---
title: "European Civilization’s “Free Space” and Modern China · 欧洲文明的“自由空间”与现代中国"
author: "Liu Xiaofeng"
translator: "S. Alexander Laurent (AI-assisted, 2026)"
title_ru: "«Свободное пространство» европейской цивилизации и современный Китай"
author_ru: "Лю Сяофэн"
languages: [zh, en]
shelf: "LCI editions"
section: 6 of 11
url: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/6/
cite: "Liu Xiaofeng, tr. S. Alexander Laurent (AI-assisted, 2026), European Civilization’s “Free Space” and Modern China · 欧洲文明的“自由空间”与现代中国, section 6. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/6/"
---

# European Civilization’s “Free Space” and Modern China · 欧洲文明的“自由空间”与现代中国

*Liu Xiaofeng, tr. S. Alexander Laurent (AI-assisted, 2026)*

Russian: «Свободное пространство» европейской цивилизации и современный Китай, Лю Сяофэн

Liu Xiaofeng’s long essay of 2018 on Carl Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth: how Europe’s “free space” of conquest made modern international law, and what that order has meant for China, from the Treaty of Tordesillas to the Thirty-Eighth Parallel. With his 41 notes. In Chinese beside a new English translation.

> Chinese: 刘小枫，《欧洲文明的“自由空间”与现代中国——读施米特〈大地的法〉札记》, as republished on Sohu, 12 December 2018 (original journal pagination not reconstructed).

> English: Laurentium Cultural Industries, complete translation with the author’s 41 notes (9 October 2026).

## 6. 4. “Amity Lines” and Discriminatory Divisions

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/6/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/liu-xiaofeng-free-space/6/#p-N

[¶0] 4. “Amity Lines” and Discriminatory Divisions

> Chinese: 四、“友好线”与歧视性划分

[¶1] Since this is a historical process, the evolution of these boundary treaties and their historical connections imply that “the different courses and stages of global linear thinking intersect to form entirely different spatial orders,” carrying entirely different meanings in international law. A political-historiographical approach requires an examination of these treaties’ premises and presuppositions in international law, as well as the conceptions of political space they reflect. In this way, Schmitt raises the question to the level of political philosophy, and Hobbes and Hegel enter the discussion in succession.

> Chinese: 既然是一个历史的过程，这些划界条约的演变及其历史关联，便隐含着“全球划界思维的不同线路和不同阶段彼此交错而形成截然不同的空间秩序”，其中蕴含着截然不同的国际法内涵。政治史学式的思考需要考察这些条约的国际法前提和预设，以及它们所反映的政治空间观念。这样一来，施米特就把问题上升到政治哲学高度，霍布斯和黑格尔接踵出场。

[¶2] This section is therefore especially important. The three points of theoretical analysis Schmitt puts forward here form the foundation for the elaboration in the next two chapters and well deserve close attention.

> Chinese: 可见这一节非常重要，施米特在这里提出的三点理论分析，是随后两章展开的基础，颇值得细看。

[¶3] First, a historical turning point separates the raya lines of Spain and Portugal from the “amity lines” of England and France. Spain and Portugal were “spiritually homogeneous” and submitted to the mediation of the Roman Curia. Behind the raya lines, as contractual agreements in international law, “stood a common religious order (ordo) and a political entity”; the Roman Curia “was in fact an arbiter under international law.” Although the Curia could not determine to whom the land belonged, it was responsible for the division of missionary territories (Missionsgebiete). Schmitt acknowledges that this itself “was also an expression of a spatial order, namely one distinguishing the Christian sphere of influence from non-Christian regions.”

