1. A discourse of the philosopher Favorinus directed against those who are called Chaldaeans, and who profess to tell men's fortunes from the conjunction and movements of the stars and constellations.
1. Dissertatio Favorini philosophi adversus cos qui Chaldaei appellantur, et ex coetu motibusque siderum et stellarum fata hominum dicturos pollicentur.
AGAINST those who call themselves “Chaldaeans” or “astrologers,” and profess from the movements and position of the stars to be able to read the future, I once at Rome heard the philosopher Favorinus discourse in Greek in admirable and brilliant language.
ADVERSUM istos qui sese “Chaldaeos” seu “genethliacos” appellant ac de motu deque positu stellarumstellarunm dicere posse quae futura sunt profitentur, audivimus quondam Favorinum philosophum Romae Graece disserentem egregia atque inlustri oratione;
But whether it was for the purpose of exercising, not vaunting, his talent, or because he seriously and sincerely believed what he said, I am unable to tell; but I promptly jotted down the heads of the topics and of the arguments which he used, so far as I could recall them immediately after leaving the meeting, and they were about to this effect: That this science of the Chaldaeans was not of so great antiquity as they would have it appear; that the founders and authors of it were not those whom they themselves name, but that tricks and delusions of that kind were devised by jugglers and men who made a living and profit from their lies.
exercendi autem, non ostentandi, gratia ingenii, an quod ita serio iudicatoque existimaret, non habeo dicere. Capita autem locorum argumentorumque quibus usus est, quod eius meminisse potui, egressus ibi ex auditione propere adnotavi, eaque fuerunt ad hanc ferme sententiam: disciplinam istam Chaldaeorum tantae vetustatis non esse quantae videri volunt, neque eos principes eius auctoresque esse, quos ipsi ferant, sed id praestigiarum atque offuciarum genus commentos esse homines aeruscatores et cibum quaestumque ex mendaciis captantes.
And since they saw that some terrestrial phenomena known to men were caused by the influence and control of the heavenly bodies, as for example the ocean, as though a companion of the moon, grows old and resumes its youth along with her—from this, forsooth, they derived an argument for persuading us to believe that all human affairs, both the greatest and the least, as though bound to the stars and constellations, are influenced and governed by them.
Atque eos, quoniam viderent terrena quaedam inter homines caelestium rerum sensu atque ductu moveri, quale est quod oceanus quasi lunae comes cum ea simul senescit adolescitque, hinc videlicet sibi argumentum ad suadendum paravisse ut crederemus omnia rerum humanarum et parva et maxima, tamquam stellis atque sideribus evincta, duci et regi.
But Favorinus said that it was utterly foolish and absurd to suppose, because the tide of the ocean corresponds with the course of the moon, that a suit at law which one happens to have about an aqueduct with his neighbours, or with the man next door about a party wall, is also bound to heaven as if by a kind of chain and is decided by the stars.
Esse autem nimis quam ineptum absurdumque, ut, quoniam aestus oceani cum lunae curriculo congruit, negotium quoque alicuius, quod ei forte de aquae ductu cum rivalibus aut de communi pariete cum vicino apud iudicem est, ut existimemus, id negotium quasi habena quadam de caelo vinctum gubernari.
But even if by some divine power and purpose this could happen, yet he thought that it could by no means be grasped and understood in such a brief and scant span of life as ours by any human intellect, but he believed that some few things were conjectured paxumere/steron, (to use his own term), that is, “somewhat roughly,” with no sure foundation of knowledge, but in a loose, random and arbitrary manner, just as when we look at objects far away with eyes blinded by their remoteness from us.
Quod etsi vi et ratione quapiam divina fieri potest, nequaquam id tamen censebat in tam brevi exiguoque vitae spatio quantovis hominis ingenio conprehendi posse et percipi, set coniectari pauca quaedam, ut verbo ipsius utar, παχυμερέστερον, nullo scientiae fundo concepto, sed fusa et vaga et arbitraria, qualis longinqua oculorum acies est per intervalla media caligantium;tolli enim quod maxime inter deos atque homines differt, si homines quoque res omnis post futuras praenoscerent.
For the greatest difference between men and gods was removed, if man also had the power of foreknowing all future events.
