132. And yet it is the duty of men who are proud because of natural gifts and not merely because of fortune to undertake such deeds much rather than to levy tribute on the islanders, who are deserving of their pity, seeing that because of the scarcity of land they are compelled to till mountains, while the people of the mainland, because of the abundance of their territory, allow most of it to lie waste, and have, nevertheless, from that part of it which they do harvest, grown immensely rich.
132. καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονοῦντας τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς νησιώτας δασμολογεῖν, οὓς ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐλεεῖν, ὁρῶντας τούτους μὲν διὰ σπανιότητα τῆς γῆς ὄρη γεωργεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους, τοὺς δʼ ἠπειρώτας διʼ ἀφθονίαν τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς ἀργὸν περιορῶντας, ἐξ ἧς δὲ καρποῦνται τοσοῦτον πλοῦτον κεκτημένους.
133. It is my opinion that if anyone should come here from another part of the world and behold the spectacle of the present state of our affairs, he would charge both the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians with utter madness, not only because we risk our lives fighting as we do over trifles when we might enjoy in security a wealth of possessions, but also because we continually impoverish our own territory while neglecting to exploit that of Asia.
133. ἡγοῦμαι δʼ, εἴ τινες ἄλλοθεν ἐπελθόντες θεαταὶ γένοιντο τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων, πολλὴν ἂν αὐτοὺς καταγνῶναι μανίαν ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν, οἵ τινες οὕτω περὶ μικρῶν κινδυνεύομεν, ἐξὸν ἀδεῶς πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν χώραν διαφθείρομεν, ἀμελήσαντες τὴν Ἀσίαν καρποῦσθαι.
134. As for the barbarian, nothing is more to his purpose than to take measures to prevent us from ever ceasing to make war upon each other; while we, on the contrary, are so far from doing anything to embroil his interests or foment rebellion among his subjects that when, thanks to fortune, dissensions do break out in his empire we actually lend him a hand in putting them down. Even now, when the two armies are fighting in Cyprus, we permit him to make use of the one and to besiege the other, although both of them belong to Hellas;
134. καὶ τῷ μὲν οὐδὲν προὐργιαίτερόν ἐστιν ἢ σκοπεῖν ἐξ ὧν μηδέποτε παυσόμεθα πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολεμοῦντες· ἡμεῖς δὲ τοσούτου δέομεν συγκρούειν τι τῶν ἐκείνου πραγμάτων ἢ ποιεῖν στασιάζειν, ὥστε καὶ τὰς διὰ τύχην αὐτῷ γεγενημένας ταραχὰς συνδιαλύειν ἐπιχειροῦμεν, οἵ τινες καὶ τοῖν στρατοπέδοιν τοῖν περὶ Κύπρον ἐῶμεν αὐτὸν τῷ μὲν χρῆσθαι τὸ δὲ πολιορκεῖν, ἀμφοτέροιν αὐτοῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὄντοιν.
135. for the Cyprians, who are in revolt against him, are not only on friendly terms with us but are also seeking the protection of the Lacedaemonians; and as to the forces which are led by Tiribazus, the most effective troops of his infantry have been levied from these parts, and most of his fleet has been brought together from Ionia; and all these would much more gladly make common cause and plunder Asia than risk their lives fighting against each other over trifling issues.
135. οἵ τε γὰρ ἀφεστῶτες πρὸς ἡμᾶς τʼ οἰκείως ἔχουσι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐνδιδόασιν, τῶν τε μετὰ Τειριβάζου στρατευομένων καὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ τὸ χρησιμώτατον ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν τόπων ἤθροισται, καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀπʼ Ἰωνίας συμπέπλευκεν, οἳ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον κοινῇ τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐπόρθουν ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕνεκα μικρῶν ἐκινδύνευον.
136. But these things we take no thought to prevent; instead, we wrangle about the islands of the Cyclades, when we have so recklessly given over so many cities and such great forces to the barbarians. And therefore some of our possessions are now his, some will soon be his, and others are threatened by his treacherous designs. And he has rightly conceived an utter contempt for us all;
136. ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐδεμίαν ποιούμεθα πρόνοιαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν, τοσαύτας δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πόλεις καὶ τηλικαύτας τὸ μέγεθος δυνάμεις οὕτως εἰκῇ τῷ βαρβάρῳ παραδεδώκαμεν. τοιγαροῦν τὰ μὲν ἔχει, τὰ δὲ μέλλει, τοῖς δʼ ἐπιβουλεύει, δικαίως ἁπάντων ἡμῶν καταπεφρονηκώς.
137. for he has attained what no one of his ancestors ever did: Asia has been conceded both by us and by the Lacedaemonians to belong to the King; and as for the cities of the Hellenes, he has taken them so absolutely under his control that he either razes them to the ground or builds his fortresses within them. And all this has come about by reason of our own folly, not because of his power.
137. διαπέπρακται γὰρ ὃ τῶν ἐκείνου προγόνων οὐδεὶς πώποτε· τήν τε γὰρ Ἀσίαν διωμολόγηται καὶ παρʼ ἡμῶν καὶ παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως εἶναι, τάς τε πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας οὕτω κυρίως παρείληφεν, ὥστε τὰς μὲν αὐτῶν κατασκάπτειν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεις ἐντειχίζειν. καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γέγονε διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἄνοιαν, ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου δύναμιν.
138. And yet there are those who stand in awe of the greatness of the King’s power and maintain that he is a dangerous enemy, dwelling at length on the many reversals which he has brought about in the affairs of the Hellenes. In my judgement, however, those who express such sentiments do not discourage but urge on the expedition; for if he is going to be hard to make war against when we have composed our differences and while he, himself is still beset by dissensions, then verily we should be in utmost dread of that time when the conflicting interests of the barbarians are settled and are governed by a single purpose, while we continue to be, as now, hostile to each other.
138. καίτοι τινὲς θαυμάζουσι τὸ μέγεθος τῶν βασιλέως πραγμάτων, καί φασιν αὐτὸν εἶναι δυσπολέμητον, διεξιόντες ὡς πολλὰς τὰς μεταβολὰς τοῖς Ἕλλησι πεποίηκεν. ἐγὼ δʼ ἡγοῦμαι μὲν τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας οὐκ ἀποτρέπειν ἀλλʼ ἐπισπεύδειν τὴν στρατείαν· εἰ γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁμονοησάντων αὐτὸς ἐν ταραχαῖς ὢν χαλεπὸς ἔσται προσπολεμεῖν, ἦ που σφόδρα χρὴ δεδιέναι τὸν καιρὸν ἐκεῖνον, ὅταν τὰ μὲν τῶν βαρβάρων καταστῇ καὶ διὰ μιᾶς γένηται γνώμης, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ νῦν πολεμικῶς ἔχωμεν.
139. But even though these objectors do in fact lend support to my contention, yet, for all that, they are mistaken in their views about the power of the King; for if they could show that he had ever in the past prevailed over both Athens and Lacedaemon at once, they would have reason for attempting to alarm us now. But if this is not the case, and the truth is that when we and the Lacedaemonians have been in conflict he has but given support to one of the two sides and so rendered the achievements of that one side more brilliant, this is no evidence of his own power. For in such times of crisis small forces have often played a great part in turning the scale; for example, even for the people of Chios I might make the claim that whichever side they have been inclined to support, that side has proved stronger on the sea.
139. οὐ μὴν οὐδʼ εἰ συναγορεύουσι τοῖς ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ λεγομένοις, οὐδʼ ὣς ὀρθῶς περὶ τῆς ἐκείνου δυνάμεως γιγνώσκουσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπέφαινον αὐτὸν ἅμα τοῖν πολέοιν ἀμφοτέροιν πρότερόν ποτε περιγεγενημένον, εἰκότως ἂν ἡμᾶς καὶ νῦν ἐκφοβεῖν ἐπεχείρουν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν μὴ γέγονεν, ἀντιπάλων δʼ ὄντων ἡμῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων προσθέμενος τοῖς ἑτέροις ἐπικυδέστερα τὰ πράγματα θάτερʼ ἐποίησεν, οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο σημεῖον τῆς ἐκείνου ῥώμης. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς πολλάκις μικραὶ δυνάμεις μεγάλας τὰς ῥοπὰς ἐποίησαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ Χίων ἔχοιμʼ ἂν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον εἰπεῖν, ὡς ὁποτέροις ἐκεῖνοι προσθέσθαι βουληθεῖεν, οὗτοι κατὰ θάλατταν κρείττους ἦσαν.
