thy mind.For he bases his charge, not upon birth alone, as did his model, but on fierce and savage nurture, for his next verse reads:And fierce Hyrcanian tigers gave thee suck.And there is no doubt that in forming character the disposition of the nurse and the quality of the milk play a great part; for the milk, although imbued from the beginning with the material of the father's seed, forms the infant offspring from the body and mind of the mother as well.
“Scite igitur et perite noster Maro, quod, cum versus illos Homeri consectaretur:οὐκ ἄρα σοί γε πατὴρ ἦν ἱππότα Πηλεύς,Οὐδὲ Θέτις μήτηρ· γλαυκὴ δέ σε τίκτε θάλασσαΠέτραι τʼ ἠλίβατοι, ὅτι τοι νόος ἐστὶν ἀπηνής,non partionem solam, tamquam ille quem sequebatur, sed alituram quoque feram et saevam criminatus est; addidit enim hoc de suo:Hyrcanaeque admorunt ubera tigres,quoniam videlicet in moribus inolescendis magnam fere partem ingenium altricis et natura lactis tenet, quae iam a principio imbuta paterni seminis concretione, ex matris etiam corpore et animo recentem indolem configurat.”
And in addition to all this, who can neglect or despise this consideration also, that those who desert their offspring, drive them from them, and give them to others to nurse, do sever, or at any rate loosen and relax, that bond and cementing of the mind and of affection with which nature attaches parents to their children?
“Et praeter haec autem, quis illud etiam neglegere aspernarique possit, quod quae partus suos deserunt ablegantque a sese et aliis nutriendos dedunt, vinculum illud coagulumque animi atque amoris, quo parentes cum filiis natura consociat, interscindunt aut certe quidem diluunt deteruntque.”
For when the child is given to another and removed from its mother's sight, the strength of maternal ardour is gradually and little by little extinguished, every call of impatient anxiety is silenced, and a child which has been given over to another to nurse is almost as completely forgotten as if it had been lost by death.
“Nam ubi infantis aliorsum dati facta ex oculis amolitiost, vigor ille maternae flagrantiae sensim atque paulatim restinguitur omnisque inpatientissimae sollicitudinis strepitus consilescit, neque multo minor amendati ad nutricem aliam filii, quam morte amissi, obliviost.”
Moreover, the child's own feelings of affection, fondness, and intimacy are centred wholly in the one by whom it is nursed, and therefore, just as happens in the case of those who are exposed at birth, it has no feeling for the mother who bore it and no regret for her loss. Therefore, when the foundations of natural affection have been destroyed and removed, however much children thus reared may seem to love their father and mother, that affection is in a great measure not natural but merely courteous and conventional.
“Ipsius quoque infantis adfectio animi, amoris, consuetudinis in ea sola unde alitur occupatur, et proinde, ut in expositis usu venit, matris quae genuit neque sensum ullum neque desiderium capit. Ac propterea, oblitteratis et abolitis nativae pietatis elementis, quicquid ita educati liberi amare patrem atque matrem videntur, magnam fere partem non naturalis ille amor est, sed civilis et opinabilis.”
" I heard Favorinus make this address in the Greek language. I have reproduced his sentiments, so far as I was able, for the sake of their general utility, but the elegance, copiousness and richness of his words hardly any power of Latin eloquence could equal, least of all my humble attainments.
Haec Favorinum dicentem audivi Graeca oratione. Cuius sententias communis utilitatis gratia, quantum meminisse potui, rettuli, amoenitates vero et copias ubertatesque verborum Latina omnis facundia vix quaedam indipisci potuerit, mea tenuitas nequaquam.
