1. Discussions held by a Stoic philosopher and in opposition by a Peripatetic, with Favorinus as arbiter; and the question at issue was, how far virtue availed in determining a happy life and to what extent happiness was dependent on what are called external circumstances THERE were two friends of Favorinus, philosophers of no little note in the city of Rome; one of them was a follower of the Peripatetic school, the other of the Stoic. I was once present when these men argued ably and vigorously, each for his own beliefs, when we were all with Favorinus at Ostia. And we were walking along the shore in springtime, just as evening was falling. And on that occasion the Stoic mantatined that man could enjoy a happy life only through virtue, and that the greatest wretchedness was due to wickedness only, even though all the other blessings, which are called external, should be lacking to the virtuous man and present with the wicked. The Peripatetic, on the other hand, admitted that a wretched life was due solely to vicious thoughts and wickedness, but he believed that virtue alone was by no means sufficient to round out all the parts of a happy life, since the complete use of one's limbs, good health, a reasonably attractive person, property, good repute, and all the other advantages of body and fortune seemed necessary to make a perfectly happy life. Here the Stoic made outcry against him, and maintaining that his opponent was advancing two contrary propositions, expressed his surprise that, since wickedness and virtue were two opposites, and a wretched and a happy life were also opposites, he did not preserve in each the force and nature of an opposite, but believed that wickedness alone was sufficient to cause an unhappy life, at the same time declaring that virtue alone was not sufficient to guarantee a happy life. And he said that it was especially inconsistent and contradictory for one who maintained that a life could in no way be made happy if virtue alone were lacking, to deny on the other hand that a life could be happy when virtue alone was present, and thus to take away from virtue when present and demanding it, that honour which he gave and bestowed upon virtue when lacking. Thereupon the Peripatetic, in truth very wittily, said: “Pray pardon me, and tell me this, whether you think that an amphora of wine from which a congius has been taken, is still an amphora?” “By no means,” was the reply, “can that be called an amphora of wine, from which a congius is missing.” When the Peripatetic heard this, he retorted: “Then it will have to be said that one congius makes an amphora of wine, since when that one is lacking, it is not an amphora, and when it is added, it becomes an amphora. But if it is absurd to say that an amphora is made from one single congius, it is equally absurd to say that a life is made happy by virtue alone by itself, because when virtue is lacking life can never be happy.” Then Favorinus, turning to the Peripatetic, said: “This clever turn which you have used about the congius of wine is indeed set forth in the books; but, as you know, it ought to be regarded rather as a neat catch than as an honest or plausible argument. For when a congius is lacking, it indeed causes the amphora not to be of full measure; but when it is added and put in, it alone does not make, but completes, an amphora. But virtue, as the Stoics say, is not an addition or a supplement, but it by itself is the equivalent of a happy life, and therefore it alone makes a happy life, when it is present.” These and some other minute and knotty arguments each advanced in support of his own opinion, before Favorinus as umpire. But when the first night-lights appeared and the darkness grew thicker, we escorted Favorinus to the house where he was putting up; and when he went in, we separated.
