1.5. for the praetors of the previous year, Marcus Iunius in Etruria, Publius Sempronius in Gaul, their command was continued, with the two legions which each had held;
1.5. et praetoribus prioris anni M. Iunio in Etruria, P. Sempronio in Gallia cum binis legionibus quas habuerant prorogatum est imperium.
1.6. the command of Marcus Marcellus also was continued, that as proconsul in Sicily he might finish the remainder of the war with the army which he had.
1.6. prorogatum et M. Marcello, ut pro consule in Sicilia reliqua belli perficeret eo exercitu quem haberet:
1.7. he should need reinforcements, he should provide them from the legions which Publius Cornelius, the propraetor, commanded in Sicily, provided he did not enlist any soldier from the number of those to whom the senate had refused a discharge and a return to their home towns before the end of the war.
1.7. si supplemento opus esset, suppleret de legionibus quibus P. Cornelius pro praetore in Sicilia praeesset, dum ne quem militem legeret ex eo numero quibus senatus missionem reditumque in patriam negasset ante belli finem.
1.9. Gaius Sulpicius, to whom Sicily had fallen, were assigned the two legions which Publius Cornelius had held, and reinforcements from Gnaeus Fulvius' army, which in the previous year had been dishonourably cut to pieces and put to flight in Apulia.
1.9. C. Sulpicio cui Sicilia euenerat duae legiones quas P. Cornelius habuisset decretae et supplementum de exercitu Cn. Fului, qui priore anno in Apulia foede caesus fugatusque erat.
1.10. this class of soldier the senate had established the same term of service as for the men who were at Cannae. An additional mark of disgrace for both alike was that they were not to winter in towns, nor to construct their winter quarters within ten miles of any city. Lucius Cornelius in Sardinia were given the two legions which Quintus Mucius had commanded.
1.10. huic generi militum senatus eundem, quem Cannensibus, finem statuerat militiae. additum etiam utrorumque ignominiae est ne in oppidis hibernarent neue hiberna propius ullam urbem decem milibus passuum aedificarent. L. Cornelio in Sardinia duae legiones datae quibus Q. Mucius praefuerat; supplementum si opus esset consules scribere iussi.
1.12. , if necessary, the consuls were bidden to enrol. Titus Otacilius and Marcus Valerius were assigned the coasts of Sicily and Greece, together with the legions and fleets which they commanded.'
1.12. T. Otacilio et M. Ualerio Siciliae Graeciaeque orae cum legionibus classibusque quibus praeerant decretae; quinquaginta Graecia cum legione una, centum Sicilia cum duabus legionibus habebat naues.
1.13. Greece had fifty ships and one legion, Sicily a hundred ships and two legions. -three Roman legions carried on the war that year on land and sea. the beginning of that year, when the letter of Lucius Marcius was brought before the senate, his achievement was thought magnificent; but many were offended by the official title used, since he had written “Propraetor to the Senate,” although his command had not been given him by order of the people, nor by authority of the senate. was a bad precedent, they said, for generals to be chosen by armies, and for the sanctity of elections with the required auspices to be removed instead to camps and the provinces, far from laws and magistrates, at the bidding of reckless soldiers.
1.13. tribus et uiginti legionibus Romanis eo anno bellum terra marique est gestum. principio eius anni cum de litteris L. Marci referretur, res gestae magnificae senatui uisae: titulus honoris, quod imperio non populi iussu, non ex auctoritate patrum dato 'propraetor senatui' scripserat, magnam partem hominum offendebat: rem mali exempli esse imperatores legi ab exercitibus et sollemne auspicandorum comitiorum in castra et prouincias procul ab legibus magistratibusque ad militarem temeritatem transferri.
2.3. when some moved that the matter be laid before the senate, it seemed better to postpone deliberation on that point until the knights who had brought the letter from Marcius should depart.
2.3. et cum quidam referendum ad senatum censerent, melius uisum differri eam consultationem donec proficiscerentur equites qui ab Marcio litteras attulerant.
2.4. regard to grain and clothing for the army, it was voted to reply that both matters would receive the attention of the senate, but not to address it “the Propraetor Lucius Marcius,” for fear he should get, as though already decided, the very thing which they had left to be considered.
2.4. rescribi de frumento et uestimentis exercitus placuit eam utramque rem curae fore senatui; adscribi autem 'propraetori L. Marcio ' non placuit, ne id ipsum quod consultationi reliquerant pro praeiudicato ferret.
2.5. the knights had been sent away, the consuls brought up that matter first of all, and there was complete unanimity that the tribunes of the plebs should be persuaded to bring before the plebs at the earliest possible moment the question as to whom they preferred to send with full authority to Spain and the army of which Gnaeus Scipio had been the commander —in —chief.
2.5. dimissis equitibus, de nulla re prius consules rettulerunt, omniumque in unum sententiae congruebant agendum cum tribunis plebis esse, primo quoque tempore ad plebem ferrent quem cum imperio mitti placeret in Hispaniam ad eum exercitum cui Cn. Scipio imperator praefuisset.
2.6. matter was arranged with the tribunes and due notice given; but a different dispute had claimed men's attention.
2.6. ea res cum tribunis acta promulgataque est; sed aliud certamen occupauerat animos.
2.7. Gaius Sempronius Blaesus, having named a day for the trial, was inveighing against Gnaeus Fulvius in harangues, because of the loss of his army in Apulia, insisting that many generals out of recklessness and lack of experience had led their armies into a dangerous place; but that no one except Gnaeus Fulvius had ruined his legions with every vice before he betrayed them.
2.7. C. Sempronius Blaesus die dicta Cn. Fuluium ob exercitum in Apulia amissum in contionibus uexabat, multos imperatores temeritate atque inscitia exercitum in locum praecipitem duxisse dictitans, neminem praeter Cn.
2.8. so it could be truly said that they were lost before they saw the enemy, and that they were defeated, not by Hannibal, but by their own commander.
2.8. Fuluium ante corrupisse omnibus uitiis legiones suas quam proderet. itaque uere dici posse prius eos perisse quam uiderent hostem, nec ab Hannibale, sed ab imperatore suo uictos esse.
2.9. one, in casting his vote, he said, clearly saw to what sort of man he was entrusting a command and an army. had been the difference between Tiberius Sempronius and Gnaeus Fulvius?
2.9. neminem cum suffragium ineat satis cernere cui imperium, cui exercitum permittat. quid interfuisse inter Ti. Sempronium <et Cn.
