---
title: "European Civilization’s “Free Space” and Modern China · 欧洲文明的“自由空间”与现代中国"
author: "Liu Xiaofeng"
translator: "S. Alexander Laurent (AI-assisted, 2026)"
title_ru: "«Свободное пространство» европейской цивилизации и современный Китай"
author_ru: "Лю Сяофэн"
languages: [zh, en]
shelf: "LCI editions"
url: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/
cite: "Liu Xiaofeng, tr. S. Alexander Laurent (AI-assisted, 2026), European Civilization’s “Free Space” and Modern China · 欧洲文明的“自由空间”与现代中国. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/"
---

# European Civilization’s “Free Space” and Modern China · 欧洲文明的“自由空间”与现代中国

*Liu Xiaofeng, tr. S. Alexander Laurent (AI-assisted, 2026)*

Russian: «Свободное пространство» европейской цивилизации и современный Китай, Лю Сяофэн

Liu Xiaofeng’s long essay of 2018 on Carl Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth: how Europe’s “free space” of conquest made modern international law, and what that order has meant for China, from the Treaty of Tordesillas to the Thirty-Eighth Parallel. With his 41 notes. In Chinese beside a new English translation.

> Chinese: 刘小枫，《欧洲文明的“自由空间”与现代中国——读施米特〈大地的法〉札记》, as republished on Sohu, 12 December 2018 (original journal pagination not reconstructed).

> English: Laurentium Cultural Industries, complete translation with the author’s 41 notes (9 October 2026).

## Contents

1. [Abstract](https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/1.md)
2. [Introduction](https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/2.md)
3. [1. A Difficult Subject to Broach](https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/3.md)
4. [2. The Divide Between Ancient and Modern World Orders](https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/4.md)
5. [3. What Is “Global Linear Thinking”?](https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/5.md)
6. [4. “Amity Lines” and Discriminatory Divisions](https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/6.md)
7. [5. The Globalized Order and the Crisis of a New Nomos of the Earth](https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/7.md)
8. [6. China’s Modern Transformation and International Law](https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/8.md)
9. [7. New China and International Law](https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/9.md)
10. [Epilogue: From the Raya Lines to the Thirty-Eighth Parallel](https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/10.md)
11. [Author’s notes](https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/11.md)

## 1. Abstract

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/1/#p-N

[¶0] Abstract

> Chinese: 提要

[¶1] Recent “global history” takes human social life as its point of departure, as though the bloody struggle for world supremacy within European civilization had already produced a victor, and the age of a globalized “cosmopolitan” society envisioned by liberal political actors were about to arrive. Even if it has not arrived, the “global history” inaugurated by Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth remains state-centered while at the same time transcending “Eurocentrism.” Its theoretical premise, by contrast, is that the deadly struggle among the great powers has not ended: it has merely spread beyond Europe to encompass the globe.

> Chinese: 晚近的“全球史”以人类社会生活为本位，似乎欧洲文明内部争夺世界支配权的血腥厮杀已经决出胜负，自由主义政治人所憧憬的全球化“世界公民”社会时代即将来临。即便没有来临，施米特的《大地的法》所开创的“全球史”研究仍然以国家为本位，同时又超逾了“欧洲中心主义”，其学理依据反倒是：大国间的厮杀并没有终结，不过是越出欧洲范围扩展到全球而已。

[¶2] When confronted with two concepts of “global history” informed by distinctly different sets of questions, choosing to align ourselves with a “global history” centered on human social life means that we believe the globalized age of a “cosmopolitan” society really will arrive. If this is not the case, if the ideal of a “cosmopolitan” society that has retained its appeal from the eighteenth century to the present may be a utopia, and if the deadly struggles among states remain frequent and brutal, then devoting our historical research and teaching to instilling a liberal-democratic “cosmopolitan” consciousness in the younger generation will cause our descendants to forget that the land beneath their feet still stands within a world-historical moment of globalized, state-centered conflict.

> Chinese: 当面对问题意识明显不同的两种“全球史”概念时，选择与以人类社会生活为本位的“全球史”接轨便意味着，我们相信“世界公民”社会的全球化时代真的会来临。如果情形并非如此，如果18世纪以来迄今不衰的“世界公民”社会理念也许是一种乌托邦，如果国家间的厮杀依然频繁而且惨烈，那么，我们的史学研究和教学致力于给年轻一代灌输自由民主的“世界公民”意识，其结果便是让我们的后代忘记自己脚下的土地仍然置身于以国家为本位的全球化冲突的世界历史时刻。

## 2. Introduction

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/2/#p-N

[¶0] Introduction

> Chinese: 引子

[¶1] Over the past thirty years, a new historiography known as “global history” has emerged in English-language scholarship. It has now substantially changed what is taught as world history in universities and secondary schools in the United States and other English-speaking countries. Guided by the national policy of “bringing ourselves into line with international practice,” Chinese scholars, too, are striving to catch up with this new historiographical trend.

> Chinese: 晚近30年来，英语学界兴起一种名为“全球史”（global history）的新史学，如今已在相当程度上改变了美国以及其他英语国家的大学和中学的世界史教学内容。在“与国际接轨”的国策指引下，我国学界也正在奋力追赶这股史学新潮。

[¶2] The Rise of the West, published in 1963 by William H. McNeill (1917–2016), is said to mark the birth of “global history” or the “new world history.” [1] Indeed, we should take note of its subtitle: “A History of the Human Community.”

> Chinese: 麦克尼尔（William H. McNeill， 1917 - 2016）在 1963年出版的《西方的兴起》（the Rise of the West），据说堪称“全球史”或“新世界史”的诞生标志。 [1]的确，我们应该注意到，该书有这样一个副标题：“人类共同体史”（a History of the Human Community）。

[¶3] It is not easy to understand why The Rise of the West should count as marking the birth of “global history.” Clearly, attention to historical phenomena across broad geographical expanses and long periods of time is not, in itself, enough to inaugurate a new form of world history. Historical narratives concerned with large-scale structures, processes, and comparisons at a highly macroscopic level have been a stock-in-trade of the leading world historians since the eighteenth century. If overturning historiographical “Eurocentrism” is the defining feature of this new form of world history, then McNeill’s use of “The Rise of the West” as his main title to highlight the “universal-historical” significance of modern European civilization makes it difficult to say that he escaped what is commonly called “Eurocentrism.” If the hallmark of “global history” is a shift from centering the state to centering the everyday social life of humanity, then McNeill’s great work, which takes the way of life of modern Western states as its point of departure, plainly fails to meet this criterion.

> Chinese: 要理解《西方的兴起》何以算得上“全球史”的诞生标志，并不容易。显然不能说，关注大范围、长时段的历史现象，便足以开创世界史的新样式。着眼高度宏观的大结构、大过程、大比较的历史叙事，是 18世纪以来的世界史名家都有的本领。如果说颠覆史学的“欧洲中心主义”是世界史新样式的关键特点，那么，麦克尼尔用“西方的兴起”这个主标题突显现代欧洲文明具有的“普遍历史”意义，就很难说他摆脱了通常所谓的“欧洲中心主义”。如果说从以国家为本位转向以人类日常社会生活为本位是“全球史”学的标志，那么，麦克尼尔的这部大著以西方现代国家的生活方式为本位，显然并不符合这条标准。

[¶4] In my view, if The Rise of the West can be said to mark the birth of “global history,” then the true marker is the “cosmopolitanism,” born in the eighteenth century, to which McNeill subscribed. In The Rise of the West, McNeill declared this to be a “powerfully persuasive belief” in which he had unwavering confidence. [2] It is precisely on the basis of this belief that contemporary “global” historiography can claim to overturn the “Eurocentric” habits of historical scholarship and call for a shift from a state-centered approach to one centered on human social life.

> Chinese: 在笔者看来，如果《西方的兴起》算得上“全球史”的诞生标志，那么，麦克尼尔所信奉的诞生于 18世纪的“世界公民论”（the cosmopolitanism）才堪称真正的标志。麦克尼尔在《西方的兴起》中宣称，这是他确信不疑的“说服力极强的信念”。 [2]正是基于这样的信念，当今的“全球史”编撰学才得以宣称颠覆史学中的“欧洲中心主义”习性，呼吁从国家本位转向人类社会生活本位。

[¶5] The enthusiasm with which Chinese historians are now bringing themselves into line with contemporary Western “global history” reminds me that Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth (1950), published thirteen years before McNeill’s The Rise of the West, had already inaugurated a kind of “global history” that genuinely overturned “Eurocentrism” in political historiography. [3] Unlike the orientation of recent “global history,” however, Schmitt continued to uphold the state-centered character of traditional political historiography. He did not regard phenomena such as everyday social life or changes in social structure as the primary concerns of world-historical research.

> Chinese: 眼下我国史学界热情满怀地与当代西方的“全球史”史学接轨让笔者想起：早在麦克尼尔的《西方的兴起》问世之前 13年，施米特的《大地的法》（1950）就已经开创了一种“全球史”，而且实实在在颠覆了政治史学中的“欧洲中心主义”。 [3]但与晚近的“全球史”研究取向不同，施米特仍然持守以国家为本位的传统政治史学品格，并不把社会日常生活或社会结构的变迁之类的现象视为世界史研究的首要关切对象。

[¶6] This raises a question worth considering: how can state-centered research in world history overturn “Eurocentrism” in historiography and even in other disciplines of the humanities?

> Chinese: 值得思考的问题来了：以国家为本位的世界史研究，何以可能颠覆史学乃至人文学其他学科中的“欧洲中心主义”？

## 3. 1. A Difficult Subject to Broach

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/3/#p-N

[¶0] 1. A Difficult Subject to Broach

> Chinese: 一、难言的论题

[¶1] The central part of The Rise of the West is Part Three. Its title, “The Era of Western Dominance,” defines a broad historical period, from AD 1500 to 1950, and complements the title of the book. McNeill seeks to present the following historical fact: “modern civilization” equals “European civilization,” and “European civilization” equals “the era of Western dominance” or “the rise of the West.”

> Chinese: 《西方的兴起》的核心篇章是第三编，此编标题“西方统治的时代”所确定的历史大时段为公元 1500年至 1950年，与书名互为表里。麦克尼尔力图展现这样一个历史事实：“现代文明”等于“欧洲文明”，“欧洲文明”等于“西方统治的时代”或“西方的兴起”。

[¶2] In everyday Chinese usage, the concept of “the West” is rather ambiguous. It is both a collective designation for ancient Greek civilization, ancient Roman civilization, and European civilization, and, in practice, a term that more often refers to the modern European civilization that rose from the sixteenth century onward. After all, the forces that invaded China were neither Alexander’s allied Greek army nor Caesar’s Roman legions, but the Anglo-French forces. Before the “Sino-Japanese Naval War of 1894,” China had already engaged in military conflicts with Britain and France in succession at its own doorstep. The inscription on the Monument to the People’s Heroes in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square commemorates “the heroes who have sacrificed their lives for China’s independence and autonomy since 1840.” By marking the “Opium War” as the beginning of China’s modern history, it accords entirely with a Chinese periodization of world history.

> Chinese: 在汉语的日常用法中，“西方”概念颇为含混，既是古希腊文明、古罗马文明和欧洲文明的总称，实际含义又更多指 16世纪以来崛起的现代欧洲文明。毕竟，入侵中国的既非亚历山大的希腊联军，也非恺撒的罗马军团，而是英法联军。“甲午海战”之前，中国在自己家门口已先后与英国和法国发生过军事冲突。北京天安门广场上的人民英雄纪念碑碑文铭记着“ 1840年以来为中国的独立自主而牺牲的英雄”，标明中国的现代史以“鸦片战争”为开端，完全符合中国式的世界史分期。

[¶3] This historical fact reminds us that the concept of “Eurocentrism” is rather ambiguous. “Europe” was long fragmented, with constant wars among its kingdoms; what is called “Eurocentrism” must therefore refer to the worldwide dominance of certain powerful European states. Yet even the Congress of Vienna in the early nineteenth century did not truly settle which states were Europe’s great powers: the fragile “Holy Alliance” of Russia, Prussia, and Austria could not dominate Britain, nor had France lost all its strength as a result of Napoleon’s defeat.

> Chinese: 这一历史事实提醒我们，“欧洲中心主义”这个概念颇为含混。“欧洲”长期四分五裂，各王国间战事不断，所谓“欧洲中心主义”当指欧洲的某些强权国家的世界性支配。但即便 19世纪初期的维也纳会议也没有真正确定欧洲强国究竟是谁：脆弱的俄、普、奥三国“神圣同盟”并不能支配英国，法兰西也没有因拿破仑战败而彻底丧失实力。

[¶4] In 1833, Ranke published The Great Powers (also translated as On the Great Powers), in which he sought to examine the conflicts among Europe’s great powers over the preceding century and a half, from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth century, through the world-historical perspective that Europeans had only begun to develop less than a century earlier. He called this historical period a “world moment” (den Weltmoment). In other words, for Ranke, the fundamental constituents of the “world” were conflicts among great powers. This long essay is acknowledged in the history of historiography not only as a classic of world history but also as a model of “Eurocentric” historical scholarship. By presenting the latest “tendencies” in the conflicts among Europe’s great powers, Ranke sought to clarify several “widely prevalent” misconceptions about “the formation of the modern world.” [4] Thus, “Eurocentric” historiography refers first and foremost to a historiography of the European great powers’ struggle for world supremacy.

> Chinese: 1833年，兰克发表《诸大国》（又译《论列强》），力图凭靠欧洲人在不到一个世纪之前才刚刚开启的世界历史视野来考察晚近一个半世纪（17世纪末至 19世纪初期）的欧洲大国冲突，并把这一历史时段称为“世界时刻”（den Weltmoment）。换言之，在兰克眼里，“世界”构成的基本要素是大国冲突。这篇长文不仅是史学史公认的世界史经典文献，也是“欧洲中心主义”史学的圭臬。通过展示欧洲大国之间相互冲突的最新“趋势”，兰克致力澄清“普遍流布的”关于“现代世界形成过程”的若干误识。 [4]从而，所谓“欧洲中心主义”史学，首先指欧洲诸大国争夺世界支配权的史学。

[¶5] Among the subsequent classics of “Eurocentric” world history, we can hardly avoid mentioning The Geographical Pivot of History (1904) and Democratic Ideals and Reality (1919) by Halford J. Mackinder (1861–1947). [5] Although Mackinder was renowned as a political geographer, his geographical thought plainly possessed a world-historical perspective and presupposed a certain political theory.

> Chinese: 接下来的“欧洲中心主义”世界史的经典之作，恐怕不得不提到麦金德（Halford J. Mackinder， 1861 - 1947）的《历史的地理枢纽》（1904）和《民主的理想与现实》（1919）。 [5]麦金德虽然以政治地理学名家，但他的地理学思想明显具有世界史视野，并以某种政治理论为前提。

[¶6] Even from a world-historical perspective informed by historical sociology, geopolitical conflicts among civilizations rank among the most important internal driving mechanisms of world history. [6] From antiquity to the present, civilizational conflicts have manifested themselves primarily as conflicts among political entities. The conflicts in Europe from 1500 all the way to 1950, however, were conflicts among states within a single civilization. The state-centered character of “Eurocentric” historiography is therefore not only reasonable but also consistent with the historical facts.

> Chinese: 即便按照历史社会学路向的世界史观点，诸种文明之间的地缘政治冲突算得上世界历史最为重要的内在动力机制。 [6]文明冲突从古至今都主要体现为政治体之间的冲突，而欧洲自 1500年以来直到 1950年的冲突，则是同一文明内部的国家间冲突。因此，“欧洲中心主义”史学以国家为本位，不仅有道理，也符合史实。

[¶7] Recent “global history” centers on human social life. Its premise appears to be that the bloody struggle for world supremacy within European civilization has already produced a victor, and that the age of a globalized “cosmopolitan” society envisioned by liberal political actors is about to arrive. Even if it has not arrived, it is worth calling on liberal-democratic intellectuals throughout the world to unite in opposing every form of state-centeredness, including representative democratic regimes, so as to hasten the arrival of a global society of “world citizens.” Accordingly, liberal-democratic intellectuals among historians have raised the banner of opposition to “Eurocentrism,” each bringing their talents to bear in retelling world history and inaugurating the new narrative of “global history.”

> Chinese: 晚近的“全球史”以人类社会生活为本位，其前提显得是：欧洲文明内部争夺世界支配权的血腥厮杀已经决出胜负，自由主义政治人所憧憬的全球化“世界公民”社会时代即将来临。即便没有来临，也值得号召全世界自由民主知识人联合起来，反对任何形式的国家本位，包括代议制的民主政体，促使“世界公民”的全球社会早日来临。于是，史学界的自由民主知识人高举反“欧洲中心主义”大旗，各显才华重述世界史，开创了“全球史”的新叙事。

[¶8] The “global history” inaugurated by Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth remains state-centered while at the same time transcending “Eurocentrism.” Its theoretical premise, by contrast, is that the deadly struggle among the great powers has not ended: it has merely spread beyond Europe to encompass the globe. The modern “era” (Era) of world history since 1500 was the historical moment of Europe’s rise, and is therefore called “the European Era.” Although the end of this “era” signifies the end of “Europe as the center,” it does not mean that state-centered conflict has ended. Rather, the pattern of conflict among the great powers within Europe inaugurated by the modern “European Era” has expanded into conflict on a global scale.

> Chinese: 施米特的《大地的法》所开创的“全球史”研究仍然以国家为本位，同时又超逾了“欧洲中心主义”，其学理依据反倒是：大国间的厮杀并没有终结，不过是越出欧洲范围扩展到全球而已。 1500年以来的世界历史的现代“纪元”（Era）是欧洲崛起的历史时刻，因此被称为“欧洲纪元”（the European Era）。这一“纪元”的终结虽然意味着“欧洲中心”的终结，却并不意味着以国家为本位的冲突已然终结。毋宁说，现代式的“欧洲纪元”所开启的欧洲内部的大国冲突格局已经扩展为全球范围的冲突。

[¶9] Historical sociologists have good reason to use statistics to demonstrate that “how war brings states into being and how states lead to war” remains a fundamental question confronting political historiography: in the eighteenth century, there were 68 wars worldwide, with 4 million deaths; in the nineteenth century, 205 wars, with 8 million deaths; and in the twentieth century, 275 wars, with 115 million deaths. [7] When confronted with two concepts of “global history” informed by distinctly different sets of questions, choosing to align ourselves with a “global history” centered on human social life means that we believe the globalized age of a “cosmopolitan” society really will arrive. If this is not the case, if the ideal of a “cosmopolitan” society that has retained its appeal from the eighteenth century to the present may be a utopia, and if the deadly struggles among states remain frequent and brutal, then devoting our historical research and teaching to instilling a liberal-democratic “cosmopolitan” consciousness in the younger generation will cause our descendants to forget that the land beneath their feet still stands within a world-historical moment of globalized, state-centered conflict.

> Chinese: 历史社会学家有理由用统计数字来证明，“战争如何促成国家以及国家如何导致战争”仍然是政治史学面临的基本问题：在 18世纪，整个世界共有 68场战争，死亡人数 4百万，在 19世纪，共有 205场战争，死亡人数 8百万， 20世纪则有 275场战争，死亡人数一亿一千五百万。 [7]当面对问题意识明显不同的两种“全球史”概念时，选择与以人类社会生活为本位的“全球史”接轨便意味着，我们相信“世界公民”社会的全球化时代真的会来临。如果情形并非如此，如果 18世纪以来迄今不衰的“世界公民”社会理念也许是一种乌托邦，如果国家间的厮杀依然频繁而且惨烈，那么，我们的史学研究和教学致力于给年轻一代灌输自由民主的“世界公民”意识，其结果便是让我们的后代忘记自己脚下的土地仍然置身于以国家为本位的全球化冲突的世界历史时刻。

[¶10] Almost half a century ago, the eminent German-American world historian Felix Gilbert (1905–1991) announced the indisputable historical fact of “the end of the European Era.” [8] That we have only now come to a roughly clear understanding of this historical reality is simply because, when his book appeared, the Cold War had not yet ended and China was in the midst of its “unprecedented” second revolution.

> Chinese: 差不多半个世纪前，著名德裔美籍世界史学家吉尔伯特（Felix Gilbert， 1905 – 1991）就宣告了“欧洲纪元的终结”（the End of the European Era）这一不争史实。 [8]我们直到今天才大致清楚这一历史实情，不过是因为该书出版之际，冷战尚未结束，我国也正在进行“史无前例”的第二次革命。

[¶11] Today, it is also easy for us to see clearly that the period indicated by the book’s subtitle, “From 1890 to the Present [1970],” was precisely the historical moment in which the ancient Chinese empire underwent its difficult transformation and entered world history. If we wish to draw lessons from world history, then the work that will enlighten us is not McNeill’s The Rise of the West but Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth.

> Chinese: 今天的我们同样很容易清楚地看到，该书副标题“从 1890年到当今[1970]”，正是古老的中华帝国艰难转型进入世界史的历史时刻。如果我们要从世界史中吸取经验教训，那么，对我们具有启发性的就不会是麦克尼尔的《西方的兴起》，而是施米特的《大地的法》。

[¶12] At the end of his brief “Preface,” Schmitt declares that the “European Era” has ended, but that the global evils to which it gave rise have not. Indeed, because of these evils, the future of humanity as a whole has become even more uncertain:

> Chinese: 在简短的“前言”结尾时施米特就宣告：“欧洲纪元”已经终结，但这个纪元所引出的全球性恶果不仅没有终结，整个人类的命运还因为这一恶果而更为前景难卜：

[¶13] The hitherto Eurocentric (europa - zentrische) order of international law is in decline, and the old nomos of the earth is also approaching its sunset. The traditional order arose from the wondrous, fairy-tale discovery of the New World, from a historical event without precedent or successor. Only through a fantastic analogy can one imagine a modern version of an international legal order: on its way to the moon, humanity discovers a new and unknown celestial body that can be freely developed and exploited, thereby alleviating human strife on earth. Even on the basis of such an imagining, unresolved questions remain for a new nomos of the earth, questions that cannot be answered by new discoveries in the natural sciences. (p. 2)

> Chinese: 迄今为止的欧洲中心（europa - zentrische）的国际法秩序在走向衰落，古老的大地法则亦日薄西山。传统秩序源于对新世界的童话般的惊奇发现，源于一种空前绝后的历史事件。只有借助奇幻般的类比想象，人们才能设想一个现代版的国际法秩序，即人类登月的途中发现了一个新的、未知的星体，可以对其自由开发和利用，从而减轻了人类在地球上的争斗。即便以这种想象为根据，对于新的大地法则来说，仍然存在悬而未决的问题，这些问题不是借助自然科学的新发现所能解决的。（页2）

[¶14] The new school of “global history” is said to place particular emphasis on the concrete particulars of world-historical research: commercial exchange, the spread of species and diseases, climate change, and even the various conditions of everyday life. John E. Wills’s 1688: A Global History: China and the World in an Extraordinary Year (2001) enjoyed considerable fame and is said to have remained among the top ten on The New York Times bestseller list for 35 consecutive weeks. The author brought together in a single volume details of life in the year 1688 among the Chinese under the Kangxi Emperor, the Russians under Peter the Great, the Turks under the Grand Sultan, the Indians under Aurangzeb, the Jews of Jerusalem, and even the Aboriginal peoples of Australia, to say nothing of the Europeans in Europe’s various prominent kingdoms. For readers in the English-speaking world who had just entered the twenty-first century, this offered a refreshing sense of world history.

> Chinese: 新派的“全球史”研究据说特别注重世界史研究的具体性，比如商业交往、物种传播、疾病蔓延、气候变化，乃至各种日常生活状态。韦尔斯（John E.Wills）的《 1688年的全球史：一个非凡年代里的中国与世界》（2001）名噪一时，据说连续 35周高居《纽约时报》畅销书榜前 10名。作者把康熙大帝治下的中国人、彼得大帝治下的俄罗斯人、大苏丹统治下的土耳其人、奥朗则布治下的印度人、耶路撒冷的犹太人乃至澳大利亚的土著人——更不用说欧洲各显要王国的欧洲人在 1688这一年的生活细节蒐集一册，让刚刚进入 21世纪的英语世界读者对世界史的感觉耳目一新。

[¶15] Nevertheless, Wills acknowledges that in 1688 only a very small number of “a few kinds of Europeans” “could grasp comprehensively the diversity, distribution, and connections of the world’s regions and peoples.” This amounts to admitting that the emergence of “Eurocentrism” had its own historical basis. By presenting the conditions of life across the globe in 1688, the author hopes to convey to people today the greatest world-historical transformation. It is not that the world then “was far emptier, with vast stretches of forest and fields,” nor that it “was far quieter, without loudspeakers or internal-combustion engines,” but that “human technology” could change so rapidly, and “political orders and forms of life” undergo such “earth-shattering reversals.” Accordingly, one of the very few “kinds of Europeans” Wills mentions most often in his “Prelude” is Locke. [9]

> Chinese: 尽管如此，韦尔斯承认，在 1688年，仅有极少数“几类欧洲人”“能够全面把握世界各个地区、各个民族的多样性及其分布和联系”。这无异于承认，“欧洲中心主义”的产生自有其历史依据。通过展示 1688年的全球生活状态，作者希望让今天的人们感到的最大的世界历史巨变，并非是当时的世界“空旷多了，有大片森林和田野绵延”，也不是当时的世界“安静多了，没有扩音器，没有内燃机”，而是“人类的技术”竟然会有如此迅速的变化，“政治秩序、生活形态”会有如此“天翻地覆的逆转”。因此，在“序曲”中，韦尔斯提及最多的极少数“几类欧洲人”之一是洛克。 [9]

[¶16] Locke’s political teachings did not influence the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688; rather, they inspired the later American Revolution. We can hardly avoid asking: while overturning “Eurocentrism,” is the new school of “global history” also constructing a kind of “Americentrism”?

> Chinese: 洛克的政治学说并没有影响 1688年的“光荣革命”，倒是启发了后来的美国革命。我们难免会问：新派的“全球史”在颠覆“欧洲中心主义”的同时，是否又在打造一种“美国中心主义”？

[¶17] Wills’s remarks show us that the historical particulars with which “global history” should concern itself are less the everyday conditions of the human community’s social life than the principles governing the order of human life. In 1688, the world had no globally unified principles of order. Today, we constantly hear expressions such as “the international community,” “the international order,” “international public opinion,” and “international tribunals,” as though some international nomos [law] really existed behind the scenes. In fact, it does not.

> Chinese: 韦尔斯的说法让我们看到，“全球史”研究应该关注的历史具体性，与其说是人类共同体社会生活的日常状态，不如说是人类生活的秩序法则。 1688年的世界并没有全球统一的秩序法则，如今我们的耳边不断听见“国际社会”“国际秩序”“国际舆论”“国际法庭”之类的声音，似乎冥冥中真的有一种国际的 nomos [法]，其实不然。

[¶18] As a classic of “global history,” Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth is concerned with precisely this kind of historical particularity: how European international law came into being and changed over time. If there was ever such a thing as “Eurocentrism,” then European international law can at least count as a concrete embodiment of that “-ism.” The problem is that Schmitt says this “order of international law is in decline.”

