---
title: "Attic Nights · Noctes Atticae"
author: "Aulus Gellius"
translator: "John C. Rolfe"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Classical Latin"
section: 33 of 46
url: https://scriptura.si/works/gellius-attic-nights/33/
cite: "Aulus Gellius, tr. John C. Rolfe, Attic Nights · Noctes Atticae, section 33. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/gellius-attic-nights/33/"
---

# Attic Nights · Noctes Atticae

*Aulus Gellius, tr. John C. Rolfe*

Notes made on winter nights near Athens: grammar, law, philosophy and stories, Androclus and the lion among them.

> Latin: ed. John C. Rolfe, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi1254.phi001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: John C. Rolfe, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi1254.phi001.perseus-eng1). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 33. Book XIV · chapters 2–8

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/gellius-attic-nights/33/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/gellius-attic-nights/33/#p-N

[¶0] "Besides these questions, there is disagreement also on this point, whether it is consistent with the Practice and office of a judge by his occasional remarks so to explain and set forth the matter and he case which is being tried, that before the time of his decision, as the result of statements which at he time are made before him in a confused and doubtful form, he gives signs and indications of the motions and feelings by which he is affected on each occasion and at every time.

> Latin: “Praeter haec super ea quoque re dissentitur, an ex usu exque officio sit iudicis, rem causamque de qua cognoscit interlocutionibus suis ita exprimere consignareque, ut ante sententiae tempus, ex iis quae apud eum in praesens confuse varieque dicuntur, proinde ut quoquo in loco ac tempore movetur, signa et indicia faciat motus atque sensus sui.”

[¶1] For those judges who give the impression of being keen and quick hink that the matter in dispute cannot be examined and understood, unless the judge by frequent questions and necessary interruptions makes his own opinion clear and grasps that of the litigants. But, on the other hand, those who have a reputation for calmness and dignity maintain that the judge ought not, before giving his decision and while the case is being pleaded by both parties, to indicate his opinion whenever he is influenced by some argument that is brought forward.

> Latin: “Nam qui iudices,” inquit, “acres atque celeres videntur, non aliter existimant rem qua de agitur indagari conprehendique posse, nisi is qui iudicat crebris interrogationibus necessariisque interlocutionibus et suos sensus aperiat et litigantium deprehendat.”

[¶2] For they say that the result will be, since one emotion of the mind after another must be excited by the variety of points and arguments, that such judges will seem to feel and speak differently about the same case and almost at the same time.

> Latin: “Contra autem qui sedatiores et graviores putantur negant iudicem debere ante sententiam, dum causa utrumque agitatur, quotiens aliqua re proposita motus est, totiens significare quid sentiat. Eventurum enim aiunt, ut, quia pro varietate propositionum argumentorumque alius atque alius motus animi patiendus est, aliter atque aliter eadem in causa eodemque in tempore sentire et interloqui videantur.”

[¶3] “But,” said he, "about these and other similar discussions as to the duty of a judge I shall attempt to give you my views later, when we have leisure, and I will repeat the precepts of Aelius Tubero on the subject, which I have read very recently. But so far as concerns the money which you said was claimed before your tribunal, I advise you, by Heaven! to follow the counsel of that shrewdest of men, Marcus Cato;

> Latin: “Sed de his,” inquit, “et ceteris huiuscemodi iudicialis officii tractatibus et nos posthac, cum erit otium, dicere quid sentiamus conabimur et praecepta Aelii Tuberonis super officio iudicis, quae nuperrime legi, recensebimus.”

[¶4] for he, in the speech which he delivered For Lucius Turius against Gnaeus Gellius, said that this custom had been handed down and observed by our forefathers, that if a question at issue between two men could not be proved either by documents or witnesses, then the question should be raised before the judge who was trying the case which of the two was the better man, and if they were either equally good or equally bad, that then the one upon whom the claim was made should be believed and the verdict should be given in his favour.

> Latin: “Quod autem ad pecuniam pertinet quam apud iudicem peti dixisti, suadeo hercle tibi, utare M. Catonis, prudentissimi viri, consilio, qui, in oratione quam Pro L. Turio contra Cn. Gellium dixit, ita esse a maioribus traditum observatumque ait, ut si quod inter duos actum est neque tabulis neque testibus planum fieri possitposit, tum apud iudicem qui de ea re cognosceret, uter ex his vir melior esset quaereretur et, si pares essent seu boni pariter seu mali, tum illi unde petitur crederetur ac secundum eum iudicaretur.”