2.10. Tiberius Sempronius, though he had been given an army of slaves, by his training and authority had soon brought it about that no one of them in battle remembered his class and origin, and that they were a defence to allies, a terror to enemies. had rescued Cumae, Beneventum and other cities out of the jaws of Hannibal, as it were, and restored them to the Roman people.
2.10. Fuluium? Ti. Sempronium > cum ei seruorum exercitus datus esset breui effecisse disciplina atque imperio ut nemo eorum generis ac sanguinis sui memor in acie esset <sed> praesidio sociis, hostibus terrori essent; Cumas Beneuentum aliasque urbes eos uelut e faucibus Hannibalis ereptas populo Romano restituisse:
2.11. Gnaeus Fulvius, having an army of Roman citizens, men well born and brought up as free men, had steeped them in the vices of slaves. this was what he had accomplished: that they were overbearing and turbulent in their dealings with allies, cowardly and unwarlike towards the enemy, and unable to withstand even the battle —cry of the Carthaginians, to say nothing of their attack.
2.11. Cn. Fuluium Quiritium Romanorum exercitum, honeste genitos, liberaliter educatos, seruilibus uitiis imbuisse. ergo effecisse ut feroces et inquieti inter socios, ignaui et imbelles inter hostes essent, nec impetum modo Poenorum sed ne clamorem quidem sustinere possent.
2.12. surely it was no wonder that the soldiers had given way in battle, when their commander was the first of all to flee.
2.12. nec hercule mirum esse <cessisse> milites in acie cum primus omnium imperator fugeret:
2.13. wondered more, he said, that some had fallen where they stood, and that not all had shared the consternation and flight of Gnaeus Fulvius. Gaius Flaminius, Lucius Paulus, Lucius Postumius, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio had preferred to fall in battle —line rather than to desert their entrapped armies. Gnaeus Fulvius, almost the only man to report the destruction of his army, had returned to Rome.
2.13. magis mirari se aliquos stantes cecidisse et non omnes comites Cn. Fului fuisse pauoris ac fugae. C. Flaminium, L. Paulum, L. Postumium, Cn. ac P. Scipiones cadere in acie maluisse quam deserere circumuentos exercitus:
2.14. was a shameful thing that the army of Cannae, for having escaped from the battle —line, had been deported to Sicily, not to be relieved of service there until the enemy withdrew from Italy, and that the same action had been taken recently in the case of Gnaeus Fulvius' legions;
2.14. Cn. Fuluium prope unum nuntium deleti exercitus Romam redisse. facinus indignum esse Cannensem exercitum quod ex acie fugerit in Siciliam deportatum ne prius inde dimittatur quam hostis ex Italia decesserit et hoc idem in Cn. Fului legionibus nuper decretum, Cn.
2.15. that the flight of Gnaeus Fulvius from a battle begun by his own recklessness should have gone unpunished, and he should be expecting to spend his old age in cook —shops and brothels in which he passed his youth, whereas the soldiers, whose only fault was that they were like their commander, had been all but exiled and were enduring military service in disgrace.
2.15. Fuluio fugam ex proelio ipsius temeritate commisso impunitam esse et eum in ganea lustrisque ubi iuuentam egerit senectutem acturum, milites qui nihil aliud peccauerint quam quod imperatoris similes fuerint relegatos prope in exsilium ignominiosam pati militiam;
2.16. different was freedom at Rome for the rich and the poor, for the man who had held and the man who had not held public office! defendant shifted the blame from himself to the soldiers. had been fiercely clamouring for battle, he said, when they were led out into line, not on the day they wished, since it was too late, but on the following day, and although drawn up at a favourable time and place, they failed to withstand the reputed or the real strength of the enemy. they were all fleeing in disorder, he too was carried away by the crowd, as Varro in the battle of Cannae, as many other generals.
2.16. adeo imparem libertatem Romae diti ac pauperi, honorato atque inhonorato esse. reus ab se culpam in milites transferebat: eos ferociter pugnam poscentes, productos in aciem non eo quo uoluerint, quia serum diei fuerit, sed postero die, et tempore et loco aequo instructos, seu famam seu uim hostium non sustinuisse. cum effuse omnes fugerent, se quoque turba ablatum, ut Uarronem Cannensi pugna, ut multos alios imperatores.
3.3. , he said, could he have been of service to the state by resisting all alone, unless his death was to be a remedy for national disasters?
3.3. qui autem solum se restantem prodesse rei publicae, nisi si mors sua remedio publicis cladibus futura esset, potuisse?
3.4. was not that for lack of supplies he had been imprudently led into an unfavourable position; it was not that while advancing in column without reconnoitring he had been surprised and surrounded; it was by an open attack, by arms, by a battle —line that he had been defeated. the spirit of his own men nor that of the enemy had been under his control: every man's own temperament, he said, produces boldness or consternation.
3.4. non se inopia commeatus [non] in loca iniqua incaute deductum, non agmine inexplorato euntem insidiis circumuentum: ui aperta armis acie uictum. nec suorum animos nec hostium in potestate habuisse: suum cuique ingenium audaciam aut pauorem facere. bis est accusatus pecuniaque anquisitum.
3.5. he was accused and a fine required; at the third hearing witnesses were furnished, and he was not only loaded with every kind of reproach, but also many swore that the beginning of flight and panic was made by the praetor; that the soldiers, deserted by him, in the belief that the general's fear was not unfounded, had retreated. such anger was kindled that the assembly shouted that the magistrate must demand a capital penalty.
3.5. tertio testibus datis cum, praeterquam quod omnibus probris onerabatur, iurati permulti dicerent fugae pauorisque initium a praetore ortum, ab eo desertos milites cum haud uanum timorem ducis crederent terga dedisse, tanta ira accensa est ut capite anquirendum contio succlamaret.
3.7. that point also a fresh dispute began. when the accuser, having twice demanded a fine, said at the third hearing that he demanded capital punishment, the tribunes were appealed to. they said that they would not stand in their colleague's way, to prevent him from doing what was permitted him by ancestral custom, that is, from making his demand either according to the laws or according to custom, as he preferred, until he should condemn the defendant either to capital punishment or to pay a fine.
3.7. de eo quoque nouum certamen ortum; nam cum bis pecunia anquisisset, tertio capitis se anquirere diceret, tribuni plebis appellati collegae negarunt se in mora esse quo minus, quod ei more maiorum permissum esset, seu legibus seu moribus mallet, anquireret quoad uel capitis uel pecuniae iudicasset priuato.
3.9. that Sempronius said he judged Gnaeus Fulvius guilty of treason and asked of Gaius Calpur-. nius, the city praetor, a day for the assembly.
