6. China’s Modern Transformation and International Law
六、中国的现代转型与国际法
Wills’s 1688: A Global History has a subtitle that strikes me as somewhat peculiar: “China and the World in an Extraordinary Year.” My patriotic feelings cannot prevent me from asking a question: why not Russia and the world, or India and the world, or Turkey and the world?
韦尔斯的《 1688年的全球史》用了一个让笔者感到多少有些奇怪的副标题：“一个非凡年代里的中国与世界。”笔者的国家情怀并不能阻止自己提出一个问题：为什么不是俄国与世界，或印度与世界，或土耳其与世界？
Certainly, “China and the world” is better able to display a global perspective. Moreover, Europeans at that time had only just become acquainted with China, that land of ritual and propriety, and were bound to find it novel. In the nearly one hundred years between Father Mendoza’s publication in Rome of History of the Great Chinese Empire (1585) and French missionaries’ successive publication of Latin translations of the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Analects between 1661 and 1672, Europeans’ great geographical discoveries revealed not only “uncivilized” America but also a highly civilized China. [16]
固然，“中国与世界”更能展示全球视野。何况，那个时候的欧洲人刚刚认识中国这个礼仪之邦，难免感到新奇。从门多萨神父在罗马出版《大中华帝国志》（1585年），到 1661 – 1672年间法国传教士陆续出版《大学》《中庸》《论语》的拉丁文译本，近一百年间，欧洲人在地理大发现中不仅发现了“未开化”的美洲，也发现了高度文明化的中国。 [16]
Even so, a rising Russia, or the Ottoman Empire, which still posed a direct threat to Europe, was plainly more important in the eyes of European intellectuals at the time. After all, in the geopolitical perception of Europeans then, China was far removed from Europe and posed no threat of war. We might well imagine that when Wills was writing 1688: A Global History in the 1990s, New China was rising peacefully, yet Europeans, drawing on their own historical experience, had a very real sense that the “threat” of China was approaching.
尽管如此，正在崛起的俄罗斯或对欧洲仍然构成直接威胁的奥斯曼帝国，在当时的欧洲智识人眼里显然更为重要。毕竟，在当时欧洲人的地缘政治感觉中，中国离欧洲老远，不会对欧洲构成战争威胁。我们未必不能设想，韦尔斯写作《 1688年的全球史》时在 1990年代，新中国正在和平崛起，欧洲人凭自己的历史经验却实实在在感觉到中国的“威胁”即将来临。
If so, the place in which China appears in The Nomos of the Earth deserves attention. In the fourth section of Chapter Three, discussing “Territorial Changes under European Public Law,” Schmitt says that European territorial changes were “established primarily through collective treaties among the European great powers.” This means that Europe was a community, and the principle sustaining this community’s spatial order was the “idea of a balance of power.” It is in this context that China is mentioned for the first time in The Nomos of the Earth. Although no more than a mention, it offers considerable insight into our understanding of China’s encounter with European international law.
倘若如此，中国在《大地的法》中出现的位置就值得注意。第三章第四节论及“欧洲公法中的领土变更”时，施米特说，欧洲的领土变更“主要通过欧洲大国之间的集体性条约而确立”。这意味着欧洲是一个共同体，而维持这个共同体的空间秩序原则是“均势观念”。在这一语境中，《大地的法》第一次提到中国，尽管仅仅是提到而已，但对我们认识中国与欧洲国际法的遭遇不乏启发。
A “balance of power” has to be sustained by an equilibrium of strength among the great powers. In his celebrated The Great Powers, Ranke succinctly outlined the historical condition of modern Europe: great powers may decline into small states, and small states may rise to become great powers, making a permanently unchanging balance of power impossible. Both the decline of a great power into a small state and the rise of a small state into a great power involve territorial changes; thus changes in the balance of power necessarily manifest themselves as spatial conflicts between states. Ranke did not ask why, since the sixteenth century, modern European history had been governed by the idea of a “balance of power.” We, however, would do well to ask: why did no international conception of a “balance of power” emerge in the geopolitics of ancient Asia, or, to put it another way, why did European-style wars between states not emerge?
“均势”得靠大国之间的势力平衡来支撑，兰克在其著名的《诸大国》中以精炼的笔法概述了欧洲的现代历史状况：大国可能沦为小国，小国可能崛起为大国，从而不可能有恒定不变的均势。大国沦为小国或小国崛起为大国，都会涉及到领土变更，从而，均势的变化必然体现为国家间的空间冲突。兰克并没有问，为何自 16世纪以来，现代欧洲的历史受“均势”观念支配？我们则值得问题：为何在亚洲的古代地缘政治中没有出现国际性的“均势”观念，或者说为何没有出现欧洲式的国家之间的战争？
Schmitt attempts to answer this question: Europe was originally a community of Christian civilization, and a “great power” meant a state occupying an important position within this “established order.” We naturally recall that, from the tenth century onward, Europe’s only great power was the German Holy Roman Empire, which Schmitt calls “the medieval spatial order of empire and papacy” (compare pp. 21–28).
施米特试图回答这个问题：欧洲本来是一个基督教文明共同体，所谓“大国”指某个国家在这个“既定秩序”中占据重要地位。我们自然会想到， 10世纪以来，欧洲唯一的大国是德意志神圣罗马帝国，施米特称之为“中世纪的皇帝制和教宗制的空间秩序”（比较页 21 - 28）。
With the rise of territorial nation-states under feudal monarchies, rebellion arose within the Christian community. The Reformation tore apart Europe’s common faith, and intricate, unceasing wars within that community followed. One might say that the “balance of power” becoming the guiding idea of the modern European order meant that this order had retreated from civilization into a barbaric condition that “venerated force.” It would not be inappropriate to describe modern European history in Mencius’s famous words, “There were no righteous wars in the Spring and Autumn period” (Mencius, “Jin Xin,” Part Two). Progress in commercial-technological civilization cannot justify wars between states.