> Chinese: 首先，从西葡两国的拉亚线到英法两国的“友好线”（amity lines），其间有一个历史性转折。因为，西葡两国在“精神上同质”，服从罗马教廷调停，拉亚线作为国际法意义上的契约性协议，“背后存在一个共同的宗教秩序（ordo）以及政权实体”，罗马教廷“实乃一个国际法上的裁判官”。罗马教廷虽然不能决定陆地归属，却负责传教区的划分（Missionsgebiete）。施米特承认，这本身“也是一种空间秩序的表达，即一种区分基督教势力范围和非基督教区域的空间秩序”。

[¶4] Moreover, since “the division of missionary territories was intimately connected with the delimitation of navigation and trade,” the pope also intervened in the distribution of economic and political interests. This raised a question: did Christian kingdoms have the right to use force against regions that resisted missionary activity and “free trade”? To address this, the Spanish Dominican friar Francisco Vitoria (1483–1546) advanced a doctrine of just war in 1538. In Vitoria’s view, freedom of missionary activity and freedom of commerce were not initially, but ultimately became, “legal titles to just war, and consequently legal rights of appropriation and annexation” (p. 61, note). [10]

> Chinese: 不仅如此，由于“传教区的划分与航海和贸易的界分息息相关”，教宗也就插手了经济和政治利益的分配。由此引出的问题是：基督教王国是否有权利对抵制传教和“自由贸易”的地区动用武力。为此，西班牙的多明我会教士维多利亚（Francisco Vitoria，1483 - 1546）在 1538年提出了一套关于正义战争的说法。在维多利亚看来，传教自由和商业自由起初不是、但最终成了“正义战争的法权资格，并因此而成为占取和兼并的法权”（页 61注释）。 [10]

[¶5] Even so, in Schmitt’s view, “the raya lines themselves did not concern the demarcation of Christian and non-Christian regions,” but constituted “an internal boundary within the framework of a spatial order between two Christian powers engaged in extensive appropriation.” The crucial point is that, at the time, “land-appropriation and sea-appropriation had not yet been distinguished,” and the common spatial order of medieval European Christendom had not yet been breached.

> Chinese: 尽管如此，在施米特看来，“拉亚线本身并不涉及基督教和非基督教地区的界分”，而是“两个大肆占取的基督教势力之间空间秩序框架下的一种内部分界”。关键在于，当时，“占地和夺海尚未区分开来”，中世纪欧洲基督教的共同空间秩序尚未突破。

[¶6] In 1559, Spain and France reached the secret oral agreement of the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. The element of European history embodied in this agreement was the division of the Roman Church, which inaugurated “the age of religious wars between Catholic and Protestant sea-appropriating powers.” Why does Schmitt attach such importance to this oral agreement? Because it had major historical significance for the formation of European international law: it distinguished conflicts within the Christian family of Europe from conflicts outside it. Conflicts between Catholics and Protestants and their respective states were internal conflicts; a conflict between a member of this great family and an outsider was a different matter.

> Chinese: 1559年，西班牙与法国达成口头性的《卡托-康布雷齐和约》秘密协定，这个协定带有的欧洲历史因素是罗马教会的分离，从而开启了“天主教和新教夺海势力之间宗教战争的年代”。为什么施米特看重这个口头协定？因为它对欧洲国际法的形成具有重要的历史意义，即区分欧洲基督教家庭内部与外部的冲突：天主教和新教及其国家间的冲突属于内部冲突，这个大家庭的成员之一与外部的冲突另当别论。

[¶7] This means that so-called “international law” was the law governing relations within the European family and did not apply outside it. Spain repeatedly declared that “the various treaties have no effect in the ‘Indies’ (Indien), because these belong to the New World.” This meant that when war broke out within the European family, its members had to observe the rules governing relations among European states, namely so-called “international law.” But if a conflict broke out between a member of this family and a nonmember, the rules could be disregarded and the war fought however one pleased. The Anglo-French forces could set fire to the Yuanmingyuan after entering Beijing, whereas the French could not do such things when they entered Vienna.

> Chinese: 这意味着，所谓“国际法”是欧洲大家庭内部关系的法律，不适用于这个家庭之外。西班牙多次表态，“诸多条约对‘印第安’（Indien）不起效用，因为它属于新世界。”这意味着，欧洲大家庭之间发生战争，各家庭成员就得遵守欧洲国家间的规矩，即所谓“国际法”。如果是这个大家庭成员与某个非家庭成员之间发生冲突，就可以不讲规矩，想怎么打就怎么打。英法联军攻入北京后可以放火烧圆明园，法国人攻入维也纳则不能干这类事情。

[¶8] Schmitt notes that matters became more complicated when France, competing with the Spanish king, allied itself with heathens, barbarous pirates, and even “Spain’s cities in the Americas to carry out plunder together” (p. 63). For outsiders had been introduced into a conflict between two members of the same family. Yet because this conflict took place outside European territory, or “on the other side of the line,” it was not bound by the laws of the European family. In this way, drawing a boundary became a demarcation of order: whether a conflict between two members of the same family occurred on this side of the line or the other distinguished the presence of law from its absence.

