1. A somewhat careful inquiry into these words of Marcus Tullius in his first Oration against Antony: “But many things seem to threaten contrary even to nature and to fate”; and a discussion of the question whether the words “fate” and “nature” mean the same thing or something different. MARCUS CICERO, in his first Oration against Antony, has left us these words: “I hastened then to follow him whom those present did not follow; not that I might be of any service, for I had no hope of that nor could I promise it, but in order that if anything to which human nature is liable should happen to me (and many things seem to threaten contrary even to nature and contrary to fate) I might leave what I have said to-day as a witness to my country of my constant devotion to its interests.” Cicero says “contrary to nature and contrary to fate.” Whether he intended both words, “fate” and “nature,” to have the same meaning and has used two words to designate one thing, or whether he so divided and separated them that nature seems to bring some casualties and fate others, I think ought to be investigated; and this question ought especially to be asked—how it is that he has said that many things to which humanity is liable can happen contrary to fate, when the plan and order and a kind of unconquerable necessity of fate are so ordained that all things must be included within the decrees of fate; unless perhaps he has followed Homer's saying:Lest, spite of fate, you enter Hades' home.But there is no doubt that Cicero referred to a violent and sudden death, which may properly seem to happen contrary to nature. But why he has put just that kind of death outside the decrees of fate it is not the part of this work to investigate, nor is this the time. The point, however, must not be passed by, that Virgil too had that same opinion about fate which Cicero had, when in his fourth book he said of Elissa, who inflicted a violent death upon herself:For since she perished not by fate's decree,Nor earned her death;just as if, in making an end of life, those deaths which are violent do not seem to come by fate's decree. Cicero, however, seems to have followed the words of Demosthenes, a man gifted with equal wisdom and eloquence, which express about the same idea concerning nature and fate. For Demosthenes in that splendid oration entitled On the Crown wrote as follows: “He who thinks that he was born only for his parents, awaits the death appointed by fate, the natural death; but he who thinks that he was born also for his country, will be ready to die that he may not see his country enslaved.” What Cicero seems to have called “fate” and “nature,” Demosthenes long before termed “fate” and “the natural death.” For “a natural death” is one which comes in the course of fate and nature, as it were, and is caused by no force from without.
1. Inquisitio verborum istorum M. Tulli curiosior quae sunt in primo Antonianarum libro, “multa autem inpendere videntur praeter naturam etiam praeterque fatum”; tractatumque an idem duo ista significant, “fatum” atque “natura,” an diversum. MARCUS CICERO in primo Antonianarum ita scriptum reliquit: “Hunc igitur ut sequerer properavi quem praesentes non sunt secuti; non ut proficerem aliquid, neque enim sperabam id nec praestare poteram, sed ut, si quid mihi humanitus accidisset, multa autem inpendere videntur praeter naturam etiam praeterque fatum, huius diei vocem testem reipublicae relinquerem meae perpetuae erga se voluntatis.” “Praeter naturam,” inquit, “praeterque fatum.” An utrumque idem valere voluerit “fatum” atque “naturam” et duas res καθʼ ἑνὸς ὑποκειμένου posuerit, an vero diviserit separaritque, ut alios casus natural ferre videatur, alios fatum, considerandum equidem puto, atque id maxime requirendum, qua ratione dixerit accidere multa humanitus posse praeter fatum, quando sic ratio et ordo et insuperabilis quaedam necessitas fati constituitur, ut omnia intra fatum claudenda sint, nisi illud sane Homeri secutus est:Μὴ καὶ ὑπὲρ μοῖραν δόμον Ἄιδος εἰσαφίκηαι. Nihil autem dubium est quin violentam et inopinatam mortem significaverit, quae quidem potest recte videri accidere praeter naturam. Sed cur id quoque genus mortis extra fatum posuerit, neque operis huius est explorare neque temporis. Illud tamen non praetermittendum est, quod Vergilius quoque id ipsum quod Cicero de fato opinatus est, cum hoc in quarto libro dixit de Elissa, quae mortem per vim potita est:Nam quia nec fato, merita nec morte peribat,tamquam in faciendo fine vitae quae violenta sunt non videantur e fato venire. Demosthenis autem, viri prudentia pari atque facundia praediti, verba idem fere significantia de natura atque fato M. Cicero secutus videtur. Ita enim scriptum est in oratione illa egregia, cui titulus est Ὓπὲρ Στεφάνου: Ὁ μὲν τοῖς γονεῦσι νομίζων μόνον γεγενῆσθαι, τὸν τῆς εἱμαρμένης καὶ τὸν αὐτόματον θάνατον περιμένει· ὁ δὲ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ταύτην ἐπιδεῖν δουλεύουσαν ἀποθνήσκειν βουλεύσεται. Quod Cicero “fatum” atque “naturam” videtur dixisse, id multo ante Demosthenes τὴν πεπρωμένην et τὸν αὐτόματον θάνατον appellavit. Αὐτόματος enim θάνατος, quasi naturalis et fatalis, nulla extrinsecus vi coactus venit.
2. About an intimate talk of the poets Pacuvius and Accius in the town of Tarentum. THOSE who have had leisure and inclination to inquire into the life and times of learned men and hand them down to memory, have related the following anecdote of the tragic poets Marcus Pacuvius and Lucius Accius: “Pacuvius,” they say, “when already enfeebled by advanced age and constant bodily illness, had withdrawn from Rome to Tarentum. Then Accius, who was a much younger man, coming to Tarentum on his way to Asia, visited Pacuvius, and being hospitably received and detained by him for several days, at his request read him his tragedy entitled Atreus.” Then they say that Pacuvius remarked that what he had written seemed sonorous and full of dignity, but that nevertheless it appeared to him somewhat harsh and rugged. “What you say is true,” replied Accius, “and I do not greatly regret it; for it gives me hope that what I write hereafter will be better. For they say it is with the mind as it is with fruits; those which are at first harsh and bitter, later become mild and sweet; but those which at once grow mellow and soft, and are juicy in the beginning, presently become, not ripe, but decayed. Accordingly, it has seemed to me that something should be left in the products of the intellect for time and age to mellow.”
