25.6. To this camp came legates from Tycha and Neapolis with fillets and woollen bands, praying that they be spared bloodshed and fires.
25.6. legati eo ab Tycha et Neapoli cum infulis et uelamentis uenerunt, precantes ut a caedibus et ab incendiis parceretur.
25.7. Marcellus held a council in regard to their prayers —such they were rather than demands —and with the approval of all gave an order to the soldiers that no one should injure a free person; everything else would be spoil.
25.7. de quorum precibus quam postulatis magis consilio habito Marcellus ex omnium sententia edixit militibus ne quis liberum corpus uiolaret: cetera praedae futura. castra obiectu parietum pro muro saepta;
25.8. The camp was enclosed by bricks from house-walls to serve as a wall of defence. At those camp gates which opened toward the streets outposts and detachments were stationed by Marcellus, that no attack upon the camp might occur while the soldiers were dispersed.
25.8. portis regione platearum patentibus stationes praesidiaque disposuit, ne quis in discursu militum impetus in castra fieri posset.
25.9. Then at a given signal the soldiers scattered. And although doors were forced and everywhere were the sounds of panic and uproar, they nevertheless refrained from bloodshed. To plundering there was no limit until they had carried away all the possessions accumulated in a long-continued prosperity.
25.9. inde signo dato milites discurrerunt; refractisque foribus cum omnia terrore ac tumultu streperent, a caedibus tamen temperatum est; rapinis nullus ante modus fuit quam omnia diuturna felicitate cumulata bona egesserunt.
25.10. Meanwhile even Philodemus, having no hope of assistance and receiving assurance that he might return unharmed to Epicydes, led his garrison out and surrendered the hill to the Romans.
25.10. inter haec et Philodemus, cum spes auxilii nulla esset, fide accepta ut inuiolatus ad Epicyden rediret, deducto praesidio tradidit tumulum Romanis.
25.11. While the attention of all was diverted in the direction of the uproar of a city in part captured, Bomilcar, favoured by such a night that on account of a violent storm the Roman fleet could not ride at anchor in open water, came out of the harbour of Syracuse with thirty-five ships, and with no enemy to prevent, put to sea, leaving fifty-five ships to Epicydes and the
25.11. auersis omnibus ad tumultum ex parte captae urbis Bomilcar noctem eam nactus, qua propter uim tempestatis stare ad ancoram in salo Romana classis non posset, cum triginta quinque nauibus ex portu Syracusano profectus libero mari uela in altum dedit quinque et quinquaginta nauibus Epicydae et Syracusanis relictis;
25.13. Syracusans. And after informing the Carthaginians how critical was the situation at Syracuse, he returned after a few days with a hundred ships. He was presented with many gifts, it is reported, by Epicydes out of the royal treasures of Hiero.
25.13. edoctisque Carthaginiensibus in quanto res Syracusana discrimine esset cum centum nauibus post paucos dies redit, multis, ut fama est, donis ex Hieronis gaza ab Epicyde donatus.
26.1. Marcellus, after getting possession of Euryalus and garrisoning it, was relieved of one fear, that some troops of the enemy in the rear might be admitted to the citadel and embarrass his men, hemmed in and hampered by the walls.
26.1. Marcellus Euryalo recepto praesidioque addito una cura liber erat ne qua ab tergo uis hostium in arcem accepta inclusos impeditosque moenibus suos turbaret.
26.2. He thereupon laid siege to Achradina with three camps placed in suitable positions, in the hope of reducing the beleaguered to absolute want.
26.2. Achradinam inde trinis castris per idonea dispositis loca, spe ad inopiam omnium rerum inclusos redacturum, circumsedit.
26.3. When the outposts on both sides had been inactive for some days, suddenly the arrival of Hippocrates and Himilco had the effect that the Romans were actually besieged on all sides.
26.3. cum per aliquot dies quietae stationes utrimque fuissent, repente aduentus Hippocratis et Himilconis ut ultro undique oppugnarentur Romani fecit.
26.4. For Hippocrates, after fortifying a camp by the Great Harbour and giving the signal to the forces occupying Achradina, attacked the old Roman camp, which was commanded by Crispinus, at the same time that Epicydes made a sally against Marcellus' outposts, and just when the Carthaginian fleet put in to the shore lying between the city and the Roman camp, to make it impossible for any force to be sent to the aid of Crispinus by Marcellus.
26.4. nam et Hippocrates castris ad magnum portum communitis signoque iis dato qui Achradinam tenebant castra uetera Romanorum adortus est, quibus Crispinus praeerat, et Epicydes eruptionem in stationes Marcelli fecit et classis Punica litori quod inter urbem et castra Romana erat adpulsa est, ne quid praesidii Crispino summitti a Marcello posset.
26.5. However, it was more of an uproar than a battle that the enemy offered. For Crispinus not only drove Hippocrates back from his fortifications, but also pursued him as he fled in disorder, and Marcellus likewise forced Epicydes into the city.
26.5. tumultum tamen maiorem hostes praebuerunt quam certamen; nam et Crispinus Hippocraten non reppulit tantum munimentis sed insecutus etiam est trepide fugientem, et Epicyden Marcellus in urbem compulit;
26.6. And now, even for the future, he seemed to have sufficiently insured that there should be no danger from their sudden raids.
26.6. satisque iam etiam in posterum uidebatur prouisum ne quid ab repentinis eorum excursionibus periculi foret.
26.7. Then in addition pestilence brought to both sides a calamity which forthwith diverted the attention of the two armies from strategy. For owing to the autumn season and places naturally unhealthy, unendurable heat affected the health of nearly all the men in both camps, but much more outside the city than within. And at first they sickened and died owing to the season and their position.