> Chinese: 施米特提到，为了与西班牙国王竞争，法国与异教徒、野蛮的海盗乃至“西班牙在美洲的城市结盟，共同实施掠夺”（页 63），就使得事情复杂化了。因为，两个同属一个家庭的成员之间的冲突引入了外部成员。但是，由于这一冲突发生在欧洲地域之外，或者说发生在“界线另一边”，就不受欧洲大家庭法律的约束。这样一来，划界就变得了秩序的分界：两个同属一个家庭的成员之间的冲突在界线这边和那边，是有法和无法的区分。

[¶9] Schmitt gives the example of France’s privy councillor, Cardinal de Richelieu (1585–1642), who declared that French ships were forbidden to attack Spanish and Portuguese vessels, but only as far as the Tropic of Cancer; beyond this line they were not bound by the prohibition, unless Spain and Portugal opened the land and sea routes to the Americas and India. This example shows that during the second stage of the great geographical discoveries, when Europe’s great powers competed for dominance overseas, the scope of European international law was still constrained by the prevailing balance of power.

> Chinese: 施米特举例说，法国的枢密官黎塞留（Cardinal de Richelieu， 1585 - 1642）宣布，法国船舰不准袭击西葡两国船只，仅以北回归线为界，越过此线就不受约束，除非西班牙和葡萄牙开放通往美洲和印度的陆上和海上通道。这个例子让我们看到，地理大发现的第二阶段即欧洲各强权国家争夺海外势力支配权时期，欧洲国际法的适用范围仍然受均势状态的限制。

[¶10] At this line, Europe ended and the New World began. At this line, European law, and especially European public law, also lost its force. Thus, beyond this line, the prohibitions on war advanced by European international law up to that point ceased to apply, and wars of appropriation were fought without restraint. Beyond this line began an “overseas” region where there were no legal restrictions on war and only the law of the jungle, in which the strong devour the weak, prevailed. (pp. 63–64)

> Chinese: 以此线为界，欧洲结束，新世界开始。以此线为界，欧洲的法律，尤其是欧洲的公法，也失去了效力。因此，从这条线开始，迄今的欧洲国际法所推动的战争禁令也失效了，为占取而行的争战肆无忌惮。在这条线之外，一个“海外的”区域开始了，这里不存在战争的法律限制，所行的只有弱肉强食的丛林法则。（页63 - 64）

[¶11] Europeans behaved in a “civilized” manner only among themselves. Beyond the “amity lines” lay the state of nature, where there was no “common premise or common authority.” The European states agreed that beyond the line “lay an entirely free new world”: “It was called free because this line marked out a region in which violence could be used at will.” In the United States’ present-day declarations of “freedom of navigation,” we can still discern this meaning from more than three hundred years ago.

> Chinese: 欧洲人的“文明”行为仅仅是内部行为，在“友好线”之外就是自然状态，在这里没有“一个共同的前提或共同的权威”。欧洲国家共同认可，此线之外“尽是自由新天地”：“所谓自由，是因为这条线划定了一个可以肆意使用暴力的区域。”在当今美国的“自由航行”的宣称中，我们还可以看到三百多年前的这层含义。

[¶12] The implication of this line was that only the princes and subjects of Christian Europe could be treaty partners in the new global appropriation. Yet the supposed common ground underlying relations among the princes and peoples of Christian Europe lacked both a unified, concrete, and legitimate arbitral authority and any concrete principle of division beyond the strong devouring the weak and first possession conferring title. This could give rise to a general conception that everything happening on the other side of the line was exempt from judgment according to the legal, political, and moral standards hitherto recognized in Europe. This would mean a tremendous easing of Europe’s internal problems, and this way of easing tensions was precisely the notorious “beyond the line” device of international law. (p. 64)

