1. That Asinius Gallus and Largius Licinus criticized a saying of Cicero's in the speech which he delivered For Marcus Caelius; and what may be said with truth and propriety in defence of that saying, in reply to those most foolish critics. JUST as there have been monsters of men who expressed impious and false opinions about the immortal gods, so there have been some so extravagant and so ignorant that they have dared to say that Marcus Cicero spoke without correctness, propriety, or consideration; among these are Asinius Gallus and Largius Licinus, and the latter's book even bears the outrageous title of The Scourge of Cicero. Now the other things that they have censured are certainly not worth hearing or mentioning; but let us consider the value of this stricture of theirs, in which particularly they are, in their own opinion, very keen critics of language. Marcus Cicero in his speech For Marcus Caelius writes as follows: “As to the charge made against his chastity and published by all his accusers, not in the form of actual charges, but of gossip and calumnies, Marcus Caelius will never take that so much to heart, as to repent that he was not born ugly.” They think that Cicero has not used the proper word in saying paeniteat, or “repent,” and they go so far as to add that it is almost absurd; “for,” they say, “we regularly use paenitere when things which we ourselves have done, or which have been done in accordance with our wish and design, later begin to displease us and we change our opinion about them.” But that no one correctly says that he “repents being born” or “repents being mortal,” or “because he feels pain from any chance injury or wound inflicted upon his body”; for in such cases there is no design or choice on our part, but such things happen to us against our will by some necessity or force of nature. “In the same way,” they continue, “it was not a matter of choice with Marcus Caelius with what person he was born; yet he says that ' he did not repent this,' as if there were in that circumstance ground for a feeling of repentance.” This is in fact, as they say, the force of that word, and paenitere is strictly used of none but voluntary acts, although our forefathers used that same word also in a different sense and connected paenitere with the words paene (almost) and paenuria (want). But that is another question, and will be spoken of in another place. But with regard to the point at issue, giving to paenitere this same meaning which is commonly recognized, what Marcus Cicero said is not only not foolish, but in the highest degree elegant and witty. For since the adversaries and detractors of Marcus Caelius, inasmuch as he was of handsome person, made use of his appearance and figure to throw doubt upon his chastity, therefore Cicero, making sport of such an absurd charge as to impute to him as a fault the good looks which nature had given him, has deliberately adopted that very same false charge of which he is making fun, saying: “Marcus Caelius is not sorry for not having been born ugly”; so that by the very fact of speaking thus he might reproach his accusers and wittily show that they were doing an absurd thing in making Caelius' handsome person an accusation against him, just as if the person with which he was born depended upon his own volition.
1. Quod Gallus Asinius et Largius Licinus sententiam M. Ciceronis reprehenderunt ex oratione quam dixit Pro M. CaelioCaclio; et quid ad versus homines stolidissimos pro eadem sententia vere digneque dici possit. UT quidam fuerunt monstra hominum, quod de dis inmortalibus impias falsasque opiniones prodiderunt, ita nonnulli tam prodigiosi tamque vecordes extiterunt, in quibus sunt Gallus Asinius et Largius Licinus, cuius liber etiam fertur infando titulo Ciceromastix, ut scribere ausi sint M. Ciceronem parum integre atque inproprie atque inconsiderate locutum. Atque alia quidem quae reprehenderunt neque dictu neque auditu digna sunt, sed enim hoc, in quo sibimet ipsi praeter cetera esse visi sunt verborum pensitatores subtilissimi, cedo, quale id sit consideremus. M. Cicero Pro M. Caelio ita scribit: “Nam quod obiectum est de pudicitia quodque omnium accusatorum non criminibus, sed vocibus maledictisque celebratum est, id numquam tam acerbe feret M. Caelius, ut eum paeniteat non deformem esse natum.” Non existumant verbo proprio esse usum, quod ait “paeniteat,” atque id prope ineptum etiam esse dicunt. “Nam ‘paenitere,’” inquiunt, “tum dicere solemus, cum quae ipsi fecimus aut quae de nostra voluntate nostroque consilio facta sunt, ea nobis post incipiunt displicere sententiamque in iis nostram demutamus”; neminem autem recte ita loqui “paenitere sese, quod natus sit” aut “paenitere, quod mortalis sit” aut “quod ex offenso forte vulneratoque corpore dolorem sentiat,” quando istiusmodi rerum nec consilium sit nostrum nec arbitrium, sed ea ingratis nostris vi ac necessitate naturae nobis accidant: “Sicut hercle,” inquiunt, “non voluntarium fuit M. Caelio, quali forma nasceretur, cuius eum dixit ‘non paenitere,’ tamquam in ea causa res esset ut rationem caperet paenitendi.” Est haec quidem, quam dicunt, verbi huiusce sententia et “paenitere” nisi in voluntariis rebus non probe dicitur, tametsi antiquiores verbo ipso alio quoque modo usitati sunt et “paenitet” ab eo quod est “paene” et “paenuria” dixerunt. Sed id aliorsum pertinet atque alio in loco dicetur. Nunc autem, sub hac eadem significatione quae vulgo nota est, non modo ineptum hoc non est quod M. Cicero dixit, sed festivissimum adeo et facetissimum est. Nam cum adversarii et obtrectatores M. Caeli, quoniam erat pulchro corpore, formam eius et faciem in suspiciones inpudicitiae accerserent, inludens Cicero tam absurdam criminationem, quod formam, quam natura fecerat, vitio darent, eodem ipso errore quem inludebat sciens usus est et “non paenitet,” inquit, “M. Caelium, non deformem esse natum,” ut vel hac ipsa re, quod ita dicebat, obprobraret adversariis ac per facetias ostentaret facere eos deridiculum, quod proinde Caelio formam crimini darent, quasi arbitrium eius fuisset, quali forma nasceretur.