3.9. tum Sempronius perduellionis se iudicare Cn. Fuluio dixit, diemque comitiis ab C. Calpurnio praetore urbano petit.
3.10. the defendant had recourse to another hope, in case his brother Quintus Fulvius might be able to attend at the trial, as he was then influential both from the fame of his successes and from the hope, now almost fulfilled, of taking Capua.
3.10. inde alia spes ab reo temptata est, si adesse in iudicio Q. Fuluius frater posset, florens tum et fama rerum gestarum et propinqua spe Capuae potiundae.
3.11. Fulvius had written a pitiful letter in that sense on behalf of his brother's life, and the senators had declared that leaving Capua was not to the interest of the state, when the day for the assembly was at hand Gnaeus Fulvius went into exile at Tarquinii.
3.11. id cum per litteras miserabiliter pro fratris capite scriptas petisset Fuluius negassentque patres e re publica esse abscedi a Capua, postquam dies comitiorum aderat, Cn.
3.12. plebs voted that his exile was legal. the whole effort of the war had been directed against Capua. it was rather an intensive blockade than a series of assaults, and the slaves and commoners were unable either to endure hunger or to send messengers to Hannibal through guards so near to each other. Numidian was discovered who took a letter, declared that he would make his way out, and kept his promise. out right through the Roman camp at night he inspired in the Capuans the hope that, while they still had some strength left, they might attempt a sally in all directions.
3.12. Fuluius exsulatum Tarquinios abiit. id ei iustum exsilium esse sciuit plebs. inter haec uis omnis belli uersa in Capuam erat; obsidebatur tamen acrius quam oppugnabatur, nec aut famem tolerare seruitia ac plebs poterant aut mittere nuntios ad Hannibalem per custodias tam artas. inuentus est Numida qui acceptis litteris euasurum se professus praestaret promissum. per media Romana castra nocte egressus spem accendit Campanis dum aliquid uirium superesset ab omni parte eruptionem temptandi.
4.3. in the many engagements they were as a rule successful in cavalry battles, while in infantry they were worsted. be victorious, however, was by no means so cheering as it was depressing to be vanquished at any point by a beleaguered and almost captured enemy. length a method was devised, so that what was lacking to their strength might be compensated by skilful tactics.
4.3. ceterum in multis certaminibus equestria proelia ferme prospera faciebant, pedites superabantur; sed nequaquam tam laetum uincere quam triste uinci ulla parte erat ab obsesso et prope expugnato hoste. inita tandem ratio est ut quod uiribus deerat arte aequaretur.
4.4. of all the legions were picked young men who by reason of strength and lightness of build were the swiftest. were furnished with round shields of smaller size than those used by cavalry, and seven javelins apiece four feet long and having iron heads such as are on the spears of the light —armed troops.
4.4. ex omnibus legionibus electi sunt iuuenes maxime uigore ac leuitate corporum ueloces; eis parmae breuiores quam equestres et septena iacula quaternos longa pedes data, praefixa ferro quale hastis uelitaribus inest.
4.5. horsemen would each of them take one of these men on to their own horses, and they trained them both to ride behind and to leap down nimbly when the signal was given.
4.5. eos singulos in equos suos accipientes equites adsuefecerunt et uehi post sese et desilire perniciter ubi datum signum esset.
4.6. thanks to daily practice they seemed to do this with sufficient daring, they advanced into the plain which was situated between the camp and the city wall in the face of the Capuan cavalry in battle —line.
4.6. postquam adsuetudine cotidiana satis intrepide fieri uisum est, in campum qui medius inter castra murumque erat aduersus instructos Campanorum equites processerunt, et ubi ad coniectum teli uentum est signo dato uelites desiliunt.
4.7. when they had come within range, at a given signal the light —armed leaped to the ground. an infantry line suddenly dashes out from the cavalry at the enemy's horsemen, and while attacking they hurl one javelin after another.
4.7. pedestris inde acies ex equitatu repente in hostium equites incurrit iaculaque cum impetu alia super alia emittunt;
4.8. throwing a great number of these against horses and men in all directions, they wounded very many. more consternation was created by the strange and the unexpected, and the cavalry charging into the frightened enemy caused them to flee with slaughter all the way to the gates.
4.8. quibus plurimis in equos uirosque passim coniectis permultos uolnerauerunt; pauoris tamen plus ex re noua atque inopinata iniectum est, et in perculsum hostem equites inuecti fugam stragemque eorum usque ad portas fecerunt.
4.9. the Roman side was superior in cavalry also; it was made the practice to have light —armed in the legions.
4.9. inde equitatu quoque superior Romana res fuit;
4.10. originator of combining infantry with cavalry they say was Quintus Navius, a centurion, and that for so doing honour was paid him by the general. matters stood thus at Capua, Hannibal was drawn in opposite directions by the desire to take the citadel of Tarentum and to hold Capua., regard for Capua prevailed, a city on which he saw that the attention of all his allies and enemies was concentrated, and one destined to be a striking example, whatever might be the result of its revolt from the Romans.
4.10. institutum ut uelites in legionibus essent. auctorem peditum equiti immiscendorum centurionem Q. Nauium ferunt honorique id ei apud imperatorem fuisse. cum in hoc statu ad Capuam res essent, Hannibalem diuersum Tarentinae arcis potiundae Capuaeque retinendae trahebant curae. uicit tamen respectus Capuae in quam omnium sociorum hostiumque conuersos uidebat animos, documento futurae qualemcunque euentum defectio ab Romanis habuisset.
5.3. , leaving in the land of the Bruttii a large part of his baggage and all the heavy —armed, with picked infantry and cavalry he hastened into Campania in the best possible condition for a rapid march. spite of his swift movement thirty —three elephants managed to follow him.
5.3. igitur magna parte impedimentorum relicta in Bruttiis et omni grauiore armatu, cum delectis peditum equitumque quam poterat aptissimus ad maturandum iter in Campaniam contendit; secuti tamen tam raptim euntem tres et triginta elephanti.
5.4. encamped in a closed valley behind Tifata, a mountain commanding Capua. he approached, he first captured the stronghold of Galatia, overpowering its garrison, and then directed his march against the besiegers of Capua. sending word in advance to Capua, stating at what time he proposed to attack the Roman camp, so that they also, making ready for a sally, might at the same time burst out of all the gates, he inspired great alarm.