> Chinese: 该界线的潜台词是，只有基督教欧洲的诸侯和子民，才能成为参与新全球占取的协约伙伴。但是，这些隐藏在基督教欧洲诸侯和民族之间的所谓共同点，既缺乏一个统一的、具体且有合法性的仲裁机构，也缺乏一种除了弱肉强食、先占先得之外的具体的划分原则。由此可以产生一个普遍的设想，即此线彼岸发生的一切，都不能用迄今在欧洲已获承认的法律、政治和道德标准去评价。这将意味着欧洲内部问题的巨大缓和，而这种缓和矛盾的方式，正是国际法上臭名昭著的“界线之外”的伎俩。（页64）

[¶13] We should note that when Richelieu announced this rule in July 1634, Europe was in the midst of its first great internal war of the modern age, the German Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), while a number of historians regard the two great European wars of the twentieth century as a second Thirty Years’ War of this kind.

> Chinese: 应该注意到，黎塞留在 1634年 7月宣布这一规矩时，正值欧洲内部的现代第一场大战即德意志 30年战争（1618 - 1648）期间，而 20世纪的两次欧洲大战则被好些史学家视为第二次这样的 30年战争。

[¶14] Schmitt’s theoretical analysis of these three points concentrates on the second, which occupies eight pages, while the first and third each take up fewer than two. Here we see Schmitt raise the problem that concerns him to the level of political philosophy.

> Chinese: 施米特对于这三点的理论分析侧重于第二点，篇幅长达 8页，而第一和第三点分别不到两页篇幅。在这里我们看到，施米特让他所关注的问题上升到政治哲学高度。

[¶15] The amity lines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries disclosed two kinds of supposedly free regions in which the European peoples could act abroad without scruple: first, free land, the Americas, where Europeans could appropriate freely without further regard for any previously existing laws; second, the free sea, the newly discovered oceans that the French, Dutch, and English regarded as regions open to free appropriation. (p. 64)

> Chinese: 16、17世纪的友好界线彰显了两种所谓的自由区域，在此，欧洲各族对外可以无所顾忌地大展拳脚：其一是自由的土地——美洲，欧洲人可以在此自由地占取，一切旧有的法律不必再顾忌；其二是自由的海洋，新发现的大洋被法国人、荷兰人和英格兰人看成可以自由占取的区域。（页64）

[¶16] This amounts to saying that “free land” and “free sea” are in fact predatory concepts. Yet they sound as though they refer to common property in the Roman-law sense (res communis omnium), and are thus thoroughly deceptive concepts. No one has stopped to ask: among whom are this “free land” and this “free sea” held in common?

> Chinese: 这无异于说，所谓“自由的土地”和“自由的海洋”其实都是掠夺性概念，但它听起来像是指罗马法意义上的共同财物（res communis omnium），从而是个彻头彻尾的欺骗性概念。人们没有想过：谁与谁拥有共同的“自由土地”和“自由海洋”？

[¶17] Since the struggle for distant “free land” required passage across the “free sea,” the historic controversy between the English jurist Selden and the Dutch jurist Grotius arose. [11] Here, however, Schmitt does not analyze that famous controversy, but instead seeks to reveal the question in the history of political philosophy raised by these two predatory concepts, “free land” and “free sea”:

> Chinese: 由于争夺遥远的“自由土地”需要通过“自由的海洋”，于是就有了英国法学家塞尔顿与荷兰法学家格劳秀斯的历史性论争。 [11]不过，施米特在这里没有论析这场著名论争，而是致力于揭示“自由的土地”和“自由的海洋”这两个掠夺性概念所引发的政治哲学史问题：

[¶18] The demarcated free spheres recognized by Christian governments had the consequence of universally and fundamentally shaking all traditional spiritual and moral principles. … In other words, the demarcation of free spheres meant a radical overturning of all the rules and premises inherited from antiquity and the Christian Middle Ages. (p. 65)

> Chinese: 基督教政府所承认的划分出去的自由领域造成了一个后果，即普遍、彻底地撼动了所有传统的精神和道德原则……换言之，对古代和基督教中世纪传承下来的所有规则和前提，自由领域的划分意味着一个彻底的颠覆。（页65）

[¶19] Schmitt sharply observes that setting apart free spheres meant that justice, goodness, and even truth had a limited sphere of application: “Christian princes and their subjects all agreed not to distinguish between right and wrong, or good and evil, in certain territories.” This meant that so-called “freedom” was lawlessness without any moral constraint. Europeans were civilized people only in their own homelands; outside them, they were savage men in a state of nature.