1. Disputationes a philosophophilosophy Stoico et contra a Peripatetico, arbitro Favorino, factae; quaesitumque inter eos quantum in perficiendaperfcienda vita beata virtus valeret quantumque esset in his quae dicuntur extranea. FAMILIARES Favorini erant duo quidam non incelebres in urbe Roma philosophi. Eorum fuit unus Peripateticae disciplinaediscilinae sectator, alter Stoicae. His quondam ego acriter atque contente pro suis utrimque decretis propugnantibus, cum essemus una omnesones Ostiae cum Favorino, interfui. Ambulabamus autem in litore, cum iam advesperasceret, aestate anni novi. Atque ibi Stoicus censebat et vitam beatam homini virtute animi sola et miseriammiseriar summam malitia sola posse effici, etiamsi cetera bona omnia quae corporalia et externa appellarentur virtuti deessent, malitiae adessent. Ille contra Peripateticus miseram quidem vitam vitiis animi et malitia sola fieri concedebat, sed ad conplendos omnes vitae beatae numeros virtutem solam nequaquam satis esse existimabat, quoniam et corporis integritas sanitasque et honestus modus formae et pecunia familiaris et bona existimatio ceteraque omnia corporis et fortunae bona necessaria viderentur perficiendae vitae beatae. Reclamabat hoc in loco Stoicus et, tamquam duas ille res diversas poneret, mirabatur, quod, cum essent malitia et virtus duo contraria, vita misera et beata quoque aeque contraria, non servaret in utrisque vim et naturamnatural contrarii et ad miseriam quidem vitae conficiendam satis valere malitiam solam putaret, ad praestandam vero beatam vitam non satis solam esse virtutem diceret. Atque id maxime dissidere neque convenire dicebat, quod qui profiteretur vitam nullo pacto beatam effici posse si virtus sola abesset, idem contra negaret, beatam fieri vitam cum sola virtus adesset, et quem daret haberetque virtuti absenti honorem, eundem petenti atque praesenti adimeret. Tum Peripateticus perquam hercle festive: “Rogo te,” inquit, “cum bona venia respondeas an existimes esse vini amphoram, cum abest ab ea unus congius?” “Minime,” inquit, “vini amphora dici potest ex qua abest congius.” Hoc ubi accepit Peripateticus, “Unus igitur,” inquit, “congius amphoram facere dici debebit, quoniam, cum deest ille unus, non fit amphora vini et, cum accessit, fit amphora. Quod si id dicere absurdum est, uno congio solo fieri amphoram, itidem absurdum est una sola virtute vitam fieri beatam dicere, quoniam, cum virtus abest, beata esse vita numquam potest.” Tum Favorinus aspiciens Peripateticum, “Est quidem,” inquit, “argutiola haec qua de congio vini usus es exposita in libris; sed, ut scis, captio magis lepida quam probum aut simile argumentum videri debet.” “Congius enim, cum deest, efficit quidem ne sit iustae mensurae amphora; sed cum accedit et additur, non ille unus facit amphoram, sed supplet.” “Virtus autem, ut isti dicunt, non accessio neque supplementum, sed sola ipsa vitae beatae instar est et propterea beatam vitam sola una, cum adest, facit.” Haec atque alia quaedam minuta magis et nodosa, tamquam apud arbitrum Favorinum, in suam uterque sententiam conferebant. Sed cum iam prima fax noctis et densiores esse tenebrae coepissent, prosecuti Favorinum in domum, ad quam devertebat, discessimus.
2. What kind of questions we used to discuss when spending the Saturnalia at Athens; and some amusing sophistries and enigmas WE used to spend the Saturnalia at Athens very merrily yet temperately, not “relaxing our minds,” as the saying is—for, as Musonius asserts, to relax the mind is like losing it—but diverting our minds a little and relieving them by the delights of pleasant and improving conversation. Accordingly, a number of us Romans who had come to Greece, and who attended the same lectures and devoted ourselves to the same teachers, met at the same dinner-table. Then the one who was giving the entertainment in his turn, offered as a prize for solving a problem the work of some old Greek or Roman writer and a crown woven from laurel, and put to us as many questions as there were guests present. But when he had put them all, the question which each was to discuss and the order of speaking were determined by lot. Then, when a question was correctly answered, the reward was a crown and a prize; if it was not correctly answered, it was passed on to the next in the allotment, and this process was repeated throughout the circle. If no one could answer a particular question, the crown was dedicated to the god in whose honour the festival was held. Now the questions that were proposed were of this kind: an obscure saying of some early poet, amusing rather than perplexing; some point in ancient history; the correction of some tenet of philosophy which was commonly misinterpreted, the solution of some sophistical catch, the investigation of a rare and unusual word, or of an obscure use of the tense of a verb of plain meaning. And I recollect that once seven questions were put, the first of which was an explanation of these verses in the Saturae of Quintus Ennius, in which one word is very neatly used in many different senses. They run as follows:Who tries with craft another to deceive,Deceives himself, if he says he's deceivedWhom he'd deceive. For if whom you'd deceivePerceives that he's deceived, the deceiver 'tisWho is deceived, if 'other's not deceived. The second question was how it ought to be understood and interpreted that Plato in the State which he planned in his books said koina\s ta\s gunai=kas, that is, declared that women “should be common property,” and that the rewards of the bravest men and the greatest warriors should be the kisses of boys and maidens. In the third place this was asked, in what words the fallacy of the following catches consisted and how they could be made out and explained: “What you have not lost, that you have. You have not lost horns; therefore you have horns.” Also another catch: “What I am, that you are not. I am a man; therefore you are not a man.” Then it was inquired what was the solution of this sophistry: “When I lie and admit that I lie, do I lie or speak the truth?” Afterwards this question was put, why the patricians are in the habit of entertaining one another on the Megalensia, and the plebeians on the Cerealia. Next came this question: “What one of the early poets used the verb verant, in the sense of 'they speak the truth '?” The sixth question was, what kind of plant the “asphodel” was, which Hesiod mentioned in the following lines:O fools! who know not how much half exceeds the whole,Or that the asphodel and mallow make fine food.And also what Hesiod meant when he said that the half was more than the whole. The last of all the questions was this: of what tense the verbs scripserim, legerim and venerim are, perfect or future, or both. When these questions had been put in the order that I have mentioned, and had been discussed and explained by the several guests on whom the lots fell, we were all presented with crowns and books, except for the one question about the verb verant. For at the time no one remembered that the word was used by Quintus Ennius in the thirteenth book of his Annals in the following line:Do seers speak truth (verant), predicting life's extent?Therefore the crown for this question was presented to Saturn, the god of that festival.