Ipsam deinde siderum stellarumque observationem, quam esse originem scientiae suae praedicarent, hautquaquam putabat liquide consistere.
Furthermore, he thought that even the observation of the stars and constellations, which they declared to be the foundation of their knowledge, was by no means a matter of certainty. “For if the original Chaldaeans,” said he, “who dwelt in the open plains, watched the movements and orbits of the stars their separations and conjunctions, and observed their effects, let this art continue to be practised, but let it be only under the same inclination of the heavens as that under which the Chaldaeans then were. For the system of observation of the Chaldaeans cannot remain valid, if anyone should wish to apply it to different regions of the sky.
“Nam si principes Chaldaei, qui in patentibus campis colebant, stellarum motus et vias et discessiones et coetus intuentes, quid ex his efficeretur observaverunt, procedat,” inquit, “haec sane disciplina, set sub ea modo inclinatione caeli, sub qua tunc Chaldaei fuerunt; non enim potest,” inquit, “ratio Chaldaeorum observationis manere, si quis ea uti velit sub diversis caeli regionibus. Nam quanta,” inquit, “partium circulorumque caeli ex devergentia et convexionibus mundi varietas sit, quis non videt?”
For who does not see,” said he, “how great is the diversity of the zones and circles of the heavens caused by the inclination and convexity of the earth? Why then should not those same stars, by which they maintain that all human and divine affairs are affected, just as they do not everywhere arouse cold and heat, but change and vary the weather, at the same time causing calm in one place and storm in another—why should they not, I say, produce one series of affairs and events in the land of the Chaldaeans, another among the Gaetulians, another on the Danube, and still another on the Nile?
“Eaedem igitur stellae, per quas omnia divina humanaque fieri contendunt, sicuti non usquequaque pruinas aut calores cient, sed mutant et variant tempestatesque eodem in tempore alibi placidas, alibi violentas movent, cur non eventa quoque rerum ac negotiorum alia efficiunt in Chaldaeis, alia in Gaetulis, alia aput Danuvium, alia aput Nilum?”“Per autem,” inquit, “inconsequens, ipsum quidem corpus et habitum tam profundi aeris sub alio atque alio caeli curvamine non eundem manere, in hominum autem negotiis stellas istas opinari idem semper ostendere, si eas ex quacumque terra conspexeris.”
But,” said he, “it is utterly inconsistent to suppose that the mass and the condition of this vast height of air does not remain the same under one or another region of the heavens, but that in human affairs those stars always indicate the same thing from whatever part of the earth you may observe them.”
Praeterea mirabatur id cuiquam pro percepto liquere, stellas istas quas a Chaldaeis et Babyloniis sive Aegyptiis observatas ferunt, quas multi “erraticas,” Nigidius “errones” vocat, non esse plures quam volgo dicerentur;
Besides, he expressed his surprise that anyone considered it a certainty that those stars which they say were observed by the Chaldaeans and Babylonians, or by the Egyptians, which many call erraticae, or “wandering,” but Nigidius called errones, or “the wanderers,” are not more numerous than is commonly assumed;
posse enim fieri existimabat ut et alii quidam planetes pari potestate essent, sine quibus recta atque perpetua observatio perfici non quiret, neque eos tamen cernere homines possent propter exuperantiam vel splendoris vel altitudinis.
for he thought it might possibly be the case that there were some other planets of equal power, without which a correct and final observation could not be completed, but that men could not see them because of their remarkable brilliance or altitude.
“Nam et quaedam,” inquit,“sidera a quibusdam terris conspiciuntur earumque terrarum hominibus nota sunt; sed eadem ipsa ex alia omni terra non videntur et sunt aliis omnino ignarissima.”
' For,' said he, “some stars are visible from certain lands and are known to the men of those lands; but those same stars are not visible from every other land and are wholly unknown to other men.
“Atque uti demus,” inquit, “et has tantummodo stellas et ex una parte terrae observari debuisse, quae tandem finis observationis istius fuit et quae tempora satis esse visa sunt ad percipiendum quid praemonstraret aut coetus stellarum aut circuitus aut transitus?”
