1. How Socrates used to train himself in physical endurance; and of the temperate habits of that philosopher. Among voluntary tasks and exercises for strengthening his body for any chance demands upon its endurance we are told that Socrates habitually practised this one: he would stand, so the story goes, in one fixed position, all day and all night, from early dawn until the next sunrise, open-eyed, motionless, in his very tracks and with face and eyes riveted to the same spot in deep meditation, as if his mind and soul had been, as it were, withdrawn from his body. When Favorinus in his discussion of the man's fortitude and his many other virtues had reached this point, he said: “He often stood from sun to sun, more rigid than the tree trunks.” His temperance also is said to have been so great, that he lived almost the whole period of his life with health unimpaired. Even amid the havoc of that plague which, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, devastated Athens with a deadly species of disease, by temperate and abstemious habits he is said to have avoided the ill-effects of indulgence and retained his physical vigour so completely, that he was not at all affected by the calamity common to all.
1. Quo genere solitus sit philosophus Socrates exercere patientiam corporis; deque eiusdem viri temperantia. INTER labores voluntarios et exercitia corporis ad fortuitas patientiae vices firmandi id quoque accepimus Socraten facere insuevisse: stare solitus Socrates dicitur pertinaci statu perdius atque pernox a summo lucis ortu ad solem alterumalteum orientem inconivens, immobilis, isdem in vestigiis et ore atque oculis eundem in locum directis cogitabundus, tamquam quodam secessu mentis atque animi facto a corpore. Quam rem cum Favorinus de fortitudine eius viri ut pleraque disserens attigisset, πολλάκις, inquit, ἐξ ἡλίου εἰς ἥλιον εἱστήκει ἀστραβέστερος τῶν πρέμνων. Temperantia quoque fuisse eum tanta traditum est, ut omnia fere vitae suae tempora valitudine inoffensa vixerit. In illius etiam pestilentiae vastitate quae in belli Peloponnensiaci principis Atheniensium civitatem internecivo genere morbi depopulata est, is parcendi moderandique rationibus dicitur et a voluptatum labe cavisse et salubritates corporis retinuisse, ut nequaquam fuerit communi omnium cladi obnoxius.
2. What rules of courtesy should be observed by fathers and sons in taking their places at able, keeping their seats, and similar matters at home and elsewhere, when the sons are magistrates and the fathers private citizens; and a discourse of the philosopher Taurus on this subject, with an illustration taken from Roman history. THE governor of the province of Crete, a man of senatorial rank, had come to Athens for the purpose of visiting and becoming acquainted with the philosopher Taurus, and in company with this same governor was his father. Taurus, having just dismissed his pupils, was sitting before the door of his room, and we stood by his side conversing with him. In came the governor of the province and with him his father. Taurus arose quietly, and after salutations had been exchanged, sat down again. Presently the single chair that was at hand was brought and placed near them, while others were being fetched. Taurus invited the governor's father to be seated; to which he replied: “Rather let this man take the seat, since he is a magistrate of the Roman people.” “Without prejudicing the case,” said Taurus, “do you meanwhile sit down, while we look into the matter and inquire whether it is more proper for you, who are the father, to sit, or your son, who is a magistrate.” And when the father had seated himself, and another chair had been placed near by for his son also, Taurus discussed the question with what, by the gods! was a most excellent valuation of honours and duties. The substance of the discussions was this: In public places, functions and acts the rights of fathers, compared with tile authority of sons who are magistrates, give way somewhat and are eclipsed; but when they are sitting together unofficially in the intimacy of home life, or walking about, or even reclining at a dinner-party of intimate friends, then the official distinctions between a son who is a magistrate and a father who is a private citizen are at an end, while those that are natural and inherent come into play. “Now, your visit to me,” said he, “our present conversation, and this discussion of duties are private actions. Therefore enjoy the same priority of honours at my house which it is proper for you to enjoy in your own home as the older man.” These remarks and others to the same purport were made by Taurus at once seriously and pleasantly. Moreover, it has seemed not out of place to add what I have read in Claudius about the etiquette of father and son under such circumstances. I therefore quote Quadrigarius' actual words, transcribed from the sixth book of his Annals "The consuls then elected were Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus for the second time and Quintus Fabius Maximus, son of the Maximus who had been consul the year before. The father, at the time proconsul, mounted upon a horse met his son the consul, and because lie was his father, would not dismount, nor did the lictors, who knew that the two men lived in the most perfect harmony, presume to order him to do so. As the father drew near, the consul said: “What next?” The lictor in attendance quickly understood and ordered Maximus the proconsul to dismount. Fabius obeyed the order and warmly commended his son for asserting the authority which he had as the gift of the people."