140. Nay, it is obviously not fair to estimate the power of the King from those exploits in which he has joined forces with the one or the other of us, but rather from the wars which he, unaided, has fought on his own behalf. Take, first, the case of Egypt: since its revolt from the King, what progress has he made against its inhabitants? Did he not dispatch to this war the most renowned of the Persians, Abrocomas and Tithraustes and Pharnabazus, and did not they, after remaining there three years and suffering more disasters than they inflicted, finally withdraw in such disgrace that the rebels are no longer content with their freedom, but are already trying to extend their dominion over the neighboring peoples as well?
140. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τούτων δίκαιόν ἐστι σκοπεῖν τὴν βασιλέως δύναμιν, ἐξ ὧν μεθʼ ἑκατέρων γέγονεν, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ πεπολέμηκεν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀποστάσης Αἰγύπτου τί διαπέπρακται πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας αὐτήν; οὐκ ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον κατέπεμψε τοὺς εὐδοκιμωτάτους Περσῶν, Ἀβροκόμαν καὶ Τιθραύστην καὶ Φαρνάβαζον, οὗτοι δὲ τρίʼ ἔτη μείναντες, καὶ πλείω κακὰ παθόντες ἢ ποιήσαντες, τελευτῶντες οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀπηλλάγησαν, ὥστε τοὺς ἀφεστῶτας μηκέτι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀγαπᾶν, ἀλλʼ ἤδη καὶ τῶν ὁμόρων ζητεῖν ἐπάρχειν;
141. Next, there is his campaign against Evagoras. Evagoras is ruler over but a single city; he is given over to the Persians by the terms of the Treaty; his is an insular power and he has already sustained a disaster to his fleet; he has, at present, for the defense of his territory only three thousand light-armed troops; yet, humble as is the power of Evagoras, the King has not the power to conquer it in war, but has already frittered away six years in the attempt; and, if we may conjecture the future by the past, there is much more likelihood that someone else will rise in revolt before Evagoras is reduced by the siege—so slothful is the King in his enterprises.
141. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτʼ ἐπʼ Εὐαγόραν στρατεύσας, ὃς ἄρχει μὲν μιᾶς πόλεως, ἐν δὲ ταῖς συνθήκαις ἔκδοτός ἐστιν, οἰκῶν δὲ νῆσον κατὰ μὲν θάλατταν προδεδυστύχηκεν, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς χώρας τρισχιλίους ἔχει μόνον πελταστάς, ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὕτω ταπεινῆς δυνάμεως οὐ δύναται περιγενέσθαι βασιλεὺς πολεμῶν, ἀλλʼ ἤδη μὲν ἓξ ἔτη διατέτριφεν, εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς γεγενημένοις τεκμαίρεσθαι, πολὺ πλείων ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἕτερον ἀποστῆναι πρὶν ἐκεῖνον ἐκπολιορκηθῆναι· τοιαῦται βραδυτῆτες ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι ταῖς βασιλέως ἔνεισιν.
142. Again, in the Rhodian War, the King had the good will of the allies of Lacedaemon because of the harshness with which they were governed, he availed himself of the help of our seamen; and at the head of his forces was Conon, who was the most competent of our generals, who possessed more than any other the confidence of the Hellenes, and who was the most experienced in the hazards of war; yet, although the King had such a champion to help him in the war, he suffered the fleet which bore the brunt of the defense of Asia to be bottled up for three years by only an hundred ships, and for fifteen months he deprived the soldiers of their pay; and the result would have been, had it depended upon the King alone, that they would have been disbanded more than once; but, thanks to their commander and to the alliance which was formed at Corinth, they barely succeeded in winning a naval victory.
142. ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ περὶ Ῥόδον ἔχων μὲν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων συμμάχους εὔνους διὰ τὴν χαλεπότητα τῶν πολιτειῶν, χρώμενος δὲ ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις ταῖς παρʼ ἡμῶν, στρατηγοῦντος δʼ αὐτῷ Κόνωνος, ὃς ἦν ἐπιμελέστατος μὲν τῶν στρατηγῶν, πιστότατος δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἐμπειρότατος δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον κινδύνων, τοιοῦτον λαβὼν συναγωνιστὴν τρία μὲν ἔτη περιεῖδε τὸ ναυτικὸν τὸ προκινδυνεῦον ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀσίας ὑπὸ τριήρων ἑκατὸν μόνων πολιορκούμενον, πεντεκαίδεκα δὲ μηνῶν τοὺς στρατιώτας τὸν μισθὸν ἀπεστέρησεν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπʼ ἐκείνῳ πολλάκις ἂν διελύθησαν, διὰ δὲ τὸν ἐφεστῶτα καὶ τὴν συμμαχίαν τὴν περὶ Κόρινθον συστᾶσαν μόλις ναυμαχοῦντες ἐνίκησαν.
143. And these were the most royal and the most imposing of his achievements, and these are the deeds about which people are never weary of speaking who are fain to exalt the power of the barbarians! So no one can say that I am not fair in my use of instances, nor that I dwell upon the minor undertakings of the King and pass over the most important;
143. καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὰ βασιλικώτατα καὶ σεμνότατα τῶν ἐκείνῳ πεπραγμένων, καὶ περὶ ὧν οὐδέποτε παύονται λέγοντες οἱ βουλόμενοι τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων μεγάλα ποιεῖν. ὥστʼ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔχοι τοῦτʼ εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐ δικαίως χρῶμαι τοῖς παραδείγμασιν, οὐδʼ ὡς ἐπὶ μικροῖς διατρίβω τὰς μεγίστας τῶν πράξεων παραλείπων·
144. for I have striven to forestall just such a complaint, and have recounted the most glorious of his exploits. I do not, however, forget his minor campaigns; I do not forget that Dercylidas, with a thousand heavy-armed troops, extended his power over Aeolis; that Draco took possession of Atarneus, and afterwards collected an army of three thousand light-armed men, and devastated the plains of Mysia; that Thimbron, with a force only a little larger, crossed over into Lydia and plundered the whole country; and that Agesilaus, with the help of the army of Cyrus, conquered almost all the territory this side of the Halys river.
144. φεύγων γὰρ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἔργων διῆλθον, οὐκ ἀμνημονῶν οὐδʼ ἐκείνων, ὅτι Δερκυλίδας μὲν χιλίους ἔχων ὁπλίτας τῆς Αἰολίδος ἐπῆρχε, Δράκων δὲ Ἀταρνέα καταλαβὼν καὶ τρισχιλίους πελταστὰς συλλέξας τὸ Μύσιον πεδίον ἀνάστατον ἐποίησε, Θίβρων δὲ ὀλίγῳ πλείους τούτων διαβιβάσας τὴν Λυδίαν ἅπασαν ἐπόρθησεν, Ἀγησίλαος δὲ τῷ Κυρείῳ στρατεύματι χρώμενος μικροῦ δεῖν τῆς ἐντὸς Ἅλυος χώρας ἐκράτησεν.
145. And assuredly we have no greater reason to fear the army which wanders about with the King nor the valor of the Persians themselves; for they were clearly shown by the troops who marched inland with Cyrus to be no better than the King’s soldiers who live on the coast. I refrain from speaking of all the other battles in which the Persians were worsted, and I am willing to grant that they were split with factions, and so where not inclined to throw themselves wholeheartedly into the struggle against the King’s brother.
145. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως περιπολοῦσαν, οὐδὲ τὴν Περσῶν ἀνδρίαν ἄξιον φοβηθῆναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι φανερῶς ἐπεδείχθησαν ὑπὸ τῶν Κύρῳ συναναβάντων οὐδὲν βελτίους ὄντες τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ. τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλας μάχας ὅσας ἡττήθησαν ἐῶ, καὶ τίθημι στασιάζειν αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ βούλεσθαι προθύμως πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν βασιλέως διακινδυνεύειν.