2. CuiusmodiCuinsmodi quaestionum certationibus Saturnalicia ludicraIudicra Athenis agitare soliti sinus; atque inibi expressa quaedam sophismatia et aenigmataaenigniata oblectatoria SATURNALIA Athenis agitabamus hilare prorsum ac modeste, non, ut dicitur, “remittentes animum”— nam “remittere,” inquit Musonius, “animum quasi amittere est”—, sed demulcentes eum paulum atque laxantes iucundis honestisque sermonum inlectationibus. conueniebamusColveniebamus autem ad eandem cenam conplusculi, qui Romani in Graeciam veneramus quiquequiqiue easdem auditiones eosdemque doctores colebamus. Tum qui et cenulam ordine suo curabat, praemium soluendaesolvenudae quaestionis ponebat librum veteris scriptoris vel Graecum vel Latinum et coronam e lauro plexam, totidemque res quaerebat quot homines istic eramus; cumque eas omnis exposuerat, rem locumque dicendi sors dabat. Quaestio igitur soluta corona et praemio donabatur, non soluta autem tramittebatur ad eum qui sortito successerat, idque in orbem vice pari servabatur. Si nemo dissolvebat, corona eius quaestionis deo cuius id festum erat dicabatur. Quaerebantur autem res huiuscemodi: aut sententia poetae veteris lepide obscura, non anxie, aut historiae antiquioris requisitio, aut decreti cuiuspiam ex philosophia perperam invulgati purgatio, aut captionis sophisticae solutio, aut inopinati rariorisque verbi indagatio, aut tempus item in verbo perspicuo obscurissimum. Itaque nuper quaesita esse memini numero septem, quorum prima fuit enarratio horum versuum, qui sunt in Saturis Quinti Enni uno multifariam verbo concinniter inplicati. Quorum exemplum hoc est:Nám qui lepidé postulat álterum frustrári,Quém frustratúr, frustra eum dícit frustra ésse;Nám si se frústrari quém frustras séntit,Quí frustratur frustrast, sí non ille frústra est. Secunda quaestio fuit quonam modo audiri atque accipi deberet, quod Plato, in civitate quam in libris suis condidit, κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, id est communes esse mulieres, censuit et praemia viris fortissimis summisque bellatoribus posuit saviationes puerorum et puellarum. Tertio in loco hoc quaesitum est, in quibus verbis captionum istarum fraus esset et quo pacto distingui resolvique possent: “Quod non perdidisti, habes; cornua non perdidisti: habesbabes igitur cornua,” item altera captio: “quod ego sum, id tu non es; homo ego sum: homo igitur tu non es.” Quaesitum ibi est quae esset huius quoque sophismatis resolutio: “Cum mentior et mentiri me dico, mentior an verum dico?” Postea quaestio istaec fuit, quam ob causam patricii Megalensibus mutitare soliti sint, plebes Cerealibus. Secundum ea hoc quaesitum est: verbum “verant,” quod significat “vera dicunt,” quisnam poetarum veterum dixerit? Sexta quaestio fuitfruit, “asphodelumasphlodelum” cuiusmodi herba sit, quod Hesiodus in isto versu posuerit:Νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντὸςΟὐδʼ ὅσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλῳ μέγʼ ὄνειαρ,et quid item Hesiodus se dicere sentiat, cum dimidium plus esse toto dicit. Postrema quaestionumquaestionium omnium haec fuit: “Scripserim,” “legerim,” “venerim,” cuius temporis verba sint, praeteriti an futuri an utriusque? Haec ubi ordine quo dixi proposita atque singulis sorte ductis disputata explanataque sunt, libris coronisque omnes donati sumus, nisi ob unam quaestionem, quae fuit de verbo “verant.” Nemo enim tum commeminerat, dictum esse a Q. Ennio id verbum in tertio decimo Annalium in isto versu:Satin vates verant aetate in agunda?Corona igitur huius quaestionis deo feriarum istarum Saturno datast.
