1. A Difficult Subject to Broach
一、难言的论题
The central part of The Rise of the West is Part Three. Its title, “The Era of Western Dominance,” defines a broad historical period, from AD 1500 to 1950, and complements the title of the book. McNeill seeks to present the following historical fact: “modern civilization” equals “European civilization,” and “European civilization” equals “the era of Western dominance” or “the rise of the West.”
《西方的兴起》的核心篇章是第三编，此编标题“西方统治的时代”所确定的历史大时段为公元 1500年至 1950年，与书名互为表里。麦克尼尔力图展现这样一个历史事实：“现代文明”等于“欧洲文明”，“欧洲文明”等于“西方统治的时代”或“西方的兴起”。
In everyday Chinese usage, the concept of “the West” is rather ambiguous. It is both a collective designation for ancient Greek civilization, ancient Roman civilization, and European civilization, and, in practice, a term that more often refers to the modern European civilization that rose from the sixteenth century onward. After all, the forces that invaded China were neither Alexander’s allied Greek army nor Caesar’s Roman legions, but the Anglo-French forces. Before the “Sino-Japanese Naval War of 1894,” China had already engaged in military conflicts with Britain and France in succession at its own doorstep. The inscription on the Monument to the People’s Heroes in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square commemorates “the heroes who have sacrificed their lives for China’s independence and autonomy since 1840.” By marking the “Opium War” as the beginning of China’s modern history, it accords entirely with a Chinese periodization of world history.
在汉语的日常用法中，“西方”概念颇为含混，既是古希腊文明、古罗马文明和欧洲文明的总称，实际含义又更多指 16世纪以来崛起的现代欧洲文明。毕竟，入侵中国的既非亚历山大的希腊联军，也非恺撒的罗马军团，而是英法联军。“甲午海战”之前，中国在自己家门口已先后与英国和法国发生过军事冲突。北京天安门广场上的人民英雄纪念碑碑文铭记着“ 1840年以来为中国的独立自主而牺牲的英雄”，标明中国的现代史以“鸦片战争”为开端，完全符合中国式的世界史分期。
This historical fact reminds us that the concept of “Eurocentrism” is rather ambiguous. “Europe” was long fragmented, with constant wars among its kingdoms; what is called “Eurocentrism” must therefore refer to the worldwide dominance of certain powerful European states. Yet even the Congress of Vienna in the early nineteenth century did not truly settle which states were Europe’s great powers: the fragile “Holy Alliance” of Russia, Prussia, and Austria could not dominate Britain, nor had France lost all its strength as a result of Napoleon’s defeat.
这一历史事实提醒我们，“欧洲中心主义”这个概念颇为含混。“欧洲”长期四分五裂，各王国间战事不断，所谓“欧洲中心主义”当指欧洲的某些强权国家的世界性支配。但即便 19世纪初期的维也纳会议也没有真正确定欧洲强国究竟是谁：脆弱的俄、普、奥三国“神圣同盟”并不能支配英国，法兰西也没有因拿破仑战败而彻底丧失实力。
In 1833, Ranke published The Great Powers (also translated as On the Great Powers), in which he sought to examine the conflicts among Europe’s great powers over the preceding century and a half, from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth century, through the world-historical perspective that Europeans had only begun to develop less than a century earlier. He called this historical period a “world moment” (den Weltmoment). In other words, for Ranke, the fundamental constituents of the “world” were conflicts among great powers. This long essay is acknowledged in the history of historiography not only as a classic of world history but also as a model of “Eurocentric” historical scholarship. By presenting the latest “tendencies” in the conflicts among Europe’s great powers, Ranke sought to clarify several “widely prevalent” misconceptions about “the formation of the modern world.” [4] Thus, “Eurocentric” historiography refers first and foremost to a historiography of the European great powers’ struggle for world supremacy.