2. Certain words from the first book of the Annals of Quintus Claudius, noted in a hasty reading.
2. Verba quaedam ex Q. Claudi Annalium primo cursim in legendo notata.
WHENEVER I read the book of an early writer, I tried afterwards, for the purpose of quickening my memory, to recall and review any passages in the book which were worthy of note, in the way either of praise or censure; and I found it an exceedingly helpful exercise for ensuring my recollection of elegant words and phrases, whenever need of them should arise.
CUM librum veteris scriptoris legebamus, conabamur postea memoriae vegetandae gratia indipisci animo ac recensere quae in eo libro scripta essent in utrasque existimationes laudis aut culpae adnotamentis digna, eratque hoc sane quam utile exercitium ad conciliandas nobis, ubi venisset usus, verborum sententiarumquesententiarunlque elegantium recordationes.
For example, in the first book of the Annals of Quintus Claudius, which I had read on the preceding two days, I noted these passages: “The greater number,” says he, “threw away their arms and hid themselves unarmed.”
Velut haec verba ex Q. Claudi primo Annali, quae meminisse potui, notavi, quem librum legimus biduo proximo superiore.
The verb inhatebrant, for “hid themselves,” seemed poetic, but neither improper nor harsh. “While these things were going on,” he says, “the Latins, their spirits raised because of their easy victory, form a plan.”
“Arma,” inquit, “plerique abiciunt atque inermi inlatebrant sese.” “Inlatebrant” verbum poeticum visum est, sed non absurdum neque asperum.
Subnixo animo is. significant and carefully chosen expression with the force of “raised and elevated in spirit”; and it indicates loftiness and confidence of spirit, since we are, as it were, raised and lifted up by that upon which we depend. “He bids each one,” he says, “go to his own house and enjoy his possessions.”
“Ea,” inquit, “dum fiunt, Latini subnixo animo ex victoria inerti consilium ineunt.” “Subnixo animo” quasi sublimisublimli et supra nixo, verbum bene significans et non fortuitum; demonstratque animi altitudinem fiduciamque, quoniam quibus innitimur, iis quasi erigimur attollimurque.
Frunisci, meaning “enjoy,” was somewhat rare in the days of Marcus Tullius and became still rarer after that time, and its Latinity was questioned by those who were unacquainted with our early literature.
“Domus,” inquit, “suas quemque ire iubet et sua omnia frunisci.” “Frunisci” rarius quidem fuit in aetate M. Tulli ac deinceps infra rarissimum, dubitatunque est ab inperitis antiquitatis an Latinum foret.
However, fruniscor is not only good Latin, but it is more elegant and pleasing than fruor, from which it is formed in the same way as fatiscor from fateor.
Non modo autem Latinum, sed iucundius amoeniusque etiam verbum est “fruniscor” quam “fruor,” et ut “fatiscor” a “fateor,” ita “fruniscor” factum est a “fruor.”
Quintus Metellus Numidicus, who is known to have used the Latin tongue with purity and simplicity, in the letter which he sent when in exile To the Domitii, wrote as follows: “They indeed were cut off from every right and honour, I lack neither water nor fire and I enjoy (fruiscor) the greatest glory.” Novius, in his Atellan farce entitled The Miser, uses this word:What eagerly they sought they can't enjoy (frunisci);
Q. Metellus Numidicus, qui caste pureque lingua usus Latina videtur, in epistula quam exul Ad Domitios misit, ita scripsit: “Illi vero omni iure atque honestate interdicti, ego neque aqua neque igni careo et summa gloria fruniscor.”
Who does not spare, enjoys the goods he has. “And the Romans,” says Quadrigarius, “get possession of (copiantur) many arms and a great supply of provisions, and enormous booty.”
Novius, in Atellania quae Parcus inscripta est, hoc verbo ita utitur:Quód magno opere quaésiverunt, id frunisci nón queunt.Qui non parsit ápud se, … frunítus est.
Copiantur is a soldier's word, and you will not readily find it in the pleaders of civil suits; it is formed in the same way as lignantur, or “gather wood,” pabulantur, or “forage,” and aquantur, or “get water.” Quadrigarius uses sole occaso for “at sunset.”
“Et Romani,” inquit, “multis armis et magno commeatu praedaque ingenti copiantur.” “Copiantur” verbum castrense est nec facile id reperias apud civilium causarum oratores, ex eademque figura est qua “lignantur” et “pabulantur” et “aquantur.” “Sole,” inquit, “occaso.”
This expression has a flavour of antiquity which is not without charm, if one possesses an ear that is not dull and commonplace; furthermore the phrase occurs in the Twelve Tables in the following passage: “Before midday let them hear the case, with both parties making their pleas in person. After midday, decide the ease in favour of the one who is present. If both are present, let sunset be the limit of the proceedings.”