随着封建王权式的地域性民族国家崛起，基督教共同体内部出现了叛乱，宗教改革撕裂了欧洲的共同信仰，随之而来的是这个共同体内部错综复杂的连绵战争。可以说，“均势”观念成为现代欧洲秩序的主导理念意味着，欧洲秩序从文明状态退回到“尚力”的野蛮状态。用孟子的名言“春秋无义战”（《孟子·尽心章句下》）来描述现代欧洲的历史，不会不恰当，商业 – 技术文明的进步并不能让国家间的战争称义。
In this historical context, the divided community of Christian Europe could establish a new order only by relying on an international law constructed through various bilateral or multilateral treaties. Within this order that “venerated force,” it was extremely important for a state to be recognized as a “great power.” The question is: recognized as a great power by whom? By the existing great powers, of course. Schmitt writes:
在这样的历史语境中，分裂的基督教欧洲共同体只能凭靠各种双边或多边条约所建构的国际法来建立新秩序。在这一“尚力”的秩序中，一个国家被承认为“大国”非常重要。问题是，被谁承认为大国？当然是被既存大国承认。施米特说：
The recognition of one great power by another is the highest form of recognition in international law. Such recognition is mutual recognition to the highest degree. (p. 170)
一个大国被另一个大国承认，是国际法承认中的最高形式。这种承认是最高程度的相互承认。（页170）
This means that modern European international law endorses the barbaric law of the jungle: recognition as a “great power” amounts to acknowledging that a political entity has the military strength to redefine its own boundaries. Although Ratzel takes a world-historical perspective in his discussion of “frontiers” in his celebrated Political Geography, the vast majority of his historical examples come from modern Europe. [17] Thus he writes:
这意味着，现代欧洲国际法认可野蛮的丛林法则：被承认为“大国”等于承认一个政治体有军事实力重新确立自己的边界。拉策尔在其名著《政治地理学》中论述“边疆”时，尽管具有世界历史视野，他的绝大部分史例出自现代欧洲。 [17]因此他说，
Changes in all the regions of a state cause its frontiers to expand or contract, and changes in each portion of its territory are thereby put to the test. Efforts to improve frontiers usually proceed not by reducing them, but by waging wars of plunder, shortening the boundary by adding territory. (Ibid., p. 123)
国家所有地区的变化引起自身边疆的扩张或缩减，每一部分领土的变化也因之受到考验。当致力于改善边疆时，通常不是通过缩减边疆的方式，而是进行掠夺战争，以通过增加疆土的方式缩减疆界。（同上，页123）
The problem is that the legal forms of the various bilateral or multilateral treaties of European international law make the law of the jungle, founded on “wars of plunder,” look quite “civilized.” Schmitt mentions here that Russia and Prussia in the eighteenth century, and Italy in the nineteenth, were successively “recognized by the traditional great powers as new great powers.” The “traditional great powers” were the powerful European states, such as France, Britain, and Austria. The recognition of Prussia and Italy as “new great powers” indicated only a change in the balance of power within the European community. By contrast, the recognition of Russia meant that an alien people had entered Europe’s public legal order, thereby changing the spatial configuration of the European order.
问题在于，欧洲国际法的各种双边或多边条约的法律形式让基于“掠夺战争”的丛林法则看起来颇为“文明”。施米特在这里提到，俄罗斯和普鲁士在 18世纪、意大利在 19世纪先后“被传统大国承认为新的大国”。所谓“传统大国”指欧洲的强势国家如法国、英国、奥地利等。普鲁士和意大利被承认为“新的大国”，仅仅表明欧洲共同体内部的均势变化，与此不同，俄罗斯得到承认意味着一个外族进入了欧洲的公法秩序，从而更改了欧洲秩序的空间格局。
“According to the textbooks, the United States was recognized as a great power in 1865.” Schmitt calls this something of an oddity, because the foreign policy announced by President Monroe in 1823 “fundamentally opposed the system of recognition constructed by the European great powers.” In other words, the famous “Monroe Doctrine” showed that the United States did not recognize the European-style modern order. Was it not ridiculous, then, for the great powers within that European order to recognize America as a great power? In Schmitt’s view, America’s separatist stance toward the European order meant that “the Western Hemisphere line had begun to oppose treating the particular European order as a universal global spatial order.”
“根据教科书，美国于 1865年被承认为大国”，施米特说，这算得上是件怪事。因为，美国总统门罗在 1823年宣告的对外政策，“根本上反对欧洲大国所构建的承认制度”。换言之，著名的“门罗主义”表明，美国并不承认欧洲式的现代秩序，而欧洲秩序中的大国却承认美国成了大国，岂不是搞笑。在施米特看来，美国对欧洲秩序采取的分离主义立场意味着，“西半球界线已经开始反对将特别化的欧洲视为普遍化的全球空间秩序”。
Of relevance to us in China, Schmitt next discusses the circumstances in which Japan gained recognition from the European great powers:
与我们中国相关，施米特接下来说到日本获得欧洲大国承认的情形：
Japan’s recognition as a great power came in 1894 (the Sino-Japanese War) and subsequently in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05. Japan won both wars and was therefore permitted to join the small circle of international law composed of the great powers. Japan regarded the punitive expedition (die Strafexpedition) it conducted against China, a great power, as an event of decisive significance. With the emergence of this Asian great power, a new, non-Eurocentric world order began to surface (p. 170).