2. Super poetarum Pacuvii et Accii conloquio familiari in oppido Tarentino. QUIBUS otium et studium fuit vitas atque aetates doctorum hominum quaerere ac memoriae tradere, de M. Pacuvio et L. Accio tragicis poetis historiam scripserunt huiuscemodi: “Cum Pacuvius,” inquiunt, “grandi iam aetate et morbo corporis diutino adfectus, Tarentum ex urbe Roma concessisset, Accius tunc, haut parvo iunior, proficiscens in Asiam, cum in oppidum venisset, devertit ad Pacuvium comiterque invitatus plusculisque ab eo diebus retentus, tragoediam suam cui Atreus nomen est desideranti legit.” Tum Pacuvium dixisse aiunt sonora quidem esse quae scripsisset et grandia, sed videri tamen ea sibi duriora paulum et acerbiora. “Ita est,” inquit Accius, “uti dicis, neque id me sane paenitet; meliora enim fore spero, quae deinceps scribam.” “Nam quod in pomis, itidem,” inquit, “esse aiunt in ingeniis; quae dura et acerba nascuntur, post fiunt mitia et iucunda; sed quae gignuntur statim vieta et mollia atque in principio sunt uvida, non matura mox fiunt, sed putria.” “Relinquendum igitur visum est in ingenio quod dies atque aetas mitificet.”
3. Whether the words necessitudo and necessitas differ from each other in meaning. IT is a circumstance decidedly calling for laughter and ridicule, when many grammarians assert that necessitudo and necessitas are unlike and different, in that necessitas is an urgent and compelling force, but necessitudo is a certain right and binding claim of consecrated intimacy, and that this is its only meaning. But just as it makes no difference at all whether you say suavitudo or suavitas (sweetness), acerbitudo or acerbitas (bitterness), acritudo or acritas (sharpness), as Accius wrote in his Neoptolemus, in the same way no reason can be assigned for separating necessitudo and necessitas. Accordingly, in the books of the early writers you may often find necessitudo used of that which is necessary; but necessitas certainly is seldom applied to the law and duty of respect and relationship, in spite of the fact that those who are united by that very law and duty of relationship and intimacy are called necessarii (kinsfolk). However, in a speech of Gaius Caesar, In Support of the Plautian Law, I found necessitas used for necessitudo, that is for the bond of relationship. His words are as follows: “To me indeed it seems that, as our kinship (necessitas) demanded, I have failed neither in labour, in pains, nor in industry.” I have written this with regard to the lack of distinction between these two words as the result of reading the fourth book of the History of Sempronius Asellio, an early writer, in which he wrote as follows about Publius Africanus, the son of Paulus: “For he had heard his father, Lucius Aemilius Paulus, say that a really able general never engaged in a pitched battle, unless the utmost necessity (necessitudo) demanded, or the most favourable opportunity offered.”
3. An vocabula haec, “necessitudo” et “necessitas,” differenti significatione sint. RISU prorsus atque ludo res digna est, cum plerique grammaticorum adseverant, “necessitudinem” et “necessitatem” mutare differreque, ideo quod “necessitas” sit vis quaepiam premens et cogens, “necessitudo” autem dicatur ius quoddam et vinculum religiosae coniunctionis, idque unum solitarium significet. Sicut autem nihil quicquam interest, “suavitudo” dicas an “suavitas,” “sanctitudo” an “sanctitas,” “acerbitudo” an “acerbitas,” “acritudo” an, quod Accius in Neoptolemo scripsit, “acritas,” ita nihil rationis dici potest qui “necessitudo” et “necessitas” separentur. Itaque in libris veterum vulgo reperias, “necessitudinem” dici pro eo quod necessum est. Sed “necessitas” sane pro iure officioque observantiae adfinitatisve infrequens est, quamquam qui ob hoc ipsum ius adfinitatis familiaritatisque coniuncti sunt “necessarii” dicuntur. Repperi tamen in oratione C. Caesaris, Qua Plautian Rogationem Suasit, “necessitatem” dictam pro “necessitudine,” id est iure adfinitatis. Verba haec sunt: “Equidem mihi videor pro nostra necessitate non labore, non opera, non industria defuisse.” Hoc ego scripsi de utriusque vocabuli indifferentia, admonitus forte verbi istius, cum legerem Sempronii Asellionis, veteris scriptoris, quartum ex Historia librum, in quo de P. Africano, Pauli filio, ita scriptum est: “Nam se patrem suum audisse dicere L. Aemilium Paulum, nimis bonum imperatorem signis conlatis non decertare, nisi summa necessitudo aut summa occasio data esset.”
4. Copy of a letter of Alexander to his mother Olympias; and Olympias' witty reply. IN many of the records of Alexander's deeds, and not long ago in the book of Marcus Varro entitled Orestes or On Madness, I have read that Olympias, the wife of Philip, wrote a very witty reply to her son Alexander. For he had addressed his mother as follows: “King Alexander, son of Jupiter Hammon, greets his mother Olympias.” Olympias replied to this effect: “Pray, my son,” said she, “be silent, and do not slander me or accuse me before Juno; undoubtedly she will take cruel vengeance on me, if you admit in your letters that I am her husband's paramour.” This courteous reply of a wise and prudent woman to her arrogant son seemed to warn him in a mild and polite fashion to give up the foolish idea which lie had formed from his great victories, from the flattery of his courtiers, and from his incredible success—that he was the son of Jupiter.
