12. Those who have written about “taking” a Vestal virgin, of whom the most painstaking is Antistius Labeo, have stated that it is unlawful for a girl to be chosen who is less than six, or more than ten, years old; she must also have both father and mother living; she must be free too from any impediment in her speech, must not have impaired hearing, or be marked by any other bodily defect; she must not herself have been freed from paternal control, nor her father before her, even if her father is still living and she is under the control of her grandfather; neither one nor both of her parents may have been slaves or engaged in mean occupations. But they say that one whose sister has been chosen to that priesthood acquires exemption, as well as one whose father is a1 flamen or an augur, one of the Fifteen in charge of the Sibylline Books, one of the Seven who oversee the banquets of the gods, or a dancing priest of Mars. Exemption from that priesthood is regularly allowed also to the betrothed of a pontiff and to the daughter of a priest of the tubilustrium. Furthermore the writings of Ateius Capito inform us that the daughter of a man without residence in Italy must not be chosen, and that the daughter of one who has three children must be excused. Now, as soon as the Vestal virgin is chosen, escorted to the House of Vesta and delivered to the pontiffs, she immediately passes from the control of her father without the ceremony of emancipation or loss of civil rights, and acquires the right to make a will. But as to the method and ritual for choosing a Vestal, there are, it is true, no ancient written records, except that the first to be appointed was chosen by Numa. There is, however, a Papian law, which provides that twenty maidens be selected from the people at the discretion of the chief pontiff, that a choice by lot be made from that number in the assembly, and that the girl whose lot is drawn be “taken” by the chief pontiff and become Vesta's. But that allotment in accordance with the Papian law is usually unnecessary at present. For if any man of respectable birth goes to the chief pontiff and offers his daughter for the priesthood, provided consideration may be given to her candidacy without violating any religious requirement, the senate grants him exemption from the Papian law. Now the Vestal is said to be “taken,” it appears, because she is grasped by the hand of the chief pontiff and led away from the parent under whose control she is, as if she had been taken in war. In the first book of Fabius Pictor's History the formula is given which the chief pontiff should use in choosing a Vestal. It is this: “I take thee, Amata, as one who has fulfilled all the legal requirements, to be priestess of Vesta, to perform the rites which it is lawful for a Vestal to perform for the Roman people, the Quirites.” Now, many think that the term “taken” ought to be used only of a Vestal. But, as a matter of fact, the flamens of Jupiter also, as well as the augurs, were said to be “taken.” Lucius Sulla, in the second book of his Autobiography, wrote as follows: “Publius Cornelius, the first to receive the surname Sulla, was taken to be flamen of Jupiter.” Marcus Cato, in his accusation of Servius Galba, says of the Lusitanians: “Yet they say that they wished to revolt. I myself at the present moment wish a thorough knowledge of the pontifical law; shall I therefore be taken as chief pontiff? If I wish to understand the science of augury thoroughly, shall anyone for that reason take me as augur?” Furthermore, in the Commentaries on the Twelve Tables compiled by Labeo we find this passage: “A Vestal virgin is not heir to any intestate person, nor is anyone her heir, should she die without making a will, but her property, they say, reverts to the public treasury. The legal principle involved is an unsettled question.” The Vestal is called “Amata” when taken by the chief pontiff, because there is a tradition that the first one who was chosen bore that name.