146. But after Cyrus had been killed, and all the people of Asia had joined forces, even under these favorable conditions they made such a disgraceful failure of the war as to leave for those who are in the habit of vaunting Persian valor not a word to say. For they had to deal with only six thousand Hellenes —not picked troops, but men who, owing to stress of circumstances, were unable to live in their own cities. These were, moreover, unfamiliar with the country; they had been deserted by their allies; they had been betrayed by those who made the expedition with them; they had been deprived of the general whom they had followed; and yet the Persians were so inferior to these men that the King, finding himself in difficult straits and having no confidence in the force which was under his own command, did not scruple to arrest the captains of the auxiliaries in violation of the truce, hoping by this lawless act to throw their army into confusion, and preferring to offend against the gods rather than join issue openly with these soldiers.
146. ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ Κύρου τελευτήσαντος συνῆλθον ἅπαντες οἱ τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντες, ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καιροῖς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἐπολέμησαν, ὥστε μηδένα λόγον ὑπολιπεῖν τοῖς εἰθισμένοις τὴν Περσῶν ἀνδρίαν ἐπαινεῖν. λαβόντες γὰρ ἑξακισχιλίους τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐκ ἀριστίνδην ἐπειλεγμένους, ἀλλʼ οἳ διὰ φαυλότητα ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν οὐχ οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν ζῆν, ἀπείρους μὲν τῆς χώρας ὄντας, ἐρήμους δὲ συμμάχων γεγενημένους, προδεδομένους δʼ ὑπὸ τῶν συναναβάντων, ἀπεστερημένους δὲ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ μεθʼ οὗ συνηκολούθησαν, τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν ἥττους ἦσαν, ὥσθʼ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀπορήσας τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασι καὶ καταφρονήσας τῆς περὶ αὑτὸν δυνάμεως τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς τῶν ἐπικούρων ὑποσπόνδους συλλαβεῖν ἐτόλμησεν, ὡς εἰ τοῦτο παρανομήσειε συνταράξων τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ μᾶλλον εἵλετο περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐξαμαρτεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ διαγωνίσασθαι.
148. But when he failed in this plot—for the soldiers not only stood together but bore their misfortune nobly,—then, as they set out on their journey home, he sent with them Tissaphernes and the Persian cavalry. But although these kept plotting against them throughout the entire journey, the Hellenes continued their march to the end as confidently as if they had been under friendly escort, dreading most of all the uninhabited regions of that country, and deeming it the best possible fortune to fall in with as many of the enemy as possible.
148. διαμαρτὼν δὲ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς, καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν συμμεινάντων καὶ καλῶς ἐνεγκόντων τὴν συμφοράν, ἀπιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς Τισσαφέρνην καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας συνέπεμψεν, ὑφʼ ὧν ἐκεῖνοι παρὰ πᾶσαν ἐπιβουλευόμενοι τὴν ὁδὸν ὁμοίως διεπορεύθησαν ὡσπερανεὶ προπεμπόμενοι, μάλιστα μὲν φοβούμενοι τὴν ἀοίκητον τῆς χώρας, μέγιστον δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν νομίζοντες εἰ τῶν πολεμίων ὡς πλείστοις ἐντύχοιεν.
149. Let me sum up the whole matter: These men did not set out to get plunder or to capture a town, but took the field against the King himself, and yet they returned in greater security than ambassadors who go to him on a friendly mission. Therefore it seems to me that in every quarter the Persians have clearly exposed their degeneracy; for along the coast of Asia they have been defeated in many battles, and when they crossed to Europe they were duly punished, either perishing miserably or saving their lives with dishonor; and to crown all, they made themselves objects of derision under the very walls of their King’s palace.
149. κεφάλαιον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ λείαν ἐλθόντες οὐδὲ κώμην καταλαβόντες, ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ αὐτὸν τὸν βασιλέα στρατεύσαντες, ἀσφαλέστερον κατέβησαν τῶν περὶ φιλίας ὡς αὐτὸν πρεσβευόντων. ὥστε μοι δοκοῦσιν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τόποις σαφῶς ἐπιδεδεῖχθαι τὴν αὑτῶν μαλακίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ παραλίᾳ τῆς Ἀσίας πολλὰς μάχας ἥττηνται, καὶ διαβάντες εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην δίκην ἔδοσαν (οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλοντο, οἱ δʼ αἰσχρῶς ἐσώθησαν), καὶ τελευτῶντες ὑπʼ αὐτοῖς τοῖς βασιλείοις καταγέλαστοι γεγόνασιν.
150. And none of these things has happened by accident, but all of them have been due to natural causes; for it is not possible for people who are reared and governed as are the Persians, either to have a part in any other form of virtue or to set up on the field of battle trophies of victory over their foes. For how could either an able general or a good soldier be produced amid such ways of life as theirs? Most of their population is a mob without discipline or experience of dangers, which has lost all stamina for war and has been trained more effectively for servitude than are the slaves in our country.
150. καὶ τούτων οὐδὲν ἀλόγως γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ πάντʼ εἰκότως ἀποβέβηκεν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τοὺς οὕτω τρεφομένους καὶ πολιτευομένους οὔτε τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς μετέχειν οὔτʼ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις τρόπαιον ἱστάναι τῶν πολεμίων. πῶς γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνων ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐγγενέσθαι δύναιτʼ ἂν ἢ στρατηγὸς δεινὸς ἢ στρατιώτης ἀγαθός, ὧν τὸ μὲν πλεῖστόν ἐστιν ὄχλος ἄτακτος καὶ κινδύνων ἄπειρος, πρὸς μὲν τὸν πόλεμον ἐκλελυμένος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν δουλείαν ἄμεινον τῶν παρʼ ἡμῖν οἰκετῶν πεπαιδευμένος, οἱ δʼ ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις δόξαις ὄντες αὐτῶν ὁμαλῶς μὲν οὐδὲ κοινῶς οὐδὲ πολιτικῶς οὐδεπώποτʼ ἐβίωσαν, ἅπαντα δὲ τὸν χρόνον διάγουσιν εἰς μὲν τοὺς ὑβρίζοντες τοῖς δὲ δουλεύοντες, ὡς ἂν ἄνθρωποι μάλιστα τὰς φύσεις διαφθαρεῖεν, καὶ τὰ μὲν σώματα διὰ τοὺς πλούτους τρυφῶντες, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς διὰ τὰς μοναρχίας ταπεινὰς καὶ περιδεεῖς ἔχοντες, ἐξεταζόμενοι πρὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς βασιλείοις καὶ προκαλινδούμενοι καὶ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες, θνητὸν μὲν ἄνδρα προσκυνοῦντες καὶ δαίμονα προσαγορεύοντες, τῶν δὲ θεῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀλιγωροῦντες.
151. Those, on the other hand, who stand highest in repute among them have never governed their lives by dictates of equality or of common interest or of loyalty to the state; on the contrary, their whole existence consists of insolence toward some, and servility towards others—a manner of life than which nothing could be more demoralizing to human nature. Because they are rich, they pamper their bodies; but because they are subject to one man’s power, they keep their souls in a state of abject and cringing fear, parading themselves at the door of the royal palace, prostrating themselves, and in every way schooling themselves to humility of spirit, falling on their knees before a mortal man, addressing him as a divinity, and thinking more lightly of the gods than of men. So it is that those of the Persians who come down to the sea, whom they term satraps, do not dishonor the training which they receive at home, but cling steadfastly to the same habits: they are faithless to their friends and cowardly to their foes; their lives are divided between servility on the one hand and arrogance on the other; they treat their allies with contempt and pay court to their enemies. For example, they maintained the army under Agesilaus at their own expense for eight months, but they deprived the soldiers who were fighting in the Persian cause of their pay for double that length of time; they distributed an hundred talents among the captors of Cisthene, but treated more outrageously than their prisoners of war the troops who supported them in the campaign against Cyprus.