“Sole occaso” non insuavi vetustate est, si quis aurem habeat non sordidam nec proculcatam; in Duodecim autem Tabulis verbum hoc ita scriptum est: “Ante meridiem causam coniciunto, cum perorant ambo praesentes. Post meridiem praesenti litem addicito. Si ambo praesentes, sol occasus suprema tempestas esto.”
“We,” says he, “will leave it undecided (in medium).” The common people say in medio; for they think that in medium is an error, and if you should say in medium ponere (to make known), they consider that also a solecism; but if anyone examines these words with some care, that expression will seem to him the more correct and the more expressive; moreover in Greek qei=nai ei)s me/son, is not an error.
“Nos,” inquit, “in medium relinquemus.” Vulgus “in medio” dicit; nam vitium esse istuc putat et, si dicas “in medium ponere,” id quoque esse soloecon putant; set probabilius significantiusque sic dici videbitur, si quis ea verba non incuriose introspiciat; Graece quoque θεῖναι εἰς μέσον, vitium id non est.
"After it was announced," he says, “that a battle had been fought against the Gauls (in Gallos), the State was troubled.” In Gallos is nester and finer than cum Gallis or contra Gallos; for these are somewhat awkward and out of date.
“Postquam nuntiatum est,” inquit, “ut pugnatum esset in Gallos, id civitas graviter tulit.” “In Gallos” mundius subtiliusque est quam “cum Gallis” aut “contra Gallos”; nam pinguiora haec obsoletioraque sunt.
“At the same time,” he says, “he excelled in person, in exploits, in eloquence, in position, in energy, and confidence alike, so that it was easily seen that he possessed from himself and in himself a great equipment (magnum viaticum) for overthrowing the republic.” Magnum viaticum is a novel expression for great ability and great resources, and Claudius seems to have followed the Greeks, who transferred e)fo/dion from the meaning of “money for a journey” to preparation for other things, and often say e)fodi/ason for “prepare” and “make ready.”
“Simul,” inquit, “forma, factis, eloquentia, dignitate, acrimonia, confidentia pariter praecellebat, ut facile intellegeretur magnum viaticum ex se atque in se ad rempublicam evertendam habere.” “Magnum viaticum” pro magna facultate et paratu magno nove positum est, videturque Graecos secutus, qui ἐφόδιον a sumptu viae ad aliarum quoque rerum apparatus traducunt ac saepe ἐφοδίασον pro eo dicunt, quod est “institue” et “instrue.”
“For Marcus Manlius,” said he, “who, as I have shown above, saved the Capitol from the Gauls, and whose service, along with that of Marcus Furius the dictator, the State found especially (cumprime) valiant and irresistible against the Gauls, yielded to no one in race, in strength and in warlike valour.” Adprime is more frequent for “especially”; cumprime is rarer and is derived from the expression cumprimis with the force of inprimis.
“Nam Marcus,” inquit, “Manlius, quem Capitolium servasse a Gallis supra ostendi cuiusque operam cum M. Furio dictatore apud Gallos cumprime fortem atque exsuperabilem respublica sensit, is et genere et vi et virtute bellica nemini concedebat.” “Adprime” crebrius est, “cumprime” rarius traductumque ex eo est, quod “cumprimis” dicebant pro quod est “inprimis.”
Quadrigarius says that “he has no need for riches (divitias).” We use the ablative divitiis with opus. But this usage of his is not a mistake in grammar, nor is it even what is termed a figure; for it is correct Latin and the early writers quite frequently used that case; moreover, no reason can be given why divis opus esse is more correct than divitias, except by those who look upon the innovations of grammarians as oracular responses.
“NihilNihl sibi,” inquit, “divitias opus esse.” Nos “divitiis” dicimus. Sed vitium hoc orationis nullum est ac ne id quidem est quod figura dici solet; recta enim istaec oratio est et veteres conpluscule ita dixerunt, nec ratio dici potest, cur rectius sit “divitiis opus esse” quam “divitias,” nisi qui grammaticorum nova instituta ut τεμένων ἱερά observant.
“For herein especially,” says he, “lies the injustice of the gods, that the worst men are the least subject to injury, and that they do not allow the best men to remain long (diurnare) with us.” His use of diurnare for diu vivere is unusual, but it is justified by the figure by which we use perennare (to last for years). He says: “He conversed (consermonabatur) with them.”
“Nam hac,” inquit, “maxime versatur deorum iniquitas, quod deteriores sunt incolumiores neque optimum quemquam inter nos sinunt diurnare.” Inusitate “diurnare” dixit pro “diu vivere,” sed ex ea figuratione est, qua dicimus “perennare.” “Cum iis,” inquit, “consermonabatur.”
Semocinari seems somewhat rustic, but is more correct; sermocinari is more common, but is not such pure Latin.
“Sermonari” rusticius videtur, sed rectius est, “sermocinari” tritius, sed corruptius est.
“That he would not do even that,” says he, “which he then advised.” He has used ne id quoque for ne id quidem; the former is not common now in conversation, but is very frequent in the books of the earlier writers.
“Sese,” inquit, “ne id quoque, quod tum suaderet, facturum esse.” “Ne id quoque” dixit pro “ne id quidem,” infrequens nunc in loquendo, sed in libris veterum creberrimum.
“Such is the sanctity (sanctitudo) of the fane,” says he, “that no one ever ventured to violate it.”