对日本之大国地位的承认是在1894年（中日战争）和接下来的1904/05年日俄战争，日本赢得了这两场战争，因此被允许加入由诸大国组成的国际法小圈子。日本将自己对中国这个大国实施的惩罚性征战（die Strafexpedition）视为具有决定意义的事件。伴随着这个亚洲大国的出现，一个新的非欧洲中心的世界秩序开始浮出水面（页170）。
Schmitt does not call Japan’s recognition as a great power an oddity, because Japan did not, as America did, declare its refusal to belong to the European system. This means that Japan’s fighting the naval battles of the First Sino-Japanese War and waging a Russo-Japanese War on Chinese soil conformed entirely to the rules of modern European laws of war, and thus enabled Japan to become a prominent member of the family of European public law. Because Japan fought these two wars in East Asia, it replicated modern Europe’s “civilized” rules of barbarism in Asia, extending them geographically beyond Europe. Hence Schmitt’s statement that “a new, non-Eurocentric world order began to surface.”
施米特没有说，日本被承认为大国是件怪事，因为日本没有像美国那样宣称自己拒绝归属欧洲体系。这意味着，日本打甲午海战和在中国土地上打了一场日俄战争，完全符合现代欧洲的战争法规矩，从而能够凭此成为欧洲公法大家庭中的要员。由于日本是在东亚打的这两场战争，现代欧洲的“文明化”野蛮法则被日本复制到亚洲，使之在地理意义上越出了欧洲范围。因此，施米特说，“一个新的非欧洲中心的世界秩序开始浮出水面。”
Schmitt does not mention Korea, thus inadvertently displaying the habits of European scholars of public law himself. He should not have forgotten the cause of the First Sino-Japanese War, or who assassinated Itō Hirobumi in northeastern China. In any event, China’s first appearance in The Nomos of the Earth serves merely as corroboration of Schmitt’s account of Japan becoming a great power according to the modern European nomos of the earth. In fact, European international jurists had no need to wait for the Russo-Japanese War: the naval battles of the First Sino-Japanese War already sufficed to demonstrate that Japan was worthy of being a European-style great power. [18] A statement in the international jurist von Liszt’s 1898 textbook International Law, cited by Schmitt in a later footnote, can serve as historical testimony:
施米特没有提到朝鲜，以至于他自己也不经意地带有欧洲公法学家的习惯。他不应该忘记甲午战争的起因，以及谁在中国东北刺杀了伊藤博文。无论如何，中国在《大地的法》中的第一次出现，仅仅是施米特笔下的日本依据现代欧洲的大地法成为大国的佐证。事实上，对于欧洲的国际法学家来说，根本无需等到日俄战争，甲午海战已经足以证明日本不愧为欧洲式大国。 [18]施米特在后来的一条脚注中所引用的国际法学家冯·李斯特（von Liszt）在 1898年出版的教科书《国际法》中的一句话，可以作为历史的证言：
Japan must now be included within the community of international law; its culture is unquestionably above the level of the Christian-European states. In its war against China, Japan observed the rules of international law more strictly than most European states. (p. 213, n. 1)
如今必须把日本纳入国际法共同体之内，它的文化绝对在基督教 - 欧洲国家的水平线之上。日本在对中国的战争中比大多数欧洲国家都更严格地遵守了国际法规则。（页213注1）
China appears for the second time in The Nomos of the Earth in the second section of Chapter Four, entitled “The End of European Public Law.” As in the context of its first appearance, the issue concerns the eastward extension, or globalization, of European public law. The difference is that the historical context is now the end of European public law (pp. 212–214). Schmitt says that this historical context seems rather strange, because Asian states had already joined the European system of international law in the 1880s and 1890s and “were unconcerned about the problems of a thoroughly Eurocentric international law.” This meant that European public law “would ultimately be transformed into an undifferentiated, universal international law” (p. 212).
中国第二次出现在《大地的法》中，见于第四章题为“欧洲公法的终结”的第二节。与第一次出现时的语境一样，问题涉及欧洲公法的东移或全球化。不同之处在于，现在的历史语境是欧洲公法的终结（页 212 - 214）。施米特说，这一历史语境显得颇为奇怪。因为，亚洲国家在 1880至 1890年代已经加入欧洲的国际法体系，“对完全欧洲中心主义的国际法所存在的问题并不介意”，这意味着欧洲公法“最终将转变成一种无差别的普遍的国际法”（页 212）。
In Schmitt’s account, Asian states entered the modern European system of international law in two ways. One was “nonpolitical and technical”: Japan, Siam (the former name of “Thailand”), and China joining the Universal Postal Union, for example. Since their entry into the European international legal system was “nonpolitical,” people failed to see “the problems arising from the transformation of the spatial order in the European conception.” The second way was political, namely through predatory war. Here Schmitt once again mentions the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War:
按施米特的描述，亚洲国家加入现代欧洲国际法体系的方式有两种：一种是“非政治性的、技术性的”方式，比如日本、暹罗（“泰国”旧称）和中国加入万国邮政联盟。既然是“非政治性”加入欧洲国际法体系，人们也就看不到“欧洲观念中空间秩序的转变所存在的问题”。第二种方式是政治性的，即通过掠夺性战争。施米特在这里再次提到甲午战争和日俄战争：
Through its war with China in 1894 and its victorious war with the European great power Russia in 1904, Japan demonstrated to the world its willingness to observe the rules of European laws of war. It had thus knocked its “welcoming committee” to the ground. Moreover, in 1900 Japan had participated on an equal footing with the European great powers in the expeditionary force that suppressed the “Boxer uprising.” An Asian great power had thus risen and gained recognition. (p. 212)