26.7. accessit et ad <haec> pestilentia, commune malum, quod facile utrorumque animos auerteret a belli consiliis. nam tempore autumni et locis natura grauibus, multo tamen magis extra urbem quam in urbe, intoleranda uis aestus per utraque castra omnium ferme corpora mouit.
26.8. Later the mere care of the ill and contagion spread the disease, so that those who had fallen ill died neglected and abandoned, or else they carried off with them those who sat by them and those who nursed, having caught the same malignant disease. And so every day funerals and death were before their eyes, and wailings were heard on all sides day and night.
26.8. ac primo temporis ac loci uitio et aegri erant et moriebantur; postea curatio ipsa et contactus aegrorum uolgabat morbos, ut aut neglecti desertique qui incidissent morerentur aut adsidentes curantesque eadem ui morbi repletos secum traherent, cotidianaque funera et mors ob oculos esset et undique dies noctesque ploratus audirentur.
26.10. Finally, from habituation to misery they had so lost their humane feelings that, so far from escorting the dead with tears and the wailing that was their due, they did not even carry them out and bury them; and dead bodies lay strewn about before the eyes of men awaiting a like death, and the dead seriously affected the ill, the ill the sound, not only through fear, but also by putrefaction and the pestilent odour of corpses.
26.10. postremo ita adsuetudine mali efferauerant animos, ut non modo lacrimis iustoque comploratu prosequerentur mortuos sed ne efferrent quidem aut sepelirent, iacerentque strata exanima corpora in conspectu similem mortem exspectantium, mortuique aegros, aegri ualidos cum metu, tum tabe ac pestifero odore corporum conficerent;
26.11. And some choosing to die by the sword, dashed into the outposts of the enemy single-handed.
26.11. et ut ferro potius morerentur, quidam inuadebant soli hostium stationes.
26.12. A much more violent epidemic, however, had attacked the Carthaginian camp than the Roman. For the Romans in their long blockade of Syracuse had grown more accustomed to the climate and the water.
26.12. multo tamen uis maior pestis Poenorum castra quam Romana <adfecerat; nam Romani> diu circumsedendo Syracusas caelo aquisque adsuerant magis.
26.13. Of the enemy's army, the Sicilians scattered, each to his own neighbouring city, as soon as they saw that the disease was spreading owing to the unwholesomeness of the place, while the Carthaginians, who had no refuge anywhere, with even their generals, Hippocrates and Himilco, perished to the last man.
26.13. ex hostium exercitu Siculi, ut primum uidere ex grauitate loci uolgari morbos, in suas quisque propinquas urbes dilapsi sunt; at Carthaginienses, quibus nusquam receptus erat, cum ipsis ducibus Hippocrate atque Himilcone ad internecionem omnes perierunt.
26.15. Marcellus, as soon as the pestilence began to be so serious, had transferred his soldiers into the city, and shelter and shade had revived the invalids. Nevertheless many in the Roman army were carried off by the same pestilence.
26.15. Marcellus, ut tanta uis ingruebat mali, traduxerat in urbem suos, infirmaque corpora tecta et umbrae recreauerant; multi tamen ex Romano exercitu eadem peste absumpti sunt.
27.1. The Carthaginian land-army having been destroyed, the Sicilians who had been Hippocrates' soldiers had occupied..., not large towns, but defended both by situation and fortifications. One of them is three miles from Syracuse, the other fifteen miles. To these they were bringing supplies from their own communities and also summoning auxiliaries.
27.1. deleto terrestri Punico exercitu Siculi, qui Hippocratis milites fuerant, * * haud magna oppida, ceterum et situ et munimentis tuta; tria milia alterum ab Syracusis, alterum quindecim abest; eo et commeatus e ciuitatibus suis comportabant et auxilia accersebant.
27.2. Meanwhile Bomilcar left for Carthage a second time with his fleet, and he set forth the situation of their allies in such terms as to inspire hope, not only that effectual aid could be lent to them, but also that the Romans could be captured in the virtually captured city.
27.2. interea Bomilcar iterum cum classe profectus Carthaginem, ita exposita fortuna sociorum, ut spem faceret non ipsis modo salutarem opem ferri posse sed Romanos quoque in capta quodam modo urbe capi, perpulit ut onerarias naues quam plurimas omni copia rerum onustas secum mitterent classemque suam augerent.
27.3. He thus prevailed upon them to send with him as many transports as possible, laden with all kinds of supplies, and to enlarge his fleet. Accordingly, setting out from Carthage with a hundred and thirty warships and seven hundred transports, he had winds quite favourable for the crossing to Sicily. But the same winds did not allow him to round Pachynum.
27.3. igitur centum triginta nauibus longis, septingentis onerariis profectus a Carthagine satis prosperos uentos ad traiciendum in Siciliam habuit;
27.4. The report at first of Bomilcar's coming, and then its unexpected delay, brought rejoicing and fear by turns to Romans and Syracusans.
27.4. sed iidem uenti superare eum Pachynum prohibebant.
27.5. Upon that Epicydes, fearing that, if the same winds which were then holding should continue to blow from the east for several days, the Carthaginian fleet would make for Africa again, turned over Achradina to the commanders of the mercenaries and sailed to meet Bomilcar, who
27.5. Bomilcaris aduentus fama primo, dein praeter spem mora cum gaudium et metum in uicem Romanis Syracusanisque praebuisset, Epicydes metuens ne, si pergerent iidem qui tum tenebant ab ortu solis flare per dies plures uenti,
27.7. was keeping his fleet in a roadstead facing Africa. He feared a naval battle, not so much because he was inferior in his forces and the number of his ships —in fact he had even more —as because the winds then blowing were more favourable to the Roman fleet than to his own. Nevertheless Epicydes gained his consent to try the fortune of a naval engagement.