“Tanta,” inquit, “sanctitudo fani est, ut numquam quisquam violare sit ausus.” “Sanctitas” quoque et “sanctimonia” non minus Latine dicuntur, sed nescio quid maioris dignitatis est verbum “sanctitudo,”
Sanctitas and sanctimonia are equally good Latin, but the word sanctitudo somehow has greater dignity, just as Marcus Cato, in his speech Against Lucius Veturius, thought it more forcible to use duritudo than duritia, saying, “Who knew his impudence and hardihood (duritudinem).”
sicuti M. Cato In L. Veturium “duritudinem” quam “duritiam” dicere gravius putavit: “Qui illius,” inquit, “impudentiam norat et duritudinem.”
“Since the Roman people,” says Quadrigarius, “had given such a pledge (arrabo) to the Samites.” He applied the term arrabo to the six hundred hostages and preferred to use that word rather than pignus, since the force of arrabo in that connection is weightier and more pointed; but nowadays arrabo is beginning to be numbered among vulgar words, and arra seems even more so, although the early writers often used arra, and Laberius has it several times.
“Cum tantus,” inquit, “arrabo penes Samnites populi Romani esset.” “Arrabonem” dixit sescentos obsides et id maluit quam pignus dicere, quoniam vis huius vocabuli in ea sententia gravior acriorque est; sed nunc “arrabo” in sordidis verbis haberi coeptus ac multo videtur sordidius “arra,” quamquam “arra” quoque veteres saepe dixerint et conpluriens Laberius.
“They have spent most wretched lives (vitas),” says Quadrigarius, and, “This man is worn out by too much leisure (otiis).” In both cases elegance is sought by the use of the plural number.
“Miserrimas,” inquit, “vitas exegerunt,” et: “hic nimiis in otiis,” inquit, “consumptus est.” Elegantia utrobique ex multitudine numeri quaesita est.
“Cominius,” says he, “came down the same way he had gone up and so deceived the Gauls.” He says that Cominius “gave words to the Gauls,” meaning “deceived them,” although he had said nothing to anybody; and the Gauls who were besieging the Capitol had seen him neither going up nor coming down. But “he gave words” is used with the meaning of “he escaped the notice of, and circumvented.”
“Cominius,” inquit, “qua ascenderat, descendit atque verba Gallis dedit.” “Verba Cominium dedisse Gallis” dicit, qui nihil quicquam cuiquam dixerat; neque eum Galli, qui Capitolium obsidebant, ascendentem aut descendentem viderant. Sed “verba dedit” haut secus posuit quam si tu dicas “latuit atque obrepsit.”
Again he says: “There were valleys and great woods (arboreta).”
“Convalles,” inquit, “et arboreta magna erant.”
Arboreta is a less familiar word, arbusta the more usual one.
“Arboreta” ignobilius verbum, “arbusta” celebratius.
“They thought,” says he, “that those who were without and those that were within the citadel were exchanging communications (commutationes) and plans” Commutationes, meaning “conferences and communications,” is not usual, but, by Heaven! is neither erroneous nor inelegant.
“Putabant,” inquit, “eos qui foris atque qui in arce erant inter se commutationes et consilia facere.” “Commutationes,” id est conlationes communicationesque, non usitate dixit, set non hercle inscite nec ineleganter.
These few notes on that book, such things as I remembered after reading it, I have now jotted down for my own use.
Haec ego pauca interim super eo libro, quorum memoria post lectionem subpetierat, mihi notavi.
3. The words of Marcus Varro in the twenty fifth book of his Humran Antiquities, in which he has interpreted a line of Homer contrary to the general opinion. IT happened in the course of conversations which we carried on about the dates of various inventions for human use, that a young man not without learning observed that the use of spartum or “Spanish broom” also was for a long time unknown in the land of Greece and that it was imported from Spain many years after the taking of Ilium. One or two half-educated fellows who were present there, of the class that the Greeks call a)gorai=oi, or “haunters of the market-place,” laughed in derision of this statement, and declared that the man who had made it had read a copy of Homer which happened to lack the following verse:And rotted the ship's timbers, loosed the ropes (spa/rta). Then the youth, in great vexation, replied: “It was not my book that lacked that line, but you who badly lacked a teacher, if you believe that spa/rta in that verse means what we call spartum, or 'a rope of Spanish broom'” They only laughed the louder, and would have continued to do so, had he not produced the twenty-fifth book of Varro's Human Antiquities, in which Varro writes as follows of that Homeric word: “I believe that spa/rta in Homer does not mean sparta, or 'Spanish broom,' but rather spa/rtoi, a kind of broom which is said to grow in the Theban territory. In Greece there has only recently been a supply of spartum, imported from Spain. The Liburnians did not make use of that material either, but as a rule fastened their ships together with thongs, while the Greeks made more use of hemp, tow, and other cultivated plants (sativis), from which ropes got their name of sparta.” Since Varro says this, I have grave doubts whether the last syllable in the Homeric word ought not to have an acute accent; unless it be because words of this kind, when they pass from their general meaning to the designation of a particular thing, are distinguished by a difference in accent.