4. Descripta Alexandri ad matrem Olympiadem epistula; et quid Olympias festive ei rescripserit. IN plerisque monimentis rerum ab Alexandro gestarum, et paulo ante in libro M. Varronis qui inscriptus est Orestes vel De Insania, Olympiadem, Philippi uxorem, festivissime rescripsisse legimus Alexandro filio. Nam cum is ad matrem ita scripsisset: “Rex Alexander, lovis Hammonis filius, Olympiadi matri salutem dicit,” Olympias ei rescripsit ad hanc sententiam: “Amabo,” inquit, “mi fili, quiescas neque deferas me neque criminere adversum lunonem; malum mihi prorsus illa magnum dabit, cum tu me litteris tuis paelicem esse illi confiteris.” Ea mulieris scitae atque prudentis erga ferocem filium comitas sensim et comiter admonuisse eum visa est deponendam esse opinionem vanam quam ille ingentibus victoriis et adulantium blandimentis et rebus supra fidem prosperis inbiberat, genitum esse sese de Iove.
5. On the philosophers Aristotle, Theophrastus and Eudemus; and of the graceful tact of Aristotle in selecting a successor as head of his school. THE philosopher Aristotle, being already nearly sixty-two years of age, was sickly and weak of body and had slender hope of life. Then the whole band of his disciples came to him, begging and entreating that he should himself choose a successor to his position and his office, to whom, as to himself, they might apply after his last day, to complete and perfect their knowledge of the studies into which he had initiated them. There were at the time in his school many good men, but two were conspicuous, Theophrastus and Eudemus, who excelled the rest in talent and learning. The former was from the island of Lesbos, but Eudemus from Rhodes. Aristotle replied that he would do what they asked, so soon as the opportunity came. A little later, in the presence of the same men who had asked him to appoint a master, he said that the wine he was then drinking did not suit his health, but was unwholesome and harsh; that therefore they ought to look for a foreign wine, something either from Rhodes or from Lesbos. He asked them to procure both kinds for him, and said that he would use the one which he liked the better. They went, sought, found, brought. Then Aristotle asked for the Rhodian and tasting it said: “This is truly a sound and pleasant wine.” Then he called for the Lesbian. Tasting that also, he remarked: “Both are very good indeed, but the Lesbian is the sweeter.” When he said this, no one doubted that gracefully, and at the same time tactfully, he had by those words chosen his successor, not his wine. This was Theophrastus, from Lesbos, a man equally noted for the fineness of his eloquence and of his life. And when, not long after this, Aristotle died, they accordingly all became followers of Theophrastus.
5. De Aristotele et Theophrasto et Eudemo philosophis; deque eleganti verecundia Aristotelis successorem diatribae suae eligentis. ARISTOTELES philosophus, annos iam fere natus duo et sexaginta, corpore aegro adfectoque ac spe vitae tenui fuit. Tunc omnis eius sectatorum cohors ad eum accedit, orantes obsecrantesque ut ipse deligeret loci sui et magisterii successorem, quo post summum eius diem proinde ut ipso uterentur ad studia doctrinarum conplenda excolendaque quibus ab eo inbuti fuissent. Erant tunc in eius ludo boni multi, sed praecipui duo, Theophrastus et Eudemus. Ingenio hi atque doctrinis ceteros praestabant; alter ex insula Lesbo fuit, Eudemus autem Rodo. Aristoteles respondit facturum esse quod vellent, cum id sibi foret tempestivum. Postea brevi tempore, cum idem illi qui de magistro destinando petierant praesentes essent, vinum ait quod tum biberet non esse id ex valitudine sua, sed insalubre esse atque asperum ac propterea quaeri debere exoticum, vel Rodium aliquod vel Lesbium. Id sibi utrumque ut curarent petivit, usurumque eo dixit quod sese magis iuvisset. Eunt, quaerunt, inveniunt, adferunt. Tum Aristoteles Rodium petit, degustat: “Firmum,” inquit, “hercle vinum et iucundum.” Petit mox Lesbium. Quo item degustato: “Utrumque,” inquit, “oppido bonum, sed ἡδίων ὁ Λέσβιος.” Id ubi dixit, nemini fuit dubium quin lepide simul et verecunde successorem illa voce sibi, non vinum delegisset. Is erat e Lesbo Theophrastus, suavitate homo insigni linguae pariter atque vitae. Itaque non diu post Aristotele vita defuncto, ad Theophrastum omnes concesserunt.
6. The term which the early Latins used for the Greek word prosw|di/ai; also that the term barbarismus was used neither by the early Romans nor by the people of Attica. WHAT the Greeks call prosw|di/ai, or “tones,” our early scholars called now notae vocum, or “marks of tone,” now moderamenta, or “guides,” now accenticulae, or “accents,” and now voculationes, or “intonations.” But the fault which we designate when we say now that anyone speaks barbare, or “outlandishly,” they did not call “outlandish” but “rustic,” and they said that those speaking with that fault spoke “in a countrified manner” (rustice). Publius Nigidius, in his Grammatical Notes says: “Speech becomes rustic, if you misplace the aspirates.” Whether therefore those who before the time of the deified Augustus expressed themselves purely and properly used the word barbarismus (outlandishness), which is now common, I for my part have not yet been able to discover.
6. Quid veteres Latini dixerint quas Graeci προσῳδίας appellant; item quod vocabulum “arbarismi” non usurpaverint neque Romani antiquiores neque Attici. QUAS Graeci προσῳδίας dicunt, eas veteres docti tum “notas vocum,” tum “moderamenta,” tum “accentiunculas,” tum “voculationes” appellabant; quod nunc autem “barbare” queen loqui dicimus, id vitium sermonis non “barbarum” esse, sed “rusticum,” et cum eo vitio loquentes “justice” loqui dictitabant. P. Nigidius in Commentariis Grammaticis: “Rusticus fit sermo,” inquit, “si adspires perperam.” Itaque id vocabulum, quod dicitur vulgo “barbarismus,” qui ante divi Augusti aetatem pure atque integre locuti sunt an dixerint, nondum equidem inveni.