日本通过1894年与中国的战争以及1904年与欧洲大国俄罗斯的胜利战争，向世界证明它愿意遵守欧洲的战争法规则。因此，它已经将其“接待团”打翻在地。此外，日本还在1900年与欧洲大国一起平等地参加了镇压“义和拳暴动”的远征军。一个亚洲大国从此而崛起并得到承认。（页212）
Schmitt directs our attention to how European international jurists from the 1890s onward explained the comprehensive opening of the European international legal community. These jurists said that “non-European, non-American peoples (Völker)” had now been incorporated into the community of European public law, and that the system currently included twenty-five European states and nineteen American states. Yet when referring to the European states, these jurists used the term “sovereign states”; when speaking of the American states, they omitted the word “sovereign.” They did the same when mentioning Asian states such as “Persia, China, Japan, Korea, and Siam.” These countries “maintained regular treaty relations with members of the [European] community,” indicating that they were already members of the family of European international law (pp. 213–214). Schmitt immediately adds:
施米特让我们注意， 1890年代以来的欧洲国际法学家们如何解释欧洲国际法共同体的全方位开放。这些法学家说，现在“非欧洲、非美洲的人民（Völker）”已经被纳入欧洲公法共同体，目前，在这个体系中，欧洲国家有 25个，美洲国家有 19个。但在提到欧洲国家时，这些法学家用了“主权国家”这个概念，说到美洲国家时，他们就省掉了“主权”二字。提到亚洲国家如“波斯、中国、日本、朝鲜、暹罗”时同样如此，他们“与[欧洲]共同体成员保持着经常性的条约关系”，表明这些国家已经是欧洲国际法大家庭成员（页 213 - 214）。施米特紧接着说：
This is a panoramic picture, both a prophecy and an authentic document. It clearly reveals the historical upheaval from European international law to an international law extending beyond Europe. Looking back at the history of international law in the 1890s, we seek to focus on its crucial historical facts. By the end of the nineteenth century, European international jurisprudence had lost every trace of a reflective spirit, even abandoning, entirely unconsciously, the conception of spatial structure within the traditional order. (p. 214)
这是一幅全景画卷，既是预言，也是一份真实文献。清晰地展现了从欧洲国际法向超越欧洲之国际法的历史剧变。通过回顾1890年代的国际法历史，我们尽力聚焦于国际法历史中的关键史实。19世纪末的欧洲国际法学没有了任何反思精神，甚至在全然无意识的情况下丢掉了传统秩序中的空间结构观念。（页214）
Even today, Asian specialists in the history of international law still lack the awareness of spatial structure of which Schmitt speaks here. When discussing the history of the concept of “sovereignty,” they display no “reflective spirit” whatsoever, even when adopting a so-called “diachronic perspective.” [19] We, for our part, should recall a curious occurrence in our own academic world since the late 1990s. It shows that certain Chinese historians since the end of the twentieth century have not only lost their reflective spirit but even, entirely unconsciously, abandoned the conception of spatial structure within our country’s traditional order. This is something I find difficult to put out of my mind.
直到今天，亚洲研究国际法史的专家仍然缺乏施米特在这里所说的空间结构意识，谈论“主权”概念的历史时，即便采用了所谓“历时性透视”，却见不到“任何反思精神”。 [19]我们则应该想起 1990年代末以来发生在我国学界的一件怪事，这事表明， 20世纪末以来的某些中国史学家不仅丧失了反思精神，甚至全然下意识地丢掉了我国传统秩序中的空间结构观念，让笔者难以释怀。
The circumstances were these: although China, as Schmitt says, had already recognized the European system of international law from the 1880s onward, the revolutionary governments of the Republican period pursued “revolutionary diplomacy” under the slogan of abolishing “unequal treaties,” producing continuous and severe friction with that system. [20] As reform and opening up began to bear fruit (1999–2000), China faced the practical question of entering “international society” or aligning itself with international law. Chinese diplomacy in the late Qing and early Republican periods suddenly became a fashionable topic among historians of modern China:
事情的原委是这样：中国虽然如施米特所说，自 1880年代以来已经承认欧洲的国际法体系，但民国以来的革命政府以废除“不平等条约”为口号推行“革命外交”，与欧洲国际法体系发生了持续不断的严重摩擦。 [20]改革开放初见成效之际（1999年至 2000年），中国面临进入“国际社会”或与国际法接轨的现实问题，晚清和民国初期的中国外交一时成为近代史学界的热门话题：
Within the modern Western international legal order, the so-called principle of sovereign equality was not unconditional. But how could one enjoy full legal personality under that order? The Qing government’s officials responsible for Western affairs initially chose to observe and fulfill treaties in order to buy time to enrich the country and strengthen its armed forces, using modernized weaponry to safeguard national autonomy and independence. They were followed by the reformers around the time of the Hundred Days’ Reform, who hoped to establish a modern state through a series of political and social reforms, large and small and thoroughly transformative, and, under universal principles and public law revered by all nations and valid for all ages, to advance toward a world of Great Unity in a civilized society. With the advent of the twentieth century, once building a “civilized state” in the international legal sense and joining international society had become the supreme national objective, the Qing government’s urgent tasks were the “civilizing” of the state, participation in international conferences, and membership in international organizations. [21]
