--- title: "Alcibiades I · Ἀλκιβιάδης αʹ" author: "Plato" translator: "Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" section: 2 of 3 url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-i/2/ cite: "Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, Alcibiades I · Ἀλκιβιάδης αʹ, section 2. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-i/2/" --- # Alcibiades I · Ἀλκιβιάδης αʹ *Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb* Socrates tells the ambitious young Alcibiades that before he rules others he must know himself. > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg013, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg013.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (Stephanus sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 2. 114c–125b Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-i/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-i/2/#p-N [¶0] 114c. Alc. Yes. > Greek: 114c. ΑΛ. ναί. [¶1] Soc. And again, will not the same man persuade either one or many about number? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕνα τε καὶ πολλοὺς πείσει; [¶2] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶3] Soc. And this will be the man who knows—the arithmetician? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὗτος δʼ ἔσται ὁ εἰδώς, ὁ ἀριθμητικός; [¶4] Alc. Quite so. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶5] Soc. And you too can persuade a single man about things of which you can persuade many? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ἅπερ καὶ πολλοὺς οἷός τε πείθειν εἶ, ταῦτα καὶ ἕνα; [¶6] Alc. Presumably. > Greek: ΑΛ. εἰκός γε. [¶7] Soc. And these are clearly things that you know. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα δῆλον ὅτι ἃ οἶσθα. [¶8] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶9] Soc. And the only difference between the orator speaking before the people and one who speaks in a conversation like ours is that the former persuades men in a number together of the same things, and the latter persuades them one at a time? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν τοσοῦτον μόνον διαφέρει τοῦ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ῥήτορος ὁ ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε συνουσίᾳ, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἁθρόους πείθει τὰ αὐτά, ὁ δὲ καθʼ ἕνα; [¶10] 114d. Alc. It looks like it. > Greek: 114d. ΑΛ. κινδυνεύει. [¶11] Soc. Come now, since we see that the same man may persuade either many or one, try your unpracticed hand on me, and endeavor to show that the just is sometimes not expedient. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴθι νῦν, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται πολλούς τε καὶ ἕνα πείθειν, ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐμμελέτησον καὶ ἐπιχείρησον ἐπιδεῖξαι ὡς τὸ δίκαιον ἐνίοτε οὐ συμφέρει. [¶12] Alc. You are insolent, Socrates! > Greek: ΑΛ. ὑβριστὴς εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶13] Soc. This time, at any rate, I am going to have the insolence to persuade you of the opposite of that which you decline to prove to me. > Greek: ΣΩ. νῦν γοῦν ὑφʼ ὕβρεως μέλλω σε πείθειν τἀναντία οἷς σὺ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις. [¶14] Alc. Speak, then. > Greek: ΑΛ. λέγε δή. [¶15] Soc. Just answer my questions. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνου μόνον τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. [¶16] 114e. Alc. No, you yourself must be the speaker. > Greek: 114e. ΑΛ. μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ αὐτὸς λέγε. [¶17] Soc. What? Do you not wish above all things to be persuaded? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ; οὐχ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλει πεισθῆναι; [¶18] Alc. By all means, to be sure. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάντως δήπου. [¶19] Soc. And you would best be persuaded if you should say “the case is so”? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ λέγεις ὅτι ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει, μάλιστʼ ἂν εἴης πεπεισμένος; [¶20] Alc. I agree. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶21] Soc. Then answer; and if you do not hear your own self say that the just is expedient, put no trust in the words of anyone again. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνου δή· καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς σὺ σαυτοῦ ἀκούσῃς ὅτι τὰ δίκαια καὶ συμφέροντά ἐστιν, ἄλλῳ γε λέγοντι μὴ πιστεύσῃς. [¶22] Alc. I will not: but I may as well answer; for I do not think I shall come to any harm. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὔτοι, ἀλλʼ ἀποκριτέον· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἴομαι βλαβήσεσθαι. [¶23] 115a. Soc. You are quite a prophet! Now tell me, do you consider some just things to be expedient, and others not? > Greek: 115a. ΣΩ. μαντικὸς γὰρ εἶ. καί μοι λέγε· τῶν δικαίων φῂς ἔνια μὲν συμφέρειν, ἔνια δʼ οὔ; [¶24] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶25] Soc. And again, some noble, and some not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὰ μὲν καλὰ αὐτῶν εἶναι, τὰ δʼ οὔ; [¶26] Alc. What do you mean by that question? > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς; [¶27] Soc. I would ask whether anyone ever seemed to you to be doing what was base and yet just. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἴ τις ἤδη σοι ἔδοξεν αἰσχρὰ μέν, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν; [¶28] Alc. Never. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. [¶29] Soc. Well, are all just things noble? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλά; [¶30] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶31] Soc. And what of noble things, in their turn? Are they all good, or some only, while others are not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ αὖ τὰ καλά; πότερον πάντα ἀγαθά, ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δʼ οὔ; [¶32] Alc. In my opinion, Socrates, some noble things are evil. > Greek: ΑΛ. οἴομαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνια τῶν καλῶν κακὰ εἶναι. [¶33] Soc. And some base things are good? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ἀγαθά; [¶34] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶35] 115b. Soc. Do you mean as in one of the many cases where men have gone to rescue a comrade or kinsman in battle, and have been either wounded or killed, while those who did not go to the rescue, as duty bade, have got off safe and sound? > Greek: 115b. ΣΩ. ἆρα λέγεις τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πολλοὶ ἐν πολέμῳ βοηθήσαντες ἑταίρῳ ἢ οἰκείῳ τραύματα ἔλαβον καὶ ἀπέθανον, οἱ δʼ οὐ βοηθήσαντες, δέον, ὑγιεῖς ἀπῆλθον; [¶36] Alc. Precisely. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶37] Soc. And such a rescue you call noble, in respect of the endeavor to save those whom it was one’s duty to save; and this is courage, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν τοιαύτην βοήθειαν καλὴν μὲν λέγεις κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τοῦ σῶσαι οὓς ἔδει, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· ἢ οὔ; [¶38] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶39] Soc. But you call it evil, in respect of the deaths and wounds? > Greek: ΣΩ. κακὴν δέ γε κατὰ τοὺς θανάτους τε καὶ ἕλκη· ἦ γάρ; [¶40] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶41] 115c. Soc. And is not the courage one thing, and the death another? > Greek: 115c. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἡ ἀνδρεία, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ θάνατος; [¶42] Alc. Certainly. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶43] Soc. Then it is not in the same respect that rescuing one’s friends is noble and evil? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτόν γʼ ἐστι καλὸν καὶ κακὸν τὸ τοῖς φίλοις βοηθεῖν; [¶44] Alc. Apparently not. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται. [¶45] Soc. Then see if, inasmuch as it is noble, it is also good; for in the present case you were admitting that the rescue was noble in respect of its courage: now consider this very thing, courage, and say whether it is good or bad. Consider it in this way: which would you choose to have, good things or evil? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅρα τοίνυν εἰ, ᾗ γε καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνταῦθα. κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν γὰρ ὡμολόγεις καλὸν εἶναι τὴν βοήθειαν· τοῦτʼ οὖν αὐτὸ σκόπει, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· σὺ πότερʼ ἂν δέξαιό σοι εἶναι, ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακά; [¶46] Alc. Good. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀγαθά. [¶47] 115d. Soc. And most of all, the greatest goods, and of such things you would least allow yourself to be deprived? Alc. To be sure. Soc. Then what do you say of courage? At what price would you allow yourself to be deprived of it? Alc. I would give up life itself if I had to be a coward. Soc. Then you regard cowardice as the uttermost evil. Alc. I do. Soc. On a par with death, it seems. Alc. Yes. Soc. And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice? Alc. Yes. > Greek: 115d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μέγιστα μάλιστα. ΑΛ. ⟨ναί.⟩ ΣΩ. καὶ ἥκιστα τῶν τοιούτων δέξαιο ἂν στέρεσθαι; ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν λέγεις περὶ ἀνδρείας; ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν αὐτοῦ δέξαιο στέρεσθαι; ΑΛ. οὐδὲ ζῆν ἂν ἐγὼ δεξαίμην δειλὸς ὤν. ΣΩ. ἔσχατον ἄρα κακῶν εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ δειλία. ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. ἐξ ἴσου τῷ τεθνάναι, ὡς ἔοικε. ΑΛ. φημί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν θανάτῳ τε καὶ δειλίᾳ ἐναντιώτατον ζωὴ καὶ ἀνδρεία; ΑΛ. ναί. [¶48] 115e. Soc. And you would most desire to have the former, and least the latter? Alc. Yes. Soc. Is that because you think the former best, and the latter worst? Alc. To be sure. Soc. So you reckon courage among the best things, and death among the worst. Alc. I do. Soc. Then the rescue of one’s friends in battle, inasmuch as it is noble in respect of the working of good by courage, you have termed noble? Alc. Apparently. Soc. But evil, in respect of the working of evil by death? Alc. Yes. > Greek: 115e. ΣΩ. καὶ τὰ μὲν μάλιστʼ ἂν εἶναι βούλοιό σοι, τὰ δὲ ἥκιστα; ΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄριστα ἡγῇ, τὰ δὲ κάκιστα; ⟨ ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.⟩ ⟨ ΣΩ. ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἄρα σὺ ἡγῇ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι κἀν τοῖς κακίστοις θάνατον.⟩ ΑΛ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν ἐν πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις, ᾗ μὲν καλόν, κατʼ ἀγαθοῦ πρᾶξιν τὴν τῆς ἀνδρείας, καλὸν αὐτὸ προσεῖπας; ΑΛ. φαίνομαί γε. ΣΩ. κατὰ δέ γε κακοῦ πρᾶξιν τὴν τοῦ θανάτου κακόν; ΑΛ. ναί. [¶49] 116. Soc. So we may fairly describe each of these workings as follows: as you call either of them evil because of the evil it produces, so you must call it good because of the good it produces. > Greek: 116. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὧδε δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἑκάστην τῶν πράξεων· εἴπερ ᾗ κακὸν ἀπεργάζεται κακὴν καλεῖς, καὶ ᾗ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὴν κλητέον. [¶50] 116a. Alc. I believe that is so. > Greek: 116a. ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶51] Soc. And again, are they noble inasmuch as they are good, and base inasmuch as they are evil? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ᾗ ἀγαθόν, καλόν· ᾗ δὲ κακόν, αἰσχρόν; [¶52] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶53] Soc. Then in saying that the rescue of one’s friends in battle is noble and yet evil, you mean just the same as if you called the rescue good, but evil. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν ἄρʼ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις βοήθειαν λέγων καλὴν μὲν εἶναι, κακὴν δέ, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως λέγεις ἢ εἰ προσεῖπες αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴν μέν, κακὴν δέ. [¶54] Alc. I believe what you say is true, Socrates. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶55] Soc. So nothing noble, in so far as it is noble, is evil, and nothing base, in so far as it is base, is good. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν καλῶν, καθʼ ὅσον καλόν, κακόν, οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καθʼ ὅσον αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθόν. [¶56] 116b. Alc. Apparently. > Greek: 116b. ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται. [¶57] Soc. Now then, consider it again in this way: whoever does nobly, does well too, does he not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ὧδε σκέψαι. ὅστις καλῶς πράττει, οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει; [¶58] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶59] Soc. And are not those who do well happy? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἱ δʼ εὖ πράττοντες οὐκ εὐδαίμονες; [¶60] Alc. Of course. > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶61] Soc. And they are happy because of the acquisition of good things? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εὐδαίμονες διʼ ἀγαθῶν κτῆσιν; [¶62] Alc. Certainly. > Greek: ΑΛ. μάλιστα. [¶63] Soc. And they acquire these by doing well and nobly? > Greek: ΣΩ. κτῶνται δὲ ταῦτα τῷ εὖ καὶ καλῶς πράττειν; [¶64] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶65] Soc. So doing well is good? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ εὖ ἄρα πράττειν ἀγαθόν; [¶66] Alc. Of course. > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; [¶67] Soc. And welfare is noble? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καλὸν ἡ εὐπραγία; [¶68] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶69] 116c. Soc. Hence we have seen again that noble and good are the same thing. > Greek: 116c. ΣΩ. ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐφάνη ἡμῖν πάλιν αὖ καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν. [¶70] Alc. Apparently. > Greek: ΑΛ. φαίνεται. [¶71] Soc. Then whatever we find to be noble we shall find also to be good, by this argument at least. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι ἂν ἄρα εὕρωμεν καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν εὑρήσομεν ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου. [¶72] Alc. We must. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη. [¶73] Soc. Well then, are good things expedient or not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὰ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρει ἢ οὔ; [¶74] Alc. Expedient. > Greek: ΑΛ. συμφέρει. [¶75] Soc. And do you remember what our admissions were about just things? > Greek: ΣΩ. μνημονεύεις οὖν περὶ τῶν δικαίων πῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν; [¶76] Alc. I think we said that those who do just things must do noble things. > Greek: ΑΛ. οἶμαί γε τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καλὰ πράττειν. [¶77] Soc. And that those who do noble things must do good things? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς τὰ καλὰ ἀγαθά; [¶78] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶79] 116d. Soc. And that good things are expedient? > Greek: 116d. ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρειν; [¶80] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶81] Soc. Hence just things, Alcibiades, are expedient. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰ δίκαια ἄρα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, συμφέροντά ἐστιν. [¶82] Alc. So it seems. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔοικεν. [¶83] Soc. Well now, are not you the speaker of all this, and I the questioner? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ταῦτα οὐ σὺ ὁ λέγων, ἐγὼ δὲ ὁ ἐρωτῶν; [¶84] Alc. I seem to be, apparently. > Greek: ΑΛ. φαίνομαι, ὡς ἔοικα. [¶85] Soc. So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians, imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that just and expedient are the same? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν τις ἀνίσταται συμβουλεύσων εἴτε Ἀθηναίοις εἴτε Πεπαρηθίοις, οἰόμενος γιγνώσκειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, φήσει δʼ εἶναι τὰ δίκαια κακὰ ἐνίοτε, ἄλλο τι ἢ καταγελῴης ἂν αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδήπερ τυγχάνεις καὶ σὺ λέγων ὅτι ταὐτά ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντα; [¶86] 116e. Alc. But by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I am saying, I feel altogether in such a strange state! For from moment to moment I change my view under your questioning. > Greek: 116e. ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδʼ ἔγωγε οὐδʼ ὅτι λέγω, ἀλλʼ ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικα ἀτόπως ἔχοντι· τοτὲ μὲν γάρ μοι ἕτερα δοκεῖ σοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, τοτὲ δʼ ἄλλα. [¶87] Soc. And are you unaware, my friend, what this feeling is? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶτα τοῦτο, ὦ φίλε, ἀγνοεῖς τὸ πάθημα τί ἐστιν; [¶88] Alc. I am, quite. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶89] Soc. Well, do you suppose that if someone should ask you whether you have two eyes or three, two hands or four, or anything else of that sort, you would answer differently from moment to moment, or always the same thing? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἴει ἂν οὖν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῴη σε δύο ὀφθαλμοὺς ἢ τρεῖς ἔχεις, καὶ δύο χεῖρας ἢ τέτταρας, ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλα, ἢ ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτά; [¶90] 117a. Alc. I begin to have misgivings about myself, but still I think I should make the same answer. > Greek: 117a. ΑΛ. δέδοικα μὲν ἔγωγε ἤδη περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, οἶμαι μέντοι τὰ αὐτά. [¶91] Soc. And the reason would be, because you know? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅτι οἶσθα; τοῦτʼ αἴτιον; [¶92] Alc. I think so. > Greek: ΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε. [¶93] Soc. Then if you involuntarily give contradictory answers, clearly it must be about things of which you are ignorant. > Greek: ΣΩ. περὶ ὧν ἄρα ἄκων τἀναντία ἀποκρίνῃ, δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τούτων οὐκ οἶσθα. [¶94] Alc. Very likely. > Greek: ΑΛ. εἰκός γε. [¶95] Soc. And you say you are bewildered in answering about just and unjust, noble and base, evil and good, expedient and inexpedient? Now, is it not obvious that your bewilderment is caused by your ignorance of these things? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ μὴ ἀποκρινόμενος φῂς πλανᾶσθαι; εἶτα οὐ δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, διὰ ταῦτα πλανᾷ; [¶96] 117b. Alc. I agree. > Greek: 117b. ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε. [¶97] Soc. Then is it the case that when a man does not know a thing he must needs be bewildered in spirit regarding that thing? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει· ἐπειδάν τίς τι μὴ εἰδῇ, ἀναγκαῖον περὶ τούτου πλανᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχήν; [¶98] Alc. Yes, of course. > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶99] Soc. Well now, do you know in what way you can ascend to heaven? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οἶσθα ὅντινα τρόπον ἀναβήσῃ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν; [¶100] Alc. On my word, not I. > Greek: ΑΛ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε. [¶101] Soc. Is that too a kind of question about which your judgement is bewildered? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ πλανᾶταί σου ἡ δόξα περὶ ταῦτα; [¶102] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶103] Soc. Do you know the reason, or shall I state it? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δʼ αἴτιον οἶσθα ἢ ἐγὼ φράσω; [¶104] Alc. State it. > Greek: ΑΛ. φράσον. [¶105] Soc. It is, my friend, that while not knowing the matter you do not suppose that you know it. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι, ὦ φίλε, οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος. [¶106] 117c. Alc. Here again, how do you mean? > Greek: 117c. ΑΛ. πῶς αὖ τοῦτο λέγεις; [¶107] Soc. Do your share, in seeing for yourself. Are you bewildered about the kind of thing that you do not know and are aware of not knowing? For instance, you know, I suppose, that you do not know about the preparation of a tasty dish? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅρα καὶ σὺ κοινῇ. ἃ μὴ ἐπίστασαι, γιγνώσκεις δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι, πλανᾷ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; ὥσπερ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας οἶσθα δήπου ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα; [¶108] Alc. Quite so. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶109] Soc. Then do you think for yourself how you are to prepare it, and get bewildered, or do you entrust it to the person who knows? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν αὐτὸς περὶ ταῦτα δοξάζεις ὅπως χρὴ σκευάζειν καὶ πλανᾷ, ἢ τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ ἐπιτρέπεις; [¶110] Alc. I do the latter. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὕτως. [¶111] Soc. And what if you should be on a ship at sea? Would you think whether the tiller should be moved inwards or outwards, and in your ignorance bewilder yourself, or would you entrust it to the helmsman, and be quiet? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ ἐν νηῒ πλέοις, ἆρα δοξάζοις ἂν πότερον χρὴ τὸν οἴακα εἴσω ἄγειν ἢ ἔξω, καὶ ἅτε οὐκ εἰδὼς πλανῷο ἄν, ἢ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἂν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοις; [¶112] 117d. Alc. I would leave it to him. Soc. So you are not bewildered about what you do not know, so long as you know that you do not know? Alc. It seems I am not, Soc. Then do you note that mistakes in action also are due to this ignorance of thinking one knows when one does not? Alc. Here again, how do you mean? Soc. We set about acting, I suppose, when we think we know what we are doing? > Greek: 117d. ΑΛ. τῷ κυβερνήτῃ. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα περὶ ἃ μὴ οἶσθα πλανᾷ, ἄνπερ εἰδῇς ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα; ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔοικα. ΣΩ. ἐννοεῖς οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα ἐν τῇ πράξει διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιάν ἐστι, τὴν τοῦ μὴ εἰδότα οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; ΑΛ. πῶς αὖ λέγεις τοῦτο; ΣΩ. τότε που ἐπιχειροῦμεν πράττειν, ὅταν οἰώμεθα εἰδέναι ὅτι πράττομεν; ΑΛ. ναί. [¶113] 117e. Alc. Yes. Soc. But when people think they do not know, I suppose they hand it over to others? Alc. To be sure. Soc. And so that kind of ignorant person makes no mistakes in life, because they entrust such matters to others? Alc. Yes. Soc. Who then are those who make mistakes? For, I take it, they cannot be those who know. Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: 117e. ΣΩ. ὅταν δέ γέ πού τινες μὴ οἴωνται εἰδέναι, ἄλλοις παραδιδόασι; ΑΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν μὴ εἰδότων ἀναμάρτητοι ζῶσι διὰ τὸ ἄλλοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιτρέπειν; ΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. τίνες οὖν οἱ ἁμαρτάνοντες; οὐ γάρ που οἵ γε εἰδότες. ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶114] 118. Soc. But since it is neither those who know, nor those of the ignorant who know that they do not know, the only people left, I think, are those who do not know, but think that they do? > Greek: 118. ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δʼ οὔθʼ οἱ εἰδότες οὔθʼ οἱ τῶν μὴ εἰδότων εἰδότες ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν, ἦ ἄλλοι λείπονται ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες, οἰόμενοι δʼ εἰδέναι; [¶115] 118a. Alc. Yes, only those. > Greek: 118a. ΑΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὗτοι. [¶116] Soc. Then this ignorance is a cause of evils, and is the discreditable sort of stupidity? > Greek: ΣΩ. αὕτη ἄρα ἡ ἄγνοια τῶν κακῶν αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία; [¶117] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶118] Soc. And when it is about the greatest matters, it is most injurious and base? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅταν ᾖ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα, τότε κακουργοτάτη καὶ αἰσχίστη; [¶119] Alc. By far. > Greek: ΑΛ. πολύ γε. [¶120] Soc. Well then, can you mention any greater things than the just, the noble, the good, and the expedient? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἔχεις μείζω εἰπεῖν δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων; [¶121] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶122] Soc. And it is about these, you say, that you are bewildered? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν περὶ ταῦτα σὺ φῂς πλανᾶσθαι; [¶123] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶124] Soc. But if you are bewildered, is it not clear from what has gone before that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ πλανᾷ, ἆρʼ οὐ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἀγνοεῖς τὰ μέγιστα, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐκ εἰδὼς οἴει αὐτὰ εἰδέναι; [¶125] 118b. Alc. I am afraid so. > Greek: 118b. ΑΛ. κινδυνεύω. [¶126] Soc. Alack then, Alcibiades, for the plight you are in! I shrink indeed from giving it a name, but still, as we are alone, let me speak out. You are wedded to stupidity, my fine friend, of the vilest kind; you are impeached of this by your own words, out of your own mouth; and this, it seems, is why you dash into politics before you have been educated. And you are not alone in this plight, but you share it with most of those who manage our city’s affairs, except just a few, and perhaps your guardian, Pericles. > Greek: ΣΩ. βαβαῖ ἄρα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, οἷον πάθος πέπονθας· ὃ ἐγὼ ὀνομάζειν μὲν ὀκνῶ, ὅμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἐσμέν, ῥητέον. ἀμαθίᾳ γὰρ συνοικεῖς, ὦ βέλτιστε, τῇ ἐσχάτῃ, ὡς ὁ λόγος σου κατηγορεῖ καὶ σὺ σαυτοῦ· διὸ καὶ ᾁττεις ἄρα πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πρὶν παιδευθῆναι. πέπονθας δὲ τοῦτο οὐ σὺ μόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πραττόντων τὰ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως, πλὴν ὀλίγων γε καὶ ἴσως τοῦ σοῦ ἐπιτρόπου Περικλέους. [¶127] 118c. Alc. Yes, you know, Socrates, they say he did not get his wisdom independently, but consorted with many wise men, such as Pythocleides and Anaxagoras; and now, old as he is, he still confers with Damon for that very purpose. > Greek: 118c. ΑΛ. λέγεταί γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου σοφὸς γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς καὶ σοφοῖς συγγεγονέναι, καὶ Πυθοκλείδῃ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ· καὶ νῦν ἔτι τηλικοῦτος ὢν Δάμωνι σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα. [¶128] Soc. Well, but did you ever find a man who was wise in anything and yet unable to make another man wise in the same things as himself? For instance, the man who taught you letters was wise himself, and also made you wise, and anyone else he wished to, did he not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἤδη τινʼ εἶδες σοφὸν ὁτιοῦν ἀδυνατοῦντα ποιῆσαι ἄλλον σοφὸν ἅπερ αὐτός; ὥσπερ ὅς σε ἐδίδαξεν γράμματα, αὐτός τʼ ἦν σοφὸς καὶ σὲ ἐποίησε τῶν τε ἄλλων ὅντινʼ ἐβούλετο· ἦ γάρ; [¶129] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶130] 118d. Soc. And you too, who learnt from him, will be able to make another man wise? > Greek: 118d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ὁ παρʼ ἐκείνου μαθὼν ἄλλον οἷός τε ἔσῃ; [¶131] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶132] Soc. And the same holds of the harper and the trainer? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ κιθαριστὴς δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδοτρίβης ὡσαύτως; [¶133] Alc. Certainly. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶134] Soc. For, I presume, it is a fine proof of one’s knowing anything that one knows, when one is able to point to another man whom one has made to know it. > Greek: ΣΩ. καλὸν γὰρ δήπου τεκμήριον τοῦτο τῶν ἐπισταμένων ὁτιοῦν ὅτι ἐπίστανται, ἐπειδὰν καὶ ἄλλον οἷοί τʼ ὦσιν ἀποδεῖξαι ἐπιστάμενον. [¶135] Alc. I agree. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶136] Soc. Well then, can you tell me whom Pericles made wise? One of his sons, to begin with? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν Περικλῆς τίνα ἐποίησεν σοφόν, ἀπὸ τῶν ὑέων ἀρξάμενος; [¶137] 118e. Alc. But what if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, Socrates? > Greek: 118e. ΑΛ. τί δʼ εἰ τὼ Περικλέους ὑεῖ ἠλιθίω ἐγενέσθην, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶138] Soc. Well, Cleinias, your brother. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ Κλεινίαν τὸν σὸν ἀδελφόν. [¶139] Alc. But why should you mention Cleinias, a madman? > Greek: ΑΛ. τί δʼ ἂν αὖ Κλεινίαν λέγοις, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον; [¶140] Soc. Well, if Cleinias is mad and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason are we to assign, in your case, for his allowing you to be in your present condition? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν Κλεινίας μὲν μαίνεται, τὼ δὲ Περικλέους ὑεῖ ἠλιθίω ἐγενέσθην, σοὶ τίνα αἰτίαν ἀναθῶμεν, διʼ ὅτι σε οὕτως ἔχοντα περιορᾷ; [¶141] Alc. I believe I am myself to blame for not attending to him. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἐγὼ οἶμαι αἴτιος οὐ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν. [¶142] 119a. Soc. But tell me of any other Athenian or foreigner, slave or freeman, who is accounted to have become wiser through converse with Pericles; as I can tell you that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, and Callias, son of Calliades, became through that of Zeno; each of them has paid Zeno a hundred minae, and has become both wise and distinguished. > Greek: 119a. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων δοῦλον ἢ ἐλεύθερον εἰπὲ ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνουσίαν σοφώτερος γεγονέναι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔχω σοι εἰπεῖν διὰ τὴν Ζήνωνος Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου, ὧν ἑκάτερος Ζήνωνι ἑκατὸν μνᾶς τελέσας σοφός τε καὶ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν. [¶143] Alc. Well, upon my word, I cannot. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔχω. [¶144] Soc. Very good: then what is your intention regarding yourself? Will you remain as you are, or take some trouble? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶεν· τί οὖν διανοῇ περὶ σαυτοῦ; πότερον ἐᾶν ὡς νῦν ἔχεις, ἢ ἐπιμέλειάν τινα ποιεῖσθαι; [¶145] 119b. Alc. We must put our heads together, Socrates. And indeed, as soon as you speak, I take the point and agree. For the men who manage the city’s affairs, apart from a few, do strike me as uneducated. > Greek: 119b. ΑΛ. κοινὴ βουλή, ὦ Σώκρατες. καίτοι ἐννοῶ σου εἰπόντος καὶ συγχωρῶ· δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττοντες ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων ἀπαίδευτοι εἶναι. [¶146] Soc. Then what does that mean? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶτα τί δὴ τοῦτο; [¶147] Alc. That if they were educated, I suppose anyone who undertook to contend against them would have to get some knowledge and practice first, as he would for a match with athletes: but now, seeing that these men have gone in for politics as amateurs, what need is there for me to practise and have the trouble of learning? > Greek: ΑΛ. εἰ μέν που ἦσαν πεπαιδευμένοι, ἔδει ἂν τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα αὐτοῖς ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι μαθόντα καὶ ἀσκήσαντα ἰέναι ὡς ἐπʼ ἀθλητάς· νῦν δʼ ἐπειδὴ καὶ οὗτοι ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντες ἐληλύθασιν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, τί δεῖ ἀσκεῖν καὶ μανθάνοντα πράγματα ἔχειν; ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι τούτων τῇ γε φύσει πάνυ πολὺ περιέσομαι. [¶148] 119c. For I am sure that my natural powers alone will give me an easy victory over them. Soc. Ho, ho, my good sir, what a thing to say! How unworthy of your looks and your other advantages! Alc. What is your meaning now, Socrates? What is the connection? Soc. I am grieved for you, and for my love. Alc. Why, pray? Soc. That you should expect your contest to be with the men we have here. Alc. Well, but with whom is it to be? Soc. Is that a worthy question to be asked by a man who considers himself high-spirited? > Greek: 119c. ΣΩ. βαβαῖ, οἷον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοῦτʼ εἴρηκας· ὡς ἀνάξιον τῆς ἰδέας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν σοι ὑπαρχόντων. ΑΛ. τί μάλιστα καὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. ἀγανακτῶ ὑπέρ τε σοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ ἔρωτος. ΑΛ. τί δή; ΣΩ. εἰ ἠξίωσας τὸν ἀγῶνά σοι εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπους. ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τίνας μήν; [¶149] 119d. Alc. How do you mean? Is not my contest with these men? Soc. Well, suppose you were intending to steer a warship into action, would you be content to be the best hand among the crew at steering or, while regarding this skill as a necessary qualification, would you keep your eye on your actual opponents in the fight, and not, as now, on your fellow-fighters? These, I conceive, you ought so far to surpass that they would not feel fit to be your opponents, but only to be your despised fellow-fighters against the enemy, if you mean really to make your mark with some noble action that will be worthy both of yourself and of the city. > Greek: 119d. ΣΩ. ἄξιον τοῦτό γε καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἄνδρα οἰόμενον μεγαλόφρονα εἶναι. ΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις; οὐ πρὸς τούτους μοι ὁ ἀγών; ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ τριήρη διενοοῦ κυβερνᾶν μέλλουσαν ναυμαχεῖν, ἤρκει ἄν σοι τῶν συνναυτῶν βελτίστῳ εἶναι τὰ κυβερνητικά, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν ᾤου ἂν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ἀπέβλεπες δʼ ἂν εἰς τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνταγωνιστάς, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς νῦν εἰς τοὺς συναγωνιστάς; ὧν δήπου περιγενέσθαι σε δεῖ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καταφρονηθέντας συναγωνίζεσθαί σοι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, εἰ δὴ τῷ ὄντι γε καλόν τι ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι διανοῇ καὶ ἄξιον σαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς πόλεως. [¶150] 119e. Alc. Why, I do mean to. > Greek: 119e. ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διανοοῦμαί γε. [¶151] Soc. So you think it quite fitting for you to be satisfied if you are better than the soldiers, but neglect to keep your eye on the enemy’s leaders with a view to showing yourself better than they are, or to plan and practise against them! > Greek: ΣΩ. πάνυ σοι ἄρα ἄξιον ἀγαπᾶν εἰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν βελτίων εἶ, ἀλλʼ οὐ πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἡγεμόνας ἀποβλέπειν εἴ ποτε ἐκείνων βελτίων γέγονας, σκοποῦντα καὶ ἀσκοῦντα πρὸς ἐκείνους. [¶152] 120a. Alc. Of whom are you speaking now, Socrates? > Greek: 120a. ΑΛ. λέγεις δὲ τίνας τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶153] Soc. Do you not know that our city makes war occasionally on the Spartans and on the Great King? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶσθα ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίοις τε καὶ τῷ μεγάλῳ βασιλεῖ πολεμοῦσαν ἑκάστοτε; [¶154] Alc. That is true. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶155] Soc. And if you are minded to be the head of our state, you would be right in thinking that your contest is with the kings of Sparta and of Persia? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἡγεμὼν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως, πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέας καὶ τοὺς Περσῶν τὸν ἀγῶνα ἡγούμενός σοι εἶναι ὀρθῶς ἂν ἡγοῖο; [¶156] Alc. That sounds like the truth. > Greek: ΑΛ. κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν. [¶157] Soc. No, my good friend; you ought rather to keep your eye on Meidias the quail-filliper and others of his sort—who undertake to manage the city’s affairs, while they still have the slavish hair (as the women would say) showing in their minds through their lack of culture, and have not yet got rid of it; who, moreover, have come with their outlandish speech to flatter the state, not to rule it—to these, I tell you, should your eyes be turned; and then you can disregard yourself, and need neither learn what is to be learnt for the great contest in which you are to be engaged, nor practise > Greek: ΣΩ. οὔκ, ὠγαθέ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς Μειδίαν σε δεῖ τὸν ὀρτυγοκόπον ἀποβλέπειν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους—οἳ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἔτι τὴν ἀνδραποδώδη, φαῖεν ἂν αἱ γυναῖκες, τρίχα ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπʼ ἀμουσίας καὶ οὔπω ἀποβεβληκότες, ἔτι δὲ βαρβαρίζοντες ἐληλύθασι κολακεύσοντες τὴν πόλιν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἄρξοντες—πρὸς τούτους σε δεῖ, οὕσπερ λέγω, βλέποντα σαυτοῦ δὴ ἀμελεῖν, καὶ μήτε μανθάνειν ὅσα μαθήσεως ἔχεται, μέλλοντα τοσοῦτον ἀγῶνα ἀγωνίζεσθαι, μήτε ἀσκεῖν ὅσα δεῖται ἀσκήσεως, [¶158] 120c. what requires practice, and so ensure that you are perfectly prepared before entering upon a political career. > Greek: 120c. καὶ πᾶσαν παρασκευὴν παρεσκευασμένον οὕτως ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως. [¶159] Alc. Why, Socrates, I believe you are right; though I think neither the Spartan generals nor the Persian king are at all different from other people. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς μέν μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν, οἶμαι μέντοι τούς τε Λακεδαιμονίων στρατηγοὺς καὶ τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων. [¶160] Soc. But, my excellent friend, consider what this notion of yours means. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ ἄριστε, τὴν οἴησιν ταύτην σκόπει οἵαν ἔχεις. [¶161] Alc. In regard to what? > Greek: ΑΛ. τοῦ πέρι; [¶162] Soc. First of all, do you think you would take more pains over yourself if you feared them and thought them terrible, or if you did not? > Greek: ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν ποτέρως ἂν οἴει σαυτοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, φοβούμενός τε καὶ οἰόμενος δεινοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι, ἢ μή; [¶163] 120d. Alc. Clearly, if I thought them terrible. > Greek: 120d. ΑΛ. δῆλον ὅτι εἰ δεινοὺς οἰοίμην. [¶164] Soc. And do you think you will come to any harm by taking pains over yourself? > Greek: ΣΩ. μῶν οὖν οἴει τι βλαβήσεσθαι ἐπιμεληθεὶς σαυτοῦ; [¶165] Alc. By no means; rather that I shall get much benefit. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὀνήσεσθαι. [¶166] Soc. And on this single count that notion of yours is so much to the bad. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν τοῦτο τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔχει ἡ οἴησις αὕτη. [¶167] Alc. True. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶168] Soc. Then, in the second place, observe the probability that it is false. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὅτι καὶ ψευδής ἐστιν, ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων σκέψαι. [¶169] Alc. How so? > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς δή; [¶170] Soc. Is it probable that noble races should produce better natures, or not? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον εἰκὸς ἀμείνους γίγνεσθαι φύσεις ἐν γενναίοις γένεσιν ἢ μή; [¶171] 120e. Alc. Clearly, noble races would. > Greek: 120e. ΑΛ. δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς γενναίοις. [¶172] Soc. And will not the well-born, provided they are well brought up, probably be perfected in virtue? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς εὖ φύντας, ἐὰν καὶ εὖ τραφῶσιν, οὕτω τελέους γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετήν; [¶173] Alc. That must be so. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη. [¶174] Soc. Then let us consider, by comparing our lot with theirs, whether the Spartan and Persian kings appear to be of inferior birth. Do we not know that the former are descendants of Hercules and the latter of Achaemenes, and that the line of Hercules and the line of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus? > Greek: ΣΩ. σκεψώμεθα δή, τοῖς ἐκείνων τὰ ἡμέτερα ἀντιτιθέντες, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι φαυλοτέρων γενῶν εἶναι οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Περσῶν βασιλῆς. ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὡς οἱ μὲν Ἡρακλέους, οἱ δὲ Ἀχαιμένους ἔκγονοι, τὸ δʼ Ἡρακλέους τε γένος καὶ τὸ Ἀχαιμένους εἰς Περσέα τὸν Διὸς ἀναφέρεται; [¶175] 121a. Alc. Yes, and mine, Socrates, to Eurysaces, and that of Eurysaces to Zeus! > Greek: 121a. ΑΛ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς Εὐρυσάκη, τὸ δʼ Εὐρυσάκους εἰς Δία. [¶176] Soc. Yes, and mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and Daedalus to Hephaestus, son of Zeus! But take the lines of those people, going back from them: you have a succession of kings reaching to Zeus—on the one hand, kings of Argos and Sparta; on the other, of Persia, which they have always ruled, and frequently Asia also, as at present; whereas we are private persons ourselves, and so were our fathers. And then, suppose that you had to make what show you could of your ancestors, and of Salamis as the native land of Eurysaces, or of Aegina as the home of the yet earlier Aeacus, to impress Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, how you must expect to be laughed at! > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὦ γενναῖε Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰς Δαίδαλον, ὁ δὲ Δαίδαλος εἰς Ἥφαιστον τὸν Διός. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τούτων ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἀρξάμενα βασιλῆς εἰσιν ἐκ βασιλέων μέχρι Διός, οἱ μὲν Ἄργους τε καὶ Λακεδαίμονος, οἱ δὲ τῆς Περσίδος τὸ ἀεί, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν· ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοί τε ἰδιῶται καὶ οἱ πατέρες. [¶177] 121b. Why, I am afraid we are quite outdone by those persons in pride of birth and upbringing altogether. Or have you not observed how great are the advantages of the Spartan kings, and how their wives are kept under statutory ward of the ephors, in order that every possible precaution may be taken against the king being born of any but the Heracleidae? > Greek: 121b. εἰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς προγόνους σε δέοι καὶ τὴν πατρίδα Εὐρυσάκους ἐπιδεῖξαι Σαλαμῖνα ἢ τὴν Αἰακοῦ τοῦ ἔτι προτέρου Αἴγιναν Ἀρτοξέρξῃ τῷ Ξέρξου, πόσον ἂν οἴει γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν; ἀλλʼ ὅρα μὴ τοῦ τε γένους ὄγκῳ ἐλαττώμεθα τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ τροφῇ. ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι τοῖς τε Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῦσιν ὡς μεγάλα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ὧν αἱ γυναῖκες δημοσίᾳ φυλάττονται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν μὴ λάθῃ ἐξ ἄλλου γενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἢ ἐξ Ἡρακλειδῶν; [¶178] 121c. And the Persian king so far surpasses us that no one has a suspicion that he could have been born of anybody but the king before him; and hence the king’s wife has nothing to guard her except fear. When the eldest son, the heir to the throne, is born, first of all the king’s subjects who are in his palace have a feast, and then for ever after on that date the whole of Asia celebrates the king’s birthday with sacrifice and feasting: but when we are born, as the comic poet says, even the neighbors barely notice it, Alcibiades. > Greek: 121c. ὁ δὲ Περσῶν τοσοῦτον ὑπερβάλλει, ὥστʼ οὐδεὶς ὑποψίαν ἔχει ὡς ἐξ ἄλλου ἂν βασιλεὺς γένοιτο ἢ ἐξ αὐτοῦ· διὸ οὐ φρουρεῖται ἡ βασιλέως γυνὴ ἀλλʼ ἢ ὑπὸ φόβου. ἐπειδὰν δὲ γένηται ὁ παῖς ὁ πρεσβύτατος, οὗπερ ἡ ἀρχή, πρῶτον μὲν ἑορτάζουσι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ βασιλέως, ὧν ἂν ἄρχῃ, εἶτα εἰς τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ βασιλέως γενέθλια πᾶσα θύει καὶ ἑορτάζει ἡ Ἀσία· ἡμῶν δὲ γενομένων, τὸ τοῦ κωμῳδοποιοῦ, οὐδʼ οἱ γείτονες σφόδρα τι αἰσθάνονται, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη. [¶179] 121d. After that comes the nurture of the child, not at the hands of a woman-nurse of little worth, but of the most highly approved eunuchs in the king’s service, who are charged with the whole tendance of the new-born child, and especially with the business of making him as handsome as possible by moulding his limbs into a correct shape; and while doing this they are in high honor. > Greek: 121d. μετὰ τοῦτο τρέφεται ὁ παῖς, οὐχ ὑπὸ γυναικὸς τροφοῦ ὀλίγου ἀξίας, ἀλλʼ ὑπʼ εὐνούχων οἳ ἂν δοκῶσιν τῶν περὶ βασιλέα ἄριστοι εἶναι· οἷς τά τε ἄλλα προστέτακται ἐπιμέλεσθαι τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστος ἔσται μηχανᾶσθαι, ἀναπλάττοντας τὰ μέλη τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ κατορθοῦντας· καὶ ταῦτα δρῶντες ἐν μεγάλῃ τιμῇ εἰσιν. [¶180] 121e. When the boys are seven years old they are given horses and have riding lessons, and they begin to follow the chase. And when the boy reaches fourteen years he is taken over by the royal tutors, as they call them there: these are four men chosen as the most highly esteemed among the Persians of mature age, namely, the wisest one, the justest one, the most temperate one, and the bravest one. > Greek: 121e. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἑπτέτεις γένωνται οἱ παῖδες, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους φοιτῶσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θήρας ἄρχονται ἰέναι. δὶς ἑπτὰ δὲ γενόμενον ἐτῶν τὸν παῖδα παραλαμβάνουσιν οὓς ἐκεῖνοι βασιλείους παιδαγωγοὺς ὀνομάζουσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ ἐξειλεγμένοι Περσῶν οἱ ἄριστοι δόξαντες ἐν ἡλικίᾳ τέτταρες, ὅ τε σοφώτατος καὶ ὁ δικαιότατος καὶ ὁ σωφρονέστατος καὶ ὁ ἀνδρειότατος. [¶181] 122. Soc. The first of these teaches him the magian lore of Zoroaster, son of Horomazes; and that is the worship of the gods: he teaches him also what pertains to a king. The justest teaches him to be truthful all his life long; the most temperate, not to be mastered by even a single pleasure, in order that he may be accustomed to be a free man and a veritable king, who is the master first of all that is in him, not the slave; while the bravest trains him to be fearless and undaunted, telling him that to be daunted is to be enslaved. But you, Alcibiades, had a tutor set over you by Pericles from amongst his servants, who was old as to be the most useless of them, Zopyrus the Thracian. > Greek: 122. ΣΩ. ὧν ὁ μὲν μαγείαν τε διδάσκει τὴν Ζωροάστρου τοῦ Ὡρομάζου—ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θεῶν θεραπεία— διδάσκει δὲ καὶ τὰ βασιλικά, ὁ δὲ δικαιότατος ἀληθεύειν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ὁ δὲ σωφρονέστατος μηδʼ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἄρχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἵνα ἐλεύθερος εἶναι ἐθίζηται καὶ ὄντως βασιλεύς, ἄρχων πρῶτον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ ἀλλὰ μὴ δουλεύων, ὁ δὲ ἀνδρειότατος ἄφοβον καὶ ἀδεᾶ παρασκευάζων, ὡς ὅταν δείσῃ δοῦλον ὄντα· σοὶ δʼ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, Περικλῆς ἐπέστησε παιδαγωγὸν τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸν ἀχρειότατον ὑπὸ γήρως, Ζώπυρον τὸν Θρᾷκα. [¶182] 122b. I might describe to you at length the nurture and education of your competitors, were it not too much of a task; and besides, what I have said suffices to show the rest that follows thereon. But about your birth, Alcibiades, or nurture or education, or about those of any other Athenian, one may say that nobody cares, unless it be some lover whom you chance to have. And again, if you chose to glance at the wealth, the luxury, the robes with sweeping trains, the anointings with myrrh, the attendant troops of menials, and all the other refinements of the Persians, you would be ashamed at your own case, on perceiving its inferiority to theirs. > Greek: 122b. διῆλθον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἄν σοι τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν, εἰ μὴ πολὺ ἔργον ἦν καὶ ἅμα ταῦθʼ ἱκανὰ δηλῶσαι καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἀκόλουθα· τῆς δὲ σῆς γενέσεως, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας, ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδενὶ μέλει, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ἐραστής σου τυγχάνει ὤν. εἰ δʼ αὖ ἐθέλεις εἰς πλούτους ἀποβλέψαι καὶ τρυφὰς καὶ ἐσθῆτας ἱματίων θʼ ἕλξεις καὶ μύρων ἀλοιφὰς καὶ θεραπόντων πλήθους ἀκολουθίας τήν τε ἄλλην ἁβρότητα τὴν Περσῶν, αἰσχυνθείης ἂν ἐπὶ σεαυτῷ, αἰσθόμενος ὅσον αὐτῶν ἐλλείπεις. [¶183] 122c. Should you choose, again, to look at the temperance and orderliness, the facility and placidity, the magnanimity and discipline, the courage and endurance, and the toil-loving, success-loving, honor-loving spirit of the Spartans, you would count yourself but a child in all these things. > Greek: 122c. εἰ δʼ αὖ ἐθελήσεις εἰς σωφροσύνην τε καὶ κοσμιότητα ἀποβλέψαι καὶ εὐχέρειαν καὶ εὐκολίαν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην καὶ εὐταξίαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερίαν καὶ φιλοπονίαν καὶ φιλονικίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίας τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων, παῖδʼ ἂν ἡγήσαιο σαυτὸν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. [¶184] 122d. If again you regard wealth, and think yourself something in that way, I must not keep silence on this point either, if you are to realize where you stand. For in this respect you have only to look at the wealth of the Spartans, and you will perceive that our riches here are far inferior to theirs. Think of all the land that they have both in their own and in the Messenian country: not one of our estates could compete with theirs in extent and excellence, nor again in ownership of slaves, and especially of those of the helot class, nor yet of horses, nor of all the flocks and herds that graze in Messene. > Greek: 122d. εἰ δʼ αὖ τι καὶ πλούτῳ προσέχεις καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οἴει τι εἶναι, μηδὲ τοῦθʼ ἡμῖν ἄρρητον ἔστω, ἐάν πως αἴσθῃ οὗ εἶ. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἐθέλεις ⟨εἰς⟩ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων πλούτους ἰδεῖν, γνώσῃ ὅτι πολὺ τἀνθάδε τῶν ἐκεῖ ἐλλείπει· γῆν μὲν γὰρ ὅσην ἔχουσιν τῆς θʼ ἑαυτῶν καὶ Μεσσήνης, οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς ἀμφισβητήσειε τῶν τῇδε πλήθει οὐδʼ ἀρετῇ, οὐδʼ αὖ ἀνδραπόδων κτήσει τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν εἱλωτικῶν, οὐδὲ μὴν ἵππων γε, οὐδʼ ὅσα ἄλλα βοσκήματα κατὰ Μεσσήνην νέμεται. [¶185] 122e. However, I pass over all these things: but there is more gold and silver privately held in Lacedaemon than in the whole of Greece; for during many generations treasure has been passing in to them from every part of Greece, and often from the barbarians also, but not passing out to anyone; and just as in the fable of Aesop, where the fox remarked to the lion on the direction of the footmarks, the traces of the money going into Lacedaemon are clear enough, but nowhere are any to be seen of it coming out; > Greek: 122e. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἐῶ χαίρειν, χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν ὅσον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἰδίᾳ· πολλὰς γὰρ ἤδη γενεὰς εἰσέρχεται μὲν αὐτόσε ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἐξέρχεται δὲ οὐδαμόσε, ἀλλʼ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸν Αἰσώπου μῦθον ὃν ἡ ἀλώπηξ πρὸς τὸν λέοντα εἶπεν, καὶ τοῦ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα νομίσματος εἰσιόντος μὲν τὰ ἴχνη τὰ ἐκεῖσε τετραμμένα δῆλα, ἐξιόντος δὲ οὐδαμῇ ἄν τις ἴδοι. [¶186] 123. Soc. so that one can be pretty sure that those people are the richest of the Greeks in gold and silver, and that among themselves the richest is the king; for the largest and most numerous receipts of the kind are those of the kings, and besides there is the levy of the royal tribute in no slight amount, which the Spartans pay to their kings. > Greek: 123. ΣΩ. ὥστε εὖ χρὴ εἰδέναι ὅτι καὶ χρυσῷ καὶ ἀργύρῳ οἱ ἐκεῖ πλουσιώτατοί εἰσιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ὁ βασιλεύς· ἔκ τε γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων μέγισται λήψεις καὶ πλεῖσταί εἰσι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ βασιλικὸς φόρος οὐκ ὀλίγος γίγνεται, ὃν τελοῦσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν. [¶187] 123b. Now, the Spartan fortunes, though great compared with the wealth of other Greeks, are nought beside that of the Persians and their king. For I myself was once told by a trustworthy person, who had been up to their court, that he traversed a very large tract of excellent land, nearly a day’s journey, which the inhabitants called the girdle of the king’s wife, and another which was similarly called her veil; > Greek: 123b. καὶ τὰ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς πρὸς Ἑλληνικοὺς μὲν πλούτους μεγάλα, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Περσικοὺς καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνων βασιλέως οὐδέν. ἐπεί ποτʼ ἐγὼ ἤκουσα ἀνδρὸς ἀξιοπίστου τῶν ἀναβεβηκότων παρὰ βασιλέα, ὃς ἔφη παρελθεῖν χώραν πάνυ πολλὴν καὶ ἀγαθήν, ἐγγὺς ἡμερησίαν ὁδόν, ἣν καλεῖν τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ζώνην τῆς βασιλέως γυναικός· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἣν αὖ καλεῖσθαι καλύπτραν, καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς τόπους καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἐξῃρημένους τὸν τῆς γυναικός, καὶ ὀνόματα ἔχειν ἑκάστους τῶν τόπων ἀπὸ ἑκάστου τῶν κόσμων. [¶188] 123c. and many other fine and fertile regions reserved for the adornment of the consort; and each of these regions was named after some part of her apparel. So I imagine, if someone should say to the king’s mother Amestris, who was wife of Xerxes, “The son of Deinomache intends to challenge your son; the mother’s dresses are worth perhaps fifty minae at the outside, while the son has under three hundred acres at Erchiae,” she would wonder to what on earth this Alcibiades could be trusting, that he proposed to contend against Artaxerxes; and I expect she would remark—“The only possible things that the man can be trusting to for his enterprise are industry and wisdom; for these are the only things of any account among the Greeks.” > Greek: 123c. ὥστʼ οἶμαι ἐγώ, εἴ τις εἴποι τῇ βασιλέως μητρί, Ξέρξου δὲ γυναικί, Ἀμήστριδι, ὅτι ἐν νῷ ἔχει σοῦ τῷ ὑεῖ ἀντιτάττεσθαι ὁ Δεινομάχης ὑός, ᾗ ἔστι κόσμος ἴσως ἄξιος μνῶν πεντήκοντα εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, τῷ δʼ ὑεῖ αὐτῆς γῆς πλέθρα Ἐρχίασιν οὐδὲ τριακόσια, θαυμάσαι ἂν ὅτῳ ποτὲ πιστεύων ἐν νῷ ἔχει οὗτος ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης τῷ Ἀρτοξέρξῃ διαγωνίζεσθαι, καὶ οἶμαι ἂν αὐτὴν εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ πιστεύων οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἐπιχειρεῖ πλὴν ἐπιμελείᾳ τε καὶ σοφίᾳ· [¶189] 123d. Whereas if she were informed that this Alcibiades who is actually making such an attempt is, in the first place, as yet barely twenty years old, and secondly, altogether uneducated; and further, that when his lover tells him that he must first learn, and take pains over himself, and practise, before he enters on a contest with the king, he refuses, and says he will do very well as he is; I expect she would ask in surprise, “On what, then, can the youngster rely?” > Greek: 123d. ταῦτα γὰρ μόνα ἄξια λόγου ἐν Ἕλλησιν. ἐπεὶ εἴ γε πύθοιτο ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης οὗτος νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ πρῶτον μὲν ἔτη οὐδέπω γεγονὼς σφόδρα εἴκοσιν, ἔπειτα παντάπασιν ἀπαίδευτος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, τοῦ ἐραστοῦ αὐτῷ λέγοντος ὅτι χρὴ πρῶτον μαθόντα καὶ ἐπιμεληθέντα αὑτοῦ καὶ ἀσκήσαντα οὕτως ἰέναι διαγωνιούμενον βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ἐθέλει, ἀλλά φησιν ἐξαρκεῖν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, οἶμαι ἂν αὐτὴν θαυμάσαι τε καὶ ἐρέσθαι· [¶190] 123e. And if we told her, “On beauty, stature, birth, wealth, and mental gifts,” she would conclude we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages of her own people in all these respects. > Greek: 123e. τί οὖν ποτʼ ἔστιν ὅτῳ πιστεύει τὸ μειράκιον; εἰ οὖν λέγοιμεν ὅτι κάλλει τε καὶ μεγέθει καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ φύσει τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡγήσαιτʼ ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, μαίνεσθαι πρὸς τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀποβλέψασα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. [¶191] 124. Soc. And I imagine that even Lampido, daughter of Leotychides and wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, who have all been kings, would wonder in the same way, when she compared her people’s resources, at your intention of having a contest with her son despite your bad upbringing. > Greek: 124. ΣΩ. οἶμαι δὲ κἂν Λαμπιδώ, τὴν Λεωτυχίδου μὲν θυγατέρα, Ἀρχιδάμου δὲ γυναῖκα, Ἄγιδος δὲ μητέρα, οἳ πάντες βασιλῆς γεγόνασιν, θαυμάσαι ἂν καὶ ταύτην εἰς τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ὑπάρχοντα ἀποβλέψασαν, εἰ σὺ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις τῷ ὑεῖ αὐτῆς διαγωνίζεσθαι οὕτω κακῶς ἠγμένος. [¶192] 124a. And yet, does it not strike you as disgraceful that our enemies’ wives should have a better idea of the qualities that we need for an attempt against them than we have ourselves? Ah, my remarkable friend, listen to me and the Delphic motto, “Know thyself”; for these people are our competitors, not those whom you think; and there is nothing that will give us ascendancy over them save only pains and skill. > Greek: 124a. καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ αἱ τῶν πολεμίων γυναῖκες βέλτιον περὶ ἡμῶν διανοοῦνται, οἵους χρὴ ὄντας σφίσιν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ἡμεῖς περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; ἀλλʼ, ὦ μακάριε, πειθόμενος ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματι, γνῶθι σαυτόν, ὅτι οὗτοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν ἀντίπαλοι, ἀλλʼ οὐχ οὓς σὺ οἴει· [¶193] 124b. If you are found wanting in these, you will be found wanting also in achievement of renown among Greeks and barbarians both; and of this I observe you to be more enamored than anyone else ever was of anything. > Greek: 124b. ὧν ἄλλῳ μὲν οὐδʼ ἂν ἑνὶ περιγενοίμεθα, εἰ μή περ ἐπιμελείᾳ γε ἂν καὶ τέχνῃ. ὧν σὺ εἰ ἀπολειφθήσῃ, καὶ τοῦ ὀνομαστὸς γενέσθαι ἀπολειφθήσῃ ἐν Ἕλλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροις, οὗ μοι δοκεῖς ἐρᾶν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἄλλου. [¶194] Alc. Well then, what are the pains that I must take, Socrates? Can you enlighten me? For I must say your words are remarkably like the truth. > Greek: ΑΛ. τίνα οὖν χρὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ποιεῖσθαι; ἔχεις ἐξηγήσασθαι; παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικας ἀληθῆ εἰρηκότι. [¶195] Soc. Yes, I can: but we must put our heads together, you know, as to the way in which we can improve ourselves to the utmost. > Greek: ΣΩ. ναί· ἀλλὰ γὰρ κοινὴ βουλὴ ᾧτινι τρόπῳ ἂν ὅτι βέλτιστοι γενοίμεθα. [¶196] 124c. For observe that when I speak of the need of being educated I am not referring only to you, apart from myself; since my case is identical with yours except in one point. > Greek: 124c. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι οὐ περὶ μὲν σοῦ λέγω ὡς χρὴ παιδευθῆναι, περὶ ἐμοῦ δὲ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθʼ ὅτῳ σου διαφέρω πλήν γʼ ἑνί. [¶197] Alc. What is that? > Greek: ΑΛ. τίνι; [¶198] Soc. My guardian is better and wiser than your one, Pericles. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁ ἐπίτροπος ὁ ἐμὸς βελτίων ἐστὶ καὶ σοφώτερος ἢ Περικλῆς ὁ σός. [¶199] Alc. Who is he, Socrates? > Greek: ΑΛ. τίς οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶200] Soc. God, Alcibiades, who until this day would not let me converse with you; and trusting in him I say that through no other man but me will you attain to eminence. > Greek: ΣΩ. θεός, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ὅσπερ σοί με οὐκ εἴα πρὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας διαλεχθῆναι· ᾧ καὶ πιστεύων λέγω ὅτι ἡ ἐπιφάνεια διʼ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου σοι ἔσται ἢ διʼ ἐμοῦ. [¶201] 124d. Alc. You are jesting, Socrates. > Greek: 124d. ΑΛ. παίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶202] Soc. Perhaps; I am right, however, in saying that we need to take pains—all men rather badly, but we two very badly indeed. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴσως· λέγω μέντοι ἀληθῆ, ὅτι ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα, μᾶλλον μὲν πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀτὰρ νώ γε καὶ μάλα σφόδρα. [¶203] Alc. As to me, you are not wrong. > Greek: ΑΛ. ὅτι μὲν ἐγώ, οὐ ψεύδῃ. [¶204] Soc. Nor, I fear, as to myself either. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲ μὴν ὅτι γε ἐγώ. [¶205] Alc. Then what can we do? > Greek: ΑΛ. τί οὖν ἂν ποιοῖμεν; [¶206] Soc. There must be no crying off or skulking, my good friend. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἀπορρητέον οὐδὲ μαλθακιστέον, ὦ ἑταῖρε. [¶207] Alc. No, for that would indeed be unseemly, Socrates. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὔτοι δὴ πρέπει γʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶208] Soc. It would; so let us consider in common. Now tell me: > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ γάρ, ἀλλὰ σκεπτέον κοινῇ. καί μοι λέγε· [¶209] 124e. we say, do we not, that we wish to be as good as possible? > Greek: 124e. φαμὲν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἄριστοι βούλεσθαι γενέσθαι. ἦ γάρ; [¶210] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶211] Soc. In what excellence? > Greek: ΣΩ. τίνα ἀρετήν; [¶212] Alc. Clearly that which is the aim of good men. > Greek: ΑΛ. δῆλον ὅτι ἥνπερ οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοί. [¶213] Soc. Good in what? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἱ τί ἀγαθοί; [¶214] Alc. Clearly, good in the management of affairs. > Greek: ΑΛ. δῆλον ὅτι οἱ πράττειν τὰ πράγματα. [¶215] Soc. What sort of affairs? Horsemanship? > Greek: ΣΩ. ποῖα; ἆρα τὰ ἱππικά; [¶216] Alc. No, no. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶217] Soc. Because we should apply to horsemen? > Greek: ΣΩ. παρὰ τοὺς ἱππικοὺς γὰρ ἂν ᾖμεν; [¶218] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶219] Soc. Well, seamanship, do you mean? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὰ ναυτικὰ λέγεις; [¶220] Alc. No. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὔ. [¶221] Soc. Because we should apply to seamen? > Greek: ΣΩ. παρὰ τοὺς ναυτικοὺς γὰρ ἂν ᾖμεν; [¶222] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶223] Soc. Well, what sort of thing? The business of what men? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ ποῖα; ἃ τίνες πράττουσιν; [¶224] Alc. Of Athenian gentlemen. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἅπερ Ἀθηναίων οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί. [¶225] 125a. Soc. Do you mean by “gentlemen” the intelligent or the unintelligent? > Greek: 125a. ΣΩ. καλοὺς δὲ κἀγαθοὺς λέγεις τοὺς φρονίμους ἢ τοὺς ἄφρονας; [¶226] Alc. The intelligent. > Greek: ΑΛ. τοὺς φρονίμους. [¶227] Soc. And everyone is good in that wherein he is intelligent? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὃ ἕκαστος φρόνιμος, τοῦτʼ ἀγαθός; [¶228] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶229] Soc. And bad wherein he is unintelligent? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὃ δὲ ἄφρων, πονηρός; [¶230] Alc. Of course. > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶231] Soc. Then is the shoemaker intelligent in the making of foot-gear? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὁ σκυτοτόμος φρόνιμος εἰς ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίαν; [¶232] Alc. Certainly. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶233] Soc. So he is good in that article? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀγαθὸς ἄρʼ εἰς αὐτά; [¶234] Alc. Good. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀγαθός. [¶235] Soc. Well now, is not the shoemaker unintelligent in the making of clothes? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ; εἰς ἱματίων ἐργασίαν οὐκ ἄφρων ὁ σκυτοτόμος; [¶236] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶237] 125b. Soc. So he is bad in that? > Greek: 125b. ΣΩ. κακὸς ἄρα εἰς τοῦτο;