7. That Homer in his poems and Herodotus in his Histories spoke differently of the nature of the lion. HERODOTUS, in the third book of his Histories, has left the statement that lionesses give birth but once during their whole life, and at that one birth that they never produce more than one cub. His words in that book are as follows: “But the lioness, although a strong and most courageous animal, gives birth once only in her lifetime to one cub; for in giving birth she discharges her womb with the whelp.” Homer, however, says that lions (for so he calls the females also, using the masculine or “common” (epicene) gender, as the grammarians call it) produce and rear many whelps. The verses in which he plainly says this are these:He stood, like to a lion before its young,Beset by hunters in a gloomy woodAnd leading them away.In another passage also he indicates the same thing:With many a groan, like lion of strong beard,From which a hunter stole away its youngAmid dense woods. Since this disagreement and difference between the most famous of poets and the most eminent of historians troubled me, I thought best to consult that very thorough treatise which the philosopher Aristotle wrote On Animals. And what I find that he has written there upon this subject I shall include in these notes, in Aristotle's own language.
7. Diversum de natura leonum dixisse Homerum in carminibus et Herodotum in historiis. LEAENAS inter omnem vitam semel parere eoque uno partu numquam edere plures quam unum, Herodotus in tertia Historia scriptum reliquit. Verba ex eo libro haec sunt: Ἡ δὲ δὴ λέαινα, ἐὸν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ θρασύτατον, ἅπαξ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τίκτει ἕν· τίκτουσα γὰρ συνεκβάλλει τῷ τέκνῳ τὰς μήτρας. Homerus autem leones, sic enim feminas quoque virili genere appellat, quod grammatici ἐπίκοινον vocant, pluris gignere atque educare catulos dicit. Versus, quibus hoc aperte demonstrat, hi sunt: Εἱστήκει, ὥς τίς τε λέων περὶ οἷσι τέκεσσιν,Ὧι ῥά τε νήπιʼ ἄγοντι συναντήσωνται ἐν ὕλῃἌνδρες ἐπακτῆρες.Item alio in loco idem significat: Πυκνὰ μάλα στενάχων· ὥς τε λὶς ἠυγένειος,Ὧι ῥά θʼ ὑπὸ σκύμνους ἐλαφηβόλος ἁρπάσῃ ἀνήρὝλης ἐκ πυκινῆς. Ea nos dissensio atque diversitas cum agitaret inclutissimi poetarum et historicorum nobilissimi, placuit libros Aristotelis philosophi inspici quos De Animalibus exquisitissime composuit. In quibus quod super ista re scriptum invenerimus, cum ipsius Aristotelis verbis in his commentariis scribemus.
8. That the poet Afranius wisely and prettily called Wisdom the daughter of Experience and Memory. THAT was a fine and true thought of the poet Afranius about the birth of Wisdom and the means of acquiring it, when he said that she was the daughter of Experience and Memory. For in that way he shows that one who wishes to be wise in human affairs does not need books alone or instruction in rhetoric and dialectics, but ought also to occupy and train himself in becoming intimately acquainted with and testing real life, and in firmly fixing in his memory all such acts and events; and accordingly he must learn wisdom and judgment from the teaching of actual experience, not from what books only, or masters, through vain words and fantasies, have foolishly represented as though in a farce or a dream. The verses of Afranius are in a Roman comedy called The Chair:My sire Experience was, me Memory bore,In Greece called Sophia, Wisdom in Rome.There is also a line of Pacuvius to about the same purport, which the philosopher Macedo, a good man and my intimate friend, thought ought to be written over the doors of all temples:I hate base men who preach philosophy.For he said that nothing could be more shameful or insufferable than that idle, lazy folk, disguised with beard and cloak, should change the character and advantages of philosophy into tricks of the tongue and of words, and, themselves saturated with vices, should eloquently assail vice.
8. Quod Afranius poeta prudenter et lepide Sapientiam filiam esse Usus et Memoriae dixit. EXIMIE hoc atque verissime Afranius poeta de gignenda conparandaque Sapientia opinatus est, quod eam filiam esse Usus et Memoriae dixit. Eo namque argumento demonstrat, qui sapiens rerum esse humanarum velit, non libris solis neque disciplinis rhetoricis dialecticisque opus esse, sed oportere eum versari quoque exercerique in rebus comminus noscendis periclitandisque eaque omnia acta et eventa firmiter meminisse et proinde sapere atque consulere ex his quae pericula ipsa rerum docuerint, non quae libri tantum aut magistri per quasdam inanitates verborum et imaginum tamquam in mimo aut in somnio deliraverint. Versus Afrani sunt in togata, cui Sellae nomen est:Usús me genuit, máter peperit Mémoria,Sophiám vocant me Grái, vos Sapiéntiam. Item versus est in eandem ferme sententiam Pacuvii, quem Macedo philosophus, vir bonus, familiaris meus, scribi debere censebat pro foribus omnium templorum:Ego odi homines ígnava opera et phílosopha Senténtia. Nihil enim fieri posse indignius neque intolerantius dicebat quam quod homines ignavi ac desides, operti barba et pallio, mores et emolumenta philosophiae in linguae verborumque artes converterent et vitia facundissime accusarent, intercutibus ipsi vitiis madentes.
