1.1. Scipio, now that he had reached Sicily, assigned his volunteers to their ranks and centuries.
1.1. Scipio postquam in Siciliam uenit, uoluntarios milites ordinauit centuriauitque.
1.2. Three hundred of them, young men in the bloom of their youth and conspicuous for their physical strength, he kept about him unarmed and ignorant of the purpose for which they were being reserved without being organized in centuries or furnished with arms.
1.2. ex iis trecentos iuuenes, florentes aetate et uirium robore insignes, inermes circa se habebat, ignorantes quem ad usum neque centuriati neque armati seruarentur.
1.3. Then he chose out of the number of the younger men of all Sicily three hundred horsemen, men of high rank and of wealth, to cross over with him into Africa.
1.3. tum ex totius Siciliae iuniorum numero principes genere et fortuna trecentos equites qui secum in Africam traicerent legit, diemque iis qua equis armisque instructi atque ornati adessent edixit.
1.4. He appointed a day also on which they were to present themselves equipped and furnished with horses and arms. Such service far from home seemed to them formidable and likely to bring many hardships and great dangers on land and sea. And concern on this account troubled not merely the men themselves but also their parents and relations.
1.4. grauis ea militia, procul domo, terra marique multos labores magna pericula allatura uidebatur; neque ipsos modo sed parentes cognatosque eorum ea cura angebat.
1.5. When the day which had been appointed came the men displayed their arms and horses. Then Scipio said reports were coming to him that some of the Sicilian horsemen shrank from that service as formidable and difficult.
1.5. ubi dies quae dicta erat aduenit, arma equosque ostenderunt. tum Scipio renuntiari sibi dixit quosdam equites Siculorum tamquam grauem et duram horrere eam militiam:
1.6. If any were of that mind he preferred that they should confess it to him at once, rather than complain later and prove spiritless soldiers and useless for the state. Let them declare what was their mind; he would give them a kindly hearing.
1.6. si qui ita animati essent, malle eos sibi iam tum fateri quam postmodo querentes segnes atque inutiles milites rei publicae esse; expromerent quid sentirent; cum bona uenia se auditurum.
1.7. When one of them ventured to say that if he was free to choose whichever he wished he did not wish to serve at all, thereupon Scipio said to him:
1.7. ubi ex iis unus ausus est dicere se prorsus, si sibi utrum uellet liberum esset, nolle militare, tum Scipio ei:
1.8. “Accordingly, since you have not concealed what your mind is, young man, I will furnish a substitute for you, and to him you shall hand over your arms and horse and the other equipment for the service, and forthwith shall take him away with you to your home, train him and see that he is taught horsemanship and the use of arms.”
1.8. 'quoniam igitur, adulescens, quid sentires non dissimulasti, uicarium tibi expediam cui tu arma equumque et cetera instrumenta militiae tradas et tecum hinc extemplo domum ducas exerceas docendum cures equo armisque.'
1.9. As the man gladly accepted the terms Scipio turned over to him one of the three hundred unarmed men that-he had. When the others saw the horseman thus discharged with the consent of the commander, every man excused himself and took a substitute.
1.9. laeto condicionem accipienti unum ex trecentis quos inermes habebat tradit. ubi hoc modo exauctoratum equitem cum gratia imperatoris ceteri uiderunt, se quisque excusare et uicarium accipere.
1.10. Thus three hundred Sicilians were replaced by Roman horsemen without expense to the state. Of their training and drilling the Sicilians were in charge, because the general's order was that any man who failed to do so should himself serve.
1.10. ita trecentis Siculis Romani equites substituti sine publica impensa. docendorum atque exercendorum curam Siculi habuerunt, quia edictum imperatoris erat ipsum militaturum qui ita non fecisset. egregiam hanc alam equitum euasisse ferunt multisque proeliis rem publicam adiuuisse.
1.12. They say that this cavalry squadron proved excellent and was of value to the state in many battles. Then while mustering the legions he chose out of them soldiers who had served for the greatest number of campaigns, especially those who had done so under Marcellus as commander, believing them to have been schooled by the best training and in particular to be most skilled in besieging cities in consequence of the long siege of Syracuse.
1.12. legiones inde cum inspiceret, plurimorum stipendiorum ex iis milites delegit, maxime qui sub duce Marcello militauerant, quos cum optima disciplina institutos credebat tum etiam ab longa Syracusarum obsidione peritissimos esse urbium oppugnandarum;
1.13. For he was planning nothing small, but already the destruction of Carthage.
1.13. nihil enim paruum sed Carthaginis iam excidia agitabat animo.
1.14. Thereupon he distributed his army among the towns, requisitioned grain from the Sicilian cities, spared the grain imported from Italy. He repaired the old ships, and with these sent Gaius Laelius to Africa for plunder. The new ships he beached at Panormus, that they might winter out of the water, since they had been built in haste of green timber.
1.14. inde exercitum per oppida dispertit; frumentum Siculorum ciuitatibus imperat, ex Italia aduecto parcit; ueteres naues reficit et cum iis C. Laelium in Africam praedatum mittit; nouas Panhormi subducit, quia ex uiridi materia raptim factae erant, ut in sicco hibernarent.
1.15. Every preparation for the war having been made, he came to Syracuse, which was not yet quite peaceful after the great unsettlement due to the war.
1.15. praeparatis omnibus ad bellum Syracusas, nondum ex magnis belli motibus satis tranquillas, uenit.
1.16. The Greeks were making their claims to properties granted them by the senate against certain Italians who were holding on with the same use of force with which they had seized the property during the war.
1.16. Graeci res a quibusdam Italici generis eadem ui qua per bellum ceperant retinentibus, concessas sibi ab senatu repetebant.
1.17. Thinking it of the utmost importance to keep a promise given by the state, Scipio restored their property to the Syracusans, partly by an edict, partly also by granting hearings against those who persisted in maintaining an unlawful possession.
1.17. omnium primum ratus tueri publicam fidem, partim edicto, partim iudiciis etiam in pertinaces ad obtinendam iniuriam redditis suas res Syracusanis restituit. non ipsis tantum ea res sed omnibus Siciliae populis grata fuit, eoque enixius ad bellum adiuuerunt.