[¶5] But in this case about which you are in doubt the claimant is a person of the highest character and the one on whom the claim is made is the worst of men, and there are no witnesses to the transaction between the two.

> Latin: “In hac autem causa de qua tu ambigis, optimus est qui petit, unde petitur deterrimus, et res est inter duos acta sine testibus.”

[¶6] So then go and give credit to the claimant and condemn the one on whom the claim is made, since, as you say, the two are not equal and the claimant is the better man."

> Latin: “Eas igitur et credas ei qui petit, condemnesque eum de quo petitur, quoniam, sicuti dicis, duo pares non sunt et qui petit melior est.”

[¶7] This was the advice which Favorinus gave me at that time, as became a philosopher.

> Latin: Hoc quidem mihi tum Favorinus, ut virum philosophum decuit, suasit.

[¶8] But I thought that I should show more importance and presumption than became my youth and humble merit, if I appeared to sit in judgment on and condemn a man from the characters of the disputants rather than from the evidence in the case; yet I could not make up my mind to acquit the defendant, and accordingly I took oath that the matter was not clear to me and in that way I was relieved from rendering a decision.

> Latin: Sed maius ego altiusque id esse existimavi quam quod meae aetati et mediocritati conveniret, ut cognovisse et condemnasse de moribus, non de probationibus rei gestae viderer; ut absolverem tamen inducere in animum non quivi et propterea iuravi, mihi non liquere, atque ita iudicatu illo solutus sum.

[¶9] The words of the speech of Marcus Cato which Favorinus mentioned are these: “And I have learnt this from the tradition of our ancestors: if anyone claim anything from another, and both are equally either good or bad, provided there are no witnesses to the transaction between the two, the one from whom the claim is made ought rather to be credited. Now, if Gellius had made a wager with Turio on the issue, ' Provided Gellius were not a better man than Turio,' no one, I think, would be so mad as to decide that Gellius is better than Turio; if Gellius is not better than Turio, the one from whom the claim is made ought preferably to be credited.”

> Latin: Verba ex oratione M. Catonis cuius commeminit Favorinus, haec sunt: “Atque ego a maioribus memoria sic accepiaccept: si quis quid alter ab altero peterent, si ambo pares essent, sive boni sive mali essent, quod duo res gessissent uti testes non interessent, illi unde petitur, ei potius credendum esse. Nunc si sponsionem fecissent Gellius cum Turio: ‘Ni vir melior esset Gellius quam Turius,’ nemo, opinor, tam insanus esset qui iudicaret meliorem esse Gellium quam Turium; si non melior Gellius est Turio, potius oportet credi unde petitur.”

[¶10] 3. Whether Plato and Xenophon were rivals and not on good terms with each other. THOSE who have written most carefully and thoroughly about the life and character of Xenophon and Plato have expressed the belief that they were not free from certain secret and concealed feelings of enmity and rivalry of each other, and they have set forth some conjectural evidence of this, drawn from their writings. These are in fact of this sort: that Plato in his great number of works nowhere makes mention of Xenophon, nor, on the other hand, does Xenophon mention Plato in his writings, although both men, and in particular Plato in the dialogues which he wrote, mention many followers of Socrates. This too they thought was an indication of no sincerely friendly feeling: that Xenophon in opposition to that celebrated work of Plato, which he wrote on the best form of constitution and of governing a city-state, having barely read the two books of Plato's work which were first made public, proposed a different mode of government (to wit, a monarchy) in the work entitled Paidei/as Ku/rou, or The Education of Cyrus. They say that Plato was so disturbed by that conduct and book of his, that having made mention of king Cyrus in one of his own books, in order to criticize and belittle Xenophon's work he said that Cyrus was indeed a strong and active man, but “had by no means had a fitting education”; for these are Plato's words about Cyrus. Moreover, they think that this also is added to what I have already said: that Xenophon, in the book which he wrote as records of the sayings and doings of Socrates, asserts that Socrates never discussed the causes and laws of the heavens and of nature, and that he never touched upon or approved the other sciences, called by the Greeks maqh/mata which did not contribute to a good and happy life; accordingly, he says that those who have attributed discourses of that kind to Socrates are guilty of a base falsehood. “But when Xenophon wrote this,” they say, “The of course refers to Plato, in whose works Socrates discourses on physics, music and geometry.” But if anything of this kind was to be believed, or even suspected, in noble and dignified men, I do not believe that the motive was hostility or envy, or a contest for gaining greater glory; for such considerations are wholly alien to the character of philosophers, among whom those two were in all men's judgment pre-eminent. What then is the reason for that opinion? Undoubtedly this: the mere equality and likeness of kindred talents, even though the desire and inclination of contention be absent, nevertheless create an appearance of rivalry. For when two or more men of great intellectual gifts, who have gained distinction in the same pursuit, are of equal or nearly equal fame, then there arises among their various partisans emulation in expressing an estimate of their efforts and merit. Then later, from the contention of others, the contagion of rivalry spreads to the men themselves, and while they are pressing on to the same goal of honour, the race is so even, or almost even, that it comes imperceptibly under a suspicion of rivalry, not from any purpose of their own, but from the zeal of their partisans. So then Xenophon and Plato, two stars of Socrates' charming philosophy, were believed to contend with and rival each other, because others strove to show that one or the other was the superior, and because two eminent characters, when they are labouring side by side for a lofty aim, beget a kind of appearance of rivalry and competition.