2. That the judgment passed by Annaeus Seneca on Quintus Ennius and Marcus Cicero was trifling and futile. SOME think of Annaeus Seneca as a writer of little value, whose works are not worth taking up, since his style seems commonplace and ordinary, while the matter and the thought are characterized, now by a foolish and empty vehemence, now by an empty and affected cleverness; and because his learning is common and plebeian, gaining neither charm nor distinction from familiarity with the earlier writers. Others, on the contrary, while not denying that his diction lacks elegance, declare that he is not without learning and a knowledge of the subjects which he treats, and that he censures the vices of the times with a seriousness and dignity which are not wanting in charm. I myself do not feel called upon to criticize and pass judgment upon his talents in general, or upon his writings as a whole; but I shall select for consideration the nature of the opinions which he has expressed about Marcus Cicero, Quintus Ennius and Publius Vergilius. For in the twenty-second book of his Moral Epistles, which he addressed to Lucilius, he says that the following verses which Quintus Ennius wrote about Cethegus, a man of the olden time, are absurd:He by his fellow citizens was called,By every man who lived and flourished then,The people's chosen flower, Persuasion's marrow.He then wrote the following about these lines: “I am surprised that men of great eloquence, devoted to Ennius, have praised those absurd verses as his best. Cicero, at any rate, includes them among examples of his good verses.” He then goes on to say of Cicero: “I am not surprised that there existed a man who could write such verses, when there existed a man who could praise them; unless haply Cicero, that great orator, was pleading his own cause and wished his own verse to appear excellent.” Later he adds this very stupid remark: “In Cicero himself too you will find, even in his prose writings, some things which will show that he did not lose his labour when he read Ennius.” Then he cites passages from Cicero which he criticizes as taken from Ennius; for example, when Cicero wrote as follows in his Republic: “As Menelaus, the Laconian, had a kind of sweet-speaking charm,” and said in another place: “he cultivates brevity of speech in his oratory.” And then that trifler apologizes for what he considers Cicero's errors, saying: “This was not the fault of Cicero, but of the times; it was necessary to say such things when such verses were read.” Then he adds that Cicero inserted these very things in order to escape the charge of being too diffuse and ornamental in his style. In the same place Seneca writes the following about Virgil also: “Our Virgil too admitted some verses which are harsh, irregular and somewhat beyond the proper length, with no other motive than that those who were devoted to Ennius might find a flavour of antiquity in the new poem.” But I am already weary of quoting Seneca; yet I shall not pass by these jokes of that foolish and tasteless man: “There are some thoughts in Quintus Ennius,” says he, “that are of such lofty tone that though written among the unwashed, they nevertheless can give pleasure among the anointed”; and, after censuring the verses about Cethegus which I have quoted above, he said: “It would be clear to you that those who love verses of this kind admire even the couches of Sotericus.” Worthy indeed would Seneca appear of the reading and study of the young, a man who has compared the dignity and beauty of early Latin with the couches of Sotericus, implying forsooth that they possessed no charm and were already obsolete and despised! Yet listen to the relation and mention of a few things which that same Seneca has well said, for example what he said of a man who was avaricious, covetous and thirsting for money: “Why, what difference does it make how much you have? There is much more which you do not have.” Is not that well put? Excellently well; but the character of the young is not so much benefited by what is well said, as it is injured by what is very badly put; all the more so, if the bad predominates, and if a part of the bad is uttered, not as an argument about some slight and trivial affair, but as advice in a matter requiring decision.