1.19. This act was acceptable not only to the owners themselves but to all the communities of Sicily as well, and all the more energetically did they render assistance for the war. In the same summer a great war broke out in Spain, instigated by Indibilis of the Ilergetes for no other reason than because contempt for other generals sprang from admiration for Scipio.
1.19. eadem aestate in Hispania coortum ingens bellum conciente Ilergete Indibili nulla alia de causa quam per admirationem Scipionis contemptu imperatorum aliorum orto:
1.20. He thought that Scipio was the one general left to the Romans, the rest having been killed by Hannibal; that consequently after the slaying of the Scipios they had no one else to send to Spain, and had also, once the war grew more serious in Italy, summoned him to face Hannibal; that, besides having merely nominal commanders in Spain, the Romans had taken away the veteran army also.
1.20. eum superesse unum ducem Romanis ceteris ab Hannibale interfectis [rebantur]; eo nec in Hispaniam caesis Scipionibus alium quem mitterent habuisse, et postquam in Italia grauius bellum urgeret, aduersus Hannibalem eum arcessitum. praeterquam quod nomina tantum ducum in Hispania Romani habeant, exercitum quoque inde ueterem deductum;
1.21. There was nothing but confusion and an untrained mob of recruits.
1.21. trepida omnia et inconditam turbam tironum esse.
1.22. Never would there be such an opportunity for the liberation of Spain.
1.22. nunquam talem occasionem liberandae Hispaniae fore.
1.23. Slaves they had been down to that time, either to Carthaginians or to Romans, and not by turns to the one people or the other but at times to both at once.
1.23. seruitum ad eam diem aut Carthaginiensibus aut Romanis, nec in uicem his aut illis sed interdum utrisque simul.
1.24. The Carthaginians had been driven out by the Romans; the Spaniards, if they should agree, were able to drive out the Romans, so that, free from all foreign authority, Spain might return permanently to its ancestral customs and usages.
1.24. pulsos ab Romanis Carthaginienses: ab Hispanis, si consentirent, pelli Romanos posse, ut ab omni externo imperio soluta in perpetuum Hispania in patrios rediret mores ritusque.
1.25. By these and similar utterances he stirred up not only his own countrymen but also the Ausetani, a neighbouring tribe, and other peoples adjoining his territory and theirs.
1.25. haec taliaque dicendo non populares modo sed Ausetanos quoque, uicinam gentem, concitat et alios finitimos sibi atque illis populos.
1.26. And thus within a few days thirty thousand infantry and about four thousand horse came together in the territory of the Sedetani, in accordance with their instructions.
1.26. itaque intra paucos dies triginta milia peditum quattuor ferme equitum in Sedetanum agrum, quo edictum erat, conuenerunt.
2.1. The Roman commanders on their part, Lucius Lentulus and Lucius Manlius Acidinus, for fear the war might grow more serious from neglect of the first hostile acts, likewise united their armies, and leading their soldiers through the Ausetanian territory with restraint on an enemy's soil, as though it were friendly, they reached the place where their enemies had concentrated and pitched camp three miles away from their camp.
2.1. Romani quoque imperatores L. Lentulus et L. Manlius Acidinus, ne glisceret prima neglegendo bellum, iunctis et ipsi exercitibus per agrum Ausetanum hostico tamquam pacato clementer ductis militibus ad sedem hostium peruenere et trium milium spatio procul a castris eorum posuerunt castra.
2.2. At first a vain effort was made through envoys to make them abandon fighting.
2.2. primo per legatos nequiquam temptatum ut discederetur ab armis;
2.3. Then when an attack was suddenly made upon Roman foragers by Spanish horse and from a Roman outpost horsemen were sent to the rescue, there was a cavalry battle with no success for either side worth mentioning.
2.3. dein cum in pabulatores Romanos impetus repente ab equitibus Hispanis factus esset, summisso ab statione Romana equitatu equestre proelium fuit haud sane memorando in partem ullam euentu.
2.4. At sunrise on the following day, under arms and drawn up, all of them displayed their battle-line at a distance of about a mile from the Roman camp.
2.4. sole oriente postero die armati instructique omnes mille ferme passus procul a castris Romanis aciem ostendere.
2.5. The Ausetani were in the centre; of the wings the Ilergetes occupied the right, unimportant Spanish tribes the left. Between the wings and the centre they had made spaces broad enough to send the cavalry through when the time came.
2.5. medii Ausetani erant; cornua dextrum Ilergetes, laeuum ignobiles tenebant Hispani populi; inter cornua et mediam aciem interualla patentia satis late fecerant qua equitatum, ubi tempus esset, emitterent.
2.6. And the Romans, having drawn up their army in the customary fashion, imitated this feature only of the enemy's line, that they likewise left broad spaces between the legions for the passage of cavalry.
2.6. et Romani more suo exercitum cum instruxissent, id modo hostium imitati sunt ut inter legiones et ipsi patentes equiti relinquerent uias.
2.7. But Lentulus thought that whichever side should first send its cavalry out into the enemy's line with its gaping intervals would use its cavalry to advantage.
2.7. ceterum Lentulus ei parti usum equitis fore ratus quae prior in dehiscentem interuallis hostium aciem equites emisisset, Ser.
2.8. He therefore ordered Servius Cornelius, a tribune of the soldiers, to command his cavalry to give their horses free rein through the broad openings in the battle-line of the enemy.
2.8. Cornelio tribuno militum imperat equites per patentes in hostium acie uias permittere equos iubeat.
2.9. Lentulus himself, after the infantry battle had begun without success, delayed only long enough to bring up the thirteenth legion from the reserves into the front line to support the twelfth legion, which had been placed on the left wing facing the Ilergetes and was giving way.
2.9. ipse coepta parum prospere pedestri pugna tantum moratus dum cedenti duodecimae legioni, quae in laeuo cornu aduersus Ilergetes locata erat, tertiam decimam legionem ex subsidiis in primam aciem firmamentum ducit, postquam aequata ibi pugna est, ad L.
2.10. Now that the battle was evenly balanced there, he came up to Lucius Manlius, who was in the foremost ranks, encouraging the men and bringing up reserves to such positions as the case required.