3. What the orator Aeschines, in the speech in which he accused Timarchus of unchastity, said that the Lacedaemonians decided about the praiseworthy suggestion of a most unpraiseworthy man AESCHINES, the most acute and sagacious of the orators who gained renown in the Athenian assemblies, in that cruel, slanderous and virulent speech in which he severely and directly accused Timarchus of unchastity, says that a man of advanced years and high character, a leader in that State, once gave noble and distinguished counsel to the Lacedaemonians. “The people of Lacedaemon,” he says, “were deliberating as to what was honourable and expedient in a matter of great moment to their State. Then there arose, for the purpose of giving his opinion, a man notorious for the baseness of his past life, but at the same time highly eminent for his eloquence and oratory. The advice which he gave, and the course which he said ought to be followed, were approved and accepted by all, and a decree of the people was about to be passed in accordance with his opinion. Thereupon one of that body of leading citizens whom the Lacedaemonians, because of the prestige of their age and rank, reverenced as judges and directors of public policy, sprang up in a spirit of anger and vexation, and said: ' What prospect, Lacedaemonians, or what hope, pray, will there be that this city and this State can longer be secure and invincible, if we follow counsellors whose past life is like that of this man? Even if this advice is honourable and noble, let us not, I pray you, allow it to be disgraced by the pollution of its most shameful author.' And when he had said this, he selected a man conspicuous before all others for his courage and justice, but a poor speaker and without eloquence, and bade him, with the consent and at the request of all, to deliver that opinion of the eloquent man in the best language he could command, in order that, without mention of the former speaker, the vote and decree of the people might be passed under the name of him alone who had last made that proposition. And the action which that most sagacious old man had recommended was taken. So the good advice endured, but its base author was displaced.”
3. Quid Aeschines rhetor, in oratione qua Timarchum de inpudicitia accusavit, Lacedaemonios statuisse dixerit super sententia probatissima, quam inprobatissimus homo dixisset AESCHINES, vel acerrimus prudentissimusque oratorum qui apud contiones Atheniensium floruerunt, in oratione illa saeva criminosaque et virulenta, qua Timarchum de inpudicitia graviter insigniterque accusabat, nobile et inlustre consilium LacedaemoniisLaedaemoniis dedisse dicit virum indidem civitatis eiusdem principem, virtute atque aetate magna praeditum. “Populus,” inquit, “Lacedaemonius de summa republica sua, quidnam esset utile et honestum deliberabat.” “Tum exsurgitexurgit sententiae dicendae gratia homo quispiam turpitudine pristinae vitae diffamatissimus, sed lingua tunc atque facundia nimium quanto praestabilis.” “Consilium quod dabat, quodque oportere fieri suadebat, acceptum ab universis et conplacitum est futurumquefuturuinque erat ex eius sententia populi decretum.” “Ibi unus ex illo principum ordine quos Lacedaemonii, aetatis dignitatisque maiestate, tamquam arbitros et magistros disciplinae publicae verebantur, commoto irritatoque animo exilit, et ‘Quaenam,’ inquit, ‘Lacedaemonii, ratio aut quae tandem spes erit urbem hanc et hancbane rempublicam salvam inexpugnabilemqueinexpuglnabilemque esse diutius posse, si huiuscemodi anteactae vitae hominibus consiliariis utemur? Quod si proba istaec et honesta sententia est, quaeso vos, non sinamus eandem dehonestari turpissimi auctoris contagio.’” “Atque ubi hoc dixit, elegit virum fortitudine atque iustitia praeter alios praestantem, sed inopi lingua et infacundum, iussitque eum consensus petituque omnium eandem illam sententiam diserti viri cuimodi posset verbis dicere, ut nulla prioris mentione habita, scitum atque decretum populi ex eius unius nomine fieret qui id ipsum denuo dixerat.” “Atque ita, ut suaserat prudentissimus senex, factum est.” “Sic bona sententia mansit, turpis auctor mutatus est.”