12. quodque, ut Labeo dicit, necnee intestato cuiquam nec eius intestatae quisquam iure heres est. QUI de virgine capienda scripserunt, quorum diligentissime scripsit Labeo Antistius, minorem quam annos sex, maiorem quam annos decem natam, negaverunt capi fas esse; item quae non sit patrima et matrima; item quae lingua debili sensuve aurium deminuta aliave qua corporis labe insignita sit; item quae ipsa aut cuius pater emancipatus sit, etiamsi vivo patre in avi potestate sit; item cuius parentes alter amboueabove servitutem servierunt aut in negotiis sordidis versantur. Set et eam cuius soror ad id sacerdotium lecta est excusationem mereri aiunt; item cuius pater flamen aut augur aut quindecimvirum sacris faciundis aut septemvirum epulonum aut Salius est. Sponsae quoque pontificis et tubicinis sacrorum filiae vacatio a sacerdotio isto tribui solet. Praeterea Capito Ateius scriptum reliquit, neque eius legendam filiam qui domicilium in Italia non haberet, et excusandam eius qui liberos tres haberet. Virgo autem Vestalis simul est capta atque in atrium Vestae deducta et pontificibus tradita est, eo statim tempore sine emancipatione ac sine capitis minutione e patris potestate exit et ius testamenti faciundi adipiscitur. De more autem rituque capiundae virginis litterae quidem antiquiores non extant, nisi quae capta prima est a Numa rege esse captam. Sed Papiam legem invenimus, qua cavetur ut pontificis maximi arbitratu virgines e populo viginti legantur sortitioque in contione ex eo numero fiat et cuius sors virginis ducta erit, ut eam pontifex maximus capiat eaque Vestae fiat. Sed ea sortitio ex lege Papia non necessaria nunc videri solet. Nam si quis honesto loco natus adeat pontificem maximum atque offerat ad sacerdotium filiam suam, cuius dumtaxat salvis religionum observationibus ratio haberi possit, gratia Papiae legis per senatum fit. “Capi” autem virgo propterea dici videtur, quia pontificis maximi manu prensa ab eo parente in cuius potestate est, veluti bello capta, abducitur. In libro primo Fabii Pictoris, quae verba pontificem maximum dicere oporteat, cum virginem capiat, scriptum est. Ea verba haec sunt: “Sacerdotem Vestalem, quae sacra faciat quae ius siet sacerdotem Vestalem facere pro populo Romano Quiritibus, uti quae optima lege fuit, ita te, Amata, capio.” Plerique autem “capi” virginem solam debere dici putant. Sed flamines quoque Diales, item pontifices et augures “capi” dicebantur. L. Sulla Rerum Gestarum libro secundo ita scripsit: “P. Cornelius, cui primum cognomen Sullae impositum est, flamen Dialis captus.” M. Cato de Lusitanis, cum Servium Galbam accusavit: “Tamen dicunt deficere voluisse. Ego me nunc volo ius pontificium optime scire; iamne ea causa pontifex capiar? Si volo augurium optime tenere, ecquis me ob eamearn rem augurem capiat?” Praeterea in commentariisCommenlariis Labeonis, quae ad duodecimDuodecin Tabulas composuit, ita scriptum est: “Virgo Vestalis neque heres est cuiquam intestato, neque intestatae quisquam, sed bona eius in publicum redigi aiunt. Id quo iure fiat, quaeritur.” “Amata” inter capiendum a pontifice maximo appellatur, quoniam quae prima capta est hoc fuisse nomen traditum est.
13. On the philosophical question, what would be more proper on receipt of an order-to do scrupulously what was commanded, or sometimes even to disobey, in the hope that it would be more advantageous to the giver of the order; and an exposition of varying views on that subject. IN interpreting, evaluating and weighing the obligations which the philosophers call kaqh/konta, or “duties,” the question is often asked, when some task has been assigned to you and exactly what was to be done has been defined, whether you ought to do anything contrary to instructions, if by so doing it might seem that the outcome would be more successful and more advantageous to the one who imposed the task upon you. It is a difficult question which has been answered both ways by wise men. For several have taken a position on the one side and expressed the decided belief that when a matter has once for all been determined, after due deliberation, by the one whose business and right are concerned, nothing should be done contrary to his order, even if some unlooked for occurrence should promise a better way of accomplishing the end in view; for fear that, if the expectation were not realized, the offender would be liable to blame and inexorable punishment for his insubordination. If, on the other hand, the affair chanced to result more favourably, thanks would indeed be due the gods, but nevertheless a precedent would seem to have been established, which might ruin well-laid plans by weakening the binding force of a command. Others have thought that the disadvantages to be feared, in case the order was not strictly obeyed, should carefully be weighed in advance against the advantage looped for, and if the former were comparatively light and trivial, while on the contrary a greater and more substantial advantage was confidently to be expected, then they judged that one might go counter to instructions, to avoid losing a providential opportunity for successful action; and they did not believe that a