2.10. Manlium inter prima signa hortantem ac subsidia quibus res postulabat locis inducentem uenit;
2.11. He informed him that all was secured on the left wing; that he had already sent Servius Cornelius to surround the enemy with a whirlwind attack of cavalry.
2.11. indicat tuta ab laeuo cornu esse; iam missum ab se Cornelium procella equestri hostes circumfusurum.
2.12. Scarcely had Lentulus said this when the Roman horse, charging into the midst of the enemy, threw the infantry lines into confusion and at the same time closed for the Spanish cavalry the route by which they might launch their attack.
2.12. uix haec dicta dederat cum Romani equites in medios inuecti hostes simul pedestres acies turbarunt, simul equitibus Hispanorum uiam immittendi equos clauserunt.
2.13. Accordingly the Spaniards gave up the cavalry battle and dismounted. The Roman generals, on seeing the broken ranks of the enemy, and their fright and alarm and the wavering standards, exhorted and implored their soldiers to attack the discouraged enemy and not allow the line to re-form.
2.13. itaque omissa pugna equestri ad pedes Hispani descenderunt. Romani imperatores ut turbatos hostium ordines et trepidationem pauoremque et fluctuantia uiderunt signa, hortantur orant milites ut perculsos inuadant neu restitui aciem patiantur.
2.14. The barbarians would have failed to withstand so impetuous an attack, had not even their prince, Indibilis, exposed himself with the dismounted cavalry in front of the first units of the infantry. At that point a fierce battle continued for some time.
2.14. non sustinuissent tam infestum impetum barbari, ni regulus ipse Indibilis cum equitibus ad pedes degressis ante prima signa peditum se obiecisset.
2.15. Finally, when those who kept on fighting round the prince, who resisted though half-dead, but was pinned to the ground by a javelin, were overwhelmed by missile weapons and fell, at that moment began a flight pell-mell.
2.15. ibi aliquamdiu atrox pugna stetit; tandem postquam ii qui circa regem seminecem restantem deinde pilo terrae adfixum pugnabant obruti telis occubuerunt, tum fuga passim coepta.
2.16. Greater numbers were slain because the horsemen had left no room to mount their horses, and because the Romans made a spirited attack upon the terrified. And they did not withdraw until they had routed the enemy out of his camp as well.
2.16. plures caesi, quia equos conscendendi equitibus spatium non fuerat, et quia perculsis acriter institerunt Romani; nec ante abscessum est quam castris quoque exuerunt hostem.
2.17. Thirteen thousand Spaniards were slain that day, about one thousand eight hundred captured. Of the Romans and their allies little more than two hundred fell, mainly on the left wing.
2.17. tredecim milia Hispanorum caesa eo die, mille octingenti ferme capti: Romanorum sociorumque paulo amplius ducenti, maxime in laeuo cornu, ceciderunt.
2.18. Those of the Spaniards who were driven out of their camp or had escaped from the battle scattered at first over the country and then returned to their respective communities.
2.18. pulsi castris Hispani aut qui ex proelio effugerant, sparsi primo per agros, deinde in suas quisque ciuitates redierunt.
3.1. Then they were summoned by Mandonius to a council, and there, after lamenting their heavy losses and berating those who were responsible for the war, they voted that envoys should be sent to arrange for a surrender of arms and a capitulation.
3.1. tum a Mandonio euocati in concilium conquestique ibi clades suas increpitis auctoribus belli legatos mittendos ad arma tradenda deditionemque faciendam censuere.
3.2. When the envoys laid the blame upon Indibilis as responsible-for the war and upon the rest of their leading men, most of whom, they said, had fallen in the battle, and offered to deliver their arms and surrender, the answer given them was: that their surrender would be accepted only in case they should deliver Mandonius and the other instigators of the war alive.
3.2. quibus culpam in auctorem belli Indibilem ceterosque principes quorum plerique in acie cecidissent conferentibus tradentibusque arma et dedentibus sese, responsum est in deditionem ita accipi eos si Mandonium ceterosque belli concitores tradidissent uiuos;
3.3. If not, the generals said they would lead their army into the lands of the Ilergetes and Ausetani and the other tribes one after another.
3.3. si minus, exercitum se in agrum Ilergetum Ausetanorumque et deinceps aliorum populorum inducturos. haec dicta legatis renuntiataque in concilium.
3.4. Such was the reply given to the legates and reported by them to the council.
3.4. ibi Mandonius ceterique principes comprehensi et traditi ad supplicium.
3.5. Thereupon Mandonius and the other leaders were seized and handed over to be punished. For the peoples of Spain peace was restored, a double tribute for that year and grain for six months exacted, also cloaks and togas for the army; and hostages were accepted from about thirty tribes.
3.5. Hispaniae populis reddita pax; stipendium eius anni duplex et frumentum sex mensum imperatum sagaque et togae exercitui, et obsides ab triginta ferme populis accepti.
3.6. Thus a rebellious uprising in Spain was incited and suppressed within a few days with no serious consequences, and alarm was completely shifted to Africa.
3.6. ita Hispaniae rebellantis tumultu haud magno motu intra paucos dies concito et compresso, in Africam omnis terror uersus.
3.7. Gaius Laelius, having reached Hippo Regius by night, led out his soldiers and marines under their standards at daybreak to lay the country waste. Since everybody was free from concern, as if in peace-time, great losses were inflicted.
3.7. C. Laelius nocte ad Hipponem Regium cum accessisset, luce prima ad populandum agrum sub signis milites sociosque in auxilium nauales duxit.
3.8. And excited messengers filled Carthage with great alarm, reporting that the Roman fleet and Scipio as commander-in-chief had arrived. In fact it had been previously rumoured that he had already crossed over to Sicily.
3.8. omnibus pacis modo incuriose agentibus magna clades inlata; nuntiique trepidi Carthaginem terrore ingenti compleuere classem Romanam Scipionemque imperatorem—et fama fuerat iam in Siciliam transgressum—aduenisse.
3.9. Lacking exact information also as to how many ships the messengers had seen and how large a force was laying waste the country, they exaggerated every report under the stimulus of fear. Accordingly alarm and panic at first, then dejection came over their spirits.
