Soc. Then, on this showing, the same man is both bad and good.
ΣΩ. ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ κακός τε καὶ ἀγαθός.
Alc. Apparently.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
Soc. Well, can you say that good men are also bad?
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν λέγεις τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εἶναι καὶ κακούς;
Alc. No, indeed.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. But whoever do you mean by the good?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τίνας ποτὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς λέγεις;
Alc. I mean those who are able to rule in the city.
ΑΛ. τοὺς δυναμένους ἔγωγε ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει.
Soc. Not, I presume, over horses?
ΣΩ. οὐ δήπου ἵππων γε;
Soc. But over men?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀνθρώπων;
Soc. When they are sick?
ΣΩ. ἆρα καμνόντων;
Soc. Or at sea?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ πλεόντων;
Alc. I say, no.
ΑΛ. οὔ φημι.
Soc. Or harvesting?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ θεριζόντων;
125c. Soc. Doing nothing, or doing something?
125c. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ποιούντων ἤ τι ποιούντων;
Alc. Doing something, I say.
ΑΛ. ποιούντων λέγω.
Soc. Doing what? Try and let me know.
ΣΩ. τί; πειρῶ καὶ ἐμοὶ δηλῶσαι.
Alc. Well, men who do business with each other and make use of one another, as is our way of life in our cities.
ΑΛ. οὐκοῦν τῶν καὶ συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χρωμένων ἀλλήλοις, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.
Soc. Then you speak of ruling over men who make use of men?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἄρχειν ἀνθρώποις χρωμένων;
Soc. Over boatswains who make use of rowers?
ΣΩ. ἆρα κελευστῶν χρωμένων ἐρέταις;
Soc. Because that is the pilot’s distinction?
ΣΩ. κυβερνητικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γε ἀρετή;
Soc. Well, do you mean ruling over men who are flute-players, and who lead the singing and make use of dancers?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἄρχειν αὐλητῶν, ἀνθρώποις ἡγουμένων ᾠδῆς καὶ χρωμένων χορευταῖς;
125d. Alc. No, no.
125d. ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. Because, again, that is the chorus-teacher’s function?
ΣΩ. χοροδιδασκαλικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γʼ αὖ;
Alc. To be sure.
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. But whatever do you mean by being able to rule over men who make use of men?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τί ποτε λέγεις χρωμένων ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώποις οἷόν τʼ εἶναι ἄρχειν;
Alc. I mean ruling over men in the city who share in it as fellow-citizens, and do business with each other.
ΑΛ. κοινωνούντων ἔγωγε λέγω πολιτείας καὶ συμβαλλόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τούτων ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει.
Soc. Well, what art is this? Suppose I should ask you over again, as I did just now, what art makes men know how to rule over fellow-sailors?
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν αὕτη ἡ τέχνη; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ σε ἐροίμην πάλιν τὰ νυνδή, κοινωνούντων ναυτιλίας ἐπίστασθαι ἄρχειν τίς ποιεῖ τέχνη;
Alc. The pilot’s.
ΑΛ. κυβερνητική.
125e. Soc. And what knowledge—to repeat what was said a moment ago—makes them rule over their fellow-singers?
125e. ΣΩ. κοινωνούντων δʼ ᾠδῆς, ὡς νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο, τις ἐπιστήμη ποιεῖ ἄρχειν;
Alc. That which you just mentioned, the chorus-teacher’s.
ΑΛ. ἥνπερ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἡ χοροδιδασκαλία.
Soc. Well now, what do you call the knowledge of one’s fellow-citizens?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; πολιτείας κοινωνούντων τίνα καλεῖς ἐπιστήμην;
Alc. Good counsel, I should say, Socrates.
ΑΛ. εὐβουλίαν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Well, and is the pilot’s knowledge evil counsel?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; μῶν ἀβουλία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ τῶν κυβερνητῶν;
Soc. Rather good counsel?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εὐβουλία;
126a. Alc. So I should think, for the preservation of his passengers.
126a. ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, εἴς γε τὸ σῴζεσθαι πλέοντας.
Soc. Quite right. And now, for what is the good counsel of which you speak?
ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις. τί δέ; ἣν σὺ λέγεις εὐβουλίαν, εἰς τί ἐστιν;
Alc. For the better management and preservation of the city.
ΑΛ. εἰς τὸ ἄμεινον τὴν πόλιν διοικεῖν καὶ σῴζεσθαι.
Soc. And what is it that becomes present or absent when we get this better management and preservation? If, for example, you should ask me, “What is it that becomes present or absent when the body is better managed and preserved?”—I should reply, “Health becomes present, and disease absent.” Do not you think so too?
ΣΩ. ἄμεινον δὲ διοικεῖται καὶ σῴζεται τίνος παραγιγνομένου ἢ ἀπογιγνομένου; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σύ με ἔροιο· ἄμεινον διοικεῖται σῶμα καὶ σῴζεται τίνος παραγιγνομένου ἢ ἀπογιγνομένου; εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὅτι ὑγιείας μὲν παραγιγνομένης, νόσου δὲ ἀπογιγνομένης. οὐ καὶ σὺ οἴει οὕτως;
126b. Alc. Yes.