And granting,” said he, “both that only these stars ought to be observed, and that too from one part of the earth, what possible end was there to such observation, and what periods of time seemed sufficient for understanding what the conjunction or the orbits or the transits of the stars foretold? For if an observation was made in the beginning in such a manner that it was calculated under what aspect, arrangement and position of the stars anyone was born, and if thereafter his fortune from the beginning of his life, his character, his disposition, the circumstances of his affairs and activities, and finally also the end of his life were noted, and all these things as they had actually happened were committed to writing, and long afterwards, when the same stars were in the same aspect and position, it was supposed that those same things would happen to others who had been born at that same time;
“Nam si isto modo coepta fieri observatio est, ut animadverteretur quo habitu quaque forma quaque positura stellarum aliquis nasceretur, tum deinceps ab ineunte vita fortuna eius et mores et ingenium et circumstantia rerum negotiorumque et ad postremumpostrernum finis etiam vitae spectaretur eaque omnia, ut usu venerant, litteris mandarentur ac postea longis temporibus, cum ipsae illae eodem in loco eodemque habitu forent, eadem ceteris quoque eventura existimarentur,”“qui eodem illo tempore nati fuissent—si isto,” inquit, “modo observari coeptum et ex ea observatione conposita quaedam disciplina est, nullo id pacto potest procedere.”
if the first observations were made in that way,” said he, “and from such observations a kind of science was formed, it can by no means be a success.
“Dicant enim quot tandem annis vel potius quot saeculis orbis hic observationis perfici quiverit.”
For let them tell me in how many years, pray, or rather in how many ages, the cycle of the observations could be completed.” For he said that it was agreed among astrologers that those stars which they call “wandering,” which are supposed to determine the fate of all things, beginning their course together, return to the same place from which they set out only after an innumerable and almost infinite number of years, so that there could be no continuity of observation, and no literary record could endure for so long an epoch.
Constare quippe inter astrologos dicebat, stellas istas quas “erraticas” dicerent, quae esse omnium rerum fatales viderentur, infinito prope et innumerabili numero annorum ad eundem locum, cum eodem abitu simul omnes reverti unde profectae sunt, ut neque ullus observationis tenor neque memoriae ulla effigies litterarum tanto aevo potuerint edurare.
And he thought that this point also ought to be taken into consideration, that one constellation presided at the time when a man was first conceived in his mother's womb, and another one ten months later when he came into the world, and he asked how it was consistent for a different indication to be made about the same person, if, as they themselves thought, a different position and order of the same stars gave different fortunes.
Atque illud etiam cuimodi esset considerandum putabat, quod aliud stellarum agmen foret quo primumprimur tempore conciperetur homo in utero matris, aliud postea cum in decem mensibus proximis in lucem ederetur, quaerebatque qui conveniret diversam super eodem fieri demonstrationem, si, ut ipsi putarent, alius atque alius earundem stellarum situs atque ductus alias atque alias fortunas daret.
But also at the time of marriage, from which children were expected, and at the very union of the husband and wife, he said that it ought to be indicated by a fixed and inevitable position of the stars, with what character and fortune men would be born; and, indeed, long before that, when the father and mother were themselves born, it ought to be foretold even then from their horoscope what offspring they would produce; and far, far back of that, even to infinity, so that, if that science rested on any foundation of truth, a hundred years ago, or rather at the beginning of heaven and earth, and then on in an unbroken series of predictions as long as generation followed generation, those stars ought to have foretold what character and fortune anyone would have who is born to-day.
Sed et nuptiarum tempore, ex quibus liberi quaererentur, atque ipso etiam illo maris et feminae iam declarari coitu oportere dicebat certo quodam et necessario stellarum ordine quales qualique fortuna homines gignerentur; ac multo etiam ante, cum pater ipse atque mater nascerentur, ex eorum genitura debuisse iam tunc prospici quinam olim futuri essent quos hi creaturi forent; et supra longelone atque longe per infinitum, ut, si disciplina ista fundamento aliquo veritatis nixa est, centesimo usque abhinc saeculo vel magis primo caeli atque mundi exordio atque inde iam deinceps continua significatione, quotiens generis auctores eiusdem homines nascerentur, stellae istae praemonstrare debuerint qualis qualique fato futurus sit quisquis hodie natus est.
