--- title: "Alcibiades I · Ἀλκιβιάδης αʹ" author: "Plato" translator: "Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" section: 1 of 3 url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-i/1/ cite: "Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, Alcibiades I · Ἀλκιβιάδης αʹ, section 1. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-i/1/" --- # Alcibiades I · Ἀλκιβιάδης αʹ *Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb* Socrates tells the ambitious young Alcibiades that before he rules others he must know himself. > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg013, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg013.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (Stephanus sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 1. 103a–114b Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-i/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-i/1/#p-N [¶0] 103a. Soc. Son of Cleinias, I think it must surprise you that I, the first of all your lovers, am the only one of them who has not given up his suit and thrown you over, and whereas they have all pestered you with their conversation I have not spoken one word to you for so many years. The cause of this has been nothing human, but a certain spiritual opposition, of whose power you shall be informed at some later time. However, it now opposes me no longer, so I have accordingly come to you; and I am in good hopes that it will not oppose me again in the future. > Greek: 103a. ΣΩ. ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου, οἶμαί σε θαυμάζειν ὅτι πρῶτος ἐραστής σου γενόμενος τῶν ἄλλων πεπαυμένων μόνος οὐκ ἀπαλλάττομαι, καὶ ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι διʼ ὄχλου ἐγένοντό σοι διαλεγόμενοι, ἐγὼ δὲ τοσούτων ἐτῶν οὐδὲ προσεῖπον. τούτου δὲ τὸ αἴτιον γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλά τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πεύσῃ. νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκέτι ἐναντιοῦται, οὕτω προσελήλυθα· [¶1] 103b. Now I have been observing you all this time, and have formed a pretty good notion of your behavior to your lovers: for although they were many and high-spirited, everyone of them has found your spirit too strong for him and has run away. > Greek: 103b. εὔελπις δʼ εἰμὶ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ ἐναντιώσεσθαι αὐτό. σχεδὸν οὖν κατανενόηκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ σκοπούμενος ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἐραστὰς ἔσχες· πολλῶν γὰρ γενομένων καὶ μεγαλοφρόνων οὐδεὶς ὃς οὐχ ὑπερβληθεὶς τῷ φρονήματι ὑπὸ σοῦ πέφευγεν. [¶2] 104a. Soc. Let me explain the reason of your spirit being too much for them. You say you have no need of any man in any matter; for your resources are so great, beginning with the body and ending with the soul, that you lack nothing. You think, in the first place, that you are foremost in beauty and stature—and you are not mistaken in this, as is plain for all to see—and in the second place, that you are of the most gallant family in your city, the greatest city in Greece, and that there you have, through your father, very many of the best people as your friends and kinsmen, who would assist you in case of need, and other connections also, through your mother, who are not a whit inferior to these, nor fewer. > Greek: 104a. ΣΩ. τὸν δὲ λόγον, ᾧ ὑπερπεφρόνηκας, ἐθέλω διελθεῖν. οὐδενὸς φῂς ἀνθρώπων ἐνδεὴς εἶναι εἰς οὐδέν· τὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχοντά σοι μεγάλα εἶναι, ὥστε μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀρξάμενα τελευτῶντα εἰς τὴν ψυχήν. οἴει γὰρ δὴ εἶναι πρῶτον μὲν κάλλιστός τε καὶ μέγιστος—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ παντὶ δῆλον ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐ ψεύδῃ—ἔπειτα νεανικωτάτου γένους ἐν τῇ σεαυτοῦ ἐνταῦθα πρὸς πατρός τέ σοι φίλους καὶ συγγενεῖς πλείστους εἶναι καὶ ἀρίστους, οἳ εἴ τι δέοι ὑπηρετοῖεν ἄν σοι, τούτων δὲ τοὺς πρὸς μητρὸς οὐδὲν χείρους οὐδʼ ἐλάττους. [¶3] 104b. And you reckon upon a stronger power than all those that I have mentioned, in Pericles, son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian of you and your brother when he died, and who is able to do whatever he likes not only in this city but all over Greece and among many great nations of the barbarians. > Greek: 104b. συμπάντων δὲ ὧν εἶπον μείζω οἴει σοι δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου, ὃν ὁ πατὴρ ἐπίτροπον κατέλιπε σοί τε καὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ· ὃς οὐ μόνον ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει δύναται πράττειν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, ἀλλʼ ἐν πάσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ μεγάλοις γένεσιν. προσθήσω δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν πλουσίων· [¶4] 104c. And I will add besides the wealth of your house: but on this, I observe, you presume least of all. Well, you puff yourself up on all these advantages, and have overcome your lovers, while they in their inferiority have yielded to your might, and all this has not escaped you; so I am very sure that you wonder what on earth I mean by not getting rid of my passion, and what can be my hope in remaining when the rest have fled. > Greek: 104c. δοκεῖς δέ μοι ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἥκιστα μέγα φρονεῖν. κατὰ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα σύ τε μεγαλαυχούμενος κεκράτηκας τῶν ἐραστῶν ἐκεῖνοί τε ὑποδεέστεροι ὄντες ἐκρατήθησαν, καί σε ταῦτʼ οὐ λέληθεν· ὅθεν δὴ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι θαυμάζεις τί διανοούμενός ποτε οὐκ ἀπαλλάττομαι τοῦ ἔρωτος, καὶ ἥντινʼ ἔχων ἐλπίδα ὑπομένω τῶν ἄλλων πεφευγότων. [¶5] Alc. Perhaps also, Socrates, you are not aware that you have only just anticipated me. > Greek: ΑΛ. καὶ ἴσως γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι σμικρόν με ἔφθης. [¶6] 104d. For I, in fact, had the intention of coming and asking you first that very same question—what is your aim and expectation in bothering me by making a particular point of always turning up wherever I may be. For I really do wonder what can be your object, and should be very glad if you would tell me. > Greek: 104d. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι ἐν νῷ εἶχον πρότερός σοι προσελθὼν αὐτὰ ταῦτʼ ἐρέσθαι, τί ποτε βούλει καὶ εἰς τίνα ἐλπίδα βλέπων ἐνοχλεῖς με, ἀεὶ ὅπου ἂν ὦ ἐπιμελέστατα παρών· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ θαυμάζω ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἥδιστʼ ἂν πυθοίμην. [¶7] Soc. Then you will listen to me, presumably, with keen attention if, as you say, you long to know what I mean, and I have in you a listener who will stay to hear me out. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀκούσῃ μὲν ἄρα μου, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, προθύμως, εἴπερ, ὡς φῄς, ἐπιθυμεῖς εἰδέναι τί διανοοῦμαι, καὶ ὡς ἀκουσομένῳ καὶ περιμενοῦντι λέγω. [¶8] Alc. Why, to be sure: only speak. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἀλλὰ λέγε. [¶9] 104e. Soc. Look to it, then; for it would be no wonder if I should make as much difficulty about stopping as I have made about starting. > Greek: 104e. ΣΩ. ὅρα δή· οὐ γάρ τοι εἴη ἂν θαυμαστὸν εἰ, ὥσπερ μόγις ἠρξάμην, οὕτω μόγις καὶ παυσαίμην. [¶10] Alc. My good sir, speak; for I will listen. > Greek: ΑΛ. ὠγαθὲ λέγε· ἀκούσομαι γάρ. [¶11] 105. Soc. Speak I must, I suppose. Now, although it is hard for a lover to parley with a man who does not yield to lovers, I must make bold nevertheless to put my meaning into words. For if I saw you, Alcibiades, content with the things I set forth just now, and minded to pass your life in enjoying them, I should long ago have put away my love, so at least I persuade myself: but as it is, I shall propound to your face quite another set of your thoughts, whereby you will understand that I have had you continually before my mind. > Greek: 105. ΣΩ. λεκτέον ἂν εἴη. χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἄνδρα οὐχ ἥττονα ἐραστῶν προσφέρεσθαι ἐραστῇ, ὅμως δὲ τολμητέον φράσαι τὴν ἐμὴν διάνοιαν. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰ μέν σε ἑώρων ἃ νυνδὴ διῆλθον ἀγαπῶντα καὶ οἰόμενον δεῖν ἐν τούτοις καταβιῶναι, πάλαι ἂν ἀπηλλάγμην τοῦ ἔρωτος, ὥς γε δὴ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω· [¶12] 105a. For I believe, if some god should ask you: “Alcibiades, do you prefer to live with your present possessions, or to die immediately if you are not to have the chance of acquiring greater things?” I believe you would choose to die. But let me tell you what I imagine must be the present hope of your life. You think that if you come shortly before the Athenian Assembly—which you expect to occur in a very few days—you will stand forth and prove to the people that you are more worthy of honor than either Pericles or anyone else who has ever existed, and that having proved this you will have the greatest power in the state; and that if you are the greatest here, you will be the same among all the other Greeks, and not only Greeks, but all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. > Greek: 105a. νῦν δʼ ἕτερʼ αὖ κατηγορήσω διανοήματα σὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν σέ, ᾧ καὶ γνώσῃ ὅτι προσέχων γέ σοι τὸν νοῦν διατετέλεκα. δοκεῖς γάρ μοι, εἴ τίς σοι εἴποι θεῶν· ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, πότερον βούλει ζῆν ἔχων ἃ νῦν ἔχεις, ἢ αὐτίκα τεθνάναι εἰ μή σοι ἐξέσται μείζω κτήσασθαι; δοκεῖς ἄν μοι ἑλέσθαι τεθνάναι· ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐπὶ τίνι δή ποτε ἐλπίδι ζῇς, ἐγὼ φράσω. ἡγῇ, ἐὰν θᾶττον εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον παρέλθῃς—τοῦτο δʼ ἔσεσθαι μάλα ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν— παρελθὼν οὖν ἐνδείξεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ἄξιος εἶ τιμᾶσθαι ὡς οὔτε Περικλῆς οὔτʼ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πώποτε γενομένων, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐνδειξάμενος μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐὰν δʼ ἐνθάδε μέγιστος ᾖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐν Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ὅσοι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμῖν οἰκοῦσιν ἠπείρῳ. [¶13] 105b. And if that same god should say to you again, that you are to hold sway here in Europe, but are not to be allowed to cross over into Asia and to interfere with the affairs of that region, I believe you would be equally loth to live on those sole conditions either—if you are not to fill, one may say, the whole world with your name and your power; and I fancy that, except Cyrus and Xerxes, you think there has never existed a single man who was of any account. > Greek: 105b. καὶ εἰ αὖ σοι εἴποι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος θεὸς ὅτι αὐτοῦ σε δεῖ δυναστεύειν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ, διαβῆναι δὲ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν οὐκ ἐξέσται σοι οὐδὲ ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ πράγμασιν, οὐκ ἂν αὖ μοι δοκεῖς ἐθέλειν οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τούτοις μόνοις ζῆν, εἰ μὴ ἐμπλήσεις τοῦ σοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τῆς σῆς δυνάμεως πάντας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώπους· [¶14] 105c. So then that this is your hope, I know well enough; I am not merely guessing. And I daresay you will reply, since you know that what I say is true: “Well, Socrates, and what has that to do with your point?” > Greek: 105c. καὶ οἶμαί σε πλὴν Κύρου καὶ Ξέρξου ἡγεῖσθαι οὐδένα ἄξιον λόγου γεγονέναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχεις ταύτην τὴν ἐλπίδα, εὖ οἶδα καὶ οὐκ εἰκάζω. ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποις, ἅτε εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, τί δὴ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτʼ ἐστί σοι πρὸς >λόγον; [¶15] 105d. I am going to tell you, dear son of Cleinias and Deinomache. Without me it is impossible for all those designs of yours to be crowned with achievement; so great is the power I conceive myself to have over your affairs and over you, and it is for this very reason, I believe, that the god has so long prevented me from talking with you, and I was waiting to see when he would allow me. For as you have hopes of proving yourself in public to be invaluable to the state and, having proved it, of winning forthwith unlimited power, so do I hope to win supreme power over you by proving that I am invaluable to you, and that neither guardian nor kinsman nor anyone else is competent to transmit to you the power that you long for except me, with the god’s help, however. > Greek: 105d. [ὃν ἔφησθα ἐρεῖν, διὸ ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἀπαλλάττῃ;] ἐγὼ δὲ σοί γε ἐρῶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ Κλεινίου καὶ Δεινομάχης. τούτων γάρ σοι ἁπάντων τῶν διανοημάτων τέλος ἐπιτεθῆναι ἄνευ ἐμοῦ ἀδύνατον· τοσαύτην ἐγὼ δύναμιν οἶμαι ἔχειν εἰς τὰ σὰ πράγματα καὶ εἰς σέ, διὸ δὴ καὶ πάλαι οἴομαί με τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἐᾶν διαλέγεσθαί σοι, ὃν ἐγὼ περιέμενον ὁπηνίκα ἐάσει. ὥσπερ γὰρ σὺ ἐλπίδας ἔχεις ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι αὐτῇ παντὸς ἄξιος εἶ, ἐνδειξάμενος δὲ [ὅτι] οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ παραυτίκα δυνήσεσθαι, οὕτω κἀγὼ παρὰ σοὶ ἐλπίζω μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι ἐνδειξάμενος ὅτι παντὸς ἄξιός εἰμί σοι καὶ οὔτε ἐπίτροπος οὔτε συγγενὴς οὔτʼ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἱκανὸς παραδοῦναι τὴν δύναμιν ἧς ἐπιθυμεῖς πλὴν ἐμοῦ, μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέντοι. [¶16] 105e. In your younger days, to be sure, before you had built such high hopes, the god, as I believe, prevented me from talking with you, in order that I might not waste my words: but now he has set me on; > Greek: 105e. νεωτέρῳ μὲν οὖν ὄντι σοι καὶ πρὶν τοσαύτης ἐλπίδος γέμειν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ εἴα ὁ θεὸς διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ μάτην διαλεγοίμην. [¶17] 106a. for now you will listen to me. > Greek: 106a. νῦν δʼ ἐφῆκεν· νῦν γὰρ ἄν μου ἀκούσαις. [¶18] 106. Alc. You seem to me far more extraordinary, Socrates, now that you have begun to speak, than before, when you followed me about in silence; though even then you looked strange enough. Well, as to my intending all this or not, you have apparently made your decision, and any denial of mine will not avail me to persuade you. Very good: but supposing I have intended ever so much what you say, how are you the sole means through which I can hope to attain it? Can you tell me? > Greek: 106. ΑΛ. πολύ γέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν ἀτοπώτερος αὖ φαίνῃ, ἐπειδὴ ἤρξω λέγειν, ἢ ὅτε σιγῶν εἵπου· καίτοι σφόδρα γε ἦσθʼ ἰδεῖν καὶ τότε τοιοῦτος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ταῦτα διανοοῦμαι ἢ μή, ὡς ἔοικε, διέγνωκας, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ φῶ, οὐδέν μοι ἔσται πλέον πρὸς τὸ πείθειν σε. εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ ὅτι μάλιστα ταῦτα διανενόημαι, πῶς διὰ σοῦ μοι ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ σοῦ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο; ἔχεις λέγειν; [¶19] 106b. Soc. Are you asking whether I can make a long speech, such as you are used to hearing? No, my gift is not of that sort. But I fancy I could prove to you that the case is so, if you will consent to do me just one little service. > Greek: 106b. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ ἐρωτᾷς εἴ τινʼ ἔχω εἰπεῖν λόγον μακρόν, οἵους δὴ ἀκούειν εἴθισαι; οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐμόν· ἀλλʼ ἐνδείξασθαι μέν σοι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, οἷός τʼ ἂν εἴην ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, ἐὰν ἓν μόνον μοι ἐθελήσῃς βραχὺ ὑπηρετῆσαι. [¶20] Alc. Why, if you mean a service that is not troublesome, I consent. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ εἴ γε δὴ μὴ χαλεπόν τι λέγεις τὸ ὑπηρέτημα, ἐθέλω. [¶21] Soc. Do you consider it troublesome to answer questions put to you? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ χαλεπὸν δοκεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα; [¶22] Alc. No, I do not. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ χαλεπόν. [¶23] Soc. Then answer. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνου δή. [¶24] Alc. Ask. > Greek: ΑΛ. Ἐρώτα. [¶25] Soc. Well, you have the intentions which I say you have, I suppose? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡς διανοουμένου σου ταῦτα ἐρωτῶ, ἅ φημί σε διανοεῖσθαι; [¶26] 106c. Alc. Be it so, if you like, in order that I may know what you will say next. > Greek: 106c. ΑΛ. ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, οὕτως, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι καὶ ἐρεῖς. [¶27] Soc. Now then: you intend, as I say, to come forward as adviser to the Athenians in no great space of time; well, suppose I were to take hold of you as you were about to ascend the platform, and were to ask you: “Alcibiades, on what subject do the Athenians propose to take advice, that you should stand up to advise them? Is it something about which you have better knowledge than they?” What would be your reply? > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή· διανοῇ γάρ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, παριέναι συμβουλεύσων Ἀθηναίοις ἐντὸς οὐ πολλοῦ χρόνου· εἰ οὖν μέλλοντός σου ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα λαβόμενος ἐροίμην· ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τίνος Ἀθηναῖοι διανοοῦνται βουλεύεσθαι, ἀνίστασαι συμβουλεύσων; ἆρʼ ἐπειδὴ περὶ ὧν σὺ ἐπίστασαι βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι; τί ἂν ἀποκρίναιο; [¶28] 106d. Alc. I should say, I suppose, it was something about which I knew better than they. > Greek: 106d. ΑΛ. εἴποιμʼ ἂν δήπου, περὶ ὧν οἶδα βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι. [¶29] Soc. Then you are a good adviser on things about which you actually know. > Greek: ΣΩ. περὶ ὧν ἄρʼ εἰδὼς τυγχάνεις, ἀγαθὸς σύμβουλος εἶ. [¶30] Alc. To be sure. > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶31] Soc. And you know only the things you have learnt from others or discovered yourself? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μόνον οἶσθα, ἃ παρʼ ἄλλων ἔμαθες ἢ αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρες; [¶32] Alc. What could I know besides? > Greek: ΑΛ. ποῖα γὰρ ἄλλα; [¶33] Soc. And can it be that you would ever have learnt or discovered anything without being willing either to learn it or to inquire into it yourself? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ἄν ποτε ἔμαθές τι ἢ ἐξηῦρες μήτε μανθάνειν ἐθέλων μήτʼ αὐτὸς ζητεῖν; [¶34] Alc. No. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν. [¶35] Soc. Well then, would you have been willing to inquire into or learn what you thought you knew? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἠθέλησας ἂν ζητῆσαι ἢ μαθεῖν ἃ ἐπίστασθαι ᾤου; [¶36] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶37] 106e. Soc. So there was a time when you did not think that you knew what you now actually know. > Greek: 106e. ΣΩ. ἃ ἄρα νῦν τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, ἦν χρόνος ὅτε οὐχ ἡγοῦ εἰδέναι; [¶38] Alc. There must have been. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη. [¶39] Soc. Well, but I know pretty nearly the things that you have learnt: tell me if anything has escaped me. You learnt, if I recollect, writing and harping and wrestling; as for fluting, you refused to learn it. These are the things that you know, unless perhaps there is something you have been learning unobserved by me; and this you were not, I believe, if you so much as stepped out of doors either by night or by day. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἅ γε μεμάθηκας σχεδόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα· εἰ δέ τι ἐμὲ λέληθεν, εἰπέ. ἔμαθες γὰρ δὴ σύ γε κατὰ μνήμην τὴν ἐμὴν γράμματα καὶ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐλεῖν γε ἤθελες μαθεῖν. ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ ἐπίστασαι, εἰ μή πού τι μανθάνων ἐμὲ λέληθας· οἶμαι δέ γε, οὔτε νύκτωρ οὔτε μεθʼ ἡμέραν ἐξιὼν ἔνδοθεν. [¶40] Alc. No, I have taken no other lessons than those. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ οὐ πεφοίτηκα εἰς ἄλλων ἢ τούτων. [¶41] 107a. Soc. Then tell me, will it be when the Athenians are taking advice how they are to do their writing correctly that you are to stand up and advise them? Alc. Upon my word, not I. Soc. Well, about strokes on the lyre? Alc. Not at all. Soc. Nor in fact are they accustomed to deliberate on throws in wrestling either at the Assembly. Alc. No, to be sure. Soc. Then what will be the subject of the advice? For I presume it will not be about building. Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: 107a. ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν, ὅταν περὶ γραμμάτων Ἀθηναῖοι βουλεύωνται, πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς γράφοιεν, τότε ἀναστήσῃ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσων; ΑΛ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὅταν περὶ κρουμάτων ἐν λύρᾳ; ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδὲ περὶ παλαισμάτων γε εἰώθασι βουλεύεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ. ΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι. ΣΩ. ὅταν οὖν περὶ τίνος βουλεύωνται; οὐ γάρ που ὅταν γε περὶ οἰκοδομίας. ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. οἰκοδόμος γὰρ ταῦτά γε σοῦ βέλτιον συμβουλεύσει. [¶42] 107b. Soc. For a builder will give better advice than you in that matter. Alc. Yes. Soc. Nor yet will it be about divination? Alc. No. Soc. For there again a diviner will serve better than you. Alc. Yes. Soc. Whether he be short or tall, handsome or ugly, nay, noble or ignoble. Alc. Of course. Soc. For on each subject the advice comes from one who knows, not one who has riches. Alc. Of course. Soc. And whether their mentor be poor or rich will make no difference to the Athenians when they deliberate for the health of the citizens; all that they require of their counsellor is that he be a physician. > Greek: 107b. ΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐδὲ μὴν ὅταν περὶ μαντικῆς βουλεύωνται; ΑΛ. οὔ. ΣΩ. μάντις γὰρ αὖ ταῦτα ἄμεινον ἢ σύ. ΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἐάν τέ γε σμικρὸς ἢ μέγας ᾖ, ἐάν τε καλὸς ἢ αἰσχρός, ἔτι τε γενναῖος ἢ ἀγεννής. ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. εἰδότος γὰρ οἶμαι περὶ ἑκάστου ἡ συμβουλή, καὶ οὐ πλουτοῦντος. ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐάντε πένης ἐάντε πλούσιος ᾖ ὁ παραινῶν, οὐδὲν διοίσει Ἀθηναίοις ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βουλεύωνται, πῶς ἂν ὑγιαίνοιεν, ἀλλὰ ζητήσουσιν ἰατρὸν εἶναι τὸν σύμβουλον. [¶43] 107c. Alc. Naturally. > Greek: 107c. ΑΛ. εἰκότως γε. [¶44] Soc. Then what will they have under consideration if you are to be right in standing up, when you do so, as their counsellor? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅταν οὖν περὶ τίνος σκοπῶνται, τότε σὺ ἀνιστάμενος ὡς συμβουλεύσων ὀρθῶς ἀναστήσῃ; [¶45] Alc. Their own affairs, Socrates. > Greek: ΑΛ. ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶46] Soc. Do you mean with regard to shipbuilding, and the question as to what sort of ships they ought to get built? > Greek: ΣΩ. τῶν περὶ ναυπηγίας λέγεις, ὁποίας τινὰς χρὴ αὐτοὺς τὰς ναῦς ναυπηγεῖσθαι; [¶47] Alc. No, I do not, Socrates. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶48] Soc. Because, I imagine, you do not understand shipbuilding. Is that, and that alone, the reason? > Greek: ΣΩ. ναυπηγεῖν γὰρ οἶμαι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. τοῦτʼ αἴτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι; [¶49] Alc. That is just the reason. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. [¶50] 107d. Soc. Well, on what sort of affairs of their own do you mean that they will be deliberating? > Greek: 107d. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ περὶ ποίων τῶν ἑαυτῶν λέγεις πραγμάτων ὅταν βουλεύωνται; [¶51] Alc. On war, Socrates, or on peace, or on any other of the state’s affairs. > Greek: ΑΛ. ὅταν περὶ πολέμου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ περὶ εἰρήνης ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων. [¶52] Soc. Do you mean that they will be deliberating with whom they ought to make peace, and on whom they ought to make war, and in what manner? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρα λέγεις ὅταν βουλεύωνται πρὸς τίνας χρὴ εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τίσιν πολεμεῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον; [¶53] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶54] Soc. And on whom it is better to do so, ought they not? > Greek: ΣΩ. χρὴ δʼ οὐχ οἷς βέλτιον; [¶55] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶56] 107e. Soc. And at such time as it is better? > Greek: 107e. ΣΩ. καὶ τόθʼ ὁπότε βέλτιον; [¶57] Alc. Certainly. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶58] Soc. And for so long as they had better? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἄμεινον; [¶59] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶60] Soc. Now if the Athenians should deliberate with whom they should wrestle close, and with whom only at arm’s length, and in what manner, would you or the wrestling-master be the better adviser? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν βουλεύοιντο Ἀθηναῖοι τίσιν χρὴ προσπαλαίειν καὶ τίσιν ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον, σὺ ἄμεινον ἂν συμβουλεύοις ἢ ὁ παιδοτρίβης; [¶61] Alc. The wrestling-master, I presume. > Greek: ΑΛ. ὁ παιδοτρίβης δήπου. [¶62] Soc. And can you tell me what the wrestling-master would have in view when he advised as to the persons with whom they ought or ought not to wrestle close, and when and in what manner? What I mean is something like this: ought they not to wrestle close with those with whom it is better to do so? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν πρὸς τί ⟨ἂν⟩ βλέπων ὁ παιδοτρίβης συμβουλεύσειεν οἷς δεῖ προσπαλαίειν καὶ οἷς μή, καὶ ὁπότε καὶ ὅντινα τρόπον; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἆρα τούτοις δεῖ προσπαλαίειν οἷς βέλτιον, ἢ οὔ; [¶63] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶64] 108a. Soc. And so far as is better, too? > Greek: 108a. ΣΩ. ἆρα καὶ τοσαῦτα ὅσα ἄμεινον; [¶65] Alc. So far. > Greek: ΑΛ. τοσαῦτα. [¶66] Soc. And at such time also as is better? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τότε ὅτε ἄμεινον; [¶67] Alc. Certainly. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶68] Soc. But again, when one sings, one has sometimes to accompany the song with harping and stepping? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ᾁδοντα δεῖ κιθαρίζειν ποτὲ πρὸς τὴν ᾠδὴν καὶ βαίνειν; [¶69] Alc. Yes, one has. > Greek: ΑΛ. δεῖ γάρ. [¶70] Soc. And at such time as is better? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τότε ὁπότε βέλτιον; [¶71] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶72] Soc. And so far as is better? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τοσαῦθʼ ὅσα βέλτιον; [¶73] Alc. I agree. > Greek: ΑΛ. φημί. [¶74] Soc. Well now, since you applied the term “better” to the two cases of harping for accompaniment of a song and close wrestling, what do you call the “better” in the case of harping, to correspond with what in the case of wrestling I call gymnastic? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ βέλτιον μὲν ὠνόμαζες ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέροις, τῷ τε κιθαρίζειν πρὸς τὴν ᾠδὴν καὶ τῷ προσπαλαίειν, τί καλεῖς τὸ ἐν τῷ κιθαρίζειν βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τὸ ἐν τῷ παλαίειν καλῶ γυμναστικόν· [¶75] 108b. What do you call the other? > Greek: 108b. σὺ δʼ ἐκεῖνο τί καλεῖς; [¶76] Alc. I do not understand. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐκ ἐννοῶ. [¶77] Soc. Well, try to copy me: for my answer gave you, I think, what is correct in every instance; and that is correct, I presume, which proceeds by rule of the art, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ἐμὲ μιμεῖσθαι. ἐγὼ γάρ που ἀπεκρινάμην τὸ διὰ παντὸς ὀρθῶς ἔχον, ὀρθῶς δὲ δήπου ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην γιγνόμενον· ἢ οὔ; [¶78] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶79] Soc. And was not the art here gymnastic? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἡ δὲ τέχνη οὐ γυμναστικὴ ἦν; [¶80] Alc. To be sure. > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; [¶81] 108c. Soc. And I said that the better in the case of wrestling was gymnastic. > Greek: 108c. ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δʼ εἶπον τὸ ἐν τῷ παλαίειν βέλτιον γυμναστικόν. [¶82] Alc. You did. > Greek: ΑΛ. εἶπες γάρ. [¶83] Soc. And I was quite fair? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς; [¶84] Alc. I think so. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶85] Soc. Come then, in your turn—for it would befit you also, I fancy, to argue fairly —tell me, first, what is the art which includes harping and singing and treading the measure correctly? What is it called as a whole? You cannot yet tell me? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ—πρέποι γὰρ ἄν που καὶ σοὶ τὸ καλῶς διαλέγεσθαι—εἰπὲ πρῶτον τίς ἡ τέχνη ἧς τὸ κιθαρίζειν καὶ τὸ ᾁδειν καὶ τὸ ἐμβαίνειν ὀρθῶς; συνάπασα τίς καλεῖται; οὔπω δύνασαι εἰπεῖν; [¶86] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶87] Soc. Well, try another way: who are the goddesses that foster the art? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὧδε πειρῶ· τίνες αἱ θεαὶ ὧν ἡ τέχνη; [¶88] Alc. The Muses, you mean, Socrates? > Greek: ΑΛ. τὰς μούσας, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις; [¶89] 108d. Soc. I do. Now, just think, and say by what name the art is called after them. > Greek: 108d. ΣΩ. ἔγωγε. ὅρα δή· τίνα ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἐπωνυμίαν ἡ τέχνη ἔχει; [¶90] Alc. Music, I suppose you mean. > Greek: ΑΛ. μουσικήν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν. [¶91] Soc. Yes, I do. And what is that which proceeds correctly by its rule? As in the other case I was correct in mentioning to you gymnastic as that which goes by the art, so I ask you, accordingly, what you say in this case. What manner of proceeding is required? > Greek: ΣΩ. λέγω γάρ. τί οὖν τὸ κατὰ ταύτην ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐγώ σοι τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τὴν γυμναστικήν, καὶ σὺ δὴ οὖν οὕτως ἐνταῦθα τί φῄς; πῶς γίγνεσθαι; [¶92] Alc. A musical one, I suppose. > Greek: ΑΛ. μουσικῶς μοι δοκεῖ. [¶93] Soc. You are right. Come then, what is it that you term “better,” in respect of what is better in waging war and being at peace? > Greek: ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δή, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην ἄγειν, τοῦτο τὸ βέλτιον τί ὀνομάζεις; [¶94] 108e. Just as in our other instances you said that the “better” implied the more musical and again, in the parallel case, the more gymnastical, try now if you can tell me what is the “better” in this case. > Greek: 108e. ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφʼ ἑκάστῳ ἔλεγες τὸ ἄμεινον, ὅτι μουσικώτερον καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ὅτι γυμναστικώτερον· πειρῶ δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λέγειν τὸ βέλτιον. [¶95] Alc. But I am quite unable. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ οὐ πάνυ τι ἔχω. [¶96] 109. Soc. But surely that is disgraceful; for if you should speak to somebody as his adviser on food, and say that one sort was better than another, at this time and in this quantity, and he then asked you—What do you mean by the “better,” Alcibiades?—in a matter like that you could tell him you meant the more wholesome, although you do not set up to be a physician; yet in a case where you set up to have knowledge and are ready to stand up and advise as though you knew, are you not ashamed to be unable, as appears, to answer a question upon it? > Greek: 109. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρόν γε εἰ μέν τις σε λέγοντα καὶ συμβουλεύοντα περὶ σιτίων ὅτι βέλτιον τόδε τοῦδε καὶ νῦν καὶ τοσοῦτον, ἔπειτα ἐρωτήσειεν τί τὸ ἄμεινον λέγεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη; περὶ μὲν τούτων ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεινότερον, καίτοι οὐ προσποιῇ γε ἰατρὸς εἶναι· περὶ δὲ οὗ προσποιῇ ἐπιστήμων εἶναι καὶ συμβουλεύσεις ἀνιστάμενος ὡς εἰδώς, τούτου δʼ, ὡς ἔοικας, πέρι ἐρωτηθεὶς ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ; [¶97] 109a. Does it not seem disgraceful? > Greek: 109a. ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανεῖται; [¶98] Alc. Very. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶99] Soc. Then consider and do your best to tell me the connection of “better” in being at peace or at war with those to whom we ought to be so disposed. > Greek: ΣΩ. σκόπει δὴ καὶ προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν πρὸς τί τείνει τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην τε ἄγειν ἄμεινον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν οἷς δεῖ; [¶100] Alc. Well, I am considering, but I fail to perceive it. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ σκοπῶν οὐ δύναμαι ἐννοῆσαι. [¶101] Soc. But you must know what treatment it is that we allege against each other when we enter upon a war, and what name we give it when we do so? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδʼ οἶσθα, ἐπειδὰν πόλεμον ποιώμεθα, ὅτι ἐγκαλοῦντες ἀλλήλοις πάθημα ἐρχόμεθα εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸ ὀνομάζοντες ἐρχόμεθα; [¶102] 109b. Alc. I do: we say we are victims of deceit or violence or spoliation. > Greek: 109b. ΑΛ. ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε ἐξαπατώμενοί τι ἢ βιαζόμενοι ἢ ἀποστερούμενοι. [¶103] Soc. Enough: how do we suffer each of these things? Try and tell me what difference there is between one way and another. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔχε· πῶς ἕκαστα τούτων πάσχοντες; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν τί διαφέρει τὸ ὧδε ἢ ὧδε. [¶104] Alc. Do you mean by that, Socrates, whether it is in a just way or an unjust way? > Greek: ΑΛ. ἦ τὸ ὧδε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δικαίως ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως; [¶105] Soc. Precisely. > Greek: ΣΩ. αὐτὸ τοῦτο. [¶106] Alc. Why, there you have all the difference in the world. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε διαφέρει ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν. [¶107] Soc. Well then, on which sort are you going to advise the Athenians to make war—those who are acting unjustly, or those who are doing what is just? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; Ἀθηναίοις σὺ πρὸς ποτέρους συμβουλεύσεις πολεμεῖν, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἢ τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας; [¶108] 109c. Alc. That is a hard question: for even if someone decides that he must go to war with those who are doing what is just, he would not admit that they were doing so. > Greek: 109c. ΑΛ. δεινὸν τοῦτό γε ἐρωτᾷς· εἰ γὰρ καὶ διανοεῖταί τις ὡς δεῖ πρὸς τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας πολεμεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειέν γε. [¶109] Soc. For that would not be lawful, I suppose? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ νόμιμον τοῦθʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν. [¶110] Alc. No, indeed; nor is it considered honorable either. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα· οὐδέ γε καλὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι. [¶111] Soc. So you too will appeal to these things in making your speeches? > Greek: ΣΩ. πρὸς ταῦτʼ ἄρα καὶ σὺ [τὸ δίκαιον] τοὺς λόγους ποιήσῃ; [¶112] Alc. Necessarily. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη. [¶113] Soc. Then must not that “better” about which I was asking in reference to making or not making war, on those on whom we ought to or not, and when we ought to or not, be simply and solely the juster? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἠρώτων βέλτιον πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν καὶ μή, καὶ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς μή, καὶ ὁπότε καὶ μή, τὸ δικαιότερον τυγχάνει ὄν; ἢ οὔ; [¶114] Alc. Apparently it is. > Greek: ΑΛ. φαίνεταί γε. [¶115] 109d. Soc. How now, friend Alcibiades? Have you overlooked your own ignorance of this matter, or have I overlooked your learning it and taking lessons of a master who taught you to distinguish the more just and the more unjust? And who is he? Inform me in my turn, in order that you may introduce me to him as another pupil. > Greek: 109d. ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη; πότερον σαυτὸν λέληθας ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο, ἢ ἐμὲ ἔλαθες μανθάνων καὶ φοιτῶν εἰς διδασκάλου ὅς σε ἐδίδασκε διαγιγνώσκειν τὸ δικαιότερόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτερον; καὶ τίς ἐστιν οὗτος; φράσον καὶ ἐμοί, ἵνα αὐτῷ φοιτητὴν προξενήσῃς καὶ ἐμέ. [¶116] Alc. You are joking, Socrates. > Greek: ΑΛ. σκώπτεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶117] Soc. No, I swear by our common God of Friendship, whose name I would by no means take in vain. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Φίλιον τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σόν, ὃν ἐγὼ ἥκιστʼ ἂν ἐπιορκήσαιμι· ἀλλʼ εἴπερ ἔχεις, εἰπὲ τίς ἐστιν. [¶118] 109e. Come, if you can, tell me who the man is. Alc. But what if I cannot? Do you think I could not know about what is just and unjust in any other way? Soc. Yes, you might, supposing you discovered it. Alc. But do you not think I might discover it? Soc. Yes, quite so, if you inquired. Alc. And do you not think I might inquire? Soc. I do, if you thought you did not know. Alc. And was there not a time when I held that view? > Greek: 109e. ΑΛ. τί δʼ εἰ μὴ ἔχω; οὐκ ἂν οἴει με ἄλλως εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων; ΣΩ. ναί, εἴ γε εὕροις. ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἂν εὑρεῖν με ἡγῇ; ΣΩ. καὶ μάλα γε, εἰ ζητήσαις. ΑΛ. εἶτα ζητῆσαι οὐκ ἂν οἴει με; ΣΩ. ἔγωγε, εἰ οἰηθείης γε μὴ εἰδέναι. ΑΛ. εἶτα οὐκ ἦν ὅτʼ εἶχον οὕτω; [¶119] 110. Soc. Well spoken. Then can you tell me at what time it was that you thought you did not know what is just and unjust? > Greek: 110. ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ὅτε οὐκ ᾤου εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα; [¶120] 110a. Pray, was it a year ago that you were inquiring, and thought you did not know? Or did you think you knew? Please answer truly, that our debates may not be futile. > Greek: 110a. φέρε, πέρυσιν ἐζήτεις τε καὶ οὐκ ᾤου εἰδέναι; ἢ ᾤου; καὶ τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα μὴ μάτην οἱ διάλογοι γίγνωνται. [¶121] Alc. Well, I thought I knew. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ᾤμην εἰδέναι. [¶122] Soc. And two years, and three years, and four years back, were you not of the same mind? > Greek: ΣΩ. τρίτον δʼ ἔτος καὶ τέταρτον καὶ πέμπτον οὐχ οὕτως; [¶123] Alc. I was. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶124] Soc. But, you see, before that time you were a child, were you not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρὸ τοῦ παῖς ἦσθα. ἦ γάρ; [¶125] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶126] Soc. So I know well enough that then you thought you knew. > Greek: ΣΩ. τότε μὲν τοίνυν εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ᾤου εἰδέναι. [¶127] Alc. How do you know it so well? > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς εὖ οἶσθα; [¶128] 110b. Soc. Many a time I heard you, when as a child you were dicing or playing some other game at your teacher’s or elsewhere, instead of showing hesitation about what was just and unjust, speak in very loud and confident tones about one or other of your playmates, saying he was a rascal and a cheat who played unfairly. Is not this a true account? > Greek: 110b. ΣΩ. πολλάκις σοῦ ἐν διδασκάλων ἤκουον παιδὸς ὄντος καὶ ἄλλοθι, καὶ ὁπότε ἀστραγαλίζοις ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ παιδιὰν παίζοις, οὐχ ὡς ἀποροῦντος περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ μάλα μέγα καὶ θαρραλέως λέγοντος περὶ ὅτου τύχοις τῶν παίδων ὡς πονηρός τε καὶ ἄδικος εἴη καὶ ὡς ἀδικοῖ· ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω; [¶129] Alc. But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me? > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ τί ἔμελλον ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁπότε τίς με ἀδικοῖ; [¶130] Soc. Yet if you were ignorant then whether you were being unfairly treated or not, how can you ask—“What are you to do?” > Greek: ΣΩ. σὺ δʼ εἰ τύχοις ἀγνοῶν εἴτʼ ἀδικοῖο εἴτε μὴ τότε, λέγεις, τί σε χρὴ ποιεῖν; [¶131] 110c. Alc. Well, but on my word, I was not ignorant: no, I clearly understood that I was being wronged. > Greek: 110c. ΑΛ. μὰ Δίʼ ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἠγνόουν ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἐγίγνωσκον ὅτι ἠδικούμην. [¶132] Soc. So you thought you knew, even as a child, it seems, what was just and unjust. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὤιου ἄρα ἐπίστασθαι καὶ παῖς ὤν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα. [¶133] Alc. I did; and I knew too. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔγωγε· καὶ ἠπιστάμην γε. [¶134] Soc. At what sort of time did you discover it? For surely it was not while you thought you knew. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν ποίῳ χρόνῳ ἐξευρών; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐν ᾧ γε ᾤου εἰδέναι. [¶135] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶136] Soc. Then when did you think you were ignorant? Consider; I believe you will fail to find such a time. > Greek: ΣΩ. πότε οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ἡγοῦ; σκόπει· οὐ γὰρ εὑρήσεις τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον. [¶137] Alc. Upon my word, Socrates, I really cannot say. > Greek: ΑΛ. μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔκουν ἔχω γʼ εἰπεῖν. [¶138] 110d. Soc. So you do not know it by discovery. > Greek: 110d. ΣΩ. εὑρὼν μὲν ἄρʼ οὐκ οἶσθα αὐτά. [¶139] Alc. Not at all, apparently. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ πάνυ φαίνομαι. [¶140] Soc. But you said just now that you did not know it by learning either; and if you neither discovered nor learnt it, how do you come to know it, and whence? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄρτι γε οὐδὲ μαθὼν ἔφησθα εἰδέναι· εἰ δὲ μήθʼ ηὗρες μήτʼ ἔμαθες, πῶς οἶσθα καὶ πόθεν; [¶141] Alc. Well, perhaps that answer I gave you was not correct, that I knew it by my own discovery. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως τοῦτό σοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρινάμην, τὸ φάναι εἰδέναι αὐτὸς ἐξευρών. [¶142] Soc. Then how was it done? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ πῶς εἶχεν; [¶143] Alc. I learnt it, I suppose, in the same way as everyone else. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔμαθον οἶμαι καὶ ἐγὼ ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. [¶144] Soc. Back we come to the same argument. From whom? Please tell me. > Greek: ΣΩ. πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ἥκομεν λόγον. παρὰ τοῦ; φράζε κἀμοί. [¶145] 110e. Alc. From the many. > Greek: 110e. ΑΛ. παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν. [¶146] Soc. They are no very serious teachers with whom you take refuge, if you ascribe it to the many! > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ εἰς σπουδαίους γε διδασκάλους καταφεύγεις εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναφέρων. [¶147] Alc. Why, are they not competent to teach? > Greek: ΑΛ. τί δέ; οὐχ ἱκανοὶ διδάξαι οὗτοι; [¶148] Soc. Not how to play, or not to play, draughts; and yet that, I imagine, is a slight matter compared with justice. What? Do you not think so? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὔκουν τὰ πεττευτικά γε καὶ τὰ μή· καίτοι φαυλότερα αὐτὰ οἶμαι τῶν δικαίων εἶναι. τί δέ; σὺ οὐχ οὕτως οἴει; [¶149] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶150] Soc. Then if they are unable to teach the slighter, can they teach the more serious matter? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶτα τὰ μὲν φαυλότερα οὐχ οἷοί τε διδάσκειν, τὰ δὲ σπουδαιότερα; [¶151] Alc. I think so: at any rate, there are many other things that they are able to teach, more serious than draughts. > Greek: ΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἄλλα γοῦν πολλὰ οἷοί τʼ εἰσὶν διδάσκειν σπουδαιότερα τοῦ πεττεύειν. [¶152] Soc. What sort of things? > Greek: ΣΩ. ποῖα ταῦτα; [¶153] 111a. Alc. For instance, it was from them that I learnt to speak Greek, and I could not say who was my teacher, but can only ascribe it to the same people who, you say, are not serious teachers. > Greek: 111a. ΑΛ. οἷον καὶ τὸ ἑλληνίζειν παρὰ τούτων ἔγωγʼ ἔμαθον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν ἐμαυτοῦ διδάσκαλον, ἀλλʼ εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀναφέρω οὓς σὺ φῂς οὐ σπουδαίους εἶναι διδασκάλους. [¶154] Soc. Ah, gallant sir, the many may be good teachers of that, and they can justly be praised for their teaching of such subjects. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ γενναῖε, τούτου μὲν ἀγαθοὶ διδάσκαλοι οἱ πολλοί, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινοῖντʼ ἂν αὐτῶν εἰς διδασκαλίαν. [¶155] Alc. And why? > Greek: ΑΛ. τί δή; [¶156] Soc. Because in those subjects they have the equipment proper to good teachers. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι ἔχουσι περὶ αὐτὰ ἃ χρὴ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς διδασκάλους ἔχειν. [¶157] Alc. What do you mean by that? > Greek: ΑΛ. τί τοῦτο λέγεις; [¶158] Soc. You know that those who are going to teach anything should first know it themselves, do you not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι χρὴ τοὺς μέλλοντας διδάσκειν ὁτιοῦν αὐτοὺς πρῶτον εἰδέναι; [¶159] 111b. Alc. Of course. Soc. And that those who know should agree with each other and not differ? Alc. Yes. Soc. But if they differ upon anything, will you say that they know it? Alc. No, indeed. Soc. Then how can they be teachers of it? Alc. By no means. Soc. Well now, do you find that the many differ about the nature of stone or wood? If you ask one of them, do they not agree on the same answer, and make for the same things when they want to get a piece of stone or wood? > Greek: 111b. ἢ οὔ; ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς εἰδότας ὁμολογεῖν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ μὴ διαφέρεσθαι; ΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἐν οἷς δʼ ἂν διαφέρωνται, ταῦτα φήσεις εἰδέναι αὐτούς; ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. τούτων οὖν διδάσκαλοι πῶς ἂν εἶεν; ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. τί οὖν; δοκοῦσί σοι διαφέρεσθαι οἱ πολλοὶ ποῖόν ἐστι λίθος ἢ ξύλον; καὶ ἐάν τινα ἐρωτᾷς, ἆρʼ οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ὁρμῶσιν ὅταν βούλωνται λαβεῖν λίθον ἢ ξύλον; [¶160] 111c. It is just the same, too, with everything of the sort: for I am pretty nearly right in understanding you to mean just this by knowing how to speak Greek, am I not? Alc. Yes. Soc. And on these matters, as we stated, they not only agree with each other and with themselves in private, but states also use in public the same terms about them to each other, without any dispute? Alc. They do. > Greek: 111c. ὡσαύτως καὶ πάνθʼ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· σχεδὸν γάρ τι μανθάνω τὸ ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι ὅτι τοῦτο λέγεις· ἢ οὔ; ΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰς μὲν ταῦθʼ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀλλήλοις τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἰδίᾳ, καὶ δημοσίᾳ αἱ πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν αἱ μὲν ταῦθʼ αἱ δʼ ἄλλα φάσκουσαι; ΑΛ. οὐ γάρ. ΣΩ. εἰκότως ἂν ἄρα τούτων γε καὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶεν ἀγαθοί. [¶161] 111d. Soc. Then naturally they will be good teachers of these matters. Alc. Yes. Soc. And if we should wish to provide anyone with knowledge of them, we should be right in sending him to be taught by “the many” that you speak of? Alc. Certainly. Soc. But what if we wished to know not only what men were like or what horses were like, but which of them were good runners or not? Would the many still suffice to teach us this? Alc. No, indeed. Soc. And you have ample proof that they do not know this, and are not proficient teachers of it, in their not agreeing about it at all with themselves? > Greek: 111d. ΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν βουλοίμεθα ποιῆσαί τινα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰδέναι, ὀρθῶς ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν εἰς διδασκαλίαν τούτων τῶν πολλῶν; ΑΛ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ βουληθεῖμεν εἰδέναι, μὴ μόνον ποῖοι ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν ἢ ποῖοι ἵπποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τίνες αὐτῶν δρομικοί τε καὶ μή, ἆρʼ ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦτο ἱκανοὶ διδάξαι; ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. ἱκανὸν δέ σοι τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστανται οὐδὲ κρήγυοι διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν; [¶162] 111e. Alc. I have. > Greek: 111e. ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε. [¶163] Soc. And what if we wished to know not only what men were like, but what healthy or diseased men were like? Would the many suffice to teach us? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ βουληθεῖμεν εἰδέναι, μὴ μόνον ποῖοι ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν, ἀλλʼ ὁποῖοι ὑγιεινοὶ ἢ νοσώδεις, ἆρʼ ἱκανοὶ ἂν ἡμῖν ἦσαν διδάσκαλοι οἱ πολλοί; [¶164] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶165] Soc. And you would have proof of their being bad teachers of that, if you saw them differing about it? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦν δʼ ἄν σοι τεκμήριον ὅτι μοχθηροί εἰσι τούτων διδάσκαλοι, εἰ ἑώρας αὐτοὺς διαφερομένους; [¶166] Alc. I should. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε. [¶167] 112. Soc. Well then, do you now find that the many agree with themselves or each other about just and unjust men or things? > Greek: 112. ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή; νῦν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἀνθρώπων καὶ πραγμάτων οἱ πολλοὶ δοκοῦσί σοι ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ἀλλήλοις; [¶168] 112a. Alc. Far from it, on my word, Socrates. > Greek: 112a. ΑΛ. ἥκιστα νὴ Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶169] Soc. In fact, they differ most especially on these points? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; μάλιστα περὶ αὐτῶν διαφέρεσθαι; [¶170] Alc. Very much so. > Greek: ΑΛ. πολύ γε. [¶171] Soc. And I suppose you never yet saw or heard of people differing so sharply on questions of health or the opposite as to fight and kill one another in battle because of them. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὔκουν οἴομαί γε πώποτέ σε ἰδεῖν οὐδʼ ἀκοῦσαι σφόδρα οὕτω διαφερομένους ἀνθρώπους περὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ μή, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα μάχεσθαί τε καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι ἀλλήλους. [¶172] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶173] Soc. But on questions of justice or injustice I am sure you have; > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἔγωγʼ οἶδʼ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἑώρακας, ἀκήκοας γοῦν ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ Ὁμήρου· [¶174] 112b. and if you have not seen them, at any rate you have heard of them from many people, especially Homer. For you have heard the Odyssey and the Iliad? Alc. I certainly have, I suppose, Socrates. Soc. And these poems are about a difference of just and unjust Alc. Yes. Soc. And from this difference arose the fights and deaths of the Achaeans, and of the Trojans as well, and of the suitors of Penelope in their strife with Odysseus. > Greek: 112b. καὶ Ὀδυσσείας γὰρ καὶ Ἰλιάδος ἀκήκοας. ΑΛ. πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα ποιήματά ἐστι περὶ διαφορᾶς δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; ΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. καὶ αἱ μάχαι γε καὶ οἱ θάνατοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν τοῖς τε Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Τρωσὶν ἐγένοντο, καὶ τοῖς μνηστῆρσι τοῖς τῆς Πηνελόπης καὶ τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ. [¶175] 112c. Alc. That is true. > Greek: 112c. ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶176] Soc. And I imagine that when the Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians lost their men at Tanagra, and later at Coronea, among whom your own father perished, the difference that caused their deaths and fights was solely on a question of just and unjust, was it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Τανάγρᾳ Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἀποθανοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον ἐν Κορωνείᾳ, ἐν οἷς καὶ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ [Κλεινίας] ἐτελεύτησεν, οὐδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς ἄλλου ἡ διαφορὰ ἢ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου τοὺς θανάτους καὶ τὰς μάχας πεποίηκεν· ἦ γάρ; [¶177] Alc. That is true. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶178] Soc. Then are we to say that these people understand those questions, on which they differ so sharply that they are led by their mutual disputes to take these extreme measures against each other? > Greek: ΣΩ. τούτους οὖν φῶμεν ἐπίστασθαι περὶ ὧν οὕτως σφόδρα διαφέρονται, ὥστε ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἀλλήλοις τὰ ἔσχατα σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐργάζονται; [¶179] 112d. Alc. Apparently not. > Greek: 112d. ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεταί γε. [¶180] Soc. And you refer me to teachers of that sort, whom you admit yourself to be without knowledge? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς τοιούτους διδασκάλους ἀναφέρεις οὓς ὁμολογεῖς αὐτὸς μὴ εἰδέναι; [¶181] Alc. It seems I do. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔοικα. [¶182] Soc. Then how is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust, when you are so bewildered about these matters and are shown to have neither learnt them from anyone nor discovered them for yourself?. > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν εἰκός σε εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, περὶ ὧν οὕτω πλανᾷ καὶ οὔτε μαθὼν φαίνῃ παρʼ οὐδενὸς οὔτʼ αὐτὸς ἐξευρών; [¶183] Alc. By what you say, it is not likely. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἐκ μὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις οὐκ εἰκός. [¶184] 112e. Soc. There again, Alcibiades, do you see how unfairly you speak? > Greek: 112e. ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς αὖ τοῦθʼ ὡς οὐ καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη; [¶185] Alc. In what? > Greek: ΑΛ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶186] Soc. In stating that I say so. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι ἐμὲ φῂς ταῦτα λέγειν. [¶187] Alc. Why, do you not say that l do not know about the just and unjust? > Greek: ΑΛ. τί δέ; οὐ σὺ λέγεις ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων; [¶188] Soc. Not at all. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ μέντοι. [¶189] Alc. Well, do I say it? > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ; [¶190] Soc. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. ναί. [¶191] Alc. How, pray? > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς δή; [¶192] Soc. I will show you, in the following way. If I ask you which is the greater number, one or two, you will answer “two”? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὧδε εἴσῃ. ἐάν σε ἔρωμαι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ δύο πότερα πλείω ἐστί, φήσεις ὅτι τὰ δύο; [¶193] Alc. Yes, I shall. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶194] Soc. How much greater? > Greek: ΣΩ. πόσῳ; [¶195] Alc. By one. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἑνί. [¶196] Soc. Then which of us says that two are one more than one? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερος οὖν ἡμῶν ὁ λέγων ὅτι τὰ δύο τοῦ ἑνὸς ἑνὶ πλείω; [¶197] Alc. I. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἐγώ. [¶198] Soc. And I was asking, and you were answering? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἠρώτων, σὺ δʼ ἀπεκρίνου; [¶199] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶200] 113a. Soc. Then is it I, the questioner, or you the answerer, that are found to be speaking about these things? > Greek: 113a. ΣΩ. περὶ δὴ τούτων μῶν ἐγὼ φαίνομαι λέγων ὁ ἐρωτῶν, ἢ σὺ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος; [¶201] Alc. I. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἐγώ. [¶202] Soc. And what if I ask what are the letters in “Socrates,” and you tell me? Which will be the speaker? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἂν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔρωμαι ποῖα γράμματα Σωκράτους, σὺ δʼ εἴπῃς, πότερος ὁ λέγων; [¶203] Alc. I. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἐγώ. [¶204] Soc. Come then, tell me, as a principle, when we have question and answer, which is the speaker—the questioner, or the answerer? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, ἑνὶ λόγῳ εἰπέ· ὅταν ἐρώτησίς τε καὶ ἀπόκρισις γίγνηται, πότερος ὁ λέγων, ὁ ἐρωτῶν ἢ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος; [¶205] Alc. The answerer, I should say, Socrates. > Greek: ΑΛ. ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶206] 113b. Soc. And throughout the argument so far, I was the questioner? > Greek: 113b. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄρτι διὰ παντὸς ἐγὼ μὲν ἦ ὁ ἐρωτῶν; [¶207] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶208] Soc. And you the answerer? > Greek: ΣΩ. σὺ δʼ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος; [¶209] Alc. Quite so. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶210] Soc. Well then, which of us has spoken what has been said? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; τὰ λεχθέντα πότερος ἡμῶν εἴρηκεν; [¶211] Alc. Apparently, Socrates, from what we have admitted, it was I. > Greek: ΑΛ. φαίνομαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐγώ. [¶212] Soc. And it was said that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, did not know about just and unjust, but thought he did, and intended to go to the Assembly as adviser to the Athenians on what he knows nothing about; is not that so? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐλέχθη περὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ καλὸς ὁ Κλεινίου οὐκ ἐπίσταιτο, οἴοιτο δέ, καὶ μέλλοι εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἐλθὼν συμβουλεύσειν Ἀθηναίοις περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν οἶδεν; οὐ ταῦτʼ ἦν; [¶213] 113c. Alc. Apparently. > Greek: 113c. ΑΛ. φαίνεται. [¶214] Soc. Then, to quote Euripides, the result is, Alcibiades, that you may be said to have heard it from yourself, not me, and it is not I who say it, but you, and you tax me with it in vain. And indeed what you say is quite true. For it is a mad scheme this, that you meditate, my excellent friend—of teaching things that you do not know, since you have taken no care to learn them. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἄρα συμβαίνει, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη· σοῦ τάδε κινδυνεύεις, οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοέναι, οὐδʼ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, ἀλλὰ σύ, ἐμὲ δὲ αἰτιᾷ μάτην. καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὖ λέγεις. μανικὸν γὰρ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιχείρημα ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, διδάσκειν ἃ οὐκ οἶσθα, ἀμελήσας μανθάνειν. [¶215] 113d. Alc. I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks rarely deliberate as to which is the more just or unjust course: for they regard questions of this sort as obvious; and so they pass them over and consider which course will prove more expedient in the result. For the just and the expedient, I take it, are not the same, but many people have profited by great wrongs that they have committed, whilst others, I imagine, have had no advantage from doing what was right. > Greek: 113d. ΑΛ. οἶμαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀλιγάκις Ἀθηναίους βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας πότερα δικαιότερα ἢ ἀδικώτερα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἡγοῦνται δῆλα εἶναι, ἐάσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὁπότερα συνοίσει πράξασιν. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ οἶμαι ἐστὶν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐλυσιτέλησεν ἀδικήσασι μεγάλα ἀδικήματα, καὶ ἑτέροις γε οἶμαι δίκαια ἐργασαμένοις οὐ συνήνεγκεν. [¶216] Soc. What then? Granting that the just and the expedient are in fact as different as they can be, you surely do not still suppose you know what is expedient for mankind, and why it is so? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἕτερα μὲν τὰ δίκαια τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα, οὔ τί που αὖ σὺ οἴει ταῦτʼ εἰδέναι ἃ συμφέρει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ διʼ ὅτι; [¶217] 113e. Alc. Well, what is the obstacle, Socrates,—unless you are going to ask me again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it for myself? > Greek: 113e. ΑΛ. τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰ μή με αὖ ἐρήσῃ παρʼ ὅτου ἔμαθον ἢ ὅπως αὐτὸς ηὗρον. [¶218] 114. Soc. What a way of going on! If your answer is incorrect, and a previous argument can be used to prove it so, you claim to be told something new, and a different line of proof, as though the previous one were like a poor worn-out coat which you refuse to wear any longer; you must be provided instead with something clean and unsoiled in the way of evidence. > Greek: 114. ΣΩ. οἷον τοῦτο ποιεῖς. εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγεις, τυγχάνει δὲ δυνατὸν ὂν ἀποδεῖξαι διʼ οὗπερ καὶ τὸ πρότερον λόγου, οἴει δὴ καινὰ ἄττα δεῖν ἀκούειν ἀποδείξεις τε ἑτέρας, ὡς τῶν προτέρων οἷον σκευαρίων κατατετριμμένων, καὶ οὐκέτʼ ἂν σὺ αὐτὰ ἀμπίσχοιο, εἰ μή τίς σοι τεκμήριον καθαρὸν καὶ ἄχραντον οἴσει. [¶219] 114a. But I shall ignore your sallies in debate, and shall none the less ask you once more, where you learnt your knowledge of what is expedient, and who is your teacher, asking in one question all the things I asked before; and now you will clearly find yourself in the same plight, and will be unable to prove that you know the expedient either through discovery or through learning. But as you are dainty, and would dislike a repeated taste of the same argument, I pass over this question of whether you know or do not know what is expedient for the Athenians: but why have you not made it clear whether the just and the expedient are the same or different? > Greek: 114a. ἐγὼ δὲ χαίρειν ἐάσας τὰς σὰς προδρομὰς τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐρήσομαι πόθεν μαθὼν αὖ τὰ συμφέροντʼ ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὅστις ἐστὶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, καὶ πάντʼ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερον ἐρωτῶ μιᾷ ἐρωτήσει; ἀλλὰ γὰρ δῆλον ὡς εἰς ταὐτὸν ἥξεις καὶ οὐχ ἕξεις ἀποδεῖξαι οὔθʼ ὡς ἐξευρὼν οἶσθα τὰ συμφέροντα οὔθʼ ὡς μαθών. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τρυφᾷς καὶ οὐκέτʼ ἂν ἡδέως τοῦ αὐτοῦ γεύσαιο λόγου, τοῦτον μὲν ἐῶ χαίρειν, εἴτʼ οἶσθα εἴτε μὴ τὰ Ἀθηναίοις συμφέροντα· [¶220] 114b. If you like, question me as I did you, or if you prefer, argue out the matter in your own way. > Greek: 114b. πότερον δὲ ταὐτά ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντʼ ἢ ἕτερα, τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας; εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σέ, εἰ δέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διέξελθε. [¶221] Alc. But I am not sure I should be able, Socrates, to set it forth to you. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ οἷός τʼ ἂν εἴην, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ διελθεῖν. [¶222] Soc. Well, my good sir, imagine I am the people in Assembly; even there, you know, you will have to persuade each man singly, will you not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ὠγαθέ, ἐμὲ ἐκκλησίαν νόμισον καὶ δῆμον· καὶ ἐκεῖ τοί σε δεήσει ἕνα ἕκαστον πείθειν. ἦ γάρ; [¶223] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶224] Soc. And the same man may well persuade one person singly, and many together, about things that he knows, just as the schoolmaster, I suppose, persuades either one or many about letters? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνα τε οἷόν τε εἶναι κατὰ μόνας πείθειν καὶ συμπόλλους περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῇ, ὥσπερ ὁ γραμματιστὴς ἕνα τέ που πείθει περὶ γραμμάτων καὶ πολλούς;