5.4. in ualle occulta post Tifata, montem imminentem Capuae, consedit. adueniens cum castellum Calatiam praesidio ui pulso cepisset, in circumsedentes Capuam se uertit, praemissisque nuntiis Capuam quo tempore castra Romana adgressurus esset ut eodem et illi ad eruptionem parati portis omnibus se effunderent, ingentem praebuit terrorem;
5.6. on one side he himself attacked, on the other all the Capuans, cavalry and infantry, sallied out, and with them the Carthaginian garrison, commanded by Bostar and Hanno.
5.6. nam alia parte ipse adortus est, alia Campani omnes, equites peditesque, et cum iis Punicum praesidium cui Bostar et Hanno praeerant erupit.
5.7. Romans in their alarm, so as not to leave one point undefended by rushing in the same direction, divided their forces among them as follows: Appius Claudius was placed facing the Capuans, Fulvius facing Hannibal:
5.7. Romani ut in re trepida, ne ad unam concurrendo partem aliquid indefensi relinquerent, ita inter sese copias partiti sunt:
5.8. Gaius Nero, the propraetor, with the cavalry of six legions took his place along the road leading to Suessula, Gaius Fulvius Flaccus, the lieutenant, with the cavalry of the allies in the direction of the river Volturnus.
5.8. Ap. Claudius Campanis, Fuluius Hannibali est oppositus; C. Nero propraetor cum equitibus sex legionum uia quae Suessulam fert, C. Fuluius Flaccus legatus cum sociali equitatu constitit e regione Uolturni amnis.
5.9. battle began not only with the usual shouting and uproar, but, in addition to the noise of men and horses and arms, the non —combatant populace of Capua disposed along the walls produced so much shouting, together with the clashing of bronze, such as is usually kept up in the still night of a lunar eclipse, as to divert the attention even of the combatants.
5.9. proelium non solito modo clamore ac tumultu est coeptum; sed ad alium uirorum equorum armorumque sonum disposita in muris Campanorum imbellis multitudo tantum cum aeris crepitu qualis in defectu lunae silenti nocte cieri solet edidit clamorem ut auerteret etiam pugnantium animos.
5.10. Appius was easily keeping the Capuans away from the earthwork of the camp; on the other side a larger force, Hannibal and the Carthaginians, were pressing Fulvius. the sixth legion gave way, and after it had been forced back, a cohort of Spaniards with three elephants managed even to reach the earthwork, and had broken through the Roman centre, and wavered between the hope of breaking through into the camp and the danger of being cut off from their own troops.
5.10. Campanos facile a uallo Appius arcebat: maior uis ab altera parte Fuluium Hannibal et Poeni urgebant. legio ibi sexta loco cessit; qua pulsa, cohors Hispanorum cum tribus elephantis usque ad uallum peruasit; ruperatque mediam aciem Romanorum et in ancipiti spe ac periculo erat utrum in castra perrumperet an intercluderetur a suis.
5.12. Fulvius, on seeing the alarm of the legion and the danger to the camp, bade Quintus Navius and other first centurions to attack the cohort of the enemy fighting beneath the earthwork. said that it was a very critical moment; that either they must be allowed to pass —and it would be less of an effort for them to burst into the camp than it had been to break through the solid line —or else they must be disposed of beneath the earthwork.
5.12. quem pauorem legionis periculumque castrorum Fuluius ubi uidit, Q. Nauium primoresque alios centurionum hortatur ut cohortem hostium sub uallo pugnantem inuadant: in summo discrimine rem uerti; aut uiam dandam iis esse—et minore conatu quam condensam aciem rupissent in castra inrupturos—aut conficiendos sub uallo esse;
5.14. that it would not involve much fighting; they were few and cut off from their own men; and if the battle —line, which in the panic of the Romans seemed to have been broken through, should face against the enemy from both sides, it would enclose them between two fronts.
5.14. nec magni certaminis rem fore; paucos esse et ab suis interclusos; et quae dum paueat Romanus interrupta acies uideatur, eam si se utrimque in hostem uertat ancipiti pugna medios circumuenturam.
5.15. Navius, on hearing these words of the commander, snatched a standard of the second maniple of the hastati from the standard —bearer and carried it towards the enemy, threatening that he would throw it into their midst if the soldiers did not quickly follow him and take a hand in the battle.
5.15. Nauius ubi haec imperatoris dicta accepit, secundi hastati signum ademptum signifero in hostes infert, iacturum in medios eos minitans ni se propere sequantur milites et partem capessant pugnae. ingens corpus erat et arma honestabant;
5.16. huge frame he had, and his arms added distinction; and the standard held aloft had attracted citizens and enemies to the sight.
5.16. et sublatum alte signum conuerterat ad spectaculum ciues hostesque.
5.17. when he had pushed through to the standards of the Spaniards, spears were then hurled at him from every side, and almost the entire line turned against him alone. neither the numbers of the enemy nor the mass of weapons could beat off the attack of such a man. Marcus Atilius, the lieutenant, started to carry the standard of the first maniple of the prin- cipes of the same legion towards the cohort of Spaniards, and at the same time Lucius Porcius Licinus and Titus Popilius, the lieutenants in command of the camp, fought with spirit on the earthwork and slew the elephants directly on the wall, as they were trying to cross. the trench was filled with their bodies, it furnished the enemy with a passage, just as if an embankment or a bridge had been thrown over it.
5.17. ceterum postquam iam ad signa peruenerat Hispanorum, tum undique in eum tragulae coniectae et prope tota in unum acies uersa; sed neque multitudo hostium neque telorum uis arcere impetum eius uiri potuerunt. et M. Atilius legatus primi principis ex eadem legione signum inferre in cohortem Hispanorum coepit; et qui castris praeerant, L. Porcius Licinus et T. Popillius legati, pro uallo acriter propugnant elephantosque transgredientes in ipso uallo conficiunt. quorum corporibus cum oppleta fossa esset, uelut aggere aut ponte iniecto transitum hostibus dedit; ibi per stragem iacentium elephantorum atrox edita caedes.
6.3. , all over the heap of fallen elephants, a terrible slaughter ensued. the other side of the camp the Capuans and the Carthaginian garrison had already been repulsed, and fighting was going on just outside the gate of Capua leading toward Volturnum.
6.3. altera in parte castrorum iam impulsi erant Campani Punicumque praesidium et sub ipsa porta Capuae quae Uolturnum fert pugnabatur;
6.4. it was not so much the armed men that were resisting the Romans trying to burst in, as that the gate, armed with larger and smaller artillery, kept the enemy back by missiles hurled from a distance.
6.4. neque tam armati inrumpentibus Romanis resistebant quam porta ballistis scorpionibusque instructa missilibus procul hostes arcebat.