“But how,” said he, “can it be believed that the fate and fortune foretold by the form and position of any one of the stars are fixed and attached to one particular individual, and that the same position of the stars is restored only after a long series of years, if the indications of the same man's life and fortunes in such short intervals, through the single degrees of his forefathers and through an infinite order of successions, are so often and so frequently pointed out as the same, although the position of the stars is not the same?
“Quo autem,” inquit, “pacto credi potest, uniuscuiusque stellarum formae et positionis sortem atque fortunam uni omnino homini certam destinatamque esse eamque formam post longissima saeculorum spatia restitui, si vitae fortunarumquefortunaruinque eiusdem hominis indicia in tam brevibus intervallis per singulos maiorum eius gradus perque infinitum successionum ordinem tam saepe ac tam multipliciter eadem ipsa, non eadem stellarum facie denotantur?”
But if this can happen, and if this contradiction and variation be admitted through all the epochs of antiquity in foretelling the origin of those men who are to be born afterwards, this inequality confounds the observation and the whole theory of the science falls to the ground.”
“Quod si id fieri potest eaque diversitas atque varietas admittitur per omnis antiquitatis gradus ad significanda eorum hominum qui post nascentur exordia imparilitas haec turbat observationem omnisque ratio disciplinae confunditur.”
Moreover, he thought that the most intolerable thing was their belief that not only occurrences and events of an external nature, but even men's very deliberations, their purposes, their various pleasures, their likes and dislikes, the chance and sudden attractions and aversions of their feelings on trifling matters, were excited and influenced from heaven above; for example, if you happened to wish to go to the baths, and then should change your mind, and again should decide to go, that all this happens, not from some shifting and variable state of mind, but from a fateful ebb and flow of the planets. Thus men would clearly be seen to be, not logika\ zw=a or “reasoning beings,” as they are called, but a species of ludicrous and ridiculous puppets, if it be true that they do nothing of their own volition or their own will, but are led and driven by the stars.
iamlam vero id minime ferundum censebat, quod non modo casus et eventa quae evenirent extrinsecus, sed consilia quoque ipsa hominum et arbitria et varias voluntates adpetitionesque et declinationes et fortuitos repentinosque in levissimis rebus animorum impetus recessusque moveri agitarique desuper e caelo putarent; tamquam quod forte ire in balneas volueris ac deinde nolueris atque id rursus volueris, non ex aliqua dispari variaque animi agitatione, sed ex necessaria quadam errantium siderum reciprocatione contigerit, ut plane homines non, quod dicitur, λογικὰ ζῶα, sed ludicra et ridenda quaedam neurospasta esse videantur, si nihil sua sponte, nihil arbitratu suo faciunt, sed ducentibus stellis et aurigantibus.
“And if,” said he, “they affirm that it could have been foretold whether king Pyrrhus or Manius Curius was to be victorious in the battle, why, pray, do they not dare also to predict which of the players with dice or counters on a board will win?
“Ac si,” inquit, “potuisse praedici adfirmant Pyrrusne rex an Manius Curius proelio victurus esset, cur tandem non de alea quoque ac de calculis et alveolo audent dicere, quisnam ibi ludentium vincat? An videlicet magna sciunt, parva nesciunt, et minora maioribus inperceptiora sunt?”
Or, forsooth, do they know important things, but not those which are unimportant; and are unimportant things more difficult to understand than the important? But if they claim knowledge of great matters and say that they are plainer and easier to be understood, I should like,” said he, “to have them tell me, in this observation of the whole world, in comparison with such mighty works of nature, what they regard as great in the trifling and brief fortunes and affairs of men.
“Sed si magnitudines rerum sibi vindicant magisque esse perspicuas et facilius comprehendi posse dicunt, volo,” inquit, “mili respondeant quid in hac totius mundi contemplatione, prae tantis naturae operibus, in tam parvis atque brevibus negotiis fortunisque hominum magnum putent?”
And I should like to have them answer this question also,” said he: “if the instant in which man at birth is allotted his destiny is so brief and fleeting, that at that same moment not more than one can be born with the same conjunction under the same circle of the heavens, and if therefore even twins have different lots in life, since they are not born at the same instant—I ask them to tell me,” said he, “how and by what plan they are able to overtake the course of that fleeting moment, which can scarcely be grasped by one's thoughts, or to detain and examine it, when in the swift revolution of days and nights even the briefest moments, as they say, cause great changes?”