precedent for disobedience was to be feared, provided always that considerations of such a kind could be urged. But they thought that particular regard should be paid to the temperament and disposition of the person whose business and command were involved: he must not be stern, hard, autocratic and implacable, as in the case of the orders of a Postumius and a Manlius. For if an account must be rendered to such a commander, they recommended that nothing be done contrary to the letter of his order. I think that this question of obedience to commands of such a nature will be more clearly defined, if I add the example set by Publius Crassus Mucianus, a distinguished and eminent man. This Crassus is said by Sempronius Asellio and several other writers of Roman history to have had the five greatest and chiefest of blessings; for he was very rich, of the highest birth, exceedingly eloquent, most learned in the law, and chief pontiff. When he, in his consulship, was in command in the province of Asia, and was making preparations to beset and assault Leucae, he needed a long, stout beam from which to make a battering-ram, to breach the walls of that city. Accordingly, he wrote to the chief engineer of the people of Mylatta, allies and friends of the Romans, to have the larger of two masts which he had seen in their city sent him. Then the chief engineer on learning the purpose for which Crassus wanted the mast, did not send him the larger, as had been ordered, but the smaller, which he thought was more suitable, and better adapted for making a ram, besides being easier to transport. Crassus ordered him to be summoned, asked why he had not sent the mast which had been ordered, and ignoring the excuses and reasons which the man urged, caused him to be stripped and soundly beaten with rods; for he thought that all the authority of a commander was weakened and made of no effect, if one might reply to orders which he received, not with due obedience, but with an unsolicited plan of his own.
13. Quaesitum esse in philosophia, quidnam foret in recepto mandato rectius, idne omnino facere quod mandatum est, an nonnumquam etiam contra, si id speres ei qui mandavit utilius fore; superque ea quaestione expositae diversae sententiae. IN officiis capiendis, censendis iudicandisque, quae καθήκοντα philosophi appellant, quaeri solet an negotio tibi dato et quid omnino faceres definite. contra quid facere debeas, si eo facto videri possit res eventura prosperius exque utilitate eius qui id tibi negotium mandavit. Anceps quaestio et in utramque partem a prudentibus viris arbitrata est. Sunt enim non pauci qui sententiam suam una in parte defixerint et re semel statuta deliberataque ab eo cuius id negotium pontificiumque esset, nequaquam putaverint contra dictum eius esse faciendum, etiamsi repentinus aliqui casus rem commodius agi posse polliceretur; ne, si spes fefellisset, culpa inpatientiae et poena indeprecabilis subeunda esset; si res forte melius vertisset, dis quidem gratia habenda, sed exemplum tamen intromissum videretur, quo bene consulta consilia religione mandati soluta corrumperentur. Alii existimaverunt incommoda prius quae metuenda essent, si res gesta aliter foret quam imperatum est, cum emolumento spei pensitanda esse et, si ea leviora minoraque, utilitas autem contra gravior et amplior spe quantum potest firma ostenderetur, tum posse adversum mandata fieri censuerunt, ne oblata divinitus rei bene gerendae occasio amitteretur; neque timendum exemplum non parendi crediderunt, si rationes dumtaxat huiuscemodi non abessent. Cumprimiscum autem respiciendum putaverunt ingenium naturamque illius cuia res praeceptumque esset: ne ferox, durus, indomitus inexorabilisque sit, qualia fuerunt Postumiana imperia et Manliana. Nam si tali praeceptori ratio reddenda sit, nihil faciendum esse monuerunt aliter quam praeceptum est. Instructius deliberatiusque fore arbitramur theorematium hoc de mandatis huiuscemodi obsequendis, si exemplum quoque P. Crassi Muciani, clari atque incluti viri, apposuerimus. Is Crassus a Sempronio Asellione et plerisque aliis historiae Romanae scriptoribus traditur habuisse quinque rerum bonarum maxima et praecipua: quod esset ditissimus, quod nobilissimus, quod eloquentissimus, quod iuris consultissimus, quod pontifex maximus. Is cum in consulatu obtineret Asiam provinciam et circumsedere oppugnareque Leucas pararet opusque esset firma atque procera trabe, qui arietem faceret quo muros eius oppidi quateret, scripsit ad magistrum ἀρχιτεκτόνων Mylattensium, sociorum amicorumque populi Romani, ut ex malis duobus, quos apud eos vidisset, uter maior esset eum mittendum curaret. Tum magister ἀρχιτεκτόνων comperto quamobrem malum desideraret, non, uti iussus erat, maiorem, sed quem esse magis idoneum aptioremque faciendo arieti facilioremque portatu existimabat, minorem misit. Crassus eum vocari iussit et, cum interrogasset cur non quem iusserat misisset, causis rationibusque quas dictitabat spretis, vestimenta detrahi imperavit virgisque multum cecidit, corrumpi atque dissolvi officium omne imperantis ratus. si quis ad id quod facere iussus est non obsequio debito, sed consilio non desiderato respondeat.