> Chinese: 施米特的《大地的法》作为“全球史”经典之作，关注的正是这样的历史具体性：欧洲国际法的形成及其历史嬗变是怎么回事。如果说曾有过一种“欧洲中心主义”，那么，欧洲国际法至少算得上这种“主义”的具体体现。问题在于，施米特说这种“国际法秩序在走向衰落”。

[¶19] One view holds that the word Erde in Schmitt should be translated into Chinese not as “earth” but as “the globe,” because Schmitt’s Erde includes the oceans. The lines of Goethe quoted by Schmitt in his “Preface” demonstrate that this view is mistaken.

> Chinese: 有一种观点认为，施米特笔下的 Erde这个语词不应译作“大地”，而应译作“地球”，因为施米特笔下的 Erde包括海洋。施米特在“前言”中引用的歌德诗句可以证明，这种看法是错的。

[¶20] Goethe writes: “All things of no consequence will pass away; only the sea and the earth stand unmoved.” Here, Meer [sea] and Erde [earth] are set alongside and against one another, showing that Erde cannot be translated as “the globe.” Expressed in our traditional vocabulary, “all-under-heaven” might better convey Schmitt’s meaning of Erde. After all, Schmitt is concerned with order and the rules of governance. It might be more suggestive if we read “the nomos of the earth” as “the nomos of all-under-heaven,” or, whenever the word Erde [earth] appears, read it as “all-under-heaven.”

> Chinese: 歌德写到，“所有无关紧要的事物终将消散，只有海洋和大地巍然不动。”在这里， Meer [海洋]与 Erde [大地]并列对举，可见 Erde不能译作“地球”。用我们的传统语汇来表达，也许 Erde译作“天下”更为切合施米特的含义。毕竟，施米特关切的是秩序和统治规则。我们若把“大地的法”读作“天下的法”，或者在涉及 Erde [大地]这个语词时不妨读作“天下”，可能更有意味。

[¶21] I am not proposing a change to the translated title of the book. Rather, occasionally reading “earth” as our “all-under-heaven” might help us better understand the questions Schmitt discusses. After all, The Nomos of the Earth, or “the nomos of all-under-heaven,” is a work of global history whose riches are positively dazzling. Its questions concerning the history of political thought, geopolitics, the theory of war, and other areas are not only profound but also highly relevant to present realities.

> Chinese: 笔者并非要建议改书名译法，毋宁说，偶尔将“大地”读作我们的“天下”，兴许有助于我们更好地理解施米特所讨论的问题。毕竟，《大地的法》或“天下之法”是全球史论著，内涵宏富得让人眼花缭乱，其中涉及的政治思想史、地缘政治学、战争理论等方面的问题，不仅精深，而且富有现实性。

[¶22] We immediately confront a question: how should we grasp the most crucial concern animating The Nomos of the Earth? A careful, close reading of the “Preface” readily reveals that this really is a problem.

> Chinese: 我们随即面临一个问题：应该如何把握《大地的法》最为关键的问题意识？悉心细读“前言”便不难发现，这还真是个问题。

[¶23] The very first sentence of the “Preface” carries a particular significance: “This book is an undefended work of scholarship, the fruit of difficult experiences.” Being defended or “undefended” (wehrlose) belongs to the vocabulary of warfare. Does a scholarly work need defenses like those of a military position? Is Schmitt playing with rhetoric? In the Western literary and historical tradition, historiography belongs to rhetoric, and the writing of history must pay attention to rhetorical form. For Schmitt, however, expressions such as “difficult experiences” (harter Erfarungen) and “undefended” are really no mere rhetoric. After all, he had been detained and investigated by the Allies between 1946 and 1948.

> Chinese: “前言”第一句话就别有意味：“这本书是历经艰难之后的一部不设防的学术成果。”设防还是“不设防”（wehrlose）是军事术语，学术著作需要军事警戒式的设防？难道施米特在玩修辞？按照西方文史传统，史学隶属于修辞学，史书写作必须讲究修辞。但对施米特来说，所谓“历经艰难”（harter Erfarungen）或“不设防”之类言辞，还真不是修辞。毕竟，他在 1946年至 1948年期间曾被盟军拘留调查。

[¶24] What kind of suspicion was he seeking to avoid? Clearly, ideological suspicion. In the “Preface,” Schmitt expresses his gratitude to “geographers, as represented by Mackinder,” but immediately changes tack:

> Chinese: 避免什么嫌疑？显然是意识形态嫌疑。施米特在“前言”中对“以麦金德为代表的地理学家们”表示了感谢，但他马上笔锋一转：

[¶25] Nevertheless, juridical thinking remains clearly distinct from geography. Jurists’ knowledge of things and land, of reality and territory, does not derive from geographers. The concept of sea appropriation bears a juridical, rather than a geographical, imprint. (p. 2)

> Chinese: 不过，法学思维还是明显不同于地理学。法学家对事物与土地、现实与领土的知识并非源于地理学家，夺海概念具有法学而非地理学印记。（页2）

[¶26] Why does Schmitt mention Mackinder? Because Mackinder’s The Geographical Pivot of History and Democratic Ideals and Reality advanced a very famous geopolitical view: maritime great powers must contain continental great powers, because the geographical nature of the latter is aggressive. Schmitt clearly does not agree with Mackinder’s theoretical position, yet in refuting him he inevitably faces the danger of political incorrectness. This is because Mackinder’s political geography, with its world-historical perspective, rests on “liberal-democratic ideals,” and refuting Mackinder risks the suspicion of refuting those “ideals.”

> Chinese: 施米特为什么提到麦金德？因为麦金德的《历史的地理枢纽》和《民主的理想与现实》提出了非常著名的地缘政治观：海属大国必须遏制陆属大国，因为后者的地理天性具有侵略性。施米特显然不赞同麦金德的理论立场，但他要反驳麦金德，又难免面临政治不正确的危险。因为，麦金德的具有世界历史视野的政治地理学依托“自由民主理想”，反驳麦金德就有反驳这种“理想”之嫌。

[¶27] To remain faithful to his scholarly calling, Schmitt has no choice but to refute Mackinder. Accordingly, he makes a special declaration in the “Preface” that he “will adhere strictly to factual evidence, including certain specific questions, in order to avoid any suspicion of error” (p. 2). In other words, Schmitt hopes to rely on “factual evidence” to establish Mackinder’s error: although Mackinder had already incorporated the Western Hemisphere into his world-historical perspective by the third formulation of his “Heartland” theory, he still failed to see the real problem of the age of globalization.

> Chinese: 为了忠实于学术职分，施米特不得不反驳麦金德。因此，他在“前言”中特别申明，自己“会严格恪守事实依据，包括某些具体问题，以避免任何犯错误的嫌疑”（页 2）。换言之，施米特希望凭靠“事实依据”证实麦金德所犯的错误：虽然麦金德在第三次表述他的“心脏地带”论时已经把西半球纳入其世界史视野，他毕竟没有看到全球化时代的真正问题。

## 4. 2. The Divide Between Ancient and Modern World Orders

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/4/#p-N

[¶0] 2. The Divide Between Ancient and Modern World Orders

> Chinese: 二、古今“天下”秩序的分界线

[¶1] The Nomos of the Earth is divided into four chapters. The first, entitled “Introduction,” is very short, comprising five brief essays and running to approximately 40 pages in the Chinese translation. Yet the question it raises and discusses is important: how to distinguish the law of nations before the global age from international law after its advent. Beginning with an overview of “pre-global law of nations” (Vor - globales Völkerrecht), and tracing back through Christian and ancient Greek conceptions of the world, Schmitt sets out his understanding of the original meaning of “nomos”:

> Chinese: 《大地的法》全书分四章，题为“引论”的第一章篇幅很短，由五篇短文构成，约 40页（按中译本计算），但提出并讨论的问题颇为重要，即如何区分全球时代之前的万民法与全球时代之后的国际法。从“前全球时代的万民法”（Vor - globales Völkerrecht）概观入手，通过回溯基督教和古希腊的天下观，施米特提出了他对“法”的原初含义的理解：

[¶2] For us, nomos is the fundamental process of spatial distribution, a process of great importance in every historical period. For peoples living together on this earth, now measured by modern science, it signifies the achievement of a structurally orienting convergence of order and location. (p. 46)

> Chinese: 对我们来说，法是关于空间分配的基本进程，在每一个历史时期都非常重要，对于共同生活在这个业已被现代科学测量过的地球上的人民来说，它意味着实现了秩序与场域的结构导向性汇合。（页46）

[¶3] Clearly, the “global [perspective]” (global) is the key to distinguishing the ancient from the modern world order. Understanding what a “global [perspective]” means is therefore the key to understanding Schmitt’s subject.

> Chinese: 显然，“全球[视野]”（global）是区分天下秩序的古今之变的关键。从而，理解何谓“全球[视野]”，乃是理解施米特论题的关键。

[¶4] The final section of Chapter One is entitled “On Appropriation as a Constitutive Element of International Law.” “Appropriation” is the key term, while “international law” refers to the axiomatic principles upon which the European order formed after the “rise of Europe” in the sixteenth century. In other words, the formation of European international law was based on “the great movement of appropriation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” (p. 47).

> Chinese: 第一章最后一节题为“论占取作为国际法之建构性因素”，“占取”是关键词，而“国际法”指 16世纪“欧洲崛起”以来的欧洲秩序赖以形成的公理性法则。换言之，欧洲国际法的形成基于“ 16 - 17世纪的大占取运动”（页 47）。

[¶5] In Chapter Two, which follows, Schmitt presents us with a title whose wording is familiar, though its meaning may not be fully understood: “The Appropriation of the New World.” The “New World” here refers to the American continents. Clearly, from a world-historical standpoint, the “global [perspective]” was born of Europe’s historical movement of “appropriating the New World” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

> Chinese: 接下来的第二章，施米特就让我们看到一个耳熟但未必能详的标题：“占取新世界”。这里的“新世界”指美洲大陆。很清楚，从世界史角度讲，“全球 [视野]”诞生于 16至 17世纪的欧洲“占取新世界”的历史运动。

[¶6] Chapter Two contains three sections and is in fact also not very long, at approximately 60 pages. It, too, is introductory in character, especially its first section, “The First Global Lines.” Here, the birth of the “global [perspective]” is defined more concretely as the geographical division of global spheres of influence by the European great powers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

> Chinese: 第二章含三节，篇幅其实也不长（约 60页），同样具有引论性质，尤其是第一节“最初的地球分界线”。在这里，“全球[视野]”的诞生被更为具体地界定为 16至 17世纪的欧洲大国对全球势力范围的地理划分。

[¶7] Schmitt’s central argument rests on two points. First, the European Christian monarchies’ “appropriation” of the Western Hemisphere after the great geographical discoveries intensified interstate conflicts within Europe, and European international law emerged in response. Second, with the rise of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, European international law entered into decline. We must recognize that the United States was the product of the European Christian kingdoms’ “appropriation” of American land and was thus an extension of the European order: the great European powers fought fiercely in the Americas to contend for American territory. The ambivalent relationship with the European order of the independent state established in North America by Europeans in the British colonies, namely the United States, is the key to the transformations, or the rise and fall, of European international law. The end of “Eurocentrism,” or the rise of “globalism,” may very well mean the rise of Americentrism.

> Chinese: 施米特提出的关键论题基于如下两个要点：第一，欧洲的基督教君主国在地理大发现之后对西半球的“占取”加剧了欧洲内部的国家间冲突，欧洲国际法应运而生；第二，随着西半球的美国崛起，欧洲国际法便走向衰落。我们必须意识到，美国是欧洲的基督教王国“占取”美洲陆地的结果，从而是欧洲秩序的延伸：为了争夺美洲地盘，欧洲大国之间在美洲大打出手。英属殖民地的欧洲人在北美洲建立的独立国家即美国与欧洲秩序若即若离的关系，乃是欧洲国际法嬗变或兴衰的关键。“欧洲中心主义”的终结或“全球主义”的兴起，很可能意味着美国中心主义的兴起。

[¶8] Thus, as we can see, the following two chapters, Three and Four, form the main body of the book and account for two-thirds of its length, approximately two hundred pages. Chapter Three, entitled “European Public Law,” discusses the formation of the nomos of the world in the European Era; Chapter Four, entitled “Questions Concerning a New Nomos of the Earth,” corresponds to the second argument above, the rise of the United States. The so-called “new nomos of the earth” is tantamount to the law of America’s world order. If America’s new “nomos of the world” has an intrinsic connection to Mackinder’s world-historical political geography, then even “defenses” could not effectively protect Schmitt’s historical inquiry grounded in “factual evidence.”

> Chinese: 因此我们看到，随后的第三和第四章是全书主体，占全书三分之二篇幅（约两百页）：第三章题为“欧洲公法”，即讨论欧洲纪元的天下之法的形成；第四章题为“关于新大地法的诸问题”，对应上述第二个论题即美国的崛起。所谓“新大地法”，无异于指美国的天下秩序之法。如果美国的新“天下法”与麦金德的世界历史政治地理观有内在的连带关系，那么，施米特凭靠“事实依据”的史学探究即便“设防”也不可能有效。

[¶9] The title of the first essay in Chapter Three is “The State as the Leading Force in a New Interstate, Eurocentric Global Spatial Order.” In other words, the “appropriation” of the Western Hemisphere could only be an act of states. The first essay in Chapter Four is entitled “The Last Appropriation by Europe as a Whole.” Schmitt writes:

> Chinese: 第三章第一篇的标题是“国家成为新的国家间欧洲中心主义全球空间秩序的主导力量”，换言之，对西半球的“占取”只会是国家行为。第四章第一篇的标题是“整个欧洲的最终占取”，施米特写到：

[¶10] The waning of European public law coincided with the loss, from the hands of the European powers, of the last land appropriated outside Europe. This was also the farewell performance of a common European international law. Its stage was the soil of Africa. At the same time, between 1870 and 1900, Japan, as Asia’s leading power, gradually entered the international arena: first entering into treaty relations, then joining administrative organizations such as the Universal Postal Union, and finally being admitted as an equal member of the common order of European international law. On African soil, however, competition among the European states continued over colonial societies undergoing development or newly established. (p. 196)

> Chinese: 欧洲公法的花落时节，也正是欧洲以外的最后一块占取之地从欧洲强国们的手中失落之日，这也是共同欧洲国际法的谢幕演出。演出的舞台在非洲的土地上。与此同时，从1870到1900这段时期，作为亚洲的领先者日本逐步走上国际舞台，首先进入条约关系中，继而加入像万国邮政联盟这样的管理组织，并最终被接纳为欧洲国际法共同秩序中的平等一员。但是，在非洲大地上，仍然上演着欧洲国家之间为了开拓中的和新建立的殖民地社会而展开的竞争。（页196）

[¶11] The European powers’ struggle for Africa was merely the “waning of European public law.” The next section is entitled “The End of European Public Law.” We see that the “factual evidence” Schmitt provides here is that the Spanish-American War of 1898 marked the starting point of the rise of the United States. Schmitt says that this war demonstrated:

> Chinese: 欧洲强国争夺非洲不过是“欧洲公法的花落时节”，接下来的第二节题为“欧洲公法的终结”。我们看到，施米特在这里给出的“事实依据”是， 1898年的美西战争成为美国崛起的起点。施米特说，这场战争表明：

[¶12] American foreign policy had already turned toward an era of overt imperialism. This war did not adhere to the traditional continental conception of the Western Hemisphere, but reached deep into the Pacific and even into the regions of the ancient East. (p. 274)

> Chinese: 美国的外交政策已经转向了一个开放的帝国主义时代。这次战争没有遵守西半球的传统的大陆概念，而是深入太平洋地区，甚至深入到古老的东方区域。（页274）

[¶13] From then on, “intervention was legitimized, and the United States could intervene in all important world affairs, whether political, social, or economic” (p. 290). The end of “Europe as the center” thus by no means signifies the end of state-centeredness. Rather, it means only that the United States succeeded in pushing the European great powers out of the Americas, making itself the sole dominant great power in the Americas, and then participating in that capacity in the competition to repartition global spheres of influence. Gilbert’s dating of the historical moment of “the end of the European Era” to the period beginning in 1890 is entirely consistent with Schmitt’s view.

> Chinese: 从此，“干涉被正当化了，美国可以插手政治、社会、经济等所有重要的世界事务”（页 290）。因此，“欧洲中心”的终结绝非意味着国家本位的终结，毋宁说，它仅仅意味着美国成功将欧洲大国挤出美洲，让自己成为独霸美洲的大国，然后以此大国身份参与重新划分全球势力范围的竞争。吉尔伯特把“欧洲纪元的终结”的历史时刻确定为 1890年以来，与施米特的看法完全一致。

[¶14] Seen in this light, the final section of Chapter One and the first section of Chapter Two form the pivot of The Nomos of the Earth, especially the latter. Here Schmitt briefly sets out the central point of the following three chapters. To see this point clearly, however, we need to compare it with the main tenets of Mackinder’s world-historical geography.

> Chinese: 由此看来，《大地的法》的第一章最后一节和第二章第一节乃全书枢纽，尤其后者。施米特在这里扼要阐述了随后三章的核心要点，但要看清这一要点，我们需要对比麦金德的世界历史地理观的要点。

[¶15] In Mackinder’s view, before the discovery of the New World in the sixteenth century, humanity’s struggle for living space unfolded only in two regions of the Eurasian-African landmass, which he called the “World - Island.” Two-thirds of the world’s population was settled in the “Crescent” of peripheral lands along the ocean-bounded eastern, southern, and western edges of Eurasia. The Eurasian “interior” (heart - land, also translated as “Heartland”), namely the central and northern parts of this landmass, was immensely extensive but very sparsely populated. Yet its steppe tribes long maintained a strategic advantage over the political entities of the Crescent. It was only through the great geographical discoveries of the generation of Columbus and other great navigators, which enabled the peoples of Western Europe to connect Eurasia’s eastern and western coasts by sea, that the strategic advantage of the Eurasian “Heartland” was neutralized (The Pivot, p. 64).

> Chinese: 在麦金德看来， 16世纪发现新大陆之前，人类争夺生存空间的斗争仅在地球上的欧亚非大陆——他称之为“世界岛”（World - Island）——的两个区域展开。全世界三分之二的人口定居在欧亚大陆被海洋包围的东、南、西面的“新月形”（Crescent）边缘地带，欧亚大陆“腹地”（heart - land，又译“心脏地带”）即这块陆地的中部和北部，地域极为广阔，人口却十分稀少，但这里的草原部族却对新月形地带的政治体长期保持战略优势。凭靠哥伦布一代伟大的航海家们的地理大发现，西欧民族通过航行把欧亚大陆东西海岸连接起来，才解除了欧亚大陆“心脏地带”的战略优势（《枢纽》，页 64）。

[¶16] The classical geographical relationship between Eurasia’s peripheral regions and its continental interior thus underwent a reversal of world-historical significance. The key to this historical change was that “when the seafaring peoples of Western Europe controlled the oceans with their fleets, settled along the outer rims of the continents, and, to varying degrees, turned the maritime fringes of Asia into dependencies,” they opened up a new Crescent, which Mackinder called the “Outer Crescent” (The Pivot, p. 68).

> Chinese: 欧亚大陆边缘地带与大陆腹地的古典地理关系因此而发生了具有世界历史意义的颠倒，这一历史变化的关键在于：“当西欧的航海民族以他们的舰队控制海洋，在各大陆的外缘定居，并在不同程度上把亚洲的海洋边缘变成属地时”，就开辟出一个新的新月形地带——麦金德称为“外新月形地带”（《枢纽》，页 68）。

[¶17] Thus Mackinder states at the very beginning of The Geographical Pivot of History that the geographical discoveries of the Columbian epoch had extended over a history of four hundred years. Following close on the heels of explorers, travelers, and missionaries came the “political appropriation” of the newly discovered lands by the monarchical states of Western Europe. By 1900, however, the Columbian epoch had ended, and on the earth’s surface “hardly a piece of land remained whose claims to ownership required confirmation” (The Pivot, p. 44).

> Chinese: 因此，麦金德在《历史的地理枢纽》中一开始就说，哥伦布纪元的地理发现经历了长达四百年历史，紧随探险家或旅行者或传教士的脚步而来的，是西欧王权国家对地理新发现的“政治占取”（political appropriation）。但是，到 1900年的时候，哥伦布纪元已经结束，全球地表上已经“几乎没有留下一块需要确认所有权申明的土地”（《枢纽》，页 44）。

[¶18] The process of “political appropriation” lasting more than three hundred years, which Mackinder did not discuss in detail, is precisely the “factual evidence, including certain specific questions” that Schmitt wishes to examine closely: the subject of Chapter Three. On the basis of this historical fact, Schmitt advances a view of the history of the modern world entirely different from Mackinder’s. Mackinder keeps his gaze fixed on the threat posed by the continental Heartland to the maritime great powers and the New World, a threat that he believes to be world-historical. Schmitt, by contrast, keeps his gaze fixed on the relationship between Europe, including Britain, and the “New World,” namely the Western Hemisphere revealed by the great geographical discoveries.

> Chinese: 麦金德没有细说的长达三百多年的“政治占取”过程，恰恰是施米特要细说的“事实依据，包括某些具体问题”，即第三章的内容。依据这一历史事实，施米特提出了与麦金德截然不同的现代世界的历史观。麦金德的目光牢牢盯住大陆心脏地带对海属大国以及新世界的威胁——如他相信的那样，这是一种世界历史性的威胁，施米特则把目光紧紧盯住包括英国在内的欧洲与“新世界”即地理大发现所发现的西半球的关系。

## 5. 3. What Is “Global Linear Thinking”?

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/5/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/5/#p-N

[¶0] 3. What Is “Global Linear Thinking”?

> Chinese: 三、什么是“全球划界思维”

[¶1] If this is so, the first section of Chapter 2, entitled “The Appropriation of the New World,” is the key to the entire book; the following two sections merely begin to develop its basic argument. To grasp this section is to grasp the essential meaning of the book, and it therefore deserves close reading.

> Chinese: 倘若如此，题为“占取新世界”的第二章第一节是全书关键，随后两节不过是对第一节中的基本论点的初步展开。把握这一节也就能把握全书要义，因此值得细看。

[¶2] This section is not long, approximately fifteen pages. Let us first consider its title: “The First Global Lines.” The term “dividing line” implies an act of “division.” According to Schmitt’s etymological explanation of “nomos,” it means “division, appropriation, and nurturing.” Drawing a “dividing line” thus means establishing a “nomos of the earth” and the spatial order that follows from it. Hence his statement that the global division set in motion by “the circumnavigation of the globe and the discovery of the New World at the beginning of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries” brought about the formation of the world law of the European epoch, namely international law, and that the history of its formation “continued into the twentieth century” (p. 55).

> Chinese: 这一节篇幅不长（大约 15页），让我们首先关注标题：“最初的地球分界线”。“分界线”这个术语隐含“划分”行为，按施米特对“法”的词源学解释，“法”意味着“划分、占取、养育”。从而，“分界线”的划分意味着创立一种“大地法”以及随之而来的空间秩序。所以他说，“ 15、 16世纪伊始的环球航行以及新大陆的发现”引发的全球划分，促成了欧洲纪元的天下法——国际法的形成，而这个形成史“一直持续到20世纪”（页 55）。

[¶3] The discovery of the New World immediately brought disputes over land-appropriation and sea-appropriation (Land - und Seenahme). The division and structure of the earth increasingly became a shared concern among neighboring peoples and powers. The earth’s dividing lines now had to be redrawn, and the land of the globe required a new division and arrangement. (p. 55)

> Chinese: 新大陆的发现立即带来了有关占地和夺海（Land - und Seenahme）的纷争。地球的划分与结构越来越成为相邻人群与势力之间的共同话题。此时，地球的分界线需要重新设定，全球的土地需要作出新的划分与安排。（页55）

[¶4] This was the beginning of the European epoch, or the modern beginning of world history, and of course the beginning of “Eurocentrism.” It was accompanied by a heightened historical and scientific consciousness. Put another way, as the world law of the European epoch took shape, Europe produced a vast range of writings of every kind, whose hold on scholarly thought has yet to be broken.

> Chinese: 这就是欧洲纪元的开端，或者说世界历史的现代开端，当然也是“欧洲中心主义”的开端。随之而来的还有历史意识和科学意识的提升，或者说随欧洲纪元的天下法的形成，欧洲产生出大量各色著述，迄今的学术思考还没有摆脱这些著述的支配。

[¶5] Anyone would acknowledge that the facts Schmitt adduces are well founded. The question is how to understand this beginning. For Schmitt, “from the standpoint of political practice, what matters is not the regional division of the earth’s surface, but the actual content of the earth’s spatial order” (p. 55). Yet Mackinder likewise views the historical transformations of the world’s geopolitical configuration “from the standpoint of political practice.” Why, then, is his approach problematic? Is it really impossible to distinguish right from wrong in political matters?

> Chinese: 谁都会承认，施米特所说的事实有根有据，问题在于，如何理解这个开端。对施米特来说“从政治实践层面来看，重要的不是地球表面的区域划分，而是地球空间秩序的实际内容”（页 55）。可是，麦金德同样“从政治实践层面来看”世界地缘的历史嬗变，为何又有问题？难道人们在政治问题上真的没法判别对错？

[¶6] Schmitt goes on to point out that the Eurocentrism of the European epoch is essentially a doctrine of civilizational superiority. Once American-centrism replaces Eurocentrism, a doctrine of American civilizational superiority makes its historical entrance:

> Chinese: 施米特接下来指出，欧洲纪元的欧洲中心主义实质上是一种文明优越论。一旦美国中心论取代欧洲中心论，美国文明优越论就历史地出场了：

[¶7] From the sixteenth to the twentieth century, European international law regarded the Christian states of Europe as the creators and bearers of the entire world order. The “European standard” was taken as the normal standard of the time, naturally applicable to the other parts of the world. “Civilization” as such was equated with “European civilization.” In this sense, Europe continued to be regarded as the center of the world. When the “New World” appeared, Europe naturally assumed the position of the “Old World.” The appearance of the American continent disclosed an entirely new world: even those scholars and cosmographers of antiquity and the Middle Ages who knew that the world was spherical and that one could reach India by sailing continually westward had never imagined that such a vast continent existed between Europe and East Asia. (pp. 55–56)

> Chinese: 16到20世纪的欧洲国际法，将欧洲基督教国家视为整个世界秩序的创造者和承担者。“欧洲标准”被认为是当时的常态标准，理所当然地适用于世界其他板块。所谓“文明”即被等同于“欧洲文明”。在此意义上，欧洲依然被看作是世界的中心。当“新世界”出现之时，欧洲的地位自然就成了“老世界”。美洲大陆的出现，展现了一个全新的世界，因为即便是古代和中世纪那些了解世界是一个球体、一直向西航行即可抵达印度的学问家和宇宙学家们也不曾料想，在欧洲和东亚之间竟还有这样一片广袤大陆的存在。（页55 - 56）

[¶8] Strictly speaking, a civilizational doctrine of “self-centeredness” is a general characteristic of classical civilizations. Schmitt was of course well aware that “the Christian peoples and princes of the Middle Ages all regarded Rome in Europe or Jerusalem as the center of the world.” We might add that the ancient Chinese regarded China as the center of the world. The difference is that, although the ancients in Europe, like the ancient Chinese, knew nothing of the other ancient parts of the earth’s surface, they were fully aware that powerful and dangerous enemies surrounded them on every side, whereas the powerful foreign enemies threatening the ancient Chinese came chiefly from the west and the north.