> Latin: 3. An aemuli offensique inter sese fuerint Xenophon et Plato. Qui de Xenophontis Platonisque vita et moribus pleraque omnia exquisitissime scripsere, non afuisse ab eis motus quosdam tacitos et occultos simultatis aemulationisque mutuae putaverunt et eius rei argumenta quaedam coniectaria ex eorum scriptis protulerunt. Ea sunt profecto huiuscemodi: quod neque a Platone in tot numero libris mentio usquam facta sit Xenophontis neque item contra ab eo in suis libris Platonis, quamquam uterque ac maxime Plato complurium Socratis sectatorum in sermonibus quos scripsit commermerit. Id etiam esse non sincerae neque amicae voluntatis indicium crediderunt, quod Xenophon inclito illi operi Platonis, quod de optimo statu reipublicae civitatisque administrandae scriptum est, lectis ex eo duobus fere libris qui primi in volgus exierant, opposuit contra conscripsitque diversum regiae administrationis genus, quod Παιδείας Κύρου inscriptum est. Eo facto scriptoque eius usque adeo permotum esse Platonem ferunt, ut quodam in libro, mentione Cyri regis habita, retractandi levandique eius operis gratia, virum quidem Cyrum navum et strenuum fuisse dixerit, παιδείας δὲ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἧφθαι τὸ παράπαν; haec enim verba sunt de Cyro Platonis. Praeterea putant id quoque ad ista, quae dixi, accedere: quod Xenophon, in libris quos dictorum atque factorum Socratis commentarios composuit, negat Socraten de caeli atque naturae causis rationibusque umquam disputavisse, ac ne disciplinas quidem ceteras, quae μαθήματα Graeci appellant, quae ad bene beateque vivendum non pergerent, aut attigisse aut comprobasse, idcircoque turpiter eos mentiri dicit, qui dissertationes istiusmodi Socrati adtribuerent. “Hoc autem,” inquiunt, “Xenophon cum scripsit, Platonem videlicet notat, in cuius libris Socrates physicapbysica et musica et geometrica disserit.” Sed enim de viris optimis et gravissimis si credendum hoc aut suspicandum fuit, causam equidem esse arbitror non obtrectationis nec invidiae neque de gloria maiore parienda certationis; haec enim procul a moribus philosophiae absunt, in quibus illi duo omnium iudicio excelluerunt. Quae igitur est opinionis istius ratio? Haec profecto est: aequiperatio ipsa plerumque et parilitas virtutum inter sese consimilium, etiamsi contentionis studium et voluntas abest, speciem tamen aemulationis creat. Nam cum ingenia quaedam magna duorum pluriumve in eiusdem rei studio inlustrium aut pari sunt fama aut proxima, oritur apud diversos favisores eorum industriae laudisque aestumandae contentio. Tum postea ex alieno certamine ad eos quoque ipsos contagium certationis adspirat cursusque eorum ad eandem virtutis calcem pergentium, quando est compar vel ambiguusarmbiguus, in aemulandi suspiciones non suo, sed faventium studio delabitur. Proinde igitur et Xenophon et Plato, Socraticae amoenitatis duo lumina, certare aemularique inter sese existimati sunt, quia de his apud alios uter esset exsuperantiorexuperantior certabatur et quia duae eminentiae, cum simul iunctae in arduum nituntur, simulacrum quoddam contentionis aemulae pariunt.