14. What was said and done by Gaius Fabricius, a man of great renown and great deeds, but of simple establishment and little money, when the Samnites offered him a great amount of gold, in the belief that he was a poor man. JULIUS HYGINUS, in the sixth book of his work On the Lives and Deeds of Famous Men, says that a deputation from the Samnites came to Gaius Fabricius, the Roman general, and after mentioning his many important acts of kindness and generosity to the Samnites since peace was restored, offered him a present of a large sum of money, begging that he would accept and use it. And they said that they did this because they saw that his house and mode of life were far from magnificent, and that he was not so well provided for as his high rank demanded. Thereupon Fabricius passed his open hands from his ears to his eyes, then down to his nose, his mouth, his throat, and finally to the lower part of his belly; then he replied to the envoys: “So long as I can restrain and control all those members which I have touched, I shall never lack anything; therefore I cannot accept money, for which I have no use, from those who, I am sure, do have use for it.”
14. Quid dixerit feceritque C. Fabricius, magna vir gloria magnisque rebus gestis, sed familiae pecuniaeque inops, cum ei Samnites tamquam indigent grave aurum donarent. IULIUS Hyginus, in libro De Vita Rebusque inlustriumInlustrirm Virorum sexto, legatos dicit a Samnitibus ad C. FabriciumFabriciuni, imperatoremimnperatorem populi Romani, venisse et memoratis multis magnisque rebus quae bene ac benivole post redditam pacem Samnitibus fecisset, obtulisse dono grandem pecuniam orasseque uti acciperet utereturque, atque id facere Samnites dixisse, quod viderent multa ad splendorem domus atque victus defieri neque pro amplitudine dignitateque lautum paratum esse. tumTurn Fabricium planas manus ab auribus ad oculos et infra deinceps ad nares et ad os et ad gulam atque inde porro ad ventrem imum deduxisse et legatis ita respondisse: dum illis omnibus membris quae attigisset obsistere atque imperare posset, numquam quicquam defuturum; propterea se pecuniam qua nihil sibi esset usus ab his quibus eamearn sciret usui esse non accipere.