> Chinese: 严格来讲，文明的“自我中心”论是古典文明的一般特征。施米特当然清楚，“中世纪的基督教各民族及其王侯们，都将欧洲的罗马或耶路撒冷看成世界的中心。”我们会补充说，中国古人会把中国看成世界的中心。不同的是，欧洲的古人尽管与古代中国人一样，对世界地表上的其他古老部分并无了解，却充分了解自己的周边到处是强大而又危险的敌人，而威胁着古代中国人的强大外敌，主要来自西面和北面。

[¶9] For Schmitt, the fact that 1492 marked the birth of a “New World” meant that the great geographical discoveries had radically transformed traditional concepts “ranging from the earth’s center (Mitte) to its age (Alter).” Europeans now saw “an immense, hitherto unknown, non-European space,” and proceeded to seize and possess this new space. From this Schmitt advances his central argument:

> Chinese: 在施米特看来， 1492年标志着一个“新世界”的诞生意味着，地理大发现彻底改变了“包括地球的中心（Mitte）到地球的年龄（Alter）”的传统概念。现在，欧洲人看到了“一个巨大的、迄今为止不为人知的、非欧洲的空间”，并进而夺取和占有这一新空间。施米特由此提出了自己的关键论点：

[¶10] The most fundamental and decisive point for the ensuing centuries was that this newly emergent world was not treated as an enemy, but as free space (freier Raum), that is, as ownerless land (freies Feld) freely available for European conquest and expansion. During the first three hundred years, Europe undoubtedly assigned itself an exceptionally commanding position: it was both the center of the world and the center of the old continent. Yet from the outset the New World overturned the previous content of such concrete concepts as “center” and “old.” For the struggle among the European powers for the New World now began, and behind these conflicts a new spatial order and a new pattern of division were on the verge of emerging. (p. 56)

> Chinese: 对之后几个世纪最本质和关键的一点是，这个新出现的世界并没有被当作敌人，而是被当作自由空间（freier Raum），即被当作可以任由欧洲去征服和扩张的无主土地（freies Feld）。在起初的三百年间，欧洲的自我定位无疑极其强势：欧洲既是世界的中心，也是老大陆的中心。但新世界从一开始就颠覆了以往关于“中心”或“古老”这些具体概念的内涵。因为从今往后，欧洲内部列强争夺新世界的争战拉开了序幕，在这些争斗背后，新的空间秩序和新的划分格局呼之欲出。（页56）

[¶11] The question Schmitt proceeds to investigate is this: what relationship does the European powers’ struggle for the New World bear to the rise and decline of European public law?

> Chinese: 施米特要进一步探究的问题是：欧洲列强争夺新大陆与欧洲公法的兴衰有什么关系。

[¶12] Treaty of Tordesillas

> Chinese: Tratado de Tordesillas

[¶13] The discovery of the New World and the struggle for it prompted attempts by European states to conclude treaties through “amicable negotiation,” dividing up the new space for appropriation. This was the beginning of European international law; in other words, European international law originated in efforts to settle the conflicts among European states arising from their struggle for newly discovered spaces on the earth’s surface. The Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 was only the beginning of such attempts. During the following three hundred years, wars among European states grew ever more numerous, as did treaties to settle or restrain them. In practical terms, therefore, the formation and development of European international law were chiefly intended to limit wars among the political entities within the community of Christian Europe. Yet Schmitt emphasizes that European international law was born with an inherent internal contradiction: wars among the European kingdoms grew increasingly fierce over the division and appropriation of new spaces in the world; if the original meaning of “nomos” is “division, appropriation, and nurturing,” how could European international law genuinely limit wars arising from division and appropriation?

> Chinese: 新大陆的发现和争夺，催生了欧洲国家之间通过“友好协商”签订条约来划分占取新空间的尝试。这是欧洲国际法的开端，或者说，欧洲国际法源于平息欧洲国家之间因争夺新发现的地表空间而产生的冲突。 1494年的《托尔德西利亚条约》仅仅是这种尝试的开端，在随后三百年的历史过程中，欧洲国家之间的战争越来越多，平息或约束战争的条约也越来越多。因此，从实践上讲，欧洲国际法的形成和发展，主要是为了限制基督教欧洲共同体内部各政治体之间的战争。但施米特强调，欧洲国际法的诞生在一开始就带有与生俱来的内在矛盾：欧洲王国之间的战争因划分和占取新的世界空间而日趋激烈，“法”的本义就是“划分、占取、养育”，欧洲国际法又何以可能真正限制因划分和占取而引发的战争。

[¶14] Schmitt therefore emphasizes that what matters is to recognize that the discovery of the New World and the ensuing struggle among the European powers gave rise to “a particular mode of thinking,” namely “global linear thinking” (globales Liniendenken):

> Chinese: 因此，施米特强调，重要的是应该看到，新大陆的发现以及引发的欧洲列强争夺，催生出“一种特定的思维方式”，即“全球划界思维”（globales Liniendenken）：

[¶15] This mode of thinking constituted a distinctive stage in the development of human spatial consciousness and began to take root with the discovery of the “New World” and the opening of the “modern age” (Beginn der “Neuzeit”). It advanced step by step alongside the development of cartography and of the globe itself. As the word global [worldwide] indicates, this thinking already encompassed the whole earth, both its surface and what lay beneath; its all-embracing character was already pronounced, and it rested on the equal juxtaposition (Gleichsetzung) of sea and land. (p. 57)

> Chinese: 这种思维方式在人类空间意识的发展历程中成为特别的一个阶段，并随着“新大陆”的发现与“新时代”的开场（Beginn der “Neuzeit”）而开始植根。这种思维方式，随着地图绘制和地球本身的发展，也一步一步向前发展。从global[全球]这个词语看来，这种思维已经覆盖了全部地球，包括地表和地下，其无所不包的特点已经很凸现，并基于海洋和陆地的平等并置（Gleichsetzung）。（页57）

[¶16] Here Schmitt refers to the critical argument he has already advanced in the “Preface”: this thinking “was highly political from the outset and cannot be understood merely in a geographical sense.” Mackinder is renowned as a geographer, but we should not imagine him to be a natural scientist with supposedly apolitical, neutral qualities. In fact, Mackinder’s historical-geographical conception of the world displays the unmistakably political features of “linear thinking”: the Eurasian heartland / the crescent belt / the outer crescent belt. The following sentence may be said to strike directly at the crux of Mackinder’s essay “The Geographical Pivot of History”:

> Chinese: 在这里，施米特提到他在“前言”中已经提出的批判性观点：这种思维“从一开始就是高度政治性的，而不能仅仅是地理学意义上的”。麦金德以地理学家著称，我们不能以为他是个自然科学家，似乎具有非政治的中性特征。事实上，麦金德的世界历史地理观带有非常明显的政治性“划界思维”特征：欧亚大陆腹地 / 新月形地带 / 外新月形地带。下面这句话可以说直指麦金德《历史的地理枢纽》一文的要害：

[¶17] The neutrality of geography itself failed to prevent the onset of a political struggle, a struggle that immediately unfolded around geographical concepts. (p. 57)

> Chinese: 地理学本身的中立性未能阻却一场政治斗争的开场，这是一场围绕地理概念而旋即上演的政治斗争。（页57）

[¶18] The word “neutrality” here recalls Schmitt’s famous critique of liberal political science and jurisprudence in The Concept of the Political: the “neutrality” vaunted by this political science and jurisprudence is either self-deception that deceives others or a form of political deception. Seen in this light, the questions Schmitt considers in The Nomos of the Earth belong to the same line of thought as those he considers in The Concept of the Political.

> Chinese: 这里出现的“中立性”一词会让我们想起施米特在《政治的概念》中对自由主义政治学- 法学的著名批判：这种政治学 - 法学所标榜的“中立性”不是自欺欺人，就是一种政治欺骗。由此看来，施米特在《大地的法》中所思考的问题，与他在《政治的概念》中思考的问题一脉相承。

[¶19] He immediately gives two examples. First, Hobbes’s political philosophy rests on geometry and arithmetic, making it appear that he is discussing “self-evident axioms,” whereas it actually implies “the urgent necessity of distinguishing friend from enemy.” Second, the location of the prime meridian on today’s globes is not the result of scientific neutrality, but of “the struggle between the French and the English for command of the seas and dominion over the world”: the English placed the meridian through Greenwich, while since the eighteenth century the French had placed the prime meridian at the Paris Observatory, only abandoning their contest with the English in the twentieth century. The German astronomical almanac, too, “did not submit to the Greenwich meridian until 1916.”

> Chinese: 他马上举了两个例子，第一，霍布斯的政治哲学有几何学和算术学垫底，似乎他谈论的是“不言自明的公理”，其实隐含着“急迫地划分敌我的必要性”。第二，今日地球仪上的本初子午线的定位，不是科学的中立性结果，而是“法国人和英国人在制海权和世界主宰权上斗争”的结果：英国人把子午线定在跨越格林威治的位置，而法国人自18世纪以来就将本初子午线定在巴黎天文台所处的位置，直到20世纪才放弃同英国人较劲，而德国的星象学年鉴“也直至1916年才屈就于格林威治子午线”。

[¶20] The example of Hobbes has theoretical implications: it means that the “global linear thinking” Schmitt discusses is a question of political philosophy. Thus The Nomos of the Earth is by no means merely a work on the legal history of international law; it is also a work of political philosophy.

> Chinese: 霍布斯的例子具有理论意涵，这意味着，施米特所讨论的“全球划界思维”是个政治哲学问题。从而，《大地的法》绝非仅仅是关于国际法的法学史论著，也是政治哲学论著。

[¶21] From the perspective of world history, the great geographical discoveries passed through three stages over almost three centuries. Overseas competition between the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal was only the first stage, during which Spain discovered and appropriated South America. Spain and Portugal used force to monopolize the sea routes and forbid other kingdoms from using them. The kingdoms of England and France therefore had to open alternative routes, proceeding westward from the north, northwest, or northeast in the direction pioneered by Columbus. This led to new discoveries: vast expanses of North American land stretching from the Caribbean to the Arctic, whose colonization began immediately.

> Chinese: 从世界史角度上讲，地理大发现经历了三个阶段，历时差不多三个世纪，西班牙与葡萄牙两个王国的海外竞争仅仅是第一阶段，西班牙发现并占取了南美洲。西班牙和葡萄牙凭靠武力霸占了航线，不准其他王国使用，英格兰和法兰西王国只有另辟航路，从北面、西北面或东北面沿哥伦布开辟的方向往西，结果有了新的发现——发现从加勒比海到北极的北美洲大片陆地，并随即开始殖民。

[¶22] After 1632, the kingdoms of England and the Netherlands rose to challenge the hegemony of the Spanish kingdom, forcibly using its sea routes and beginning trade wars for control of Asia. This period, which continued into the first thirty years of the eighteenth century, is historically known as the second stage of the great geographical discoveries. In the mid-eighteenth century, the European kingdoms led the exploration of the Americas and Asia: naval fleets took scientists on exploratory voyages, broadly establishing the general configuration of the land along the eastern and western shores of the Pacific and proving Ptolemy’s geographical conjectures wrong. This is historically known as the “Silver Age” of geographical discovery. After Cook discovered the lands of the South Pacific, very little coastline on the earth remained to be explored. This is historically known as the third stage of the great geographical discoveries; only then did the now-established world maps and globes we use today come into being.

> Chinese: 1632年以后，英格兰王国和荷兰王国崛起，冲撞西班牙王国的霸权，强行占用其航路，开始了争夺亚洲的贸易战，一直到 18世纪前 30年，史称第二阶段的地理大发现。 18世纪中期，欧洲王国主导了对美洲和亚洲的探索：航队由海军带着科学家进行探察，大致搞清了太平洋东西海岸陆地的一般结构，证实了托勒密的地理设想是错的——史称地理发现的“白银时代”。库克发现南太平洋的陆地之后，地球上留待探察的海岸线已经所剩无几——史称第三阶段的地理大发现，从此才有了今天作为定版的世界地图和地球仪。

[¶23] Here Schmitt focuses his account on the historic acts of boundary-drawing in the first two stages, seeking to reveal the differences between their respective forms of “linear thinking.” We must attend to the political-historiographical intention behind this manner of writing.

> Chinese: 施米特在这里着重记叙了前两个阶段的历史性划界事件，并力图揭示这两个阶段的“划界思维”的差异。我们必须关注，他的如此笔法的政治史学意图何在。

[¶24] Schmitt says that 1492 is merely the emblematic year in which Columbus was commissioned to undertake his voyage; it is not the beginning of “linear thinking.” The true beginning was the “papal meridian” promulgated by Pope Alexander VI on May 4, 1494, to resolve the dispute between the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal. In passing, Schmitt refutes the claim that a fixed land and a free sea have stood in opposition since antiquity:

> Chinese: 施米特说， 1492年仅仅是哥伦布受命远航的标志性年份，它并不是“划界思维”的开端。真正的开端是罗马教宗亚历山大六世在 1494年 5月 4日发布的“教宗子午线”，以此解决西班牙王国与葡萄牙王国的争端。施米特顺便驳斥了确定的陆地与自由的海洋自古对立的论调：

[¶25] The opposition between fixed land and free sea, embodied in the spatial order of international law between 1713 and 1939, was still unknown at the time these lines were drawn. (p. 58)

> Chinese: 1713年到1939年之间国际法空间秩序所体现出的确定陆地与自由海洋之间的对立，在划界的当时还是陌生的事情。（页58）

[¶26] The fixity of the land means that land belongs to a sovereign; the freedom of the sea means that the sea has not yet been placed under sovereignty. Only a month after the “papal meridian” was drawn, on June 7, Spain and Portugal drew another meridian by signing the Treaty of Tordesillas under the mediation of a papal envoy. In Schmitt’s view, this treaty divided, or more precisely carved up, the entire oceanic extent of the globe for the first time: “Taking this meridian as the boundary, newly discovered regions to the west belonged to Spain, and newly discovered regions to the east to Portugal.” In other words, the appropriation of land included the right to control maritime passages; henceforth, the sea no longer possessed the “free” character of something without an owner.

> Chinese: 陆地的确定性指陆地有主权归属，海洋的自由性指海洋尚未有主权归属。“教宗子午线”划过之后仅仅一个月（6月 7日），西班牙和葡萄牙在教宗使节调停下，通过签订《托尔德西利亚条约》又划定了另一条子午线。在施米特看来，这个条约首次划分——或更准确地说瓜分了——整个地球的海洋范围：“以该子午线为界，往西新发现的区域归西班牙，往东新发现的区域归葡萄牙。”换言之，对陆地的占取包含对海洋通道的控制权，从此海洋不再具有无主的“自由”性质。

[¶27] As a supplement to the Treaty of Tordesillas, Spain and Portugal signed the Treaty of Saragossa (Vertrag von Saragossa) in April 1529, drawing a so-called “raya line” (Raya) through eastern Siberia, Japan, and central Australia, running the length of the western Pacific. This global dividing line is of great importance not only in Schmitt’s subsequent discussion but also to us, because it lies close to China, quite apart from the fact that this remains to the present day what geopolitics calls a shatterbelt.

> Chinese: 作为《托尔德西利亚条约》的补充，西班牙和葡萄牙在 1529年 4月签订《萨拉戈萨条约》（Vertrag von Saragossa），划定了一条穿过东西伯利亚、日本和澳大利亚中部的所谓“拉亚线”（Raya），纵贯太平洋西部。这条地球分界线不仅在施米特随后的论述中非常重要，而且对我们也非常重要，因为这条线靠近中国，更不用说这里直到如今仍然是政治地缘学所谓的破碎地带。

[¶28] Then, in 1559, Spain and France signed the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis (Cateau Cambrésis). This division marked a turning point in world history, because this time the dispute over partition was being settled between Spain and France. This meant that conflicts over boundary-drawing had extended beyond the great family of the Holy Roman Empire. Even so, this treaty dividing spheres of influence stressed its supposedly “amicable” character. In other words, although Spain and France did not belong to the same political unit, they nevertheless acknowledged that both belonged to the European family and believed in the same God, and that their dispute over partition should be resolved “amicably.”

> Chinese: 接下来的 1559年，西班牙和法国之间签订了《卡托-康布雷齐和约》（Cateau Cambrésis）。这次划分具有世界历史的转折意义，因为，这次是西班牙与法国解决争分。这意味着，划界冲突已经越出神圣罗马帝国这个大家庭范围。尽管如此，这次划分势力范围的条约强调了所谓“友好”性质。换言之，尽管西班牙与法国不属于同一个政治单位，毕竟认同双方都属于欧洲大家庭，信奉同一个上帝，应该“友好”解决争分。

[¶29] The Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, or the symbolic reconciliation between France and Spain.

> Chinese: La paix du Cateau-Cambresis ou la réconciliation symbolique entre la France et l'Espagne.

[¶30] Schmitt’s world-historical gaze then suddenly turns to the Second World War in the twentieth century, and he mentions the rise of the United States.

> Chinese: 随后，施米特的世界史目光突然投向了 20世纪的第二次世界大战，并提到美国的崛起。

[¶31] Global linear thinking has its own distinctive developmental path and history. Its various instances must now be assessed further from the perspective of the spatial order of international law. Together, these instances form an interconnected and unified theoretical sequence extending from the discovery of the New World of the Americas in 1492 to American declarations during the Second World War. (p. 60)

> Chinese: 全球性的划界思维有其独特的发展路径和历史。这种思维的多个例证现在要以国际法空间秩序的眼光来进一步评断。这些例证共同构成自1492年发现美洲新大陆到二战时的美国声明期间一系列相互关联而统一的理论序列。（页60）

[¶32] What does Schmitt mean by placing the discovery of the American New World in 1492 alongside the United States during the Second World War and joining them into a long historical thread? Does he mean to say that the twentieth century’s Second World War was merely the latest of Europe’s repeated redrawing of global boundaries since 1492?

> Chinese: 施米特把 1492年发现美洲新大陆与二战时的美国相提并论，并连成一条历史的长段线索，其意何在？难道他想要说， 20世纪的第二次世界大战不过是欧洲自 1492年以来的多次更改全球划界的最近一次而已？

[¶33] It is not difficult to understand why Schmitt attaches greater importance to “raya lines” and “amity lines.” The “raya lines” show that lands and seas far from Europe had become objects of contention among the European powers; the “amity lines” show that more European powers had joined the struggle. Chapter 3 therefore begins with the following heading: the state becomes the leading force in the new interstate, Eurocentric global spatial order. This raises the need for European states to regulate their relations by establishing laws: a common law among European states, namely international law, became an urgent necessity.

> Chinese: 施米特更看重“拉亚线”和“友好线”，原因不难理解。因为，“拉亚线”表明，远离欧洲地域的陆地和海洋成了欧洲强国的争夺对象；“友好线”则表明，更多的欧洲强国加入了争夺行列。因此，第三章以这样一个标题开始：国家成为新的国家间欧洲中心主义全球空间秩序的主导力量。这就引出欧洲国家之间必须通过订立法律来规约相互关系的问题——欧洲国家之间的共同法即国际法成为当务之急。

[¶34] But why does Schmitt connect the “raya lines” and “amity lines” to the United States in the twentieth century? We may suppose that, according to the logic of “raya lines” and “amity lines,” a rising United States was bound to participate in the European kingdoms’ disputes over boundaries and partition, since it was, after all, a country born from Europe’s womb. We all know that, from the Cairo Declaration to the Yalta Agreement, the United States and Soviet Russia presided over a new round of global boundary-drawing. Needless to say, as had repeatedly happened throughout earlier history, the redrawing of boundaries depended on victory or defeat in wars between states. Even when the European states fought one another to pieces over global boundaries, they remained within the “amity lines.” Yet after the Second World War in the twentieth century, the United States revised the principle of “amity lines,” which could be called a modern European tradition, breaking the rules of European public international law that had developed over nearly three hundred years and overturning Europe’s “amicable” law of war.

> Chinese: 可是，施米特为什么要把“拉亚线”和“友好线”与 20世纪的美国联系起来呢？可以设想，按照“拉亚线”和“友好线”的逻辑，美国的崛起必定会参与欧洲王国之间的划界争分，因为美国毕竟是出自欧洲母腹的国家。我们都清楚，从开罗宣言到雅尔塔协议，美国和苏俄主持了新一轮全球划界。不用说，与过去的历史上一再出现的情形一样，重新划界取决于国家间的战争胜负。欧洲国家即便因全球划界相互之间打得一塌糊涂，毕竟都在“友好线”之内，但 20世纪的二战后的美国修改了堪称现代欧洲传统的“友好线”原则，打破了近三百年来形成的欧洲国际公法的规矩，颠覆了欧洲的“友好”战争法。

[¶35] We can thus understand why Chapters 3 and 4 of The Nomos of the Earth focus on the historical transformation of the nature of war: from medieval war to the “non-discriminatory war” of modern Europe, and then to discriminatory war at the end of the European epoch, from 1890 onward.

> Chinese: 由此我们可以理解，《大地的法》第三和第四两章的重点内容是战争性质的历史嬗变：从中世纪的战争到现代欧洲的“非歧视性战争”，再到欧洲纪元终结时（1890年以来）的歧视性战争。

## 6. 4. “Amity Lines” and Discriminatory Divisions

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/6/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/6/#p-N

[¶0] 4. “Amity Lines” and Discriminatory Divisions

> Chinese: 四、“友好线”与歧视性划分

[¶1] Since this is a historical process, the evolution of these boundary treaties and their historical connections imply that “the different courses and stages of global linear thinking intersect to form entirely different spatial orders,” carrying entirely different meanings in international law. A political-historiographical approach requires an examination of these treaties’ premises and presuppositions in international law, as well as the conceptions of political space they reflect. In this way, Schmitt raises the question to the level of political philosophy, and Hobbes and Hegel enter the discussion in succession.

> Chinese: 既然是一个历史的过程，这些划界条约的演变及其历史关联，便隐含着“全球划界思维的不同线路和不同阶段彼此交错而形成截然不同的空间秩序”，其中蕴含着截然不同的国际法内涵。政治史学式的思考需要考察这些条约的国际法前提和预设，以及它们所反映的政治空间观念。这样一来，施米特就把问题上升到政治哲学高度，霍布斯和黑格尔接踵出场。

[¶2] This section is therefore especially important. The three points of theoretical analysis Schmitt puts forward here form the foundation for the elaboration in the next two chapters and well deserve close attention.

> Chinese: 可见这一节非常重要，施米特在这里提出的三点理论分析，是随后两章展开的基础，颇值得细看。

[¶3] First, a historical turning point separates the raya lines of Spain and Portugal from the “amity lines” of England and France. Spain and Portugal were “spiritually homogeneous” and submitted to the mediation of the Roman Curia. Behind the raya lines, as contractual agreements in international law, “stood a common religious order (ordo) and a political entity”; the Roman Curia “was in fact an arbiter under international law.” Although the Curia could not determine to whom the land belonged, it was responsible for the division of missionary territories (Missionsgebiete). Schmitt acknowledges that this itself “was also an expression of a spatial order, namely one distinguishing the Christian sphere of influence from non-Christian regions.”

> Chinese: 首先，从西葡两国的拉亚线到英法两国的“友好线”（amity lines），其间有一个历史性转折。因为，西葡两国在“精神上同质”，服从罗马教廷调停，拉亚线作为国际法意义上的契约性协议，“背后存在一个共同的宗教秩序（ordo）以及政权实体”，罗马教廷“实乃一个国际法上的裁判官”。罗马教廷虽然不能决定陆地归属，却负责传教区的划分（Missionsgebiete）。施米特承认，这本身“也是一种空间秩序的表达，即一种区分基督教势力范围和非基督教区域的空间秩序”。

[¶4] Moreover, since “the division of missionary territories was intimately connected with the delimitation of navigation and trade,” the pope also intervened in the distribution of economic and political interests. This raised a question: did Christian kingdoms have the right to use force against regions that resisted missionary activity and “free trade”? To address this, the Spanish Dominican friar Francisco Vitoria (1483–1546) advanced a doctrine of just war in 1538. In Vitoria’s view, freedom of missionary activity and freedom of commerce were not initially, but ultimately became, “legal titles to just war, and consequently legal rights of appropriation and annexation” (p. 61, note). [10]

> Chinese: 不仅如此，由于“传教区的划分与航海和贸易的界分息息相关”，教宗也就插手了经济和政治利益的分配。由此引出的问题是：基督教王国是否有权利对抵制传教和“自由贸易”的地区动用武力。为此，西班牙的多明我会教士维多利亚（Francisco Vitoria，1483 - 1546）在 1538年提出了一套关于正义战争的说法。在维多利亚看来，传教自由和商业自由起初不是、但最终成了“正义战争的法权资格，并因此而成为占取和兼并的法权”（页 61注释）。 [10]

[¶5] Even so, in Schmitt’s view, “the raya lines themselves did not concern the demarcation of Christian and non-Christian regions,” but constituted “an internal boundary within the framework of a spatial order between two Christian powers engaged in extensive appropriation.” The crucial point is that, at the time, “land-appropriation and sea-appropriation had not yet been distinguished,” and the common spatial order of medieval European Christendom had not yet been breached.

> Chinese: 尽管如此，在施米特看来，“拉亚线本身并不涉及基督教和非基督教地区的界分”，而是“两个大肆占取的基督教势力之间空间秩序框架下的一种内部分界”。关键在于，当时，“占地和夺海尚未区分开来”，中世纪欧洲基督教的共同空间秩序尚未突破。

[¶6] In 1559, Spain and France reached the secret oral agreement of the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. The element of European history embodied in this agreement was the division of the Roman Church, which inaugurated “the age of religious wars between Catholic and Protestant sea-appropriating powers.” Why does Schmitt attach such importance to this oral agreement? Because it had major historical significance for the formation of European international law: it distinguished conflicts within the Christian family of Europe from conflicts outside it. Conflicts between Catholics and Protestants and their respective states were internal conflicts; a conflict between a member of this great family and an outsider was a different matter.

> Chinese: 1559年，西班牙与法国达成口头性的《卡托-康布雷齐和约》秘密协定，这个协定带有的欧洲历史因素是罗马教会的分离，从而开启了“天主教和新教夺海势力之间宗教战争的年代”。为什么施米特看重这个口头协定？因为它对欧洲国际法的形成具有重要的历史意义，即区分欧洲基督教家庭内部与外部的冲突：天主教和新教及其国家间的冲突属于内部冲突，这个大家庭的成员之一与外部的冲突另当别论。

[¶7] This means that so-called “international law” was the law governing relations within the European family and did not apply outside it. Spain repeatedly declared that “the various treaties have no effect in the ‘Indies’ (Indien), because these belong to the New World.” This meant that when war broke out within the European family, its members had to observe the rules governing relations among European states, namely so-called “international law.” But if a conflict broke out between a member of this family and a nonmember, the rules could be disregarded and the war fought however one pleased. The Anglo-French forces could set fire to the Yuanmingyuan after entering Beijing, whereas the French could not do such things when they entered Vienna.