9. What Tullius Tiro wrote in his commentaries about the Suculae, or “Little Pigs,” and the Hyades, which are the names of constellations. TULLIUS TIRO was the pupil and freedman of Marcus Cicero and an assistant in his literary work. He wrote several books on the usage and theory of the Latin language and on miscellaneous questions of various kinds. Pre-eminent among these appear to be those to which he gave the Greek title Pande/ktai, implying that they included every kind of science and fact. In these he wrote the following about the stars which are called the Suculae, or “Little Pigs”: “The early Romans,” says he, “were so ignorant of Grecian literature and so unfamiliar with the Greek language, that they called those stars which are in the head of the Bull Suculae, or 'The Little Pigs,' because the Greeks call them u(a/des; for they supposed that Latin word to be a translation of the Greek name because u(/es in Greek is sues in Latin. But the u(a/des,” says he, “are so called, ou)k a)po\ tw=n u(w=n (that is, not from pigs), as our rude forefathers believed, but from the word u(/ein; for both when they rise and when they set they cause rainstorms and heavy showers. And pluere, (to rain) is expressed in the Greek tongue by u(/ein.” So, indeed, Tiro in his Pandects. But, as a matter of fact, our early writers were not such boors and crowns as to give to the stars called hyades the name of suculae, or “little pigs,” because u(/es are called sues in Latin; but just as what the Greeks call u(pe/r we call super, what they call u(/ptios we call supinus, what they call u(forbo/s we call subulcus, and finally, what they call u(/pnos we call first sypnus, and then, because of the kinship of the Greek letter y and the Latin o, somnus—just so, what they call u(a/des were called by us, first shades, and then suculae. But the stars in question are not in the head of the Bull, as Tiro says, for except for those stars the Bull has no head; but they are so situated and arranged in the circle that is called the “zodiac,” that from their position they seem to present the appearance and semblance of a bull's head, just as the other parts, and the rest of the figure of the Bull, are formed and, as it were, pictured by the place and location of those stars which the Greeks call Pleia/des and we, Vergiliae.
9. Quid Tullius Tiro in commentariis scripserit de “Suculis” et “Hyadibus,” quae sunt stellarum vocabula. TULLIUS TIRO M. Ciceronis alumnus et libertus adiutorque in litteris studiorum eius fuit. Is libros compluris de usu atque ratione linguae Latinae, item de variis atque promiscis quaestionibus composuit. In his esse praecipui videntur quos Graeco titulo Πανδέκτας inscripsit, tamquam omne rerum atoue doctrinarum genus continentis. Ibi de his stellis quae appellantur “suculae” hoc scriptum est: “Adeo,” inquit, “veteres Romani litteras Graecas nesciverunt et rudes Graecae linguae fuerunt, ut stellas quae in capite tauri sunt propterea ‘suculas’ appellarint, quod eas Graeci ὑάδας vocant, tamquam id verbum Latinum Graeci verbi interpretamentum sit, quia quae Graece ‘sues’ Latine dicantur. Sed ὑάδες,” inquit, “οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑῶν (id est, non a subus), ita ut nostri opici putaverunt, sed ab eo quod est ὕειν, appellantur; nam et cum oriuntur et cum occidunt, tempestates pluvias largosque imbres cient. Pluere autem Graeca lingua ὕειν dicitur.” Haec quidem Tiro in Pandectis. Sed enim veteres nostri non usque eo rupices et agrestes fuerunt, ut stellas hyadas idcirco “suculas” nominarent, quod ὕες Latine “sues” dicantur; sed ut quod Graeci ὑπέρ, nos “super” dicimus, quod illi ὕπτιος, nos “supinus,” quod illi ὑφορβός, nos “subulcus,” quod item illi ὕπνος, nos primo “sypnus,” deinde per y Graecae Latinaeque o litterae cognationem “somnus”: sic quod ab illis ὑάδες, a nobis primo “syades,” deinde “suculae” appellatae. Stellae autem istae non in capite tauri sunt, ut Tiro dicit, nullum enim videtur praeter eas stellas tauri caput, set hae ita circulo qui “zodiacus” dicitur sitae locataeque sunt, ut ex earum positu species quaedam et simulacrum esse videatur tauri capitis, sicuti ceterae partes et reliqua imago tauri conformata et quasi depicta est locis regionibusque earum stellarum quas Graeci Πλειάδας, nos “Vergilias” vocamus.
10. The derivation of soror, according to Antistins Labeo, and that of frater, according to Publius Nigidius. ANTISTIUS LABEO cultivated the study of civil law with special interest, and gave advice publicly to those who consulted him on legal questions; he was also not unacquainted with the other liberal arts, and he had delved deep into grammar and dialectics, as well as into the earlier and more recondite literature. He had also become versed in the origin and formation of Latin words, and applied that knowledge in particular to solving many knotty points of law. In fact, after his death works of his were published, which are entitled Posteriores, of which three successive books, the thirty-eighth, thirty-ninth and fortieth, are full of information of that kind, tending to explain and illustrate the Latin language. Moreover, in the books which he wrote On the Praetor's Edict he has included many observations, some of which are graceful and clever. Of such a kind is this, which we find written in the fourth book On the Edict: “A soror, or 'sister,'” he says, “is so called because she is, as it were, born seorsum, or ' outside,' and is separated from that home in which she was born, and transferred to another family.” Moreover, Publius Nigidius, a man of prodigious learning, explains the word frater, or “brother,” by a no less clever and ingenious derivation: “A frater,” he says, “is so called because he is, as it were, fere alter, that is, 'almost another self.'”