3.9. nec quot naues uidissent nec quanta manus agros popularetur satis gnari omnia in maius metu augente accipiebant. itaque primo terror pauorque, dein maestitia animos incessit:
3.10. So far, they said, had fortune changed that those who as victors had but lately had their own army before the walls of Rome and, after laying low so many armies of the enemy, had by force or by voluntary action received the surrender of all the peoples of Italy, with the shifting fortune of war were now destined to see the devastation of Africa and a siege of Carthage, when they had no such strength as the Romans had possessed to endure all that.
3.10. tantum fortunam mutasse ut qui modo ipsi exercitum ante moenia Romana habuissent uictores stratisque tot hostium exercitibus omnes Italiae populos aut ui aut uoluntate in deditionem accepissent, ii uerso Marte Africae populationes et obsidionem Carthaginis uisuri forent, nequaquam pari ad patienda ea robore ac Romani fuissent.
3.12. For them, they said, the Roman populace, for them Latium had always furnished a greater and more numerous body of young men growing up in place of so many armies slain.
3.12. illis Romanam plebem, illis Latium iuuentutem praebuisse maiorem semper frequentioremque pro tot caesis exercitibus subolescentem:
3.13. As for their own populace, they were unwarlike in the city, unwarlike in the country. Hireling auxiliaries were being recruited from the Africans, a race shifting with every fickle breath of hope and lacking in loyalty.
3.13. suam plebem imbellem in urbe, imbellem in agris esse; mercede parari auxilia ex Afris, gente ad omnem auram spei mobili atque infida.
3.14. Of the kings, moreover, Syphax had been alienated after his conference with Scipio, they said, and Masinissa by open defection had shown himself their bitterest enemy. Nowhere was there any hope, nowhere any aid.
3.14. iam reges, Syphacem post conloquium cum Scipione alienatum, Masinissam aperta defectione infestissimum hostem. nihil usquam spei, nihil auxilii esse.
3.15. Mago was neither setting in motion any uprising on the part of Gaul, nor uniting with Hannibal; and Hannibal himself by this time was on the decline both in repute and in strength.
3.15. nec Magonem ex Gallia mouere tumultus quicquam nec coniungere sese Hannibali, et Hannibalem ipsum iam et fama senescere et uiribus.
4.1. Such were the laments into which men had fallen in consequence of the recent news when impending alarm roused them again to deliberate how they should meet the dangers of the moment.
4.1. in haec deflenda prolapsos ab recenti nuntio animos rursus terror instans reuocauit ad consultandum quonam modo obuiam praesentibus periculis iretur.
4.2. It was decided to hold levies speedily in city and country; to send men to hire African auxiliaries; to fortify the city, to bring in grain, to provide arms offensive and defensive, to equip ships and send them to Hippo to face the Roman fleet.
4.2. dilectus raptim in urbe agrisque haberi placet; mittere ad conducenda Afrorum auxilia; munire urbem, frumentum conuehere, tela arma parare; instruere naues ac mittere ad Hipponem aduersus Romanam classem.
4.3. While they were already thus employed the news at last came that Laelius, not Scipio, had sailed across and only sufficient forces to raid the farms; that the bulk of the main army was still in Sicily.
4.3. iam haec agentibus nuntius tandem uenit Laelium non Scipionem, copiasque quantae ad incursiones agrorum satis sint transuectas; summae belli molem adhuc in Sicilia esse.
4.4. So there was a breathing spell, and they set about sending embassies to Syphax and other princes, to cement an alliance. To Philip also envoys were sent to promise him two hundred talents of silver, on condition that he should cross over into Sicily or Italy.
4.4. ita respiratum mittique ad Syphacem legationes aliosque regulos firmandae societatis causa coeptae. ad Philippum quoque missi qui ducenta argenti talenta pollicerentur ut in Siciliam aut in Italiam traiceret.
4.5. Men were sent likewise to their own commanders in Italy, that by every sort of alarm they should keep Scipio there.
4.5. missi et ad suos imperatores in Italiam ut omni terrore Scipionem retinerent;
4.6. Not only envoys were sent to Mago but twenty-five war-ships, six thousand infantry, eight hundred horsemen, seven elephants, and in addition a large sum of money to hire auxiliaries. Relying upon these resources he was to advance nearer to the city of Rome with his army and unite with Hannibal.
4.6. ad Magonem non legati modo sed uiginti quinque longae naues, sex milia peditum, octingenti equites, septem elephanti, ad hoc magna pecunia ad conducenda auxilia quibus fretus propius urbem Romanam exercitum admoueret coniungeretque se Hannibali.
4.7. Such were their plans and deliberations at Carthage when Masinissa, aroused by the report of a Roman fleet, came with a few horsemen to Laelius, who was carrying off a vast amount of booty from territory that lacked troops and garrisons.
4.7. haec Carthagini parabant agitabantque, cum ad Laelium praedas ingentes ex agro inermi ac nudo praesidiis agentem Masinissa fama Romanae classis excitus cum equitibus paucis uenit.
4.8. Masinissa complained that Scipio was conducting the war without spirit in not having already transported his army to Africa, while the Carthaginians were panic-stricken and Syphax was entangled in wars with neighbours. He was certain, he said, that if Syphax should be given time to settle his affairs to his own satisfaction, there would be no real loyalty in his dealings with the Romans.
4.8. is segniter rem agi ab Scipione questus, quod non exercitum iam in Africam traiecisset perculsis Carthaginiensibus, Syphace impedito finitimis bellis; quem certum habere, si spatium ad sua ut uelit componenda detur, nihil sincera fide cum Romanis acturum.
4.9. Laelius should exhort and spur Scipio on to avoid delay. For himself, although he had been driven out of his kingdom, he would assist with no inconsiderable forces of infantry and cavalry. Laelius also must not tarry in Africa. A fleet, he believed, had sailed from Carthage, and with that fleet it was unsafe to engage in the absence of Scipio.
4.9. hortaretur stimularet Scipionem ne cessaret; se, quamquam regno pulsus esset, cum haud contemnendis copiis adfuturum peditum equitumque. nec ipsi Laelio morandum in Africa esse; classem credere profectam a Carthagine cum qua absente Scipione non satis tutum esset contrahi certamen.