2. Quod Annaeus Seneca, iudicans de Q. Ennio deque M. Tullio, levi futtilique iudicio fuit. DE Annaeo Seneca partim existimant ut de scriptore minime utili, cuius libros adtingere nullum pretium operae sit, quod oratio eius vulgaria videatur et protrita, res atque sententiae aut inepto inanique impetu sint aut levi et causidicali argutia, eruditio autem vernacula et plebeia nihilque ex veterum scriptis habens neque gratiae neque dignitatis. Alii vero elegantiae quidem in verbis parum esse non infitias eunt, sed et rerum quas dicat scientiam doctrinamque ei non deesse dicunt et in vitiis morum obiurgandis severitatem gravitatemque non invenustam. Mihi de omni eius ingenio deque omni scripto iudicium censuramque facere non necessum est; sed quod de M. Cicerone et Q. Ennio et P. Vergilio iudicavit, ea res cuimodicuiusmodi sit, ad considerandum ponemus. In libro enim vicesimo secundo Epistularum Moralium quas ad Lucilium conposuit, deridiculos versus Q. Ennium de Cetego antiquo viro fecisse hos dicit:is dictust ollis popularibus olimQui tum vivebant homines atque aevum agitabant,Flos delibatus populi, Suadaeque medulla. Ac deinde scripsit de isdem versibus verba haec: “Admiror eloquentissimos viros et deditos Ennio pro optimis ridicula laudasse. Cicero certe inter bonos eius versus et hos refert.” Atque id etiam de Cicerone dicit: “Non miror,” inquit, “fuisse qui hos versus scriberet, cum fuerit qui laudaret; nisi forte Cicero summus orator agebat causam suam et volebat suos versus videri bonos.” Postea hoc etiam addidit insulsissime: “Aput ipsum quoque,” inquit, “Ciceronem invenies, etiam in prosa oratione, quaedam ex quibus intellegas ilium non perdidisse operam, quod Ennium legit.” Ponit deinde quae apud Ciceronem reprehendat, quasi Enniana, quod ita scripserit in libris De Republica: “Ut Menelao Laconi quaedam fuit suaviloquens iucunditas,” et quod alio in loco dixerit: “breviloquentiam in dicendo colit.” Atque ibi homo nugator Ciceronis errores deprecatur et: “Non fuit,” inquit, “Ciceronis hoc vitium, sed temporis; necesse erat haec dici, cum illa legerentur.” Deinde adscribit Ciceronem haec ipsa interposuisse ad effugiendam infamiam nimis lascivae orationis et nitidae. De Vergilio quoque eodem in loco verba haec ponit: “Vergilius quoque noster non ex alia causa duros quosdam versus et enormes et aliquid supra mensuram trahentis interposuit quam ut Ennianus populus adgnosceret in novo carmine aliquid antiquitatis.” Sed iam verborum Senecae piget; haec tamen inepti et insubidi hominis ioca non praeteribo: “Quidam sunt,” inquit, “tam magni sensus Q. Ennii, ut, licet scripti sint inter hircosos, possint tamen inter unguentatos placere”; et, cum reprehendisset versus quos supra de Cetego posuimus: “Qui huiuscemodi,” inquit, “versus amant, liqueat tibi eosdem admirari et Soterici lectos.” Dignus sane Seneca videatur lectione ac studio adulescentium, qui honorem coloremque veteris orationis Soterici lectis compararit, quasi minimae scilicet gratiae et relictis iam contemptisque. Audias tamen commemoraricormmemorari ac referri pauca quaedam quae idem ipse Seneca bene dixerit, quale est illud, quod in hominem avarum et avidum et pecuniae sitientem dixit: “Quid enim refert quantum habeas? multo illud plus est quod non habesbabes.” Benene hoc? sane bene; sed adulescentium indolem non tam iuvant quae bene dicta sunt quam inficiunt quae pessime, multoque tanto magis, si et plura sunt quae deteriora sunt, et quaedam in his non pro enthymemate aliquo rei parvae ac simplicis, sed in re ancipiti pro consilio dicuntur.
3. The meaning and origin of the word lictor and the varying opinions of Valgius Rufus and Tullius Tiro on that subject. VALGIUS RUFUS, in the second of the books which he entitled On Matters Investigated by Letter, says that the lictor was so called from ligando or “binding,” because when the magistrates of the Roman people had given orders that anyone should be beaten with rods, his legs and arms were always fastened and bound by an attendant, and therefore that the member of the college of attendants who had the duty of binding him was called a lictor. And he quotes as evidence on this subject Marcus Tullius, citing these words from the speech entitled In Defence of Gaius Rabirius: “Lictor, bind his hands.” This is what Valgius says. Now, I for my part agree with him; but Tullius Tiro, the freedman of Marcus Cicero, wrote that the lictor got his name from limus or licium. “For,” says he, “those men who were in attendance upon the magistrates were girt across with a kind of girdle called limus.” But if there is anyone who thinks that what Tiro said is more probable, because the first syllable in lictor is long like that of licium, but in the word ligo is short, that has nothing to do with the case. For in lictor from ligando, lector from legendo, vitor from viendo, tutor from tuendo, and structor from struendo, the vowels, which were originally short, are lengthened.