[¶11] 4. That Chrysippus skilfully and vividly represented the likeness of Justice in melodious and picturesque language. MOST worthily, by Heaven! and most elegantly did Chrysippus, in the first book of his work entitled On Beauty and Pleasure, depict the face and eyes of Justice, and her aspect, with austere and noble word-painting. For he represents the figure of Justice, and says that it was usually represented by the painters and orators of old in about the following manner: “Of maidenly form and bearing, with a stern and fearsome countenance, a keen glance of the eye, and a dignity and solemnity which was neither mean nor cruel, but awe-inspiring.” From the spirit of this representation he wished it to be understood that the judge, who is the priest of Justice, ought to be dignified, holy, austere, incorruptible, not susceptible to flattery, pitiless and inexorable towards the wicked and guilty, vigorous, lofty, and powerful, terrible by reason of the force and majesty of equity and truth. Chrysippus' own words about Justice are as follows: “She has the title of virgin as a symbol of her purity and an indication that she has never given way to evil-doers, that she has never yielded to soothing words, to prayers and entreaties, to flattery, nor to anything of that kind. Therefore she is properly represented too as stern and dignified, with a serious expression and a keen, steadfast glance, in order that she may inspire fear in the wicked and courage in the good; to the latter, as her friends, she presents a friendly aspect, to the former a stern face.” I thought it the more necessary to quote these words of Chrysippus, in order that they might be before us for consideration and judgment, since, on hearing me read them, some philosophers who are more sentimental in their views called that a representation of Cruelty rather than of Justice.

> Latin: 4. Quod apte Chrysippus et graphice imaginem Iustitiae modulis coloribusque verborum depinxit. CONDIGNE mehercule et condecore Chrysippus, in librorum qui inscribuntur Περὶ Καλοῦ καὶ Ἡδονῆς primo, os et oculos Iustitiae vultumque eius severis atque venerandis verborum coloribus depinxit. Facit quippe imaginem Iustitiae fierique solitam esse dicit a pictoribus rhetoribusque antiquioribus ad hunc ferme modum: “Forma atque filo virginali, aspectu vehementi et formidabili, luminibus oculorum acribus, neque humilis neque atrocis, sed reverendae cuiusdam tristitiae dignitate.” Ex imaginis autem istius significatione intellegi voluit, iudicem, qui Iustitiae antistes est, oportere esse grave, sanctum, severum, incorruptum, inadulabilem contraque improbos nocentesque inmisericordem atque inexorabilem erectumque et arduum ac potentem, vi et maiestate aequitatis veritatisque terrificum. Verba ipsa Chrysippi de Iustitia scripta haec sunt: Παρθένος δὲ εἶναι λέγεται κατὰ σύμβολον τοῦ ἀδιάφθορος εἶναι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς κακούργοις, μηδὲ προσίεσθαι μήτε τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς λόγους μήτε παραίτησιν καὶ δέησιν μήτε κολακείαν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν τοιούτων· οἷς ἀκολούθως καὶ σκυθρωπὴ γράφεται καὶ συνεστηκὸς ἔχουσα τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ ἔντονον καὶ δεδορκὸς βλέπουσα, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν ἀδίκοις φόβον ἐμποεῖν, τοῖς δὲ δικαίοις θάρσος· τοῖς μὲν προσφιλοῦς ὄντος τοῦ τοιούτου προσώπου, τοῖς δὲ ἑτέροις προσάντους. Haec verba Chrysippi eo etiam magis ponenda existimavi, ut prompta ad considerandum iudicandumque sint, quoniam legentibus ea nobis delicatiorum quidam disciplinarum philosophi, Saevitiae imaginem istam esse, non Iustitiae, dixerunt.

[¶12] 5. The strife and contention of two eminent grammarians at Rome as to the vocative case of egregius. ONCE upon a time, wearied with constant writing, I was walking in the park of Agrippa for the purpose of relieving and resting my mind. And there, as it chanced, I saw two grammarians of no small repute in the city of Rome, and was a witness of a violent dispute between them, one maintaining that vir egregi was the proper form of the vocative case, the other vir egregie. The argument of the one who thought that we should say egregi was of this sort: “Whatever nouns or words,” said he, “end in the nominative singular in the syllable us preceded by i, in the vocative case terminate in the letter i, as Caelius Caeli, modius modi, tertius terti, Accius Acci, Titius Titi, and the like; so then egregious, since it ends in the syllable us in the nominative and the letter i precedes that syllable, must in the vocative singular have i for the final letter, and therefore it is correct to say egregi, not egregie. For divus and rivus and clivus do not end in the syllable us, but in that which ought to be written with two us, and in order to indicate that sound a new letter was devised, which was called the digamma.” When the other heard this, he said: "O egreie grammatice, or if you prefer, egregissime, tell me, I pray you, what is the vocative case of, inscius, impius, sobrius, ebrius, proprius, propitious, anxius, and contrarius, which end in the syllable us and have the letter i before the final syllable? For shame and modesty prevent me from pronouncing them according to your rule." Now the other, overcome by the accumulation of so many words against him, remained silent for a time; but then he nevertheless rallied, and upheld and defended that same rule which he had laid down, maintaining that proprius, propitius, anxius and contrarius ought to have the same form in the vocative case as adversarius and extrarius; that inscius also and impius and ebrius and sobrius were somewhat less commonly, nevertheless more correctly, made to end in that same case in the letter i rather than e. But as this contest of theirs was likely to be continued for some time, I did not think it worth while to listen to those same arguments any longer, and I left them shouting and wrangling.