27.7. classis Punica Africam repeteret, tradita Achradina mercennariorum militum ducibus ad Bomilcarem nauigat. classem in statione uersa in Africam habentem atque timentem nauale proelium, non tam quod impar uiribus aut numero nauium esset—quippe etiam plures habebat—quam quod uenti aptiores Romanae quam suae classi flarent, perpulit tamen ut fortunam naualis certaminis experiri uellet.
27.9. And Marcellus too, seeing that a Sicilian army was being brought together from the entire island and at the same time a Carthaginian fleet was approaching with unlimited supplies, and fearing that he might be hard pressed by land and sea, being shut up within the enemies' city, decided, although he was inferior in the number of his ships, to prevent Bomilcar from reaching Syracuse.
27.9. et Marcellus, cum et Siculum exercitum ex tota insula conciri uideret et cum ingenti commeatu classem Punicam aduentare, ne simul terra marique inclusus urbe hostium urgeretur, quamquam impar numero nauium erat, prohibere aditu Syracusarum Bomilcarem constituit.
27.10. The two opposing fleets lay on this side and that of the promontory of Pachynum, ready to engage as soon as calm weather should enable them to put to sea.
27.10. duae classes infestae circa promunturium Pachynum stabant, ubi prima tranquillitas maris in altum euexisset, concursurae.
27.11. And so, as the southeast wind, which had been blowing hard for some days, was now dropping, Bomilcar was the first to get under weigh. And at first his fleet appeared to be heading out to sea, the more readily to round the promontory.
27.11. itaque cadente iam Euro, qui per dies aliquot saeuierat, prior Bomilcar mouit; cuius primo classis petere altum uisa est, quo facilius superaret promunturium;
27.12. But on seeing that the Roman ships were steering towards him, Bomilcar, alarmed by something unforeseen, made sail for open water, and after sending messengers to Heraclea to command the transports to return thence to Africa, he himself sailed along the coast of Sicily and made for Tarentum.
27.12. ceterum postquam tendere ad se Romanas naues uidit, incertum qua subita territus re, Bomilcar uela in altum dedit missisque nuntiis Heracleam qui onerarias retro Africam repetere iuberent ipse Siciliam praeteruectus Tarentum petit.
27.13. Epicydes, suddenly bereft of a hope so high, in order not to return, only to share the siege of a city in large part captured, sailed to Agrigentum, intending to await the outcome, rather than to set anything in motion from there.
27.13. Epicydes, a tanta repente destitutus spe, ne in obsidionem magna ex parte captae urbis rediret, Agrigentum nauigat, exspectaturus magis euentum quam inde quicquam moturus.
28.1. When these things were reported to the camp of the Sicilians, that Epicydes had left Syracuse, that the island had been abandoned by the Carthaginians and almost handed over a second time to the Romans, after first ascertaining by conferences the wish of the besieged, they sent legates to Marcellus to make terms for the surrender of the city.
28.1. quae ubi in castra Siculorum sunt nuntiata Epicyden Syracusis excessisse, a Carthaginiensibus relictam insulam et prope iterum traditam Romanis, legatos de condicionibus dedendae urbis explorata prius per conloquia uoluntate eorum qui obsidebantur ad Marcellum mittunt.
28.3. It was virtually agreed that all that had anywhere belonged to the kings should belong to the Romans, that everything else should be secured to the Sicilians along with freedom and their own laws. Accordingly the legates summoned to a conference the men to whom power had been entrusted by Epicydes, and said that they had been sent by the army of the Sicilians at the same time to Marcellus and to them, in order that all, the besieged and those who had been outside of the operations, might share the same lot and neither party make any special terms for itself.
28.3. cum haud ferme discreparet, quin quae ubique regum fuissent Romanorum essent, Siculis cetera cum libertate ac legibus suis seruarentur, euocatis ad conloquium iis quibus ab Epicyde creditae res erant, missos se simul ad Marcellum, simul ad eos ab exercitu Siculorum aiunt, ut una omnium qui obsiderentur quique extra obsidionem fuissent fortuna esset neue alteri proprie sibi paciscerentur quicquam.
28.5. And then, being admitted by them, that they might speak with their relatives and guest-friends, they explained the terms which they had already settled with Marcellus, and by holding out assurances of safety prevailed upon them to join with themselves in an attack upon Epicydes' prefects, Polyclitus and Philistion and an Epicydes surnamed Sindon.
28.5. recepti deinde ab iis, ut necessarios hospitesque adloquerentur, expositis quae pacta iam cum Marcello haberent, oblata spe salutis perpulere eos ut secum praefectos Epicydis Polyclitum et Philistionem et Epicyden, cui Sindon cognomen erat, adgrederentur.
28.6. After slaying them and calling the populace to an assembly, they complained of privation and other things at which among themselves they had been in the habit of murmuring in secret. And they said that, although so many hardships were a burden to them, they ought not to blame fortune, because it was in their own power to say how long they would endure them.
28.6. interfectis iis et multitudine ad contionem uocata inopiam quaeque ipsi inter se fremere occulte soliti erant conquesti, quamquam tot mala urgerent, negarunt fortunam accusandam esse quod in ipsorum esset potestate quam diu ea paterentur;
28.7. The Romans, they said, had had as their ground for besieging Syracuse their love, not hatred, of the Syracusans. For on learning that the power had been seized by Hippocrates and Epicydes, minions of Hannibal and later of Hieronymus, it was then that they had made war and had begun to besiege the city, in order to capture, not the city itself, but its cruel tyrants.