6.5. attack of the Romans was further checked by the wounding of Appius Claudius, the general encouraging his men at the front, when the upper part of his chest was struck by a javelin below the left shoulder.
6.5. et suppressit impetum Romanorum uolnus imperatoris Ap. Claudi, cui suos ante prima signa adhortanti sub laeuo umero summum pectus gaeso ictum est. magna uis tamen hostium ante portam est caesa, ceteri trepidi in urbem compulsi.
6.6. a great number of the enemy were slain before the gate, and the rest driven in disorder into the city. Hannibal likewise, seeing the slaughter of the Spanish cohort, and that the enemy's camp was being defended with the utmost vigour, gave up the attack upon it and began to recall his standards and to make his advancing infantry retreat, while interposing his cavalry in the rear, to prevent the enemy from pursuing.
6.6. et Hannibal postquam cohortis Hispanorum stragem uidit summaque ui castra hostium defendi, omissa oppugnatione recipere signa et conuertere agmen peditum obiecto ab tergo equitatu ne hostis instaret coepit.
6.7. legions showed great eagerness to pursue the enemy; but Flaccus ordered the recall to be sounded thinking that enough had been accomplished for both purposes —that the Campanians should appreciate how little defence they had in Hannibal, and that Hannibal himself should be aware of it.
6.7. legionum ardor ingens ad hostem insequendum fuit: Flaccus receptui cani iussit, satis ad utrumque profectum ratus ut et Campani quam haud multum in Hannibale praesidii esset, et ipse Hannibal sentiret.
6.8. of the authorities on this battle relate that eight thousand men were slain in Hannibal's army, three thousand in the Campanian, and that fifteen standards were taken from the Carthaginians and eighteen from the Campanians.
6.8. caesa eo die, qui huius pugnae auctores sunt, octo milia hominum de Hannibalis exercitu, tria ex Campanis tradunt, signaque Carthaginiensibus quindecim adempta, duodeuiginti Campanis.
6.9. other writers I have found that the battle was by no means on such a scale, but that there was more panic than fighting, when Numidians and Spaniards with elephants had burst into the Roman camp unexpectedly, and while the elephants, on their way straight through the camp, were causing wreckage of tents in the midst of a terrible din, and making the beasts of burden break their halters and flee;
6.9. apud alios nequaquam tantam molem pugnae inueni plusque pauoris quam certaminis fuisse, cum inopinato in castra Romana Numidae Hispanique cum elephantis inrupissent, elephanti per media castra uadentes stragem tabernaculorum ingenti sonitu ac fugam abrumpentium uincula iumentorum facerent;
6.11. that, in addition to the uproar, there was also a ruse; for Hannibal sent in men in Italian dress and acquainted with the Latin language, to bid the soldiers, in the name of the consuls, each for himself to flee to the neighbouring mountains, since the camp had been taken; but that the ruse was quickly recognized and frustrated with great loss to the enemy; that the elephants were driven out of the camp by the use of fire.
6.11. fraudem quoque super tumultum adiectam, immissis ab Hannibale qui habitu Italico gnari Latinae linguae iuberent consulum uerbis quoniam amissa castra essent pro se quemque militum in proximos montes fugere; sed eam celeriter cognitam fraudem oppressamque magna caede hostium; elephantos igni e castris exactos.
6.13. whatever way it began and ended, this was the last battle before the surrender of Capua. medix tuticus, which is the highest office among the Campanians, Seppius Loesius was serving that year, though born in a humble station and having slender means. say that his mother on his behalf as a minor was once expiating a household portent, and when the soothsayer had given his answer that the very highest authority at Capua would come to that boy, she, finding nothing to justify that hope, said “you mean the ruin of the Campanians, when the highest office shall come to my son.”
6.13. hoc ultimum, utcumque initum finitumque est, ante deditionem Capuae proelium fuit. medix tuticus, qui summus magistratus apud Campanos est, eo anno Seppius Loesius erat, loco obscuro tenuique fortuna ortus. matrem eius quondam pro pupillo eo procurantem familiare ostentum cum respondisset haruspex summum quod esset imperium Capuae peruenturum ad eum puerum, nihil ad eam spem adgnoscentem dixisse ferunt:
6.15. mockery of a true prediction also came true. when they were hard pressed by starvation and the sword, and there remained no hope that they could hold out, while those who were born to the expectation of public offices were refusing them, Loesius, who complained that Capua had been abandoned and betrayed by its leading men, was the last of all the Campanians to receive their highest magistracy. Hannibal, seeing that it was impossible either to tempt the enemy into battle again, or to break a way through their camp to Capua, for fear the new consuls should cut off his supplies also, resolved to retire without accomplishing his undertaking and to move his camp away from Capua.
6.15. 'ne tu perditas res Campanorum narras, ubi summus honos ad filium meum perueniet.' ea ludificatio ueri et ipsa in uerum uertit; nam cum fame ferroque urgerentur nec spes ulla superesset sisti <posse iis qui nati> in spem honorum erant honores detractantibus, Loesius querendo desertam ac proditam a primoribus Capuam, summum magistratum ultimus omnium Campanorum cepit. ceterum Hannibal, ut nec hostes elici amplius ad pugnam uidit neque per castra eorum perrumpi ad Capuam posse, ne suos quoque commeatus intercluderent noui consules, abscedere inrito incepto et mouere a Capua statuit castra.
7.3. carefully considering whither he should remove, the impulse came to him to proceed to Rome, the very centre of the war. was something which he had always desired to do, but after the battle of Cannae he had let the opportunity pass, as others commonly complained, and as he himself frequently admitted.
7.3. multa secum quonam inde ire pergeret uoluenti subiit animum impetus caput ipsum belli Romam petendi, cuius rei semper cupitae praetermissam occasionem post Cannensem pugnam et alii fremebant et ipse non dissimulabat:
7.4. unexpected alarm and confusion it need not be beyond his hopes that some part of the city could be seized. if Rome should be in danger, he thought that either both of the Roman commanders or one of them would at once abandon Capua; and that if they should divide their forces, each being weakened would give either himself or the Capuans the chance of success.
7.4. necopinato pauore ac tumultu non esse desperandum aliquam partem urbis occupari posse, et si Roma in discrimine esset, Capuam extemplo omissuros aut ambo imperatores Romanos aut alterum ex iis;
7.5. one concern tormented him, the fear that as soon as he had withdrawn, the Capuans might at once be surrendered.
7.5. et si diuisissent copias, utrumque infirmiorem factum aut sibi aut Campanis bene gerendae rei fortunam daturos esse.