> Chinese: 这意味着，所谓“国际法”是欧洲大家庭内部关系的法律，不适用于这个家庭之外。西班牙多次表态，“诸多条约对‘印第安’（Indien）不起效用，因为它属于新世界。”这意味着，欧洲大家庭之间发生战争，各家庭成员就得遵守欧洲国家间的规矩，即所谓“国际法”。如果是这个大家庭成员与某个非家庭成员之间发生冲突，就可以不讲规矩，想怎么打就怎么打。英法联军攻入北京后可以放火烧圆明园，法国人攻入维也纳则不能干这类事情。

[¶8] Schmitt notes that matters became more complicated when France, competing with the Spanish king, allied itself with heathens, barbarous pirates, and even “Spain’s cities in the Americas to carry out plunder together” (p. 63). For outsiders had been introduced into a conflict between two members of the same family. Yet because this conflict took place outside European territory, or “on the other side of the line,” it was not bound by the laws of the European family. In this way, drawing a boundary became a demarcation of order: whether a conflict between two members of the same family occurred on this side of the line or the other distinguished the presence of law from its absence.

> Chinese: 施米特提到，为了与西班牙国王竞争，法国与异教徒、野蛮的海盗乃至“西班牙在美洲的城市结盟，共同实施掠夺”（页 63），就使得事情复杂化了。因为，两个同属一个家庭的成员之间的冲突引入了外部成员。但是，由于这一冲突发生在欧洲地域之外，或者说发生在“界线另一边”，就不受欧洲大家庭法律的约束。这样一来，划界就变得了秩序的分界：两个同属一个家庭的成员之间的冲突在界线这边和那边，是有法和无法的区分。

[¶9] Schmitt gives the example of France’s privy councillor, Cardinal de Richelieu (1585–1642), who declared that French ships were forbidden to attack Spanish and Portuguese vessels, but only as far as the Tropic of Cancer; beyond this line they were not bound by the prohibition, unless Spain and Portugal opened the land and sea routes to the Americas and India. This example shows that during the second stage of the great geographical discoveries, when Europe’s great powers competed for dominance overseas, the scope of European international law was still constrained by the prevailing balance of power.

> Chinese: 施米特举例说，法国的枢密官黎塞留（Cardinal de Richelieu， 1585 - 1642）宣布，法国船舰不准袭击西葡两国船只，仅以北回归线为界，越过此线就不受约束，除非西班牙和葡萄牙开放通往美洲和印度的陆上和海上通道。这个例子让我们看到，地理大发现的第二阶段即欧洲各强权国家争夺海外势力支配权时期，欧洲国际法的适用范围仍然受均势状态的限制。

[¶10] At this line, Europe ended and the New World began. At this line, European law, and especially European public law, also lost its force. Thus, beyond this line, the prohibitions on war advanced by European international law up to that point ceased to apply, and wars of appropriation were fought without restraint. Beyond this line began an “overseas” region where there were no legal restrictions on war and only the law of the jungle, in which the strong devour the weak, prevailed. (pp. 63–64)

> Chinese: 以此线为界，欧洲结束，新世界开始。以此线为界，欧洲的法律，尤其是欧洲的公法，也失去了效力。因此，从这条线开始，迄今的欧洲国际法所推动的战争禁令也失效了，为占取而行的争战肆无忌惮。在这条线之外，一个“海外的”区域开始了，这里不存在战争的法律限制，所行的只有弱肉强食的丛林法则。（页63 - 64）

[¶11] Europeans behaved in a “civilized” manner only among themselves. Beyond the “amity lines” lay the state of nature, where there was no “common premise or common authority.” The European states agreed that beyond the line “lay an entirely free new world”: “It was called free because this line marked out a region in which violence could be used at will.” In the United States’ present-day declarations of “freedom of navigation,” we can still discern this meaning from more than three hundred years ago.

> Chinese: 欧洲人的“文明”行为仅仅是内部行为，在“友好线”之外就是自然状态，在这里没有“一个共同的前提或共同的权威”。欧洲国家共同认可，此线之外“尽是自由新天地”：“所谓自由，是因为这条线划定了一个可以肆意使用暴力的区域。”在当今美国的“自由航行”的宣称中，我们还可以看到三百多年前的这层含义。

[¶12] The implication of this line was that only the princes and subjects of Christian Europe could be treaty partners in the new global appropriation. Yet the supposed common ground underlying relations among the princes and peoples of Christian Europe lacked both a unified, concrete, and legitimate arbitral authority and any concrete principle of division beyond the strong devouring the weak and first possession conferring title. This could give rise to a general conception that everything happening on the other side of the line was exempt from judgment according to the legal, political, and moral standards hitherto recognized in Europe. This would mean a tremendous easing of Europe’s internal problems, and this way of easing tensions was precisely the notorious “beyond the line” device of international law. (p. 64)

> Chinese: 该界线的潜台词是，只有基督教欧洲的诸侯和子民，才能成为参与新全球占取的协约伙伴。但是，这些隐藏在基督教欧洲诸侯和民族之间的所谓共同点，既缺乏一个统一的、具体且有合法性的仲裁机构，也缺乏一种除了弱肉强食、先占先得之外的具体的划分原则。由此可以产生一个普遍的设想，即此线彼岸发生的一切，都不能用迄今在欧洲已获承认的法律、政治和道德标准去评价。这将意味着欧洲内部问题的巨大缓和，而这种缓和矛盾的方式，正是国际法上臭名昭著的“界线之外”的伎俩。（页64）

[¶13] We should note that when Richelieu announced this rule in July 1634, Europe was in the midst of its first great internal war of the modern age, the German Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), while a number of historians regard the two great European wars of the twentieth century as a second Thirty Years’ War of this kind.

> Chinese: 应该注意到，黎塞留在 1634年 7月宣布这一规矩时，正值欧洲内部的现代第一场大战即德意志 30年战争（1618 - 1648）期间，而 20世纪的两次欧洲大战则被好些史学家视为第二次这样的 30年战争。

[¶14] Schmitt’s theoretical analysis of these three points concentrates on the second, which occupies eight pages, while the first and third each take up fewer than two. Here we see Schmitt raise the problem that concerns him to the level of political philosophy.

> Chinese: 施米特对于这三点的理论分析侧重于第二点，篇幅长达 8页，而第一和第三点分别不到两页篇幅。在这里我们看到，施米特让他所关注的问题上升到政治哲学高度。

[¶15] The amity lines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries disclosed two kinds of supposedly free regions in which the European peoples could act abroad without scruple: first, free land, the Americas, where Europeans could appropriate freely without further regard for any previously existing laws; second, the free sea, the newly discovered oceans that the French, Dutch, and English regarded as regions open to free appropriation. (p. 64)

> Chinese: 16、17世纪的友好界线彰显了两种所谓的自由区域，在此，欧洲各族对外可以无所顾忌地大展拳脚：其一是自由的土地——美洲，欧洲人可以在此自由地占取，一切旧有的法律不必再顾忌；其二是自由的海洋，新发现的大洋被法国人、荷兰人和英格兰人看成可以自由占取的区域。（页64）

[¶16] This amounts to saying that “free land” and “free sea” are in fact predatory concepts. Yet they sound as though they refer to common property in the Roman-law sense (res communis omnium), and are thus thoroughly deceptive concepts. No one has stopped to ask: among whom are this “free land” and this “free sea” held in common?

> Chinese: 这无异于说，所谓“自由的土地”和“自由的海洋”其实都是掠夺性概念，但它听起来像是指罗马法意义上的共同财物（res communis omnium），从而是个彻头彻尾的欺骗性概念。人们没有想过：谁与谁拥有共同的“自由土地”和“自由海洋”？

[¶17] Since the struggle for distant “free land” required passage across the “free sea,” the historic controversy between the English jurist Selden and the Dutch jurist Grotius arose. [11] Here, however, Schmitt does not analyze that famous controversy, but instead seeks to reveal the question in the history of political philosophy raised by these two predatory concepts, “free land” and “free sea”:

> Chinese: 由于争夺遥远的“自由土地”需要通过“自由的海洋”，于是就有了英国法学家塞尔顿与荷兰法学家格劳秀斯的历史性论争。 [11]不过，施米特在这里没有论析这场著名论争，而是致力于揭示“自由的土地”和“自由的海洋”这两个掠夺性概念所引发的政治哲学史问题：

[¶18] The demarcated free spheres recognized by Christian governments had the consequence of universally and fundamentally shaking all traditional spiritual and moral principles. … In other words, the demarcation of free spheres meant a radical overturning of all the rules and premises inherited from antiquity and the Christian Middle Ages. (p. 65)

> Chinese: 基督教政府所承认的划分出去的自由领域造成了一个后果，即普遍、彻底地撼动了所有传统的精神和道德原则……换言之，对古代和基督教中世纪传承下来的所有规则和前提，自由领域的划分意味着一个彻底的颠覆。（页65）

[¶19] Schmitt sharply observes that setting apart free spheres meant that justice, goodness, and even truth had a limited sphere of application: “Christian princes and their subjects all agreed not to distinguish between right and wrong, or good and evil, in certain territories.” This meant that so-called “freedom” was lawlessness without any moral constraint. Europeans were civilized people only in their own homelands; outside them, they were savage men in a state of nature.

> Chinese: 施米特尖锐地指出，划分出自由领域意味着，正义、善乃至真理有一个适用范围：“基督教的王侯和子民都一致同意，对于特定的地域不去区分是非与对错。”这意味着所谓“自由”就是无法无天，没有任何道德约束。欧洲人在自己的家园内才是文明人，在家园之外是野蛮的自然人。

[¶20] From this Schmitt develops a new understanding of the doctrine of the state of nature in Hobbes’s theory of the state. He candidly acknowledges that his own The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, published twelve years earlier, in 1938, had also failed to recognize this point: Hobbes’s view that in the state of nature man is a wolf to man has a “historical connection” with the drawing of “amity lines” (p. 67, note). This was so even though Schmitt had recognized that, despite accepting international law, the European states remained in a “state of nature” confronting one another: “Only within the state is there security; outside the state there is none.” [12]

> Chinese: 施米特由此引出了对霍布斯国家理论中的自然状态论的重新理解，并坦然承认，自己在 12年前（1938）发表的《霍布斯国家理论中的利维坦》也没有能够看到这一点，即霍布斯认为，自然状态下人与人的关系是狼，这个观点与“友好线”的划分有“历史性关联”（页 67注释），尽管他看到，即便接受了国际法，欧洲各国仍然处于相互对峙的“自然状态”——“国家里才有安全，国家之外毫无安全”。 [12]

[¶21] Vitoria, after all, still acknowledged that barbarians were human beings too. After the Enlightenment, this humanitarian view was proclaimed even more loudly. Yet in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, “man is a wolf to man” became a rule of actual life. This was connected with the drawing of the so-called “amity lines,” because “the New World became an open and unrestricted sphere recognized by the governments of Christian Europe” (p. 66). Unlike twelve years earlier, Schmitt now holds that it was by no means accidental that Hobbes’s doctrine of the “state of nature” appeared at the time of the discovery of the free New World:

> Chinese: 维多利亚毕竟还承认，野蛮人也是人。启蒙运动之后，这种人道观更为响亮，唯独在 16至 17世纪，“人与人是狼”成了一条现实法则。这与所谓“友好线”的划界有关，因为，“新大陆成为基督教欧洲政府承认的开放和不受拘束的领域”（页 66）。与 12年前不同，施米特现在认为，霍布斯的“自然状态”说出现在发现自由的新大陆之际，绝非偶然：

[¶22] Hobbes clearly based his thinking not only on a remorseful reflection on Europe’s civil wars, but also on the fact of the New World’s emergence. The “state of nature” of which Hobbes spoke was by no means a utopia nonexistent in space. His state of freedom was rather a “no-man’s-land,” but far from a “nowhere.” This land could be located, and Hobbes located it in the New World. In Leviathan, “American-ness” (Americani) is explicitly described as the wolfish character of humanity in the state of nature. The atrocities mentioned in Behemoth refer to the actions of Spanish Christians in the Inca Empire. Admittedly, Hobbes’s later thought was more concerned with constructing abstract concepts than with reflecting on concrete processes in time and space. Or, to put it another way, the so-called state of nature was rather a hypothetical construction than a historical reality. Yet this did not efface the important historical connection between the state of nature and the amity lines. (pp. 66–67)

> Chinese: 霍布斯显然不是仅仅基于忏悔欧洲内战的观感，而是也基于新世界的诞生这一事实。霍布斯所言的“自然状态”绝非一片在空间上不存在的乌托邦。霍布斯所说的自由状态毋宁是一种“无人之境”，但远非“无在之境”。这片土地可以定位，而霍布斯也将其定位在新世界。在《利维坦》中，“美洲性”（Americani）被明确表述为人类在自然状态中狼的性格。在《比希莫斯》一书中提到的暴行，就是指西班牙的基督教徒们在印加帝国的所作所为。虽然霍布斯的晚期思想更多致力于建构抽象概念，而不是针对具体的时间和空间历程的思考。或者说，所谓自然状态毋宁是一种假想的建构，而不是历史的真实。但是，这并未消除自然状态与友好界线的重要历史联系。（页66 - 67）

[¶23] Schmitt’s first long footnote here also deserves close reading, for he says that “Hegel’s approach to the construction of the state likewise continued in the direction opened up by Hobbes”: “For Hegel, America was a place with civil society but no state.” This footnote is puzzling: was “civil society,” in Hegel’s view, a state of nature? If so, did the American political order amount to a state of barbarism?

> Chinese: 施米特在这里下的第一个长注也值得细看，因为他说，“黑格尔的国家建构思路亦延续了霍布斯开辟的方向”：“在黑格尔看来，美国是一个没有国家只有市民社会的地方。”这个注释令人费解：“市民社会”在黑格尔看来是自然状态？倘若如此，美国政制无异于野蛮状态？

[¶24] Schmitt quickly passes over this question and turns to Ferdinand Tönnies’s studies of Hobbes. He says that Tönnies recognized the need to understand Hobbes’s doctrine of the state of nature in its historical context. This context was precisely the age in which the idea of “amity lines and a new kind of utterly free, unrestricted space” emerged, although this did not exclude the possibility that Hobbes’s state of nature referred to the already obsolete feudal anarchy of the Middle Ages.

> Chinese: 施米特很快滑过这个问题，转而说到滕尼斯（Ferdinand Tönnies）的霍布斯研究。他说滕尼斯看到，应该从历史语境的角度来理解霍布斯的自然状态论，而这个历史语境正是“友好之线以及一种新型的非常自由的无限制空间”观念冒出来的时代，尽管并不排除霍布斯的自然状态指已经过时的中世纪的封建无政府状态。

[¶25] In the main text, however, the question passed over in the footnote is taken up again: Schmitt says that “a third clear illustration of the effect of the amity lines is provided by Locke.” We should recall: was Locke not the intellectual founding father of the United States? When discussing Locke, however, Schmitt does not name the United States directly, saying only that “in Locke’s conception, too, the state of nature and the New World are intimately connected historically”:

> Chinese: 但是，在正文中，脚注中滑过的问题得到延续：施米特说，“友好界线效用的第三个明证当推洛克。”我们应该想到，洛克不正是美国的立国教父吗？不过，在说到洛克时，施米特没有直接点美国的名，仅仅说“在洛克的设想里，自然状态和新世界在历史上也休戚相关”：

[¶26] Except that in Locke this state of nature had already become an entirely tolerable social condition (Sozial - Zustand), and no longer carried the old meaning of beyond the line [beyond this line]. (p. 67) [13]

> Chinese: 只不过这个自然状态在洛克那里已成为一个完全可以承受的社会状态（Sozial - Zustand），而不再是旧有的beyond the line[此线之外]）的含义。（页67）[13]

[¶27] Following this logic, Schmitt appears to indicate, in exceedingly cautious prose, that the founding of the United States and its subsequent rise followed the law of the jungle characteristic of the state of nature. Whether this is indeed Schmitt’s view can be confirmed only through a close reading of Chapter 4. Nevertheless, the following passage provides something of a clue:

> Chinese: 按照这种逻辑推论下去，施米特显得以极为小心的笔法表明：美国的立国及其后来的崛起，遵循的是自然状态的丛林法则。施米特的观点是否如此，我们需要细读第四章才能得到印证。尽管如此，随后的一段话多少可以看到一点儿端倪：

[¶28] The significance in international law of the amity lines drawn in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was that they marked out vast free territories as battlefields for the struggle over the New World. Their legal justification was that, by demarcating free territories, the space of freedom and peace on this side of the line, governed by European public law, was relieved of pressure and protected from threats arising from conditions on the other side; otherwise, the stability of Europe’s zone of peace would have been difficult to maintain. In other words, demarcating a battlefield for the struggle over the New World served to restrain warfare within Europe. This was the source of its significance and legitimacy in international law. (p. 68)

> Chinese: 16、17世纪划定的友好界线的国际法意义在于，大片的自由疆域，为争夺新世界而开战的疆场被划定出来。其法律上的正当性在于，通过划定自由疆域，界线这边由欧洲公法管控下的自由与和平的空间获得了释放，不会因为界线那边的情况而遭遇威胁，否则欧洲和平区的稳定也难以维持。换言之，划定争夺新世界的战场，服务于对欧洲内部战争的遏制。这就是其国际法上的意义与合法性所在。（页68）

[¶29] To put it plainly, the United States rose within the free territories marked out by Europeans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where there were no constraints of international law between states. At its founding, the United States also proclaimed its separation from Europe. After the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States reentered the civilized European order, bringing barbarous, lawless habits into Europe. Thus, during the first European war of the twentieth century, a discriminatory concept of war emerged, and the European epoch, or Europe’s tradition of international law, began to draw to a close.

> Chinese: 说白了，美国是在 16 - 17世纪的欧洲人所划出的自由疆域中崛起的，这里没有国家间的国际法的约束，美国在立国之初也宣称与欧洲切割。在 1898年的美西战争之后，美国重新介入文明的欧洲秩序，把野蛮的非法习惯带入欧洲。于是， 20世纪的第一次欧战就出现了歧视性的战争概念，欧洲纪元或者说欧洲的国际法传统开始走向终结。

[¶30] From a world-historical perspective, American conduct was learned from Britain’s instruction, assistance, and example. Britain had achieved global hegemony by the end of the nineteenth century, and that hegemony rested on the division made by the “amity lines.” From the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the civilized-world side of the “amity lines” had consisted of the great family of Europe. Now Britain alone remained as this family’s sole, unquestioned master: the civilized world was Britain alone, and everything “beyond the line” was free territory.

> Chinese: 从世界历史的角度看，美国行为来自英国的传帮带。因为，英国在 19世纪末取得了全球性霸权，而这种霸权基于“友好线”的划分。在 16 - 18世纪，“友好线”的文明世界一边是欧洲这个大家庭。现在，这个大家庭仅剩下英国这个唯一的绝对老大，文明世界仅仅是英国，“此线之外”都是自由疆域。

[¶31] Schmitt gives two examples to illustrate this. First, “English law has continued to this day to distinguish among the particular characteristics of different territories.” This is because colonial possession took diverse forms, whereas continental European legal thinking recognized only one type of territory: “state territory” (Staatsgebiet).

> Chinese: 施米特举了两个例子来说明这一点。首先，“英国法律直到现在都一直保留了对不同疆域特殊性的区分。”这是因为殖民地的占有形式具有多样性，而欧洲大陆性的法制思维只承认一种疆域类型，即“国家疆域”（Staatsgebiet）。

[¶32] Second, English law includes the concept of the “state of exception” (Ausnahmezustand). For example, the law of naval warfare seeks to demarcate a particular sphere in time and space within which all existing legal rights may be suspended, thereby marking out in legal form a period of exception distinct from normality. In Schmitt’s view, this concept plainly rests on the practice of marking out free spheres:

> Chinese: 第二，英国法中有所谓“例外状态”（Ausnahmezustand）概念，比如海战法旨在划定时间和空间上的一个特点领域，在这个领域可以吊销一切既有法权，从而以法律形式划出一个有别于常态的例外时期。在施米特看来，这一概念明显基于划出自由领域的习惯：

[¶33] Within this special region of time and space, anything can happen, provided there is a practical need for it. (Ibid.)

> Chinese: 在这一时间和空间的特殊区域里，一切都可能发生，只要有这样的实际需要。（同上）

[¶34] This means that “the marks of freedom and justice are both confined to a particular span of time.” From this, Schmitt brings out the nature of the Anglo-American liberal conception of law: the visions of a free sea, free trade, and a free world economy rest on marking out room for maneuver for free competition and free exploitation, namely the free space for unrestricted plunder demarcated by the “amity lines.” In this space, humanity obeys the law of the jungle: “a ruthless trial of strength,” “duels aimed at mutual annihilation,” and “the free play of different systems of valuation and shifts in the balance of power.” In language familiar to us, the drawing of “amity lines” is the jurisprudential foundation of double standards.

> Chinese: 这意味着，“自由和正义的烙印皆局限于特定的时间之内。”施米特由此引出英美式自由主义法制理念的性质：所谓自由海洋、自由贸易和自由世界经济的设想，基于划出一个自由竞争和自由开发的进退空间，也就是“友好线”所划分出来的自由掠夺的自由空间。在这个空间，人类服从丛林规则，即“严酷的实力较量”和“消灭彼此的决斗”，以及“不同的评价体系和实力消长的自由游戏”。用我们熟悉的语言来说，“友好线”的划分是双重标准的法理基础。

[¶35] Only here does Schmitt reconnect with Hegel’s previously interrupted judgment on America: the Anglo-American political systems “are constructed upon a non-state civil society,” and this civil society is “an unrestrained, self-seeking jungle”:

> Chinese: 在这里，施米特才连接起上面断掉的那个黑格尔关于美国的论断：英美政体“建构在非国家的市民社会之上”，而这个市民社会是“无所顾忌、自私自利的丛林”：

[¶36] In Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of history, America was still regarded, in a particular sense, as a civil society without a state. (p. 70)

> Chinese: 在黑格尔开设的历史哲学课堂上，美国仍被认为是特殊意义上的无国家的市民社会。（页70）。

[¶37] Through his analysis of the divisions marked by the “amity lines,” Schmitt brings out a central theme in political thought from Hobbes to Hegel and even Marx: the binary opposition between the free sphere of civil society and the state as the realm of objective reason. Hobbes’s distinction between the state of nature and the civilized state [civil condition] is not merely diachronic, marking the transition from the state of nature to the formation of civil society; it is also a parallel, simultaneous distinction: the economic sphere is a state of nature, while the political sphere is civil society.

> Chinese: 通过剖析“友好线”的分界划分，施米特引出了从霍布斯到黑格尔乃至马克思的政治思想中一个核心论题，即市民社会的自由领域与作为客观理性之王国的国家之间的二元对立。霍布斯的自然状态与文明状态[市民状态]的区分，并非仅仅是历时性区分，即从摆脱自然状态到形成公民社会的区分，也是一个平行并列的区分：在经济领域是自然状态，在政治领域是公民社会。

[¶38] The “amity lines” also introduce a division between Old and New Worlds with significance for the philosophy of history: the “New World” is the space of an unknown world open to free appropriation. The relationship between the traditional “world under heaven,” that is, the “known world” (Oekumene), and the unknown world underwent a fundamental change: the latter was now an unknown world that could be explored and freely appropriated, what is today called “external space.” Thus Schmitt says, “The treaty lines of Spain and Portugal, like the English amity lines, all belonged to Europe’s land-appropriation and sea-appropriation in the New World.”

> Chinese: “友好线”还引出了具有历史哲学意义的新旧世界的划分：所谓“新世界”是可以自由占取的未知世界空间。传统的“天下”即“已知世界”（Oekumene）与未知世界的关系有了根本性变化，它是可探知的和可自由占取的未知世界——如今所谓的“外部空间”。因此，施米特说，“西葡两国的盟线和英国的友好界线一样，都归属于欧洲对新世界的占地和夺海。”

[¶39] The problem is that Europe was not a unified political unit, and the members of this great family did not hesitate to fight fierce wars for supremacy over one another. Thus “these lines regulated relations among the European appropriating powers by dividing and enclosing space,” thereby regulating relations within the family of European powers. Viewed from the other direction, international law or international treaties reflected changes in the distribution of power within the European family.

> Chinese: 问题在于，欧洲并非是一个统一的政治单位，这个大家庭的成员为相互争雄不惜大打出手。因此，“这些界线通过划分和圈定空间来调整欧洲占取列强之间的关系”，从而调整欧洲列强之间的家族内部关系。反过来看，国际法或国际条约也就反映了欧洲大家庭内部的强权分配关系的变化。

## 7. 5. The Globalized Order and the Crisis of a New Nomos of the Earth

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/7/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/7/#p-N

[¶0] 5. The Globalized Order and the Crisis of a New Nomos of the Earth

> Chinese: 五、全球化秩序与新大地法危机

[¶1] The global order since the late nineteenth century has been the globalization of the European international legal order. The Thirty Years’ War of the twentieth century showed that two major non-European elements had entered into the distribution of power within the European family: the United States in North America and China in East Asia. This meant that relations internal to Europe had expanded into relations internal to the globe. Russia is a great power straddling Europe and Asia. Not only is its geographical position ambiguous, but it entered the game of the European international legal order as early as the eighteenth century, and thus cannot be counted as a non-European national element.

> Chinese: 19世纪末以来的全球秩序是欧洲国际法秩序的全球化， 20世纪的 30年战争表明，欧洲大家庭之间的强权分配加入了两大非欧洲的元素：北美洲的美国和东亚的中国。这意味着，欧洲内部关系扩大为全球内部关系。俄国属于横跨欧亚的大国，不仅地缘位置有两歧性，而且早在 18世纪就加入了欧洲的国际法秩序游戏，因此不能算作非欧洲的国家元素。

[¶2] From today’s perspective, the evolution of the globalized order since the late nineteenth century must be divided into two stages. The Thirty Years’ War and its outcome—the outbreak of the Cold War—constitute the first stage; the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rise of China since the 1990s constitute the second.

> Chinese: 从今天的视角来看， 19世纪末以来的全球化秩序的演化得分两个阶段， 30年战争及其结局（冷战爆发）为第一阶段， 1990年代以来，苏联瓦解和中国的崛起为第二阶段。

[¶3] Schmitt’s attention in The Nomos of the Earth falls primarily on the first stage in the formation of the global order. It is worth noting that Chapter Four devotes nearly a third of the book—roughly one hundred pages—to examining the significance of America’s rise for political jurisprudence. Twelve years after the publication of The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt published Theory of the Partisan, focusing on how China was drawn into the twentieth-century global order. Although Schmitt did not foresee China’s rise, he had already perceived with extraordinary acuity that the Chinese Revolution would bring forth a new, postmodern nomos of the earth, breaking apart the global order constructed by the modern nomos of the earth of the European epoch.