3. Verba M. Varronis ex libro quinto et vicesimo Humanarum, quibus contra opinionem volgariam interpretatus est Homeri versum. IN sermonibus forte quos de temporibus rerum ad usus hominum repertarum agitabamus, adulescens quispiam non indoctus sparti quoque usum in terra Graecia diu incognitum fuisse dixit multisque post Ilium captum tempestatibus ex terra Hispania advectum. Riserunt hoc ad inludendum ex his, qui ibi aderant, unus atque alter, male homines litterati, quod genus ἀγοραίους Graeci appellant, atque eum qui id dixerat librum legisse Homeri aiebant, cui versus hic forte deesset:Καὶ δὴ δοῦρα σέσηπε νεῶν καὶ σπάρτα λέλυνται. Tum ille prorsum inritatus: “Non,” inquit, “meo libro versus iste, sed vobis plane magister defuit, si creditis in eo versu σπάρτα id significare quod nos ‘spartum’ dicimus.” Maiorem illi risum subiciunt, neque id desierunt, nisi liber ab eo prolatus esset M. Varronis vicesimus quintus Humanarum, in quo de isto Homeri verbo a Varrone ita scriptum est: “Ego σπάρτα apud Homerum non plus ‘spartum’ significare puto quam σπάρτους, qui dicuntur in agro Thebano nati. In Graecia sparti copia modo coepit esse ex Hispania. Neque ea ipsa facultate usi Liburni; sed hi plerasque naves loris suebant, Graeci magis cannabo et stuppa ceterisque sativis rebus, a quibus σπάρτα appellabant.” Quod cum ita Varro dicat, dubito hercle, an posterior syllaba in eo verbo, quod apud Homerum est, acuenda sit, nisi quia voces huiusmodi, cum ex communi significatione in rei certae proprietatem concedunt, diversitate accentuum separantur.
4. What the poet Menander said to Philemon, by whom he was often undeservedly defeated in contests in comedy; and that Euripides was very often vanquished in tragedy by obscure poets. IN contests in comedy Menander was often defeated by Philemon, a writer by no means his equal, owing to intrigue, favour, and partisanship. When Menander once happened to meet his rival, he said: “Pray pardon me, Philemon, but really, don't you blush when you defeat me?” Marcus Varro says that Euripides also, although he wrote seventy-five tragedies, was victor with only five, and was often vanquished by some very poor poets. Some say that Menander left one hundred and eight comedies, others that the number was a hundred and nine. But we find these words of Apollodorus, a very famous writer, about Menander in his work entitled Chronica:Cephissia's child, by Diopeithes sired,An hundred plays he left and five besides;At fifty-two he died.Yet Apollodorus also writes in the same book that out of all those hundred and five dramas Menander gained the victory only with eight.
4. Quid Menander poeta Philemoni poetae dixerit, a quo saepe indigne in certaminibuscertamninibus comoediarum superatus est; et quod saepissime Euripides in tragoedia ab ignobilibus poetis victus est. MENANDER a Philemone, nequaquam pari scriptore, in certaminibus comoediarum ambitu gratiaque et factionibus saepenumero vincebatur. Eum cum forte habuisset obviam, “Quaeso,” inquit, “Philemo, bona venia dic mihi, cum me vincis, non erubescis?” Euripidem quoque M. Varro ait, cum quinque et septuaginta tragoedias scripserit, in quinque solis vicisse, cum eum saepe vincerent aliquot poetae ignavissimi. Menandrum autem alii centum octo, partim centum novem reliquisse comoedias ferunt. Sed Apollodori, scriptoris celebratissimi, hos de Menandro versus legimus in libro qui Chronica inscriptus est:Κηφισιεὺς ὢν ἐκ Διοπείθους πατρός,Πρὸς τοῖσιν ἑκατὸν πέντε γράψας δράματαἘξέλιπε, πεντήκοντα καὶ δυεῖν ἐτῶν. Ex istis tamen centum et quinque omnibus, solis eum octo vicisse, idem Apollodorus eodem in libro scripsit.