10. Quid “sororis” ἔτυμον esse dixerit Labeo Antistius, et quid “fratris” P. Nigidius. LABEO ANTISTIUS iuris quidem civilis disciplinam principali studio exercuit et consulentibus de iure publice responsitavit; ceterarum quoque bonarum artium non expers fuit et in grammaticam sese atque dialecticam litterasque antiquiores altioresque penetraverat Latinarumque vocum origines rationesque percalluerat, eaque praecipue scientia ad enodandos plerosque iuris laqueos utebatur. Sunt adeo libri post mortem eius editi, qui Posteriores inscribuntur, quorum librorum tres continui, tricesimus octavus et tricesimus nonus et quadragesimus, pleni sunt id genus rerum ad enarrandam et inlustrandam linguam Latinam conducentium. Praeterea in libris quos Ad Praetoris Edictum scripsit multa posuit, partim lepide atque argute reperta. Sicuti hoc est quod in quarto Ad Edictum libro scriptum legimus: “‘Soror,’” inquit, “appellata est, quod quasi seorsum nascitur separaturque ab ea domo in qua nata est et in aliam familiam transgreditur.” “Fratris” autem vocabulum P. Nigidius, homo inpense doctus, non minus arguto subtilique ἐτύμῳ interpretatur: “‘Frater,’” inquit, “est dictus quasi ‘fere alter.’”
11. Marcus Varro's opinion of the just and proper number of banqueters; his views about the dessert and about sweetmeats. THAT is a very charming book of Marcus Varro's, one of his Menippean Satires, entitled You know not what the Late Evening may Bring, in which he descants upon the proper number of guests at a dinner, and about the order and arrangement of the entertainment itself. Now he says that the number of the guests ought to begin with that of the Graces and end with that of the Muses; that is, it should begin with three and stop at nine, so that when the guests are fewest, they should not be less than three, when they are most numerous, not more than nine. “For it is disagreeable to have a great number, since a crowd is generally disorderly, and at Rome it stands, at Athens it sits, but nowhere does it recline. Now, the banquet itself,” he continues, “has four features, and then only is it complete in all its parts: if a nice little group has been got together, if the place is well chosen, the time fit, and due preparation not neglected. Moreover, one should not,” he says, “invite either too talkative or too silent guests, since eloquence is appropriate to the Forum and the courts, but silence to the bed-chamber and not to a dinner.” He thinks, then, that the conversation at such a time ought not to be about anxious and perplexing affairs, but diverting and cheerful, combining profit with a certain interest and pleasure, such conversation as tends to make our character more refined and agreeable. “This will surely follow,” he says, “if we talk about matters which relate to the common experience of life, which we have no leisure to discuss in the Forum and amid the press of business. Furthermore, the host,” he says, “ought rather to be free from meanness than over-elegant,” and, he adds: “At a banquet not everything should be read, but such things as are at once edifying and enjoyable.” And he does not omit to tell what the nature of the dessert ought to be. For he uses these words: “Those sweetmeats (bellaria) are sweetest which are not sweet; for harmony between delicacies and digestion is not to be counted upon.” That no one may be puzzled by the word bellaria which Varro uses in this passage, let me say that it means all kinds of dessert. For what the Greeks called pe/mmata or tragh/mata, our forefathers called bellaria. In the earlier comedies one may find this term applied also to the sweeter wines, which are called Liberi bellaria, or “sweetmeats of Bacchus.”
11. Quem M. Varro aptum iustumque esse numerum convivarum existimarit; ac de mensis secundis et de bellariis. LEPIDISSIMUS liber est M. Varronis ex Satiris Menippeis, qui inscribitur Nescis Quid Vesper Serus Vehat, in quo disserit de apto convivarum numero deque ipsius convivii habitu cultuque. Dicit autem, convivarum numerum incipere oportere a Gratiarum numero et progredi ad Musarum, id est proficisci a tribus et consistere in novem, ut, cum paucissimi convivae sunt, non pauciores sint quam tres, cum plurimi, non plures quam novem. “Nam multos,” inquit, “esse non convenit, quod turba plerumque est turbulenta et Romae quidem stat, sedet Athenis, nusquam autem cubat. Ipsum deinde convivium constat,” inquit, “ex rebus quattuor et tum denique omnibus suis numeris absolutum est, si belli homunculi conlecti sunt, si electus locus, si tempus lectum, si apparatus non neglectus. Nec loquaces autem,” inquit, “convivas nec mutos legere oportet, quia eloquentia in foro et aput subsellia, silentium vero non in convivio, set in cubiculo esse debet.” Sermones igitur id temporis habendos censet non super rebus anxiis aut tortuosis, sed iucundos atque invitabiles et cum quadam inlecebra et voluptate utiles, ex quibus ingenium nostrum venustius fiat et amoenius. “Quod profecto,” inquit, “eveniet, si de id genus rebus ad communem vitae usum pertinentibus confabulemur, de quibus in foro atque in negotiis agendi non est otium. Dominum autem,” inquit, “convivii esse oportet non tam lautum, quam sine sordibus,” et: “In convivio legi nec omnia debent, sed ea potissimum, quae simul sint βιωφελῆ et delectent.” Neque non de secundis quoque mensis, cuiusmodi esse eas oporteat, praecipit. His enim verbis utitur: “Bellaria,” inquit, “ea maxime sunt mellita, quae melltta non sunt; πέμμασιν enim cum πέψει societas infida.” Quod Varro hoc in loco dixit “bellaria,” ne quis forte in ista voce haereat, significat id vocabulum omne mensae secundae genus. Nam quae πέμματα Graeci aut τραγήματα dixerunt, ea veteres nostri “bellaria” appellaverunt. Vina quoque dulciora est invenire in comoediis antiquioribus hoc nomine appellata dictaque esse ea “Liberi bellaria.”