> Chinese: 施米特在《大地的法》中的关注，重点落在全球秩序形成的第一阶段。我们值得注意到，第四章用了占全书近三分之一的篇幅（约一百页）来考察美国崛起的政治法学含义。《大地的法》发表 12年后，施米特发表了《游击队理论》，重点考察中国如何被拖入 20世纪的全球秩序。尽管施米特没有预见到中国的崛起，但他已经极为敏锐地看到，中国革命将带出后现代的新大地法，打破欧洲纪元的现代大地法所营构的全球秩序。

[¶4] This helps us understand why, in Schmitt’s view, relations between the United States and Russia continued the European tradition of demarcation by “amity lines.” Whereas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the logical outcome of the great powers’ common criteria for demarcation was to establish “spatial domains of unrestrained conquest,” the issue now was domination of those domains. The fundamental problem remained unchanged: “There was still no single tribunal to arbitrate disputes and conflicts.”

> Chinese: 由此可以理解，在施米特看来，美国与俄国的关系仍然延续的是欧洲式的“友好线”划分传统。虽然在16至17世纪，列强之间统一划分标准的逻辑结果是确立“肆意征服的空间领域”，如今则是支配这些空间领域，根本性的问题依然如故：“仍然缺乏一个统一的调停争端和矛盾的仲裁庭”。

[¶5] Here Schmitt returns to the concept of “geographical discovery” with which this essay began. The real meaning of “geographical discovery” is nothing other than “effective occupation” (effektive Okkupation), that is, acts of appropriation directed by the state. This is the premise of Mackinder’s essay “The Geographical Pivot of History.” Schmitt states that he has already shown us that this premise, which Mackinder adopts without a second thought, is precisely a departure from the Roman law inherited by Europe’s classical tradition. Over more than three hundred years, this departure “finally became a distinctive legal title to the acquisition of land” (Erwerbstitel) in the late nineteenth century, and produced two pernicious consequences:

> Chinese: 施米特在这里回到了本文起头的“地理发现”概念：所谓“地理发现”的真实含义无异于“有效占有”（effektive Okkupation），即国家支配的占取行动，这是麦金德的《历史的地理枢纽》一文的前提。施米特表示，他已经让我们看到，麦金德不假思索地采取的这个前提，恰恰是对欧洲古典传统所承继的罗马法的背离。这一背离经历了三百多年历史，在 19世纪末“终于成为一种独特的获取土地的法权资格”（Erwerbstitel），并引出了两个恶果：

[¶6] First, before the great powers’ acquisition of land in the face of competition gained general recognition, a protracted struggle might be necessary; second, the legal assessment of a war would be made according to its outcome. In other words, war was recognized as a lawful means of changing title to land. Yet the background to the drawing of global lines was rationalization, humanization, and legalization; in other words, its actual purpose was to prevent war. (p. 71)

> Chinese: 首先，在列强冲破竞争取得土地广受承认之前，必要的时候会经历长时间的争夺战；其二，对战争的法律评价会根据战争的结果做出。换言之，战争被承认为改变土地占有权的合法手段。全球界线划定的背景却是理性化、人性化和法律化，换言之，实际是为了阻止战争。（页71）

[¶7] These two points lead to the key proposition of Schmitt’s theory of postmodern war: the transition from legally regulated war to discriminatory war. This means that continental land wars constrained by European international law, or wars confined to natural military conflicts between states, became ideological wars. Originally, both sides fought to contend for living space; now, however, the victorious side would invoke the “humanitarian” grounds of opposing war to declare the defeated side war criminals, and then punish them on moral grounds. It is as though the European great powers had originally all belonged to a band of robbers, fighting fiercely over the earth’s surface, while three hundred years of European international law had gradually established a set of robbers’ gentlemen’s agreements and “humanitarian” rules for their mutual brawls. Now the defeated are robbers, while the victors have become international gendarmes enforcing the law in the name of “reason” and “humanity.”

> Chinese: 这两个要点引出了施米特的后现代战争理论的关键要点：从法制化战争转向歧视性战争。这意味着，受欧洲国际法约束的大陆土地战争或局限于国家之间的自然的军事冲突的战争，变成了意识形态化的战争。本来，战争双方都是为了争夺生存空间而战，但胜利方现在会以反战争的“人道”理由裁定战败方为战争罪犯，进而在道义上施以惩罚。这就好比说，欧洲各大国本来都是一伙强盗，为争夺地表空间大打出手，而三百年来的欧洲国际法逐渐形成了一套强盗性质的君子协定和相互打斗的“人道”规矩。现在呢，战败方是强盗，战胜方成了以“理性”和“人道”名义执法的国际宪兵。

[¶8] We plainly cannot suppose that Schmitt was protesting the injustice of Germany’s becoming the object of judgment by an “international tribunal” after the Second World War. After all, Schmitt had proposed the concept of “discriminatory war” as early as 1939, and the basic views of The Nomos of the Earth had already appeared in essays from the Weimar Republic period. “The League of Nations and Europe” (1928) and “The International Legal Forms of Modern Imperialism” (1932) both bear this out. [14]

> Chinese: 我们显然不能以为，施米特是在为二战后的德国成为“国际法庭”的审判对象鸣冤叫屈。毕竟，早在 1939年，施米特就提出了“歧视性战争”观念，而《大地的法》中的基本观点已见于魏玛民国时期的文章：《国际联盟与欧洲》（1928）和《现代帝国主义的国际法形式》（1932）都是证明。 [14]

[¶9] Chapter Four of The Nomos of the Earth shows us that Schmitt’s thinking arose from the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference, an outcome directly connected to the outbreak of the Second World War. Nevertheless, Schmitt wrote The Nomos of the Earth after the Second World War, whose outcome was no longer the convening of a “peace conference,” even a discriminatory one, but the trial of “criminals who waged aggressive war.” The Nazi Party’s extermination of the Jews compelled all Germans collectively to bear the charge of being “war criminals,” even though Germans had made nearly forty attempts to assassinate Hitler, twenty-two of them carried out by the military—acts Schmitt called “tyrannicide.” [15]

> Chinese: 《大地的法》第四章让我们看到，施米特的思考来自巴黎和会的结果，而二战的爆发与这个结果有直接关系。尽管如此，《大地的法》是施米特在二战之后写成的，而二战的结果已经不再是召开哪怕歧视性的“和会”，而是审判“发动侵略战争的罪犯”。纳粹党对犹太人的灭绝让全体德国人不得不集体背负“战争罪犯”的罪名，尽管德国人针对希特勒的刺杀行动多达近 40次，军方实施的就有 22次——施米特称为“诛杀僭主”的行动。 [15]

[¶10] The Allies’ trial of Germany after the Second World War was procedurally lawful, but Schmitt poses a tacit challenge: can European international law really lead the internal conflicts of the European family out of a barbaric state of nature? Was “mass slaughter” unprecedented within the “amity lines” the Europeans themselves had drawn? In this respect, the difference between Hobbes and Grotius is of decisive significance.

> Chinese: 二战后盟国对德国的审判在程序上合法，施米特则暗中挑战：欧洲国际法真的能让欧洲大家庭的内部冲突走出野蛮的自然状态？在欧洲人自己划定的“友好线”之内，“大屠杀”难道是头一回？就此而言，霍布斯与格劳秀斯的差异具有决定性的意义。

[¶11] As noted above, the first section of Chapter Two of The Nomos of the Earth is entitled “The First Global Lines: From Raya Lines through Amity Lines to the Line of the Western Hemisphere.” Schmitt’s discussion of Hobbes in this section quietly foreshadows the historical turning point discussed in Chapter Four under “The Emergence of the Western Hemisphere Line.” Since, in proposing his theory of the “state of nature,” “Hobbes clearly based his thinking not only on a remorseful reflection on Europe’s civil wars, but also on the fact of the New World’s emergence,” the political principle underlying America’s rise is, in the final analysis, the law of the jungle.

> Chinese: 前文提到，《大地的法》第二章第一节的标题是“最初的地球分界线：从拉亚线经友好界线到西半球分界线”，施米特在这一节中讨论到霍布斯，为第四章讨论“西半球线浮现出来”时的历史转折埋下了隐而不显的伏笔。既然“霍布斯显然不是仅仅基于忏悔欧洲内战的观感，而是也基于新世界的诞生这一事实”才提出了他的“自然状态”说，那么，美国崛起所持有的政治原则说到底是丛林原则。

[¶12] Only once the spatial order of states on European soil had been demarcated did the third and final international line—the Western Hemisphere line—emerge. The land order for the New World inherited from Europe and Eurocentric international law was destined to come into conflict with the situation demarcated by this line. (p. 71)

> Chinese: 只有等到欧洲土地的国家空间秩序划定停当，第三条也就是最后一条国际界线——西半球线才浮现出来。欧洲和欧洲中心的国际法传承下来的对新世界的土地秩序，注定要与此线划定的局势形成对立。（页71）

[¶13] This means that America’s rise, in altering the configuration established by Europe’s “amity lines,” amounted to globalizing the barbaric law of the jungle. From this Schmitt unfolds his own account of world history, in which the transformations of the nomos of the earth can be divided into three major stages: the premodern nomos of the earth, when the classical civilizations were unacquainted with one another → the modern European nomos of the earth (the establishment of Eurocentrism) → the postmodern globalized nomos of the earth (the pernicious consequences of European international law).

> Chinese: 这意味着，美国崛起改变欧洲的“友好线”所划定的格局，无异于让野蛮的丛林法则全球化。施米特由此铺展出一条他眼中的世界历史脉络，即大地的法在世界历史中的嬗变可分为三大阶段：前现代各古典文明互不相识的大地法→现代欧洲的大地法（欧洲中心主义的确立）→后现代的全球化大地法（欧洲国际法引出的恶果）。

[¶14] Premodern Europe’s universal law was based on an “ancient land order.” The modern European power states’ division of the world overturned this premodern European “ancient land order,” establishing a system of international law that regulated the modern European order. America’s rise, in turn, both inherited and altered the rules of demarcation of modern European international law.

> Chinese: 前现代的欧洲天下法基于“古老的土地秩序”，现代欧洲强权国家的世界划分颠覆了欧洲前现代的“古老的土地秩序”，建立起规范现代欧洲秩序的国际法体系，美国的崛起则既承继又改变了现代欧洲国际法的划界规则。

[¶15] Schmitt focuses on the historical development from the second, modern stage to the third, postmodern stage. In his view, this change began in the eighteenth century. This means that the spread of Hobbes’s theory of the “state of nature” had a decisive influence on the world-historical transformation marked by “the emergence of the Western Hemisphere line”: since the state of nature is a state of war, “it is necessary to examine and discuss the construction of the spatial order between states in European international law and the framework of war they espoused.”

> Chinese: 施米特重点关注第二阶段（即现代阶段）至第三阶段（即后现代阶段）的历史演进，在他看来，这一变化始于 18世纪。这意味着，霍布斯的“自然状态”论的传播对“西半球线浮现出来”时的世界历史转变具有决定性影响：既然自然状态是战争状态，那么就“有必要梳理和探讨欧洲国际法上国家间的空间秩序建构以及它们所推崇的战争架构”。

[¶16] In any event, the modern, that is, European stage of world history should be defined as an age of “civilized” barbarism. It is because this stage overlapped with the formation of technological-commercial civilization, and especially because it became entangled with doctrines of “humanitarianism” from the eighteenth century onward, that people to this day not only find it difficult to distinguish good from evil, but also argue incessantly.

> Chinese: 无论如何，世界历史的现代阶段即欧洲阶段，应该界定为“文明化”的野蛮阶段。由于这一阶段与技术–商业文明的形成叠合在一起，尤其是与 18世纪以来的“人道主义”论搅合在一起，才让人们迄今不仅善恶难辨，而且争议不断。

## 8. 6. China’s Modern Transformation and International Law

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/8/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/8/#p-N

[¶0] 6. China’s Modern Transformation and International Law

> Chinese: 六、中国的现代转型与国际法

[¶1] Wills’s 1688: A Global History has a subtitle that strikes me as somewhat peculiar: “China and the World in an Extraordinary Year.” My patriotic feelings cannot prevent me from asking a question: why not Russia and the world, or India and the world, or Turkey and the world?

> Chinese: 韦尔斯的《 1688年的全球史》用了一个让笔者感到多少有些奇怪的副标题：“一个非凡年代里的中国与世界。”笔者的国家情怀并不能阻止自己提出一个问题：为什么不是俄国与世界，或印度与世界，或土耳其与世界？

[¶2] Certainly, “China and the world” is better able to display a global perspective. Moreover, Europeans at that time had only just become acquainted with China, that land of ritual and propriety, and were bound to find it novel. In the nearly one hundred years between Father Mendoza’s publication in Rome of History of the Great Chinese Empire (1585) and French missionaries’ successive publication of Latin translations of the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Analects between 1661 and 1672, Europeans’ great geographical discoveries revealed not only “uncivilized” America but also a highly civilized China. [16]

> Chinese: 固然，“中国与世界”更能展示全球视野。何况，那个时候的欧洲人刚刚认识中国这个礼仪之邦，难免感到新奇。从门多萨神父在罗马出版《大中华帝国志》（1585年），到 1661 – 1672年间法国传教士陆续出版《大学》《中庸》《论语》的拉丁文译本，近一百年间，欧洲人在地理大发现中不仅发现了“未开化”的美洲，也发现了高度文明化的中国。 [16]

[¶3] Even so, a rising Russia, or the Ottoman Empire, which still posed a direct threat to Europe, was plainly more important in the eyes of European intellectuals at the time. After all, in the geopolitical perception of Europeans then, China was far removed from Europe and posed no threat of war. We might well imagine that when Wills was writing 1688: A Global History in the 1990s, New China was rising peacefully, yet Europeans, drawing on their own historical experience, had a very real sense that the “threat” of China was approaching.

> Chinese: 尽管如此，正在崛起的俄罗斯或对欧洲仍然构成直接威胁的奥斯曼帝国，在当时的欧洲智识人眼里显然更为重要。毕竟，在当时欧洲人的地缘政治感觉中，中国离欧洲老远，不会对欧洲构成战争威胁。我们未必不能设想，韦尔斯写作《 1688年的全球史》时在 1990年代，新中国正在和平崛起，欧洲人凭自己的历史经验却实实在在感觉到中国的“威胁”即将来临。

[¶4] If so, the place in which China appears in The Nomos of the Earth deserves attention. In the fourth section of Chapter Three, discussing “Territorial Changes under European Public Law,” Schmitt says that European territorial changes were “established primarily through collective treaties among the European great powers.” This means that Europe was a community, and the principle sustaining this community’s spatial order was the “idea of a balance of power.” It is in this context that China is mentioned for the first time in The Nomos of the Earth. Although no more than a mention, it offers considerable insight into our understanding of China’s encounter with European international law.

> Chinese: 倘若如此，中国在《大地的法》中出现的位置就值得注意。第三章第四节论及“欧洲公法中的领土变更”时，施米特说，欧洲的领土变更“主要通过欧洲大国之间的集体性条约而确立”。这意味着欧洲是一个共同体，而维持这个共同体的空间秩序原则是“均势观念”。在这一语境中，《大地的法》第一次提到中国，尽管仅仅是提到而已，但对我们认识中国与欧洲国际法的遭遇不乏启发。

[¶5] A “balance of power” has to be sustained by an equilibrium of strength among the great powers. In his celebrated The Great Powers, Ranke succinctly outlined the historical condition of modern Europe: great powers may decline into small states, and small states may rise to become great powers, making a permanently unchanging balance of power impossible. Both the decline of a great power into a small state and the rise of a small state into a great power involve territorial changes; thus changes in the balance of power necessarily manifest themselves as spatial conflicts between states. Ranke did not ask why, since the sixteenth century, modern European history had been governed by the idea of a “balance of power.” We, however, would do well to ask: why did no international conception of a “balance of power” emerge in the geopolitics of ancient Asia, or, to put it another way, why did European-style wars between states not emerge?

> Chinese: “均势”得靠大国之间的势力平衡来支撑，兰克在其著名的《诸大国》中以精炼的笔法概述了欧洲的现代历史状况：大国可能沦为小国，小国可能崛起为大国，从而不可能有恒定不变的均势。大国沦为小国或小国崛起为大国，都会涉及到领土变更，从而，均势的变化必然体现为国家间的空间冲突。兰克并没有问，为何自 16世纪以来，现代欧洲的历史受“均势”观念支配？我们则值得问题：为何在亚洲的古代地缘政治中没有出现国际性的“均势”观念，或者说为何没有出现欧洲式的国家之间的战争？

[¶6] Schmitt attempts to answer this question: Europe was originally a community of Christian civilization, and a “great power” meant a state occupying an important position within this “established order.” We naturally recall that, from the tenth century onward, Europe’s only great power was the German Holy Roman Empire, which Schmitt calls “the medieval spatial order of empire and papacy” (compare pp. 21–28).

> Chinese: 施米特试图回答这个问题：欧洲本来是一个基督教文明共同体，所谓“大国”指某个国家在这个“既定秩序”中占据重要地位。我们自然会想到， 10世纪以来，欧洲唯一的大国是德意志神圣罗马帝国，施米特称之为“中世纪的皇帝制和教宗制的空间秩序”（比较页 21 - 28）。

[¶7] With the rise of territorial nation-states under feudal monarchies, rebellion arose within the Christian community. The Reformation tore apart Europe’s common faith, and intricate, unceasing wars within that community followed. One might say that the “balance of power” becoming the guiding idea of the modern European order meant that this order had retreated from civilization into a barbaric condition that “venerated force.” It would not be inappropriate to describe modern European history in Mencius’s famous words, “There were no righteous wars in the Spring and Autumn period” (Mencius, “Jin Xin,” Part Two). Progress in commercial-technological civilization cannot justify wars between states.

> Chinese: 随着封建王权式的地域性民族国家崛起，基督教共同体内部出现了叛乱，宗教改革撕裂了欧洲的共同信仰，随之而来的是这个共同体内部错综复杂的连绵战争。可以说，“均势”观念成为现代欧洲秩序的主导理念意味着，欧洲秩序从文明状态退回到“尚力”的野蛮状态。用孟子的名言“春秋无义战”（《孟子·尽心章句下》）来描述现代欧洲的历史，不会不恰当，商业 – 技术文明的进步并不能让国家间的战争称义。

[¶8] In this historical context, the divided community of Christian Europe could establish a new order only by relying on an international law constructed through various bilateral or multilateral treaties. Within this order that “venerated force,” it was extremely important for a state to be recognized as a “great power.” The question is: recognized as a great power by whom? By the existing great powers, of course. Schmitt writes:

> Chinese: 在这样的历史语境中，分裂的基督教欧洲共同体只能凭靠各种双边或多边条约所建构的国际法来建立新秩序。在这一“尚力”的秩序中，一个国家被承认为“大国”非常重要。问题是，被谁承认为大国？当然是被既存大国承认。施米特说：

[¶9] The recognition of one great power by another is the highest form of recognition in international law. Such recognition is mutual recognition to the highest degree. (p. 170)

> Chinese: 一个大国被另一个大国承认，是国际法承认中的最高形式。这种承认是最高程度的相互承认。（页170）

[¶10] This means that modern European international law endorses the barbaric law of the jungle: recognition as a “great power” amounts to acknowledging that a political entity has the military strength to redefine its own boundaries. Although Ratzel takes a world-historical perspective in his discussion of “frontiers” in his celebrated Political Geography, the vast majority of his historical examples come from modern Europe. [17] Thus he writes:

> Chinese: 这意味着，现代欧洲国际法认可野蛮的丛林法则：被承认为“大国”等于承认一个政治体有军事实力重新确立自己的边界。拉策尔在其名著《政治地理学》中论述“边疆”时，尽管具有世界历史视野，他的绝大部分史例出自现代欧洲。 [17]因此他说，

[¶11] Changes in all the regions of a state cause its frontiers to expand or contract, and changes in each portion of its territory are thereby put to the test. Efforts to improve frontiers usually proceed not by reducing them, but by waging wars of plunder, shortening the boundary by adding territory. (Ibid., p. 123)

> Chinese: 国家所有地区的变化引起自身边疆的扩张或缩减，每一部分领土的变化也因之受到考验。当致力于改善边疆时，通常不是通过缩减边疆的方式，而是进行掠夺战争，以通过增加疆土的方式缩减疆界。（同上，页123）

[¶12] The problem is that the legal forms of the various bilateral or multilateral treaties of European international law make the law of the jungle, founded on “wars of plunder,” look quite “civilized.” Schmitt mentions here that Russia and Prussia in the eighteenth century, and Italy in the nineteenth, were successively “recognized by the traditional great powers as new great powers.” The “traditional great powers” were the powerful European states, such as France, Britain, and Austria. The recognition of Prussia and Italy as “new great powers” indicated only a change in the balance of power within the European community. By contrast, the recognition of Russia meant that an alien people had entered Europe’s public legal order, thereby changing the spatial configuration of the European order.

> Chinese: 问题在于，欧洲国际法的各种双边或多边条约的法律形式让基于“掠夺战争”的丛林法则看起来颇为“文明”。施米特在这里提到，俄罗斯和普鲁士在 18世纪、意大利在 19世纪先后“被传统大国承认为新的大国”。所谓“传统大国”指欧洲的强势国家如法国、英国、奥地利等。普鲁士和意大利被承认为“新的大国”，仅仅表明欧洲共同体内部的均势变化，与此不同，俄罗斯得到承认意味着一个外族进入了欧洲的公法秩序，从而更改了欧洲秩序的空间格局。

[¶13] “According to the textbooks, the United States was recognized as a great power in 1865.” Schmitt calls this something of an oddity, because the foreign policy announced by President Monroe in 1823 “fundamentally opposed the system of recognition constructed by the European great powers.” In other words, the famous “Monroe Doctrine” showed that the United States did not recognize the European-style modern order. Was it not ridiculous, then, for the great powers within that European order to recognize America as a great power? In Schmitt’s view, America’s separatist stance toward the European order meant that “the Western Hemisphere line had begun to oppose treating the particular European order as a universal global spatial order.”

> Chinese: “根据教科书，美国于 1865年被承认为大国”，施米特说，这算得上是件怪事。因为，美国总统门罗在 1823年宣告的对外政策，“根本上反对欧洲大国所构建的承认制度”。换言之，著名的“门罗主义”表明，美国并不承认欧洲式的现代秩序，而欧洲秩序中的大国却承认美国成了大国，岂不是搞笑。在施米特看来，美国对欧洲秩序采取的分离主义立场意味着，“西半球界线已经开始反对将特别化的欧洲视为普遍化的全球空间秩序”。

[¶14] Of relevance to us in China, Schmitt next discusses the circumstances in which Japan gained recognition from the European great powers:

> Chinese: 与我们中国相关，施米特接下来说到日本获得欧洲大国承认的情形：

[¶15] Japan’s recognition as a great power came in 1894 (the Sino-Japanese War) and subsequently in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05. Japan won both wars and was therefore permitted to join the small circle of international law composed of the great powers. Japan regarded the punitive expedition (die Strafexpedition) it conducted against China, a great power, as an event of decisive significance. With the emergence of this Asian great power, a new, non-Eurocentric world order began to surface (p. 170).

> Chinese: 对日本之大国地位的承认是在1894年（中日战争）和接下来的1904/05年日俄战争，日本赢得了这两场战争，因此被允许加入由诸大国组成的国际法小圈子。日本将自己对中国这个大国实施的惩罚性征战（die Strafexpedition）视为具有决定意义的事件。伴随着这个亚洲大国的出现，一个新的非欧洲中心的世界秩序开始浮出水面（页170）。

[¶16] Schmitt does not call Japan’s recognition as a great power an oddity, because Japan did not, as America did, declare its refusal to belong to the European system. This means that Japan’s fighting the naval battles of the First Sino-Japanese War and waging a Russo-Japanese War on Chinese soil conformed entirely to the rules of modern European laws of war, and thus enabled Japan to become a prominent member of the family of European public law. Because Japan fought these two wars in East Asia, it replicated modern Europe’s “civilized” rules of barbarism in Asia, extending them geographically beyond Europe. Hence Schmitt’s statement that “a new, non-Eurocentric world order began to surface.”

> Chinese: 施米特没有说，日本被承认为大国是件怪事，因为日本没有像美国那样宣称自己拒绝归属欧洲体系。这意味着，日本打甲午海战和在中国土地上打了一场日俄战争，完全符合现代欧洲的战争法规矩，从而能够凭此成为欧洲公法大家庭中的要员。由于日本是在东亚打的这两场战争，现代欧洲的“文明化”野蛮法则被日本复制到亚洲，使之在地理意义上越出了欧洲范围。因此，施米特说，“一个新的非欧洲中心的世界秩序开始浮出水面。”

[¶17] Schmitt does not mention Korea, thus inadvertently displaying the habits of European scholars of public law himself. He should not have forgotten the cause of the First Sino-Japanese War, or who assassinated Itō Hirobumi in northeastern China. In any event, China’s first appearance in The Nomos of the Earth serves merely as corroboration of Schmitt’s account of Japan becoming a great power according to the modern European nomos of the earth. In fact, European international jurists had no need to wait for the Russo-Japanese War: the naval battles of the First Sino-Japanese War already sufficed to demonstrate that Japan was worthy of being a European-style great power. [18] A statement in the international jurist von Liszt’s 1898 textbook International Law, cited by Schmitt in a later footnote, can serve as historical testimony:

> Chinese: 施米特没有提到朝鲜，以至于他自己也不经意地带有欧洲公法学家的习惯。他不应该忘记甲午战争的起因，以及谁在中国东北刺杀了伊藤博文。无论如何，中国在《大地的法》中的第一次出现，仅仅是施米特笔下的日本依据现代欧洲的大地法成为大国的佐证。事实上，对于欧洲的国际法学家来说，根本无需等到日俄战争，甲午海战已经足以证明日本不愧为欧洲式大国。 [18]施米特在后来的一条脚注中所引用的国际法学家冯·李斯特（von Liszt）在 1898年出版的教科书《国际法》中的一句话，可以作为历史的证言：

[¶18] Japan must now be included within the community of international law; its culture is unquestionably above the level of the Christian-European states. In its war against China, Japan observed the rules of international law more strictly than most European states. (p. 213, n. 1)

> Chinese: 如今必须把日本纳入国际法共同体之内，它的文化绝对在基督教 - 欧洲国家的水平线之上。日本在对中国的战争中比大多数欧洲国家都更严格地遵守了国际法规则。（页213注1）

[¶19] China appears for the second time in The Nomos of the Earth in the second section of Chapter Four, entitled “The End of European Public Law.” As in the context of its first appearance, the issue concerns the eastward extension, or globalization, of European public law. The difference is that the historical context is now the end of European public law (pp. 212–214). Schmitt says that this historical context seems rather strange, because Asian states had already joined the European system of international law in the 1880s and 1890s and “were unconcerned about the problems of a thoroughly Eurocentric international law.” This meant that European public law “would ultimately be transformed into an undifferentiated, universal international law” (p. 212).