126b. ΑΛ. ναί.
Soc. And if, again, you asked me, “What becomes present in a better condition of the eyes?”—I should answer in just the same way, “Sight becomes present, and blindness absent.” So, in the case of the ears, deafness is caused to be absent, and hearing to be present, when they are improved and getting better treatment.
ΣΩ. καὶ εἴ μʼ αὖ ἔροιο· τίνος δὲ παραγιγνομένου ἄμεινον ὄμματα; ὡσαύτως εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὅτι ὄψεως μὲν παραγιγνομένης, τυφλότητος δὲ ἀπογιγνομένης. καὶ ὦτα δὲ κωφότητος μὲν ἀπογιγνομένης, ἀκοῆς δὲ ἐγγιγνομένης βελτίω τε γίγνεται καὶ ἄμεινον θεραπεύεται.
Soc. Well then, what is it that becomes present or absent when a state is improved and has better treatment and management?
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή; πόλις τίνος παραγιγνομένου καὶ ἀπογιγνομένου βελτίων τε γίγνεται καὶ ἄμεινον θεραπεύεται καὶ διοικεῖται;
126c. Alc. To my mind, Socrates, friendship with one another will be there, while hatred and faction will be absent.
126c. ΑΛ. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν φιλία μὲν αὐτοῖς γίγνηται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τὸ μισεῖν δὲ καὶ στασιάζειν ἀπογίγνηται.
Soc. Now, by friendship do you mean agreement or disagreement?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν φιλίαν λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν ἢ διχόνοιαν;
Alc. Agreement.
ΑΛ. ὁμόνοιαν.
Soc. And what art is it that causes states to agree about numbers?
ΣΩ. διὰ τίνʼ οὖν τέχνην ὁμονοοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις περὶ ἀριθμούς;
Alc. Arithmetic.
ΑΛ. διὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν.
Soc. And what of individuals? Is it not the same art?
ΣΩ. τί δὲ οἱ ἰδιῶται; οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτήν;
Soc. And it makes each single person agree with himself?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἕκαστος;
Soc. And what art makes each of us agree with himself as to which is the longer, a span or a cubit?
ΣΩ. διὰ τίνα δὲ τέχνην ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁμονοεῖ περὶ σπιθαμῆς καὶ πήχεος ὁπότερον μεῖζον;
126d. Is it not mensuration?
126d. οὐ διὰ τὴν μετρητικήν;
Alc. Of course.
ΑΛ. τί μήν;
Soc. And it makes both individuals and states agree with each other?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀλλήλοις καὶ αἱ πόλεις;
Soc. And what about the balance? Is it not the same here too?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; περὶ σταθμοῦ οὐχ ὡσαύτως;
Soc. Then what is that agreement of which you speak, and about what? And what art secures it? And is it the same in an individual as in a state, when one agrees with oneself and with another?
ΣΩ. ἣν δὲ δὴ σὺ λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν, τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τοῦ, καὶ τίς αὐτὴν τέχνη παρασκευάζει; καὶ ἆρα ἥπερ πόλει, αὑτὴ καὶ ἰδιώτῃ, αὐτῷ τε πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον;
Alc. Most likely.
ΑΛ. εἰκός γέ τοι.
Soc. Well, what is it? Do not flag in your answers, but do your best to tell me.
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἔστι; μὴ κάμῃς ἀποκρινόμενος, ἀλλὰ προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν.
126e. Alc. I suppose I mean the friendship and agreement that you find when a father and mother love their son, and between brother and brother, and husband and wife.
126e. ΑΛ. ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι φιλίαν τε λέγειν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν, ἥνπερ πατήρ τε ὑὸν φιλῶν ὁμονοεῖ καὶ μήτηρ, καὶ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῷ καὶ γυνὴ ἀνδρί.
Soc. Then do you suppose, Alcibiades, that a husband can possibly agree with his wife about woolwork, when he does not understand it, and she does?
ΣΩ. οἴει ἂν οὖν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἄνδρα γυναικὶ περὶ ταλασιουργίας δύνασθαι ὁμονοεῖν, τὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενον τῇ ἐπισταμένῃ;
Soc. Nor has he any need, since that is a woman’s pursuit.
ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε δεῖ οὐδέν· γυναικεῖον γὰρ τοῦτό γε μάθημα.
127a. Soc. Or again, could a woman agree with a man about soldiering, when she has not learnt it?
127a. ΣΩ. τί δέ; γυνὴ ἀνδρὶ περὶ ὁπλιτικῆς δύναιτʼ ἂν ὁμονοεῖν μὴ μαθοῦσα;
Soc. Because, I expect you will say again, that is a man’s affair.