“Atque id velim etiam,” inquit, “ut respondeant: si tam parvum atque rapidum est momentum temporis, in quo homo nascens fatum accipit, ut in eodem illo puncto sub eodem circulo caeli plures simul ad eandem competentiam nasci non queant, et si idcircoideirco gemini quoque non eadem vitae sorte sunt, quoniam non eodem temporis puncto editi sunt peto,” inquit, “respondeant, cursum illum temporis transvolantis, qui vix cogitatione animi conprehendi potest, quonam pacto aut consulto adsequi queant aut ipsi perspicere et reprehendere, cum in tam praecipiti dierum noctiumque vertigine minima momenta ingentes facere dicant mutationes?”
Then, finally, he asked what answer could be made to this argument, that human beings of both sexes, of all ages, born into the world under different positions of the stars and in regions widely separated, nevertheless sometimes all perished together by the same kind of death and at the same moment, either from an earthquake, or a falling building, or the sack of a town, or the wreck of the same ship.
Ad postremum autem et quid esset quod adversum hoc dici posset requirebat, quod homines utriusque sexus, omnium aetatum, diversis stellarum motibus in vitam editi, regionibus sub quibus geniti sunt longe distantibus, omnes tamen isti, aut hiantibus terris aut labentibus tectis aut oppidorum expugnationibus aut eadem in navi fluctu obruti, eodem genere mortis eodemque ictu temporis universi simul interirent.
“This,” said he, “of course would never happen, if the natal influence assigned to the birth of each of them had its own peculiar conditions.
“Quod scilicet,” inquit, “numquam eveniret, si momenta nascendi singulis adtributa suas unumquidque leges haberent.”
But if,” he said, “they answer that even in the life and death of men who are born at different times certain events may happen which are alike and similar, through some similar conjunction of the stars at a later time, why may not sometimes everything become equal, so that through such agreement and similarity of the stars many a Socrates and Antisthenes and Plato may appear, equal in birth, in person, in talent, in character, in their whole life and in their death? But this,” said he, “can by no means whatever happen.
“Quod si quaedam,” inquit, “in hominum morte atque vita etiam diversis temporibus editorum per stellarum pares quosdam postea conventus paria nonnulla et consimilia posse dicunt optingere, cur non aliquando possint omnia quoque paria usu venire, ut existant per huiuscemodi stellarum concursiones et similitudines Socratae simul et Antisthenae et Platones multi genere, forma, ingenio, moribus, vita omni et morte pari? Quod nequaquam,” inquit, “prorsus fieri potest.”
Therefore they cannot properly use this argument against the inequality of men's births and the similarity of their death.”
“Non igitur hac causa probe uti queunt adversum hominum impares ortus, interitus pares.”
He added that he excused them from this further inquiry: namely, if the time, the manner and the cause of men's life and death, and of all human affairs, were in heaven and with the stars, what would they say of flies, worms, sea urchins, and many other minute animals of land and sea? Were they too born and destroyed under the same laws as men? so that to frogs also and gnats either the same fates are assigned at birth by the movements of the constellations, or, if they do not believe that, there seemed to be no reason why that power of the stars should be effective with men and ineffectual with the other animals. These remarks I have touched upon in a dry, unadorned, and almost jejune style.
Illud autem condonare se his dicebat quod non id quoque requireret: si vitae mortisque hominum rerumque humanarum omnium tempus et ratio et causa in caelo et apud stellas foret, quid de muscis aut vermiculis aut echinis, multis aliis minutissimis terra marique animantibus dicerent? An istaec quoque isdem, quibus homines, legibus nascerentur isdemque itidem extinguerentur? ut aut ranunculis quoque et culicibus nascendi fata sint de caelestium siderum motibus adtributa aut, si id non putarent, nulla ratio videretur cur ea siderum vis in hominibus valeret, deficeret in ceteris.
But Favorinus, such was the man's talent, and such is at once the copiousness and the charm of Greek eloquence, delivered them at greater length and with more charm, brilliance and readiness, and from time to time he warned us to take care lest in any way those sycophants should worm their way into our confidence by sometimes seeming to stumble upon, and give utterance to, something true.