28.7. Romanis causam oppugnandi Syracusas fuisse caritatem Syracusanorum, non odium; nam ut occupatas res ab satellitibus Hannibalis, deinde Hieronymi, Hippocrate atque Epicyde, audierint, tum bellum mouisse et obsidere urbem coepisse, ut crudeles tyrannos eius, non ut ipsam urbem expugnarent.
28.8. But now that Hippocrates had perished, that Epicydes had been cut off from Syracuse and his prefects slain, now that the Carthaginians had everywhere been driven by land and sea from their occupation of Sicily, what reason remained for the Romans not to wish Syracuse to be preserved, just as if Hiero himself, who was unrivalled in maintaining friendship with Rome, were still alive?
28.8. Hippocrate uero interempto, Epicyde intercluso ab Syracusis et praefectis eius occisis, Carthaginiensibus omni possessione Siciliae terra marique pulsis quam superesse causam Romanis cur non, perinde ac si Hiero ipse uiueret unicus Romanae amicitiae cultor, incolumes Syracusas esse uelint?
28.9. Accordingly both for the city and for individuals there was no other danger than from themselves, if they should let slip the opportunity of a reconciliation with the Romans. Moreover so favourable an opportunity as there was at that moment, if it should be evident that Syracuse, once it had been freed from insolent tyrants,..., would never come again.
28.9. itaque nec urbi nec hominibus aliud periculum quam ab semet ipsis esse, si occasionem reconciliandi se Romanis praetermisissent; eam autem, qualis illo momento horae sit, nullam deinde fore, si simul liberatas †ab impotentibus tyrannis apparuisset†.
29.1. The speech was heard with great and unanimous approval. It was decided, however, to elect magistrates before naming legates. Then out of the number of these magistrates' representatives were sent to Marcellus. The foremost of these said: “In the beginning it was not we Syracusans who forsook your friendship, but Hieronymus, who was by no means so conscienceless toward you as toward us.”
29.1. omnium ingenti adsensu audita ea oratio est. praetores tamen prius creari quam legatos nominari placuit; ex ipsorum deinde praetorum numero missi oratores ad Marcellum, quorum princeps 'neque primo' inquit 'Syracusani a uobis defecimus sed Hieronymus, nequaquam tam in uos impius quam in nos,
29.3. “And later the peace concluded on the assassination of the tyrant was broken, not by any Syracusan, but by the king's minions, Hippocrates and Epicydes, after they had subdued us, now by terrorizing, now by treason. Nor can any man say that there has ever been any time of freedom for us that was not a time of peace with you.”
29.3. nec postea pacem tyranni caede compositam Syracusanus quisquam sed satellites regii Hippocrates atque Epicydes oppressis nobis hinc metu hinc fraude turbauerunt. nec quisquam dicere potest aliquando nobis libertatis tempus fuisse quod pacis uobiscum non fuerit.
29.4. “Certain it is that now, when through the slaying of those who were holding Syracuse in subjection we have begun for the first time to be our own masters, we have come forthwith to give up our arms, to surrender ourselves, the city, the walls, to reject no lot which shall be imposed by you Romans. The glory of capturing the most notable and most beautiful of Greek cities the gods have given to you, Marcellus.”
29.4. nunc certe caede eorum qui oppressas tenebant Syracusas cum primum nostri arbitrii esse coepimus, extemplo uenimus ad tradenda arma, dedendos nos, urbem, moenia, nullam recusandam fortunam quae imposita a uobis fuerit.
29.5. “All that we have ever accomplished on land and sea that is worthy of record is added to the distinction of your triumph.”
29.5. gloriam captae nobilissimae pulcherrimaeque urbis Graecarum dei tibi dederunt, Marcelle. quidquid unquam terra marique memorandum gessimus, id tui triumphi titulo accedit.
29.6. “Would you wish men merely to believe tradition as to the greatness of the city you have captured, rather than that it be a sight even to posterity, a city which shall show to every man who comes by land or by sea, at one spot our trophies won from the Athenians and the Carthaginians, at another your trophies won from us, and that you hand over Syracuse intact to your house, to be kept under the clientship and tutelage of those who bear the name Marcellus?”
29.6. famaene credi uelis quanta urbs a te capta sit quam posteris quoque eam spectaculo esse, quo quisquis terra, quisquis mari uenerit nunc nostra de Atheniensibus Carthaginiensibusque tropaea, nunc tua de nobis ostendat incolumesque Syracusas familiae uestrae sub clientela nominis Marcellorum tutelaque habendas tradas?
29.7. “Let not the memory of Hieronymus have more weight with you Romans than that of Hiero. The latter was much longer your friend than the former your enemy; and you have had positive experience of the good deeds of the one, while the other's folly resulted only in his own destruction.” Everything could be obtained from the Romans and was already assured.
29.7. ne plus apud uos Hieronymi quam Hieronis memoria momenti faciat. diutius ille multo amicus fuit quam hic hostis, et illius benefacta etiam re sensistis, huius amentia ad perniciem tantum ipsius ualuit.' omnia et impetrabilia et tuta erant apud Romanos:
29.8. It was among the Sicilians themselves that war and danger chiefly lay. For the deserters, thinking that they would surely be handed over to the Romans, aroused the mercenary auxiliaries also to the same fear.
29.8. inter ipsos plus belli ac periculi erat. namque transfugae, tradi se Romanis rati, mercennariorum quoque militum auxilia in eundem compulere metum;
29.9. And seizing arms they first slew the magistrates and then dispersed to massacre the Syracusans, and in anger they slew all whom chance threw in their way and carried off everything on which they could lay hands.