12. That the tribunes of the commons have the right to arrest, but not to summon. IN one of the letters of Ateius Capito we read that Antistius Labeo was exceedingly learned in the laws and customs of the Roman people and in the civil law. “But,” he adds, “an excessive and mad love of freedom possessed the man, to such a degree that, although the deified Augustus was then emperor and was ruling the State, Labeo looked upon nothing as lawful and accepted nothing, unless he had found it ordered and sanctioned by the old Roman law.” He then goes on to relate the reply of this same Labeo, when he was summoned by the messenger of a tribune of the commons. He says: “When the tribunes of the commons had been appealed to by a woman against Labeo and had sent to him at the Gallianum bidding him come and answer the woman's charge, he ordered the messenger to return and say to the tribunes that they had the right to summon neither him nor anyone else, since according to the usage of our forefathers the tribunes of the commons had the power of arrest, but not of summons; that they might therefore come and order his arrest, but they did not have the right to summon him when absent.” Having read this in that letter of Capito's, I later found the same statement made more fully in the twenty-first book of Varro's Human Antiquities, and I have added Varro's own words on the subject: “In a magistracy” says he, “some have the power of summons, others of arrest, others neither; summoning, for example, belongs to the consuls and others possessing the imperium; arrest, to the tribunes of the commons and the rest who are attended by a messenger; neither summoning nor arrest to the quaestors and others who have neither a lictor nor a messenger. Those who have the power of summons may also arrest, detail, and lead off to prison, all this whether those whom they summon are present or are sent for by their order. The tribunes of the commons have no power of summons, nevertheless many of them in ignorance have used that power, as if they were entitled to it; for some of them have ordered, not only private persons, but even a consul to be summoned before the rostra. I myself, when a triumvir, on being summoned by Porcius, tribune of the commons, did not appear, following the authority of our leading men, but I held to the old law. Similarly, when I was a tribune, I ordered no one to be summoned, and required no one who was summoned by one of my colleagues to obey, unless he wished.” I think that Labeo, being a private citizen at the time, showed unjustified confidence in that law of which Marcus Varro has written, in not appearing when summoned by the tribunes. For how the mischief was it reasonable to refuse to obey those whom you admit to have the power of arrest? For one who can lawfully be arrested may also be taken to prison. But since we are inquiring why the tribunes, who had full power of coercion, did not have the right to summon... because the tribunes of the commons seem to have been elected in early times, not for administering justice, nor for taking cognizance of suits and complaints when the parties were absent, but for using their veto-power when there was immediate need, in order to prevent injustice from being done before their eyes; and for that reason the right of leaving the city at night was denied them, since their constant presence and personal oversight were needed to prevent acts of violence.
12. Tribunos plebis prensionem habere, vocationem non habere. IN quadam epistula Atei Capitonis scriptum legimus, Labeonem Antistium legum atque morum populi Romani iurisque civilis doctum adprime fuisse. “Sed agitabat,” inquit, “hominem libertas quaedam nimia atque vecors usque eo ut, divo Augusto iam principe et rempublicam obtinente, ratum tamen pensumque nihil haberet, nisi quod iussum sanctumque esse in Romanis antiquitatibus legisset,” ac deinde narrat, quid idem Labeo per viatorem a tribunis plebi vocatus responderit: “Cum a muliere,” inquit, “quadam tribuni plebis adversum eum aditi, in Gallianum ad eum misissent, ut veniret et mulieri responderet, iussit eum qui missus erat redire et tribunis dicere ius eos non habere neque se neque alium quemquam vocandi, quoniam moribus maiorum tribuni plebis prensionem haberent, vocationem non haberent; posse igitur eos venire et prendi se iubere, sed vocandi absentem ius non habere.” Cum hoc in ea Capitonis epistula legissemus, id ipsum postea in M. Varronis Rerum Humanarum uno et vicesimo libro enarratius scriptum invenimus, verbaque ipsa super ea re Varronis adscripsimus: “In magistratu,” inquit, “habent alii vocationem, alii prensionem, alii neutrum; vocationem, ut consules et ceteri qui habent imperiunm; prensionem, ut tribuni plebis et alii qui habent viatorem; neque vocationem neque prensionem, ut quaestores et ceteri qui neque lictorem habent neque viatorem. Qui vocationem habent, idem prendere, tenere, abducere possunt, et haec omnia sive adsunt quos vocant sive acciri iusserunt. Tribuni plebis vocationem habent nullam, neque minus multi imperiti, proinde atque haberent, ea sunt usi; nam quidam non modo privatum, sed etiam consulem, in rostra vocari iusserunt. Ego triumvirum, vocatus a Porcio, tribuno plebis, non ivi, auctoribus principibus, et vetus ius tenui. Item tribunus cum essem, vocari neminem iussi, nec vocatum a conlega parere invitum.” Huius ego iuris quod M. Varro tradit Labeonem arbitror vana tunc fiducia, cum privatus esset, vocatum a tribunis non isse. Quae, malum, autem ratio fuit vocantibus nolle obsequi quos confiteare ius habere prendendi? Nam qui iure prendi potest et in vincula duci potest. Sed quaerentibus nobis quam ob causam tribuni, qui haberent summam coercendi potestatem, ius vocandi non habuerint..., quod tribuni plebis antiquitus creati videntur non iuri dicundo nec causis querelisque de absentibus noscendis, sed intercessionibus faciendis quibus usus praesens fuisset, ut iniuria quae coram fieret arceretur; ac propterea ius abnoctandi ademptum, quoniam, ut vim fieri vetarent, adsiduitate eorum et praesentium oculis opus erat.