> Chinese: 施米特尖锐地指出，划分出自由领域意味着，正义、善乃至真理有一个适用范围：“基督教的王侯和子民都一致同意，对于特定的地域不去区分是非与对错。”这意味着所谓“自由”就是无法无天，没有任何道德约束。欧洲人在自己的家园内才是文明人，在家园之外是野蛮的自然人。

[¶20] From this Schmitt develops a new understanding of the doctrine of the state of nature in Hobbes’s theory of the state. He candidly acknowledges that his own The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, published twelve years earlier, in 1938, had also failed to recognize this point: Hobbes’s view that in the state of nature man is a wolf to man has a “historical connection” with the drawing of “amity lines” (p. 67, note). This was so even though Schmitt had recognized that, despite accepting international law, the European states remained in a “state of nature” confronting one another: “Only within the state is there security; outside the state there is none.” [12]

> Chinese: 施米特由此引出了对霍布斯国家理论中的自然状态论的重新理解，并坦然承认，自己在 12年前（1938）发表的《霍布斯国家理论中的利维坦》也没有能够看到这一点，即霍布斯认为，自然状态下人与人的关系是狼，这个观点与“友好线”的划分有“历史性关联”（页 67注释），尽管他看到，即便接受了国际法，欧洲各国仍然处于相互对峙的“自然状态”——“国家里才有安全，国家之外毫无安全”。 [12]

[¶21] Vitoria, after all, still acknowledged that barbarians were human beings too. After the Enlightenment, this humanitarian view was proclaimed even more loudly. Yet in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, “man is a wolf to man” became a rule of actual life. This was connected with the drawing of the so-called “amity lines,” because “the New World became an open and unrestricted sphere recognized by the governments of Christian Europe” (p. 66). Unlike twelve years earlier, Schmitt now holds that it was by no means accidental that Hobbes’s doctrine of the “state of nature” appeared at the time of the discovery of the free New World:

> Chinese: 维多利亚毕竟还承认，野蛮人也是人。启蒙运动之后，这种人道观更为响亮，唯独在 16至 17世纪，“人与人是狼”成了一条现实法则。这与所谓“友好线”的划界有关，因为，“新大陆成为基督教欧洲政府承认的开放和不受拘束的领域”（页 66）。与 12年前不同，施米特现在认为，霍布斯的“自然状态”说出现在发现自由的新大陆之际，绝非偶然：

[¶22] Hobbes clearly based his thinking not only on a remorseful reflection on Europe’s civil wars, but also on the fact of the New World’s emergence. The “state of nature” of which Hobbes spoke was by no means a utopia nonexistent in space. His state of freedom was rather a “no-man’s-land,” but far from a “nowhere.” This land could be located, and Hobbes located it in the New World. In Leviathan, “American-ness” (Americani) is explicitly described as the wolfish character of humanity in the state of nature. The atrocities mentioned in Behemoth refer to the actions of Spanish Christians in the Inca Empire. Admittedly, Hobbes’s later thought was more concerned with constructing abstract concepts than with reflecting on concrete processes in time and space. Or, to put it another way, the so-called state of nature was rather a hypothetical construction than a historical reality. Yet this did not efface the important historical connection between the state of nature and the amity lines. (pp. 66–67)