151. τοιγαροῦν οἱ καταβαίνοντες αὐτῶν ἐπὶ θάλατταν, οὓς καλοῦσι σατράπας, οὐ καταισχύνουσι τὴν ἐκεῖ παίδευσιν, ἀλλʼ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς αὐτοῖς διαμένουσι, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἀπίστως πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀνάνδρως ἔχοντες, καὶ τὰ μὲν ταπεινῶς τὰ δʼ ὑπερηφάνως ζῶντες, τῶν μὲν συμμάχων καταφρονοῦντες τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους θεραπεύοντες. τὴν μέν γε μετʼ Ἀγησιλάου στρατιὰν ὀκτὼ μῆνας ταῖς αὑτῶν δαπάναις διέθρεψαν, τοὺς δʼ ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν κινδυνεύοντας ἑτέρου τοσούτου χρόνου τὸν μισθὸν ἀπεστέρησαν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν Κισθήνην καταλαβοῦσιν ἑκατὸν τάλαντα διένειμαν, τοὺς δὲ μεθʼ αὑτῶν εἰς Κύπρον στρατευσαμένους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ὕβριζον.
154. To put it briefly—and not to speak in detail but in general terms,— who of those that have fought against them has not come off with success, and who of those that have fallen under their power has not perished from their atrocities? Take the case of Conon, who, as commander in the service of Asia, brought an end to the power of the Lacadaemonians: did they not shamelessly seize him for punishment by death? Take, on the other hand, the case of Themistocles, who in the service of Hellas defeated them at Salamis: did they not think him worthy of the greatest gifts?
154. ὡς δʼ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν καὶ μὴ καθʼ ἓν ἕκαστον ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τίς ἢ τῶν πολεμησάντων αὐτοῖς οὐκ εὐδαιμονήσας ἀπῆλθεν, ἢ τῶν ὑπʼ ἐκείνοις γενομένων οὐκ αἰκισθεὶς τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν; οὐ Κόνωνα μέν, ὃς ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀσίας στρατηγήσας τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων κατέλυσεν, ἐπὶ θανάτῳ συλλαβεῖν ἐτόλμησαν, Θεμιστοκλέα δʼ, ὃς ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτοὺς κατεναυμάχησε, τῶν μεγίστων δωρεῶν ἠξίωσαν;
155. Then why should we cherish the friendship of men who punish their benefactors and so openly flatter those who do them injury? Who is there among us whom they have not wronged? When have they given the Hellenes a moment’s respite from their treacherous plots? What in our world is not hateful to them who did not shrink in the earlier war from rifling even the images and temples of the gods, and burning them to the ground? Therefore, the Ionians deserve to be commended because, when their sanctuaries had been burned, they invoked the wrath of Heaven upon any who should disturb the ruins or should desire to restore their shrines as they were of old; and they did this, not because they lacked the means to rebuild them, but in order that there might be left a memorial to future generations of the impiety of the barbarians, and that none might put their trust in men who do not scruple to commit such sins against our holy temples, but that all might be on their guard against them and fear them, seeing that they waged that war not against our persons only, but even against our votive offerings to the gods.
155. καίτοι πῶς χρὴ τὴν τούτων φιλίαν ἀγαπᾶν, οἳ τοὺς μὲν εὐεργέτας τιμωροῦνται, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς ποιοῦντας οὕτως ἐπιφανῶς κολακεύουσιν; περὶ τίνας δʼ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐξημαρτήκασιν; ποῖον δὲ χρόνον διαλελοίπασιν ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς Ἕλλησιν; τί δʼ οὐκ ἐχθρὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστι τῶν παρʼ ἡμῖν, οἳ καὶ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἕδη καὶ τοὺς νεὼς συλᾶν ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ καὶ κατακάειν ἐτόλμησαν; διὸ καὶ τοὺς Ἴωνας ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ἐμπρησθέντων ἱερῶν ἐπηράσαντο εἴ τινες κινήσειαν ἢ πάλιν εἰς τἀρχαῖα καταστῆσαι βουληθεῖεν, οὐκ ἀποροῦντες πόθεν ἐπισκευάσωσιν, ἀλλʼ ἵνʼ ὑπόμνημα τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις ᾖ τῆς τῶν βαρβάρων ἀσεβείας, καὶ μηδεὶς πιστεύῃ τοῖς τοιαῦτα εἰς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐξαμαρτεῖν τολμῶσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φυλάττωνται καὶ δεδίωσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοὺς οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἡμῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀναθήμασι πολεμήσαντας.
157. Of my own countrymen also I have a similar tale to tell. For towards all other peoples with whom they have been at war, they forget their past enmities the moment they have concluded peace, but toward the Asiatics they feel no gratitude even when they receive favors from them; so eternal is the wrath which they cherish against the barbarians. Again, our fathers condemned many to death for defection to the Medes; in our public assemblies even to this day, before any other business is transacted, the Athenians call down curses upon any citizen who proposes friendly overtures to the Persians; and, at the celebration of the Mysteries, the Eumolpidae and the Kerykes, because of our hatred of the Persians, give solemn warning to the other barbarians also, even as to men guilty of murder, that they are for ever banned from the sacred rites.
157. ἔχω δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν ἡμετέρων τοιαῦτα διελθεῖν. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοις πεπολεμήκασιν, ἅμα διαλλάττονται καὶ τῆς ἔχθρας τῆς γεγενημένης ἐπιλανθάνονται, τοῖς δʼ ἠπειρώταις οὐδʼ ὅταν εὖ πάσχωσι χάριν ἴσασιν· οὕτως ἀείμνηστον τὴν ὀργὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχουσιν. καὶ πολλῶν μὲν οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν μηδισμοῦ θάνατον κατέγνωσαν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συλλόγοις ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀρὰς ποιοῦνται, πρὶν ἄλλο τι χρηματίζειν, εἴ τις ἐπικηρυκεύεται Πέρσαις τῶν πολιτῶν· Εὐμολπίδαι δὲ καὶ Κήρυκες ἐν τῇ τελετῇ τῶν μυστηρίων διὰ τὸ τούτων μῖσος καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις βαρβάροις εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἱερῶν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀνδροφόνοις, προαγορεύουσιν.
158. So ingrained in our nature is our hostility to them that even in the matter of our stories we linger most fondly over those which tell of the Trojan and the Persian wars, because through them we learn of our enemies’ misfortunes; and you will find that our warfare against the barbarians has inspired our hymns, while that against the Hellenes has brought forth our dirges; and that the former are sung at our festivals, while we recall the latter on occasions of sorrow.
158. οὕτω δὲ φύσει πολεμικῶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχομεν, ὥστε καὶ τῶν μύθων ἥδιστα συνδιατρίβομεν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς καὶ Περσικοῖς, διʼ ὧν ἔστι πυνθάνεσθαι τὰς ἐκείνων συμφοράς. εὕροι δʼ ἄν τις ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους ὕμνους πεποιημένους, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας θρήνους ἡμῖν γεγενημένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς ᾀδομένους, τῶν δʼ ἐπὶ ταῖς συμφοραῖς ἡμᾶς μεμνημένους.
159. Moreover, I think that even the poetry of Homer has won a greater renown because he has nobly glorified the men who fought against the barbarians, and that on this account our ancestors determined to give his art a place of honor in our musical contests and in the education of our youth, in order that we, hearing his verses over and over again, may learn by heart the enmity which stands from of old between us and them, and that we, admiring the valor of those who were in the war against Troy, may conceive a passion for like deeds.
159. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τὴν Ὁμήρου ποίησιν μείζω λαβεῖν δόξαν, ὅτι καλῶς τοὺς πολεμήσαντας τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐνεκωμίασε, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βουληθῆναι τοὺς προγόνους ἡμῶν ἔντιμον αὐτοῦ ποιῆσαι τὴν τέχνην ἔν τε τοῖς τῆς μουσικῆς ἄθλοις καὶ τῇ παιδεύσει τῶν νεωτέρων, ἳνα πολλάκις ἀκούοντες τῶν ἐπῶν ἐκμανθάνωμεν τὴν ἔχθραν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν πρὸς αὐτούς, καὶ ζηλοῦντες τὰς ἀρετὰς τῶν στρατευσαμένων τῶν αὐτῶν ἔργων ἐκείνοις ἐπιθυμῶμεν.