1833年，兰克发表《诸大国》（又译《论列强》），力图凭靠欧洲人在不到一个世纪之前才刚刚开启的世界历史视野来考察晚近一个半世纪（17世纪末至 19世纪初期）的欧洲大国冲突，并把这一历史时段称为“世界时刻”（den Weltmoment）。换言之，在兰克眼里，“世界”构成的基本要素是大国冲突。这篇长文不仅是史学史公认的世界史经典文献，也是“欧洲中心主义”史学的圭臬。通过展示欧洲大国之间相互冲突的最新“趋势”，兰克致力澄清“普遍流布的”关于“现代世界形成过程”的若干误识。 [4]从而，所谓“欧洲中心主义”史学，首先指欧洲诸大国争夺世界支配权的史学。
Among the subsequent classics of “Eurocentric” world history, we can hardly avoid mentioning The Geographical Pivot of History (1904) and Democratic Ideals and Reality (1919) by Halford J. Mackinder (1861–1947). [5] Although Mackinder was renowned as a political geographer, his geographical thought plainly possessed a world-historical perspective and presupposed a certain political theory.
接下来的“欧洲中心主义”世界史的经典之作，恐怕不得不提到麦金德（Halford J. Mackinder， 1861 - 1947）的《历史的地理枢纽》（1904）和《民主的理想与现实》（1919）。 [5]麦金德虽然以政治地理学名家，但他的地理学思想明显具有世界史视野，并以某种政治理论为前提。
Even from a world-historical perspective informed by historical sociology, geopolitical conflicts among civilizations rank among the most important internal driving mechanisms of world history. [6] From antiquity to the present, civilizational conflicts have manifested themselves primarily as conflicts among political entities. The conflicts in Europe from 1500 all the way to 1950, however, were conflicts among states within a single civilization. The state-centered character of “Eurocentric” historiography is therefore not only reasonable but also consistent with the historical facts.
即便按照历史社会学路向的世界史观点，诸种文明之间的地缘政治冲突算得上世界历史最为重要的内在动力机制。 [6]文明冲突从古至今都主要体现为政治体之间的冲突，而欧洲自 1500年以来直到 1950年的冲突，则是同一文明内部的国家间冲突。因此，“欧洲中心主义”史学以国家为本位，不仅有道理，也符合史实。
Recent “global history” centers on human social life. Its premise appears to be that the bloody struggle for world supremacy within European civilization has already produced a victor, and that the age of a globalized “cosmopolitan” society envisioned by liberal political actors is about to arrive. Even if it has not arrived, it is worth calling on liberal-democratic intellectuals throughout the world to unite in opposing every form of state-centeredness, including representative democratic regimes, so as to hasten the arrival of a global society of “world citizens.” Accordingly, liberal-democratic intellectuals among historians have raised the banner of opposition to “Eurocentrism,” each bringing their talents to bear in retelling world history and inaugurating the new narrative of “global history.”
晚近的“全球史”以人类社会生活为本位，其前提显得是：欧洲文明内部争夺世界支配权的血腥厮杀已经决出胜负，自由主义政治人所憧憬的全球化“世界公民”社会时代即将来临。即便没有来临，也值得号召全世界自由民主知识人联合起来，反对任何形式的国家本位，包括代议制的民主政体，促使“世界公民”的全球社会早日来临。于是，史学界的自由民主知识人高举反“欧洲中心主义”大旗，各显才华重述世界史，开创了“全球史”的新叙事。
The “global history” inaugurated by Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth remains state-centered while at the same time transcending “Eurocentrism.” Its theoretical premise, by contrast, is that the deadly struggle among the great powers has not ended: it has merely spread beyond Europe to encompass the globe. The modern “era” (Era) of world history since 1500 was the historical moment of Europe’s rise, and is therefore called “the European Era.” Although the end of this “era” signifies the end of “Europe as the center,” it does not mean that state-centered conflict has ended. Rather, the pattern of conflict among the great powers within Europe inaugurated by the modern “European Era” has expanded into conflict on a global scale.