Haec nos sicca et incondita et propemodum ieiuna oratione adtingimusadtigimus. Set Favorinus, ut hominis ingenium fuit utque est Graecae facundiae copia simul et venustas, latius ea et amoenius et splendidius et profluentius exequebatur, atque identidem commonebat ut caveremus ne qua nobis isti sycophantae ad faciendam fidem inreperent, quod viderentur quaedam interdum vera effutire aut spargere.
“For they do not,” said he, “say anything that is tangible, definite or comprehensible, but depending upon slippery and roundabout conjecture, groping with cautious steps between truth and falsehood, as if walking in the dark, they go their way. And after making many attempts they either happen suddenly on the truth without knowing it, or led by the great credulity of those who consult them, they get hold by cunning of something true, and therefore obviously find it easier to come somewhere near the truth in past events than in those to come. Yet all the true things which they say through accident or cunning,” said he, “are not a thousandth part of the falsehoods which they utter.”
“Non enim comprehensa,” inquit, “neque definita neque percepta dicunt, sed lubrica atque ambagiosa coniectatione nitentes, inter falsa atque vera pedetemptim quasi per tenebras ingredientes, eunt et aut multa temptando incidunt repente inprudentes in veritatem aut ipsorum, qui eos consulunt, multa credulitate ducente perveniunt callide ad ea quae vera sunt, et idcirco videntur in praeteritis rebus quan in futuris veritatem facilius imitari. Ista tamen omnia quae aut tenere aut astute vera dicunt, prae ceteris,” inquit, “quae mentiuntur, pars ea non sit millesima.”
But besides these remarks which I heard Favorinus make, I recall many testimonies of the ancient poets, by which delusive fallacies of this kind are refuted. Among these is the following saying of Pacuvius:Could men divine the future, they'd match Jove.Also this from Accius, who writes:I trust the augurs not, who with mere wordsEnrich men's ears, to load themselves with gold.
Praeter haec autem quae dicentem Favorinum audivimus, multa etiam memini poetarum veterum testimonia, quibus huiuscemodihuiuscenodi ambages fallaciosae confutantur. Ex quibus est Pacuvianum illud:Nám si quae eventúra sunt provideant, aequiperént Iouilovi,item Accianum illud:Nihil (inquit) crédo auguribus, qui aúres verbis dívitantAliénas, suas ut aúro locupletént domus.
Favorinus too, wishing to deter and turn away young men from such calculators of nativities and from certain others of that kind, who profess to reveal all the future by means of magic arts, concluded with arguments of this sort, to show that they ought by no means to be resorted to and consulted. “They predict,” said he, “either adverse or prosperous events.
Idem Favorinus, deterrere volens ac depellere adulescentes a genethliacisgenethiacis istis et quibusdam aliis id genus, qui prodigiosis artibus futura omnia dicturos pollicentur, nullo pacto adeundos eos esse consulendosque huiuscemodi argumentisargdnmentis concludebat:
If they foretell prosperity and deceive you, you will be made wretched by vain expectations; if they foretell adversity and lie, you will be made wretched by useless fears. But if they predict truly and the events are unhappy, you will thereby be made wretched by anticipation, before you are fated to be so; if on the contrary they promise prosperity and it conies to pass, then there will clearly be two disadvantages: the anticipation of your hopes will wear you out with suspense, and hope will in advance have reaped the fruit of your approaching happiness. Therefore there is every reason why you should not resort to men of that kind, who profess knowledge of the future.”
“Aut adversa,” inquit, “eventura dicunt, aut prospera. Si dicunt prospera et fallunt, miser fies frustra expectando; si adversa dicunt et mentiuntur, miser fiesties frustra timendotirnendo; sin vera respondent eaque sunt non prospera, iam inde ex animo miser fies, antequam e fato fias; si felicia promittunt eaque eventura sunt, tum plane duo erunt incommoda: et expectatio te spei suspensum fatigabit et futurum gaudii fructum spes tibi iam praefloraverit. Nullo igitur pacto utendum est istiusmodi hominibus res futuras praesagientibus.”