5.1. Directly after this conversation Laelius sent Masinissa away, and on the following day he weighed anchor at Hippo, his ships booty-laden, and sailing back to Sicily delivered Masinissa's messages to Scipio.
5.1. ab hoc sermone dimisso Masinissa Laelius postero die naues praeda onustas ab Hippone soluit, reuectusque in Siciliam mandata Masinissae Scipioni exposuit.
5.2. About the same time the ships which had been sent to Mago from Carthage came into port between Ligurian Albingaunum and Genua.
5.2. iisdem ferme diebus naues quae ab Carthagine ad Magonem missae erant inter Albingaunos Ligures Genuamque accesserunt.
5.3. In that region, as it happened, Mago had his fleet at the time. On hearing the words of the envoys, who urged him to get together the largest possible armies, he at once held a council of Gauls and Ligurians; for great numbers of both nations were present.
5.3. in iis locis tum forte Mago tenebat classem; qui legatorum auditis uerbis iubentium exercitus quam maximos comparare, extemplo Gallorum et Ligurum—namque utriusque gentis ingens ibi multitudo erat—concilium habuit;
5.4. And he told them that he had been sent to restore their liberty, and that forces were being sent to him from home, as they themselves saw; but with what resources, with how large an army that war was to be waged depended upon themselves.
5.4. et missum se ad eos uindicandos in libertatem ait et, ut ipsi cernant, mitti sibi ab domo praesidia; sed quantis uiribus quanto exercitu id bellum geratur, in eorum potestate esse.
5.5. There were two Roman armies, he said, one in Gaul, the other in Etruria. He was sure that Spurius Lucretius would unite with Marcus Livius; that many thousands must be armed for resistance to two generals, two Roman armies.
5.5. duos exercitus Romanos, unum in Gallia, alterum in Etruria esse; satis scire Sp. Lucretium se cum M. Liuio iuncturum; multa milia armanda esse ut duobus ducibus duobus exercitibus Romanis resistatur.
5.6. The Gauls said that they were entirely willing to do so, but that since they had almost before their eyes one Roman camp within their borders and another in the neighbouring land of Etruria, if it should become known that they had aided the Carthaginian by furnishing auxiliaries, forthwith hostile armies would invade their territory from both directions. From Gauls he should require such support as could be given in secret.
5.6. Galli summam ad id suam uoluntatem esse dicere; sed cum una castra Romana intra fines, altera in finitima terra Etruria prope in conspectu habeant, si palam fiat auxiliis adiutum ab sese Poenum, extemplo infestos utrimque exercitus in agrum suum incursuros. ea ab Gallis desideraret quibus occulte adiuuari posset:
5.7. Ligurians were free to act, they said, since Roman camps were far from their land and their cities; it was right that they should arm their young men and take their proper share in the war.
5.7. Liguribus, quod procul agro urbibusque eorum castra Romana sint, libera consilia esse; illos armare iuuentutem et capessere pro parte bellum aequum esse. Ligures haud abnuere:
5.8. The Ligurians did not refuse, but simply asked for two months' time to hold levies. Meanwhile Mago by sending men secretly through their territory hired Gauls as soldiers. Supplies also of every kind were coming to him in secret from the Gallic nations.
5.8. tempus modo duorum mensum petere ad dilectus habendos. interim Mago milites Gallos dimissis clam per agros eorum mercede conducere; commeatus quoque omnis generis occulte ad eum a Gallicis populis mittebantur.
5.9. Marcus Livius led his army of slave-volunteers over from Etruria into Gaul and, having united with Lucretius, prepared to confront Mago, should he move out of Liguria towards the city; but should the Carthaginian quietly remain in a distant region at the foot of the Alps, he too would remain where he was, near Ariminum, for the defence of Italy.
5.9. M. Liuius exercitum uolonum ex Etruria in Galliam traducit, iunctusque Lucretio, si se Mago ex Liguribus propius urbem moueat, obuiam ire parat, si Poenus sub angulo Alpium quietus se contineat, et ipse in eadem statione circa Ariminum Italiae praesidio futurus.
6.1. After the return of Gaius Laelius from Africa Scipio was spurred on by Masinissa's encouragement, and the soldiers seeing booty from the land of the enemy being brought ashore from an entire fleet, were likewise fired with a desire to cross over as soon as possible. The greater design, however, was interrupted by a lesser, that of recovering the city of Locri, which in the rebellion of Italy had also gone over to the Carthaginians.
6.1. post reditum ex Africa C. Laeli et Scipione stimulato Masinissae adhortationibus et militibus praedam ex hostium terra cernentibus tota classe efferri accensis ad traiciendum quam primum, interuenit maiori minor cogitatio Locros urbem recipiendi, quae sub defectionem Italiae desciuerat et ipsa ad Poenos.
6.2. Bright hopes of accomplishing that purpose, moreover, arose from a petty circumstance. There was brigandage rather than normal war operations in the country of the Bruttii, where a beginning had been made by the Numidians, and the Bruttians fell in with that practice not more on account of their Punic alliance than of their own nature.
6.2. spes autem adfectandae eius rei ex minima re adfulsit. latrociniis magis quam iusto bello in Bruttiis gerebantur res, principio ab Numidis facto et Bruttiis non societate magis Punica quam suopte ingenio congruentibus in eum morem;
6.3. Finally the Roman soldiers also from a kind of infection now delighted in plunder, making raids upon the enemy's farms just as far as their commanders permitted.
6.3. postremo Romani quoque milites iam contagione quadam rapto gaudentes, quantum per duces licebat, excursiones in hostium agros facere.
6.4. They had overpowered certain Locrians straying from the city and had carried them off to Regium. In the number of these captives were some artisans who, as it happened, were in the habit of plying their trade for hire among the Carthaginians in the citadel of Locri.
6.4. ab iis egressi quidam urbe Locrenses circumuenti Regiumque abstracti fuerant. in eo captiuorum numero fabri quidam fuere, adsueti forte apud Poenos mercede opus in arce Locrorum facere.