4. How Sulpicius Apollinaris made fun of a man who asserted that he alone understood Sallust's histories, by inquiring the meaning of these words in Sallust: incertum, stolidior an vacnior. WHEN I was already a young man at Rome, having laid aside the purple-bordered toga of boyhood, and was on my own account seeking masters of deeper knowledge, I happened to be with the booksellers in Shoemaker's Street at the time when Sulpicius Apollinaris, the most learned man of all within my memory, in the presence of a large gathering made fun of a boastful fellow who was parading his reading of Sallust, and turned him into ridicule with that kind of witty irony which Socrates used against the sophists. For when the man declared that he was the one and only reader and expositor of Sallust, and openly boasted that he did not merely search into the outer skin and obvious meaning of his sentences, but delved into and thoroughly examined the very blood and marrow of his words, then Apollinaris, pretending to embrace and venerate his learning, said: “Most opportunely, my good master, do you come to me now with the blood and marrow of Sallust's language. For yesterday I was asked what in the world those words of his meant which he wrote in the fourth book of his Histories about Gnaeus Lentulus, of whom he says that it is uncertain whether he was more churlish or more unreliable”; and he quoted the very words, as Sallust wrote them: “But Gnaeus Lentulus, his colleague, surnamed Clodianus, a man of patrician family—and it is not at all easy to say whether he was more churlish or more unreliable—proposed a bill for exacting the money which Sulla had remitted to the purchasers of property.” Apolinaris therefore asserted that it was asked of him, and that he had not been able to answer tile question, what was meant by vanior and what by stolidior, since Sallust seemed to have separated the words and contrasted them with each other, as if they were different and unlike and did not both designate the same fault; and therefore he asked that the man would tell him the meaning and origin of the two words. Then the other, showing by a grin and a grimace that he despised both the subject of the inquiry and the questioner himself; said: “I am accustomed to examine and explain the marrow and blood of ancient and recondite words, as I said, not of those which are in common use and trite. Surely a man is more worthless and stupid than Gnaeus Lentulus himself, if he does not know that vanitas and stoliditas indicate the same kind of folly.” But having said that, he left us in the very midst of our discussion and began to sneak off: Then we laid hold on him and pressed him, and in particular Apollinaris begged him to discourse at greater length and more plainly upon the difference, or, if he preferred, on the similarity of the words, and not to begrudge the information to one who was eager to learn. Then the fellow, realizing by this time that he was being laughed at, pleaded an engagement and made off But we afterwards learned from Apollinaris that the term rani was properly applied, not as in common parlance to those who were foolish or dull or silly, but, as the most learned of the ancients had used them, to liars, deceivers, and those who cleverly devised light and empty statements in place of those which were true and earnest. But that those were called stolidi who were not so much foolish and witless as austere, churlish and disagreeable, such men as the Greeks called moxqhroi/, “ugly fellows,” and fortikoi/, “common” or “vulgar folk.” He also said that the roots and derivations of these words were to be found in the books of Nigidius. Having sought for these words and found them, with examples of their earliest meanings, I made a note of them, in order to include them in the notes contained in these Nights, and I think that I have already introduced them somewhere among them.