15. What a tiresome and utterly hateful fault is vain and empty loquacity, and how often it has been censured in deservedly strong language by the greatest Greek and Latin writers. THE talk of empty-headed, vain and tiresome babblers, who with no foundation of solid matter let out a stream of tipsy, tottering words, has justly been thought to come from the lips and not from the heart. Moreover, men say that the tongue ought not to be unrestrained and rambling, but guided and, so to speak, steered by cords connected with the heart and inmost breast. Yet you may see some men spouting forth words with no exercise of judgment, but with such great and profound assurance that many of them in the very act of speaking are evidently unaware that they are talking. Ulysses, on the contrary, a man gifted with sagacious eloquence, spoke, not from his lips but from his heart, as Hommer says—a remark which applies less to the sound and quality of his utterance than to the depth of the thoughts inwardly conceived; and the poet went on to say, with great aptness, that the teeth form a rampart to check wanton words, in order that reckless speech may not only be restrained by that watchful sentry the heart, but also hedged in by a kind of outpost, so to speak, stationed at the lips. The words of Homer which I mentioned above are these:When from his breast his mighty voice went forthand:What a word has passed the barrier of your teeth.I have added also a passage from Marcus Tullius, in which he expresses his strong and just hatred of silly and unmeaning volubility. He says: “Provided this fact be recognized, that neither should one commend the dumbness of a man who knows a subject, but is unable to give it expression in speech, nor the ignorance of one who lacks knowledge of his subject, but abounds in words; yet if one must choose one or the other alternative, I for my part would prefer tongue-tied knowledge to ignorant loquacity.” Also in the first book of the De Oratore he wrote as follows: “For what is so insane as the empty sound of words, however well-chosen and elegant, if there be no foundation of sense or sagacity?” But Marcus Cato in particular is a relentless assailant of this fault. For in the speech entitled If Caelius, tribune of the commons, should have summoned him, he says: “That man is never silent who is afflicted with the disease of talking, as one in a lethargy is afflicted with that of drinking and sleeping. For if you should not come together when he calls an assembly, so eager is he to talk that he would hire someone to listen. And so you hear him, but you do not listen, just as if he were a quack. For a quack's words are heard, but no one trusts himself to him when he is sick.” Again Cato, in the same speech, upbraiding the same Marcus Caelius, tribune of the commons, for the cheapness at which not only his speech but also his silence could be bought, says: “For a crust of bread he can be hired either to keep silence or to speak.” Most deservedly too does Homer call Thersites alone of all the Greeks a)metroeph/s, “of measureless speech,” and a)krito/muqos, “a reckless babbler,” declaring that his words are many and a)/kosma, or “disordered,” like the endless chatter of daws; for what else does e)kolw/a (“he chattered” ) mean? There is also a line of Eupolis most pointedly aimed at men of that kind:In chatter excellent, unable quite to speak,and our countryman Sallust, wishing to imitate this, writes: “Talkative rather than eloquent.” It is for the same reason that Hesiod, wisest of poets, says that the tongue should not be vulgarly exposed but hidden like a treasure, and that it is exhibited with best effect when it is modest, restrained and musical. His own words are:The greatest of man's treasures is the tongue,Which wins most favour when it spares its wordsAnd measured is of movement.The following verse of Epicharmus is also to the point:Thou art not skilled in speech, yet silence cannot keep,and it is from this line surely that the saying arose: “Who, though he could not speak, could not be silent.” I once heard Favorinus say that the familiar lines of Euripides:Of unrestrained mouthAnd of lawless follyIs disaster the end,ought not to be understood as directed only at those who spoke impiously or lawlessly, but might even with special propriety be used also of men who prate foolishly and immoderately, whose tongues are so extravagant and unbridled that they ceaselessly flow and seethe with the foulest dregs of language, the sort of persons to whom the Greeks apply the highly significant term kata/glwssoi, or “given to talk.” I learned from a friend of his, a man of learning, that the famous grammarian Valerius Probus, shortly before his death, began to read Sallust's well-known saying, “a certain amount of eloquence but little discretion,” as “abundant talkativeness, too little discretion,” and that he insisted that Sallust left it in that form, since the word loquentia was very characteristic of Sallust, an innovator in diction, while eloquentia was not at all consistent with lack of discretion. Finally, loquacity of this kind and a disorderly mass of empty grandiloquence is scored with striking epithets by Aristophanes, wittiest of poets, in the following lines:A stubborn-creating, stubborn-pulling fellow,Uncurbed, unfettered, uncontrolled of speech,Unperiphrastic, bombastiloquent.And no less pointedly did our forefathers also call men of that kind, who were drowned in words, "babblers, gabbllers and chatterboxes."