> Chinese: 中国第二次出现在《大地的法》中，见于第四章题为“欧洲公法的终结”的第二节。与第一次出现时的语境一样，问题涉及欧洲公法的东移或全球化。不同之处在于，现在的历史语境是欧洲公法的终结（页 212 - 214）。施米特说，这一历史语境显得颇为奇怪。因为，亚洲国家在 1880至 1890年代已经加入欧洲的国际法体系，“对完全欧洲中心主义的国际法所存在的问题并不介意”，这意味着欧洲公法“最终将转变成一种无差别的普遍的国际法”（页 212）。

[¶20] In Schmitt’s account, Asian states entered the modern European system of international law in two ways. One was “nonpolitical and technical”: Japan, Siam (the former name of “Thailand”), and China joining the Universal Postal Union, for example. Since their entry into the European international legal system was “nonpolitical,” people failed to see “the problems arising from the transformation of the spatial order in the European conception.” The second way was political, namely through predatory war. Here Schmitt once again mentions the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War:

> Chinese: 按施米特的描述，亚洲国家加入现代欧洲国际法体系的方式有两种：一种是“非政治性的、技术性的”方式，比如日本、暹罗（“泰国”旧称）和中国加入万国邮政联盟。既然是“非政治性”加入欧洲国际法体系，人们也就看不到“欧洲观念中空间秩序的转变所存在的问题”。第二种方式是政治性的，即通过掠夺性战争。施米特在这里再次提到甲午战争和日俄战争：

[¶21] Through its war with China in 1894 and its victorious war with the European great power Russia in 1904, Japan demonstrated to the world its willingness to observe the rules of European laws of war. It had thus knocked its “welcoming committee” to the ground. Moreover, in 1900 Japan had participated on an equal footing with the European great powers in the expeditionary force that suppressed the “Boxer uprising.” An Asian great power had thus risen and gained recognition. (p. 212)

> Chinese: 日本通过1894年与中国的战争以及1904年与欧洲大国俄罗斯的胜利战争，向世界证明它愿意遵守欧洲的战争法规则。因此，它已经将其“接待团”打翻在地。此外，日本还在1900年与欧洲大国一起平等地参加了镇压“义和拳暴动”的远征军。一个亚洲大国从此而崛起并得到承认。（页212）

[¶22] Schmitt directs our attention to how European international jurists from the 1890s onward explained the comprehensive opening of the European international legal community. These jurists said that “non-European, non-American peoples (Völker)” had now been incorporated into the community of European public law, and that the system currently included twenty-five European states and nineteen American states. Yet when referring to the European states, these jurists used the term “sovereign states”; when speaking of the American states, they omitted the word “sovereign.” They did the same when mentioning Asian states such as “Persia, China, Japan, Korea, and Siam.” These countries “maintained regular treaty relations with members of the [European] community,” indicating that they were already members of the family of European international law (pp. 213–214). Schmitt immediately adds:

> Chinese: 施米特让我们注意， 1890年代以来的欧洲国际法学家们如何解释欧洲国际法共同体的全方位开放。这些法学家说，现在“非欧洲、非美洲的人民（Völker）”已经被纳入欧洲公法共同体，目前，在这个体系中，欧洲国家有 25个，美洲国家有 19个。但在提到欧洲国家时，这些法学家用了“主权国家”这个概念，说到美洲国家时，他们就省掉了“主权”二字。提到亚洲国家如“波斯、中国、日本、朝鲜、暹罗”时同样如此，他们“与[欧洲]共同体成员保持着经常性的条约关系”，表明这些国家已经是欧洲国际法大家庭成员（页 213 - 214）。施米特紧接着说：

[¶23] This is a panoramic picture, both a prophecy and an authentic document. It clearly reveals the historical upheaval from European international law to an international law extending beyond Europe. Looking back at the history of international law in the 1890s, we seek to focus on its crucial historical facts. By the end of the nineteenth century, European international jurisprudence had lost every trace of a reflective spirit, even abandoning, entirely unconsciously, the conception of spatial structure within the traditional order. (p. 214)

> Chinese: 这是一幅全景画卷，既是预言，也是一份真实文献。清晰地展现了从欧洲国际法向超越欧洲之国际法的历史剧变。通过回顾1890年代的国际法历史，我们尽力聚焦于国际法历史中的关键史实。19世纪末的欧洲国际法学没有了任何反思精神，甚至在全然无意识的情况下丢掉了传统秩序中的空间结构观念。（页214）

[¶24] Even today, Asian specialists in the history of international law still lack the awareness of spatial structure of which Schmitt speaks here. When discussing the history of the concept of “sovereignty,” they display no “reflective spirit” whatsoever, even when adopting a so-called “diachronic perspective.” [19] We, for our part, should recall a curious occurrence in our own academic world since the late 1990s. It shows that certain Chinese historians since the end of the twentieth century have not only lost their reflective spirit but even, entirely unconsciously, abandoned the conception of spatial structure within our country’s traditional order. This is something I find difficult to put out of my mind.

> Chinese: 直到今天，亚洲研究国际法史的专家仍然缺乏施米特在这里所说的空间结构意识，谈论“主权”概念的历史时，即便采用了所谓“历时性透视”，却见不到“任何反思精神”。 [19]我们则应该想起 1990年代末以来发生在我国学界的一件怪事，这事表明， 20世纪末以来的某些中国史学家不仅丧失了反思精神，甚至全然下意识地丢掉了我国传统秩序中的空间结构观念，让笔者难以释怀。

[¶25] The circumstances were these: although China, as Schmitt says, had already recognized the European system of international law from the 1880s onward, the revolutionary governments of the Republican period pursued “revolutionary diplomacy” under the slogan of abolishing “unequal treaties,” producing continuous and severe friction with that system. [20] As reform and opening up began to bear fruit (1999–2000), China faced the practical question of entering “international society” or aligning itself with international law. Chinese diplomacy in the late Qing and early Republican periods suddenly became a fashionable topic among historians of modern China:

> Chinese: 事情的原委是这样：中国虽然如施米特所说，自 1880年代以来已经承认欧洲的国际法体系，但民国以来的革命政府以废除“不平等条约”为口号推行“革命外交”，与欧洲国际法体系发生了持续不断的严重摩擦。 [20]改革开放初见成效之际（1999年至 2000年），中国面临进入“国际社会”或与国际法接轨的现实问题，晚清和民国初期的中国外交一时成为近代史学界的热门话题：

[¶26] Within the modern Western international legal order, the so-called principle of sovereign equality was not unconditional. But how could one enjoy full legal personality under that order? The Qing government’s officials responsible for Western affairs initially chose to observe and fulfill treaties in order to buy time to enrich the country and strengthen its armed forces, using modernized weaponry to safeguard national autonomy and independence. They were followed by the reformers around the time of the Hundred Days’ Reform, who hoped to establish a modern state through a series of political and social reforms, large and small and thoroughly transformative, and, under universal principles and public law revered by all nations and valid for all ages, to advance toward a world of Great Unity in a civilized society. With the advent of the twentieth century, once building a “civilized state” in the international legal sense and joining international society had become the supreme national objective, the Qing government’s urgent tasks were the “civilizing” of the state, participation in international conferences, and membership in international organizations. [21]

> Chinese: 在近代西方的国际法秩序里，所谓主权平等的原则并不是无条件的。但怎样才可享有国际法秩序下的完全人格呢？清政府洋务官僚最初选择的是遵守条约、履行条约，以换取时间争取富国强兵，以现代化武装维护国家的自主独立；继之而起的是戊戌前后维新派希望通过一系列大大小小、翻天覆地的政治社会改革，建立近代国家，在万国共尊、万世通行的公理公法下，迈向文明社会的大同世界。进入20世纪，当构建国际法意义的“文明国”、加入国际社会已成为国家的至上命题时，清政府的急务便是国家的“文明化”，以及与闻国际会议，参加国际组织了。[21]

[¶27] This means that the Chinese governments of the late Qing and early Republican periods did not regard the bilateral or multilateral treaties they signed with European-style great powers as “unequal treaties.” A debate over what constituted an “unequal treaty” thus abruptly arose among historians of modern China. It was said that whether a treaty was equal depended on two conditions: first, whether the form and procedure of its conclusion were equal, and second, whether its contents impaired China’s sovereignty. This definition is vague, and its formulation lacks the precision of legal language. Nevertheless, a count based on these criteria found that of the 736 treaties China had concluded with foreign countries since the nineteenth century, 343 could still be identified as unequal treaties, involving as many as twenty-three countries. [22]

> Chinese: 这意味着，清末民初的中国政府并未把与欧洲式大国签订的双边或多边条约视为“不平等条约”。于是，我国近代史学界骤然兴起一场关于何谓“不平等条约”的论争。据说，条约是否平等取决于两项条件：第一，缔结条约的形式和程序是否平等，第二，条约内容是否损害了中国的主权。这个界定含糊不清，表述也缺乏法律修辞的确定性。尽管如此，按此标准统计， 19世纪以来的中国与外国订立的条约有 736个，其中仍有 343个可以确认为不平等条约，涉及国家多达 23个。 [22]

[¶28] The concept of an “unequal treaty” actually signifies a refusal to recognize the treaty’s validity, rather than a refusal to recognize its legality. In the understanding of legal positivism, a treaty that a state concludes with another under duress, to the detriment of its own interests, should be regarded as both lawful and valid. Thus scholars of legal history in China acknowledge that, within the framework of legal positivism, “it is difficult to discuss the problem of ‘unequal treaties’ substantively.” [23]

> Chinese: “不平等条约”这一概念实际意味着不承认条约的有效性，而非不承认其合法性。按实证法学的理解，某个国家在受胁迫（duress）的条件下与他国缔结的有损自身利益的条约，应该被视为既合法也有效。因此，我国的法学史学者承认，在实证法学的框架下，“‘不平等条约’问题很难得到实质性讨论”。 [23]

[¶29] In practical politics, the situation is plainly another matter. An agreement that someone concludes with another person under duress, to the detriment of his own interests, will of course be regarded as both lawful and valid. But this does not mean that he should not regard it as an “unequal treaty” and abolish it once he has escaped the conditions of duress. The same applies to relations and conduct between states. In other words, treaties reflect only temporary circumstances between states.

> Chinese: 在实际政治中，情形显然是另一回事。一个人在受胁迫的条件下与他人缔结的有损自身利益的条约，当然会被视为既合法也有效，但这不等于他不应该把这条约视为“不平等条约”，并在摆脱受胁迫的处境后废除条约。国家间的行为关系同样如此，换言之，条约仅仅反映国家间的暂时状况。

[¶30] In 1945, when China’s wartime government signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union, to the detriment of its own sovereignty, Chiang Kai-shek specially sent Chiang Ching-kuo along with the delegation so that personal connections could be brought into play. One day, Stalin did indeed invite Chiang Ching-kuo to his private residence for an informal conversation. He told Chiang Ching-kuo that the Soviet side’s insistence at the negotiating table on retaining the interests in China inherited from tsarist Russia was merely intended to prevent China from invading the Soviet Union. Chiang Ching-kuo replied: How could China invade the Soviet Union? Nothing of the sort had ever happened in history. We could conclude a treaty in which China guaranteed never to invade the Soviet Union. Stalin smiled and said: Since this is a private occasion, I shall tell you frankly: all treaties are scraps of paper; everything comes down to strength.

> Chinese: 1945年，中国的战时政府与苏联签订有损自身主权的《中苏友好同盟条约》时，蒋介石特别派蒋经国随代表团同行，以便打人情牌。有一天，斯大林果然把蒋经国请到自己的私人官邸闲叙。他对蒋经国说，苏方在谈判桌上坚持沙俄留下的在华利益，不过是为了防止中国侵略苏联。蒋经国说，中国怎么会侵略苏联呢？历史上从未有过这样的事情。我们可以订立一个条约，中方保证永不侵犯苏联。斯大林笑了一下说：今天是私下场合，我就坦率告诉你吧，所有条约都是废纸，一切凭实力说话。

[¶31] We must acknowledge that Stalin grasped the essential spirit of European international law better than the jurists or historians. Another of his famous sayings shows this just as clearly: nowadays, a state’s borders extend as far as its armies advance. The law of the jungle espoused by European civilization receives a concise and precise expression in this saying.

> Chinese: 我们得承认，斯大林比法学家或史学家们更好地把握住了欧洲国际法的精神实质。他还有一句名言同样如此：如今，一个国家的军队打到哪里，国家的边界就在哪里。欧洲文明信奉的丛林法则，在这句名言中得到精炼而又准确的表达。

[¶32] That being so, the references to “unequal treaties” filling the pages of books on modern Chinese history are not excessive. Yet certain positivist historians regard this expression as rhetoric belonging to the “revolutionary view of history,” with “little significance in diplomatic history and international law,” because the concept itself amounts to “doubt about and a challenge to the legality and validity of treaties.” In their view, the use of “unequal treaties” for political mobilization is entirely understandable in its historical context, but using such rhetoric in historical research today is out of place: we should revise our historical narrative and avoid using this “biased” concept. This professor of history further says:

> Chinese: 既然如此，中国现代史书中满篇“不平等条约”的说法，并不为过。但在某些实证史学家看来，这种说法是“革命史观”的修辞，“在外交史与国际法上的意义并不大”，因为这个概念本身无异于“对条约的合法性及效力的怀疑与挑战”。在历史的语境中，“不平等条约”的说法用于政治动员完全可以理解，如今的史学研究还使用这样的修辞就不合时宜，应该修改我们的历史叙述，避免使用这种“带偏见”的概念。这位史学教授还说，

[¶33] Overemphasizing the moral defects of “unequal treaties” and the moral superiority of China’s “treaty abrogation” entails certain self-contradictions. The Qing government also enjoyed treaty privileges abroad, including three exclusively administered concessions in Korea (Incheon, Busan, and Wonsan), as well as Chinese concessions within the international settlements at Chinnampo and elsewhere, and it enjoyed consular jurisdiction. Before the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China and Japan enjoyed reciprocal consular jurisdiction, and Japan repeatedly requested treaty revision to abolish China’s consular jurisdiction in Japan. China enjoyed reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment with Mexico and Peru. When China requested treaty revision from various countries in the 1920s, Mexico also requested that China relinquish its most-favored-nation treatment in Mexico. [24]

> Chinese: 太过强调“不平等条约”在道德上之瑕疵，及中国“废约”在道德上之优越性，会有自相矛盾之处。清政府也曾在外国享有条约特权，如在朝鲜有专管租界三处（仁川、釜山、元山），另外在甑南浦等公共租界中也有中国租界，并享有领事裁判权。马关条约之前，中国与日本互享领事裁判权，日本曾多次要求修约，取消中国在日本之领事裁判权。中国与墨西哥、秘鲁互享最惠国待遇，1920年代中国向各国要求修约时，墨西哥也要求中国放弃在墨之最惠国待遇。 [24]

[¶34] We cannot help asking: can these examples demonstrate “self-contradiction in the moral superiority” of the Chinese revolutionaries’ advocacy of “treaty abrogation”? Relations between the Qing dynasty and Korea involved far more than “concessions.” Even Korea’s new army was trained by Yuan Shikai, whom the Qing government had dispatched, to say nothing of the fact that the First Sino-Japanese War began because China sent troops to help Korea resist a foreign enemy. “China enjoyed reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment with Mexico and Peru”: is there something morally problematic about the reciprocal enjoyment of most-favored-nation rights, or about their mutual cancellation?

> Chinese: 我们不禁要问：这些例子能够证明与中国革命党人的“废约”主张在“道德上的优越性自相矛盾”吗？清朝与朝鲜的关系，岂止是“租界”，连朝鲜的新军也是清朝政府派袁世凯训练出来的，更何况甲午战争的起因是中国派军队为朝鲜抵御外敌。“中国与墨西哥、秘鲁互享最惠国待遇”，难道互享最惠国待遇权利以及相互取消这种权利，在道德上有问题？

[¶35] The most ludicrous example is this: Japan and China had originally enjoyed reciprocal consular jurisdiction. Later, Japan became a European-style great power and repeatedly requested treaty revision to abolish China’s consular jurisdiction in Japan. This means that Japan relied on its growing military strength to demand the unilateral enjoyment of consular jurisdiction. Whose morality, exactly, is this historian proving to be problematic?

> Chinese: 最滑稽的例子是：日本与中国本来互享领事裁判权，后来日本成了欧洲式大国，于是多次要求修约，取消中国在日本之领事裁判权，这意味着日本凭靠自身军事实力的增长要求单方面享有领事裁判权——这位史学家究竟在证明谁的道德有问题呢？

[¶36] Nevertheless, on this basis the historian still maintains that the long-established “revolutionary view of history” has “obscured the rich variety of other dimensions in diplomatic history, narrowed the perspective of our understanding of modern history, and distorted the interpretation of historical facts.” He argues that we should use “empirical research” to cleanse historical writing of the revolutionary rhetoric fashioned by the Nationalist and Communist parties since the 1920s, turning instead to “the negotiations of regular diplomatic practice,” rather than “focusing solely on condemning imperialist aggression.”

> Chinese: 尽管如此，这位史学家仍然凭此认为，长期以来的“革命史观”已经“遮蔽了外交史中丰富的其他面向，窄化了我们对近代史理解的视野，也扭曲了对史实的诠释”，应该以“实证研究”清洗国共两党在 1920年代以来打造的革命史学修辞，转而“注重外交常轨之交涉谈判”，而非“只注重谴责帝国主义侵略”。

[¶37] The Nationalist and Communist parties used concise, readily understandable methods to portray the technically complex and abstruse “unequal treaties” as the principal obstacle to China’s progress. Their media propaganda catered to and stirred popular emotions; the reasoned arguments of the Beiyang diplomats were no match for it, and the public campaigns launched by the two parties successfully won people’s hearts. (Treaty Revision, p. 8)

> Chinese: 国共两党用简洁易懂方法，把技术上复杂艰涩的“不平等条约”描述为限制中国进步的主要障碍，其媒体宣传迎合并激发了大众情绪；北洋外交家的理性辩论措辞无法相比，国共两党发动的公众运动成功地赢得人心。（《修约史》，页8）

[¶38] We may ask: can the “empirical research” of positivist historians not also “distort the interpretation of historical facts”? This historian immediately proceeds to do just that. In his view, the Beiyang government’s use of participation in the European war to abrogate the Sino-German and Sino-Austrian treaties and “revoke the unequal privileges of the two countries” deserves to be called “an unprecedented achievement in Chinese diplomatic history” (Treaty Revision, pp. 62–66). We have reason to ask: did the Beiyang government revoke those “unequal privileges” through “the reasoned arguments of its diplomats”?

> Chinese: 我们可以问：实证史学家的“实证研究”不会“扭曲对史实的诠释”吗？接下来这位史学家自己就马上扭曲对史实的诠释。在他看来，北洋政府借参加欧战废止了中德和中奥条约，“收回两国不平等特权”，堪称“中国外交史之创举”（《修约史》，页 62 - 66）。我们有理由问：北洋政府是靠“外交家的理性辩论措辞”收回“不平等特权”的吗？

[¶39] The historian further says that after the Paris Peace Conference, China negotiated separately with Germany and concluded “the first completely equal new treaty, even obtaining compensation for the internment of prisoners that none of the Allied countries received, as well as enormous war reparations.” These were “the only war reparations modern China obtained from a foreign country in its capacity as a victorious state,” and deserved to be called “an important milestone in the Beiyang government’s course of treaty revision” (Treaty Revision, pp. 82–109). If Schmitt were to see these dozens of pages of “empirical research,” he might not be angry. More likely he would find them amusing: to think that China has minds like this—poor Chinese!

> Chinese: 这位史学家还说，巴黎和会之后，中国单独与德国议约，订立了“第一个完全平等的新条约，甚至取得协约国各国所无之俘虏收容费，以及巨额之战事赔偿”，是“近代中国唯一对外以战胜国身份取得的战事赔偿”，堪称“北洋修约历程中重要的里程碑”（《修约史》，页 82 - 109）。施米特若看见长达数十页的这种“实证研究”未必会生气，他多半会感到好笑：中国竟然有这种脑筋，可怜的中国人！

[¶40] We ourselves, of course, can only be astonished: this historian does not mention the events that sparked the May Fourth Movement. It is as though the students of Beiping had done something morally wrong by obstructing the Beiyang diplomats’ “reasoned arguments” in Paris, while there was nothing morally problematic about the Beiyang government’s “substituting laborers for soldiers,” sending workers to participate in the war, where countless numbers were killed or wounded digging trenches near the battlefield, and obtaining “enormous war reparations.” [25] More absurdly still, the historian regards this new treaty China obtained “in its capacity as a victorious state” as a “completely equal” treaty. Surely not even an elementary school pupil would understand “equality” in this way.

> Chinese: 我们自己当然会感到惊诧：这位史学家没有提到引发“五四”运动的事情，似乎北平学生阻扰北洋政府外交家在巴黎的“理性辩论”是道德上有问题，而北洋政府“以工代兵”派出劳工参战，在战场附近修战壕死伤无数，得了“巨额之战事赔偿”，在道德上没问题。 [25]更荒唐的是，这位史学家把中国“以战胜国身份取得”的这份新条约视为“完全平等”的条约——连小学生也不至于如此理解“平等”吧。

[¶41] There are still more absurd “interpretations of historical facts.” The historian writes:

> Chinese: 还有荒唐的“对史实的诠释”——这位史学家说，

[¶42] “Abolishing unequal treaties” had little significance in state practice. Between 1925 and 1927, the Nationalist Government vigorously pursued “revolutionary diplomacy” and loudly proclaimed “treaty abrogation,” but it was not yet the internationally recognized central government and had never actually abrogated a treaty. After the April 12 [Incident], the Nanjing Nationalist Government gradually returned to regular international diplomatic practice, emphasizing “the negotiation of new treaties.” From then on, “abolishing unequal treaties” lost its substantive significance in international negotiations. (Treaty Revision, pp. 7–8)

> Chinese: “废除不平等条约”在国家实践上意义不大。1925 – 1927年间，国民政府厉行“革命外交”高唱“废约”，但那时尚非国际承认之中央政府，也未曾真正废除过条约。412[事变]之后，南京国民政府逐渐回归国际外交常轨，强调“改订新约”，自此“废除不平等条约”失去国际交涉上的实质意义。（《修约史》，页7 - 8）

[¶43] It appears that this historian does have some knowledge of a basic political truth: weak countries have no diplomacy. What is laughable is that his book takes the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between China and Russia, signed on May 31, 1924 (usually abbreviated to the “Sino-Russian Agreement”), as a case study, devoting more than 120 pages of “archival analysis” to proving that, “despite pressures at home and abroad, the Beiyang government persisted in defending national rights, and its diplomatic performance deserves praise” (pp. 174–308). If this historian is too busy poring over archives to learn the fundamentals of history and political science, he should have the self-awareness to refrain from discussing political history. After all, the “technical complexity and abstruseness” of treaty negotiations and treaty-making is one thing; the complexity and ambiguity of historical political events is another. They belong to utterly different levels of inquiry.

> Chinese: 看来，这位史学家多少还知道一个政治常识：弱国无外交。搞笑的是，他在书中以 1924年 5月 31签署的《中俄解决悬案大纲协定》（通常简称“中俄协定”）为个案，花了 120多页的“档案分析”来证明，北洋政府“尽管内外交迫，但仍坚持维护国权，外交表现可圈可点”（页 174 – 308）。如果这位史学家埋头看档案太忙，没时间学习基本的史学和政治学知识，那么，他应该有自知之明不谈政治史的事情。毕竟，条约谈判以及订立条约在“技术上复杂艰涩”，与历史上的政治事件复杂难辨是两回事，而且问题层次有天壤之别。

[¶44] China and Russia share a border several thousand kilometers long. More than three hundred years of boundary-making between them amply demonstrate China’s encounter with what Schmitt calls European international public law. The Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 demarcated the eastern section of the border. More than twenty subsequent rounds of boundary demarcation and treaty-making followed. The process of China’s continual loss of territory was also the process by which the tsarist Russian Empire became a prominent member of the family of European public law. The Treaty of Bura of 1727 demarcated the middle section of the border. From the 1850s through the 1880s—that is, before the arrival of the age of imperialism, or what Schmitt calls the “new nomos of the earth”—Russia used a succession of treaties to carve away roughly 1.5 million square kilometers or more of Chinese territory along the eastern and western sections of the Sino-Russian border. [26] As Li Hongzhang lay dying, the Russian minister knelt before him, begging him to sign a treaty carving away Chinese territory. Li Hongzhang died without signing. Yet before this great statesman, born at an ill-fated time, closed his eyes, one last tear for China flowed from the corner of his eye!

> Chinese: 中俄边界接壤数千公里，两国之间历时长达三百多年的划界史足以证明，中国与施米特所说的欧洲国际公法的遭际。 1689年的中俄《尼布楚条约》划定了两国的东段边界，之后划界订约 20多次，中国不断丧失领土的过程，也是沙俄帝国成为欧洲公法大家庭要员的过程。 1727年的《布连斯奇条约》划定了中段边界， 19世纪 50年代至 80年代，即帝国主义时代或施米特所说的“新大地法”来临之前，俄国通过多个条约切割了中俄边界东段和西段约 150多万平方公里的中国领土。 [26]李鸿章弥留之际，俄国公使跪在他面前，恳求他在一份切割中国土地的条约上签字。李鸿章至死没签，但这位生不逢时的大政治家闭眼之前，眼角为中国流出了最后一滴泪珠！

[¶45] After Lenin’s Soviet republic was established, it twice issued “Declarations to China” (1919/1920). The first announced only the renunciation of the discriminatory Russo-Chinese treaties concluded since the 1850s, but included a promise to return the Chinese Eastern Railway to China without compensation. The second explicitly declared that “all treaties concluded with China by previous Russian governments are entirely null and void.” From today’s perspective, we can hardly say that the Beiyang government missed its opportunity and that Soviet Russia, as its international position improved, withdrew its promise to return the Chinese Eastern Railway. Rather, although China had become a republic several years before Russia, it had not achieved national integration and was utterly unable, in the actual negotiations, to bring about new treaties and boundary demarcations. How, then, could the Beiyang government’s diplomatic performance be said to “deserve praise”?

> Chinese: 列宁的苏维埃共和国建立后，两次发表“对华宣言”（1919/1920），第一次仅宣布放弃 19世纪 50年代以来的俄中歧视性条约，但包括承诺将中东铁路无偿归还中国；第二次则明确宣布，“以前俄国历届政府同中国定立的一切条约全部无效。”今天的我们很难说，北洋政府错过时机，苏俄随着自己的国际处境好转又收回了归还中东铁路的承诺。毋宁说，中国虽然比俄国早几年改制共和，却并未实现国家整合，在具体谈判中根本无力落实重新订约和划界，北洋政府的外交表现何以谈得上“可圈可点”。

[¶46] We now also know that the Soviet Union’s international communist ideal did not genuinely create a “new nomos of the earth.” In fact, in the actual negotiations the Soviet Russian government agreed, at most, to renounce only a handful of the tsarist empire’s treaties concluded since the 1890s. Even the Sino-Soviet Agreement and the Fengtian-Soviet Agreement signed in 1924 stipulated only that China had the right to redeem the Chinese Eastern Railway and that, until redemption, China and the Soviet Union would administer it jointly. In reality, it remained under Soviet Russia’s exclusive control.