4. Quod Sulpicius Apollinaris praedicantem quendam a sese uno Sallusti historias intellegi inlusit, quaestione proposita quid verba ista apud Sallustium significarent: “incertum, stolidior an vanior.” CUM iam adulescentuli Romae praetextam et puerilem togam mutassemus magistrosque tunc nobis nosmet ipsi exploratiores quaereremus, in Sandaliario forte apud librarioslibraries fuimus, cum ibi in multorum hominum coetu Apollinaris Sulpicius, vir in memoria nostra praeter alios doctus, iactatorem quempiam et venditatorem Sallustianae lectionis inrisit inlusitque genere illo facetissimae dissimulationis, qua Socrates ad sophistas utebatur. Nam cum ille se unum et unicum lectorem esse enarratoremque Sallustii diceret neque primam tantum cutem ac speciem sententiarum, sed sanguinem quoque ipsum ac medullam verborum eius eruere atque introspicere penitus praedicaret, tum Apollinaris amplecti venerarique se doctrinas illius dicens: “Per,” inquit, “magister optume, exoptatus mihi nunc venis cum sanguine et medulla Sallusti verborum.” “Hesterno enim die quaerebatur ex me quidnam verba haec eius in quarto Historiarum libro de Cn. Lentulo scripta significent, de quo incertum fuisse ait, stolidiorne esset an vanior,” eaque ipsa verba, uti sunt a Sallustio scripta, dixit: “At Cn. Lentulus patriciae gentis; collega eius, cui cognomentum Clodiano fuit, perincertum stolidior an vanior, legem de pecunia quamn Sulla emptoribus bonorum remiserat exigenda promulgavit.” Quaesitum ergo ex se Apollinaris neque id se dissolvere potuisse adseverabat, quid esset “vanior” et quid “stolidior,” quoniam Sallustius sic ea separasse atque opposuisse inter se videretur, tamquamtamqnuam diversa ac dissimilia nec eiusdem utraque vitii forent, ac propterea petebat uti se doceret significationes utriusque vocis et origines. Tum ille rictu oris labearumquelabeairumque ductu contemni a se ostendens et rem de qua quaereretur et hominem ipsum qui quaereret, “Priscorum,” inquit, “et remotorum ego verborum medullas et sanguinem, sicuti dixi, perspicere et elicere soleo, non istorum quae proculcata vulgo et protrita sunt. Ipso illo quippequilppe Cn. LentuloLentulto ‘stolidior’ est et ‘vanior’ qui ignorat eiusdem stultitiae esse vanitatem et stoliditatem.” Sed ubi hoc dixit, media ipsa sermonum reliquit et abire coepit. Nos deinde eum tenebamus urgebamusque, et cumprimis Apollinaris, ut de vocabulorum vel differentia vel, si ei ita videretur, similitudine plenius apertiusque dissereret et, ut ne sibi invideret discere volenti, orabat. Atque ille, se iam plane inludi ratus, negotium sibi esse causatur et digreditur. Nos autem posteaposted ex Apollinari didicimus, “vanos” proprie dici, non ut vulgus diceret, desipientis aut hebetes aut ineptos, sed, ut veterum doctissimi dixissentdiissent, mendaces et infidos et levia inaniaque pro gravibus et veris astutissime componentes; “stolidos” autem vocari non tam stultos et excordes quam taetros et molestos et inlepidos, quos Graeci μχθηροὺς καὶ φορτικούς dicerent. Etyma quoque harum vocum et origines scriptas esse dicebat in libris Nigidianis. Quas requisitas ego et repertas cum primarum significationum exemplis, ut commentariis harum Noctium inferrem, notavi et intulisse iam me aliquo in loco commentationibus istis existimo.
5. That Quintus Ennius, in the seventh book of his Annals, wrote quadrupes eques, and not quadrupes equus, as many read it. A NUMBER of us young men, friends of his, were at Puteoli with the rhetorician Antonius Julianus, a fine man in truth and of distinguished eloquence, and we were spending the summer holidays in amusement and gaiety, amid literary diversions and seemly and improving pleasures. And while we were there, word was brought to Julianus that a certain reader, a man not without learning, was reciting the Annals of Ennius to the people in the theatre in a very refined and musical voice. “Let us go,” said he, “to hear this ' Ennianist.' whoever he may be”; for that was the name by which the man wished to be called. When at last we had found him reading amid loud applause—and he was reading the seventh book of the Annals of Ennius—we first heard him wrongly recite the following lines:Then with great force on rush the four-footed horse (equus)And elephants,and without adding many more verses, he departed amid the praises and applause of the whole company. Then Julianus, as he came out of the theatre, said:What think you of this reader and his fourfooted horse? For surely he read it thus:Denique vi magna quadrupes equus atque elephantProiciunt sese.Do you think that, if he had had a master and instructor worth a penny, he would have said quadrupes equus and not quadrupes eqces? For no one who has given any attention to ancient literature doubts that Ennius left it written in that way.When several of those who were present declared that they had read quadrupes equus, each with his own teacher, and wondered what was the meaning oft quadrupes eques, Julianus rejoined: " I could wish, my worthy young friends, that you had read Quintus Ennius as accurately as did Publius Vergilius, who, imitating this verse of his in The Georgics, used eques for equus in these lines:Thessalian Lapiths, high on horses' back,Gave us the bit and circling course, and taughtThe horse full armed, to gallop o'er the plainAnd round his paces proud.In this passage, unless one is foolishly and silkily captious, equiter can be taken in no other sense than that of 'horse,' for many of the early writers called the man who sat upon a horse eques and also the horse on which he sat. Hence equitare also, which is derived from the word eques, equitis, was said both of the man who rode the horse and of the horse which carried the man. Lucilius, indeed, a man conspicuous for his command of the Latin language, says equum equitare in these lines:With what we see the courser run and trot,With this he runs and trots. Now, 'tis with eyesWe see him trot; hence with his eyes he trots.“But,” said Apollinaris, I was not content with these examples, and in order that it might not appear uncertain and doubtful, but clear and evident, whether Ennius wrote equus or eques, I procured at great trouble and expense, for the sake of examining one line, a copy of heavy and venerable antiquity, which it was almost certain had been edited by the hand of Lampadio; and in that copy I found eques and not equus written in that line. " This at the time Julianus explained to us, along with other problems, clearly and courteously. But afterwards I ran upon the very same remarks in some very well-known handbooks.