15. Quam inportunum vitiumvitiimn plenumque odii sit futilis inanisque loquacitas, et quam multis in locis a principibus utriusque linguae viris detestatione iusta culpata sit. QUI sunt leves et futiles et importuni locutores quique nullo rerum pondere innixi verbis uvidis et lapsantibus diffluunt, eorum orationem bene existimatum est in ore nasci, non in pectore, linguam autem debere aiunt non esse liberam nec vagam, sed vinclis de pectore imo ac de corde aptis moverirnoveri et quasi gubernari. Sed enim videas quosdam scatere verbis sine ullo iudicii negotio cum securitate multa et profunda, ut loquentes plerumque videantur loqui sese nescire. Ulixen contra Homerus, virum sapienti facundia praeditum, vocem mittere ait non ex ore, sed ex pectore, quod scilicet non ad sonum magis habitumquehabitunmque vocis quam ad sententiarum penitus conceptarum altitudinem pertineret, petulantiaeque verborum coercendae vallum esse oppositum dentium luculente dixit, ut loquendi temeritas non cordis tantum custodia atque vigilia cohibeatur, sed et quibusdam quasi excubiis in ore positis saepiatur. Homerica, de quibus supra dixi, haec sunt:Ἀλλʼ ὅτε δὴ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος εἵη,et:Ποῖόν σε ἔπος φύγεν ἕρκος ὀδόντων. M. Tullii quoque verba posui, quibus stultam et inanem dicendi copiam graviter et vere detestatus est: “Dummodo,” inquit, “hoc constet, neque infantiam eius, qui rem norit, sed eam explicare dicendo non queat, neque inscientiam illius, cui res non subpetat, verba non desint, esse laudandam; quorum si alterum sit optandum, malim equidem indisertam prudentiam quam stultam loquacitatem.” Item in libro De Oratore primo verba haec posuit: “Quid enim est tam furiosum quam verborum vel optimorum atque ornatissimorum sonitus inanis, nulla subiecta sententia nec scientia?” Cumprimis autem M. Cato atrocissimus huiusce vitii insectator est. Namque in oratione, quae inscripta est Si se Caelius tribunus plebis appellasset, “Numquam,” inquit, “tacet, quemquern morbus tenet loquendi tamquam veternosum bibendi atque dormiendi. Quod si non conveniatis, cum convocari iubet, ita cupidus orationis conducat, qui auscultet. Itaque auditis, non auscultatis, tamquam pharmacopolam. Nam eius verba audiuntur, verum se ei nemo committit, si aeger est.” Idem Cato in eadem oratione eidem M. Caelio tribuno plebi vilitatem obprobrans non loquendi tantum, verum etiam tacendi: “Frusto,” inquit, “panis conduci potest, vel uti taceat vel uti loquatur.” Neque non merito Homerus unum ex omnibus Thersitam ἀμετροεπῆ et ἀκριτόμυθον appellat verbaque illius multa et ἄκοσμα strepentium sine modo graculorum similia esse dicit. Quid enim est aliud ἐκολώα? Eupolidis quoque versus de id genus hominibus consignatissime factus est:Λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν,quod Sallustius noster imitari volens sic scribit: “Loquax,” inquit, “magis quam facundus.” Quapropter Hesiodus, poetarumpoetartum prudentissimus, linguam non vulgandam, sed recondendam esse dicit proinde ut thesaurum, eiusque esse in promendo gratiam plurimam, si modesta et parca et modulata sit:Γλώσσης τοι θησαυρὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἄριστος,Φειδωλῆς πλείστη δὲ χαρις κατὰ μέτροι ἰούσης, Epicharmium quoque illud non inscite se habet: Οὐ λέγειν τύγʼ ἐσσὶ δεινός, ἀλλὰ σιγᾶν ἀδύνατος,ex quo hoc profecto sumptum est: “Qui cum loqui non posset, tacere non potuit.” Favorinum ego audivi dicere versus istos Euripidi:Ἀχαλίνων στομάτωνἈνόμου τʼ ἀφροσύναςΤὸ τέλος δυστυχία,non de his tantum factos accipi debere, qui impia aut inlicita dicerent, sed vel maxime de hominibus quoque posse dici stulta et inmodica blaterantibus, quorum lingua tam prodiga infrenisque sit, ut fluat semper et aestuet conluvione verborum taeterrima, quod genus homines a Graecis significantissimo vocabulo κατάγλωσσοι appellantur. Valerium Probum, grammaticum inlustrem, ex familiari eius, docto viro, comperi, Sallustianum illud, “satis eloquentiae, sapientiae parum,” brevi antequam vita decederet, sic legere coepisse et sic a Sallustio relictum affirmavisse: “satis loquentiae, sapientiae parum,” quod “loquentia” novatori verborum Sallustio maxime congrueret, “eloquentia” cum insipientia minime conveniret. Huiuscemodi autem loquacitatem verborumque turbam magnitudine inani vastam facetissimus poeta Aristophanes insignibus vocabulis denotavit in his versibus:Ἄνθρωπον ἀγριοποιόν, αὐθαδόστομον,Ἔχοντʼ ἀχάλινον, ἀκρατές, ἀπύλωτον στόμα,Ἀπεριλάλητον, κομποφακελορρήμονα, neque minus insigniter veteres quoque nostri hoc genus homines in verba proiectos “locutuleios” et “blaterones” et “linguaces” dixerunt Quod verba istaec Quadrigari ex Annali tertio, “ibi mille hominum occiditur,” non licenter neque de poetarum figura, sed ratione certa et proba grammaticae disciplinae dicta sunt.