13. That it is stated in Marcus Varro's books on Human Antiquities that the aediles and quaestors of the Roman people might be cited before a praetor by a private citizen. WHEN from the secluded retreat of books and masters I had come forth among men and into the light of the forum, I remember that it was the subject of inquiry in many of the quarters frequented by those who gave public instruction in law, or offered counsel, whether a quaestor of the Roman people could be cited by a praetor. Moreover, this was not discussed merely as an academic question, but an actual instance of the kind had chanced to arise, in which a quaestor was to be called into court. Now, not a few men thought that the praetor did not have the right to summon him, since he was beyond question a magistrate of the Roman people and could neither be summoned, nor if he refused to appear could he be taken and arrested without impairing the dignity of the office itself which he held. But since at that time I was immersed in the books of Marcus Varro, as soon as I found that this matter was the subject of doubt and inquiry, I took down the twenty-first book of his Human Antiquities, in which the following is written: “It is lawful for those magistrates who have the power neither of summoning the people as individuals nor of arrest, even to be called into court by a private citizen. Marcus Laevinus, a curule aedile, was cited before a praetor by a private citizen; to-day, surrounded as they are by public servants, aediles not only may not be arrested, but even presume to disperse the people.” This is what Varro says in the part of his work which concerns the aediles, but in an earlier part of the same book he says that quaestors have the right neither to summon nor to arrest. Accordingly, when both parts of the book had been read, all came over to Varro's opinion, and the quaestor was summoned before the praetor.
13. Quod in libris Humanarum M. Varronis scriptum est aediles et quaestores populi Romani in ius a privato ad praetorem vocari posse. CUM ex angulis secretisque librorum ac magistrorum in medium iam hominum et in lucem fori prodissem, quaesitum esse memini in plerisque Romae stationibus ius publice docentium aut respondentium, an quaestor populi Romani a praetore in ius vocari posset. Id autem non ex otiosa quaestione agitabatur, sed usus forte natae rei ita erat, ut vocandus esset in ius quaestor. Non pauci igitur existimabant ius vocationis in eum praetori non esse, quoniam magistratus populi Romani procul dubio esset et neque vocari neque, si venire nollet, capi atque prendi, salva ipsius magistratus maiestate, posset. Sed ego, qui tum adsiduus in libris M. Varronis fui, cum hoc quaeri dubitarique animadvertissem, protuli unum et vicesimum Rerum Humanarum, in quo ita scriptum fuit: “Qui potestatem neque vocationis populi viritim habent neque prensionis, eos magistratus a privato in ius quoque vocari est potestas. M. Laevinus, aedilis curulis, a privato ad praetorem in ius est eductus; nunc stipati servis publicis non modo prendi non possunt, sed etiam ultro submovent populum.” Hoc Varro in ea libri parte de aedilibus, supra autem in eodem libro quaestores neque vocationem habere neque prensionem dicit. Utraque igitur libri parte recitata, in Varronis omnes sententiam concesserunt, quaestorque in ius ad praetorem vocatus est.
14. The meaning of pomerium. THE augurs of the Roman people who wrote books On the Auspices have defined the meaning of pomerium in the following terms: “The pomerium is the space within the rural district designated by the augurs along the whole circuit of the city without the walls, marked off by fixed bounds and forming the limit of the city auspices.” Now, the most ancient pomerium, which was established by Romulus, was bounded by the foot of the Palatine hill. But that pomerium, as the republic grew, was extended several times and included many lofty hills. Moreover, whoever had increased the domain of the Roman people by land taken from an enemy had the right to enlarge the pomerium. Therefore it has been, and even now continues to be, inquired why it is that when the other six of the seven hills of the city are within the pomerium, the Aventine alone, which is neither a remote nor an unfrequented district, should be outside the pomerium; and why neither king Servius Tullius nor Sulla, who demanded the honour of extending the pomerium, nor later the deified Julius, when he enlarged the pomerium, included this within the designated limits of the city. Messala wrote that there seemed to be several reasons for this, but above them all he himself approved one, namely, because on that hill Remus took the auspices with regard to founding the city, but found the birds unpropitious and was less successful in his augury than Romulus. “Therefore,” says he, “all those who extended the pomerium excluded that hill, on the ground that it was made ill-omened by inauspicious birds.” But speaking of the Aventine hill, I thought I ought not to omit something which I ran across recently in the Commentary of Elys, an early grammarian. In this it was written that in earlier times the Aventine was, as we have said, excluded from the pomerium, but afterwards by the authority of the deified Claudius it was admitted and honoured with a place within the limits of the pomerium.
14. Quid sit “pomerium.” “POMERIUM” quid esset augures populi Romani qui libros De Auspiciis scripserunt istiusmodi sententia definierunt: “Pomerium est locus intra agrum effatum per totius urbis circuitum pone muros regionibus certeis determinatus, qui facit finem urbani auspicii.” Antiquissimum autem pomerium, quod a Romulo institutum est, Palatini montis radicibus terminabatur. Sed id pomerium pro incrementis reipublicae aliquotiens prolatum est et multos editosque collis circumplexum est. Habebat autem ius proferendi pomerii qui populum Romanum agro de hostibus capto auxerat. Propterea quaesitum est, ac nunc etiam in quaestione est, quam ob causam ex septem urbis montibus, cum ceteri sex intra pomerium sint, Aventinus solum, quae pars non longinqua nec infrequens est, extra pomerium sit, neque id Servius Tullius rex neque Sulla, qui proferendi pomerii titulum quaesivit, neque postea divus Iulius, cum pomerium proferret, intra effatos urbi fines incluserint. Huius rei Messala aliquot causas videri scripsit; sed praeter eas omnis ipse unam probat, quod in eo monte Remus urbis condendae gratia auspicaverit avesque inritas habuerit superatusque in auspicio a Romulo sit: “Idcirco,” inquit, “omnes qui pomerium protulerunt montem istum excluserunt, quasi avibus obscenis ominosum.” Sed de Aventino monte praetermittendum non putavi quod non pridem ego in Elydis, grammatici veteris, Conmmenlario offendi, in quo scriptum erat Aventinum antea, sicuti diximus, extra pomerium exclusum, post auctore divo Claudio receptum et intra pomerii fines observatum.