> Latin: 5. Lis atque contentio grammaticorum Romae inlustrium enarrata, super casu vocativo vocabuli quod est “egregius.” DEFESSUS ego quondam diutina commentatione laxandi levandique animi gratia in Agrippae campo deambulabam. Atque ibi duos forte grammaticos conspicatus non parvi in urbe Roma nominisnorrinis, certationi eorum acerrimae adfui, cum alter in casu vocativo “vir egregi” dicendum contenderet, alter “vir egregie.” Ratio autem eius, qui “egregi” oportere dici censebat, huiuscemodi fuit: “Quaecumque,” inquit, “nomina seu vocabula recto casu numero singulari ‘us’ syllaba finiuntur, in quibus ante ultimam syllabam posita est i littera, ea omnia casu vocativo i littera terminantur, ut ‘Caelius Caeli,’ ‘modius modi,’ ‘tertius terti,’ ‘Accius Acci,’ ‘Titius Titi’ et similia omnia; sic igitur ‘egregius,’ quoniam ‘us’ syllaba in casu nominandi finitur eamque syllabam praecedit i littera, habere debebit in casu vocandi i litteram extremam et idcirco ‘egregi,’ non ‘egregie,’ rectius dicetur. Nam ‘divus’ et ‘rivus’ et ‘clivus’ non ‘us’ syllaba terminantur, sed ea quae per duo u scribenda est, propter cuius syllabae sonum declarandum reperta erat nova littera, quae ‘digammadigarma’ appellabatur.” Hoc ubi ille alter audivit, “O,” inquit, “egregie grammatice vel, si id mavis, egregissime, die, oro te, ‘inscius’ et ‘impius’ et ‘sobrius’ et ‘ebrius’ et ‘proprius’ et ‘propitius’ et ‘anxius’ et ‘contrarius,’ quae ‘us’ syllaba finiuntur, in quibus ante ultimam syllabam i littera est, quem casum vocandi habent? Me enim pudor et verecundia tenent, pronuntiare ea secundum tuam definitionem.” Sed cum ille paulisper oppositu horum vocabulorum commotus reticuisset et mox tamen se conlegisset eandemque illam quam definierat regulam retineret et propugnaret diceretque et “proprium” et “propitium” et “anxium” et “contrarium” itidem in casu vocativo dicendum, ut “adversarius” et “extrarius” diceretur; “inscium” quoque et “impium” et “ebrium” et “sobrium” insolentiusiiisolentius quidem paulo, sed rectius per i litteram, non per e, in eodem casu pronuntiandum, eaque inter eos contentio longius duceretur, non arbitratus ego operae pretium esse eadem istaec diutius audire, clamantes conpugnantesque illos reliqui.