施米特的《大地的法》所开创的“全球史”研究仍然以国家为本位，同时又超逾了“欧洲中心主义”，其学理依据反倒是：大国间的厮杀并没有终结，不过是越出欧洲范围扩展到全球而已。 1500年以来的世界历史的现代“纪元”（Era）是欧洲崛起的历史时刻，因此被称为“欧洲纪元”（the European Era）。这一“纪元”的终结虽然意味着“欧洲中心”的终结，却并不意味着以国家为本位的冲突已然终结。毋宁说，现代式的“欧洲纪元”所开启的欧洲内部的大国冲突格局已经扩展为全球范围的冲突。
Historical sociologists have good reason to use statistics to demonstrate that “how war brings states into being and how states lead to war” remains a fundamental question confronting political historiography: in the eighteenth century, there were 68 wars worldwide, with 4 million deaths; in the nineteenth century, 205 wars, with 8 million deaths; and in the twentieth century, 275 wars, with 115 million deaths. [7] When confronted with two concepts of “global history” informed by distinctly different sets of questions, choosing to align ourselves with a “global history” centered on human social life means that we believe the globalized age of a “cosmopolitan” society really will arrive. If this is not the case, if the ideal of a “cosmopolitan” society that has retained its appeal from the eighteenth century to the present may be a utopia, and if the deadly struggles among states remain frequent and brutal, then devoting our historical research and teaching to instilling a liberal-democratic “cosmopolitan” consciousness in the younger generation will cause our descendants to forget that the land beneath their feet still stands within a world-historical moment of globalized, state-centered conflict.
历史社会学家有理由用统计数字来证明，“战争如何促成国家以及国家如何导致战争”仍然是政治史学面临的基本问题：在 18世纪，整个世界共有 68场战争，死亡人数 4百万，在 19世纪，共有 205场战争，死亡人数 8百万， 20世纪则有 275场战争，死亡人数一亿一千五百万。 [7]当面对问题意识明显不同的两种“全球史”概念时，选择与以人类社会生活为本位的“全球史”接轨便意味着，我们相信“世界公民”社会的全球化时代真的会来临。如果情形并非如此，如果 18世纪以来迄今不衰的“世界公民”社会理念也许是一种乌托邦，如果国家间的厮杀依然频繁而且惨烈，那么，我们的史学研究和教学致力于给年轻一代灌输自由民主的“世界公民”意识，其结果便是让我们的后代忘记自己脚下的土地仍然置身于以国家为本位的全球化冲突的世界历史时刻。
Almost half a century ago, the eminent German-American world historian Felix Gilbert (1905–1991) announced the indisputable historical fact of “the end of the European Era.” [8] That we have only now come to a roughly clear understanding of this historical reality is simply because, when his book appeared, the Cold War had not yet ended and China was in the midst of its “unprecedented” second revolution.
差不多半个世纪前，著名德裔美籍世界史学家吉尔伯特（Felix Gilbert， 1905 – 1991）就宣告了“欧洲纪元的终结”（the End of the European Era）这一不争史实。 [8]我们直到今天才大致清楚这一历史实情，不过是因为该书出版之际，冷战尚未结束，我国也正在进行“史无前例”的第二次革命。
Today, it is also easy for us to see clearly that the period indicated by the book’s subtitle, “From 1890 to the Present [1970],” was precisely the historical moment in which the ancient Chinese empire underwent its difficult transformation and entered world history. If we wish to draw lessons from world history, then the work that will enlighten us is not McNeill’s The Rise of the West but Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth.