> Chinese: 霍布斯显然不是仅仅基于忏悔欧洲内战的观感，而是也基于新世界的诞生这一事实。霍布斯所言的“自然状态”绝非一片在空间上不存在的乌托邦。霍布斯所说的自由状态毋宁是一种“无人之境”，但远非“无在之境”。这片土地可以定位，而霍布斯也将其定位在新世界。在《利维坦》中，“美洲性”（Americani）被明确表述为人类在自然状态中狼的性格。在《比希莫斯》一书中提到的暴行，就是指西班牙的基督教徒们在印加帝国的所作所为。虽然霍布斯的晚期思想更多致力于建构抽象概念，而不是针对具体的时间和空间历程的思考。或者说，所谓自然状态毋宁是一种假想的建构，而不是历史的真实。但是，这并未消除自然状态与友好界线的重要历史联系。（页66 - 67）

[¶23] Schmitt’s first long footnote here also deserves close reading, for he says that “Hegel’s approach to the construction of the state likewise continued in the direction opened up by Hobbes”: “For Hegel, America was a place with civil society but no state.” This footnote is puzzling: was “civil society,” in Hegel’s view, a state of nature? If so, did the American political order amount to a state of barbarism?

> Chinese: 施米特在这里下的第一个长注也值得细看，因为他说，“黑格尔的国家建构思路亦延续了霍布斯开辟的方向”：“在黑格尔看来，美国是一个没有国家只有市民社会的地方。”这个注释令人费解：“市民社会”在黑格尔看来是自然状态？倘若如此，美国政制无异于野蛮状态？

[¶24] Schmitt quickly passes over this question and turns to Ferdinand Tönnies’s studies of Hobbes. He says that Tönnies recognized the need to understand Hobbes’s doctrine of the state of nature in its historical context. This context was precisely the age in which the idea of “amity lines and a new kind of utterly free, unrestricted space” emerged, although this did not exclude the possibility that Hobbes’s state of nature referred to the already obsolete feudal anarchy of the Middle Ages.

> Chinese: 施米特很快滑过这个问题，转而说到滕尼斯（Ferdinand Tönnies）的霍布斯研究。他说滕尼斯看到，应该从历史语境的角度来理解霍布斯的自然状态论，而这个历史语境正是“友好之线以及一种新型的非常自由的无限制空间”观念冒出来的时代，尽管并不排除霍布斯的自然状态指已经过时的中世纪的封建无政府状态。

[¶25] In the main text, however, the question passed over in the footnote is taken up again: Schmitt says that “a third clear illustration of the effect of the amity lines is provided by Locke.” We should recall: was Locke not the intellectual founding father of the United States? When discussing Locke, however, Schmitt does not name the United States directly, saying only that “in Locke’s conception, too, the state of nature and the New World are intimately connected historically”:

> Chinese: 但是，在正文中，脚注中滑过的问题得到延续：施米特说，“友好界线效用的第三个明证当推洛克。”我们应该想到，洛克不正是美国的立国教父吗？不过，在说到洛克时，施米特没有直接点美国的名，仅仅说“在洛克的设想里，自然状态和新世界在历史上也休戚相关”：

[¶26] Except that in Locke this state of nature had already become an entirely tolerable social condition (Sozial - Zustand), and no longer carried the old meaning of beyond the line [beyond this line]. (p. 67) [13]

> Chinese: 只不过这个自然状态在洛克那里已成为一个完全可以承受的社会状态（Sozial - Zustand），而不再是旧有的beyond the line[此线之外]）的含义。（页67）[13]

[¶27] Following this logic, Schmitt appears to indicate, in exceedingly cautious prose, that the founding of the United States and its subsequent rise followed the law of the jungle characteristic of the state of nature. Whether this is indeed Schmitt’s view can be confirmed only through a close reading of Chapter 4. Nevertheless, the following passage provides something of a clue:

> Chinese: 按照这种逻辑推论下去，施米特显得以极为小心的笔法表明：美国的立国及其后来的崛起，遵循的是自然状态的丛林法则。施米特的观点是否如此，我们需要细读第四章才能得到印证。尽管如此，随后的一段话多少可以看到一点儿端倪：

[¶28] The significance in international law of the amity lines drawn in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was that they marked out vast free territories as battlefields for the struggle over the New World. Their legal justification was that, by demarcating free territories, the space of freedom and peace on this side of the line, governed by European public law, was relieved of pressure and protected from threats arising from conditions on the other side; otherwise, the stability of Europe’s zone of peace would have been difficult to maintain. In other words, demarcating a battlefield for the struggle over the New World served to restrain warfare within Europe. This was the source of its significance and legitimacy in international law. (p. 68)