29.9. arreptisque armis praetores primum obtruncant, inde ad caedem Syracusanorum discurrunt quosque fors obtulit irati interfecere atque omnia quae in promptu erant diripuerunt.
29.10. Then, not to be without commanders, they chose six prefects, three to be in charge of Achradina and three of Nasus. When the uproar was at last stilled and they were diligently enquiring what terms had been made with the Romans, the truth began to dawn upon them, that their case was different from that of the deserters.
29.10. tum, ne sine ducibus essent, sex praefectos creauere ut terni Achradinae ac Nasso praeessent. sedato tandem tumultu exsequentibus sciscitando quae acta cum Romanis essent, dilucere id quod erat coepit aliam suam ac perfugarum causam esse.
30.1. Just at the right moment the legates returned from Marcellus, stating that the mercenaries had been aroused by an unfounded suspicion, and that the Romans had no reason for demanding their punishment.
30.1. in tempore legati a Marcello redierunt, falsa eos suspicione incitatos memorantes nec causam expetendae poenae eorum ullam Romanis esse.
30.2. One of the three prefects of Achradina was a Spaniard, Moericus by name. To him, among the- retinue of the legates, one of the Spanish auxiliaries was sent on purpose. Finding Moericus alone, he first explained the condition in which he had left Spain, from which he had recently come. The whole of that country, he said, was held by Roman arms.
30.2. erat e tribus Achradinae praefectis Hispanus Moericus nomine. ad eum inter comites legatorum de industria unus ex Hispanorum auxiliaribus est missus, qui sine arbitris Moericum nanctus primum, quo in statu reliquisset Hispaniam—et nuper inde uenerat—exponit: omnia Romanis ibi obtineri armis.
30.3. If he should do something worth while, he could be a chief among his own people, whether he preferred to serve on the Roman side or to return to his native town. On the other hand, if he continued to prefer to be besieged, what hope was there for a man shut in by land and sea?
30.3. posse eum, si operae pretium faciat, principem popularium esse, seu militare cum Romanis seu in patriam reuerti libeat: contra, si malle obsideri pergat, quam spem esse terra marique clauso?
30.4. Moericus was impressed by these words, and when it was decided to send legates to Marcellus, sent his brother as one of them. He was escorted separately from the rest to Marcellus by that same Spaniard, and after receiving a promise and arranging the steps to be taken, returned to Achradina.
30.4. motus his Moericus, cum legatos ad Marcellum mitti placuisset, fratrem inter eos mittit, qui per eundem illum Hispanum secretus ab aliis ad Marcellum deductus, cum fidem accepisset composuissetque agendae ordinem rei, Achradinam redit.
30.5. Then Moericus, to divert the attention of everybody from the suspicion of treason, said he did not approve of having legates going back and forth; that none should be admitted or sent; and that, in order to keep a closer guard, suitable positions should be divided among the prefects, so that each should be responsible for the defence of his own section.
30.5. tum Moericus, ut ab suspicione proditionis auerteret omnium animos, negat sibi placere legatos commeare ultro citroque: neque recipiendum quemquam neque mittendum et, quo intentius custodiae seruentur, opportuna diuidenda praefectis esse, ut suae quisque partis tutandae reus sit. omnes adsensi sunt.
30.6. All agreed. In the assignment of sections the region extending from the Fountain of Arethusa to the entrance of the Great Harbour fell to Moericus himself.
30.6. partibus diuidendis ipsi regio euenit ab Arethusa fonte usque ad ostium magni portus: id ut scirent Romani fecit.
30.7. He saw to it that the Romans knew that. Accordingly Marcellus ordered a transport with armed men to be towed at night by a four-banker to Achradina, and the soldiers to be landed near the gate which is by the Fountain of Arethusa.
30.7. itaque Marcellus nocte nauem onerariam cum armatis remulco quadriremis trahi ad Achradinam iussit exponique milites regione portae quae prope fontem Arethusam est.
30.8. This done at the fourth watch, and the soldiers landed there having been admitted according to agreement by Moericus through the gate, Marcellus at daybreak with all his forces assailed the walls of Achradina. The result was that not only did he turn the attention of the defenders of Achradina to himself, but from Nasus also columns of armed men, leaving their posts, united in haste, to ward off the violent attack of the Romans.
30.8. hoc cum quarta uigilia factum esset expositosque milites porta, ut conuenerat, recepisset Moericus, luce prima Marcellus omnibus copiis moenia Achradinae adgreditur ita ut non eos solum qui Achradinam tenebant in se conuerteret, sed ab Nasso etiam agmina armatorum concurrerent relictis stationibus suis ad uim et impetum Romanorum arcendum.
30.10. During this confusion light vessels, previously equipped, sailed around to Nasus and landed their troops. These made an unexpected attack upon the half-manned outposts and the open doors of the gate through which the armed men had dashed out a little while before, and with no great resistance captured Nasus, deserted by the excitement and flight of the guards.
30.10. in hoc tumultu actuariae naues, instructae iam ante circumuectaeque ad Nassum, armatos exponunt qui improuiso adorti semiplenas stationes et adapertas fores portae, qua paulo ante excurrerant armati, haud magno certamine Nassum cepere desertam trepidatione et fuga custodum.
30.11. And no others showed less capacity to defend or determination to hold out than the deserters, since they did not quite trust even their own men and fled out of the midst of the conflict.
30.11. neque in ullis minus praesidii aut pertinaciae ad manendum quam in transfugis fuit, quia ne suis quidem satis credentes e medio certamine effugerunt.