今天的我们同样很容易清楚地看到，该书副标题“从 1890年到当今[1970]”，正是古老的中华帝国艰难转型进入世界史的历史时刻。如果我们要从世界史中吸取经验教训，那么，对我们具有启发性的就不会是麦克尼尔的《西方的兴起》，而是施米特的《大地的法》。
At the end of his brief “Preface,” Schmitt declares that the “European Era” has ended, but that the global evils to which it gave rise have not. Indeed, because of these evils, the future of humanity as a whole has become even more uncertain:
在简短的“前言”结尾时施米特就宣告：“欧洲纪元”已经终结，但这个纪元所引出的全球性恶果不仅没有终结，整个人类的命运还因为这一恶果而更为前景难卜：
The hitherto Eurocentric (europa - zentrische) order of international law is in decline, and the old nomos of the earth is also approaching its sunset. The traditional order arose from the wondrous, fairy-tale discovery of the New World, from a historical event without precedent or successor. Only through a fantastic analogy can one imagine a modern version of an international legal order: on its way to the moon, humanity discovers a new and unknown celestial body that can be freely developed and exploited, thereby alleviating human strife on earth. Even on the basis of such an imagining, unresolved questions remain for a new nomos of the earth, questions that cannot be answered by new discoveries in the natural sciences. (p. 2)
迄今为止的欧洲中心（europa - zentrische）的国际法秩序在走向衰落，古老的大地法则亦日薄西山。传统秩序源于对新世界的童话般的惊奇发现，源于一种空前绝后的历史事件。只有借助奇幻般的类比想象，人们才能设想一个现代版的国际法秩序，即人类登月的途中发现了一个新的、未知的星体，可以对其自由开发和利用，从而减轻了人类在地球上的争斗。即便以这种想象为根据，对于新的大地法则来说，仍然存在悬而未决的问题，这些问题不是借助自然科学的新发现所能解决的。（页2）
The new school of “global history” is said to place particular emphasis on the concrete particulars of world-historical research: commercial exchange, the spread of species and diseases, climate change, and even the various conditions of everyday life. John E. Wills’s 1688: A Global History: China and the World in an Extraordinary Year (2001) enjoyed considerable fame and is said to have remained among the top ten on The New York Times bestseller list for 35 consecutive weeks. The author brought together in a single volume details of life in the year 1688 among the Chinese under the Kangxi Emperor, the Russians under Peter the Great, the Turks under the Grand Sultan, the Indians under Aurangzeb, the Jews of Jerusalem, and even the Aboriginal peoples of Australia, to say nothing of the Europeans in Europe’s various prominent kingdoms. For readers in the English-speaking world who had just entered the twenty-first century, this offered a refreshing sense of world history.
新派的“全球史”研究据说特别注重世界史研究的具体性，比如商业交往、物种传播、疾病蔓延、气候变化，乃至各种日常生活状态。韦尔斯（John E.Wills）的《 1688年的全球史：一个非凡年代里的中国与世界》（2001）名噪一时，据说连续 35周高居《纽约时报》畅销书榜前 10名。作者把康熙大帝治下的中国人、彼得大帝治下的俄罗斯人、大苏丹统治下的土耳其人、奥朗则布治下的印度人、耶路撒冷的犹太人乃至澳大利亚的土著人——更不用说欧洲各显要王国的欧洲人在 1688这一年的生活细节蒐集一册，让刚刚进入 21世纪的英语世界读者对世界史的感觉耳目一新。
Nevertheless, Wills acknowledges that in 1688 only a very small number of “a few kinds of Europeans” “could grasp comprehensively the diversity, distribution, and connections of the world’s regions and peoples.” This amounts to admitting that the emergence of “Eurocentrism” had its own historical basis. By presenting the conditions of life across the globe in 1688, the author hopes to convey to people today the greatest world-historical transformation. It is not that the world then “was far emptier, with vast stretches of forest and fields,” nor that it “was far quieter, without loudspeakers or internal-combustion engines,” but that “human technology” could change so rapidly, and “political orders and forms of life” undergo such “earth-shattering reversals.” Accordingly, one of the very few “kinds of Europeans” Wills mentions most often in his “Prelude” is Locke. [9]
尽管如此，韦尔斯承认，在 1688年，仅有极少数“几类欧洲人”“能够全面把握世界各个地区、各个民族的多样性及其分布和联系”。这无异于承认，“欧洲中心主义”的产生自有其历史依据。通过展示 1688年的全球生活状态，作者希望让今天的人们感到的最大的世界历史巨变，并非是当时的世界“空旷多了，有大片森林和田野绵延”，也不是当时的世界“安静多了，没有扩音器，没有内燃机”，而是“人类的技术”竟然会有如此迅速的变化，“政治秩序、生活形态”会有如此“天翻地覆的逆转”。因此，在“序曲”中，韦尔斯提及最多的极少数“几类欧洲人”之一是洛克。 [9]
Locke’s political teachings did not influence the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688; rather, they inspired the later American Revolution. We can hardly avoid asking: while overturning “Eurocentrism,” is the new school of “global history” also constructing a kind of “Americentrism”?