5. That it is by no mears true, as some meticulous artists in rhetoric affirm, that Marcus Cicero, in his book On Friendship, made use of a faulty argument and postulated “the disputed for the admitted”; with a careful discussion and examination of this whole question. MARCUS CICERO, in the dialogue entitled Laelius, or On Friendship, wishes to teach us that friendship ought not to be cultivated in the hope and expectation of advantage, profit, or gain, but that it should be sought and cherished because in itself it is rich in virtue and honour, even though no aid and no advantage can be gained from it. This thought he has expressed in the following words, put into the mouth of Gaius Laelius, a wise man and a very dear friend of Publius Africanus “well, then, does Africanus need my help? No more do I need his. But I love him because of a certain admiration for his virtues; he in turn has affection for me perhaps because of some opinion which he has formed of my character; and intimacy has increased our attachment. But although many great advantages have resulted, yet the motives for our friendship did not arise from the hope of those advantages. For just as we are kindly and generous, not in order to compel a return—for we do not put favours out at interest, but we are naturally inclined to generosity —just so we think that friendship is to be desired, not because we are led by hope of gain, but because all its fruit is in the affection itself.” When it chanced that these words were read in a company of cultured men, a sophistical rhetorician, skilled in both tongues, a man of some note among those clever and meticulous teachers known as texnikoi,/ or “connoisseurs,” who was at the same time not without ability in disputation, expressed the opinion that Marcus Tullius had used an argument which was neither sound nor clear, but one which was of the same uncertainty as the question at issue itself; and he described that fault by Greek words, saying that Cicero had postulated a)ufisbhtou/menon a)nti\ o(mologoume/nou, that is, “what was disputed rather than what was admitted.” “For,” said he, “he took benefci, 'the kindly,' and liberales, 'the generous,' to confirm what he said about friendship, although that very question is commonly asked and ought to be asked, with what thought and purpose one who acts liberally and kindly is kind and generous. Whether it is because he hopes for a return of the favour, and tries to arouse in the one to whom he is kind a like feeling towards himself, as almost all seem to do; or because he is by nature kindly, and kindness and generosity gratify him for their own sakes without any thought of a return of the favour, which is as a rule the rarest of all.” Furthermore, he thought that arguments ought to be either convincing, or clear and not open to controversy, and he said that the term apodixis, or “demonstration,” was properly used only when things that are doubtful or obscure are made plain through things about which there is no doubt. And in order that he might show that the kind and generous ought not to be taken as an argument or example for the question about friendship, he said: “By the same comparison and the same appearance of reason, friendship in its turn may be taken as an argument, if one should declare that men ought to be kindly and generous, not from the hope of a return, but from the desire and love of honourable conduct. For he will be able to argue in a very similar manner as follows: ' Now just as we do not embrace friendship through hope of advantage, so we ought not to be generous and kindly with the desire of having the favour returned.' He will indeed,” said he, “be able to say this, but friendship cannot furnish an argument for generosity, nor generosity for friendship, since in the case of each there is equally an open question.” It seemed to some that this artist in rhetoric argued cleverly and learnedly, but that as a matter of fact he was ignorant of the true meaning of terms. For Cicero calls a man “kind and generous” in the sense that the philosophers believe those words ought to be used: not of one who, as Cicero himself expresses it, puts favours out at interest, but of one who shows kindness without having any secret reason which redounds to his own advantage. Therefore he has used an argument which is not obscure or doubtful, but trustworthy and clear, since if anyone is truly kind and generous, it is not asked with what motive he acts kindly or generously. For he must be called by very different names if, when he does such things, he does them for his own advantage rather than for that of another. Possibly the criticism made by this sophist might have some justification, if Cicero had said: “For as we do some kind and generous action, not in order to compel a return.” For it might seem that anyone who was not kindly might happen to do a kind action, if it was done because of some accidental circumstance and not through a fixed habit of constant kindliness. But since Cicero spoke of “kindly and generous people,” and meant no other sort than that which we have mentioned before, it is “with unwashed feet,” as the proverb says, and unwashed words that our critic assails the argument of that most learned man.
5. Nequaquam esse verum, quod minutis quibusdam rhetoricae artificibus videatur, M. Ciceronem in libro quem De Amicitia scripsit vitioso argumento usum, ἀμφισβητούμενον ἀντὶ ὁμολογουμένου posuisse; totumque id consideratius tractatum exploratumque. M. CICERO, in dialogo cui titulus est Laelius vel De Amicitia, docere volens amicitiam non spe expectationeque utilitatis neque pretii mercedisque causa colendam, sed quod ipsa per sese plena virtutis honestatisque sit expetendam diligendamque esse, etiamsi nihil opis nihilque emolumenti ex ea percipi queat, hac sententia atque his verbis usus est eaque dicere facit C. Laelium, sapientem virum, qui Publii Africani fuerat amicissimus: “Quid enim?” “Africanus indigens mei? Ne ego quidem illius. Sed ego admiratione quadam virtutis eius, ille vicissim opinione fortasse nonnulla quam de meis moribus habebat me dilexit; auxit benivolentiam consuetudo. Sed quamquam utilitates multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causae diligendi profectae. Ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam—neque enim beneficium faeneramur, sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus—, sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus.” Hoc cum legeretur in coetu forte hominum doctorum, rhetoricus quidam sophista, utriusque linguae callens, haut sane ignobilis ex istis acutulis et minutis doctoribus qui τεχνικοί appellantur, atque in disserendo tamen non impiger, usum esse existimabat argumento M. Tullium non probo neque apodictico, sed eiusdem quaestionis, cuius esset ea ipsa res de qua quaereretur; verbisque id vitium Graecis appellat, quod accepisset ἀμφισβητούμενον ἀντὶ ὁμολογουμένου. “Nam ‘beneficos,’” inquit, “et ‘liberales’ sumpsit ad confirmandum id quod de amicitia dicebat, cum ipsum illud et soleat quaeri et debeat, quisquis liberaliter et benigne facit, qua mente quoque consilio benignus liberalisque sit? utrum, quia mutuam gratiam speret et eum in quem benignus sit ad parem curam sui provocet, quod facere plerique omnes videntur, an, quia natura sit benivolus benignitasque eum per sese ipsa et liberalitas delectet sine ulla recipiendae gratiae procuratione, quod est omnium ferme rarissimum?” Argumenta autem censebat aut probabilia esse debere aut perspicua et minime controversa, idque “apodixin” vocari dicebat, cum ea quae dubia aut obscura sunt, per ea quae ambigua non sunt inlustrantur. Atque, ut ostenderet beneficos liberalesque ad id quod de amicitia quaereretur quasi argumentum exemplumve sumi non oportere, “Eodem,” inquit, “simulacro eademque rationis imagine amicitia invicem pro argumento sumi potest, si quis adfirmet homines beneficos liberalesque esse debere, non spe aliqua compendii, set amore et studio honestatis.” “Poterit enim consimiliter ita dicere: ‘Namque, ut amicitiam non spe utilitatis amplectimur, sic benefici liberalesque non gratiae reciperandae studio esse debemus.’” “Poterit sane,” inquit, “ita dicere, sed neque amicitia liberalitati neque liberalitas amicitiae praebere argumentum potest, cum de utraque pariter quaeratur.” Haec ille rhetoricus artifex dicere quibusdam videbatur perite et scienter, sed videlicet eum vocabula rerum vera ignoravisse. Nam “beneficum et liberalem” Cicero appellat, ita ut philosophi appellandum esse censent, non eum qui, ut ipse ait, beneficia faeneratur, sed qui benigne facit, nulla tacita ratione ad utilitates suas redundante. Non ergo obscuro neque ambiguo argumento usus est, sed certo atque perspicuo, siquidem, qui vere beneficus liberalisque est, qua mente bene aut liberaliter facit non quaeritur. Aliis enim longe nominibus appellandus est, si, cum talia facit, sui potius quam alterius iuvandi causa facit. Processisset autem argutatori isti fortassean reprehensio, si Cicero ita dixisset: “Ut enim benefice liberaliterque facimus, non ut exigamus gratiam”; videretur enim benefice facere etiam in non beneficum cadere posse, si id per aliquam circumstantiam fieret, non per ipsam perpetuae benignitatis constantiam. Sed cum “beneficos liberalesque” dixerit neque alius modi isti sint quam cuius esse eos supra diximus, “inlotis,” quod aiunt, “pedibus” et verbis reprehendit doctissimi viri orationem.
6. That what Verrius Flaccus wrote about servus recepticius, in his second book On the Obscurities of Marcus Cato, is false. MARCUS CATO, when recommending the Voconian law, spoke as follows: “In the beginning the woman brought you a great dowry; then she holds back a large sum of money, which she does not entrust to the control of her husband, but lends it to her husband. Later, becoming angry with him, she orders a servus recepticius, or ' slave of her own,' to hound him and demand the money.” The question was asked what was meant by servus recepticius. At once the books of Verrius Flaccus On the Obscurities of Cato were asked for and produced. In the second book was found the statement that servus recepticius was the name applied to a slave that was worthless and of no value, who, after being sold, was returned because of some fault and taken back. “Therefore,” says Flaccus, "a slave of that kind was bidden to hound her husband and demand the money, in order that the man's vexation might be greater, and the insult put upon him still more bitter, for the very reason that a worthless slave dunned him for the payment of money." But with the indulgence and pardon of those, if such there be, who are influenced by the authority of Verrius Flaccus, this must be said. That recepticius servus in the case of which Cato is speaking is something very different from what Verrius wrote. And this is easy for anyone to understand; for the situation is undoubtedly this: when the woman gave the dowry to her husband, what she retained of her property and did not give over to her husband she was said to “hold back” (recipere), just as now also at sales those things are said to be “held back” which are set aside and not sold. This word Plautus also used in the Trinumnus in this line:But when he sold the house, this little placeBehind it he held back (recepit).That is, when he sold the house, he did not sell a small part which was behind the house, but held it back. Cato himself too, wishing to describe the woman as rich, says: “The woman brings a great dowry and holds back a large sum of money”; that is, she gives a great dowry and retains possession of a large sum of money. From that property then which she kept for herself after giving her dowry, she lent money to her husband. When she happened to be vexed with her husband and determined to demand the money back, she appoints to demand it from him a seruves recepticius, that is, a slave of her very own, whom she had held back with the rest of the money and had not given as part of her dowry, but had retained; for it was not right for the woman to give such an order to a slave of her husband, but only to one of her very own. I forbear to say more in defence of this view of mine; for the opinion of Verrius and mine are before you, each by itself; anyone therefore may adopt whichever of the two seems to him the truer.
6. Falsum esse, quod Verrius Flaccus, in libro secundo quos De Obscuris M. Catonis composuit, de servo recepticio scriptum reliquit. M. CATO Voconiam legem suadens verbis hisce usus est: “Principio vobis mulier magnam dotem adtulit; tum magnam pecuniam recipit, quam in viri potestatem non conmittit, eam pecuniam viro mutuam dat; postea, ubi irata facta est, servum recepticium sectari atque flagitare virum iubet.” Quaerebatur, “servus recepticius” quid esset. Libri statim quaesiti allatique sunt Verrii Flacci De Obscuris Catonis. In libro secundo scriptum et inventum est, “recepticium servum” dici nequam et nulli pretii, qui, cum venum esset datus, redhibitus ob aliquod vitium receptusque sit. “Propterea,” inquit, “servus eiusmodi sectari maritum et flagitare pecuniam iubebatur, ut eo ipso dolor maior et contumelia gravior viro fieret, quod eum servus nihili petendae pecuniae causa conpellaret.” Cum pace autem cumque venia istorum, si qui sunt, qui Verrii Flacci auctoritate capiuntur, dictum hoc sit. “Recepticius” enim “servus,” in ea re quam dicit Cato, aliud omnino est quam Verrius scripsit. Atque id cuivis facile intellectu est; res enim procul dubio sic est: quando mulier dotem marito dabat, tum quae ex suis bonis retinebat neque ad virum tramittebat, ea “recipere” dicebatur, sicuti nuncnune quoque in venditionibus “recipi” dicuntur, quae excipiuntur neque veneunt. Quo verbo Plautus quoque in Trinummo usus est in hoc versu:Postículum hoc recépit, cum aedis véndidit,id est: cum aedis vendidit, particulam quandam quae post eas aedis erat non vendidit, sed retinuit. Ipse etiam Cato mulierem demonstrare locupletem volens: “Mulier,” inquit, “et magnam dotem dat et magnam pecuniam recipit,” hoc est: et magnam dotem dat et magnam pecuniam retinet. Ex ea igitur re familiari, quam sibi dote data retinuit, pecuniam viro mutuam dat. Eam pecuniam cum viro forte irata repetere instituit, adponit ei flagitatorem “servum recepticium,” hoc est proprium servum suum, quem cum pecunia reliqua receperat neque dederat doti, sed retinuerat; non enim servo mariti imperare hoc mulierem fas erat, sed proprio suo. Plura dicere quibus hoc nostrum tuear supersedeo; ipsa enim sunt per sese evidentia et quod a Verrio dicitur et a nobis; quod utrum ergo videbitur cuique verius, eo utatur.