6.5. These men were recognized by leading Locrians who, on being driven out by the opposing party, which had surrendered Locri to Hannibal, had retired to Regium. On being asked the questions usually put by men long absent, the artisans first told them what was going on at home, and then inspired the hope that, if ransomed and sent back, they would betray the citadel to them.
6.5. hi cogniti ab Locrensium principibus qui pulsi ab aduersa factione, quae Hannibali Locros tradiderat, Regium se contulerant, cum cetera percontantibus, ut mos est qui diu absunt, quae domi agerentur exposuissent, spem fecerunt si redempti ac remissi forent arcem se iis tradituros;
6.6. It was there, they said, that they dwelt and among the Carthaginians were trusted in everything.
6.6. ibi se habitare fidemque sibi rerum omnium inter Carthaginienses esse.
6.7. Accordingly the leading men, being tormented by home-sickness and at the same time fired with a desire for vengeance on their enemies, at once ransomed the artisans and sent them back after agreeing upon a plan of action and signals for the display of which in the distance they should be on the watch. They themselves went to Scipio at Syracuse, with whom were some of the exiles. There they reported the promises of the captives and inspired in the consul a hope which gave good prospect of success.
6.7. itaque, ut qui simul desiderio patriae angerentur simul cupiditate inimicos ulciscendi arderent, redemptis extemplo iis remissisque cum ordinem agendae rei composuissent signaque quae procul edita obseruarent, ipsi ad Scipionem Syracusas profecti, apud quem pars exsulum erat, referentes ibi promissa captiuorum cum spem ab effectu haud abhorrentem consuli fecissent,
6.9. Consequently Marcus Sergius and Publius Matienus, tribunes of the soldiers, were sent with them and ordered to take three thousand soldiers from Regium to Locri. And a written order was sent to the propraetor Quintus Pleminius to assist in carrying out the project.
6.9. tribuni militum cum iis M. Sergius et P. Matienus missi iussique ab Regio tria milia militum Locros ducere; et Q. Pleminio propraetori scriptum ut rei agendae adesset.
6.10. Setting out from Regium, carrying ladders constructed for the height of the citadel as reported, about midnight they set a signal for the betrayers of the citadel from the place agreed upon.
6.10. profecti ab Regio, scalas ad editam altitudinem arcis fabricatas portantes, media ferme nocte ex eo loco unde conuenerat signum dedere proditoribus arcis;
6.11. These men were ready and alert, and after they on their part also had lowered ladders made for that very purpose and at several different places at the same time had admitted scaling parties, before any outcry could arise came the attack upon the Carthaginian guards, who in the absence of any such fear naturally were asleep.
6.11. qui parati intentique et ipsi scalas ad id ipsum factas cum demisissent pluribusque simul locis scandentes accepissent, priusquam clamor oreretur in uigiles Poenorum, ut in nullo tali metu sopitos, impetus est factus.
6.12. At first it was the groans of the dying indistinctly heard; then sudden terror on awaking, and confused action, since the reason was unknown; finally greater certainty as they awakened one another.
6.12. quorum gemitus primo morientium exauditus, deinde subita consternatio ex somno et tumultus cum causa ignoraretur, postremo certior res aliis excitantibus alios.
6.13. By this time every man was shouting his loudest “To arms!” that enemies were on the citadel and guards being cut down. And the Romans, who were by no means equal in numbers, would have been overpowered, had not an outcry raised by the men who were outside the citadel made it uncertain from what quarter the sounds came, while everything they imagined was intensified by the uproar in the dark.
6.13. iamque ad arma pro se quisque uocabat: hostes in arce esse et caedi uigiles; oppressique forent Romani nequaquam numero pares, ni clamor ab iis qui extra arcem erant sublatus incertum unde accidisset omnia uana augente nocturno tumultu fecisset.
6.14. Accordingly the Carthaginians, supposing the citadel to be already filled with the enemy, were terrified, gave up fighting and fled to the other citadel; for there are two not far apart.
6.14. itaque uelut plena iam hostium arce territi Poeni omisso certamine in alteram arcem—duae sunt haud multum inter se distantes—confugiunt.
6.15. The inhabitants were holding the city, set between combatants as a prize for the victors. From the two citadels came slight engagements every day.
6.15. oppidani urbem habebant, uictoribus praemium in medio positam; ex arcibus duabus proeliis cottidie leuibus certabatur.
6.16. Quintus Pleminius commanded the Roman, Hamilcar the Carthaginian garrison. Summoning reinforcements from neighbouring places they kept increasing their numbers.
6.16. Q. Pleminius Romano, Hamilcar Punico praesidio praeerat. arcessentes ex propinquis locis subsidia copias augebant:
6.17. Finally Hannibal himself was on the way, and the Romans would not have held out if the mass of the Locrians, embittered by the arrogance and greed of the Carthaginians, had not taken the side of the Romans.
6.17. ipse postremo ueniebat Hannibal, nec sustinuissent Romani nisi Locrensium multitudo, exacerbata superbia atque auaritia Poenorum, ad Romanos inclinasset.
7.1. Scipio, on being informed that the situation at Locri had become more critical and that Hannibal himself was approaching, was afraid to take risks for the garrison as well, since it was not easy to retire from the place.
7.1. Scipioni ut nuntiatum est in maiore discrimine Locris rem uerti ipsumque Hannibalem aduentare, ne praesidio etiam periclitaretur haud facili inde receptu, et ipse a Messana L.
7.2. Accordingly he too set out from Messana, after leaving his brother Lucius Scipio there in command of the garrison; and as soon as the strait shifted with the tide, he cast off with... ships while the current favoured. And Hannibal sent a messenger from the river Bulotus —it is not far from the city of Locri —ordering his men to engage in battle with the Romans and Locrians with the utmost violence at daybreak, while, when all eyes were turned in the direction of that conflict, he should himself attack the city unawares from the rear. When he came upon the battle, already begun at daybreak, he did not wish to shut himself in the citadel, where he would have clogged a cramped space by his numbers, and on the other hand he had not brought ladders for scaling city walls. After making a pile of the soldiers' baggage and displaying his line of battle at no great distance from the walls to frighten the enemy, while ladders and other requisites for an assault were being prepared, he rode round the city with his Numidian horsemen, to discover just where to make the attack.