3. Lictoris vocabulum qua ratione conceptum ortumque sit; et super eo diversae sententiae Valgi Rufi et Tulli Tironis. VALGIUS RUFUS in secundo librorum quos inscripsit De Rebus per Epistulam Quaesitis, “lictorem” dicit a “ligando” appellatum esse, quod, cum magistratus populi Romani virgis quempiam verberari iussissent, crura eius et manus ligari vincirique a viatore solita sint, et inde is qui ex conlegio viatorum officium ligandi haberet “lictor” sit appellatus; utiturque ad eam rem testimonio M. Tulli verbaque eius refert ex oratione quae dicta est Pro C. Rabirio: “Lictor,” inquit, “conliga manus.” Haec ita Valgius. Et nos sane cum illo sentimus; sed Tiro Tullius M. Ciceronis libertus, “lictorem” vel a “limo” vel a “licio” dictum scripsit: “Licio enim transverse, quod ‘limum’ appellatur, qui magistratibus,” inquit, “praeministrabant cincti erant.” Si quis autem est qui propterea putat probabilius esse quod Tiro dixit, quoniam prima syllaba in “lictore,” sicuti in “licio,” producta est et in eo verbo quod est “ligo” correpta est, nihil ad rem istud pertinet. Nam sicut a “ligando” “lictor” et a “legendo” “lector” et a “viendo” “vitor” et “tuendo” “tutor” et “struendo” “structor” productis quae corripiebantur vocalibus dicta sunt.
4. Lines taken from the seventh book of the Annals of Ennius, in which the courteous bearing of an inferior towards a friend of higher rank is described and defined. QUINTUS ENNIUS in the seventh book of his Annals describes and defines very vividly and skilfully in his sketch of Geminus Servilius, a man of rank, the tact, courtesy, modesty, fidelity, restraint and propriety in speech, knowledge of ancient history and of customs old and new, scrupulousness in keeping and guarding a secret; in short, the various remedies and methods of relief and solace for guarding against the annoyances of life, which the friend of a man who is his superior in rank and fortune ought to have. Those verses in my opinion are no less worthy of frequent, attentive perusal than the rules of the philosophers about duties. Besides this, there is such a venerable flavour of antiquity in these verses, such a sweetness, so unmixed and so removed from all affectation, that in my opinion they ought to be observed, remembered and cherished as old and sacred laws of friendship. Therefore I thought them worthy of quotation, in case there should be anyone who desired to see them at once;So saying, on a friend he called, with whomHe oft times gladly shared both board and speechAnd courteously informed of his affairs,On coming wearied from the sacred HouseOr Forum broad, where he all day had toiled,Directing great affairs with wisdom; one with whomHe freely spoke of matters great and small,Confiding to him thoughts approved or not,If he so wished, and found him trustworthy;With whom he took much pleasure openlyOr privily; a man to whom no thoughtSuggested heedlessness or ill intent,A cultured, loyal and a winsome man,Contented, happy, learned, eloquent,Speaking but little and that fittingly,Obliging, knowing well all ancient lore,All customs old and new, the laws of manAnd of the gods, who with due prudence toldWhat he had heard, or kept it to himself:Him 'mid the strife Servilius thus accosts. They say that Lucius Aelius Stilo used to declare that Quintus Ennius wrote these words about none other than himself, and that this was a description of Quintus Ennius' own character and disposition.
4. Versus accepti ex Q. Enni septimo Annalium, quibus depingitur finiturque ingenium comitasque hominis minoris erga amicum superiorem. DESCRIPTUM definitumque est a Quinto Ennio in Annali septimo graphice admodum sciteque sub historia Gemini Servili, viri nobilis, quo ingenio, qua comitate, qua modestia, qua fide, qua linguae parsimonia, qua loquendi opportunitate, quanta rerum antiquarum morumque veterum ac novorum scientia quantaque servandi tuendique secreti religione, qualibus denique ad muniendas vitae molestias fomentis, levamentis, solacis amicum esse conveniat hominis genere et fortuna superioris. Eos ego versus non minus frequenti adsiduoque memoratu dignos puto quam philosophorum de officiis decreta. Ad hoc color quidam vetustatisvestustatis in his versibus tam reverendus est, suavitas tam inpromiscainprolnisca tamque a fuco omni remota est, ut mea quidem sententia pro antiquis sacratisque amicitias legibus observandi, tenendi colendique sint. Quapropter adscribendos eos existimavi, si quis iam statim desideraret:Haece locutus vocat quocum bene saepe libenterMensam sermonesque suos rerumque suarumComiter inpertit, magnam cum lassus dieiPartem fuisset, de summis rebus regundisConsilio indu foro lato sanctoque senatu;Cui res audacter magnas parvasque iocumqueEloqueretur sed cura malaque et bona dictuEvomeret, si qui vellet, tutoque locaret,Quocum multa volup ac gaudia clamque palamque;Ingenium cui nulla malum sententia suadetUt faceret facinus levis aut malus; doctus, fidelis,Suavis homo, facundus, suo contentus, beatus,Scitus, secunda loquens in tempore, commodus, verbumPaucum, multa tenens antiqua sepulta, vetustasQuem facit et mores veteresque novosque tenentem,Multorum veterum leges divumque hominumque;Prudenter qui dicta loquive tacereve posset;Hunc inter pugnas conpellat Servilius sic.L. Aelium Stilonem dicere solitum ferunt Q. Ennium de semet ipso haec scripsisse picturamque istam morum et ingenii ipsius Q. Ennii factam esse.