2. How Favorinus discoursed when I consulted hint about the duty of a judge.
2. Quem in modum disseruerit Favorinus consultus a me super officio iudicis.
AT the time when I was first chosen by the praetors to be one of the judges in charge of the suits which are called “private,” I hunted up books written in both languages on the duty of a judge, in order that, being a young man, called from poets' tales and orators' perorations to preside in court, I might from lack of the “living voice,” as they say, gain legal lore from so-called “mute counsellors.” And with regard to postponements and delays and some other legal principles I was advised and helped by the Julian Law itself and by the commentaries of Masurius Sabinus and some other jurists. But in those complicated cases which often come up, and in the perplexity arising from conflicting opinions, such books gave me no aid at all.
Quo primum tempore a praetoribusraetoribus lectus in iudices sum, ut iudicia quae appellantur “privata” susciperem, libros utriusque linguae de officio iudicis scriptos conquisivi, ut homo adulescens, a poetarum fabulis et a rhetorum epilogis ad iudicandas lites vocatus, rem iudiciariam, quoniam “vocis,” ut dicitur, “vivae” penuria erat, ex “mutis,” quod aiunt, “magistris” cognoscerem. Atque in dierum quidem diffissionibus conperendinationibusque et aliis quibusdam legitimis ritibus ex ipsa lege Iulia et ex Sabini Masurii et quorundam aliorum iurisperitorum commentariis commoniti et adminiculati sumus.
For although the opinions of judges ought to be formed from the conditions of the cases before them, yet there are certain general principles and precepts by which, before hearing a case, the judge ought to guard and prepare himself against the uncertain event of future difficulties;
In his autem, quae existere solent, negotiorum ambagibus et in ancipiti rationum diversarum circumstantia nihil quicquam nos huiuscemodi libri iuverunt. Nam.
as, for example, an inexplicable perplexity in coming to an opinion once befell me. A sum of money was claimed before me, which was said to have been paid and counted out; but the claimant did not show this by documents or witnesses, but relied upon very slender arguments.
etsi consilia iudicibus ex praesentium causarum statu capienda sunt, generalia tamen quaedam praemonita et praecepta sunt, quibus ante causam praemuniri iudex praepararique ad incertos casus futurarum difficultatum debeat, sicut illa mihi tunc accidit inexplicabilis reperiendae sententiae ambiguitas.
It was clear, however, that he was a thoroughly good man, of well-known and tested integrity and of blameless life, and many striking instances of his probity and honesty were presented.
Petebatur apud me pecunia, quae dicebatur data numerataque, sed qui petebat neque tabulis neque testibus id factum docebat et argumentisarguments admodum exilibus nitebatur.
On the other hand, the man upon whom the claim was made was shown to be of no substance, of base and evil life, often convicted of lying, and full of treachery and fraud.
Sed eum constabat virum esse firme bonum notaeque et expertae fidei et vitae inculpatissimae, multaque et inlustria exempla probitatis sinceritatisque eius expromebantur;
Yet lie, along with his numerous advocates, noisily protested that the payment of the money ought to be shown in the usual way, by a “receipt for payment,” by a “book of accounts,” by “producing a signature,” by “a sealed deed,” or by the “testimony of witnesses”;
ilium autem unde petebatur hominem esse non bonae rei vitaque turpi et sordida convictumque volgo in mendaciis plenumque esse perfidiarum et fraudum ostendebatur.
and if it could be shown in none of these ways, that he ought surely to be dismissed at once and his accuser found guilty of blackmail. He maintained that the testimony relating to the life and conduct of the two parties was irrelevant;
Is tamen cum suis multis patronis clamitabat probari apud me debere pecuniam datam consuetis modis, “expensi latione,” “mensae rationibus,” “chirographi exhibitione” “tabularum obsignatione,” “testium intercessione,”
for this was a case of claiming money before a private judge, not a question of morals inquired into by the censors. Thereupon some friends of mine, whom I had asked to aid me with their advice, experienced men with a reputation gained in acting as advocates and in the business of the forum, who were always inclined to act in haste because of the suits everywhere demanding attention, declared there was no need of sitting longer and that there was no doubt that the defendant ought to be acquitted, since it could not be shown in any of the usual ways that he had received the money.
ex quibus omnibus si nulla re probaretur, dimitti iam se sane oportere et adversarium de calumnia damnari, quod de utriusque autem vita atque factis diceretur, frustra id fieri atque dici; rem enim de petenda pecunia apud iudicem privatum agi, non apud censores de moribus.