> Chinese: 16、17世纪划定的友好界线的国际法意义在于，大片的自由疆域，为争夺新世界而开战的疆场被划定出来。其法律上的正当性在于，通过划定自由疆域，界线这边由欧洲公法管控下的自由与和平的空间获得了释放，不会因为界线那边的情况而遭遇威胁，否则欧洲和平区的稳定也难以维持。换言之，划定争夺新世界的战场，服务于对欧洲内部战争的遏制。这就是其国际法上的意义与合法性所在。（页68）

[¶29] To put it plainly, the United States rose within the free territories marked out by Europeans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where there were no constraints of international law between states. At its founding, the United States also proclaimed its separation from Europe. After the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States reentered the civilized European order, bringing barbarous, lawless habits into Europe. Thus, during the first European war of the twentieth century, a discriminatory concept of war emerged, and the European epoch, or Europe’s tradition of international law, began to draw to a close.

> Chinese: 说白了，美国是在 16 - 17世纪的欧洲人所划出的自由疆域中崛起的，这里没有国家间的国际法的约束，美国在立国之初也宣称与欧洲切割。在 1898年的美西战争之后，美国重新介入文明的欧洲秩序，把野蛮的非法习惯带入欧洲。于是， 20世纪的第一次欧战就出现了歧视性的战争概念，欧洲纪元或者说欧洲的国际法传统开始走向终结。

[¶30] From a world-historical perspective, American conduct was learned from Britain’s instruction, assistance, and example. Britain had achieved global hegemony by the end of the nineteenth century, and that hegemony rested on the division made by the “amity lines.” From the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the civilized-world side of the “amity lines” had consisted of the great family of Europe. Now Britain alone remained as this family’s sole, unquestioned master: the civilized world was Britain alone, and everything “beyond the line” was free territory.

> Chinese: 从世界历史的角度看，美国行为来自英国的传帮带。因为，英国在 19世纪末取得了全球性霸权，而这种霸权基于“友好线”的划分。在 16 - 18世纪，“友好线”的文明世界一边是欧洲这个大家庭。现在，这个大家庭仅剩下英国这个唯一的绝对老大，文明世界仅仅是英国，“此线之外”都是自由疆域。

[¶31] Schmitt gives two examples to illustrate this. First, “English law has continued to this day to distinguish among the particular characteristics of different territories.” This is because colonial possession took diverse forms, whereas continental European legal thinking recognized only one type of territory: “state territory” (Staatsgebiet).

> Chinese: 施米特举了两个例子来说明这一点。首先，“英国法律直到现在都一直保留了对不同疆域特殊性的区分。”这是因为殖民地的占有形式具有多样性，而欧洲大陆性的法制思维只承认一种疆域类型，即“国家疆域”（Staatsgebiet）。

[¶32] Second, English law includes the concept of the “state of exception” (Ausnahmezustand). For example, the law of naval warfare seeks to demarcate a particular sphere in time and space within which all existing legal rights may be suspended, thereby marking out in legal form a period of exception distinct from normality. In Schmitt’s view, this concept plainly rests on the practice of marking out free spheres:

> Chinese: 第二，英国法中有所谓“例外状态”（Ausnahmezustand）概念，比如海战法旨在划定时间和空间上的一个特点领域，在这个领域可以吊销一切既有法权，从而以法律形式划出一个有别于常态的例外时期。在施米特看来，这一概念明显基于划出自由领域的习惯：

[¶33] Within this special region of time and space, anything can happen, provided there is a practical need for it. (Ibid.)

> Chinese: 在这一时间和空间的特殊区域里，一切都可能发生，只要有这样的实际需要。（同上）

[¶34] This means that “the marks of freedom and justice are both confined to a particular span of time.” From this, Schmitt brings out the nature of the Anglo-American liberal conception of law: the visions of a free sea, free trade, and a free world economy rest on marking out room for maneuver for free competition and free exploitation, namely the free space for unrestricted plunder demarcated by the “amity lines.” In this space, humanity obeys the law of the jungle: “a ruthless trial of strength,” “duels aimed at mutual annihilation,” and “the free play of different systems of valuation and shifts in the balance of power.” In language familiar to us, the drawing of “amity lines” is the jurisprudential foundation of double standards.