2. Quae ratio observatioque officiorum esse debeat inter patres filiosque in discumbendo sedendoque atque id genus rebus domidonii forisque, si filii magistratus sunt et patres privati; superque ea re Tauri philosophi dissertatio et exemplum ex historia Romana petitum. AD philosophum Taurum Athenas visendi cognoscendique eius gratia venerat V. C., praeses Cretae provinciae, et cum eo simul eiusdem praesidis pater. Taurus, sectatoribus commodum dimissis, sedebat pro cubiculi sui foribus et cum assistentibus nobis sermocinabatur. Introivit provinciae praeses et cum eo pater; assurrexit placide Taurus et post mutuam salutationem resedit. Allata moxmnox una sella est, quae in promptuprompt erat, atque dum aliae promebanturpromrebantur, apposita est. Invitavit Taurus patrem praesidispralesidis uti sederet. Ad quae ille ait: “Sedeat hic potius qui populi Romani magistratus est.” “Absque praeiudicio,” inquit Taurus, “tu interea sede, dum inspicimus quaerimusquequaerimlusque utrum conveniat, tene potius sedere, qui pater es, an filium, qui magistratus est.” Et cum pater assedisset appositumque esset aliud filio quoque eius sedile, verba super ea re Taurus facit cum summa, dii boni, honorum atque officiorum perpensationeperpenlsatione. Eorum verborum sententia haec fuit: In publicis locis atque muneribus atque actionibus patrum iura, cum filiorum qui in magistratu sunt potestatibus collata, interquiescere paululum et conivere; sed cum extra rempublicam in domesticadomestic re atque vita sedeatur, ambuletur, in convivio quoque familiarifamiliar discumbatur, tum inter filium magistratum et patrem privatum publicos honores cessare, naturales et genuinos exoriri. “Hoc igitur,” inquit, “quod ad me venistis, quod colloquimur nunc, quod de officiis disceptamus, privata actio est. Itaque utere apud me his honoribus prius, quibus domi quoque vestrae te uti priorem decet.” Haec atque alia in eandem sententiam Taurus graviter simul et comiter disseruit. Quid autem super huiuscemodihuiuscemlodi patris atque filii officio apud Claudium legerimus, non esse ab re visum est ut adscriberemus. Posuimus igitur verba ipsa Quadrigarii ex Annali eius sexto transscripta: “Deinde facti consules Ti. Sempronius Gracchus iterum, Q. Fabius Maximus, filius eius qui priore anno erat consul. Ei consulicosuli pater proconsul obviam in equo vehens venit neque descendere voluit, quod pater erat, et quod inter eos sciebant maxima concordia convenire, lictores non ausi sunt descendere iubere. Ubi iuxta venit, tum consul ait: ‘Quid postea?’; lictor ille qui apparebat cito intellexit, Maximum proconsulem descendere iussit. Fabius imperio paret et filium collaudavit, cum imperium, quod populi esset, retineret.”
3. For what reason our forefathers inserted the aspirate h in certain verbs and nouns. THE letter h (or perhaps it should be called a breathing rather than a letter) was added by our forefathers to give strength and vigour to the pronunciation of many words, in order that they might have a fresher and livelier sound; and this they seem to have done from their devotion to the Attic language, and under its influence. It is well known that the people of Attica, contrary to the usage of the other Greek races, pronounced i(xqu/s (fish), i(/ppos (horse), and many other words besides, with a rough breathing on the first letter. In the same way our ancestors said lachrumae (tears), sepulchrum (burial-place), ahenum (of bronze), vehemens (violent), incohare (begin), helluari (gormandize), hallucinari (dream), honera (burdens), honustum (burdened). For in all these words there seems to be no reason for that letter, or breathing, except to increase the force and vigour of the sound by adding certain sinews, so to speak. But apropos of the inclusion of ahenum among my examples, I recall that Fidus Optatus, a grammarian of considerable repute in Rome, showed me a remarkably old copy of the second book of the Aeneid, bought in the Sigillaria for twenty pieces of gold, which was believed to have belonged to Virgil himself. In that book, although the following two lines were written thus:Before the entrance-court, hard by the gate,With sheen of brazen (aena) arms proud Pyrrhus gleams,we observed that the letter h had been added above the line, changing aena to ahena. So too in the best manuscripts we find this verse of Virgil's written as follows:Or skims with leaves the bubbling brass's (aleni) wave.
3. Qua ratione verbis quibusdam vocabulisque veteres immiserintimmiseurint h litterae spiritum. H LITTERAM, sive illam spiritum magis quam litteram dici oportet, inserebant eamearn veteres nostri plerisque vocibus verborumverborLum firmandis roborandisque, ut sonus earum esset viridior vegetiorque; atque id videntur fecisse studio et exemplo linguae Atticae. Satis notum est Atticos ἱχθὺν et ἵππον et multa itidem alia contra morem gentium Graeciae ceterarum inspirantis prime litterae dixisse. Sic “lachrumas,” sic “sepulcrum,” sic “ahenum,” sic “vehemens,” sic “incohare,” sic “helluari,” sic “halucinari,” sic “honera,” sic “honustum” dixerunt. In his enim verbis omnibus litterae seu spiritus istius nulla ratio visa est, nisi ut firmitas et vigor vocis quasi quibusdam nervis additis intenderetur. Sed quoniam “aheni” quoque exemplo usi sumus, venit nobis in memoriam Fidum Optatum, multi nominis Romae grammaticum, ostendisse mihi librum Aeneidos secundum mirandae vetustatis, emptum in Sigillariis viginti aureis, quemquern ipsius Vergili fuisse credebatur. In quo duo isti versus cum ita scripti forent:Vestibulum ante ipsum primoque in limine PyrrusExultat, telis et luce coruscus aena,additam supra vidimus h litteram et “ahena” factum. Sic in illo quoque Vergili versu in optimis libris scriptumscriptumr invenimus:Aut foliis undam trepidi despumat aheni.
4. The reason given by Gavius Bassus for calling a certain kind of judicial inquiry divitiatio; and the explanation that others have given of the same term. WHEN inquiry is made about the choice of a prosecutor, and judgment is rendered on the question to which of two or more persons the prosecution of a defendant, or a share in the prosecution, is to be entrusted, this process and examination by jurors is called divinatio. The reason for the use of this term is a matter of frequent inquiry. Gavius Bassus, in the third book of his work On the Origin of Terms, says: “This kind of trial is called divinatio because the juror ought in a sense to divine what verdict it is proper for him to give.” The explanation offered in these words of Gavius Bassus is far from complete, or rather, it is inadequate and meagre. But at least he seems to be trying to show that divinatio is used because in other trials it is the habit of the juror to be influenced by what he has heard and by what has been shown by evidence or by witnesses; but in this instance, when a prosecutor is to be selected, the considerations which can influence a juror are very few and slight, and therefore he must, so to speak, “divine” what man is the better fitted to make the accusation. Thus Bassus. But some others think that the divinatio is so called because, while prosecutor and defendant are two things that are, as it were, related and connected, so that neither can exist without the other, yet in this form of trial, while there is already a defendant, there is as yet no prosecutor, and therefore the factor which is still lacking and unknown—namely, what man is to be the prosecutor—must be supplied by divination.