30.12. Marcellus, on learning that Nasus had been captured and one section of Achradina occupied, also that Moericus with his force had joined the Romans, sounded the recall, to prevent the royal treasures, which were reported to be larger than they really were, from being plundered.
30.12. Marcellus ut uidit captam esse Nassum et Achradinae regionem unam teneri Moericumque cum praesidio suis adiunctum, receptui cecinit, ne regiae opes, quarum fama maior quam res erat, diriperentur.
31.1. The onslaught of the soldiers being checked and time and place for their flight given to the deserters who were in Achradina, the Syracusans, at last relieved of their fear, open the gates of Achradina and send representatives to Marcellus, asking nothing else than their own lives and those of their children.
31.1. suppresso impetu militum, ut iis qui in Achradina erant transfugis spatium locusque fugae datus est, Syracusani tandem liberi metu portis Achradinae apertis oratores ad Marcellum mittunt, nihil petentes aliud quam incolumitatem sibi liberisque suis.
31.3. Marcellus, calling a council and admitting also those Syracusans who, after being driven from home during the uprisings, had been inside the Roman lines, replied that the good acts of Hiero toward the Roman people during fifty years had not been more numerous than the evil deeds done in the last few years by those who held Syracuse.
31.3. Marcellus consilio aduocato et adhibitis etiam Syracusanis qui per seditiones pulsi ab domo intra praesidia Romana fuerant, respondit non plura per annos quinquaginta benefacta Hieronis quam paucis his annis maleficia eorum qui Syracusas tenuerint erga populum Romanum esse;
31.4. But most of the misdeeds, he said, had reacted just as they should, and the men had exacted from themselves much more serious penalties for the broken treaties than the Roman people wished.
31.4. sed pleraque eorum quo debuerint reccidisse foederumque ruptorum ipsos ab se grauiores multo quam populus Romanus uoluerit poenas exegisse.
31.5. For his part, he was besieging Syracuse for the third year, not that the Roman people might keep the city enslaved, but to prevent the commanders of deserters and foreigners from holding it in captivity and subjection.
31.5. se quidem tertium annum circumsedere Syracusas, non ut populus Romanus seruam ciuitatem haberet sed ne transfugarum duces captam et oppressam tenerent.
31.6. What the Syracusans could have done was shown by the example either of those Syracusans inside the Roman lines, or of the Spanish commander Moericus, who surrendered his post, or finally of the belated but courageous resolution of the Syracusans themselves.
31.6. quid potuerint Syracusani facere, exemplo uel eos esse Syracusanorum qui intra praesidia Romana fuerint uel Hispanum ducem Moericum qui praesidium tradiderit uel ipsorum Syracusanorum postremo serum quidem, sed forte consilium.
31.7. To his mind it was by no means a sufficient reward for all the hardships and dangers, so long endured on land and sea about the Syracusan walls, that he had been able to capture Syracuse.
31.7. sibi omnium laborum periculorumque circa moenia Syracusana terra marique tam diu exhaustorum nequaquam tantum fructum esse quod capere <sibi contigerit, quantum si seruare> Syracusas potuisset.
31.8. Thereupon the quaestor was sent from Nasus with a force to receive and guard the royal funds. The city was given over to the soldiers to plunder, guards being first assigned to the houses of the men who had been inside the Roman lines.
31.8. inde quaestor cum praesidio ad Nassum ad accipiendam pecuniam regiam custodiendamque missus. urbs diripienda militi data est custodibus diuisis per domos eorum qui intra praesidia Romana fuerant.
31.9. While many shameful examples of anger and many of greed were being given, the tradition is that Archimedes, in all the uproar which the alarm of a captured city could produce in the midst of plundering soldiers dashing about, was intent upon the figures which he had traced in the dust and was slain by a soldier, not knowing who he was;
31.9. cum multa irae, multa auaritiae foeda exempla ederentur, Archimeden memoriae proditum est in tanto tumultu, quantum captae urbis in <uiis> discursus diripientium militum ciere poterat, intentum formis quas in puluere descripserat ab ignaro milite quis esset interfectum;
31.10. that Marcellus was grieved at this, and his burial duly provided for; and that his name and memory were an honour and a protection to his relatives, search even being made for them.
31.10. aegre id Marcellum tulisse sepulturaeque curam habitam, et propinquis etiam inquisitis honori praesidioque nomen ac memoriam eius fuisse.
31.11. Such in the main was the capture of Syracuse, in which there was booty in such quantity as there would scarcely have been if Carthage, with which the conflict was on even terms, had at that time been captured. A few days before Syracuse was taken, Titus Otacilius with eighty five-bankers crossed over from Lilybaeum to Utica. And having entered the harbour before daylight, he captured cargo-ships laden with grain, and disembarking ravaged a considerable area around Utica and drove booty of every kind back to the ships.
31.11. hoc maxime modo Syracusae captae; in quibus praedae tantum fuit, quantum uix capta Carthagine tum fuisset cum qua uiribus aequis certabatur. paucis ante diebus quam Syracusae caperentur T. Otacilius cum quinqueremibus octoginta Uticam ab Lilybaeo transmisit, et cum ante lucem portum intrasset, onerarias frumento onustas cepit, egressusque in terram depopulatus est aliquantum agri circa Uticam praedamque omnis generis retro ad naues egit.
31.14. On the third day after he had left Lilybaeum he returned thither with a hundred and thirty cargo-ships laden with grain and booty, and sent the grain at once to Syracuse. Had it not arrived so opportunely, a famine equally destructive to victors and vanquished was impending.