7.6. Numidian who was ready to dare and do anything was induced by Hannibal's gifts to take a letter, enter the Roman camp under the guise of a deserter, and then from the other side of the camp make his way in secret to Capua.
7.6. una ea cura angebat ne ubi abscessisset extemplo dederentur Campani. Numidam promptum ad omnia audenda donis pellicit ut litteris acceptis specie transfugae castra Romana ingressus, altera parte clam Capuam peruadat.
7.7. the letter was filled with encouragements. departure, Hannibal said, which would be of advantage to them, would draw off the Roman generals and armies from the siege of Capua to the defence of Rome.
7.7. litterae autem erant adhortatione plenae: profectionem suam quae salutaris illis foret abstracturam ad defendendam Romam ab oppugnanda Capua duces atque exercitus Romanos;
7.8. should not be downcast; by holding out for a few days they would cause the entire blockade to be raised.
7.8. ne desponderent animos; tolerando paucos dies totam soluturos obsidionem.
7.9. then ordered that boats on the Volturnus should be seized and rowed up to the fort which he had previously built for a defence.
7.9. inde naues in flumine Uolturno comprehensas subigi ad id quod iam ante praesidii causa fecerat castellum iussit.
7.10. when word came that the number of these was such that his army could be ferried across in a single night, he had food prepared for ten days, led his legions down to the river by night, and transported them across before daylight.
7.10. quarum ubi tantam copiam esse ut una nocte traici posset exercitus allatum est, cibariis decem dierum praeparatis deductas nocte ad fluuium legiones ante lucem traiecit. id priusquam fieret ita futurum compertum ex transfugis Fuluius Flaccus senatui Romam cum scripsisset, uarie animi hominum pro cuiusque ingenio adfecti sunt.
8.2. this happened Fulvius Flaccus had learned from deserters that it was to be done, and had so written to the senate at Rome; whereupon men's feelings were differently stirred according to their several natures. was natural in so alarming a situation, the senate was at once summoned, and Publius Cornelius, surnamed Asina, with no thought of Capua or of anything else, was for recalling all the generals and armies from the whole of Italy for the defence of the city.
8.2. ut in re tam trepida senatu extemplo uocato, P. Cornelius cui Asinae cognomen erat omnes duces exercitusque ex tota Italia, neque Capuae neque ullius alterius rei memor, ad urbis praesidium reuocabat.
8.3. Fabius Maximus thought it a shameful thing to withdraw from Capua, to be frightened and led about at the beck of Hannibal and in response to his threats.
8.3. Fabius Maximus abscedi a Capua terrerique et circumagi ad nutus comminationesque Hannibalis flagitiosum ducebat:
8.4. think, he said, that the man who, though victor at Cannae, had not ventured to go to the city, on being beaten back from Capua should have conceived the hope of capturing the city of Rome!
8.4. qui ad Cannas uictor ire tamen ad urbem ausus non esset, eum a Capua repulsum spem potiundae urbis Romae cepisse.
8.5. was not to besiege Rome that he was on the march, but to raise the siege of Capua. for Rome, Jupiter, witness of the treaties broken by Hannibal, and the other gods would defend her with the aid of the army stationed at the city.
8.5. non ad Romam obsidendam, sed ad Capuae liberandam obsidionem ire. Romam cum eo exercitu qui ad urbem esset Iouem foederum ruptorum ab Hannibale testem deosque alios defensuros esse.
8.6. conflicting motions were defeated by the compromise of Publius Valerius Flaccus, who, mindful of both situations, proposed that they write to the generals at Capua, informing them what forces there were to defend the city; on the other hand, what forces Hannibal was taking with him or how large an army was needed for the siege of Capua they themselves knew.
8.6. has diuersas sententias media sententia P. Ualeri Flacci uicit, qui utriusque rei memor imperatoribus qui ad Capuam essent scribendum censuit quid ad urbem praesidii esset; quantas autem Hannibal copias duceret aut quanto exercitu ad Capuam obsidendam opus esset, ipsos scire.
8.7. one of the two generals and a part of the army could be sent to Rome, provided Capua should be duly besieged by the general and army remaining, then let Claudius and Fulvius arrange between them which of the two must besiege Capua, and which must come to Rome to prevent a siege of their native city.
8.7. si ita Romam e ducibus alter et exercitus pars mitti posset, ut ab reliquo et duce et exercitu Capua recte obsideretur, inter se compararent Claudius Fuluiusque utri obsidenda Capua, utri ad prohibendam obsidione patriam Romam ueniundum esset.
8.9. this decree of the senate was brought to Capua, Quintus Fulvius, the proconsul, who, since his colleague was disabled by a wound, was obliged to return to Rome, after picking soldiers from three armies, led about fifteen thousand infantry and a thousand horsemen across the Volturnus.
8.9. hoc senatus consulto Capuam perlato Q. Fuluius proconsul, cui collega ex uolnere aegro redeundum Romam erat, e tribus exercitibus milite electo ad quindecim milia peditum mille equites Uolturnum traducit.
8.10. , on learning definitely that Hannibal would march along the Latin Way, he himself sent word in advance to the towns along the Appian Way and such as are near that road, Setia, Cora, Lavinium, that they should have supplies on hand in the cities and also bring them down from farms at a distance to the road, and draw in garrisons for the cities, so that each might have the defence of its public interests in hand.
8.10. inde cum Hannibalem Latina uia iturum satis comperisset, ipse per Appiae municipia quaeque propter eam uiam sunt, Setiam, Coram, Lauinium praemisit ut commeatus paratos et in urbibus haberent et ex agris deuiis in uiam proferrent, praesidiaque in urbes contraherent ut sua cuique res publica in manu esset. Hannibal quo die Uolturnum est transgressus, haud procul a flumine castra posuit:
9.2. Hannibal on the day that he crossed the Volturnus pitched camp not far from the river; on the next day he made his way past Cales into the region of the Sidicini. he lingered one day devastating the country, and then led along the Latin Way through the territory of Suessa, Allifae and Casinum. Casinum he remained encamped two days, and ravaged the country in all directions.
9.2. postero die praeter Cales in agrum Sidicinum peruenit. ibi diem unum populando moratus per Suessanum Allifanumque et Casinatem agrum uia Latina ducit. sub Casino biduo statiua habita et passim populationes factae.
9.3. passing Interamna and Aquinum he came into the region of Fregellae as far as the river Liris, where he found the bridge broken down by the men of Fregellae, to delay his march.
9.3. inde praeter Interamnam Aquinumque in Fregellanum agrum ad Lirim fluuium uentum, ubi intercisum pontem a Fregellanis morandi itineris causa inuenit.