[¶13] 6. Of what kind are the things which have the appearance of learning, but are neither entertaining nor useful; and also of changes in the names of several cities and regions. A FRIEND of mine, a man not without fame as a student of literature, who had passed a great part of his life among books, said to me: “I should like to aid and adorn your Nights,” at the same time presenting me with a book of great bulk, overflowing, as he himself put it, with learning of every kind. He said that he had compiled it as the result of wide, varied and abstruse reading, and he invited me to take from it as much as I liked and thought worthy of record. I took the book eagerly and gladly, as if I had got possession of the horn of plenty, and shut myself up in order to read it without interruption. But what was written there was, by Jove! merely a list of curiosities: the name of the man who was first called a “grammarian”; the number of famous men named Pythagoras and Hippocrates; Homer's description of the laurh/, or “narrow passage,” in the house of Ulysses; why Telemachus did not touch Pisistratus, who was lying beside him, with his hand, but awakened him by a kick; with what kind of bolt Euryclia shut in Telemachus; and why the same poet did not know the rose, but did know oil made from roses. It also contained the names of the companions of Ulysses who were seized and torn to pieces by Scylla; whether the wanderings of Ulysses were in the inner sea, as Aristarchus believed, or in the outer sea, according to Crates. There was also a list of the isopsephic verses in Homer; what names in the same writer are given in the form of an acrostic; what verse it is in which each word is a syllable longer than the preceding word; by what rule each head of cattle produces three offspring each year; of the five layers with which the shield of Achilles was strengthened, whether the one made of gold was on top or in the middle; and besides what regions and cities had had a change of name, as Boeotia was formerly called Aonia, Egypt Aeria, Crete by the same name Aeria, Attica Acte, Corinth Ephyre, Macedonia Emathia, Thessaly Haemonia, Tyre Sarra, Thrace Sithonia, Paestum Poseidonia. These things and many others of the same kind were included in that book. Hastening to return it to him at once, I said: “I congratulate you, most learned sir, on this display of encyclopaedic erudition; but take back this precious volume, which does not have the slightest connection with my humble writings. For my Nights, which you wish to assist and adorn, base their inquiries especially on that one verse of Homer which Socrates said was above all other things always dear to him Whate'er of good and ill has come to you at home.”

> Latin: 6. CuimodiCuinodi sint quae speciem doctrinarum habeant, sed neque delectent neque utilia sint; atque inibi de vocabulis singularum urbium regionumque inmutatis. HOMO nobis familiaris, in litterarum cultu non ignobilis magnamque aetatis partem in libris versatus “Adiutum,” inquit, “ornatumqueornatutmque volo ire Noctes tuas”; et simul dat mihi librum grandi volumine doctrinae omnigenus, ut ipse dicebat, praescatentem, quem sibi elaboratum esse ait ex multis et variis et remotis lectionibus, ut ex eo sumerem quantum liberet rerum memoria dignarum. Accipio cupidus et libens, tamquam si copiae cornum nactus essem, et recondo me penitus, ut sine arbitris legam. At quae ibi scripta erant, pro Iuppiter, mera miracula! quo nomine fuerit qui primus “grammaticus” appellatus est; et quot fuerint Pythagorae nobiles, quot Hippocratae; et cuiusmodi fuisse Homerus dicat in Ulixis domo λαύρην; et quam ob causam Telemachus cubans iunctim sibi cubantem Pisistratum non manu adtigerit, sed pedis ictu excitarit; et Euryclia Telemachum quo genere claustri incluserit; et quapropter idem poeta rosam non norit, oleum ex rosa norit. Atque illud etiam scriptum fuit, quae nomina fuerint sociorum Ulixis, qui a Scylla rapti laceratique sunt; utrum ἐν τῇ ἔσω θαλάσσῃ Ulixes erraverit κατʼ Ἀρίσταρχον an ἐν τῇ ἔξω κατὰ Κράτητα; item etiam istic scriptum fuit, qui sint apud Homerum versus isopsephi; et quorum ibi nominum παραστιχίς reperiatur; et quis adeo versus sit, qui per singula vocabula singulis syllabis increscat; ac deinde qua ratione dixerit singulas pecudes in singulos annos terna parere; et ex quinque operimentis quibus Achillis clipeus munitus est, quod factum ex auro est summum sit an medium, et praeterea quibus urbibus regionibusque vocabula iam mutata sint, quod Boeotia ante appellata fuerit “Aonia,” quod Aegyptus “Aeria,” quod Creta quoque eodem nomine “Aeria” dicta sit, quod Attice “Ἀκτή,” quod Corinthus “Ephyre,” quod Macedonia “Ἠμαθία,” quod Thessalia “Αἱμονία,” quod Tyros “Sarra,” quod Thracia ante “Sithonia” dicta sit, quod Paestum “Ποσειδώνιον.” Haec item atque alia multa istiusmodi scripta in eo libro fuerunt. Quem cum statim properans redderem: “Ὄναιό σου,” inquam, “doctissime virorum, ταύτης τῆς πολυμαθίας et librum hunc opulentissimum recipe, nil prosus ad nostras paupertinas litteras congruentem. Nam meae Noctes, quas instructum ornatumque isti, de uno maxime illo versu Homeri quaerunt, quem Socrates prae omnibus semper rebus sibi esse cordi dicebat:
Ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τʼ ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται.”