7. These words from the Atinian law, “the claim on whatever shall be stolen shall be everlasting,” seemed to Publius Nigidius and Quintus Scaevola to have reference not less to a past theft than to a future one. THE words of the ancient Atinian law are as follows: “Whatever shall have been stolen, let the right to claim the thing be everlasting.” Who would suppose that in these words the law referred to anything else than to future time? But Quintus Scaevola says that his father and Brutus and Manilius, exceedingly learned men, inquired and were in doubt whether the law was valid in cases of future theft only or also in those already committed in the past; since subruptum erit seems to indicate both times, past as well as future. Therefore Publius Nigidius, the most learned man of the Roman State, discussed this uncertainty of theirs in the twenty-third book of his Grammatical Notes. And he himself too has the same opinion, that the indication of the time is indefinite, but he speaks very concisely and obscurely, so that you may see that he is rather making notes to aid his own memory than trying to instruct his readers. However, his meaning seems to be that est and erit are independent words; when they are used alone, they have and retain their own tense, but when they are joined with a past participle, they lose the force of their own tense, and are transferred to the past. For when I say in campo est, or “he is in the field,” and in comitio est, or “he is in the comitium,” I refer to the present time; also when I say in campo erit (he will be in the field), or in comitio erit (he will be in the comitium), I indicate future time: but when I say factum est, scriptum est or subruptum est, although the verb est is in the present tense, it is nevertheless united with the past and ceases to be present. “Similarly then,” he says, “with regard also to the wording of the law; if you divide and separate these two words subruptum and erit, so that you understand subruptum erit as you would certamen erit, that is, 'there will be a contest,' or sacrificium erit (there will be a sacrifice), then the law will seem to have reference to an act completed in future time; but if you understand the two words to be united and mingled, so that subruptum erit is not two words, but one, and is a single form of the passive inflection, then that word indicates past time no less than future.”
7. Verba haec ex Atinia lege: “quod subruptum erit, eius rei aeterna auctoritas esto,” P. Nigidio et Q. Scaevolae visa esse non minus de praeterito furto quam de futuro cavisse. LEGIS veteris Atiniae verba sunt: “Quod subruptum erit, eius rei aeterna auctoritas esto.” Quis aliud putet in hisce verbis quam de tempore tantum futuro legem loqui? Sed Q. Scaevola patrem suum et Brutum et Manilium, viros adprime doctos, quaesisse ait dubitasseque utrumne in post facta modo furta lex valeret an etiam in ante facta; quoniam “subruptum erit” utrumque tempus videretur ostendere, tam praeteritum quam futurum. Itaque P. Nigidius, civitatis Romanae doctissimus, super dubitatione hac eorum scripsit in tertio vicesimo Grammaticorum Commentariorum. Atque ipse quoque idem putat, incertam esse temporis demonstrationem, sed anguste perquam et obscure disserit, ut signa rerum ponere videas ad subsidium magis memoriae suae quam ad legentium disciplinam. Videbatur tamen hoc dicere, suum verbum et “est” esse et “erit”; quando per sese ponuntur, habent atque retinent tempus suum, cum vero praeterito iunguntur, vim temporis sui amittunt et in praeteritum contendunt. Cum enim dico: “in campo est” et “in comitio est,” tempus instans significo; item cum dico “in campo erit,” tempus futurum demonstro; at cum dico: “factum est,” “scriptum est,” “subruptum est,” quamquam “est” verbum temporis est praesentis, confunditur tamen cum praeterito et praesens esse desinit. “Sic igitur,” inquit, “etiam istud quod in lege est; si dividas separesque duo verba haec ‘subruptum’ et ‘erit,’ ut sic audias ‘subruptum erit,’ tamquam ‘certamencertanien erit’ aut ‘sacrificium erit,’ tumturn videbitur lex in postfuturum loqui; si vero copulate permixteque dictum intellegas, ut ‘subruptum erit’ non duo, sed unum verbum sit idque unitum patiendi declinatione sit, Tum hoc verbo non minus praeteritum tempus ostenditur quam futurum.”