16. That those words of Quadrigarius in the third book of his Annals, “there a thousand of men is killed,” are not used arbitrarily or by a poetic figure, but in accordance with a definite and approved rule of the science of grammar. QUADRIGARIUS in the third book of his Annals wrote the following: "There a thousand of men is killed," using occiditur, not occiduntur. So too Lucilius in the third book of his Satires,From gate to gate a thousand of paces is.Thence to Salcrnum six,has mille est, not mille sunt. Varro in the seventeenth book of his Antiquilies of Man writes: “To the beginning of Romulus' reign is more than a thousand and one hundred years,” Marcus Cato in the first book of his Origins, “From there it is nearly a thousand of paces.” Marcus Cicero has in his sixth Oration against Antony, “Is the middle Janus so subject to the patronage of Lucius Antonius? Who has ever been found in that Janus who would lend Lucius Antonius a thousand of sesterces?” In these and many other passages mile is used in the singular number, and that is not, as some think, a concession to early usage or admitted as a neat figure of speech, but it is obviously demanded by rule. For the word mille does not stand for the Greek xilioi, “thousand,” but for xilia/s, “a thousand”; and just as they say one xilia/s, or two xilia/des, so we say one thousand and two thousands according to a definite and regular rule. Therefore these common expressions are correct and good usage, “There is a thousand of denarii in the chest,” and “There is a thousand of horsemen in the army.” Furthermore Lucilius, in addition to the example cited above, makes this point still clearer in another place also: for in his fifteenth book he says:This horse no jolting fine Campanian steed,Though he has passed him by one thousand, ayeAnd twain, of paces, can in a longer courseCompete with, but he will in fact appearTo run the other way.So too in the ninth book:With sesterces a thousand you can gainA hundred thousand.Lucilius wrote milli passum instead of mille passibus and uno milli nummum for unis mille nunmis, thus showing clearly that mille is a noun, used in the singular number, that its plural is milia, and that it also forms an ablative case. Nor ought we to expect the rest of the cases; for there are many other words which are declined only in single cases, and even some which are not declined at all. Therefore we can no longer doubt that Cicero, in the speech which he wrote In Defence of Milo, used these words: “Before the estate of Clodius, where fully a thousand of ablebodied men was employed on those crazy substructures,” not “were employed,” as we find it in less accurate copies; for one rule requires us to say “a thousand men,” but another, “a thousand of men.”