[¶14] 7. That Marcus Varro presented Gnaeus Pompeius, when he was consul elect for the first time, with a commentary, which Varro himself called Ei)sagwgiko/s, on the method of conducting meetings of the senate. GNAEUS POMP/EIUS was elected consul for the first time with Marcus Crassus. When he was on the point of entering upon the office, because of his long military service he was unacquainted with the method of convening and consulting the senate, and of city affairs in general. He therefore asked his friend Marcus Varro to make him a book of instructions (Ei)sagwgiko/s, as Varro himself termed it), from which he might learn what he ought to say and do when he brought a measure before the House. Varro in letters which he wrote to Op pianus, contained in the fourth book of his Investigations in Epistolary Form, says that this notebook which he made for Pompey on that subject was lost; and since what he had previously written was no longer in existence, he repeats in those letters a good deal bearing upon the same subject. First of all, he tells us there by what magistrates the senate was commonly convened according to the usage of our forefathers, naming these: “the dictator, consuls, praetors, tribunes of the commons, interrex, and prefect of the city.” No other except these, he said, had the right to pass a decree of the senate, and whenever it happened that all those magistrates were in Rome at the same time, then he says that the first in the order of the list which I have just quoted had the prior right of bringing a matter before the senate; next, by an exceptional privilege, the military tribunes also who had acted as consuls, and likewise the decemvirs, who in their day had consular authority, and the triumvirs appointed to reorganize the State, had the privilege of bringing measures before the House. Afterwards he wrote about vetoes, and said that the right to veto a decree of the senate belonged only to those who had the same authority as those who wished to pass the decree, or greater power. He then added a list of the places in which a decree of the senate might lawfully be made, and he showed and maintained that this was regular only in a place which had been appointed by an augur, and called a “temple.” Therefore in the Hostilian Senate House and the Pompeian, and later in the Julian, since those were unconsecrated places, “temples” were established by the augurs, in order that in those places lawful decrees of the senate might be made according to the usage of our forefathers. In connection with which he also wrote this, that not all sacred edifices are temples, and that not even the shrine of Vesta was a temple. After this he goes on to say that a decree of the senate made before sunrise or after sunset was not valid, and that those through whom a decree of the senate was made at that time were thought to have committed an act deserving censure. Then he gives much instruction on the same lines: on what days it was not lawful to hold a meeting of the senate; that one who was about to hold a meeting of the senate should first offer up a victim and take the auspices; that questions relating to the gods ought to be presented to the senate before those affecting men; then further that resolutions should be presented indefinitely, as affecting the general welfare, or definitely on specific cases; that a decree of the senate was made in two ways: either by division if there was general agreement, or if the matter was disputed, by calling for the opinion of each senator; furthermore the senators ought to be asked their opinions in order, beginning with the grade of consul. And in that grade in former times the one to be called upon first was always the one who had first been enrolled in the senate; but at the time when he was writing he said that a new custom had become current, through partiality and a desire to curry favour, of asking first for the opinion of the one whom the presiding officer wished to call upon, provided however that he was of consular rank. Besides this he discoursed about seizure of goods and the imposing of a fine upon a senator who was not present when it was his duty to attend a meeting. These and certain other matters of that kind, first published in the book of which I spoke above, Marcus Varro treated in a letter written to Oppianus. But when he says that a decree of the senate is commonly made in two ways, either by calling for opinions or by division, that does not seem to agree with what Ateius Capito has written in his Miscellanies. For in Book VIIII Capito says that Tubero asserts that no decree of the senate could be made without a division, since in all decrees of the senate, even in those which are made by calling for opinions, a division was necessary, and Capito himself declares that this is true. But I recall writing on this whole matter more fully and exactly in another place.