5. A discourse of the philosopher Taurus on the manner and method of enduring pain, according to the principles of the Stoics.
5. Sermo Tauri philosophi de modo atque ratione tolerandi doloris secundum Stoicorum decreta.
WHEN the philosopher Taurus was on his way to Delphi, to see the Pythian games and the throng that gathered there from almost all Greece, I was his companion. And when, in the course of the journey, we had come to Lebadia, which is an ancient town in the land of Boeotia, word was brought to Taurus there that a friend of his, an eminent philosopher of the Stoic sect, had been seized with illness and had taken to his bed.
CUM Delphos ad Pythia conventumque totius ferme Graeciae visendum philosophus Taurus iret nosque ei comites essemus inque eo itinere Lebadiam venissemus, quod est oppidum anticum in terra Boeotia, adfertur ibi ad Taurum amicum eius quempiam, nobilem in Stoica disciplina philosophum, aegra valitudine oppressum, decumbere.
Then interrupting our journey, which otherwise would have called for haste, and leaving the carriages, he hastened to visit his friend, and I followed, as I usually did wherever he went. When we came to the house in which the sick man was, we saw that he was suffering anguish from pains in the stomach, such as the Greeks call ko/los, or “colic,” and at the same time from a high fever. The stifled groans that burst from him, and the heavy sighs that escaped his panting breast, revealed his suffering, and no less his struggle to overcome it.
Tunc omisso itinere, quod alioquin maturandum erat, et relictis vehiculis, pergit eum propere videre, nosque de more, quem in locum cumque iret, secuti sumus. Et ubi ad aedes in quis ille aegrotus erat pervenimus, videmus hominem doloribus cruciatibusque alvi, quod Graeci κόλον dicunt, et febri simul rapida adflictari gemitusque ex eo conpressos erumpere spiritusque et anhelitus e pectore eius evadere, non dolorem magis indicantes quam pugnam adversum dolorem.
Later, when Taurus had sent for physicians and discussed with them the means of cure, and had encouraged the patient to keep up his endurance by commending the fortitude which he was showing, we left the house. And as we were returning to the carriages, and our companions, Taurus said: “You were witness of no very pleasant sight, it is true, but one which was, nevertheless, a profitable experience, in beholding the encounter and contest of a philosopher with pain. The violent character of the disorder, for its part, produced anguish and torture of body; reason and the spiritual nature, on the other hand, similarly played their part, supporting and restraining within bounds the violence of well-nigh ungovernable pain. He uttered no shrieks, no complaints, not even any unseemly outcries; yet, as you saw, there were obvious signs of a battle between soul and body for the man's possession.”
Post deinde, cum Taurus et medicos accersisset conlocutusque de facienda medella esset et eum ipsum ad retinendam patientiam, testimonio tolerantiae quam videbat perhibito, stabilisset, egressique inde ad vehicula et ad comites rediremus: “Vidistis,” inquit Taurus, “non sane iucundum spectaculum, sed cognitu tamen utile, congredientes conpugnantesque philosophum et dolorem. Faciebat vis illa et natura morbi, quod erat suum, distractionem cruciatumque membrorum, faciebat contra ratio et natura animi, quod erat aeque suum: perpetiebatur et cohibebat coercebatque infra sese violentias effrenati doloris. Nullos eiulatus, nullas conplorationes, ne ullas quidem voces indecoras edebat, signa tamen quaedam, sicut vidistis, existebant virtutis et corporis, de possessione hominis pugnantium.”