16. QUADRIGARIUS in tertio Annalium ita scripsit: “Ibi occiditur mille hominum.” “Occiditur,” inquit, non “occiduntur.” Item Lucilius in tertio satirarumSatirarm:Ad portam mille a porta est, sex inde Salernum,mille, inquit, est, non “mille sunt.” Varro in XVII. Humanarum: “Ad Romuli initium plus mille et centum annorum est.” M. Cato in primo Originum: “Inde est ferme mille passum.” M. Cicero in sexta in Antonium: “Itane Ianuslanus medius in L. Antonii clientela est? Quis umquam in illo Iano inventus est, qui L. Antonio mille nummum ferret expensum?” In his atque in multis aliis “mille” numero singulari dictum est; neque hoc, ut quidam putant, vetustati concessum est aut per figurarum concinnitatem admissum est, scdsed sic videtur ratio poscere. “Mille” enim non pro eo ponitur, quod Graece χίλιοι dicitur, sed quod χιλιάς et sicuti una χιλιὰς et duae χιλιάδες, ita “unum mille” et “duo milia” certa atque directa ratione dicitur. Quamobrem id quoque recte et probabiliter dici solitum “mille denarium in area est” et “mille equitum in exercitu est.” Lucilius autem, praeterquam supra posui, alio quoque in loco id manifestius demonstrat, nam in libro XV. ita dicit:huncHune, milli passum qui vicerit atque duobus,Campanus sonipes succussor nullus sequeturMaiore in spatio ac diversus videbitur ire;item libro nono: Tu milli nummum potes uno quaerere centum; milli passum dixit pro “mille passibus” et “uno milli nummum” pro “unis mille nummis” aperteque ostendit “mille” et vocabulum esse et singulari numero dici eiusque plurativum esse “milia” et casum etiam capere ablativum. Neque ceteros casus requiri oportet, cum sint alia pleraque vocabula, quae in singulos tantum casus, quaedam etiam, quae in nullum inclinentur. Quapropter nihil iam dubium est, quin M. Cicero in oratione, quam scripsit pro Milone, ita scriptum reliquerit: “Ante fundum Clodi, quo in fundo propter insanas illas substructiones facile mille hominum versabatur valentium,” non “versabantur,” quod in libris minus accuratis scriptum est; alia enim ratione “mille homines,” alia “mille hominum” dicendum est.
17. The patience with which Socrates endured his wife's shrewish disposition; and in that connection what Marcus Varro says in one of his satires about the duty of a husband. XANTHIPPE, the wife of the philosopher Socrates, is said to have been ill-tempered and quarrelsome to a degree, with a constant flood of feminine tantrums and annoyances day and night. Alcibiades, amazed at this outrageous conduct of hers towards her husband, asked Socrates what earthly reason he had for not showing so shrewish a woman the door. “Because,” replied Socrates, “it is by enduring such a person at home that I accustom and train myself to bear more easily away from home the impudence and injustice of other persons.” In the same vein Varro also said in the Menippean Satire which he entitled On the Duty of a Husband: “A wife's faults must be either put down or put up with. He who puts down her faults, makes his wife more agreeable; he who puts up with them, improves himself.” Varro contrasted the two words tollere and ferre very cleverly, to be sure, but he obviously uses tollere in the sense of “correct.” It is evident too that Varro thought that if a fault of that kind in a wife cannot be corrected, it should be tolerated, in so far of course as a man may endure it honourably; for faults are less serious than crimes.
17. Quanta cum animi aequitate toleraverit Socrates uxoris ingenium intractabile; atque inibi, quid M. Varro in quadam satura de officio mariti scripserit. XANTHIPPE, Socratis philosophiphilosophy uxor, morosa admodum fuisse fertur et iurgiosa, irarumque et molestiarum muliebrium per diem perque noctem scatebat. Has eius intemperies in maritum Alcibiades demiratus, interrogavit Socraten quaenam ratio esset cur mulierem tam acerbam domo non exigeret. “Quoniam,” inquit Socrates, “cum illam domi talem perpetior, insuesco et exerceor, ut ceterorum quoque foris petulantiam et iniuriam facilius feram.” Secundum hanc sententiam quoque Varro in Satura Menippea, quam De Officio Mariti inscripsit: “Vitium,” inquit, “uxoris aut tollendum aut ferendum est. Qui tollit vitium, uxorem commodiorem praestat, qui fert, sese meliorem facit.” Haec verba Varronis “tollere” et “ferre” lepide quidem composita sunt, sed “tollere” apparet dictum pro “corrigere.” Id etiam apparet, eiusmodi vitium uxoris, si corrigi non possit, ferendum esse Varronem censuisse, quod ferri scilicet a viro honeste potest; vitia enim flagitiis leviora sunt.