5. Quod Q. Ennius in septimo Annali “quadrupes eques” ac non “quadrupes equus,” ut legunt multi, scriptum reliquit. CUM Antonio Iuliano rhetore, viro hercle bono et facundiae florentis, complures adulescentuli, familiares eius, Puteolis aestivarum feriarum ludum et iocum in litteris amoenioribus et in voluptatibus pudicis honestisque agitabamus. Atque ibi tunc Iulianoluliano nuntiatur, ἀναγνώστην quendam, non indoctum hominem, voce admodum scita et canora Ennii Annales legere ad populum in theatro. “Eamus,” inquit, “auditum nescio quem istum Ennianistam”; hoc enim se ille nomine appellari volebat. Quem cum iam inter ingentes clamores legentem invenissemus—legebat autem librum ex annalibusAnnalibuis Ennii septimum—, hos eum primum versus perperam pronuntiantem audivimus:Denique vi magnainagna quadrupes equus atque elephantiProiciunt sese,neque multis postea versibus additis, celebrantibus eum laudantibusque omnibus, discessit. Tum Iulianus egrediens e theatro: “Quid vobis,” inquit, “de hoc anagnosta et de quadrupede equo videtur? sic enim profecto legit:Denique vi magna quadrupes equus atque elephantiProiciunt sese.” “Ecquid putatis, si magistrum praelectoremque habuisset alicuius aeris, ‘quadrupes equus’ dicturum fuisse ac non ‘quadrupes eques,’ quod ab Ennio ita scriptum relictumque esse nemo unus litterarum veterum diligens dubitavit?” Cumque aliquot eorum qui aderant “quadrupes equus” apud suum quisque grammaticumgranmmaticum legisse se dicerent et mirarentur quidnam esset “quadrupes eques,” “Vellem vos,” inquit, “optimi iuvenes, tam accurate Q. Ennium legisse quam P. Vergilius legerat, qui hunchune eius versum secutus in Georgicis suis ‘equitem’ pro ‘equo’ posuit his in versibus:Frena Pelethronii Lapithae gyrosque dedereImpositi dorso atque equitem docuere sub armisInsultare solo et gressus glomerare superbos.In quo loco equitem, si quis modo non inscite inepteque argutior sit, nihil potest accipi aliud nisi ‘equum’;” “pleraque enim veterum aetas et hominem equo insidentem et equum cui insideretur ‘equitem’ dixerunt.” “Propterea ‘equitare’ etiam, quod verbum e vocabulo ‘equitis’ inclinatum est, et homo equo utens et equus sub homine gradiens dicebatur.” “Lucilius adeo, vir adprime linguae Latinae sciens, ‘ecum equitare’ dicit his versibus:Quis hunc currere equum nos atque equitare videmus,His equitat curritque; oculis equitare videmus;Ergo oculis equitat.” “Sed enim contentus,” inquit, “ego his non fui et, ut non turbidae fidei nec ambiguae, sed ut purae liquentisque esset, ‘equus’ne an ‘eques’ scriptum Ennius reliquisset, librum summae atque reverendae vetustatisvestustatis, quem fere constabat Lampadionis manu emendatum, studio pretioque multo unius versus inspiciendi gratia conduxi et ‘eques,’ non ‘equus,’ scriptum in eo versu inveni.” Hoc tum nobis Iulianus et multa alia lucide simul et adfabiliter dixit. Sed eadem ipsa post etiam in pervulgatis commentariis scripta offendimus.