7.2. Scipione fratre in praesidio ibi relicto cum primum aestu fretum inclinatum est †naues mari secundo misit. et Hannibal a Buloto amni—haud procul is ab urbe Locris abest—nuntio praemisso ut sui luce prima summa ui proelium cum Romanis ac Locrensibus consererent dum ipse auersis omnibus in eum tumultum ab tergo urbem incautam adgrederetur, ubi luce coeptam inuenit pugnam, ipse nec in arcem se includere, turba locum artum impediturus, uoluit, neque scalas quibus scanderet muros attulerat.
7.5. He had approached the wall when a man who happened to stand nearest to him was struck by a missile from a scorpion. Frightened away by an occurrence so dangerous, he thereupon ordered the recall to be sounded and fortified a camp beyond the range of missiles.
7.5. sarcinis in aceruum coniectis cum haud procul muris ad terrorem hostium aciem ostendisset, cum equitibus Numidis circumequitabat urbem, dum scalae quaeque alia ad oppugnandum opus erant parantur, ad uisendum qua maxime parte adgrederetur:
7.6. The Roman fleet sailing from Messana reached Locri while several hours of daylight remained. All were landed from the ships and before sunset they entered the city. On the following day a battle was begun by the Carthaginians from their citadel, and Hannibal, having made ready the ladders and everything else for the assault, was coming close to the walls when suddenly the Romans opened a gate and sallied out against an enemy who feared anything but that.
7.6. progressus ad murum scorpione icto qui proximus eum forte steterat, territus inde tam periculoso casu receptui canere cum iussisset, castra procul ab ictu teli communit. classis Romana a Messana Locros aliquot horis multo die superante accessit; expositi omnes e nauibus et ante occasum solis urbem ingressi sunt.
7.8. In making this surprise attack they slew about two hundred. As for the rest, Hannibal on learning that the consul was there withdrew them to his camp, and sending word to the men in the citadel to shift for themselves, he broke camp in the night and marched away.
7.8. postero die coepta ex arce a Poenis pugna, et Hannibal iam scalis aliisque omnibus ad oppugnationem paratis subibat muros cum repente in eum nihil minus quam tale quicquam timentem patefacta porta erumpunt Romani.
7.9. And the men in the citadel set fire to the houses which they were occupying, that the commotion might delay the enemy, and with a speed that resembled flight overtook their own column before nightfall. Scipio, seeing that the citadel had been abandoned by the enemy and the site of the camp deserted, summoned the Locrians to an assembly and stoutly upbraided them for their revolt.
7.9. ad ducentos, improuidos cum inuasissent, occidunt: ceteros Hannibal, ut consulem adesse sensit, in castra recipit, nuntioque misso ad eos qui in arce erant ut sibimet ipsi consulerent nocte motis castris abiit. et qui in arce erant igni iniecto tectis quae tenebant ut is tumultus hostem moraretur, agmen suorum fugae simili cursu ante noctem adsecuti sunt. Scipio ut et arcem relictam ab hostibus et uacua uidit castra, uocatos ad contionem Locrenses grauiter ob defectionem incusauit;
8.2. He punished those who had prompted it and bestowed their property upon the leaders of the other party in view of their conspicuous loyalty towards the Romans.
8.2. de auctoribus supplicium sumpsit bonaque eorum alterius factionis principibus ob egregiam fidem aduersus Romanos concessit.
8.3. As regards their state, he said he would neither grant the Locrians anything nor take anything away.
8.3. publice nec dare nec eripere se quicquam Locrensibus dixit; Romam mitterent legatos; quam senatus aequum censuisset, eam fortunam habituros.
8.4. They should send envoys to Rome; and whatever lot the senate thought it proper for them to have would be theirs. Even though they had deserved ill of the Roman people, of this he was certain, that they would be in a better position under angry Romans than they were under friendly Carthaginians.
8.4. illud satis scire, etsi male de populo Romano meriti essent, in meliore statu sub iratis Romanis futuros quam sub amicis Carthaginiensibus fuerint.
8.5. Leaving Pleminius, his lieutenant, to defend the city with the force which had captured the citadel, Scipio crossed over to Messana with the troops with which he had come.
8.5. ipse Pleminio legato praesidioque quod arcem ceperat ad tuendam urbem relicto, cum quibus uenerat copiis Messanam traiecit.
8.6. With such arrogance and cruelty had the Locrians been treated by the Carthaginians after their revolt from the Romans that they could bear minor wrongs not only calmly but almost willingly.
8.6. ita superbe et crudeliter habiti Locrenses ab Carthaginiensibus post defectionem ab Romanis fuerant ut modicas iniurias non aequo modo animo pati sed prope libenti possent;
8.7. In actual fact, however, so far did Pleminius surpass Hamilcar, commandant of the garrison, so far did the Roman soldiers in the garrison surpass the Carthaginians in villainy and greed that they seemed to be competing not in arms but in vices.
8.7. uerum enimuero tantum Pleminius Hamilcarem praesidii praefectum, tantum praesidiarii milites Romani Poenos scelere atque auaritia superauerunt ut non armis sed uitiis uideretur certari.
8.8. Of all the things that make the power of the stronger odious to the helpless man not one was overlooked by commander and soldiers in dealing with the townspeople. Unutterable insults were practised upon their own persons, upon their children, upon their wives.
8.8. nihil omnium quae inopi inuisas opes potentioris faciunt praetermissum in oppidanos est ab duce aut a militibus; in corpora ipsorum, in liberos, in coniuges infandae contumeliae editae.
8.9. It goes without saying that their avarice did not refrain from despoiling even sacred things. And not only were other temples desecrated, but also the treasure chambers of Proserpina, untouched in every age except that they were said to have been despoiled by Pyrrhus, who met with a signal punishment and restored the plunder gained by his sacrilege.
8.9. iam auaritia ne sacrorum quidem spoliatione abstinuit; nec alia modo templa uiolata sed Proserpinae etiam intacti omni aetate thesauri, praeterquam quod a Pyrrho, qui cum magno piaculo sacrilegii sui manubias rettulit, spoliati dicebantur.