31.14. Lilybaeum tertio die quam inde profectus erat, cum centum triginta onerariis nauibus frumento praedaque onustis rediit idque frumentum extemplo Syracusas misit, quod ni tam in tempore subuenisset, uictoribus uictisque pariter perniciosa fames instabat.
32.1. In Spain in the same summer, when for about two years nothing very notable had occurred and the war was being waged more by diplomacy than by arms, the Roman generals, on leaving their winter-quarters, united their forces.
32.1. eadem aestate in Hispania, cum biennio ferme nihil admodum memorabile factum esset consiliisque magis quam armis bellum gereretur, Romani imperatores egressi hibernis copias coniunxerunt.
32.2. Thereupon a council was called and all were of one mind, that, since up to that time they had accomplished nothing except to hold Hasdrubal back from pushing on into Italy, it was time that their task should now be to end the war in Spain.
32.2. ibi consilium aduocatum omniumque in unum congruerunt sententiae, quando ad id locorum id modo actum esset ut Hasdrubalem tendentem in Italiam retinerent, tempus esse id iam agi ut bellum in Hispania finiretur;
32.3. And they believed they had sufficient reinforcements for that purpose in twenty thousand Celtiberians who had been called to arms that winter.
32.3. et satis ad id uirium credebant accessisse uiginti milia Celtiberorum ea hieme ad arma excita.
32.4. The enemy had three armies. Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, and Mago with adjoining camps were about five days' march from the Romans.
32.4. tres exercitus erant. Hasdrubal Gisgonis filius et Mago coniunctis castris quinque ferme dierum iter ab Romanis aberant.
32.5. Nearer was Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, a veteran commander in Spain. He had his army near a city called Amtorgis.
32.5. propior erat Hamilcaris filius Hasdrubal, uetus in Hispania imperator;
32.6. It was he that the Roman generals wished first to overpower; and they hoped they had quite ample forces for that end. The one remaining concern was the fear that, if he was defeated, the other Hasdrubal and Mago might in alarm withdraw to pathless forests and mountains and prolong the war.
32.6. ad urbem nomine Amtorgim exercitum habebat. eum uolebant prius opprimi duces Romani; et spes erat satis superque ad id uirium esse; illa restabat cura, ne fuso eo perculsi alter Hasdrubal et Mago in auios saltus montesque recipientes sese bellum extraherent.
32.7. They thought it best therefore to divide their forces into two armies and include the whole of Spain in their plan of operations. And they divided in such manner that Publius Cornelius should lead two-thirds of the army of Romans and allies against Mago and Hasdrubal, and that Gnaeus Cornelius with one-third of the old army and the Celtiberians in addition should carry on the war with Hasdrubal Barca.
32.7. optimum igitur rati diuisis bifariam copiis totius simul Hispaniae amplecti bellum, ita inter se diuiserunt ut P. Cornelius duas partes exercitus Romanorum sociorumque aduersus Magonem duceret atque Hasdrubalem, Cn. Cornelius cum tertia parte ueteris exercitus Celtiberis adiunctis cum Hasdrubale Barcino bellum gereret.
32.9. Setting out together, with the Celtiberians in the van, both generals and armies pitched camp near the city of Amtorgis, in sight of the enemy, but separated by a river.
32.9. una profecti ambo duces exercitusque Celtiberis praegredientibus ad urbem Amtorgim in conspectu hostium dirimente amni ponunt castra.
32.10. There Gnaeus Scipio remained with the above-mentioned forces, while Publius Scipio set out for his previously appointed share of the war.
32.10. ibi Cn. Scipio cum quibus ante dictum est copiis substitit, P. Scipio profectus ad destinatam belli partem.
33.1. Hasdrubal first noted that there was only a small army of Romans in the camp and that all their hope was in the Celtiberian auxiliaries. Then, as he was well acquainted with every form of treachery practised by barbarians and particularly by those tribes among which he had been campaigning for so many years, and as oral communication was easy, since both camps were full of Spaniards, by means of secret conferences he made an agreement with the chief men of the Celtiberians at a high price that they should withdraw their troops.
33.1. Hasdrubal postquam animaduertit exiguum Romanum exercitum in castris et spem omnem in Celtiberorum auxiliis esse, peritus omnis barbaricae et praecipue omnium earum gentium in quibus per tot annos militabat perfidiae, facili lingua, cum utraque castra plena Hispanorum essent, per occulta conloquia paciscitur magna mercede cum Celtiberorum principibus ut copias inde abducant.
33.4. Nor did it seem an outrageous act —for it was not urged that they should turn their arms against the Romans —and a price which would have been ample even for engaging in the war was offered them not to wage war. Again, not only peace itself, but also a return home and the advantage of seeing their families and their property were attractions to the mass of them.
33.4. nec atrox uisum facinus—non enim ut in Romanos uerterent arma agebatur—, et merces quanta uel pro bello satis esset dabatur ne bellum gererent, et cum quies ipsa, tum reditus domum fructusque uidendi suos suaque grata uolgo erant.
33.5. Accordingly their leaders were not more easily persuaded than the rank and file. At the same time they had no fear from the Romans either, if they, being so few in number, should try to hold them by force. It will always be a necessary precaution for Roman generals, and these instances must really be accounted warnings, not so to trust their foreign auxiliaries as not to have in camp more of their own strength and of forces that are absolutely their own.
33.5. itaque non ducibus facilius quam multitudini persuasum est. simul ne metus quidem ab Romanis erat, quippe tam paucis, si ui retinerent. id quidem cauendum semper Romanis ducibus erit exemplaque haec uere pro documentis habenda, ne ita externis credant auxiliis ut non plus sui roboris suarumque proprie uirium in castris habeant.