在近代西方的国际法秩序里，所谓主权平等的原则并不是无条件的。但怎样才可享有国际法秩序下的完全人格呢？清政府洋务官僚最初选择的是遵守条约、履行条约，以换取时间争取富国强兵，以现代化武装维护国家的自主独立；继之而起的是戊戌前后维新派希望通过一系列大大小小、翻天覆地的政治社会改革，建立近代国家，在万国共尊、万世通行的公理公法下，迈向文明社会的大同世界。进入20世纪，当构建国际法意义的“文明国”、加入国际社会已成为国家的至上命题时，清政府的急务便是国家的“文明化”，以及与闻国际会议，参加国际组织了。[21]
This means that the Chinese governments of the late Qing and early Republican periods did not regard the bilateral or multilateral treaties they signed with European-style great powers as “unequal treaties.” A debate over what constituted an “unequal treaty” thus abruptly arose among historians of modern China. It was said that whether a treaty was equal depended on two conditions: first, whether the form and procedure of its conclusion were equal, and second, whether its contents impaired China’s sovereignty. This definition is vague, and its formulation lacks the precision of legal language. Nevertheless, a count based on these criteria found that of the 736 treaties China had concluded with foreign countries since the nineteenth century, 343 could still be identified as unequal treaties, involving as many as twenty-three countries. [22]
这意味着，清末民初的中国政府并未把与欧洲式大国签订的双边或多边条约视为“不平等条约”。于是，我国近代史学界骤然兴起一场关于何谓“不平等条约”的论争。据说，条约是否平等取决于两项条件：第一，缔结条约的形式和程序是否平等，第二，条约内容是否损害了中国的主权。这个界定含糊不清，表述也缺乏法律修辞的确定性。尽管如此，按此标准统计， 19世纪以来的中国与外国订立的条约有 736个，其中仍有 343个可以确认为不平等条约，涉及国家多达 23个。 [22]
The concept of an “unequal treaty” actually signifies a refusal to recognize the treaty’s validity, rather than a refusal to recognize its legality. In the understanding of legal positivism, a treaty that a state concludes with another under duress, to the detriment of its own interests, should be regarded as both lawful and valid. Thus scholars of legal history in China acknowledge that, within the framework of legal positivism, “it is difficult to discuss the problem of ‘unequal treaties’ substantively.” [23]
“不平等条约”这一概念实际意味着不承认条约的有效性，而非不承认其合法性。按实证法学的理解，某个国家在受胁迫（duress）的条件下与他国缔结的有损自身利益的条约，应该被视为既合法也有效。因此，我国的法学史学者承认，在实证法学的框架下，“‘不平等条约’问题很难得到实质性讨论”。 [23]
In practical politics, the situation is plainly another matter. An agreement that someone concludes with another person under duress, to the detriment of his own interests, will of course be regarded as both lawful and valid. But this does not mean that he should not regard it as an “unequal treaty” and abolish it once he has escaped the conditions of duress. The same applies to relations and conduct between states. In other words, treaties reflect only temporary circumstances between states.
在实际政治中，情形显然是另一回事。一个人在受胁迫的条件下与他人缔结的有损自身利益的条约，当然会被视为既合法也有效，但这不等于他不应该把这条约视为“不平等条约”，并在摆脱受胁迫的处境后废除条约。国家间的行为关系同样如此，换言之，条约仅仅反映国家间的暂时状况。
In 1945, when China’s wartime government signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union, to the detriment of its own sovereignty, Chiang Kai-shek specially sent Chiang Ching-kuo along with the delegation so that personal connections could be brought into play. One day, Stalin did indeed invite Chiang Ching-kuo to his private residence for an informal conversation. He told Chiang Ching-kuo that the Soviet side’s insistence at the negotiating table on retaining the interests in China inherited from tsarist Russia was merely intended to prevent China from invading the Soviet Union. Chiang Ching-kuo replied: How could China invade the Soviet Union? Nothing of the sort had ever happened in history. We could conclude a treaty in which China guaranteed never to invade the Soviet Union. Stalin smiled and said: Since this is a private occasion, I shall tell you frankly: all treaties are scraps of paper; everything comes down to strength.
1945年，中国的战时政府与苏联签订有损自身主权的《中苏友好同盟条约》时，蒋介石特别派蒋经国随代表团同行，以便打人情牌。有一天，斯大林果然把蒋经国请到自己的私人官邸闲叙。他对蒋经国说，苏方在谈判桌上坚持沙俄留下的在华利益，不过是为了防止中国侵略苏联。蒋经国说，中国怎么会侵略苏联呢？历史上从未有过这样的事情。我们可以订立一个条约，中方保证永不侵犯苏联。斯大林笑了一下说：今天是私下场合，我就坦率告诉你吧，所有条约都是废纸，一切凭实力说话。
We must acknowledge that Stalin grasped the essential spirit of European international law better than the jurists or historians. Another of his famous sayings shows this just as clearly: nowadays, a state’s borders extend as far as its armies advance. The law of the jungle espoused by European civilization receives a concise and precise expression in this saying.