160. So it seems to me that the motives which summon us to enter upon a war against them are many indeed; but grief among them is the present opportunity, which we must not throw away; for it is disgraceful to neglect a chance when it is present and regret it when it is past. Indeed, what further advantage could we desire to have on our side when contemplating a war against the King beyond those which are now at hand?
160. ὥστε μοι δοκεῖ πολλὰ λίαν εἶναι τὰ παρακελευόμενα πολεμεῖν αὐτοῖς, μάλιστα δʼ ὁ παρὼν καιρός, ὃν οὐκ ἀφετέον· καὶ γὰρ αἰσχρὸν παρόντι μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι, παρελθόντος δʼ αὐτοῦ μεμνῆσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ βουληθεῖμεν ἡμῖν προσγενέσθαι, μέλλοντες βασιλεῖ πολεμεῖν, ἔξω τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων;
161. Are not Egypt and Cyprus in revolt against him? Have not Phoenicia and Syria been devastated because of the war? Has not Tyre, on which he set great store, been seized by his foes? Of the cities in Cilicia, the greater number are held by those who side with us and the rest are not difficult to acquire. Lycia no Persian has ever subdued.
161. οὐκ Αἴγυπτος μὲν αὐτοῦ καὶ Κύπρος ἀφέστηκε, Φοινίκη δὲ καὶ Συρία διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἀνάστατοι γεγόνασι, Τύρος δʼ, ἐφʼ ᾗ μέγʼ ἐφρόνησεν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τῶν ἐκείνου κατείληπται; τῶν δʼ ἐν Κιλικίᾳ πόλεων τὰς μὲν πλείστας οἱ μεθʼ ἡμῶν ὄντες ἔχουσι, τὰς δʼ οὐ χαλεπόν ἐστι κτήσασθαι. Λυκίας δʼ οὐδεὶς πώποτε Περσῶν ἐκράτησεν.
162. Hecatomnus, the viceroy of Caria, has in reality been disaffected for a long time now, and will openly declare himself whenever we wish. From Cnidus to Sinope the coast of Asia is settled by Hellenes, and these we need not to persuade to go to war—all we have to do is not to restrain them. With such bases at our command for the operation of our forces, and with so widespread a war threatening Asia on every side, why, then, need we examine too closely what the outcome will be? For since the barbarians are unequal to small divisions of the Hellenes, it is not hard to foresee what would be their plight if they should be forced into a war against our united forces.
162. Ἑκατόμνως δʼ ὁ Καρίας ἐπίσταθμος τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον ἀφέστηκεν, ὁμολογήσει δʼ ὅταν ἡμεῖς βουληθῶμεν. ἀπὸ δὲ Κνίδου μέχρι Σινώπης Ἕλληνες τὴν Ἀσίαν παροικοῦσιν, οὓς οὐ δεῖ πείθειν ἀλλὰ μὴ κωλύειν πολεμεῖν. καίτοι τοιούτων ὁρμητηρίων ὑπαρξάντων, καὶ τοσούτου πολέμου τὴν Ἀσίαν περιστάντος, τί δεῖ τὰ συμβησόμενα λίαν ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάζειν; ὅπου γὰρ μικρῶν μερῶν ἥττους εἰσίν, οὐκ ἄδηλον ὡς ἂν διατεθεῖεν, εἰ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν πολεμεῖν ἀναγκασθεῖεν.
163. But this is how the matter stands: If the barbarian strengthens his hold on the cities of the coast by stationing in them larger garrisons than he has there now, perhaps those of the islands which lie near the mainland, as, for example, Rhodes and Samos and Chios, might incline to his side; but if we get possession of them first, we may expect that the populations of Lydia and Phrygia and of the rest of the up-country will be in the power of our forces operating from those positions.
163. ἔχει δʼ οὕτως. ἐὰν μὲν ὁ βάρβαρος ἐρρωμενεστέρως κατάσχῃ τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ, φρουρὰς μείζους ἐν αὐταῖς ἢ νῦν ἐγκαταστήσας, τάχʼ ἂν καὶ τῶν νήσων αἱ περὶ τὴν ἤπειρον, οἷον Ῥόδος καὶ Σάμος καὶ Χίος, ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκείνου τύχας ἀποκλίναιεν· ἢν δʼ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰς πρότεροι καταλάβωμεν, εἰκὸς τοὺς τὴν Λυδίαν καὶ Φρυγίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν ὑπερκειμένην χώραν οἰκοῦντας ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐντεῦθεν ὁρμωμένοις εἶναι.
164. Therefore we must be quick and not waste time, in order that we may not repeat the experience of our fathers. For they, because they took the field later than the barbarians and had to abandon some of their allies, were compelled to encounter great numbers with a small force; whereas, if they had crossed over to the continent in time to be first on the ground, having with them the whole strength of Hellas, they could have subdued each of the nations there in turn.
164. διὸ δεῖ σπεύδειν καὶ μηδεμίαν ποιεῖσθαι διατριβήν, ἵνα μὴ πάθωμεν ὅπερ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ὑστερίσαντες τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ προέμενοί τινας τῶν συμμάχων ἠναγκάσθησαν ὀλίγοι πρὸς πολλοὺς κινδυνεύειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς προτέροις διαβᾶσιν εἰς τὴν ἤπειρον μετὰ πάσης τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων δυνάμεως ἐν μέρει τῶν ἐθνῶν ἕκαστον χειροῦσθαι.
165. For experience has shown that when you go to war with people who are gathered together from many places, you must not wait until they are upon you, but must strike while they are still scattered. Now our fathers, having made this mistake at the outset, entirely retrieved it only after engaging in the most perilous of struggles; but we, if we are wise, shall guard against it from the beginning, and endeavor to be the first to quarter an army in the region of Lydia and Ionia, knowing that the King holds sway over the people of the continent, not because they are his willing subjects, but because he has surrounded himself with a force which is greater than any of those which they severally possess.
165. δέδεικται γὰρ, ὅταν τις πολεμῇ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἐκ πολλῶν τόπων συλλεγομένους, ὅτι δεῖ μὴ περιμένειν ἕως ἂν ἐπιστῶσιν, ἀλλʼ ἔτι διεσπαρμένοις αὐτοῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν προεξαμαρτόντες ἅπαντα ταῦτʼ ἐπηνωρθώσαντο, καταστάντες εἰς τοὺς μεγίστους ἀγῶνας· ἡμεῖς δʼ ἂν σωφρονῶμεν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς φυλαξόμεθα, καὶ πειρασόμεθα φθῆναι περὶ τὴν Λυδίαν καὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν στρατόπεδον ἐγκαταστήσαντες, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ βασιλεὺς οὐχ ἑκόντων ἄρχει τῶν ἠπειρωτῶν, ἀλλὰ μείζω δύναμιν περὶ αὑτὸν ἑκάστων αὐτῶν ποιησάμενος·
166. So whenever we transport thither a force stronger than his, which we can easily do if we so will, we shall enjoy in security the resources of all Asia. Moreover, it is much more glorious to fight against the King for his empire than to contend against each other for the hegemony.
166. ἧς ἡμεῖς ὅταν κρείττω διαβιβάσωμεν, ὃ βουληθέντες ῥᾳδίως ἂν ποιήσαιμεν, ἀσφαλῶς ἅπασαν τὴν Ἀσίαν καρπωσόμεθα. πολὺ δὲ κάλλιον ἐκείνῳ περὶ τῆς βασιλείας πολεμεῖν, ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἀμφισβητεῖν.