> Latin: 7. Quod M. Varro Cn. Pompeio, consuli primum designato, commentarium dedit, quem appellavit ipse Εἰσαγωγικόν, de officio senatus habendi. GNAEO POMPEIO consulatus primus cum M. Crasso designatus est. Eum magistratum Pompeius cum initurus foret, quoniam per militiae tempora senatus habendi consulendique, rerum expers urbanarum fuit, M. Varronem, familiarem suum, rogavit uti commentarium faceret Εἰσαγωγικόν—sic enim Varro ipse appellat—, ex quo disceret quid facere dicereque deberet, cum senatum consuleret. Eum librum commentarium, quem super ea re Pompeio fecerat, perisse Varro ait in litteris quas ad Oppianum dedit, quae sunt in libro Epistolicarum Quaestionum quarto, in quibus litteris, quoniam quae ante scripserat non comparebant, docet rursum multa ad eamearn rem ducentia. Primum ibi ponit qui fuerint per quos more maiorum senatus haberi soleret eosque nominat: “dictatorem, consules, praetores, tribunos plebi, interregem, praefectum urbi,” neque alii praeter hos ius fuisse dixit facere senatusconsultum, quotiensque usus venisset ut omnes isti magistratus eodem tempore Romae essent, tum quo supra ordine scripti essent, qui eorum prior aliis esset, ei potissimum senatus consulendi ius fuisse ait, deinde extraordinario iure tribunos quoque militares, qui pro consulibus fuissent, item decemviros, quibus imperium consulare tum esset, item triumviros reipublicae constituendae causa creatos ius consulendi senatum habuisse. Postea scripsit de intercessionibus dixitque intercedendi ne senatusconsultum fieret ius fuisse iis solis qui eadem potestate qua ii qui senatusconsultum facere vellent maioreve essent. Tum adscripsit de locis in quibus senatusconsultum fieri iure posset, docuitque confirmavitque, nisi in loco per augurem constitute, quod “templum” appellaretur, senatusconsultum factum esset, iustum id non fuisse. Propterea et in curia Hostilia et in Pompeia et post in Iulia, cum profana ea loca fuissent, templa esse per augures constituta, ut in iis senatusconsulta more maiorum iusta fieri possent. Inter quae id quoque scriptum reliquit, non omnes aedes sacras templa esse ac ne aedem quidem Vestae templum esse. Post haec deinceps dicit senatusconsultum ante exortum aut post occasum solem factum ratum non fuisse, opus etiam censorium fecisse existimatos per quos eo tempore senatusconsultum factum esset. Docet deinde inibi multa: quibus diebus habere senatum ius non sit; immolareque hostiam prius auspicarique debere, qui senatum habiturus esset, de rebusque divinis prius quam humanis ad senatum referendum esse; tum porro referri oportere aut infinite de republica aut de singulis rebus finite; senatusque consultum fieri duobus modis: aut per discessionem, si consentiretur, aut, si res dubia esset, per singulorum sententias exquisitas; singulos autem debere consuli gradatim incipique a consulari gradu. Ex quo gradu semper quidem antea primum rogari solitum, qui princeps in senatum lectus esset; tum autem, cum haec scriberet, novum morem institutum refert per ambitionem gratiamque, ut is primus rogaretur quem rogare vellet qui haberet senatum, dum is tamen ex gradu consulari esset. Praeter haec de pignore quoque capiendo disserit deque multa dicenda senatori qui, cum in senatum venire deberet, non adesset. Haec et alia quaedam id genus in libro quo supra dixi M. Varro epistula ad Oppianum scripta executus est. Sed quod ait senatusconsultum duobus modis fieri solere, aut conquisitis sententiis aut per discessionem, parum convenire videtur cum eo quod Ateius Capito in Coniectaneis scriptum reliquit. Nam in libro VIIII. Tuberonem dicere ait nullum senatusconsultum fieri posse non discessione facta, quia in omnibus senatusconsultis, etiam in iis quae per relationem fierent, discessio esset necessaria, idque ipse Capito verum esse adfirmat. Sed de hac omni re alio in loco plenius accuratiusque nos memini scribere.

[¶15] 8. Inquiry and difference of opinion as to whether the praefect appointed for the Latin Festival has the right of convening and consulting the senate. JUNIUS declares that the praefect left in charge of the city because of the Latin Festival may not hold a meeting of the senate, since he is neither a senator nor has he the right of expressing his opinion, because he is made praefect at an age when he is not eligible to the senate. But Marcus Varro in the fourth book of his Investigations in Epistolary Form and Ateius Capito in the ninth of his Miscellanies assert that the praefect has the right to convene the senate, and Capito declares that Varro agrees on this point with Tubero, contrary to the view of Junius: “For the tribunes of the commons also,” says Capito, “had the right of convening the senate although before the bill of Atinius they were not senators.”

> Latin: 8. Quaesitumuaesitum esse dissensumque an praefectus Latinarum causa creatus insius senatus convocandi consulendique habeat. PRAEFECTUM urbi Latinarum causa relictum senatum habere posse Iunius negat, quoniam ne senator quidem sit neque ius habeat sententiae dicendae, cum ex ea aetate praefectus fiat quae non sit senatoria. M. autem Varro in quarto Epistolicarum Quaestionum et Ateius Capito in coniectaneorumConiectancorum VIII., ius esse praefecto senatus habendi dicunt; deque ea re adsensum esse Capito Varronem Tuberoni contra sententiam Iunii refert: “Nam et tribunis,” inquit, “plebis senatus habendi ius erat, quamquam senatores non essent ante Atinium plebiscitum.”