6. That Aelius Melissus, in the book to which he gave the title On Correctness of Speech, and which on its publication he called a horn of plenty, wrote something that deserves neither to be said nor heard, when he expressed the opinion that matrona and mater familias differ in meaning, thus making a distinction that is wholly groundless. WITHIN my memory Aelius Melissus held the highest rank among the grammarians of his day at Rome; but in literary criticism he showed greater boastfulness and sophistry than real merit. Besides many other works which he wrote, he made a book which at the time when it was issued seemed to be one of remarkable learning. The title of the book was designed to be especially attractive to readers, for it was called Correct Language. Who, then, would suppose that he could speak correctly or with propriety unless he had learned those rules of Melissus? From that book I take these words: “Matrona, 'a matron,' is a woman who has given birth once; she who has done so more than once is called mater familias, 'mother of a family'; just so a sow which has had one litter is called porcetra; one which has had more, scrofa.” But to decide whether Melissus thought out this distinction between matrona and mater familias and that it was his own conjecture, or whether he read what someone else had written, surely requires soothsayers. For with regard to porcetra he has, it is true, the authority of Pomponius in the Atellan farce which bears that very title but that “matron” was applied only to a woman who had given birth once, and “mother of a family” only to one who had done so more than once, can be proved by the authority of no ancient writer. Indeed, that seems much more probable which competent interpreters of ancient terms have written, that “matron” was properly applied to one who had contracted a marriage with a man, so long as she remained in that state, even though children were not yet born to them; and that she was so called from the word mater, or “mother,” a state which she had not yet attained, but which she had the hope and promise of attaining later. Matrimonium itself, or “marriage,” has the same derivation; but that woman only is called “mother of the household” who is in the power and possession of her husband, or in the power and possession of the one under whose authority her husband is; since she had come, not only into a state of wedlock, but also into the family of her husband and into the position of his heir.
6. Quod Aelius Melissus, in libro cui titulum fecit De Loquendi proprietatePropriictate, quemqueln, cum ederet, cornuin esse copiae dicebat, rem scripsit neque dictu neque audit dignam, cum differre “matronam” et “matrem familias” existimavit differentia longe vanissimavanisima. AELIUS MELISSUS in nostra memoriamemorial fuit Romae summi quidem loci inter grammaticosgranimaticos id temporis; sed maiore in litteris erat iactantiaiactintia et σοφιστείᾳ quam opera. Is praeter alia quae scripsit compluria, librum composuit, ut tum videbatur cum est editusedits, doctrinae inclutae. Ei libro titulus est ingentis cuiusdam inlecebrae ad legendum; scriptus quippe est De Loquendi Proprietate. Quis adeo existimet loqui se recte atque proprie posse, nisi illas Melissi proprietates perdidicerit? Ex eo libro verba haec suit: “Matrona” est quae semel peperit, quae saepius, “mater familias”; sicuti sus quae semel peperit, “porcetraorcetra,” quae saepius, “scrofa.” Utrum autem hoc de matrona ac de matrefamiliasmatrefamrilias Melissus excogitaverit ipse et coniectaverit, an scripture ab alio quo legerit, hariolis profecto est opus. Nam de “porcetra” habet sane auctorem Pomponium in Atellania, quae hoc eodem vocabulo inscripta est; sed “matronam” non esse appellatam nisi quae semel peperit, neque “matrem familiasfarilias” nisi quae saepius, nullis veterum scriptorum auctoritatibus confirmari potest. Enimvero illud impendio probabilius est quod idonei vocum antiquarum enarratores tradiderunt, “matronam” dictam esse proprie quae in matrimonium cum viro convenisset, quoad in eo matrimonio maneret, etiamsi liberi nondum nati forent, dictamque ita esse a matris nomine, non adepto iam, sed cum spe et omine mox adipiscendi, unde ipsum quoque “matrimonium” dicitur, “matrem” autem “familias” appellatam esse eam solam quae in mariti manu mancipioque aut in eius in cuius maritus manu mancipioque esset, quoniam non in matrimonium tantum, sed in familiam quoque mariti et in sui heredis locum venisset.