> Chinese: 如今的我们也已经知道，苏联的国际共产主义理念并没有真的创制出一种“新大地法”。事实上，苏俄政府在具体谈判中仅同意至多放弃沙俄帝国在 19世纪 90年代以来的几个条约。即便是 1924年签订的《中苏协定》和《奉俄协定》，也仅仅规定中国有权赎回中东铁路，赎回之前由中苏共管，实际上是苏俄独占。

[¶47] Moreover, between the 1920s and the 1940s, taking advantage of China’s incessant civil wars, Stalin’s Soviet Russian empire went further still. It exceeded even the discriminatory boundary treaties of the tsarist era, taking more than six hundred of the seven hundred-plus islands on China’s side of the centerline of the main channels of the Ussuri and Heilongjiang rivers.

> Chinese: 不仅如此，在 1920年代至 1940年代期间，趁中国内战频仍，斯大林的苏俄帝国更进一尺，超越沙俄帝国时期的歧视性划界条约，把乌苏里江和黑龙江主航道中心线中国一侧的 700多个岛屿划去 600多个。

[¶48] At the beginning of the twentieth century, a Chinese student in Japan named Qin Lishan naively believed that the foundation of Western civilization was the international legal order, rather than merely “bullying the weak and oppressing the few.” Huang Qun (1883–1945), likewise a student in Japan, published an article rebutting this view in the New World Journal (September 1902), which had been founded at the beginning of the twentieth century. In theory, international law was indeed based on the equality and autonomy of states; the problem was that states actually differed in strength, and their standing was in fact unequal. The so-called “civilized states” of the West really meant powerful states. Concluding treaties amounted to the strong bullying the weak, and international law could not be relied upon: Egypt’s fall to Britain and France, India’s to Britain, and Poland’s to Russia all demonstrated that, in the “new world,” “an arena of the fiercest competition, where the superior devour the flesh of the inferior,” “civilized states” cloaked themselves in “public law” as the strong preyed on the weak. [27] It seems that some people are born clearheaded and others muddleheaded: an anthropological fact unchanged since time immemorial. Once people forget this fact, they become embroiled in pointless academic disputes.

> Chinese: 20世纪初，有个中国留日学生叫秦力山，他天真地相信，西方文明的基石是国际法秩序，并非仅仅是“凌弱暴寡”。同样是留日学生的黄群（1883 - 1945）在创刊于 20世纪之初的《新世界学报》（1902年 9月）上曾撰文批驳：从理论上讲，国际法固然基于各国的平等自主，问题在于，各国强弱实际上不同，国家地位事实上不平等。西方的所谓“文明国”的含义其实是强国，条约缔结无异于以强凌弱，国际法并不可恃：埃及亡于英法、印度亡于英国，波兰亡于俄国，无不是“优食劣肉、竞争最剧之场”的“新世界”中“文明国”以“公法”为外衣弱肉强食的证明。 [27]看来，有人的脑筋天生清楚有人的脑筋天生不清楚，乃是亘古不变的人类学事实。一旦人们忘记这一事实，就会陷入无谓的学术论争。

## 9. 7. New China and International Law

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/9/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/9/#p-N

[¶0] 7. New China and International Law

> Chinese: 七、新中国与国际法

[¶1] The final chapter of The Nomos of the Earth remains closely focused on the world-historical setting before and after the First World War. Its purpose is to emphasize the discriminatory transformation of the principles of European international law: the imposition of discriminatory punishments on Germany following its defeat in that war. China's situation before and after the first European war fits the historical setting in which, as Schmitt analyzes it, European public law was universalized internationally. Defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 was followed in quick succession by the tragic outcome of the Boxer movement.[28] China then began to fragment with the emergence of the “Mutual Protection of Southeast China.” At this point, on the basis of its newly issued Open Door declaration, the United States announced its commitment to “preserving China's territorial integrity.”

> Chinese: 《大地的法》最后一章紧紧围绕第一次世界大战前后的世界历史语境，意在强调欧洲国际法原则的歧视性转变，即对在一战中战败的德国施行歧视性惩罚。第一次欧战前后时期的中国，与施米特论析的欧洲公法国际普遍化的历史语境相吻合：甲午战败之后，紧接而来的是义和团运动的悲剧性收场。 [28]随后，中国出现了“东南互保”的分崩离析局面。这个时候，美国基于刚刚出笼的“门户开放”宣言提出“保全中国领土”的宣称。

[¶2] Lattimore pointed out long ago that the substance of America's Open Door policy was the protection of American interests in China. He called this declaration the doctrine of “give me a share”:

> Chinese: 拉铁摩尔早就指出，美国的“门户开放”政策的实质是保护美国的在华利益，他称这一宣言为“分我一杯羹”主义：

[¶3] The United States did not want China to be broken into pieces, fearing that those countries which had already acquired colonial possessions in China would sell their own goods and invest their own capital to the detriment of American enterprise. Although the United States was then strong enough to participate in almost any economic competition, it had not yet decided which activities mattered most to it.[29]

> Chinese: 美国不愿中国被弄得四分五裂，深怕那些在中国业已获得殖民地所有权的国家会销售自己的货物，投入自己的资本，而损及美国的企业。美国那时虽然已有实力参加差不多任何经济角逐，但还未确定何种活动对它最关重要。 [29]

[¶4] Lattimore also recognized that America's Open Door strategy had in fact been learned from the British: China was to remain a place of “free competition” among the empires. After all, it was the world's largest unified market. Judging by Europe's modern experience, once the Chinese empire disintegrated, the modern great powers would fight a world war on Chinese soil comparable to Germany's Thirty Years' War. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 had already provided a dress rehearsal.[30] For both the old and the new great powers, dividing China economically was preferable to partitioning it by force. Thus, after the Boxer incident, China was classified as a “barbarous country” or a “semi-civilized country,” and a series of discriminatory treaties followed, involving most-favored-nation treatment, consular jurisdiction, and treaty tariffs. Add agreements imposing leased territories, demarcating spheres of influence, and granting railway and mining rights, and historians still cannot establish exactly how many “unequal treaties” there were. If the latter agreements are included, the estimated number of discriminatory treaties imposed on China exceeds one thousand, rather than seven hundred or so.

> Chinese: 拉铁摩尔还看到，美国的“门户开放”战略其实是跟英国人学的，即让中国始终是各帝国“自由竞争”的场所，毕竟，这里是世界上最大的统一市场。凭靠欧洲式的现代经验，中华帝国一旦瓦解，随之而来的将是现代列强在中国这片土地上打一场类似于德意志 30年战争的世界大战—— 1904年的日俄战争已经是一场预演。 [30]对于新老列强来说，用武力瓜分中国不如以经济手段瓜分中国。于是，义和团事件后，中国被定性为“野蛮国”或“半开化国”，一系列涉及最惠国待遇、领事裁判权和协定关税一类的歧视性条约就来了。加上强制租借地、圈定势力范围、拥有铁路权和矿权之类的契约，史学界迄今都没法搞清清楚，究竟有多少“不平等条约”。若算上后者，据估计，中国承受的歧视性条约总数在一千以上，而非七百多。

[¶5] The third reference to China in The Nomos of the Earth occurs in the historical setting before the Second World War (pp. 223–24), when China had already entered its War of Resistance against Japan. Schmitt's concern here is the role played by the post–First World War League of Nations in the globalization of European international law. President Wilson selected Geneva as the League's headquarters because this Swiss city symbolized “remaining neutral” in political conflicts in modern European political history. It was as though European international law, in becoming global international law, should adopt political “neutrality” as a juridical principle.

> Chinese: 《大地的法》第三次提到中国的历史语境是第二次世界大战之前（页 223 - 224），当时的中国已经进入抗日战争时期。施米特在这里所关注的问题是，第一次世界大战之后的“国际联盟”对于欧洲国际法的全球化具有何种作用。美国总统威尔逊选定日内瓦为国联总部所在地，因为瑞士的日内瓦在现代欧洲政治史上具有象征意义，即在政治冲突中“保持中立”，似乎欧洲国际法在成为全球国际法时，应该采取政治上“保持中立”的法理原则。

[¶6] For Schmitt, the use of terms such as “association” (Société) or “league” in the organization's name indicated that the League of Nations was not a federal structure but an institution for controlling the coordinated action of Europe's small and medium-sized states (p. 222). Schmitt emphasized that the purpose of European international law was “not to abolish war, but to limit and restrain it.” War cannot in fact be abolished; the essential task is to “avoid destructive wars,” yet “the League of Nations contributed nothing to this” (p. 223). Schmitt did not mention Japan's massacre in Nanjing, China. Nor did he mention that the League's resolution following its investigation of Japan's 1931 invasion of China's northeast proved to be a worthless scrap of paper, although he did mention the League's adherence to the “abstract principle” of “nonrecognition of occupation by force.”

> Chinese: 在施米特看来，国联名称用了“协会”（Société）或“联盟”（League）这样的语词，表明国联并不是一个联邦架构，而是操控中小型欧洲国家协同行动的机构（页 222）。施米特强调，欧洲国际法的目的“不是为了废止战争，而是为了限制和约束战争”。因为，实际上战争没法废止，关键是“避免发生毁灭性战争”，但“国联对此却毫无助益”（页 223）。施米特没有提到日本在中国南京的大屠杀行径，甚至没有提到国联在调查 1931年日本入侵中国东北事件后作出的决议形同废纸，尽管他提到，国联持守“不承认武力占领”这一“抽象原则”。

[¶7] The September 18 Incident of 1931 is well known in modern world political history. In his History of Political Ideas, Voegelin likewise observed that Japan's expansion in China intensified “because the League of Nations failed to deal adequately” with Japan's invasion of China in 1931. For Voegelin, this was the result of Japan's imitation of Western imperialism, an imitation whose consequences the West itself subsequently tasted.[31] Japan's seizure of British, American, and French colonies in Southeast Asia after the outbreak of the Pacific War could be described as giving them a dose of their own medicine. Japan's invasion of China, however, can only be described as its acquisition of the European great powers' bad habits.

> Chinese: 1931年的“ 918事件”在世界现代政治史上非常有名，沃格林在其《政治观念史》中也提到，“由于国际联盟在 1931年未能适当处理”日本对中国的入侵，日本在中国的扩张才变本加厉。在沃格林看来，这是日本效仿西方帝国主义的结果，而西方自身随后也尝到了这种效仿的滋味。 [31]太平洋战争爆发后，日本夺取英美法在东南亚的殖民地，可以说是以其人之道还治其人。但日本入侵中国，则只能说是日本学会了欧洲大国的恶习。

[¶8] In relation to Schmitt's argument, we should recognize that Japan's barbarous conduct toward China was a consequence of the spirit of European international law. In a lecture in 1944, Lattimore acknowledged that Britain's and America's indulgence was to blame for Japan's unrestrained aggression against China:

> Chinese: 与施米特的论题相关，我们则应该看到，日本对中国的野蛮行径是欧洲国际法精神的结果。拉铁摩尔在 1944年的一次讲演中承认，日本肆意侵略中国当归咎于英美纵容：

[¶9] There was a major loophole in this Anglo-American doctrine of “give me a share,” one that fundamentally weakened our opposition to Japan's encroachment on China. In all the protests that we British and Americans made to Japan, we never disputed Japan's right to make demands upon China. We protested only that the various privileges Japan obtained should not exclude us. (Solution in Asia, cited above, p. 11)

> Chinese: 在英美这种“分我一杯羹”主义中，隐藏着一个大漏洞，从根本上削弱了我们反对日本侵占中国的立场。在我们英美向日本提出的所有抗议中，从未驳斥过日本对中国提出要求的权利。我们只抗议日本所获得的种种特权，不应把我们排除在外。（《亚洲的决策》，前揭，页11）

[¶10] At the end of 1938, when Japanese forces occupied Wuhan and Guangzhou simultaneously, the American secretary of state believed that “the Japanese have already won the war; from now on, the fighting will probably amount to no more than mopping-up operations after a great victory.” Lattimore also noted that in July 1939 the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended that the State Department abrogate the commercial treaty between Japan and the United States. The department considered this “an unbelievably absurd move,” because it would “alert” Japan “to the fact that we had become its mortal enemy” (ibid., pp. 7–8).

> Chinese: 1938年底，日军同时占领武汉和广州，美国国务卿认为，“日本人已经在战争中取胜了，从今后，战事恐怕不过是大胜利之后的肃清工作而已。”拉铁摩尔还提到， 1939年 7月，美国参议院外交委员会曾建议国务院废除日美商约，国务院认为，这会是“难以置信的荒唐举动”，因为这会使日本“警惕到我们已成为它的死对头”（同上，页 7 - 8）。

[¶11] During the Tokyo Trial, Puyi, the emperor of Manchukuo who had been coerced by Japan, testified in court. The American prosecutor Keenan asked Puyi: Why did you not resist at the time? Puyi replied with a bitter smile: So many “democratic countries” stood by while Japan swallowed up China's northeast. How could I, a deposed emperor, resist? Had Puyi been familiar with modern European history, he might have said: Was Japan not simply learning from you Westerners? Was this not consistent with your customs of international law? Only ten days after I ascended the throne, Japan forced me to sign a secret agreement placing all of Manchukuo's political and economic powers, to say nothing of its military powers, in the hands of the Japanese garrison.

> Chinese: 东京审判期间，受日本胁迫的满洲国皇帝溥仪曾出庭作证。美籍检察官季南问溥仪：你当时为什么不反抗？溥仪苦笑着回答说：那么多的“民主国家”都对日本侵吞中国东北听之任之，我一个退位皇帝怎么反抗？如果溥仪熟悉欧洲的现代历史，他恐怕会说，日本不就是向你们西方人学的吗？这不是符合你们的国际法习惯吗？我登基仅仅 10天，日本就胁迫我签订秘密协定，满洲国的政治、经济更不用说军事权力一律交日本驻军掌管。

[¶12] Had Japan not attacked the United States and seized American, British, and French colonies in Southeast Asia, the Western “democratic countries” would have accepted its occupation of China's northeast, and Puyi would have remained an emperor under coercion. Were there no precedents for such things in modern European history? The film of the Nanjing Massacre secretly shot by the Reverend Magee was publicized by the American magazine Life as early as March 1938. Yet it was not until the Tokyo Trial in 1946 that these acts of massacre were judged violations of international law and the laws of war. One might ask: Why did the great “democratic countries” not bring charges under international law in 1938? Was it because China lay on the other side of Europe's “linear thinking,” a “free space” over which the great powers could contend at will? Why did the American-controlled Tokyo Trial emphasize punishing the war criminals who had launched the Pacific War rather than those who had invaded China? Was this, too, a surviving legacy of the “amity lines” in the tradition of European international law?

> Chinese: 若非日本攻击美国并夺取美英法在东南亚的殖民地，西方“民主国家”会接受日本对中国东北的占领，而溥仪仍然是被胁迫的皇帝。这类事情在欧洲现代历史中难道没有先例？马基牧师偷拍的南京大屠杀胶片，早在 1938年 3月就由美国《生活周刊》曝光，但直到 1946年的东京审判，如此屠杀行为才被定罪为违反国际法和战争法。人们会问：为什么伟大的“民主国家”没有在 1938年就依据国际法提出控告？因为中国属于欧洲的“划界思维”的另一边，是列强可以任意争夺的“自由空间”？为什么美国掌控的东京审判注重惩罚发动太平洋战争的战犯，而非入侵中国的战犯？难道这也是欧洲国际法传统的“友好线”遗风？

[¶13] The day before the Tokyo Trial opened, the presiding judge, Webb, who came from British Australia, proposed that the British judge should take precedence over the Chinese judge in the seating arrangement. He said that this was the wish of the Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in the Pacific theater. Something still more absurd followed: after seven of the twenty-eight Japanese defendants were sentenced to hang, their American lawyers petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review the judgments. Under pressure from world opinion, the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the petitions by six votes to one. Nevertheless, the very fact that it entertained them had already exposed the political character of the “International Military Tribunal for the Far East.”[32] If this has still not taught us anything about the political character of European international law and its procedures of legality, we can blame only our own boundless stupidity.

> Chinese: 东京审判开庭前一天，英属澳大利亚籍的审判庭庭长卫勃法官提出，英国法官的座次要排在中国法官前面，并说这是盟军太平洋战区最高司令官的意思。还有更荒唐的事情： 28名日本战犯被告中有 7名被判绞刑后，被告的美方律师向美国最高法院提出申诉，要求复核判决。尽管在世界舆论压力下，美国最高法院最终以 6票对 1票否决了申诉，但高院受理这一申诉本身就已经暴露了“远东国际法庭”的政治性质。 [32]如果我们还没有因此对欧洲国际法及其合法性程序的政治性质长见识，那就只能怪自己愚不可及。

[¶14] We should not forget that Chinese people have indeed displayed such boundless stupidity. During the North China crisis of 1935, General Falkenhausen (1878–1966), head of the German military advisory mission employed by Chiang Kai-shek, repeatedly warned that Japan's intention to carve up Chinese territory by military means could not have been clearer. China's government and leader had to resist firmly; otherwise, no one would come to their rescue. There could be absolutely no reliance on possible intervention by the great powers, whether jointly or individually. The North China incidents were clearly the result of “unceasing concessions on the Chinese side” and “empty verbal threats” on the Japanese side. Falkenhausen's insight arose from Germany's experience during the globalization of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Chiang Kai-shek, however, continued to expect Britain, America, and France to intervene against Japan on account of their interests in China, and did not heed Falkenhausen's warnings. Even in the week after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and before Japan's massive reinforcement of North China on July 16, Chiang still hoped to negotiate peace with Japan while awaiting intervention by the League of Nations.

> Chinese: 我们不应该忘记，中国人的确有过这样的愚不可及。 1935年华北危机之时，蒋介石聘请的德国军事顾问团团长法肯豪森上将（1878 - 1966）曾多次告诫，日本用军事手段切割中国领土的目的再明显不过，中国的政府和领袖必须坚决抵抗，否则没谁会出面救援，绝不能指望列强有可能联合或单独干涉。华北事件明显是“华方一味退让”，日方“空词恫吓”的结果。法肯豪森的洞察出自 19世纪末至 20世纪初全球化时期的德国经验，蒋介石却仍然指望英美法会因其在华利益出面干预日本，并未听从法肯豪森的告诫。甚至在卢沟桥事件之后到 7月 16日日军大举增兵华北之前的一周里，蒋介石还寄望与日本和谈，以待国联干预。

[¶15] After the battle of Taierzhuang, planned by Falkenhausen, ended in a complete victory, he told Chiang Kai-shek that the victory had to be followed up with pursuit. The routed Japanese forces must not be allowed breathing space, or they would soon return. Chiang turned a deaf ear. Even Falkenhausen, a foreigner, was so angry that he tugged at his hair; our historians, by contrast, think it was of little consequence. Although the “breaching of the Huayuankou dike” was Falkenhausen's suggestion, the underlying cause was Chiang's persistent failure to adopt an active posture of resistance in accordance with Falkenhausen's military dispositions. His mind was filled with expectations of intervention by the “international community.”[33] We cannot say that Chiang lacked patriotic feeling, only that his political intelligence was astonishingly low. At the cost of hundreds of thousands of Chinese lives, Chiang provided a bloody lesson through which China could understand the European system of international law. Yet many of our intellectuals still may not consider it a lesson at all.

> Chinese: 法肯豪森设计的台儿庄战役取得完胜后，他告诉蒋介石必须乘胜追击，不给溃败中的日军喘息之机，否则很快会卷土重来。蒋介石置若罔闻，法肯豪森作为一个外国人，也气得直揪自己的头发，我们的史学家到觉得不算回事儿。“花园口决堤”尽管是法肯豪森的建议，根本原因则是蒋介石迟迟不按法肯豪森的军事部署做出积极抵抗姿态，满脑子期待“国际社会”干预。 [33]我们不能说蒋介石没有国家情怀，只能说他的政治智商低得不可思议。蒋介石用数十万中国人的性命这一代价，为中国认识欧洲国际法体系提供了一个血的教训，而我们的好些智识人迄今未必认为这堪称教训。

## 10. Epilogue: From the Raya Lines to the Thirty-Eighth Parallel

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/10/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/10/#p-N

[¶0] Epilogue: From the Raya Lines to the Thirty-Eighth Parallel

> Chinese: 余论：从“拉亚线”到“三八线”

[¶1] The fourth and final reference to China in The Nomos of the Earth concerns the historical moment when America's rise brought forth a globalized “nomos of the earth.” Schmitt says that, from its founding, the United States consistently pursued a policy of separation from Europe. This “separatism” carried a sense of moral superiority: a farewell to “the entire political system of European monarchy” and the remaking of a wholly new Europe, or “West”:

> Chinese: 《大地的法》第四次也是最后一次提到中国，与美国崛起并带出全球化“大地法”的历史时刻相关。施米特说，美国自建国以来一直持守与欧洲分离的国策，这种“分离主义”带有道德上的优越感，即告别“欧洲君主制的整个政治体制”，重塑一个全新的欧洲或“西方”：

[¶2] The new West claims to be the true West, the true Occident, the true Europe. The new West, America (die Amerika), will replace the old West and Europe, redirect world history, and become the center of the world. The [new] West will be wholly the West (Occident) in a moral, civilizational, and political sense; it will neither be annihilated nor destroyed, nor even dethroned, but merely replaced. International law bids farewell to the era centered on old Europe. The center of civilization continues to move westward, toward America. (p. 272)

> Chinese: 新西方要求成为真正的西方、真正的西洋、真正的欧洲。新的西方，即美利坚（die Amerika）将取代老的西方和欧洲，重新确定世界历史的方向，成为世界的中心。[新的]西方将完全成为道德的、文明的和政治意义上的西方（Occident），既不会被消灭或破坏，甚至不会被废黜，而只是被替代。国际法告别了那个以老欧洲为重心的时代。文明的中心继续向西、向美利坚移动。（页272）

[¶3] Just as “thousands upon thousands of disappointed or disillusioned Europeans left old, reactionary Europe for America, to begin a new life on that sacred and unsullied soil,” the United States used the Spanish-American War of 1898 as its opportunity to turn and stride into its own “era of open imperialism.”[34] The difference was that American imperialist expansion moved eastward, “deep into the Pacific region.” The Open Door declaration of 1899 proclaimed America's right to an equal share of benefits throughout the vast regions of Asia.

> Chinese: 正当“成千上万失意或幻灭的欧洲人离开老旧而且反动的欧洲前往美利坚，在那片圣洁无暇的土地上开始新的生活”时，美国借 1898年的美西战争之机，转身大步迈向自己“开放的帝国主义时代”。 [34]不同的是，美国的帝国主义扩张方向是东方，即“深入太平洋地区”。 1899年的“门户开放”宣言宣称，美国对亚洲的广阔区域拥有利益均沾的权利。

[¶4] From the perspective of global geography, this was a step [by America] from west to east. From the standpoint of world history, the relationship between the American continent and the newly emerging East Asian space now resembled the situation a century earlier, when America's rise in world history had squeezed old Europe out of the Eastern Hemisphere. In the geography of ideas, such a striking change would become a highly sensational theme. Under its influence, 1930 announced the rise of a new world, and from then on America became connected with China. (p. 274)

> Chinese: 从全球地理的视角来看，这是一个[美国]从西方迈向东方的步骤。从世界史的角度来看，现在美利坚大陆与新出现的东亚空间的关系，就像一百年前老欧洲由于美利坚在世界史上的崛起而被挤出东半球区域一样。在思想地理学的意义上讲，这样一种显著变化会成为一个极其轰动性的主题。在其影响之下，1930年宣告了一个新世界的崛起，从此美利坚与中国联系在一起。（页274）

[¶5] Schmitt did not explain further how the United States became connected with China.[35] Following the line of thought in The Nomos of the Earth, the connection between the United States and China should be traceable to the sixteenth century, although the United States did not yet exist at all.

> Chinese: 施米特没有进一步细说，美国如何与中国联系在一起。 [35]按《大地的法》中的思路，美国与中国的联系应该可以上溯到 16世纪，尽管那时还根本没有美国。

[¶6] Under the Treaty of Zaragoza of the early sixteenth century, Portugal obtained control of all islands and waters west of the “raya line,” including all of Asia and the neighboring islands already discovered. Spain acquired dominion over virtually the entire Pacific and the space to its east. Since the treaty did not mention the Philippines, Charles V exploited the loophole and announced their colonization in 1542. He assumed that the Portuguese king would not react strongly, since there was no spice business to be done in the Philippine islands. His calculation was mistaken. Only more than twenty years later, in 1565, did the powerful Philip II establish a Spanish-controlled trading post at Manila by relying on his naval strength.

> Chinese: 按 16世纪初的《萨拉戈萨条约》，葡萄牙获得“拉亚线”以西的所有岛屿和海域的控制权，包括整个亚洲及其已经发现的属邻岛屿，西班牙则获得几乎整个太平洋及以东空间的支配权。由于条约没有提到菲律宾，查理五世钻空子，在 1542年宣布向菲律宾殖民。他以为葡萄牙国王不会做出强烈反应，因为菲律宾群岛上没香料生意可做，结果打错算盘。 20多年后（1565），强势的菲力二世才凭靠海军实力在马尼拉建立西班牙的直辖贸易站。

[¶7] At the end of the nineteenth century, taking advantage of victory in the Spanish-American War, the United States seized control of the Philippines from Spain by force. If Philip II's reliance on naval strength had altered the “raya line” for the first time, America's seizure of the Philippines from Spain by force altered it for the second. In the spring of 1942, after launching the Pacific War, Japan advanced into the Philippines, and the fifty thousand American troops under MacArthur were forced to withdraw to Australia. Japanese forces immediately followed, attacking Port Moresby in New Guinea with the intention of establishing a forward base there for an assault on the Australian mainland, which the British naval commander James Cook (1728–1779) had proclaimed “British territory” in the mid-eighteenth century. Should not Japan's war against the United States in the western Pacific be understood as an attempt to alter the “raya line”?

> Chinese: 19世纪末，趁美西战争胜利之机，美国用武力从西班牙手中夺取了菲律宾的支配权。如果说菲力二世凭靠海军实力第一次更改了“拉亚线”，那么，美国用武力从西班牙手中夺取菲律宾就是第二次更改“拉亚线”。 1942年春，日本发动太平洋战争后进兵菲律宾，麦克阿瑟麾下的五万美军被迫撤离到澳大利亚。日军随即跟进，进攻新几内亚的莫尔斯比港，企图在那里建立前进基地，进攻英国海军中校库克（James Cook， 1728 - 1779）在 18世纪中期已宣布为“英国领土”的澳大利亚本土。日本与美国的西太平洋战争，难道不应该理解为日本力图更改“拉亚线”？

[¶8] We may imagine that, had The Nomos of the Earth been completed three years later, the war on the Korean Peninsula from late 1950 to 1953 would certainly have become a major topic for Schmitt. After all, this war concerned the redrawing of the “raya line.” The Soviet Russian and American empires became adversaries in the repartition of global spheres of influence, and globalization entered a new balance-of-power configuration: the condition of “Cold War.” In the view of an American historian,

> Chinese: 可以设想，如果《大地的法》成书晚三年，那么， 1950年底至 1953年的朝鲜半岛战争一定会成为施米特笔下的一大话题。毕竟，这场战争涉及重新划分“拉亚线”：苏俄帝国与美利坚帝国成为重新划分全球势力范围的对手，全球化进程进入新的均势格局——“冷战”状态。在美国的史学家看来，

[¶9] The Korean War became a watershed in American history. It was from this point that the United States truly became a superpower, began to display a willingness to intervene in affairs across the globe, and gradually developed the corresponding means.[36]

> Chinese: 朝鲜战争成为了美国历史的一道分水岭。正是从这时开始，美国才真正地成为一个超级大国，开始表现出干涉全球事务的意愿，并逐渐发展出相应的手段。[36]

[¶10] The outbreak of the Korean War had much to do with a sudden shift in America's “linear thinking.” In January 1950, Acheson declared in a speech at the National Press Club that Korea and Taiwan lay outside America's defensive perimeter. If South Korea were attacked, the United Nations could be left to act. Whether or not this declaration reflected the true intentions of America's leadership, Stalin permitted Kim Il Sung to undertake military action to reunify his country precisely on the basis of it.