9.4. Fulvius too had been detained by the river Volturnus, as the boats had been burned by Hannibal, and he had difficulty in getting together rafts for the transporting of his army, owing to the great scarcity of timber.
9.4. et Fuluium Uolturnus tenuerat amnis, nauibus ab Hannibale incensis, rates ad traiciendum exercitum in magna inopia materiae aegre comparantem.
9.5. the army had been carried across on rafts, the rest of Fulvius' march was unhampered, as supplies had been generously set out for them not only in the cities, but also by the roadside. the eager soldiers kept encouraging one another to quicken their pace, remembering that they were marching to defend their native city.
9.5. traiecto ratibus exercitu, reliquum Fuluio expeditum iter, non per urbes modo sed circa uiam expositis benigne commeatibus, erat; alacresque milites alius alium ut adderet gradum memor ad defendendam iri patriam hortabantur.
9.6. Rome a messenger from Fregellae, riding on for a day and a night, brought great alarm. greater confusion than at its first reception was occasioned by news of the danger spread by men who ran about, adding unfounded reports to what they had heard, and it stirred the entire city. wailings of women were heard not only from private houses, but from every direction matrons pouring into the streets ran about among the shrines of the gods, sweeping the altars with their dishevelled hair, kneeling, holding up their palms to heaven and the gods, and praying them to rescue the city of Rome from the hands of the enemy and to keep Roman mothers and little children unharmed.
9.6. Romam Fregellanus nuntius diem noctemque itinere continuato ingentem attulit terrorem. tumultuosius quam allatam erat <uolgatum periculum dis>- cursu hominum adfingentium uana auditis totam urbem concitat. ploratus mulierum non ex priuatis solum domibus exaudiebatur, sed undique matronae in publicum effusae circa deum delubra discurrunt crinibus passis aras uerrentes, nixae genibus, supinas manus ad caelum ac deos tendentes orantesque ut urbem Romanam e manibus hostium eriperent matresque Romanas et liberos paruos inuiolatos seruarent.
9.9. senate awaited the magistrates in the Forum, in case they wished its advice about anything. received commands and departed each to the duty assigned him; others volunteered, in case of any need of their services. were posted on the Citadel, on the Capitol, on the walls, around the city, even on the Alban Mount and on the citadel of Aefula. the midst of this turmoil word came that Quintus Fulvius, the proconsul, had set out from Capua with an army.
9.9. senatus magistratibus in foro praesto est si quid consulere uelint. alii accipiunt imperia disceduntque ad suas quisque officiorum partes: alii offerunt se si quo usus operae sit. praesidia in arce, in Capitolio, in muris, circa urbem, in monte etiam Albano atque arce Aefulana ponuntur.
9.10. that his military power might not be annulled if he came into the city, the senate decreed that Quintus Fulvius should have equal authority with the consuls.
9.10. inter hunc tumultum Q. Fuluium proconsulem profectum cum exercitu Capua adfertur; cui ne minueretur imperium si in urbem uenisset, decernit senatus ut Q. Fuluio par cum consulibus imperium esset.
9.11. Hannibal, after laying waste the territory of Fregellae more ruthlessly on account of the breaking down of the bridges, came through the districts of Frusino and Ferentinum and Anagnia into that of Labici.
9.11. Hannibal, infestius perpopulato agro Fregellano propter intercisos pontes, per Frusinatem Ferentinatemque et Anagninum agrum in Labicanum uenit, inde Algido Tusculum petiit, nec receptus moenibus infra Tusculum dextrorsus Gabios descendit.
9.12. over Mount Algidus he went to Tusculum, and not being admitted to the city, he descended toward the right below Tusculum to Gabii. he led his army down into the Pupinian district and pitched camp eight miles distant from Rome. nearer the enemy approached the greater was the slaughter of fugitives, as the Numidians were in the lead, and the greater was the number of the captured of every class and age.
9.12. inde in Pupiniam exercitu demisso octo milia passuum ab Roma posuit castra. quo propius hostis accedebat, eo maior caedes fiebat fugientium praecedentibus Numidis, pluresque omnium generum atque aetatium capiebantur. in hoc tumultu Fuluius Flaccus porta Capena cum exercitu Romam ingressus, media urbe per Carinas Esquilias contendit; inde egressus inter Esquilinam Collinamque portam posuit castra.
10.2. this confusion Fulvius Flaccus entered Rome with his army by the Porta Capena, and hastened through the centre of the city by way of the Carinae to the Esquiline. going out he pitched his camp between Porta Esquilina and Porta Collina. plebeian aediles brought supplies thither; the consuls and the senate came to the camp; there they deliberated on the most important matters of state. was decided that the consuls should pitch their camps near the gates, Collina and Esquilina; that Gaius Calpurnius, the city praetor, should be in command of the Capitol and the Citadel, and that the senate in full numbers should be kept in the Forum, in case there might be need of deliberation in such an emergency.
10.2. aediles plebis commeatum eo comportarunt; consules senatusque in castra uenerunt; ibi de summa republica consultatum. placuit consules circa portas Collinam Esquilinamque ponere castra; C. Calpurnium praetorem urbanum Capitolio atque arci praeesse, et senatum frequentem in foro contineri si quid in tam subitis rebus consulto opus esset.
10.3. Hannibal moved his camp to the river Anio, three miles from the city. he established a permanent camp and himself with two thousand horsemen advanced toward Porta Collina as far as the Temple of Hercules, and riding up surveyed the walls and situation of the city from the nearest possible point.
10.3. inter haec Hannibal ad Anienem fluuium tria milia passuum ab urbe castra admouit. ibi statiuis positis ipse cum duobus milibus equitum ad portam Collinam usque ad Herculis templum est progressus atque unde proxime poterat moenia situmque urbis obequitans contemplabatur.
10.4. he should do so with such freedom and so at his leisure seemed to Flaccus a shame. he sent his horsemen against him and ordered that the cavalry of the enemy be driven away and back into their own camp.
10.4. id eum tam licenter atque otiose facere Flacco indignum uisum est; itaque immisit equites summouerique atque in castra redigi hostium equitatum iussit.
10.5. the engagement had begun, the consuls ordered the Numidian deserters, of whom there were at that time on the Aventine about twelve hundred, to pass through the centre of the city across the Esquiline, thinking that none were better suited to do battle in the valleys and around buildings in gardens, among tombs and along roads hemmed in on every side.
10.5. cum commissum proelium esset, consules transfugas Numidarum, qui tum in Auentino ad mille et ducenti erant, media urbe transire Esquilias iusserunt, nullos aptiores inter conualles tectaque hortorum et sepulcra et cauas undique uias ad pugnandum futuros rati.