Then one of the disciples of Taurus, a young man not untrained in philosophy, said: “If the bitterness of pain is such that it struggles against the will and judgment, forcing a man to groan involuntarily and confess the evil of his violent disorder, why is it said among the Stoics that pain is a thing indifferent and not an evil? Furthermore, why can a Stoic be compelled to do anything, or how can pain compel him, when the Stoics say that pain exerts no compulsion, and that a wise man cannot be forced to anything?”
Tum e sectatoribus Tauri invenis, in disciplinis philosophiae non ignavus, “Si tanta,” inquit, “doloris acerbitas est, ut contra voluntatem contraque iudicium animi nitatur invitumque hominem cogat ad gemendum confitendumque de malo morbi saevientis, cur dolor aput Stoicos indifferens esse dicitur, non malum? Cur deinde aut Stoicus homo cogi aliquid potest aut dolor cogere, cum et dolorem Stoici nihil cogere et sapientem nihil cogi posse dicant?”
To this Taurus, with a face that was now somewhat more cheerful, for he seemed pleased at being lured into a discussion, replied as follows:If this friend of ours were now in better health, he would have defended such unavoidable groans against reproach and, I dare say, would have answered your question; but you know that I am no great friend of the Stoics, or rather, of the Stoa; for it is often inconsistent with itself and with us, as is shown in the book which I have written on that subject.
Ad ea Taurus vultu iam propemodum laetiore, delectatus enim videbatur inlecebra quaestionis, “Si iam amicus,” inquit, “hic noster melius valeret, gemitus eiusmodi necessarios a calumnia defendisset et hanc, opinor, tibi quaestionem dissolvisset, me autem scis cum Stoicis non bene convenire, vel cum StoicaStoa potius; est enim pleraque et sibi et nobis incongruens, sicut libro quem supra illa re composuimus declaratur.”
But to oblige you, I will say 'unlearnedly and clearly,' as the adage has it, what I imagine that any Stoic now present would have said more intricately and cleverly. For you know, I suppose, that old and familiar proverb:Less eruditely speak and clearer, please.
“Sed ut tibi a me mos geratur, dicam ego ‘indoctius,’ ut aiunt, ‘et apertius,’ quae fuisse dicturum puto sinuosius atque sollertius, si quis nunc adesset Stoicorum; nosti enim, credo, verbum illud vetus et pervolgatum:Ἀμαθέστερόν πως εἰπὲ καὶ σαφέστερον λέγε.”Atque hine exorsus de dolore atque de gemitu Stoici aegrotantis ita disseruit:
And with that preamble he discoursed as follows about the pain and groans of the ailing Stoic: “Nature,” said he, "who produced us, implanted in us and incorporated in the very elements from which we sprang a love and affection for ourselves, to such a degree that nothing whatever is dearer or of more importance to us than ourselves. And this, she thought, would be the underlying principle for assuring the perpetuation of the human race, if each one of us, as soon as he saw the light, should have a knowledge and understanding first of all of those things which the philosophers of old have called ta\ prw=ta kata\ fu/sin, or 'the first principles of nature'; that is, that he might delight in all that was agreeable to his body and shrink from everything disagreeable. Later, with increasing years, reason developed from its first elements, and reflection in taking counsel, and the consideration of honour and true expediency, and a wiser and more careful choice of advantages as opposed to disadvantages; and in this way the dignity of virtue and honour became so preeminent and so superior, that any disadvantage from without which prevented our holding and retaining this quality was despised. Nothing was considered truly and wholly good unless it was honourable, and nothing evil unless it is dishonourable. All other things which lay between, and were neither honourable nor dishonourable, were decided to be neither good nor evil. But productions and relationes, which the philosophers call prohgme/na, or 'things desirable,' and a)poprohgme/na, or 'things undesirable,' are distinguished and set apart each by their own qualities. Therefore pleasure also and pain, so far as the end of living well and happily is concerned, are regarded as indifferent and classed neither with good nor with evil.
