--- title: "On the Meeting for the sake of receiving Instructions" author: "Philo of Alexandria" translator: "C. D. Yonge" languages: [en] shelf: "Second Temple" section: 12 of 14 url: https://scriptura.si/works/philo-tlg016-yonge-ogl/12/ cite: "Philo of Alexandria, tr. C. D. Yonge, On the Meeting for the sake of receiving Instructions, section 12. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/philo-tlg016-yonge-ogl/12/" --- # On the Meeting for the sake of receiving Instructions *Philo of Alexandria, tr. C. D. Yonge* ## 12. Section 143 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/philo-tlg016-yonge-ogl/12/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/philo-tlg016-yonge-ogl/12/#p-N [¶0] For as the eyes see, and still the mind sees more clearly by means of the eyes; and as the ears hear, but nevertheless the mind hears better through the medium of the ears; and as the nostrils smell, and yet the soul smells more precisely through the instrumentality of the nostrils; and in like manner, as the other external senses comprehend their respective appropriate objects, still the mind comprehends them also more purely and distinctly by their ministration. For to speak properly, it is the mind which is the eye of eyes, the hearing of hearing, and the more pure external sense of each of the external senses, using them as ministers in a court of justice, and itself deciding on the nature of the objects submitted to it, so as to approve of some and to reject others. In the same way, those that are called the intermediate arts, resembling the faculties of the body, indulge in contemplations according to certain simple observations of them, but the sciences do so with greater accuracy and with an exceedingly careful investigation. ### Section 144 [¶2] For the same relation that the mind bears to the outward Genesis xvi. 4. sense, that same does science bear towards art; for, as has been said before, the soul is as it were the outward sense of the outward sense; therefore each of them has attracted to itself some slight things of nature, concerning which it labours and occupies itself, geometry having appropriated lines, and music sounds, and philosophy the whole nature of existing things. For this world is its subject matter, and so is the whole essence, both visible and invisible, of existing things. ### Section 145 [¶4] What then is there wonderful if the soul, which sees both the whole and the parts, sees them too better than they do, as if it were furnished with larger and more acute eyes? Very naturally, therefore, proper philosophy will behold intermediate instruction its handmaiden, and see that she is pregnant, more than the other will see that she is. ### Section 146 [¶6] And yet even this is not unknown to any one, namely, that philosophy has bestowed upon all the particular sciences their first principles and seeds, from which speculations respecting them appear to arise. For it is geometry which invented equilateral and scalene triangles, and circles, and polygons, and all kinds of other figures. But it was no longer geometry that discovered the nature of a point, and a line, and a superficies, and a solid, which are the roots and foundations of the aforementioned figures. ### Section 147 [¶8] For from whence could it define and pronounce that a point is that which has no parts, that a line is length without breadth; that a superficies is that which has only length and breadth; that a solid is that which has the three properties, length, breadth, and depth? For these discoveries belong to philosophy, and the consideration of these definitions belongs wholly to the philosopher. ### Section 148 [¶10] Again, to write and read is the undertaking of this more imperfect kind of grammar, which some people, perverting the name of, call grammatistica. But to the more perfect kind of grammar belongs the explanation of the great works of the poets and historians. When, therefore, men are going through the different parts of speech, are they not in so doing trying to drag over to themselves and appropriate as a kind of accessory the discoveries of philosophy? ### Section 149 [¶12] For it is the peculiar province of philosophy to inquire what a conjunction, what a noun, what a verb, what a common noun, what a particular noun, what is deficient in a speech, what is superfluous, what is an affirmative, what an interrogative, what an indirect question, what is a comprehensive expression, what is a supplicatory form of address. For this is a science which has been compounded for the purpose of the investigation of independent propositions, and axioms, and categorems. ### Section 150 [¶14] But, moreover, has not the whole question of semi-vowels, or vowels, or such elements as are completely mute, and the consideration of the sense in which each of these expressions is ordinarily used, and in short every notion connected with the voice, and the elements, and the parts of speech, been thoroughly worked out and brought to an accurate system by philosophy? And those thieves, after having as it were carried off a few drops from her torrent, and having sought to impregnate their own shallow souls with what they have stolen, are not ashamed to bring forth her resources as their own. ### Section 151 [¶16] On which account, being elated and proud, they disregard the mistress to whom in reality the authority and the complete confirmation of their contemplations belong. But she, perceiving their neglect, will convict them, and will speak freely to them, and say, "I am treated unjustly, and in utter violation of our agreement, as far as depends on you who transgress the covenants entered into between us; ### Section 152 [¶18] for from the time that you first took to your bosom the elementary branches of education, you have honoured above measure the offspring of my handmaiden, and have respected her as your wife, and you have so completely repudiated me that you never by any chance came to the same place with me. And perhaps this may be only a suspicion of mine respecting you, arising from your open connection with my servant, which leads me to conjecture your alienation from myself, though it is not really manifest. But if your disposition is contrary to that which I suspect, still it is impossible for any one else to know this, but it is easy to God alone." ### Section 153 [¶20] On which account she says very appropriately, "May God judge between thee and me; Genesis xvi. 5. not making haste to condemn him beforehand as having done her wrong, but intimating a doubt, that perhaps he may speedily do her right, which in point of fact is seen to be the case not long afterwards, when he, excusing himself and remedying her doubts, says to her, "Behold thy handmaiden is in thy hands, do unto her as it seemeth good to thee." Genesis xvi. 5. ### Section 154 [¶22] For also, when he calls her her handmaiden, he confesses both facts, both that she is a slave and also that she is a child; for the name of the handmaiden (παιδίσκη) suits both these circumstances. At the same time also, he confesses the contrary things, opposing the child to the full-grown woman, and the mistress to her slave, all but crying out in plain words: I embrace indeed encyclical instruction as a younger maiden and as a handmaiden, but I honour knowledge and prudence as full-grown and a mistress. ### Section 155 [¶24] And the expression, "She is in thy hands," means, she is in thy power and subject to thee. And this is also a symbol of something else of this nature, namely, that the qualities of the handmaiden come to the hands of the body; for the encyclical branches of knowledge have need of the bodily organs and faculties; but the qualities of the mistress reach the soul; for the things which belong to prudence and knowledge come under the province of reason;