洛克的政治学说并没有影响 1688年的“光荣革命”，倒是启发了后来的美国革命。我们难免会问：新派的“全球史”在颠覆“欧洲中心主义”的同时，是否又在打造一种“美国中心主义”？
Wills’s remarks show us that the historical particulars with which “global history” should concern itself are less the everyday conditions of the human community’s social life than the principles governing the order of human life. In 1688, the world had no globally unified principles of order. Today, we constantly hear expressions such as “the international community,” “the international order,” “international public opinion,” and “international tribunals,” as though some international nomos [law] really existed behind the scenes. In fact, it does not.
韦尔斯的说法让我们看到，“全球史”研究应该关注的历史具体性，与其说是人类共同体社会生活的日常状态，不如说是人类生活的秩序法则。 1688年的世界并没有全球统一的秩序法则，如今我们的耳边不断听见“国际社会”“国际秩序”“国际舆论”“国际法庭”之类的声音，似乎冥冥中真的有一种国际的 nomos [法]，其实不然。
As a classic of “global history,” Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth is concerned with precisely this kind of historical particularity: how European international law came into being and changed over time. If there was ever such a thing as “Eurocentrism,” then European international law can at least count as a concrete embodiment of that “-ism.” The problem is that Schmitt says this “order of international law is in decline.”
施米特的《大地的法》作为“全球史”经典之作，关注的正是这样的历史具体性：欧洲国际法的形成及其历史嬗变是怎么回事。如果说曾有过一种“欧洲中心主义”，那么，欧洲国际法至少算得上这种“主义”的具体体现。问题在于，施米特说这种“国际法秩序在走向衰落”。
One view holds that the word Erde in Schmitt should be translated into Chinese not as “earth” but as “the globe,” because Schmitt’s Erde includes the oceans. The lines of Goethe quoted by Schmitt in his “Preface” demonstrate that this view is mistaken.
有一种观点认为，施米特笔下的 Erde这个语词不应译作“大地”，而应译作“地球”，因为施米特笔下的 Erde包括海洋。施米特在“前言”中引用的歌德诗句可以证明，这种看法是错的。
Goethe writes: “All things of no consequence will pass away; only the sea and the earth stand unmoved.” Here, Meer [sea] and Erde [earth] are set alongside and against one another, showing that Erde cannot be translated as “the globe.” Expressed in our traditional vocabulary, “all-under-heaven” might better convey Schmitt’s meaning of Erde. After all, Schmitt is concerned with order and the rules of governance. It might be more suggestive if we read “the nomos of the earth” as “the nomos of all-under-heaven,” or, whenever the word Erde [earth] appears, read it as “all-under-heaven.”
歌德写到，“所有无关紧要的事物终将消散，只有海洋和大地巍然不动。”在这里， Meer [海洋]与 Erde [大地]并列对举，可见 Erde不能译作“地球”。用我们的传统语汇来表达，也许 Erde译作“天下”更为切合施米特的含义。毕竟，施米特关切的是秩序和统治规则。我们若把“大地的法”读作“天下的法”，或者在涉及 Erde [大地]这个语词时不妨读作“天下”，可能更有意味。
I am not proposing a change to the translated title of the book. Rather, occasionally reading “earth” as our “all-under-heaven” might help us better understand the questions Schmitt discusses. After all, The Nomos of the Earth, or “the nomos of all-under-heaven,” is a work of global history whose riches are positively dazzling. Its questions concerning the history of political thought, geopolitics, the theory of war, and other areas are not only profound but also highly relevant to present realities.
笔者并非要建议改书名译法，毋宁说，偶尔将“大地”读作我们的“天下”，兴许有助于我们更好地理解施米特所讨论的问题。毕竟，《大地的法》或“天下之法”是全球史论著，内涵宏富得让人眼花缭乱，其中涉及的政治思想史、地缘政治学、战争理论等方面的问题，不仅精深，而且富有现实性。
We immediately confront a question: how should we grasp the most crucial concern animating The Nomos of the Earth? A careful, close reading of the “Preface” readily reveals that this really is a problem.