“Natura,” inquit, “omnium rerum quae nos genuit, induit nobis inolevitque in ipsis statim principiis quibus nati sumus, amorem nostri et caritatem, ita prorsus ut nihil quicquam esset carius pensiusque nobis quam nosmet ipsi, atque hoc esse fundamentum ratast conservandae hominum perpetuitatis, si unusquisque nostrum, simul atque editus in lucem foret, harum prius rerum sensum adfectionemque caperet quae a veteribus philosophis τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν appellata sunt; ut omnibus scilicet corporis sui commodis gauderet, ab incommodis omnibus abhorreret. Postea per incrementa aetatis exorta e seminibus suis ratiost et utendi consilii reputatio et honestatis utilitatisque verae contemplatio subtiliorque et exploratior commodorum incommodorumque dilectus; atque ita prae ceteris omnibus enituit et praefulsit decori et honesti dignitas ac, si ei retinendae obtinendaeve incommodum extrinsecus aliquod obstaret, contemptum est; neque aliud esse vere et simpliciter bonum nisi honestum, aliud quicquam malum nisi quod turpe esset existimatum est. Reliqua omnia, quae in medio forent ac neque honesta essent neque turpia, neque bona esse neque mala decretum est. Productiones tamen et relationes suis quaeque momentis distinctae divisaeque sunt, quae προηγμένα et ἀποπροηγμένα ipsi vocant. Propterea voluptas quoque et dolor, quod ad finemfiner ipsum bene beateque vivendi pertinet, et in mediis relicta et neque in bonis neque in malis iudicata sunt.”
But since the newly-born child is endowed with these first sensations of pain and pleasure before the appearance of judgment and reason, and is attracted to pleasure by nature, but averted and alienated from pain, as if from some bitter enemy—therefore reason, which is given to him later, is hardly able to uproot and destroy those inclinations which were originally and deeply implanted in him. Yet he constantly struggles with them, checks and tramples them under foot when they are excessive, and compels them to obey and submit to him.
“Sed enim quoniam his primis sensibus doloris voluptatisque ante consilii et rationis exortum recens natus homo inbutus est et voluptati quidem a natura conciliatus, a dolore autem, quasi a gravi quodam inimico, abiunctus alienatusque est—circo adfectiones istas primitus penitusque inditas ratio ipsi post addita convellere ab stirpe atque extinguere vix potest. Pugnat autem cum his semper et exultantis eas opprimit obteritque et parere sibi atque oboedire cogit.”
Hence you saw the philosopher, relying upon the efficacy of his system, wrestling with the insolent violence of disease and pain, yielding nothing, admitting nothing; not, as sufferers commonly do, shrieking, lamenting and calling himself wretched and unhappy, but giving vent only to panting breathing and deep sighs, which are signs and indications, not that he is overcome or subdued by pain, but that he is struggling to overcome and subdue it.
“Itaque vidistis philosophum, ratione decreti sui nixum, cum petulantia morbi dolorisque exultantia conluctantem, nihil cedentem, nihil confitentem, neque ut plerique dolentes solent, eiulantem atque lamentantem ac miserum sese et infelicem appellantem, sed acres tantum anhelitus et robustos gemitus edentem, signa atque indicia non victi nec obpressi a dolore, sed vincere eum atque obprimere enitentis.”
“But very likely,” said he, “because of the mere fact that he struggles and groans, someone may ask, if pain is not an evil, why it is necessary to groan and struggle? It is because all things which are not evil are not also wholly lacking in annoyance, but there are very many things which, though free from any great harm or baneful effect, as not being base, are none the less opposed to the gentleness and mercy of nature through a certain inexplicable and inevitable law of nature herself. These, then, a wise man can endure and put up with, but he cannot exclude them altogether from his consciousness; for a)nalghsi/a, or 'insensibility,' and a)pa/qeia, or 'lack of feeling,' not only in my judgment,” said he, "but also in that of some of the wise men of that same school (such as Panaetius, a serious and learned man) are disapproved and rejected."
“Sed haut scio,” inquit, “an dicat aliquis, ipsum illud quod pugnat, quod gemit, si malum dolor non est, cur necesse est gemere et pugnare? Quia enim omnia quae non sunt mala molestia quoque omni non carent, sed sunt pleraque noxa quidem magna et pernicie privata, quia non sunt turpia, contra naturae tamen mansuetudinem lenitatemque opposita sunt et infesta per obscuram quandam et necessariam ipsius naturae consequentiam. Haec ergo vir sapiens tolerare et exanclare potest, non admittere omnino in sensum sui non potest; ἀναλγησία enim atque ἀπάθεια non meo tantum,” inquit, “sed quorundam etiam ex eadem porticu prudentiorum hominum, sicuti iudicio Panaetii, gravis atque docti viri, inprobata abiectaque est.”