167. It were well to make the expedition in the present generation, in order that those who have shared in our misfortunes may also benefit by our advantages and not continue all their days in wretchedness. For sufficient is the time that is past, filled as it has been with every form of horror; for many as are the ills which are incident to the nature of man, we have ourselves invented more than those which necessity lays upon us, by engendering wars and factions among ourselves;
167. ἄξιον δʼ ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν ἡλικίας ποιήσασθαι τὴν στρατείαν, ἵνʼ οἱ τῶν συμφορῶν κοινωνήσαντες, οὗτοι καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπολαύσωσι καὶ μὴ πάντα τὸν χρόνον δυστυχοῦντες διαγάγωσιν. ἱκανὸς γὰρ ὁ παρεληλυθώς, ἐν ᾧ τί τῶν δεινῶν οὐ γέγονεν; πολλῶν γὰρ κακῶν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοὶ πλείω τῶν ἀναγκαίων προσεξευρήκαμεν, πολέμους καὶ στάσεις ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐμποιήσαντες, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν ἀνόμως ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοὺς δʼ ἐπὶ ξένης μετὰ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν ἀλᾶσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ διʼ ἔνδειαν τῶν καθʼ ἡμέραν ἐπικουρεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοῖς φίλοις μαχομένους ἀποθνήσκειν.
168. and, in consequence, some are being put to death contrary to law in their own countries, others are wandering with their women and children in strange lands, and many, compelled through lack of the necessities of life to enlist in foreign armies, are being slain, fighting for their foes against their friends. Against these ills no one has ever protested; and people are not ashamed to weep over the calamities which have been fabricated by the poets, while they view complacently the real sufferings, the many terrible sufferings, which result from our state of war; and they are so far from feeling pity that they even rejoice more in each other’s sorrows than in their own blessings.
168. ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐδεὶς πώποτʼ ἠγανάκτησεν, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς συμφοραῖς ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν συγκειμέναις δακρύειν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀληθινὰ δὲ πάθη πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐφορῶντες τοσούτου δέουσιν ἐλεεῖν, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλήλων κακοῖς ἢ τοῖς αὑτῶν ἰδίοις ἀγαθοῖς.
169. But perhaps many might even laugh at my simplicity if I should lament the misfortunes of individual men, in times like these, when Italy has been laid waste, when Sicily has been enslaved, when such mighty cities have been given over to the barbarians, and when the remaining portions of the Hellenic race are in the gravest peril.
169. ἴσως δʼ ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς εὐηθείας πολλοὶ καταγελάσειαν, εἰ δυστυχίας ἀνδρῶν ὀδυροίμην ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς Ἰταλία μὲν ἀνάστατος γέγονε, Σικελία δὲ καταδεδούλωται, τοσαῦται δὲ πόλεις τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐκδέδονται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μέρη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις ἐστίν.
170. I am amazed at those who hold power in our states, if they think that they have occasion to be proud when they have never been able either to propose or to conceive a remedy for a situation so momentous; for they ought, if they had been worthy of their present reputation, to have dropped all else, and have proposed measures and given counsel about our war against the barbarians.
170. θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ προσήκειν αὑτοῖς ἡγοῦνται μέγα φρονεῖν, μηδὲν πώποθʼ ὑπὲρ τηλικούτων πραγμάτων μήτʼ εἰπεῖν μήτʼ ἐνθυμηθῆναι δυνηθέντες. ἐχρῆν γὰρ αὐτούς, εἴπερ ἦσαν ἄξιοι τῆς παρούσης δόξης, ἁπάντων ἀφεμένους τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους εἰσηγεῖσθαι καὶ συμβουλεύειν.
171. Perhaps they might have helped us to get something done; but even if they had given up before gaining their object, they would, at any rate, have left to us their words as oracles for the future. But as things are, those who are held in highest honor are intent on matters of little consequence, and have left it to us, who stand aloof from public life, to advise on matters of so great moment.
171. τυχὸν μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι συνεπέραναν· εἰ δὲ καὶ προαπεῖπον, ἀλλʼ οὖν τούς γε λόγους ὥσπερ χρησμοὺς εἰς τὸν ἐπιόντα χρόνον ἂν κατέλιπον. νῦν δʼ οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις δόξαις ὄντες ἐπὶ μικροῖς σπουδάζουσιν, ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐξεστηκόσι περὶ τηλικούτων πραγμάτων συμβουλεύειν παραλελοίπασιν.
172. Nevertheless, the more faint-hearted our leading men happen to be, the more vigorously must the rest of us look to the means by which we shall deliver ourselves from our present discord. For as matters now stand, it is in vain that we make our treaties of peace; for we do not settle our wars, but only postpone them and wait for the opportune moment when we shall have the power to inflict some irreparable disaster upon each other.
172. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ὅσῳ μικροψυχότεροι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες οἱ προεστῶτες ἡμῶν, τοσούτῳ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρρωμενεστέρως δεῖ σκοπεῖν ὅπως ἀπαλλαγησόμεθα τῆς παρούσης ἔχθρας. νῦν μὲν γὰρ μάτην ποιούμεθα τὰς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης συνθήκας· οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλʼ ἀναβαλλόμεθα, καὶ περιμένομεν τοὺς καιροὺς ἐν οἷς ἀνήκεστόν τι κακὸν ἀλλήλους ἐργάσασθαι δυνησόμεθα.
173. We must clear from our path these treacherous designs and pursue that course of action which will enable us to dwell in our several cities with greater security and to feel greater confidence in each other. What I have to say on these points is simple and easy: It is not possible for us to cement an enduring peace unless we join together in a war against the barbarians, nor for the Hellenes to attain to concord until we wrest our material advantages from one and the same source and wage our wars against one and the same enemy.
173. δεῖ δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς ἐκποδὼν ποιησαμένους ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐξ ὧν τάς τε πόλεις ἀσφαλέστερον οἰκήσομεν καὶ πιστότερον διακεισόμεθα πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. ἔστι δʼ ἁπλοῦς καὶ ῥᾴδιος ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ τούτων· οὔτε γὰρ εἰρήνην οἷόν τε βεβαίαν ἀγαγεῖν, ἢν μὴ κοινῇ τοῖς βαρβάροις πολεμήσωμεν, οὔθʼ ὁμονοῆσαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας, πρὶν ἂν καὶ τὰς ὠφελίας ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιησώμεθα.
174. When these conditions have been realized, and when we have been freed from the poverty which afflicts our lives—a thing that breaks up friendships, perverts the affections of kindred into enmity, and plunges the whole world into war and strife —then surely we shall enjoy a spirit of concord, and the good will which we shall feel towards each other will be genuine. For all these reasons, we must make it our paramount duty to transfer the war with all speed from our boundaries to the continent, since the only benefit which we can reap from the wars which we have waged against each other is by resolving that the experience which we have gained from them shall be employed against the barbarians.
174. τούτων δὲ γενομένων, καὶ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀφαιρεθείσης, ἣ καὶ τὰς ἑταιρίας διαλύει καὶ τὰς συγγενείας εἰς ἔχθραν προάγει καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καθίστησιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐχ ὁμονοήσομεν καὶ τὰς εὐνοίας ἀληθινὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἕξομεν. ὧν ἕνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον ὅπως ὡς τάχιστα τὸν ἐνθένδε πόλεμον εἰς τὴν ἤπειρον διοριοῦμεν, ὡς μόνον ἂν τοῦτʼ ἀγαθὸν ἀπολαύσαιμεν τῶν κινδύνων τῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, εἰ ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις ταῖς ἐκ τούτων γεγενημέναις πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον καταχρήσασθαι δόξειεν ἡμῖν.
175. But is it not well, you may perhaps ask, on account of the Treaty, to curb ourselves and not be over-hasty or make the expedition too soon, seeing that the states which have gained their freedom through the Treaty feel grateful toward the King, because they believe that it was through him that they gained their independence, while those states which have been delivered over to the barbarians complain very bitterly of the Lacedaemonians and only less bitterly of the other Hellenes who entered into the peace, because, in their view, they were forced by them into slavery? But, I reply, is it not our duty to annul this agreement, which has given birth to such a sentiment—the sentiment that the barbarian cares tenderly for Hellas, and stands guard over her peace, while among ourselves are to be found those who outrage and evilly entreat her?
175. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως διὰ τὰς συνθήκας ἄξιον ἐπισχεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐπειχθῆναι καὶ θᾶττον ποιήσασθαι τὴν στρατείαν; διʼ ἃς αἱ μὲν ἠλευθερωμέναι τῶν πόλεων βασιλεῖ χάριν ἴσασιν, ὡς διʼ ἐκεῖνον τυχοῦσαι τῆς αὐτονομίας ταύτης, αἱ δʼ ἐκδεδομέναι τοῖς βαρβάροις μάλιστα μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπικαλοῦσιν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς μετασχοῦσι τῆς εἰρήνης, ὡς ὑπὸ τούτων δουλεύειν ἠναγκασμέναι. καίτοι πῶς οὐ χρὴ διαλύειν ταύτας τὰς ὁμολογίας, ἐξ ὧν τοιαύτη δόξα γέγονεν, ὡς ὁ μὲν βάρβαρος κήδεται τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστίν, ἡμῶν δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ λυμαινόμενοι καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες αὐτήν;
176. The crowning absurdity of all, however, is the fact that among the articles which are written in the agreement it is only the worst which we guard and observe. For those which guarantee the independence of the islands and of the cities in Europe have long since been broken and are dead letters on the pillars, while those which bring shame upon us and by which many of our allies have been given over to the enemy—these remain intact, and we all regard them as binding upon us, though we ought to have expunged them and not allowed them to stand a single day, looking upon them as commands, and not as compacts; for who does not know that a compact is something which is fair and impartial to both parties, while a command is something which puts one side at a disadvantage unjustly?
176. ὃ δὲ πάντων καταγελαστότατον, ὅτι τῶν γεγραμμένων ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις τὰ χείριστα τυγχάνομεν διαφυλάττοντες. ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτονόμους ἀφίησι τάς τε νήσους καὶ τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἐπὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης, πάλαι λέλυται καὶ μάτην ἐν ταῖς στήλαις ἐστίν· ἃ δʼ αἰσχύνην ἡμῖν φέρει καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν συμμάχων ἐκδέδωκε, ταῦτα δὲ κατὰ χώραν μένει καὶ πάντες αὐτὰ κύρια ποιοῦμεν· ἃ χρῆν ἀναιρεῖν καὶ μηδὲ μίαν ἐᾶν ἡμέραν, νομίζοντας προστάγματα καὶ μὴ συνθήκας εἶναι. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι συνθῆκαι μέν εἰσιν, αἵ τινες ἂν ἴσως καὶ κοινῶς ἀμφοτέροις ἔχωσι, προστάγματα δὲ τὰ τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐλαττοῦντα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον;
177. On this ground we may justly complain of our envoys who negotiated this peace, because, although dispatched by the Hellenes, they made the Treaty in the interest of the barbarians. For they ought, no matter whether they took the view that each of the states concerned should retain its original territory, or that each should extend its sovereignty over all that it had acquired by conquest, or that we should each retain control over what we held when peace was declared—they ought, I say, to have adopted definitely some one of these views, applying the principle impartially to all, and on this basis to have drafted the articles of the Treaty.
177. διὸ καὶ τῶν πρεσβευσάντων ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην δικαίως ἂν κατηγοροῖμεν, ὅτι πεμφθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὑπὲρ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐποιήσαντο τὰς συνθήκας. ἐχρῆν γὰρ αὐτούς, εἴτʼ ἐδόκει τὴν αὑτῶν ἔχειν ἑκάστους, εἴτε καὶ τῶν δοριαλώτων ἐπάρχειν, εἴτε τούτων κρατεῖν ὧν ὑπὸ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐτυγχάνομεν ἔχοντες, ἕν τι τούτων ὁρισαμένους καὶ κοινὸν τὸ δίκαιον ποιησαμένους, οὕτω συγγράφεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν.
178. But instead of that, they assigned no honor whatsoever to our city or to Lacedaemon, while they set up the barbarian as lord of all Asia; as if we had gone to war for his sake, or as if the rule of the Persians had been long established, and we were only just now founding our cities—whereas in fact it is they who have only recently attained this place of honor, while Athens and Lacedaemon have been throughout their entire history a power among the Hellenes.
178. νῦν δὲ τῇ μὲν ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει καὶ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐδεμίαν τιμὴν ἀπένειμαν, τὸν δὲ βάρβαρον ἁπάσης τῆς Ἀσίας δεσπότην κατέστησαν, ὥσπερ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου πολεμησάντων, ἡμῶν, ἢ τῆς μὲν Περσῶν ἀρχῆς πάλαι καθεστηκυίας ἡμῶν δʼ ἄρτι τὰς πόλεις κατοικούντων, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκείνων μὲν νεωστὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐχόντων, ἡμῶν δὲ τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι δυναστευόντων.
179. I think, however, that I shall show still more clearly both the dishonor which we have suffered, and the advantage which the King has gained by putting the matter in this way: All the world which lies beneath the firmament being divided into two parts, the one called Asia, the other Europe, he has taken half of it by the Treaty, as if he were apportioning the earth with Zeus, and not making compacts with men.
179. οἶμαι δʼ ἐκείνως εἰπὼν μᾶλλον δηλώσειν τήν τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀτιμίαν γεγενημένην καὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως πλεονεξίαν. τῆς γὰρ γῆς ἁπάσης τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ κειμένης δίχα τετμημένης, καὶ τῆς μὲν Ἀσίας τῆς δʼ Εὐρώπης καλουμένης, τὴν ἡμίσειαν ἐκ τῶν συνθηκῶν εἴληφεν, ὥσπερ πρὸς τὸν Δία τὴν χώραν νεμόμενος, ἀλλʼ οὐ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους τὰς συνθήκας ποιούμενος.
180. Yes, and he has compelled us to engrave this Treaty on pillars of stone and place it in our public temples — a trophy far more glorious for him than those which are set up on fields of battle; for the latter are for minor deeds and a single success, but this treaty stands as a memorial of the entire war and of the humiliation of the whole of Hellas.
180. καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασεν ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν καταθεῖναι, πολὺ κάλλιον τρόπαιον τῶν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ μικρῶν ἔργων καὶ μιᾶς τύχης ἐστίν, αὗται δʼ ὑπὲρ ἅπαντος τοῦ πολέμου καὶ καθʼ ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἑστήκασιν.
181. These things may well rouse our indignation and make us look to the means by which we shall take vengeance for the past and set the future right. For verily it is shameful for us, who in our private life think the barbarians are fit only to be used as household slaves, to permit by our public policy so many of our allies to be enslaved by them; and it is disgraceful for us, when our fathers who engaged in the Trojan expedition because of the rape of one woman, all shared so deeply in the indignation of the wronged that they did not stop waging war until they had laid in ruins the city of him who had dared to commit the crime, —it is disgraceful for us, I say, now that all Hellas is being continually outraged, to take not a single step to wreak a common vengeance, although we have it in our power to accomplish deeds as lofty as our dreams.
181. ὑπὲρ ὧν ἄξιον ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅπως τῶν τε γεγενημένων δίκην ληψόμεθα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα διορθωσόμεθα. καὶ γὰρ αἰσχρὸν ἰδίᾳ μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκέταις ἀξιοῦν χρῆσθαι, δημοσίᾳ δὲ τοσούτους τῶν συμμάχων περιορᾶν αὐτοῖς δουλεύοντας, καὶ τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὰ Τρωικὰ γενομένους μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἁρπασθείσης οὕτως ἅπαντας συνοργισθῆναι τοῖς ἀδικηθεῖσιν, ὥστε μὴ πρότερον παύσασθαι πολεμοῦντας πρὶν τὴν πόλιν ἀνάστατον ἐποίησαν τοῦ τολμήσαντος ἐξαμαρτεῖν, ἡμᾶς δʼ ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑβριζομένης μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, ἐξὸν ἡμῖν εὐχῆς ἄξια διαπράξασθαι.
182. For this war is the only war which is better than peace; it will be more like a sacred mission than a military expedition; and it will profit equally both those who crave the quiet life and those who are eager for war; for it will enable the former to reap the fruits of their own possessions in security and the latter to win great wealth from the possessions of our foes.