> Chinese: 朝鲜战争的爆发与美国的“划界思维”的突然转变有很大关系。 1950年元月，艾奇逊在全国记者俱乐部的演讲中宣称，朝鲜和台湾都在美国防御圈之外，如果南朝鲜受到攻击，可以让联合国去采取行动。无论这一宣称是否是美国首脑圈的真实想法，斯大林正是基于这一宣称允许金日成采取统一祖国的军事行动。

[¶11] After North Korea launched its attack, Johnson, Dulles, and even MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were “initially reluctant to commit ground forces,” because “American commitments elsewhere were more urgent.” The White House had reason to fear that, if the United States and the Soviet Union confronted one another in Europe, Korea would “become a strategic liability for the United States.” Yet the McCarthy affair made its timely entrance at this moment, and a new political correctness began to determine the “linear thinking” of democratic “two-party co-governance.”[37]

> Chinese: 北朝鲜发动进攻之后，约翰逊、杜勒斯甚至麦克阿瑟和参联会“起初都不情愿投入地面部队作战”，因为“美国在其他地区的承诺更为紧迫”。白宫有理由担心，一旦美国与苏联在欧洲摊牌，朝鲜会“成为美国的一个战略负担”。然而，麦卡锡事件在这个时候适时地出场，新的政治正确开始决定民主的“两党共治”的“划界思维”。 [37]

[¶12] From the perspective of China's modern history, the Korean Peninsula war can be regarded as New China's reply to the late-nineteenth-century Open Door declaration: the Americans were not to be allowed across the thirty-eighth parallel. An article published in 1951 by Lei Haizong, one of China's first generation of world historians, may be taken as historical testimony.[38] When America and China became connected once again after the “reform and opening” of the 1980s, the meaning of “opening” had changed completely. An owner opening the door himself and inviting outsiders in to operate joint ventures is an entirely different matter from outsiders breaking down the door or climbing over the wall to enclose land or exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.

> Chinese: 从中国的现代历史来看，朝鲜半岛战争堪称新中国对 19世纪末的“门户开放”宣言的回答：不准许美国人跨过三八线。中国的第一代世界史学家雷海宗在 1951年发表的文章，算得上历史的证言。 [38] 1980年代的“改革开放”以来，美利坚与中国再次联系在一起时，“开放”的含义完全变了：主人自己开门，请外人进来搞合资经营，与外人破门或越墙而入圈地或搞治外法权，是两码子事。

[¶13] Schmitt notes that, when America began its imperialist expansion into Asia at the end of the nineteenth century, it also abolished its domestic “freedom of appropriation.” America was no longer “open land” into which people could freely immigrate (p. 275). This should remind us that, in 1905, the United States passed legislation prohibiting Chinese immigration. Together with media exposure of the mistreatment of Chinese workers in America, this prompted large-scale movements to “boycott American goods” in China's major cities, with overseas Chinese joining in. In the end, however, the movement came to nothing. In early 1951, after Communist Chinese forces engaged American troops for the second time on the Korean Peninsula, the government of New China immediately mobilized a nationwide anti-American movement. Disregarding European international law, it froze or even confiscated American assets in China. We can say that this both violated and conformed to the rules of European public law.

> Chinese: 施米特提到，美国在 19世纪末开始对亚洲施行帝国主义扩张时，也取消了本国“内部的占取自由”，美利坚不再是“开放的土地”，可以让人自由移民（页 275）。这让我们应该想起， 1905年，美国通过禁止中国移民的法例，加上华工在美受虐待的事件在传媒曝光，中国各大城市曾爆发大规模“杯葛美货”运动，海外华人也纷纷起而响应，但结果是不了了之。 1951年初，中共军队与美军在朝鲜半岛上第二次交火后，新中国政府随即动员了全国性的反美运动，而且不理会欧洲国际法，冻结甚至剥夺美国的在华资产。我们可以说，这既违背也符合欧洲公法的规矩。

[¶14] At the end of 1949, after Communist Chinese forces captured Guangzhou, they stopped on the north bank of the Shenzhen River. What the British Empire feared did not occur. Even in the case of the “unequal treaties,” the government of New China did not rely on military force to “abrogate” them. We cannot say that New China disregarded the Western tradition of international law: whether treaties are “abrogated” depends on whether the two countries enter a state of war.

> Chinese: 1949年底，中共军队夺取广州之后，停在了深圳河北岸，大英帝国担心的事情并没有发生。即便对“不平等条约”，新中国政府并没有凭靠武力“废约”，我们不能说新中国不遵守西方的国际法传统：是否“废约”取决于两国是否进入战争状态。

[¶15] At the beginning of the Sino-British negotiations over “Hong Kong's return” in 1983, Mrs. Thatcher, known as the “Iron Lady,” attempted to maintain a position in the European international-law tradition: that “the three treaties remained valid” and that “administrative authority could be exchanged for sovereignty.” This was wide of the mark. Deng Xiaoping rejected it with a resounding sentence in Sichuan dialect: “Sovereignty is not negotiable.” Still unwilling to concede, Mrs. Thatcher subsequently asked her defense secretary whether military force could preserve Britain's hold over Hong Kong Island, which had been ceded under the treaties. Faced with the Iron Lady's excessive ignorance of military affairs, the defense secretary could only smile bitterly and shrug.

> Chinese: 中英关于“香港回归”的谈判初期（1983），有“铁娘子”之称的撒切尔夫人企图坚持“三个条约有效论”和“以治权换主权”的欧洲国际法式的立场，就离谱了。邓小平以一句掷地有声的四川话回绝道：“主权问题没得商量。”撒切尔夫人仍不甘心，她随后问自己的国防大臣，是否有可能凭靠军事力量保住按条约规定已割让的港岛。对“铁娘子”在军事方面的太过无知，国防大臣只能苦笑和耸肩。

[¶16] The foremost juridical lesson that the European system of international law taught China was this: China must first be a sovereign state worthy of the name, and national sovereignty can be obtained only through a country's own military strength. This is the basic prerequisite for China's entry into the European international-law system. Lei Haizong earned his doctorate in America through research on Turgot. After returning to China, he remained mindful that martial virtue was one of the heirlooms of the Chinese cultural spirit. Presumably this was the foremost insight he had gained from studying world history.[39]

> Chinese: 欧洲国际法体系教给中国的首要法理是：中国必须首先是名符其实的主权国家，而国家主权只能凭靠本国的军事力量来获得——这是中国进入欧洲国际法体系的基本前提。雷海宗以研究杜尔哥在美国获得博士学位，回国后他心里惦记着，中国文化精神的传家宝之一是武德，想必是他研究世界史的首要心得。 [39]

[¶17] In today’s international setting, to put it in Schmitt’s terms, as China grows the United States has every reason to worry that, in the relationship between the American continent and the newly emerging East Asian space, America will be squeezed out of Asia by China’s rise in world history, just as old Europe was squeezed out of the Eastern Hemisphere by America’s rise in world history: it is now America’s turn to see its demarcated “free space” challenged. At a minimum, because of the Korean War, the postmodern “raya lines” drawn by America and the Soviet Union made China and America adversaries in the global redrawing of boundaries.

> Chinese: 从今天的国际语境来看，用施米特的话来说，随着中国的成长，美国完全有理由担心，美国大陆与新出现的东亚空间的关系，就像老欧洲由于美国在世界史上的崛起而被挤出东半球区域一样，美国会由于中国在世界史上的崛起而被挤出亚洲：现在轮到美国划定的“自由空间”受到挑战。至少，由于朝鲜战争，美苏划定的后现代的“拉亚线”让中国与美国成了全球化重新划线的对手。

[¶18] China's rise in world history is connected with the eastward transmission of Marxism. This means that Marxism brought a new “nomos of the earth.” We should also recognize that the emergence of this new nomos is connected with Hegel's resistance to the capitalist nomos of Hobbes and Locke. At the end of chapter four, section five, Schmitt mentions again that, “in the chapter discussing the first global lines,” he “pointed out the connection between Hobbes's pre-state condition of nature and the zones of savage freedom.” In his philosophy of history, Hegel, in disputing Hobbes, had already offered an extraordinary diagnosis of America's “[state] structure in this new world”: America had not yet constituted itself as a state. It remained in “a condition in which the freedom of interests takes priority,” that is, “still at the stage of civil society.” The domestic political factors behind America's intervention in the Korean civil war in 1950 demonstrate that Schmitt's observation was not unfounded.

> Chinese: 中国在世界史上的崛起与马克思主义的东传有关。这意味着，马克思主义带来了一种新的“大地法”。我们还应该意识到，这个新大地法的提出与黑格尔抵制霍布斯–洛克的资本主义式大地法有关。施米特在第四章第五节结尾时再次提到，他“在讲述第一个全球界线的那一章，指出了霍布斯关于前国家的自然状态和野蛮自由区域的关联性”，而黑格尔在其历史哲学中反驳霍布斯时，已经对美利坚“这个新世界的[国家]结构做出了不同凡响的诊断”：美国还没有构建成一个国家，尚处于“利益自由优先的状态”，即“还停留在市民社会的阶段”。美国在 1950年介入朝鲜内战时的国内政治因素证明，施米特此言不虚。

[¶19] Schmitt then mentions the further judgment that the young Marx had made about America: in this “republic, as in the monarchies of the nineteenth century, private property determines the actual constitution and the state” (pp. 275–76). Schmitt was not a Marxist. He emphasized so strongly that the new Hegelian-Marxist nomos of the earth sought to overcome the Anglo-Saxon and Americanist nomos solely because he respected historical facts.

> Chinese: 随后施米特提到，青年马克思曾对美国做出过进一步评价：这个“共和国像 19世纪的君主国一样，私有财产决定了真正的宪法和国家”（页 275 - 276）。施米特并非马克思主义者，他如此强调黑格尔–马克思主义的新大地法志在克服盎格鲁－撒克逊和美利坚主义的大地法，仅仅因为他尊重历史的事实。

[¶20] In Hegel's view, Kantian cosmopolitanism disregarded Aristotle's emphasis on cultivation, moral education, the formation of good habits, and the socialization accomplished through the ethical life (Sittlichheit) of different cultures and histories. In short, Kant was indifferent to the moral significance and value of historical and social institutions.[40]

> Chinese: 在黑格尔看来，康德式的世界主义忽视了亚里士多德对于教化、道德教养、善良习惯的养成和以各种文化与历史的道德风尚（Sittlichheit）所实现的社会化的强调。一言以蔽之，康德对于历史性的和社会性的制度的道德意义及其道德价值漠不关心。[40]

[¶21] For us, the unavoidable question of political historiography is this: China's rise through this “ism” will inevitably introduce a new nomos of the earth into world history. This also means that the traditional virtues of Chinese civilization will necessarily enter into the struggle against the Anglo-Saxon and Americanist nomos of the earth. In fact, as early as the beginning of 1946, Mao Zedong had already “broken intellectually through the constraints of the postwar great-power system, established an independent strategy toward the United States, and ceased to give a central place to considerations of attitudes toward the Soviet Union and its interests.”[41]

> Chinese: 对我们来说，无法回避的政治史学问题是：中国凭靠这种“主义”崛起，必然会给世界历史引入新的大地法。而这也意味着，中国文明的传统德性必将参与到与盎格鲁－撒克逊和美利坚主义的大地法的斗争之中。事实上，早在 1946年初，毛泽东已经“在思想上突破战后大国体系的羁绊，确立了独立自主的对美战略，并且不再把对苏联态度及其利益的考虑放在重要位置上”。 [41]

[¶22] What, then, is this new nomos of the earth? Schmitt supplied the answer in his Theory of the Partisan of 1963.

> Chinese: 这种新大地法究竟是怎样的呢？施米特在 1963年的《游击队理论》中给出了回答。

## 11. Author’s notes

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/11/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/11/#p-N

[¶0] Author's Notes

> Chinese: 注释

[¶1] [1] Iggers and Wang Qingjia, A Global History of Modern Historiography: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present, translated by Yang Yu, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2011, p. 411. Compare Stearns, Global Civilization, translated by Zhao Yifeng, Wang Jinxin, and others, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2006; Pamela Kyle Crossley, What Is Global History?, translated by Liu Wenming, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2009.

> Chinese: [1] 伊格尔斯、王晴佳，《全球史学史：从18世纪至当代》，杨豫译，北京：北京大学出版社，2011，页411。比较斯特恩斯，《全球文明史》，赵轶峰、王晋新等译，北京：中华书局，2006；柯娇燕，《什么是全球史》，刘文明译，北京：北京大学出版社，2009。

[¶2] [2] McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community, translated by Sun Yue and others, Beijing: CITIC Press, 2015, vol. 2, p. 843.

> Chinese: [2] 麦克尼尔，《西方的兴起：人类共同体史》，孙岳等译，北京：中信出版社，2015，下册，页843。

[¶3] [3] Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, translated by Liu Yi and others, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2017. All subsequent references to this book give page numbers in the text.

> Chinese: [3] 施米特，《大地的法》，刘毅等译，上海：上海人民出版社，2017（以下凡引此书随文注页码）。

[¶4] [4] Ranke, The Secret of World History, edited by Rogers Wines, translated by Yi Lan, Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2012, p. 161.

> Chinese: [4] 兰克，《世界历史的秘密》，文斯（Rogers Wines）编，易兰译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2012，页161。

[¶5] [5] Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, translated by Lin Erwei and Chen Jiang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2007/2010. Hereafter abbreviated as The Pivot, with page numbers given in the text.

> Chinese: [5] 麦金德，《历史的地理枢纽》，林尔慰、陈江译，北京：商务印书馆，2007/2010（以下简称“《枢纽》”，随文注页码）。

[¶6] [6] Burke, The Clash of Civilizations: War and the Formation of the European State System, translated by Wang Jinxin, Shanghai: Shanghai Joint Publishing Company, 2010, p. 161.

> Chinese: [6] 伯克，《文明的冲突：战争与欧洲国家体制的形成》，王晋新译，上海：上海三联书店，2010，页161。

[¶7] [7] Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992, translated by Wei Hongzhong, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2012, p. 81.

> Chinese: [7] 蒂利，《强制、资本和欧洲国家：公元990 - 1992年》，魏洪钟译，上海：上海人民出版社，2012，页81。

[¶8] [8] Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era: 1890 to the Present, London, 1970; compare Felix Gilbert, “Bernardo Rucellai and the Orti Oricellari: A Study on the Origin of Modern Political Thought,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, vol. 12, 1949, pp. 101–31.

> Chinese: [8] Felix Gilbert，The End of the European Era: 1890 to the Present，London，1970；比较Felix Gilbert，“Bernardo Rucellai and the Orti Oricellari: A Study on the Origin of Modern Political Thought”，刊于Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes，Volume 12，1949，p. 101 - 131。

[¶9] [9] Wills, 1688: A Global History—China and the World in an Extraordinary Year, translated by Wen Hao and others, Beijing: New World Press, 2011, pp. 3–4.

> Chinese: [9]韦尔斯，《1688年的全球史：一个非凡年代里的中国与世界》，文昊等译，北京：新世界出版社，2011，页3 - 4。

[¶10] [10] See Vitoria, “On the American Indians,” in the collection edited by Brown and others, translated by Wang Wen and others, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2012, pp. 164–70.

> Chinese: [10] 参见维多利亚，《论美洲的印第安人》，见布朗等编，王文等译，上海：上海人民出版社，2012，页164 – 170。

[¶11] [11] Compare Zhang Yunlei, Legislating for War: A Study of Grotius's Philosophy of International Relations, Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2017.

> Chinese: [11] 比较张云雷，《为战争立法：格劳修斯国际关系哲理研究》，北京：中央编译出版社，2017。

[¶12] [12] Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, translated by Ying Xing and Zhu Yanbing, Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2008, pp. 86–87.

> Chinese: [12] 施米特，《霍布斯国家学说中的利维坦》，应星、朱雁冰译，上海：华东师范大学出版社，2008，页86 - 87。

[¶13] [13] Since Locke's influence on modern international political thought has long been seriously underestimated, Armitage devotes sixty pages of his celebrated work to Locke but only seventeen to Hobbes. See Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought, translated by Chen Maohua, Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press, pp. 80–139.

> Chinese: [13] 由于洛克对现代国际政治思想的影响长期以来被严重低估，阿米蒂奇在其名著中用了60页篇幅论析洛克，而论析霍布斯仅用了17页。参见阿米蒂奇，《现代国际思想的根基》，陈茂华译，杭州：浙江大学出版社，页80 - 139。

[¶14] [14] Schmitt, Positions and Concepts, translated by Zhu Yanbing, Shanghai: Shanghai Publishing House, 2009/2015, pp. 114–25, 212–33.

> Chinese: [14] 施米特，《论断与概念》，朱雁冰译，上海：上海出版社，2009 / 2015，页114 – 125，212 - 233。

[¶15] [15] See Liu Xiaofeng and Wen Yuwei, eds., Schmitt and the Poets of a Fractured Age, translated by An Ni, Wen Yuwei, and others, Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2019.

> Chinese: [15] 参见刘小枫、温玉伟编，《施米特与破碎时代的诗人》，安妮、温玉伟等译，上海：华东师范大学出版社，2019。

[¶16] [16] See Zhou Ning, The Distant Celestial Empire: Studies of Western Images of China, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006, pp. 48, 164–66.

> Chinese: [16] 参见周宁，《天朝遥远：西方的中国形象研究》，北京：北京大学出版社，2006，页48，164 - 166。

[¶17] [17] Ratzel, “The Frontier as a Peripheral Organism,” in Zhang Shiming and others, eds., Space, Law, and Academic Discourse: Classic Texts of Western Frontier Theory, Harbin: Heilongjiang Education Press, 2014, pp. 121–49.

> Chinese: [17] 拉策尔，《作为边缘机体的边疆》，见张世明等主编，《空间、法律与学术话语：西方边疆理论经典文献》，哈尔滨：黑龙江教育出版社，2014，页121 – 149。

[¶18] [18] Compare Qi Qizhang, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 from the Perspective of International Law, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2000.

> Chinese: [18] 比较戚其章，《国际法视角下的甲午战争》，北京：人民出版社，2000。

[¶19] [19] Compare Shinoda, Rethinking Sovereignty: From Classical Theory to the Global Age, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2005, pp. 29–72.

> Chinese: [19] 比较篠田英朝，《重新审视主权：从古典理论到全球时代》，北京：商务印书馆，2005，页29 - 72。

[¶20] [20] See Wang Jianlang, China's Path to the Abolition of the Unequal Treaties, Nanchang: Jiangxi People's Publishing House, 2000; Wang Dong, China's Unequal Treaties: Narrating National Humiliation and National History, Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2011.

> Chinese: [20] 参见王建朗，《中国废除不平等条约的历程》，南昌：江西人民出版社，2000；王栋，《中国的不平等条约：国耻与民族历史叙述》，上海：复旦大学出版社，2011。

[¶21] [21] Lin Xuezhong, From International Public Law to Public-Law Diplomacy: The Introduction, Interpretation, and Application of International Law in Late Qing China, Shanghai: Shanghai Classics Publishing House, 2009, p. 398.

> Chinese: [21] 林学忠，《从万国公法到公法外交：晚清国际法的传入、诠释与应用》，上海：上海古籍出版社，2009，页398。

[¶22] [22] See the relevant contributions to the debate published in Modern Chinese History Studies between 1999 and 2002.

> Chinese: [22] 参见1999年至2002年发表在《近代史研究》上的相关论争文。

[¶23] [23] Lai Junnan, International Law and Late Qing China, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2015, pp. 48–50.

> Chinese: [23] 赖骏楠，《国际法与晚清中国》，上海：上海人民出版社，2015，页48 - 50。

[¶24] [24] Tang Qihua, The Beiyang History of Treaty Revision Obscured by the “Abolition of Unequal Treaties”: 1912–1928, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010, p. 7. Hereafter abbreviated as Treaty Revision, with page numbers given in the text.

> Chinese: [24] 唐启华，《被“废除不平等条约”遮蔽的北洋修约史：1912 - 1928》，北京：社科文献出版社， 2010，页7（以下简称《修约史》，随文注页码）。

[¶25] [25] Compare Xu Guoqi, China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization, translated by Ma Jianbiao, Shanghai: Shanghai Joint Publishing Company, 2010, pp. 2–15, 258–88; Hou Zhongjun, Chinese Diplomacy and the First World War, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2017.

> Chinese: [25] 比较徐国琦，《中国与大战：寻求新的国家认同与国际化》，马建标译，上海：上海三联书店， 2010，页2 – 15，258 – 288；侯中军，《中国外交与第一次世界大战》，北京：社科文献出版社，2017。

[¶26] [26] See Wang Jingze and Li Deshan, eds., A History of China's Northeastern Frontier, Changchun: Jilin Literature and History Press, 2011.

> Chinese: [26] 参见王景泽、李德山主编，《中国东北边疆史》，长春：吉林文史出版社，2011。

[¶27] [27] Quoted in Lin Xuezhong, From International Public Law to Public-Law Diplomacy: The Introduction, Interpretation, and Application of International Law in Late Qing China, cited above, pp. 231–32. On the relationship between the concept of “civilization” and international law, see Lai Junnan's concise and lucid discussion in International Law and Late Qing China, cited above, pp. 27–43, 165–69.

> Chinese: [27]转引自林学忠，《从万国公法到公法外交：晚清国际法的传入、诠释与应用》，前揭，页231 - 232。关于“文明”观念与国际法的关系，参见赖骏楠简洁而又明晰的论述，赖骏楠，《国际法与晚清中国》，前揭，页27 – 43，165 – 169。

[¶28] [28] Compare Xiang Lanxin, The Origins of the Boxer War: A Multinational Study, Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2003.

> Chinese: [28] 比较相蓝欣，《义和团战争的起源：跨国研究》，上海：华东师范大学出版社，2003。

[¶29] [29] Lattimore, Solution in Asia, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1962, pp. 9–10.

> Chinese: [29] 拉铁摩尔，《亚洲的决策》，北京：商务印书馆，1962，页9 - 10。

[¶30] [30] Compare Wada Haruki, The Russo-Japanese War, translated by Yi Aihua and Zhang Jian, Beijing: Joint Publishing Company, 2018.

> Chinese: [30] 比较和田春树，《日俄战争》，易爱华、张剑译，北京：三联书店，2018。

[¶31] [31] Voegelin, Religion and the Rise of Modernity, translated by Huo Weian, Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2009, pp. 155–56.

> Chinese: [31] 沃格林，《宗教与现代性的兴起》，霍伟岸译，上海：华东师范大学出版社，2009 ，页155 - 156。

[¶32] [32] See Mei Xiao'ao and Mei Xiaokan, eds., Mei Ruao's Writings on the Tokyo Trial, Shanghai: Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press, 2013.

> Chinese: [32] 参见梅小璈、梅小侃编，《梅汝璈东京审判文稿》，上海：上海交通大学出版社，2013。

[¶33] [33] See William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China, translated by Chen Qianping and others, Beijing: China Youth Press, 1994; Wang Xiaohua and Zhang Qingjun, Chiang Kai-shek and Hitler: The Honeymoon in Sino-German Relations, 1927–1938, Xiamen: Taihai Publishing House, 2012.

> Chinese: [33] 参见柯伟林，《蒋介石政府与纳粹德国》，陈谦平等译，北京：中国青年出版社，1994；王晓华、张庆军，《蒋介石与希特勒：1927 - 1938中德关系的蜜月时期》，厦门：台海出版社，2012。

[¶34] [34] Compare Kindermann, China and the Rise of East Asia: 1840–2000, translated by Zhang Ying and others, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010, pp. 27–34.

> Chinese: [34] 比较金德曼，《中国与东亚崛起：1840 - 2000》，张莹等译，北京：社科文献出版社，2010，页27 - 34。

[¶35] [35] Compare Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen, eds., The Great Transformation: The United States and East Asia, 1931–1949, Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1991/1997.

> Chinese: [35]比较入江昭、孔华润编，《巨大的转变：美国与东亚（1931 - 1949）》，上海：复旦大学出版，1991 / 1997。

[¶36] [36] Isserman, The Korean War through American Eyes, translated by Chen Yushu, Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 2006, p. 11.

> Chinese: [36] 艾泽曼，《美国人眼中的朝鲜战争》，陈昱澍译，北京：当代中国出版社，2006，页11。

[¶37] [37] Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Expansion, translated by Yu Tiejun and others, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006, pp. 309–16.

> Chinese: [37] 斯奈德，《帝国的迷思：国内政治与对外扩张》，于铁军等译，北京：北京大学出版社，2006，页309 - 316。

[¶38] [38] Lei Haizong, “The Background to American Imperialism's ‘Open Door Policy toward China,’” in Wang Dunshu, ed., Collected Writings of Lei Haizong on World History, Tianjin: Tianjin People's Publishing House, 2014, pp. 269–82.

> Chinese: [38] 雷海宗，《美帝“中国门户开放政策”的背景》，见王敦书编，《雷海宗世界史文集》，天津：天津人民出版社，2014，页269 - 282。

[¶39] [39] Lei Haizong, Chinese Culture and the Chinese Soldier, Tianjin: Tianjin People's Publishing House, 2016.

> Chinese: [39] 雷海宗，《中国文化与中国的兵》，天津：天津人民出版社，2016。

[¶40] [40] Hicks, “Hegel on International Law, International Relations, and the Possibility of a World Community,” in Qiu Libo, ed. and trans., Hegel and Universal Order, Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 2009, p. 72; compare Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, translated by Zhu Xueping and Wang Xingsai, Beijing: Intellectual Property Publishing House, 2016, pp. 247–64.

> Chinese: [40] 希克斯，《黑格尔论国际法、国际关系与世界共同体的可能性》，邱立波编/译，《黑格尔与普世秩序》，北京：华夏出版社，2009，页72；比较阿维拉瑞，《黑格尔的现代国家理论》，朱学平、王兴赛译，北京：知识产权出版社，2016，页247 - 264。

[¶41] [41] Yang Kuisong, Revolution in the “Intermediate Zone”: Understanding the Chinese Communist Party's Success in Its International Context, Taiyuan: Shanxi People's Publishing House, 2010, p. 517.

> Chinese: [41] 杨奎松，《“中间地带”的革命：国际大背景下看中共成功之道》，太原：山西人民出版社，2010，页517。