8.10. Consequently, just as formerly the king's ships, battered and wrecked, had landed nothing intact but the goddess' sacred money which they were trying to carry away, so on this occasion also, with a different kind of disaster that same money visited insanity upon all who had shared in that desecration of the temple, and mutually turned commander against commander, soldier against soldier, with the frenzy of enemies.
8.10. ergo sicut ante regiae naues laceratae naufragiis nihil in terram integri praeter sacram pecuniam deae quam asportabant extulerant, tum quoque alio genere cladis eadem illa pecunia omnibus contactis ea uiolatione templi furorem obiecit atque inter se ducem in ducem, militem in militem rabie hostili uertit.
9.1. The chief command belonged to Pleminius. Part of the soldiers whom he had brought from Regium were under him, part under the tribunes.
9.1. summae rei Pleminius praeerat; militum pars sub eo quam ipse ab Regio adduxerat, pars sub tribunis erat.
9.2. Having stolen a silver cup from the house of a citizen, a fleeing soldier of Pleminius was being pursued by the owners when he chanced to meet Sergius and Matienus, tribunes of the soldiers.
9.2. rapto poculo argenteo ex oppidani domo Plemini miles fugiens sequentibus quorum erat, obuius forte Sergio et Matieno tribunis militum fuit;
9.3. By order of the tribunes the cup was taken away from the man. Thereupon angry words followed and shouting, finally a battle between Pleminius' soldiers and those of the tribunes, while numbers and rioting increased in proportion as one side or the other gained a timely arrival.
9.3. cui cum iussu tribunorum ademptum poculum esset, iurgium inde et clamor, pugna postremo orta inter Plemini milites tribunorumque, ut suis quisque opportunus aduenerat multitudine simul ac tumultu crescente.
9.4. The soldiers of Pleminius were worsted, and when they came running to him displaying bloody wounds, not without angry shouts as they reported insults that had been heaped even upon him in an altercation, he was inflamed with anger, dashed out of his house, summoned the tribunes and ordered them to be stripped and the rods made ready.
9.4. uicti Plemini milites cum ad Pleminium cruorem ac uolnera ostentantes non sine uociferatione atque indignatione concurrissent probra in eum ipsum iactata in iurgiis referentes, accensus ira domo sese proripuit uocatosque tribunos nudari ac uirgas expediri iubet.
9.5. While time was being taken to strip them —for they resisted and called upon the soldiers to help them — suddenly soldiers, flushed by their recent victory, came running from every quarter, just as if there had been a call to arms against the enemy.
9.5. dum spoliandis iis—repugnabant enim militumque fidem implorabant—tempus teritur, repente milites feroces recenti uictoria ex omnibus locis, uelut aduersus hostes ad arma conclamatum esset, concurrerunt;
9.6. And when they caught sight of the tribunes' backs already welted by the rods, upon that they were indeed suddenly fired to a much more uncontrollable madness, and after roughly handling the lictors in shameful fashion, without regard even for humanity, not to say for the dignity of his rank, they assaulted the legatus.
9.6. et cum uiolata iam uirgis corpora tribunorum uidissent, tum uero in multo impotentiorem subito rabiem accensi sine respectu non maiestatis modo sed etiam humanitatis, in legatum impetum lictoribus prius indignum in modum mulcatis faciunt.
9.7. Then, having separated and cut him off from his men, they slashed him as if an enemy and, mutilating his nose and ears, left him almost lifeless.
9.7. tum ipsum ab suis interceptum et seclusum hostiliter lacerant et prope exsanguem naso auribusque mutilatis relinquunt.
9.8. These acts being reported at Messana, Scipio a few days later sailed to Locri on a hexēris. Then having heard the case of Pleminius and the tribunes, he discharged Pleminius as innocent and left him in command of the same place, while the tribunes were adjudged guilty and put in chains, to be sent to the senate at Rome; whereupon he returned to Messana and thence to Syracuse.
9.8. his Messanam nuntiatis Scipio post paucos dies Locros hexere aduectus cum causam Plemini et tribunorum audisset, Pleminio noxa liberato relictoque in eiusdem loci praesidio, tribunis sontibus iudicatis et in uincla coniectis ut Romam ad senatum mitterentur, Messanam atque inde Syracusas rediit.
9.9. Pleminius was beside himself with rage, thinking the wrong done to him had been overlooked by Scipio and treated as too trivial; also that no one else was capable of naming a penalty for the offence except a man who had known its barbarity by suffering. Accordingly he ordered the tribunes to be brought before him, and had them mangled by every torture which any human body can endure and then put to death.
9.9. Pleminius impotens irae, neglectam ab Scipione et nimis leuiter latam suam iniuriam ratus nec quemquam aestimare alium eam litem posse nisi qui atrocitatem eius patiendo sensisset, tribunos attrahi ad se iussit, laceratosque omnibus quae pati corpus ullum potest suppliciis interfecit, nec satiatus uiuorum poena insepultos proiecit.
9.11. Not satisfied with a penalty paid by the living either, he threw them out unburied. The like cruelty was used by him against leading men of the Locrians who, he learned, had gone to Publius Scipio to complain of the outrages.
9.11. simili crudelitate et in Locrensium principes est usus quos ad conquerendas iniurias ad P. Scipionem profectos audiuit;
9.12. Then in anger he multiplied the shameful acts which, prompted previously by lust and greed, he had perpetrated upon the allies, and brought infamy and odium not only upon himself but also upon his general.
9.12. et quae antea per libidinem atque auaritiam foeda exempla in socios ediderat, tunc ab ira multiplicia edere, infamiae atque inuidiae non sibi modo sed etiam imperatori esse.
10.1. The time for the elections was already at hand when a letter from Publius Licinius, the consul, reached Rome, reporting that he and his army were suffering from a serious malady, and that they could not have held out if an equally violent or even more serious disease had not been visited upon the enemy.
10.1. iam comitiorum appetebat tempus cum a P. Licinio consule litterae Romam allatae se exercitumque suum graui morbo adflictari, nec sisti potuisse ni eadem uis mali aut grauior etiam in hostes ingruisset;