4. Quam ob causam Gavius Bassus genus quoddam iudicii “divinationem” appellari scripserit; et quam alii causam esse eiusdem vocabuli dixerint. CUM de constituendo accusatore quaeritur iudiciumque super ea re redditur cuinam potissimum ex duobus pluribusque accusatio subscriptiove in reum permittatur, ea res atque iudicum cognitio “divinatio” appellatur. Id vocabulum quam ob causam ita factum sit, quaeri solet. Gavius Bassus in tertio librorum, quos De Origine vocabulorumVocabilorum composuit, “Divinatio,” inquit, “iudicium appellatur, quoniam divinet quodammodo iudex oportet quam sententiam sese ferre par sit.” Nimis quidem est in verbis Gavi Bassi ratio inperfecta vel magis inops et ieiuna. Sed videtur tamen significare velle idcirco dici “divinationem,” quod in aliis quidem causis iudex ea quae didicit quaeque argumentis vel testibus demonstrata sunt sequi solet, in hac autem re, cum eligendus accusator est, parva admodum et exilia sunt quibus moveri iudex possit, et propterea quinam magis ad accusandum idoneus sit quasi divinandum est. Haec Bassus. Sed alii quidam “divinationem” esse appellatam putant quoniam, cum accusator et reus duae res quasi cognatae coniunctaeque sint neque utra sine altera constare possit, in hoc tamen genere causae reus quidem iam est, sed accusator nondum est, et idcirco quod adhuc usque deest et latet divinatione supplendum est, quisnam sit accusator futurus.
5. How elegantly and clearly the philosopher Favorinus described the difference between the style of Plato and that of Lysias. FAVORINUS used to say of Plato and Lysias: “If you take a single word from a discourse of Plato or change it, and do it with the utmost skill, you will nevertheless mar the elegance of his style; if you do the same to Lysias, you will obscure his meaning.”
5. Quam lepide signateque dixerit Favorinus philosophus quid intersit inter Platonis et Lysiae orationem. FAVORINUS de Lysia et Platone solitus dicere est: “Si ex Platonis,” inquit, “oratione verbum aliquod demas mutesve atque id commodatissimecommnodatissime facias, de elegantiaclegantia tamen detraxeris; si ex Lysiae, de sententia.”
6. On some words which Virgil is asserted to have used carelessly and negligently; and the answer to be made to those who bring this false charge. SOME grammarians of an earlier time, men by no means without learning and repute, who wrote commentaries on Virgil, and among them Annaeus Cornutus, criticize the poet's use of a word in the following verses as careless and negligent:That, her white waist with howling monsters girt,Dread Scylla knocked about (vexasse) Ulysses' shipsAmid the swirling depths, and, piteous sight!The trembling sailors with her sea-dogs rent.They think, namely, that vexasse is a weak word, indicating a slight and trivial annoyance, and not adapted to such a horror as the sudden seizing and rending of human beings by a ruthless monster. They also criticize another word in the following:Who has not heardOf king Eurystheus' pitiless commandsAnd altars of Busiris, the unpraised (inlaudati)?Inlaudati, they say, is not at all a suitable world, but is quite inadequate to express abhorrence of a wretch who, because he used to sacrifice guests from all over the world, was not merely “undeserving of praise,” but rather deserving of the abhorrence and execration of the whole human race. They have criticized still another word in the verse:Through tunic rough (squalentem) with gold the sword drank from his pierced side,on the ground that it is out of place to say auro squalentem, since the filth of squalor is quite opposed to the brilliance and splendour of gold. Now as to the word vexasse, I believe the following answer may be made: vexasse is an intensive verb, and is obviously derived from ve- here, in which there is already some notion of compulsion by another; for a man who is carried is not his own master. But vexare, which is derived from vehere, unquestionably implies greater force and impulse. For vexare is properly used of one who is seized and carried away, and dragged about hither and yon; just as taxare denotes more forcible and repeated action than tangere, from which it is undoubtedly derived; and iactare a much fuller and more vigorous action than iacere, from which it comes; and quassare something severer and more violent than quatere. Therefore, merely because vexare is commonly used of the annoyance of smoke or wind or dust is no reason why the original force and meaning of the word should be lost; and that meaning was preserved by the earlier writers who, as became them, spoke correctly and clearly. Marcus Cato, in the speech which he wrote On the Achaeans, has these words: And when Hannibal was rending and harrying (vexaret) the land of Italy. 'hat is to say, Cato used vexare of the effect on Italy of Hannibal's conduct, at a time when no species of disaster, cruelty or savagery could be imagined which Italy did not suffer from his hands. Marcus Tullius, in his fourth Oration against Verres, wrote: “This was so pillaged and ravaged by that wretch, that it did not seem to have been laid waste (vexata) by an enemy who in the heat of war still felt some religious scruple and some respect for customary law, but by barbarous pirates.” But concerning inlaudatus it seems possible to give two answers. One is of this kind: There is absolutely no one who is of so perverted a character as not sometimes to do or say something that can be commended (laudari.) And therefore this very ancient line has become a familiar proverb:Oft-times even a fool expresses himself to the purpose.But one who, on the contrary, in his every act and at all times, deserves no praise (laude) at all is inlaudatus, and such a man is the very worst and most despicable of all mortals, just as freedom from all reproach makes one inculpatus (blameless). Now inculpatus is the synonym for perfect goodness; therefore conversely inlaudatus represents the limit of extreme wickedness. It is for that reason that Homer usually bestows high praise, not by enumerating virtues, but by denying faults; for example: “And not unwillingly they charged,” and again:Not then would you divine Atrides seeConfused, inactive, nor yet loath to fight.Epicurus too in a similar way defined the greatest pleasure as the removal and absence of all pain, in these words: “The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of all that pains.” Again Virgil on the same principle called the Stygian pool “unlovely.” For just as he expressed abhorrence of the “unpraised” man by the denial of praise, so he abhorred the “unlovable” by the denial of love. Another defence of inlaudatus is this: laudare in early Latin means “to name” and “cite.” Thus in civil actions they use laudare of an authority, when he is cited. Conversely, the inlaudatus is the same as the inlaudabilis, namely, one who is worthy neither of mention nor remembrance, and is never to be named; as, for example, in days gone by the common council of Asia decreed that no one should ever mention the name of the man who had burned the temple of Diana at Ephesus. There remains the third criticism, his use of the expression “a tunic rough with gold.” But squalentem signifies a quantity or thick layer of gold, laid on so as to resemble scales. For squalere is used of the thick, rough scales (squamae) which are to be seen on the skins of fish or snakes. This is made clear both by others and indeed by this same poet in several passages; thus:A skin his covering was, plumed with brazen scales (squamis)And clasped with gold.and again:And now has he his flashing breastplate donned,Bristling with brazen scales (squamis).Accius too in the Pelopidae writes thus:This serpent's scales (squamae) rough gold and purple wrought.Thus we see that squalere was applied to whatever was overloaded and excessively crowded with anything, in order that its strange appearance might strike terror into those who looked upon it. So too on neglected and scaly bodies the deep layer of dirt was called squalor, and by long and continued use in that sense the entire word has become so corrupted, that finally squalor has come to be used of nothing but filth.
6. Quibus verbis ignaviter et abiecte Vergilius usus esse dicatur; et quid his qui improbe id dicunt respondeatur. NONNULLI grammatici aetatis superioris, in quibus est Cornutus Annaeus, haut sane indocti neque ignobiles, qui commentaria in Vergilium composuerunt, reprehendunt quasi incuriose et abiecte verbum positum in his versibus:Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina monstrisDulichias vexasse rates et gurgite in altoA! timidos nautas canibus lacerasse marinis; “vexasse” enim putant verbum esse leve et tenuis ac parvi incommodi, nec tantae atrocitati congruere, cum homines repente a belua immanissima rapti laniatique sint. Item aliud huiuscemodi reprehendunt:Quis aut Eurysthea durumAut inlaudati nescit Busiridis aras?“Inlaudati” parum idoneum verbum esse dicunt, neque id satis esse ad faciendam scelerati hominis detestationem, qui, quod hospites omnium gentium immolare solitus fuit, non laude indignus, sed detestatione execrationeque totius generis humani dignus esset. Item aliud verbum culpaverunt:Per tunicam squalentem auro latus haurit apertum,tamquam si non convenerit dicere “auro squalentem,” quoniam nitoribus splendoribusque auri squaloris inluvies sit contraria. Sed de verbo “vexasse” ita responderi posse credo: “Vexasse” grave verbum est factumque ab eo videtur, quod est “vehere,” in quo inest vis iam quaedam alieni arbitrii; non enim sui potens est, qui vehitur. “Vexare” autem, quod ex eo inclinatum est, vi atque motu procul dubio vastiorest. Nam qui fertur et rapsatur atque huc atque illuc distrahitur, is “vexari” proprie dicitur, sicuti “taxare” pressius crebriusque est quam “tangere,” unde id procul dubio inclinatum est, et “iactare” multo fusius largiusque est quam “iacere,” unde id verbum traductum est, et “quassare” quam “quatere” gravius violentiusque est. Non igitur, quia vulgo dici solet “(vexatum esse” quem fumo aut vento aut pulvere, propterea debet vis vera atque natura verbi deperire, quae a veteribus, qui proprie atque signate locuti sunt, ita ut decuit, conservata est. M. Catonis verba sunt ex oratione quam De Achaeis scripsit: “Cumque Hannibal terram Italiam laceraret atque vexaret”; “vexatam” Italiam dixit Cato ab Hannibale, quando nullum calamitatis aut saevitiae aut immanitatis genus reperiri queat quod in eo tempore Italia non perpessa sit; M. Tullius IV. In Verrem: “Quae ab isto sic spoliata atque direpta est, non ut ab hoste aliquo, qui tamen in bello religionem et consuetudinis iura retineret, sed ut a barbaris praedonibus vexata esse videatur.” De “inlaudato” autem duo videntur responderi posse. Unum est eiusmodi: Nemo quisquam tamtan efflictis est moribus quin faciat aut dicat nonnumquam aliquid quod laudari queat. Unde hic antiquissimus versus vice proverbii celebratus est:Πολλάκι τοι Sed enim qui omni in re atque omni tempore laude omni vacat, is “inlaudatus” est isque omnium pessimus deterrimusque est, sicuti omnis culpae privatio “inculpatum” facit. “Inculpatus” autem instar est absolutae virtutis; “inlaudatus” quoque igitur 11 finis est extremae malitiae. Itaque Homerus non virtutibus appellandis, sed vitiis detrahendis laudare ampliter solet. Hoc enim est: τὼ δʼ οὐκ ἄκοντε πετέσθην, et item illud:Ἔνθʼ οὐκ ἂν βρίζοντα ἴδοις Ἀγαμέμνονα δῖονΟὐδὲ καταπτώσσοντʼ, οὐδʼ οὐκ ἐθέλοντα μάχεσθαι. Epicurus quoque simili modo maximam voluptatem privationem detractionemque omnis doloris definivit his verbis: Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. Eadem ratione idem Vergilius “inamabilem” dixit Stygiam paludem. Nam sicut “inlaudatum” κατὰ στέρησιν laudis, ita “inamabilem” κατὰ amoris στέρησιν detestatus est. Altero modo “inlaudatus” ita defenditur: “Laudare” significat prisca lingua nominare appellareque. Sic in actionibus civilibus auctor, “laudari” dicitur, quod est nominari. Is “inlaudatus” autem est, quasi inlaudabilis, qui neque mentione aut memoria ulla dignus neque umquam nominandus est, sicuti quondam a communi consilio Asiae decretum est uti nomen eius qui templum Dianae Ephesi incenderat ne quis ullo in tempore nominaret. Tertium restat ex is quae reprehensa sunt, quod “tunicam squalentem auro” dixit. Id autem significat copiam densitatemque auri in squamarum speciem intexti. “Squalere” enim dictum a squamarum crebritate asperitateque, quae in serpentium pisciumve coriis visuntur. Quam rem et alii et hic quidem poeta locis aliquot demonstrat:Quem pellis (inquit) ahenisIn plumam squamis auro conserta tegebat, et alio loco:Iamque adeo rutilum thoraca indutus ahenisHorrebat squamis. Accius in Pelopidis ita scribit:Éius serpentis squámae squalido aúro et purpurá pertextae. Quicquid igitur nimis inculcatum obsitumque aliqua re erat, ut incuteret visentibus facie nova horrorem, id “squalere” dicebatur. Sic in corporibus incultis squamosisque alta congeries sordium “squalor” appellabatur. Cuius significationis multo assiduoque usu totum id verbum ita contaminatum est, ut iam “squalor” de re alia nulla quam de solis inquinamentis dici coeperit.