我们得承认，斯大林比法学家或史学家们更好地把握住了欧洲国际法的精神实质。他还有一句名言同样如此：如今，一个国家的军队打到哪里，国家的边界就在哪里。欧洲文明信奉的丛林法则，在这句名言中得到精炼而又准确的表达。
That being so, the references to “unequal treaties” filling the pages of books on modern Chinese history are not excessive. Yet certain positivist historians regard this expression as rhetoric belonging to the “revolutionary view of history,” with “little significance in diplomatic history and international law,” because the concept itself amounts to “doubt about and a challenge to the legality and validity of treaties.” In their view, the use of “unequal treaties” for political mobilization is entirely understandable in its historical context, but using such rhetoric in historical research today is out of place: we should revise our historical narrative and avoid using this “biased” concept. This professor of history further says:
既然如此，中国现代史书中满篇“不平等条约”的说法，并不为过。但在某些实证史学家看来，这种说法是“革命史观”的修辞，“在外交史与国际法上的意义并不大”，因为这个概念本身无异于“对条约的合法性及效力的怀疑与挑战”。在历史的语境中，“不平等条约”的说法用于政治动员完全可以理解，如今的史学研究还使用这样的修辞就不合时宜，应该修改我们的历史叙述，避免使用这种“带偏见”的概念。这位史学教授还说，
Overemphasizing the moral defects of “unequal treaties” and the moral superiority of China’s “treaty abrogation” entails certain self-contradictions. The Qing government also enjoyed treaty privileges abroad, including three exclusively administered concessions in Korea (Incheon, Busan, and Wonsan), as well as Chinese concessions within the international settlements at Chinnampo and elsewhere, and it enjoyed consular jurisdiction. Before the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China and Japan enjoyed reciprocal consular jurisdiction, and Japan repeatedly requested treaty revision to abolish China’s consular jurisdiction in Japan. China enjoyed reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment with Mexico and Peru. When China requested treaty revision from various countries in the 1920s, Mexico also requested that China relinquish its most-favored-nation treatment in Mexico. [24]
太过强调“不平等条约”在道德上之瑕疵，及中国“废约”在道德上之优越性，会有自相矛盾之处。清政府也曾在外国享有条约特权，如在朝鲜有专管租界三处（仁川、釜山、元山），另外在甑南浦等公共租界中也有中国租界，并享有领事裁判权。马关条约之前，中国与日本互享领事裁判权，日本曾多次要求修约，取消中国在日本之领事裁判权。中国与墨西哥、秘鲁互享最惠国待遇，1920年代中国向各国要求修约时，墨西哥也要求中国放弃在墨之最惠国待遇。 [24]
We cannot help asking: can these examples demonstrate “self-contradiction in the moral superiority” of the Chinese revolutionaries’ advocacy of “treaty abrogation”? Relations between the Qing dynasty and Korea involved far more than “concessions.” Even Korea’s new army was trained by Yuan Shikai, whom the Qing government had dispatched, to say nothing of the fact that the First Sino-Japanese War began because China sent troops to help Korea resist a foreign enemy. “China enjoyed reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment with Mexico and Peru”: is there something morally problematic about the reciprocal enjoyment of most-favored-nation rights, or about their mutual cancellation?
我们不禁要问：这些例子能够证明与中国革命党人的“废约”主张在“道德上的优越性自相矛盾”吗？清朝与朝鲜的关系，岂止是“租界”，连朝鲜的新军也是清朝政府派袁世凯训练出来的，更何况甲午战争的起因是中国派军队为朝鲜抵御外敌。“中国与墨西哥、秘鲁互享最惠国待遇”，难道互享最惠国待遇权利以及相互取消这种权利，在道德上有问题？
The most ludicrous example is this: Japan and China had originally enjoyed reciprocal consular jurisdiction. Later, Japan became a European-style great power and repeatedly requested treaty revision to abolish China’s consular jurisdiction in Japan. This means that Japan relied on its growing military strength to demand the unilateral enjoyment of consular jurisdiction. Whose morality, exactly, is this historian proving to be problematic?
最滑稽的例子是：日本与中国本来互享领事裁判权，后来日本成了欧洲式大国，于是多次要求修约，取消中国在日本之领事裁判权，这意味着日本凭靠自身军事实力的增长要求单方面享有领事裁判权——这位史学家究竟在证明谁的道德有问题呢？
Nevertheless, on this basis the historian still maintains that the long-established “revolutionary view of history” has “obscured the rich variety of other dimensions in diplomatic history, narrowed the perspective of our understanding of modern history, and distorted the interpretation of historical facts.” He argues that we should use “empirical research” to cleanse historical writing of the revolutionary rhetoric fashioned by the Nationalist and Communist parties since the 1920s, turning instead to “the negotiations of regular diplomatic practice,” rather than “focusing solely on condemning imperialist aggression.”
尽管如此，这位史学家仍然凭此认为，长期以来的“革命史观”已经“遮蔽了外交史中丰富的其他面向，窄化了我们对近代史理解的视野，也扭曲了对史实的诠释”，应该以“实证研究”清洗国共两党在 1920年代以来打造的革命史学修辞，转而“注重外交常轨之交涉谈判”，而非“只注重谴责帝国主义侵略”。
The Nationalist and Communist parties used concise, readily understandable methods to portray the technically complex and abstruse “unequal treaties” as the principal obstacle to China’s progress. Their media propaganda catered to and stirred popular emotions; the reasoned arguments of the Beiyang diplomats were no match for it, and the public campaigns launched by the two parties successfully won people’s hearts. (Treaty Revision, p. 8)
国共两党用简洁易懂方法，把技术上复杂艰涩的“不平等条约”描述为限制中国进步的主要障碍，其媒体宣传迎合并激发了大众情绪；北洋外交家的理性辩论措辞无法相比，国共两党发动的公众运动成功地赢得人心。（《修约史》，页8）
We may ask: can the “empirical research” of positivist historians not also “distort the interpretation of historical facts”? This historian immediately proceeds to do just that. In his view, the Beiyang government’s use of participation in the European war to abrogate the Sino-German and Sino-Austrian treaties and “revoke the unequal privileges of the two countries” deserves to be called “an unprecedented achievement in Chinese diplomatic history” (Treaty Revision, pp. 62–66). We have reason to ask: did the Beiyang government revoke those “unequal privileges” through “the reasoned arguments of its diplomats”?