182. μόνος γὰρ οὗτος ὁ πόλεμος εἰρήνης κρείττων ἐστί, θεωρίᾳ μὲν μᾶλλον ἢ στρατείᾳ προσεοικώς, ἀμφοτέροις δὲ συμφέρων, καὶ τοῖς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ τοῖς πολεμεῖν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. εἴη γὰρ ἂν τοῖς μὲν ἀδεῶς τὰ σφέτερʼ αὐτῶν καρποῦσθαι, τοῖς δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μεγάλους πλούτους κατακτήσασθαι.
183. You will find, if you weigh the matter carefully, that this undertaking is most desirable for us from many points of view. For against whom, pray, ought men to wage war who crave no aggrandizement, but look to the claims of justice alone? Is it not against those who in the past have injured Hellas, and are now plotting against her, and have always been so disposed towards us?
183. πολλαχῇ δʼ ἄν τις λογιζόμενος εὕροι ταύτας τὰς πράξεις μάλιστα λυσιτελούσας ἡμῖν. φέρε γάρ, πρὸς τίνας χρὴ πολεμεῖν τοὺς μηδεμιᾶς πλεονεξίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον σκοποῦντας; οὐ πρὸς τοὺς καὶ πρότερον κακῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ποιήσαντας καὶ νῦν ἐπιβουλεύοντας καὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον οὕτω πρὸς ἡμᾶς διακειμένους;
184. And against whom should we expect men to direct their envy who, while not wholly lacking in courage, yet curb this feeling with prudence? Is it not against those who have compassed powers that are too great for man, and yet are less deserving than those who are unfortunate among us? And against whom should those take the field who both desire to serve their gods and are at the same time intent on their own advantage? Is it not against those who are both their natural enemies and their hereditary foes, who have acquired the greatest possessions and are yet, of all men, the least able to defend them? Do not the Persians, then, fulfill all these conditions?
184. τίσι δὲ φθονεῖν εἰκός ἐστι τοὺς μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνάνδρως διακειμένους ἀλλὰ μετρίως τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι χρωμένους; οὐ τοῖς μείζους μὲν τὰς δυναστείας ἢ κατʼ ἀνθρώπους περιβεβλημένοις, ἐλάττονος δʼ ἀξίοις τῶν παρʼ ἡμῖν δυστυχούντων; ἐπὶ τίνας δὲ στρατεύειν προσήκει τοὺς ἅμα μὲν εὐσεβεῖν βουλομένους ἅμα δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐνθυμουμένους; οὐκ ἐπὶ τοὺς καὶ φύσει πολεμίους καὶ πατρικοὺς ἐχθρούς, καὶ πλεῖστα μὲν ἀγαθὰ κεκτημένους, ἥκιστα δʼ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀμύνεσθαι δυναμένους; οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνοι πᾶσι τούτοις ἔνοχοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες.
185. Furthermore, we shall not even trouble the several states by levying soldiers from them—a practice which now in our warfare against each other they find most burdensome. For it is my belief that those who will be inclined to remain at home will be far fewer than those who will be eager to join this army. For who, be he young or old, is so indolent that he will not desire to have a part in this expedition—an expedition led by the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, gathered together in the cause of the liberty of our allies, dispatched by all Greece, and faring forth to wreak vengeance on the barbarians?
185. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰς πόλεις λυπήσομεν στρατιώτας ἐξ αὐτῶν καταλέγοντες, ὃ νῦν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὀχληρότατόν ἐστιν αὐταῖς· πολὺ γὰρ οἶμαι σπανιωτέρους ἔσεσθαι τοὺς μένειν ἐθελήσοντας τῶν συνακολουθεῖν ἐπιθυμησόντων. τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἢ νέος ἢ παλαιὸς ῥᾴθυμός ἐστιν, ὅστις οὐ μετασχεῖν βουλήσεται ταύτης τῆς στρατιᾶς, τῆς ὑπʼ Ἀθηναίων μὲν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων στρατηγουμένης, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς τῶν συμμάχων ἐλευθερίας ἀθροιζομένης, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἁπάσης ἐκπεμπομένης, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων τιμωρίαν πορευομένης;
186. And how great must we think will be the name and the fame and the glory which they will enjoy during their lives, or, if they die in battle, will leave behind them—they who will have won the meed of honor in such an enterprise? For if those who made war against an Alexander and took a single city were accounted worthy of such praise, what encomiums should we expect these men to win who have conquered the whole of Asia? For who that is skilled to sing or trained to speak will not labor and study in his desire to leave behind a memorial both of his own genius and of their valor, for all time to come?
186. φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δόξαν πόσην τινὰ χρὴ νομίζειν ἢ ζῶντας ἕξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἀριστεύσαντας; ὅπου γὰρ οἱ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον πολεμήσαντες καὶ μίαν πόλιν ἑλόντες τοιούτων ἐπαίνων ἠξιώθησαν, ποίων τινῶν χρὴ προσδοκᾶν ἐγκωμίων τεύξεσθαι τοὺς ὅλης τῆς Ἀσίας κρατήσαντας; τίς γὰρ ἢ τῶν ποιεῖν δυναμένων ἢ τῶν λέγειν ἐπισταμένων οὐ πονήσει καὶ φιλοσοφήσει βουλόμενος ἅμα τῆς θʼ αὑτοῦ διανοίας καὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρετῆς μνημεῖον εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον καταλιπεῖν;
187. I am not at the present moment of the same mind as I was at the beginning of my speech. For then I thought that I should be able to speak in a manner worthy of my theme; now, however, I have not risen to its grandeur, and many of the thoughts which I had in mind to utter have escaped me. Therefore you must come to my aid and try to picture to yourselves what vast prosperity we should attain if we should turn the war which now involves ourselves against the peoples of the continent, and bring the prosperity of Asia across to Europe. And you must not depart to your homes as men who have merely listened to an oration; nay, those among you who are men of action must exhort one another to try to reconcile our city with Lacedaemon; and those among you who make claims to eloquence must stop composing orations on “deposits,” or on the other trivial themes which now engage your efforts, and center your rivalry on this subject and study how you may surpass me in speaking on the same question, bearing ever in mind that it does not become men who promise great things to waste their time on little things, nor yet to make the kind of speeches which will improve no whit the lives of those whom they convince, but rather the kind which, if carried out in action, will both deliver the authors themselves from their present distress and win for them the credit of bringing to pass great blessings for the rest of the world.
187. οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ τυγχάνω γνώμην ἔχων ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου. τότε μὲν γὰρ ᾤμην ἀξίως δυνήσεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων εἰπεῖν· νῦν δʼ οὐκ ἐφικνοῦμαι τοῦ μεγέθους αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πολλά με διαπέφευγεν ὧν διενοήθην. αὐτοὺς οὖν χρὴ συνδιορᾶν ὅσης ἂν εὐδαιμονίας τύχοιμεν, εἰ τὸν μὲν πόλεμον τὸν νῦν ὄντα περὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τοὺς ἠπειρώτας ποιησαίμεθα, τὴν δʼ εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην διακομίσαιμεν, καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκροατὰς γενομένους ἀπελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν πράττειν δυναμένους παρακαλοῦντας ἀλλήλους πειρᾶσθαι διαλλάττειν τήν τε πόλιν τὴν ἡμετέραν καὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, τοὺς δὲ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητοῦντας πρὸς μὲν τὴν παρακαταθήκην καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νῦν φλυαροῦσι παύεσθαι γράφοντας, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἅμιλλαν, καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅπως ἄμεινον ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἐροῦσιν, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τοῖς μεγάλʼ ὑπισχνουμένοις οὐ πρέπει περὶ μικρὰ διατρίβειν, οὐδὲ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἐξ ὧν ὁ βίος μηδὲν ἐπιδώσει τῶν πεισθέντων, ἀλλʼ ὧν ἐπιτελεσθέντων αὐτοί τʼ ἀπαλλαγήσονται τῆς παρούσης ἀπορίας καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιοι δόξουσιν εἶναι.