7. Of the obedience of children to their parents; and quotations on this subject from the writings of the philosophers, in which it is inquired whether all a father's commands should be obeyed. IT is a frequent subject of discussion with philosophers, whether a father should always be obeyed, whatever the nature of his commands. As to this question writers On Duty, both Greeks and our own countrymen, have stated that there are three opinions to be noticed and considered, and these they have differentiated with great acuteness The first is, that all a father's commands must be obeyed; the second, that in some he is to be obeyed, in others not; the third, that it is not necessary to yield to and obey one's father in anything. Since at first sight this last opinion is altogether shameful, I shall begin by stating what has been said on that point. “A father's command,” they say, “is either right or wrong. If it is right, it is not to be obeyed because it is his order, but the thing must be done because it is right that it be done. If his command is wrong, surely that should on no account be done which ought not to be done.” Thus they arrive at the conclusion that a father's command should never be obeyed. But I have neither heard that this view has met with approval —for it is a mere quibble, both silly and foolish, as I shall presently show—nor can the opinion which we stated first, that all a father's commands are to be obeyed, be regarded as true and acceptable. For what if he shall command treason to one's country, a mother's murder, or some other base or impious deed? The intermediate view, therefore, has seemed best and safest, that some commands are to be obeyed and others not. But yet they say that commands which ought not to be obeyed must nevertheless be declined gently and respectfully, without excessive aversion or bitter recrimination, and rather left undone than spurned. But that conclusion from which it is inferred, as has been said above, that a father is never to be obeyed, is faulty, and may be refuted and disposed of as follows: All human actions are, as learned men have decided, either honourable or base. Whatever is inherently right or honourable, such as keeping faith, defending one's country, loving one's friend's, ought to be done whether a father commands it or not; but whatever is of the opposite nature, and is base and altogether evil, should not be done even at a father's order. Actions, however, which lie between these, and are called by the Greeks now me/sa, or “neutral,” and now a)dia/fora, or “indifferent,” such as going to war, tilling the fields, seeking office, pleading causes, marrying a wife, going when ordered, coming when called; since these and similar actions are in themselves neither honourable nor base, but are to be approved or disapproved exactly according to the manner in which we perform them: for this reason they believe that in every kind of action of this description a father should be obeyed; as for instance, if he should order his son to marry a wife or to plead for the accused. For since each of these acts, in its actual nature and of itself, is neither honourable nor base, if a father should command it, he ought to be obeyed. But if he should order his son to marry a woman of ill repute, infamous and criminal, or to speak in defence of a Catiline, a Tubulus, or a Publius Clodius, of course he ought not to be obeyed, since by the addition of a certain degree of evil these acts cease to be inherently neutral and indifferent. Hence the premise of those who say that “the commands of a father are either honourable or base” is incomplete, and it cannot be considered what the Greeks call “sound and regular disjunctive proposition.” For that disjunctive premise lacks the third member, “or are neither honourable nor base.” If this be added, the conclusion cannot be drawn that a father's command must never be obeyed.