我们可以问：实证史学家的“实证研究”不会“扭曲对史实的诠释”吗？接下来这位史学家自己就马上扭曲对史实的诠释。在他看来，北洋政府借参加欧战废止了中德和中奥条约，“收回两国不平等特权”，堪称“中国外交史之创举”（《修约史》，页 62 - 66）。我们有理由问：北洋政府是靠“外交家的理性辩论措辞”收回“不平等特权”的吗？
The historian further says that after the Paris Peace Conference, China negotiated separately with Germany and concluded “the first completely equal new treaty, even obtaining compensation for the internment of prisoners that none of the Allied countries received, as well as enormous war reparations.” These were “the only war reparations modern China obtained from a foreign country in its capacity as a victorious state,” and deserved to be called “an important milestone in the Beiyang government’s course of treaty revision” (Treaty Revision, pp. 82–109). If Schmitt were to see these dozens of pages of “empirical research,” he might not be angry. More likely he would find them amusing: to think that China has minds like this—poor Chinese!
这位史学家还说，巴黎和会之后，中国单独与德国议约，订立了“第一个完全平等的新条约，甚至取得协约国各国所无之俘虏收容费，以及巨额之战事赔偿”，是“近代中国唯一对外以战胜国身份取得的战事赔偿”，堪称“北洋修约历程中重要的里程碑”（《修约史》，页 82 - 109）。施米特若看见长达数十页的这种“实证研究”未必会生气，他多半会感到好笑：中国竟然有这种脑筋，可怜的中国人！
We ourselves, of course, can only be astonished: this historian does not mention the events that sparked the May Fourth Movement. It is as though the students of Beiping had done something morally wrong by obstructing the Beiyang diplomats’ “reasoned arguments” in Paris, while there was nothing morally problematic about the Beiyang government’s “substituting laborers for soldiers,” sending workers to participate in the war, where countless numbers were killed or wounded digging trenches near the battlefield, and obtaining “enormous war reparations.” [25] More absurdly still, the historian regards this new treaty China obtained “in its capacity as a victorious state” as a “completely equal” treaty. Surely not even an elementary school pupil would understand “equality” in this way.
我们自己当然会感到惊诧：这位史学家没有提到引发“五四”运动的事情，似乎北平学生阻扰北洋政府外交家在巴黎的“理性辩论”是道德上有问题，而北洋政府“以工代兵”派出劳工参战，在战场附近修战壕死伤无数，得了“巨额之战事赔偿”，在道德上没问题。 [25]更荒唐的是，这位史学家把中国“以战胜国身份取得”的这份新条约视为“完全平等”的条约——连小学生也不至于如此理解“平等”吧。
There are still more absurd “interpretations of historical facts.” The historian writes:
还有荒唐的“对史实的诠释”——这位史学家说，
“Abolishing unequal treaties” had little significance in state practice. Between 1925 and 1927, the Nationalist Government vigorously pursued “revolutionary diplomacy” and loudly proclaimed “treaty abrogation,” but it was not yet the internationally recognized central government and had never actually abrogated a treaty. After the April 12 [Incident], the Nanjing Nationalist Government gradually returned to regular international diplomatic practice, emphasizing “the negotiation of new treaties.” From then on, “abolishing unequal treaties” lost its substantive significance in international negotiations. (Treaty Revision, pp. 7–8)
“废除不平等条约”在国家实践上意义不大。1925 – 1927年间，国民政府厉行“革命外交”高唱“废约”，但那时尚非国际承认之中央政府，也未曾真正废除过条约。412[事变]之后，南京国民政府逐渐回归国际外交常轨，强调“改订新约”，自此“废除不平等条约”失去国际交涉上的实质意义。（《修约史》，页7 - 8）
It appears that this historian does have some knowledge of a basic political truth: weak countries have no diplomacy. What is laughable is that his book takes the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between China and Russia, signed on May 31, 1924 (usually abbreviated to the “Sino-Russian Agreement”), as a case study, devoting more than 120 pages of “archival analysis” to proving that, “despite pressures at home and abroad, the Beiyang government persisted in defending national rights, and its diplomatic performance deserves praise” (pp. 174–308). If this historian is too busy poring over archives to learn the fundamentals of history and political science, he should have the self-awareness to refrain from discussing political history. After all, the “technical complexity and abstruseness” of treaty negotiations and treaty-making is one thing; the complexity and ambiguity of historical political events is another. They belong to utterly different levels of inquiry.
看来，这位史学家多少还知道一个政治常识：弱国无外交。搞笑的是，他在书中以 1924年 5月 31签署的《中俄解决悬案大纲协定》（通常简称“中俄协定”）为个案，花了 120多页的“档案分析”来证明，北洋政府“尽管内外交迫，但仍坚持维护国权，外交表现可圈可点”（页 174 – 308）。如果这位史学家埋头看档案太忙，没时间学习基本的史学和政治学知识，那么，他应该有自知之明不谈政治史的事情。毕竟，条约谈判以及订立条约在“技术上复杂艰涩”，与历史上的政治事件复杂难辨是两回事，而且问题层次有天壤之别。
China and Russia share a border several thousand kilometers long. More than three hundred years of boundary-making between them amply demonstrate China’s encounter with what Schmitt calls European international public law. The Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 demarcated the eastern section of the border. More than twenty subsequent rounds of boundary demarcation and treaty-making followed. The process of China’s continual loss of territory was also the process by which the tsarist Russian Empire became a prominent member of the family of European public law. The Treaty of Bura of 1727 demarcated the middle section of the border. From the 1850s through the 1880s—that is, before the arrival of the age of imperialism, or what Schmitt calls the “new nomos of the earth”—Russia used a succession of treaties to carve away roughly 1.5 million square kilometers or more of Chinese territory along the eastern and western sections of the Sino-Russian border. [26] As Li Hongzhang lay dying, the Russian minister knelt before him, begging him to sign a treaty carving away Chinese territory. Li Hongzhang died without signing. Yet before this great statesman, born at an ill-fated time, closed his eyes, one last tear for China flowed from the corner of his eye!