But when I contemplated the men, one abounding in honesty, the other in baseness and of a most shameful and degraded life, I could not by any means be argued into an acquittal.
Tunc ibi amici mei, quos rogaveram in consilium, viri exercitati atque in patrociniis et in operis fori celebres semperque se circumundique distrahentibus causis festinantes, non sedendum diutius ac nihil esse dubium dicebant quin absolvendus foret, quem accepisse pecuniam nulla probatione sollemni docebatur.
I therefore ordered a postponement and from the bench I proceeded to go to the philosopher Favorinus, with whom I associated a great deal at Rome at that time.
Sed enim ego homines cum considerabam, alterum fidei, alterum probri plenum spurcissimaeque vitae ac defamatissimae, nequaquam adduci potui ad absolvendum.
I told him the whole story of the suit and of the men, as it had been related to me, begging that with regard both to the matter about which I was then in doubt, as well as to others which I should have to consider in my position as judge, he should make me a man of greater wisdom in such affairs. Then Favorinus, after commending my scrupulous hesitation and my conscientiousness said: “The question which you are now considering may seem to be of a trifling and insignificant character.
Iussi igitur diem diffindi atque inde a subselliis pergo ire ad Favorinum philosophum, quem in eo tempore Romae plurimum sectabar, atque ei de causa ac de hominibus quae apud me dicta fuerant, uti res erat, narro omnia ac peto ut et ipsum illud in quo haerebam, et cetera etiam quae observanda mihi forent in officio iudicis, faceret me ut earum rerum essem prudentior.
But if you wish me to instruct you as to the full duties of a judge, this is by no means a fit place or time; for such a discussion involves many intricate questions and requires long and anxious attention and consideration. For-to touch at once upon a few leading questions for your benefit-the first query relating to the duty of a judge is this.
Tum Favorinus, religione illa cunctationis et sollicitudinis nostrae conprobata: “Id quidem,” inquit, “super quo nunc deliberas, videri potest specie tenui parvaque esse. Sed si de omni quoque officio iudicis praeire tibi me vis, nequaquam est vel loci huius vel temporis;”“est enim disceptatio ista multiiugae et sinuosae quaestionis multaque et anxia cura et circumspicientia indigens.”
If a judge chance to have knowledge of a matter which is brought to trial before him, and the matter is clearly known and demonstrated to him alone from some external circumstance or event, before it has begun to be argued or brought into court, but nevertheless the same thing is not proved in the course of the trial, ought he to decide in accordance with what he knew beforehand, or according to the evidence in the case? This question also,” said he, "is often raised, whether it is fitting and proper for a judge, after a case has been heard, if there seems to be an opportunity for compromising the dispute, to postpone the duty of a judge for a time and take the part of a common friend and peace-maker, as it were.
“Namque, ut pauca tibi nunc quaestionum capita adtingam, iam omnium primum hoc de iudicis officio quaeritur: si iudex forte id sciat, super qua re apud eum litigatur, eaque res uni ei, priusquam agi coepta aut in iudicium deducta sit, ex alio quodam negotio casuve aliquo cognita liquido et comperta sit, neque id tamen in agenda causa probetur, oporteatne eum secundum ea quae sciens venit iudicare, an secundum ea quae aguntur?”
And I know that this further is a matter of doubt and inquiry, whether a judge, when hearing a suit, ought to mention and ask about the things which it is for the interest of one of the parties to the suit to mention and inquire, even if the party in question neither mentions nor calls for them.
“Id etiam,” inquit, “quaeri solet, an deceat atque conveniat iudici causa iam cognita, si facultas esse videatur conponendi negotii, officio paulisper iudicis dilato communis amicitiae et quasi pacificatoris partes recipere?”
For they say that this is in fact to play the part of an advocate, not of a judge.
“Atque illud amplius ambigi ac dubitari scio, debeatne iudex inter cognoscendum ea quae dicto quaesitoque opus est dicere et quaerere, etiamsi cuius ea dici quaerique interest neque dicat neque postulet? Patrocinari enim prorsus hoc esse aiunt, non iudicare.”