7. De officio erga patres liberorum; deque ea re ex philosophiaephilosophies libris, in quibus scriptum quaesitumquequaesitnumque est an omnibus patris iussis obsequendum sit. QUAERI solitum est in philosophorum disceptatio nibus, an semper inque omnibus iussis patri parendum sit. Super ea re Graeci nostrique, qui De Officiis scripserunt, tres sententias esse quae spectandae considerandaeque sint tradiderunt easque subtilissime diiudicarunt. Earum una est: omnia quae pater imperat parendum; altera est: in quibusdam parendum, quibusdam non obsequendum; tertia est: nihil necesse esse patri obsequi et parere. Haec sententia quoniam primore aspectu nimis infamis est, super ea prius quae dicta sunt dicemus. “Aut recte,” inquiunt, “imperat pater aut perperam.” “Si recte imperat, non quia imperat parendum, sed quoniam id fieri ius est; si perperam, nequaquam scilicet faciendum quod fieri non oportet.” Deinde ita concludunt: “Numquam igitur est patri parendum quae imperat.” Set neque istam sententiam probari accepimus—argutiola quippe haec, sicuti mox ostendemus, frivola et inanis est—neque autem illa quam primo in loco diximus vera et proba videri potest, omnia esse quae pater iusserit parendum. Quid enim? si proditionem patriae, si matris necem, si alia quaedam imperabit turpia aut impia? Media igitur sententia optima atque tutissima visa est, quaedam esse parendum, quaedam non obsequendum. Sed ea tamen, quae obsequi non oportet, leniter et verecunde ac sine detestatione nimia sineque obprobratione acerba reprehensionis declinanda sensim et relinquenda esse dicunt quam respuenda. Conclusio vero illa qua colligitur, sicuti supra dictum est, nihil patri parendum, inperfecta est refutarique ac dilui sic potest: Omnia, quae in rebus humanis fiunt, ita ut docti censuerunt, aut honesta sunt aut turpia. Quae sua vi recta aut honesta sunt, ut fidem colere, patriam defendere, ut amicos diligere, ea fieri oportet, sive imperet pater sive non imperet; sed quae his contraria quaeque turpia, omnino iniqua sunt, ea ne si imperet quidem. Quae vero in medio sunt et a Graecis tum, μέσα tum ἀδιάφορα appellantur, ut in militiam ire, rus colere, honores capessere, causas defendere, uxorem ducere, ut iussum proficisci, ut accersitum venire, quoniam et haec et his similia per sese ipsa neque honesta sunt neque turpia, sed proinde ut a nobis aguntur, ita ipsis actionibus aut probanda fiunt aut reprehendenda: propterea in eiusmodi omnium rerum generibus patri parendum esse censent, veluti si uxorem ducere imperet aut causas pro reis dicere. Quod enim utrumque in genere ipso per sese neque honestum neque turpe est, idcirco, si pater iubeat, obsequendum est. Sed enim si imperet uxorem ducere infamem, propudiosam, criminosam, aut pro reo Catilina aliquo aut Tubulo aut P. Clodio causam dicere, non scilicet parendum, quoniam accedente aliquo turpitudinis numero desinunt esse per sese haec media atque indifferentia. Non ergo integra est propositio dicentium “aut honesta sunt, quae imperat pater, aut turpia,” neque ὑγιὲς et νόμιμον διεζευγμένον videri potest. Deest enim diiunctioni isti tertium: “aut neque honesta sunt neque turpia.” Quod si additur, non potest ita concludi: “numquam est igitur patri parendum.”
8. The unfairness of Plutarch's criticism of Epicurus' knowledge of the syllogism. PLUTARCH, in the second book of his essay On Homer, asserts that Epicurus made use of an incomplete, perverted and faulty syllogism, and he quotes Epicurus' own words: “Death is nothing to us, for what is dissolved is without perception, and what is without perception is nothing to us.” “Now Epicurus,” says Plutarch, "omitted what he ought to have stated as his major premise, that death is a dissolution of body and soul, and then, to prove something else, he goes on to use the very premise that he had omitted, as if it had been stated and conceded. But this syllogism," says Plutarch, “cannot advance, unless that premise be first presented.” What Plutarch wrote as to the form and sequence of a syllogism is true enough; for if you wish to argue and reason according to the teaching of the schools, you ought to say: “Death is the dissolution of soul and body; but what is dissolved is without perception; and what is without perception is nothing to us.” But we cannot suppose that Epicurus, being the man he was, omitted that part of the syllogism through ignorance, or that it was his intention to state a syllogism complete in all its members and limitations, as is done in the schools of the logicians; but since the separation of body and soul by death is self-evident, he of course did not think it necessary to call attention to what was perfectly obvious to everyone. For the same reason, too, he put the conclusion of the syllogism, not at the end, but at the beginning; for who does not see that this also was not due to inadvertence? In Plato too you will often find syllogisms in which the order prescribed in the schools is disregarded and inverted, with a kind of lofty disdain of criticism.
8. Quod parum aequa reprehensio Epicuri a Plutarcho facta sit in synlogismi disciplina. PlutarchusPLUTARCIIUS, secundo librorum quos De Homero composuit, inperfecte atque praepostere atque inscite synlogismo esse usum Epicurum dicit verbaque ipsa Epicuri ponit: Ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶ· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἡμᾶς. “Nam praetermisit,” inquit, “quod in prima parte sumere debuit, τὸν θάνατον εἶναι ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος διάλυσιν, tum deinde eodem ipso,” “quod omiserat, quasi posito concessoque ad confirmandum aliud utitur.” “Progredi autem hic,” inquit, “synlogismus, nisi illo prius posito, non potest.” Vere hoc quidem Plutarchus de forma atque ordine synlogismi scripsit. Nam si, ut in disciplinis traditur, ita colligere et ratiocinari velis, sic dici oportet: Ὁ θάνατος ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος διάλυσις· τὸ δὲ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ· τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦ οὑδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Sed Epicurus, cuiusmodi homost, non inscitia videtur partem istam synlogismi praetermisisse, neque id ei negotium fuit, synlogismum tamquam in scholis philosophorum cum suis numeris omnibus et cum suis finibus dicere, sed profecto, quia separatio animi et corporis in morte evidens est, non est ratus necessariam esse eius admonitionem, quod omnibus prosus erat obvium. Sicuti etiam, quod coniunctionem synlogismi non in fine posuit, set in principio; nam id quoque non inperite factum, quis non videt? Aput Platonem quoque multis in locis reperias synlogismos, repudiate conversoque ordine isto qui in docendo traditur, cum eleganti quadam reprehensionis contemptione positos esse.