中俄边界接壤数千公里，两国之间历时长达三百多年的划界史足以证明，中国与施米特所说的欧洲国际公法的遭际。 1689年的中俄《尼布楚条约》划定了两国的东段边界，之后划界订约 20多次，中国不断丧失领土的过程，也是沙俄帝国成为欧洲公法大家庭要员的过程。 1727年的《布连斯奇条约》划定了中段边界， 19世纪 50年代至 80年代，即帝国主义时代或施米特所说的“新大地法”来临之前，俄国通过多个条约切割了中俄边界东段和西段约 150多万平方公里的中国领土。 [26]李鸿章弥留之际，俄国公使跪在他面前，恳求他在一份切割中国土地的条约上签字。李鸿章至死没签，但这位生不逢时的大政治家闭眼之前，眼角为中国流出了最后一滴泪珠！
After Lenin’s Soviet republic was established, it twice issued “Declarations to China” (1919/1920). The first announced only the renunciation of the discriminatory Russo-Chinese treaties concluded since the 1850s, but included a promise to return the Chinese Eastern Railway to China without compensation. The second explicitly declared that “all treaties concluded with China by previous Russian governments are entirely null and void.” From today’s perspective, we can hardly say that the Beiyang government missed its opportunity and that Soviet Russia, as its international position improved, withdrew its promise to return the Chinese Eastern Railway. Rather, although China had become a republic several years before Russia, it had not achieved national integration and was utterly unable, in the actual negotiations, to bring about new treaties and boundary demarcations. How, then, could the Beiyang government’s diplomatic performance be said to “deserve praise”?
列宁的苏维埃共和国建立后，两次发表“对华宣言”（1919/1920），第一次仅宣布放弃 19世纪 50年代以来的俄中歧视性条约，但包括承诺将中东铁路无偿归还中国；第二次则明确宣布，“以前俄国历届政府同中国定立的一切条约全部无效。”今天的我们很难说，北洋政府错过时机，苏俄随着自己的国际处境好转又收回了归还中东铁路的承诺。毋宁说，中国虽然比俄国早几年改制共和，却并未实现国家整合，在具体谈判中根本无力落实重新订约和划界，北洋政府的外交表现何以谈得上“可圈可点”。
We now also know that the Soviet Union’s international communist ideal did not genuinely create a “new nomos of the earth.” In fact, in the actual negotiations the Soviet Russian government agreed, at most, to renounce only a handful of the tsarist empire’s treaties concluded since the 1890s. Even the Sino-Soviet Agreement and the Fengtian-Soviet Agreement signed in 1924 stipulated only that China had the right to redeem the Chinese Eastern Railway and that, until redemption, China and the Soviet Union would administer it jointly. In reality, it remained under Soviet Russia’s exclusive control.
如今的我们也已经知道，苏联的国际共产主义理念并没有真的创制出一种“新大地法”。事实上，苏俄政府在具体谈判中仅同意至多放弃沙俄帝国在 19世纪 90年代以来的几个条约。即便是 1924年签订的《中苏协定》和《奉俄协定》，也仅仅规定中国有权赎回中东铁路，赎回之前由中苏共管，实际上是苏俄独占。
Moreover, between the 1920s and the 1940s, taking advantage of China’s incessant civil wars, Stalin’s Soviet Russian empire went further still. It exceeded even the discriminatory boundary treaties of the tsarist era, taking more than six hundred of the seven hundred-plus islands on China’s side of the centerline of the main channels of the Ussuri and Heilongjiang rivers.
不仅如此，在 1920年代至 1940年代期间，趁中国内战频仍，斯大林的苏俄帝国更进一尺，超越沙俄帝国时期的歧视性划界条约，把乌苏里江和黑龙江主航道中心线中国一侧的 700多个岛屿划去 600多个。
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a Chinese student in Japan named Qin Lishan naively believed that the foundation of Western civilization was the international legal order, rather than merely “bullying the weak and oppressing the few.” Huang Qun (1883–1945), likewise a student in Japan, published an article rebutting this view in the New World Journal (September 1902), which had been founded at the beginning of the twentieth century. In theory, international law was indeed based on the equality and autonomy of states; the problem was that states actually differed in strength, and their standing was in fact unequal. The so-called “civilized states” of the West really meant powerful states. Concluding treaties amounted to the strong bullying the weak, and international law could not be relied upon: Egypt’s fall to Britain and France, India’s to Britain, and Poland’s to Russia all demonstrated that, in the “new world,” “an arena of the fiercest competition, where the superior devour the flesh of the inferior,” “civilized states” cloaked themselves in “public law” as the strong preyed on the weak. [27] It seems that some people are born clearheaded and others muddleheaded: an anthropological fact unchanged since time immemorial. Once people forget this fact, they become embroiled in pointless academic disputes.
20世纪初，有个中国留日学生叫秦力山，他天真地相信，西方文明的基石是国际法秩序，并非仅仅是“凌弱暴寡”。同样是留日学生的黄群（1883 - 1945）在创刊于 20世纪之初的《新世界学报》（1902年 9月）上曾撰文批驳：从理论上讲，国际法固然基于各国的平等自主，问题在于，各国强弱实际上不同，国家地位事实上不平等。西方的所谓“文明国”的含义其实是强国，条约缔结无异于以强凌弱，国际法并不可恃：埃及亡于英法、印度亡于英国，波兰亡于俄国，无不是“优食劣肉、竞争最剧之场”的“新世界”中“文明国”以“公法”为外衣弱肉强食的证明。 [27]看来，有人的脑筋天生清楚有人的脑筋天生不清楚，乃是亘古不变的人类学事实。一旦人们忘记这一事实，就会陷入无谓的学术论争。