33.7. The Celtiberians suddenly took up their standards and departed, and when Romans asked the reason and implored them to remain, they gave no other answer than that they were called away by a war at home.
33.7. signis repente sublatis Celtiberi abeunt, nihil aliud quaerentibus causam obtestantibusque ut manerent Romanis respondentes quam domestico se auocari bello.
33.8. Scipio, now that his allies could not be held either by entreaties or by force, saw that he could neither be a match for the enemy without them nor rejoin his brother, and that no other promising plan was available. Thereupon he decided to retire as far as possible, taking every care and being on the alert not to expose himself anywhere on level ground to the enemy, who crossed the river and kept almost at their heels as they withdrew.
33.8. Scipio, postquam socii nec precibus nec ui retineri poterant, nec se aut parem sine illis hosti esse aut fratri rursus coniungi uidit posse, nec ullum aliud salutare consilium in promptu esse, retro quantum posset cedere statuit, in id omni cura intentus necubi hosti aequo se committeret loco, qui transgressus flumen prope uestigiis abeuntium insistebat.
34.1. About the same time Publius Scipio was beset by a fear no less grave and a danger that was greater from a new enemy.
34.1. per eosdem dies P. Scipionem par terror, periculum maius ab nouo hoste urgebat.
34.2. There was the young Masinissa, at that time an ally of the Carthaginians, a man whom friendship with the Romans later made famous and powerful.
34.2. Masinissa erat iuuenis, eo tempore socius Carthaginiensium, quem deinde clarum potentemque Romana fecit amicitia.
34.3. With his Numidian cavalry he now encountered Publius Scipio on his advance, and also was continually at hand day and night, ready to attack, so that he not only captured soldiers who had wandered far from the camp in search of wood and fodder, but also rode up to the camp itself, and often dashing into the midst of the outposts threw everything into great confusion.
34.3. is tum cum equitatu Numidarum et aduenienti P. Scipioni occurrit et deinde adsidue dies noctesque infestus aderat, ut non uagos tantum procul a castris lignatum pabulatumque progressos exciperet sed ipsis obequitaret castris inuectusque in medias saepe stationes omnia ingenti tumultu turbaret.
34.5. By night also there was often alarm at the gates and on the earthwork owing to a sudden attack, nor was any place or time free from fear and anxiety for the Romans, and they were confined within their earthwork, unable to obtain anything.
34.5. noctibus quoque saepe incursu repentino in portis ualloque trepidatum est nec aut locus aut tempus ullum uacuum a metu ac sollicitudine erat Romanis, compulsique intra uallum adempto rerum omnium usu.
34.6. It was almost a regular blockade, and this would evidently be stricter if Indibilis, who was reported as approaching with seven thousand five hundred Suessetani, should join the Carthaginians. Consequently Scipio, though a general marked by caution and foresight, being forced by his straits, adopted the rash plan of going by night to meet Indibilis and giving battle wherever he should encounter him.
34.6. cum prope iusta obsidio esset futuramque artiorem eam appareret, si se Indibilis, quem cum septem milibus et quingentis Suessetanorum aduentare fama erat, Poenis coniunxisset, dux cautus et prouidens Scipio uictus necessitatibus temerarium capit consilium, ut nocte Indibili obuiam iret et quocumque occurrisset loco proelium consereret.
34.8. Therefore, leaving a moderate garrison at the camp and putting his lieutenant, Tiberius Fonteius, in command of it, he set out at midnight, and on meeting the enemy engaged them.
34.8. relicto igitur modico praesidio in castris praepositoque Ti. Fonteio legato media nocte profectus cum obuiis hostibus manus conseruit.
34.9. It was a battle of columns rather than lines; yet, so far as could be in an engagement without order, the Roman had the advantage. But the Numidian cavalry, whose notice the general had thought he had escaped, by outflanking them inspired great alarm, and in addition, when they had entered a fresh battle with the Numidians, a third enemy also arrived, the Carthaginian generals, who from the rear overtook them when already engaged.
34.9. agmina magis quam acies pugnabant; superior tamen, ut in tumultuaria pugna, Romanus erat. ceterum et equites Numidae repente, quos fefellisse se dux ratus erat, ab lateribus circumfusi magnum terrorem intulere, <et> contracto aduersus Numidas certamine nouo tertius insuper aduenit hostis, duces Poeni adsecuti ab tergo iam pugnantes;
34.10. And the Romans found themselves between two battles, uncertain against which enemy and in which direction they should choose to break through in a mass.
34.10. ancepsque proelium Romanos circumsteterat incertos in quem potissimum hostem quamue in partem conferti eruptionem facerent.
34.11. As the general was fighting and exhorting, and exposing himself where there was most to be done, his right side was pierced by a lance. And those of the enemy who in a wedge had made an attack upon the men pressing close about the general, on seeing the dying Scipio slipping from his horse, dashed everywhere along the line, wild with delight, shouting and announcing that the Roman commander had fallen.
34.11. pugnanti hortantique imperatori et offerenti se ubi plurimus labor erat latus dextrum lancea traicitur; cuneusque is hostium, qui in confertos circa ducem impetum fecerat, ut exanimem labentem ex equo Scipionem uidit, alacres gaudio cum clamore per totam aciem nuntiantes discurrunt imperatorem Romanum cecidisse.
34.12. The broadcasting of that announcement far and wide made the enemy as good as victors beyond a doubt and the Romans as good as vanquished. Flight directly from the battle-line began, once they had lost their general.
34.12. ea peruagata passim uox, ut et hostes haud dubie pro uictoribus et Romani pro uictis essent, fecit.