9. How the same Plutarch, with obvious captiousness, criticized the use of a word by Epicurus. IN the same book, Plutarch also finds fault a second time with Epicurus for using an inappropriate word and giving it an incorrect meaning. Now Epicurus wrote as follows: “The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of everything that pains.” Plutarch declares that he ought not to have said “of everything that pains,” but “of everything that is painful”; for it is the removal of pain, he explains, that should be indicated, not of that which causes pain. In bringing this charge against Epicurus Plutarch is “word-chasing” with excessive minuteness and almost with frigidity; for far from hunting up such verbal meticulousness and such refinements of diction, Epicurus hunts them down.
9. Quod idem Plutarchus evidenti calumnia verbum ab Epicuro dictum insectatus sit. IN eodem libro idem Plutarchus eundem Epicurum reprehendit, quod verbo usus sit parum proprio et alienae significationis. Ita enim scripsit Epicurus: Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. “Non,” inquit, “παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος, sed παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ dicere oportuit;” “detractio enim significandi est doloris, non,” inquit, “dolentis.” Nimis minute ac prope etiam subfrigide Plutarchus in Epicuro accusando λεξιθηρεῖ Has enim curas vocum verborumqueverborurmque elegantias non modo non sectatur Epicurus, sed etiam insectatur.
10. The meaning of favisae Capitolinae; and what Marcus Varro replied to Servius Sulpicius, who asked him about that term. SERVIUS SULPICIUS, an authority on civil law and a man well versed in letters, wrote to Marcus Varro and asked him to explain the meaning of a term which was used in the records of the censors; the term in question was favisae Capitolinae. Varro wrote in reply that he recalled that Quintus Catulus, when in charge of the restoration of the Capitol, had said that it had been his desire to lower the area Capitolina, in order that the ascent to the temple might have more steps and that the podium might be higher, to correspond with the elevation and size of the pediment; but that he had been unable to carry out his plan because the favisae had prevented. These, he said, were certain underground chambers and cisterns in the area, in which it was the custom to store ancient statues that had fallen from the temple, and some other consecrated objects from among the votive offerings. And then Varro goes on to say in the same letter, that he had never found any explanation of the term favisae in literature, but that Quintus Valerius Soranus used to assert that what we called by their Greek name thesauri (treasuries) the early Latins termed favisae, their reason being that there was deposited in them, not uncoined copper and silver, but stamped and minted money. His theory therefore was, he said, that the second letter had dropped out of the word flavisae, and that certain chambers and pits, which the attendants of the Capitol used for the preservation of old and sacred objects, were called favisae.
10. Quid sint favisae Capitolinae; et quid super eo verbo M. Varro Servio Sulpicio quaerenti rescripserit. SERVIUS SULPICIUS, iurisiunis civilis auctor, vir bene litteratus, scripsit ad M. Varronem rogavitque ut rescriberet quid significaret verbum quod in censoriis libris scriptum esset. Id erat verbum “favisae Capitolinae.” Varro rescripsit in memoriamemorial sibi esse quod Q. Catulus curator restituendi Capitolii dixisset, voluisse se aream Capitolinam deprimere, ut pluribus gradibus in aedem conscenderetur suggestusque pro fastigii magnitudine altior fieret, sed facere id non quisse, quoniam “favisae” impedissent. Id esse cellas quasdam et cisternas quae in area sub terra essent, ubi reponi solerent signa vetera quae ex eo templo collapsa essent, et alia quaedam religiosa e donis consecratis. Ac deinde eadem epistula negat quidem se in litteris invenisse cur “favisae” dictae sint, sed Q. Valerium Soranum solitum dicere ait, quos “thesauros” Graeco nomine appellaremus, priscos Latinos “flavisas” dixisse, quod in eos non rude aes argentumque, sed flata signataque pecunia conderetur. Coniectare igitur se detractam esse ex eo verbo secundam litteram et “favisas” esse dictas cellas quasdam et specus, quibus aeditui Capitolii uterentur ad custodiendas res veteres religiosas.
11. Numerous important details about Sicinius Dentatus, the distinguished warrior. WE read in the annals that Lucius Sicinius Dentatus, who was tribune of the commons in the consulship of Spurius Tarpeius and Aulus Aternius, was a warrior of incredible energy; that he won a name for his exceeding great valour, and was called the Roman Achilles. It is said that he fought with the enemy in one hundred and twenty battles, and had not a scar on his back, but forty-five in front; that golden crowns were given him eight times, the siege crown once, mural crowns three times, and civic crowns fourteen times; that eighty-three neck-chains were awarded him, more than one hundred and sixty armlets, and eighteen spears; he was presented besides with twenty-five decorations; he had a number of spoils of war, many of which were won in single combat; he took part with his generals in nine triumphal processions.
11. De Sicinio Dentato egregio bellatore multa memoratu digna. L. SICINIUM DENTATUM, qui tribunus plebi fuit Sp. Tarpeio, A. Aternio consulibus, scriptum est in libris annalibus plus quam credi debeatdefeat strenuum bellatorem fuisse nomenque ei factum ob ingentem fortitudinem appellatumque esse Achillem Romanum. Is pugnasse in hostem dicitur centum et viginti proeliis, cicatricem aversam nullam, adversas quinque et quadraginta tulisse, coronis donatus esse aureis octo, obsidionali una, muralibus tribus, civicis quattuordecim, torquibus tribus et octoginta, armillis plus centum sexaginta, hastis duodeviginti; phaleris item donatus est quinquies viciesque; spolia militaria habuit multiiuga, in his provocatoria pleraque; triumphavit cum imperatoribus suis triumphos novem.