> Chinese: 这意味着，“自由和正义的烙印皆局限于特定的时间之内。”施米特由此引出英美式自由主义法制理念的性质：所谓自由海洋、自由贸易和自由世界经济的设想，基于划出一个自由竞争和自由开发的进退空间，也就是“友好线”所划分出来的自由掠夺的自由空间。在这个空间，人类服从丛林规则，即“严酷的实力较量”和“消灭彼此的决斗”，以及“不同的评价体系和实力消长的自由游戏”。用我们熟悉的语言来说，“友好线”的划分是双重标准的法理基础。

[¶35] Only here does Schmitt reconnect with Hegel’s previously interrupted judgment on America: the Anglo-American political systems “are constructed upon a non-state civil society,” and this civil society is “an unrestrained, self-seeking jungle”:

> Chinese: 在这里，施米特才连接起上面断掉的那个黑格尔关于美国的论断：英美政体“建构在非国家的市民社会之上”，而这个市民社会是“无所顾忌、自私自利的丛林”：

[¶36] In Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of history, America was still regarded, in a particular sense, as a civil society without a state. (p. 70)

> Chinese: 在黑格尔开设的历史哲学课堂上，美国仍被认为是特殊意义上的无国家的市民社会。（页70）。

[¶37] Through his analysis of the divisions marked by the “amity lines,” Schmitt brings out a central theme in political thought from Hobbes to Hegel and even Marx: the binary opposition between the free sphere of civil society and the state as the realm of objective reason. Hobbes’s distinction between the state of nature and the civilized state [civil condition] is not merely diachronic, marking the transition from the state of nature to the formation of civil society; it is also a parallel, simultaneous distinction: the economic sphere is a state of nature, while the political sphere is civil society.

> Chinese: 通过剖析“友好线”的分界划分，施米特引出了从霍布斯到黑格尔乃至马克思的政治思想中一个核心论题，即市民社会的自由领域与作为客观理性之王国的国家之间的二元对立。霍布斯的自然状态与文明状态[市民状态]的区分，并非仅仅是历时性区分，即从摆脱自然状态到形成公民社会的区分，也是一个平行并列的区分：在经济领域是自然状态，在政治领域是公民社会。

[¶38] The “amity lines” also introduce a division between Old and New Worlds with significance for the philosophy of history: the “New World” is the space of an unknown world open to free appropriation. The relationship between the traditional “world under heaven,” that is, the “known world” (Oekumene), and the unknown world underwent a fundamental change: the latter was now an unknown world that could be explored and freely appropriated, what is today called “external space.” Thus Schmitt says, “The treaty lines of Spain and Portugal, like the English amity lines, all belonged to Europe’s land-appropriation and sea-appropriation in the New World.”

> Chinese: “友好线”还引出了具有历史哲学意义的新旧世界的划分：所谓“新世界”是可以自由占取的未知世界空间。传统的“天下”即“已知世界”（Oekumene）与未知世界的关系有了根本性变化，它是可探知的和可自由占取的未知世界——如今所谓的“外部空间”。因此，施米特说，“西葡两国的盟线和英国的友好界线一样，都归属于欧洲对新世界的占地和夺海。”

[¶39] The problem is that Europe was not a unified political unit, and the members of this great family did not hesitate to fight fierce wars for supremacy over one another. Thus “these lines regulated relations among the European appropriating powers by dividing and enclosing space,” thereby regulating relations within the family of European powers. Viewed from the other direction, international law or international treaties reflected changes in the distribution of power within the European family.

> Chinese: 问题在于，欧洲并非是一个统一的政治单位，这个大家庭的成员为相互争雄不惜大打出手。因此，“这些界线通过划分和圈定空间来调整欧洲占取列强之间的关系”，从而调整欧洲列强之间的家族内部关系。反过来看，国际法或国际条约也就反映了欧洲大家庭内部的强权分配关系的变化。