我们随即面临一个问题：应该如何把握《大地的法》最为关键的问题意识？悉心细读“前言”便不难发现，这还真是个问题。
The very first sentence of the “Preface” carries a particular significance: “This book is an undefended work of scholarship, the fruit of difficult experiences.” Being defended or “undefended” (wehrlose) belongs to the vocabulary of warfare. Does a scholarly work need defenses like those of a military position? Is Schmitt playing with rhetoric? In the Western literary and historical tradition, historiography belongs to rhetoric, and the writing of history must pay attention to rhetorical form. For Schmitt, however, expressions such as “difficult experiences” (harter Erfarungen) and “undefended” are really no mere rhetoric. After all, he had been detained and investigated by the Allies between 1946 and 1948.
“前言”第一句话就别有意味：“这本书是历经艰难之后的一部不设防的学术成果。”设防还是“不设防”（wehrlose）是军事术语，学术著作需要军事警戒式的设防？难道施米特在玩修辞？按照西方文史传统，史学隶属于修辞学，史书写作必须讲究修辞。但对施米特来说，所谓“历经艰难”（harter Erfarungen）或“不设防”之类言辞，还真不是修辞。毕竟，他在 1946年至 1948年期间曾被盟军拘留调查。
What kind of suspicion was he seeking to avoid? Clearly, ideological suspicion. In the “Preface,” Schmitt expresses his gratitude to “geographers, as represented by Mackinder,” but immediately changes tack:
避免什么嫌疑？显然是意识形态嫌疑。施米特在“前言”中对“以麦金德为代表的地理学家们”表示了感谢，但他马上笔锋一转：
Nevertheless, juridical thinking remains clearly distinct from geography. Jurists’ knowledge of things and land, of reality and territory, does not derive from geographers. The concept of sea appropriation bears a juridical, rather than a geographical, imprint. (p. 2)
不过，法学思维还是明显不同于地理学。法学家对事物与土地、现实与领土的知识并非源于地理学家，夺海概念具有法学而非地理学印记。（页2）
Why does Schmitt mention Mackinder? Because Mackinder’s The Geographical Pivot of History and Democratic Ideals and Reality advanced a very famous geopolitical view: maritime great powers must contain continental great powers, because the geographical nature of the latter is aggressive. Schmitt clearly does not agree with Mackinder’s theoretical position, yet in refuting him he inevitably faces the danger of political incorrectness. This is because Mackinder’s political geography, with its world-historical perspective, rests on “liberal-democratic ideals,” and refuting Mackinder risks the suspicion of refuting those “ideals.”
施米特为什么提到麦金德？因为麦金德的《历史的地理枢纽》和《民主的理想与现实》提出了非常著名的地缘政治观：海属大国必须遏制陆属大国，因为后者的地理天性具有侵略性。施米特显然不赞同麦金德的理论立场，但他要反驳麦金德，又难免面临政治不正确的危险。因为，麦金德的具有世界历史视野的政治地理学依托“自由民主理想”，反驳麦金德就有反驳这种“理想”之嫌。
To remain faithful to his scholarly calling, Schmitt has no choice but to refute Mackinder. Accordingly, he makes a special declaration in the “Preface” that he “will adhere strictly to factual evidence, including certain specific questions, in order to avoid any suspicion of error” (p. 2). In other words, Schmitt hopes to rely on “factual evidence” to establish Mackinder’s error: although Mackinder had already incorporated the Western Hemisphere into his world-historical perspective by the third formulation of his “Heartland” theory, he still failed to see the real problem of the age of globalization.
为了忠实于学术职分，施米特不得不反驳麦金德。因此，他在“前言”中特别申明，自己“会严格恪守事实依据，包括某些具体问题，以避免任何犯错误的嫌疑”（页 2）。换言之，施米特希望凭靠“事实依据”证实麦金德所犯的错误：虽然麦金德在第三次表述他的“心脏地带”论时已经把西半球纳入其世界史视野，他毕竟没有看到全球化时代的真正问题。