12. A law of Solon, the result of careful thought and consideration, which at first sight seems unfair and unjust, but on close examination is found to be altogether helpful and salutary. AMONG those very early laws of Solon which were inscribed upon wooden tablets at Athens, and which, promulgated by him, the Athenians ratified by penalties and oaths, to ensure their permanence, Aristotle says that there was one to this effect: “If because of strife and disagreement civil dissension shall ensue and a division of the people into two parties, and if for that reason each side, led by their angry feelings, shall take up arms and fight, then if anyone at that time, and in such a condition of civil discord, shall not ally himself with one or the other faction, but by himself and apart shall hold aloof from the common calamity of the State, let hint be deprived of his home, his country, and all his property, and be an exile and an outlaw.” When I read this law of Solon, who was a man of extraordinary wisdom, I was at first filled with something like great amazement, and I asked myself why it was that those who had held themselves aloof from dissension and civil strife were thought to be deserving of punishment. Then those who had profoundly and thoroughly studied the purpose and meaning of the law declared that it was designed, not to increase, but to terminate, dissension. And that is exactly so. For if all good men, who have been unequal to checking the dissension at the outset, do not abandon the aroused and frenzied people, but divide and ally themselves with one or the other faction, then the result will be, that when they have become members of the two opposing parties, and, being men of more than ordinary influence, have begun to guide and direct those parties, harmony can best be restored and established through the efforts of such men, controlling and soothing as they will the members of their respective factions, and desiring to reconcile rather than destroy their opponents. The philosopher Favorinus thought that this same course ought to be adopted also with brothers, or with friends, who are at odds; that is, that those who are neutral and kindly disposed towards both parties, if they have had little influence in bringing about a reconciliation because they have not made their friendly feelings evident, should then take sides, some one and some the other, and through this manifestation of devotion pave the way for restoring harmony. “But as it is,” said he, “most of the friends of both parties make a merit of abandoning the two disputants, leaving them to the tender mercies of ill-disposed or greedy advisers, who, animated by hatred or by avarice, add fuel to their strife and inflame their passions.”
12. Considerata perpensaque lex quaedam Solonis, species habens primorempriniorem iniquae iniustaeque legis, sed ad usum et emolumentum salubritatis penitus reperta. IN legibus Solonis illis antiquissimis quae Athenis axibus ligneis incisae sunt quasque latas ab eo Athenienses, ut sempiternae manerent, poenis et religionibus sanxerunt, legem esse Aristoteles refert scriptam ad hanc sententiam: “Si ob discordiam dissensionemque seditio atque discessio populi in duas partes fiet et ob eamearn causam irritatis animis utrimque arma capientur pugnabiturque, tum qui in eo tempore in eoque casu civilis discordiae non alterutrae parti sese adiunxerit, sed solitarius separatusque a communi malo civitatis secesserit, is domodonio, patria fortunisque omnibus careto, exul extorrisque esto.” Cum hanc legem Solonis, singulari sapientia praediti, legissemus, tenuit nos gravis quaedam in principio admiratio, requirens quam ob causam dignos esse poena existimaverit, qui se procul a seditione et civili pugna removissent. Tum, qui penitus atque alte usum ac sententiam legis introspexerant, non ad augendam, sed ad desinendam seditionem legem hanchanec esse dicebant. Et res prorsum se sic habent. Nam si boni omnes, qui in principio coercendae seditioni impares fuerint, populum percitum et amentem non deseruerint, ad alterutram partem dividi sese adiunxerint, tum eveniet, ut cum socii partis seorsum utriusque fuerint eaeque partes ab his, ut maioris auctoritatis viris, temperari ac regi coeperint, concordia per eos potissimum restitui conciliarique possit, dum et suos, apud quos sunt, regunt atque mitificant et aduersariosadversaries sanatos magis cupiunt quam perditos. Hoc idem Favorinus philosophus inter fratres quoque aut amicos dissidentis oportere fieri censebat, ut qui in medio sunt utriusque partis benivoli, si in concordia adnitenda parum auctoritatis quasi ambigui amici habuerint, tum alteri in alteram partem discedant ac per id meritum viam sibi ad utriusque concordiam muniant. “Nunc autem plerique,” inquit, “partis utriusque amici, quasi probe faciant, duos litigantes destituunt et relinquunt deduntque eos advocatis malivolis aut avaris, qui lites animasque eorum inflamment aut odii studio aut lucri.”
13. That the early writers used liberi in the plural number even of a single son or daughter. The early orators and writers of history or of poetry called even one son or daughter liberi, using the plural. And I have not only noticed this usage at various times in the works of several other of the older writers, but I just now ran across it in the fifth book of Sempronius Asellio's History. This Asellio was military tribune under Publius Scipio Africanus at Numantia and wrote a detailed account of the events in whose action he himself took part. His words about Tiberius Gracchus, tribune of the commons, at the time when he was killed on the Capitol, are as follows: “For whenever Gracchus left home, he was never accompanied by less than three or four thousand men.” And farther on he wrote thus of the same Gracchus: “He began to beg that they would at least defend him and his children (liberi); and then he ordered that the one male child which he had at that time should be brought out, and almost in tears commended him to the protection of the people.”
13. Liberos in multitudinis numero etiam unum filium filiamve veteres dixisse. ANTIQUI oratores historiaeque aut carminum scriptores etiam unum filium filiamve “liberos” multitudinis numero appellarunt. Idque nos, cum in complurium veterum libris scriptum aliquotiens aduerterimusadverterimnus, nunc quoque in libro Sempronii Asellionis Rerum Gestarum quinto ita esse positum offendimus. Is Asellio sub P. Scipione Africano tribunus militum ad Numantiam fuit resque eas quibus gerendis ipse interfuit conscripsit. Eius verba de Tiberio Graccho, tribuno pl., quo in tempore interfectus in Capitolio est, haec sunt: “Nam Gracchus domo cum proficiscebatur, numquam minus terna aut quaterna milia hominum sequebantur.” Atque inde infra de eodem Graccho ita scripsit: “Orare coepit id quidem, ut se defenderent liberosque suos, eumque quem virile secus tum in eo tempore habebat produci iussit populoque commendavit prope flens.”