10.6. some men on the Citadel and the Capitol saw them riding down the Clivus Publicius, they shouted that the Aventine had been captured.
10.6. quos cum ex arce Capitolioque cliuo Publicio in equis decurrentes quidam uidissent, captum Auentinum conclamauerunt.
10.7. caused so much confusion and flight that, if there had not been a Carthaginian camp outside the city, the whole panic —stricken multitude would have poured out. it was they fled to their homes and into buildings, and as their own people roamed the streets, they would hurl stones and javelins at them, as though they were enemies.
10.7. ea res tantum tumultum ac fugam praebuit ut nisi castra Punica extra urbem fuissent, effusura se omnis pauida multitudo fuerit: tunc in domos atque in tecta refugiebant, uagosque in uiis suos pro hostibus lapidibus telisque incessebant.
10.8. could the uproar be checked and their mistake revealed, since the roads were clogged by the crowd of rustics and the cattle that sudden alarm had driven into the city. cavalry battle was successful and the enemy driven away.
10.8. nec comprimi tumultus aperirique error poterat refertis itineribus agrestium turba pecorumque quae repentinus pauor in urbem compulerat. equestre proelium secundum fuit summotique hostes sunt.
10.9. because in many places disturbances which arose without reason had to be checked, it was decreed that all who had been dictators, consuls or censors should have full military power until the enemy should have retired from the walls.
10.9. et quia multis locis comprimendi tumultus erant qui temere oriebantur, placuit omnes qui dictatores consules censoresue fuissent cum imperio esse, donec recessisset a muris hostis.
10.10. in fact during the rest of the day and the following night many disturbances were provoked without reason and were checked. the next day Hannibal crossed the Anio and led all his forces out into line, and Flaccus and the consuls did not refuse battle. the armies had been drawn up on both sides for the issue of a battle in which the city of Rome was to be the prize for the victor, a great downpour mingled with hail so confused both battle —lines that, holding on to their arms with difficulty, they returned to camp, fearing everything more than the enemy.
10.10. et diei quod reliquum fuit et nocte insequenti multi temere excitati tumultus sunt compressique. postero die transgressus Anienem Hannibal in aciem omnes copias eduxit; nec Flaccus consulesque certamen detractauere. instructis utrimque exercitibus in eius pugnae casum in qua urbs Roma uictori praemium esset, imber ingens grandine mixtus ita utramque aciem turbauit ut uix armis retentis in castra sese receperint, nullius rei minore quam hostium metu.
11.3. the following day, when the lines were drawn up on the same spot, the same bad weather parted them. both days, when they had retired to their camps, to their astonishment there came a clear sky with a calm.
11.3. et postero die eodem loco acies instructas eadem tempestas diremit; ubi recepissent se in castra, mira serenitas cum tranquillitate oriebatur.
11.4. the Carthaginians it became a solemn warning, and it is reported that Hannibal was heard to say that at one time the purpose to take Rome, at another the chance, was denied him.
11.4. in religionem ea res apud Poenos uersa est, auditaque uox Hannibalis fertur potiundae sibi urbis Romae modo mentem non dari, modo fortunam.
11.5. other things, small and great, further diminished his hope. important thing was that he heard that, although he was sitting armed before the walls of the city of Rome, detachments had set out under their colours to reinforce Spain; and the unimportant circumstance was that he learned from a prisoner that about this time the land on which he had his camp chanced to have been sold, with no reduction in price on that
11.5. minuere etiam spem eius duae aliae, parua magnaque, res, magna illa quod cum ipse ad moenia urbis Romae armatus sederet milites sub uexillis in supplementum Hispaniae profectos audiit, parua autem quod per eos dies eum forte agrum in quo ipse castra haberet uenisse nihil ob id deminuto pretio cognitum ex quodam captiuo est.
11.7. account. it seemed to him so arrogant and such an indignity that a purchaser should have been found at Rome for the ground which he had seized in war and was himself its occupier and owner, that he forthwith summoned a herald and ordered the bankers' shops which were round the Roman Forum to be sold.
11.7. id uero adeo superbum atque indignum uisum eius soli quod ipse bello captum possideret haberetque inuentum Romae emptorem ut extemplo uocato praecone tabernas argentarias quae circa forum Romanum essent iusserit uenire.
11.8. by these circumstances he moved his camp back to the river Tutia, six miles from the city. he proceeded to the grove of Feronia, a shrine which at that time was noted for its wealth.
11.8. his motus ad Tutiam fluuium castra rettulit sex milia passuum ab urbe. inde ad lucum Feroniae pergit ire, templum ea tempestate inclutum diuitiis.
11.9. people of Capena and others who lived near it used to carry thither first —fruits and gifts in addition according to their means, and had kept it richly adorned with gold and silver. all those gifts the temple was at that time despoiled. Great heaps of bronze were found after the departure of Hannibal, since the soldiers inspired by religious fear deposited crude lumps.
11.9. Capenates aliique qui accolae eius erant primitias frugum eo donaque alia pro copia portantes multo auro argentoque id exornatum habebant. iis omnibus donis tum spoliatum templum; aeris acerui cum rudera milites religione inducti iacerent post profectionem Hannibalis magni inuenti.
11.10. to the spoiling of this temple there is no uncertainty among the historians. relates that on his way to Rome Hannibal turned aside to it from Eretum, and traces his march from Reate and Cutiliae and Amiternum.
11.10. —huius populatio templi haud dubia inter scriptores est. Coelius Romam euntem ab Ereto deuertisse eo Hannibalem tradit, iterque eius ab Reate Cutiliisque et ab Amiterno orditur:
11.11. says that from Campania he came into Samnium, thence into the land of the Paelignians, and passing the town of Sulmo, over into the country of the Marrucini; thence through the territory of Alba into that of the Marsians, and then to Amiternum and the village of Foruli.
11.11. ex Campania in Samnium, inde in Paelignos peruenisse, praeterque oppidum Sulmonem in Marrucinos transisse; inde Albensi agro in Marsos, hinc Amiternum Forulosque uicum uenisse.
11.12. the uncertainty is not because the traces of so great a commander and so large an army could within the memory of so short a period have become confused, for it is agreed that he passed that way.
11.12. neque ibi error est quod tanti <ducis tanti>que exercitus uestigia intra tam breuis aeui memoriam potuerint confundi — isse enim ea constat—: tantum id interest ueneritne eo itinere ad urbem an ab urbe in Campaniam redierit.