ΣΩ. ἀνδρεῖον γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἴσως αὖ φαίης ἂν εἶναι.
Soc. Then, by your account, there are some pursuits belonging to women, and some to men?
ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ μὲν γυναικεῖα, τὰ δὲ ἀνδρεῖα μαθήματα κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.
Alc. Of course.
ΑΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Soc. So in these, at any rate, there is no agreement between men and women.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ἔν γε τούτοις ἐστὶν ὁμόνοια γυναιξὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας.
Soc. And hence no friendship either, if, as we said, friendship is agreement.
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρα φιλία, εἴπερ ἡ φιλία ὁμόνοια ἦν.
Alc. Apparently not.
ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.
Soc. So women are not loved by men, in so far as they do their own work.
ΣΩ. ἧι ἄρα αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ αὑτῶν πράττουσιν, οὐ φιλοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν.
127b. Alc. It seems not.
127b. ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.
Soc. Nor are men by women, in so far as they do theirs.
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρα οἱ ἄνδρες ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ᾗ τὰ αὑτῶν.
Soc. And states, therefore, are not well ordered in so far as each person does his own business?
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ εὖ ἄρα ταύτῃ οἰκοῦνται αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν;
Alc. I think they are, Socrates.
ΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. How can you say that? Without the presence of friendship, which we say must be there if states are well ordered, as otherwise they are not?
ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις, φιλίας μὴ παρούσης, ἧς ἔφαμεν ἐγγιγνομένης εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι τὰς πόλεις, ἄλλως δʼ οὔ;
Alc. But it seems to me that friendship arises among them just on that account—that each of the two parties does its own business.
ΑΛ. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτʼ αὐτοῖς φιλία ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὅτι τὰ αὑτῶν ἑκάτεροι πράττουσιν.
127c. Soc. It was not so a moment since: but now, what do you mean this time? Does friendship arise where there is no agreement? And is it possible that agreement should arise where some know about the business, but others do not?Alc. Impossible.Soc. And are they doing what is just or unjust, when each man does his own business?Alc. What is just, of course.Soc. And when the citizens do what is just in the city, does not friendship arise among them?Alc. Again I think that must be so, Socrates.Soc. Then whatever do you mean by that friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and well-advised in order that we may be good men?
127c. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρτι γε· νῦν δὲ πῶς αὖ λέγεις; ὁμονοίας μὴ ἐγγιγνομένης φιλία ἐγγίγνεται; ἢ οἷόν θʼ ὁμόνοιαν ἐγγίγνεσθαι [περὶ τούτων] ὧν οἱ μὲν ἴσασι περὶ τούτων, οἱ δʼ οὔ;ΑΛ. ἀδύνατον.ΣΩ. δίκαια δὲ πράττουσιν ἢ ἄδικα, ὅταν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν;ΑΛ. δίκαια· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;ΣΩ. τὰ δίκαια οὖν πραττόντων ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν πολιτῶν φιλία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται πρὸς ἀλλήλους;ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη αὖ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες.
127d. For I am unable to learn either what it is, or in whom; since it appears that the same persons sometimes have it, and sometimes not, by your account.Alc. Well, by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I mean myself, and I fear that for some time past I have lived unawares in a disgraceful condition.Soc. But you must take heart. For had you perceived your plight at fifty, it would be hard for you to take pains with yourself; whereas here you are at the time of life when one ought to perceive it.
127d. ΣΩ. τίνα οὖν ποτε λέγεις τὴν φιλίαν ἢ ὁμόνοιαν περὶ ἧς δεῖ ἡμᾶς σοφούς τε εἶναι καὶ εὐβούλους, ἵνα ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ὦμεν; οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι μαθεῖν οὔθʼ ἥτις οὔτʼ ἐν οἷστισιν· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς φαίνεται ἐνοῦσα, τοτὲ δʼ οὔ, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου.ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδʼ αὐτὸς οἶδʼ ὅτι λέγω, κινδυνεύω δὲ καὶ πάλαι λεληθέναι ἐμαυτὸν αἴσχιστα ἔχων.ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ θαρρεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ᾔσθου πεπονθὼς πεντηκονταετής, χαλεπὸν ἂν ἦν σοι ἐπιμεληθῆναι σαυτοῦ·
127e. Alc. Then what should one do on perceiving it, Socrates?Soc. Answer the questions asked, Alcibiades: only do that, and with Heaven’s favor—if we are to put any trust in my divination—you and I shall both be in better case.Alc. That shall be, so far as my answering can avail.
127e. νῦν δʼ ἣν ἔχεις ἡλικίαν, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἐν ᾗ δεῖ αὐτὸ αἰσθέσθαι.ΑΛ. τί οὖν τὸν αἰσθανόμενον χρὴ ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες;ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη· καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιῇς, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, εἴ τι δεῖ καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ μαντείᾳ πιστεύειν, σύ τε κἀγὼ βέλτιον σχήσομεν.ΑΛ. ἔσται ταῦτα ἕνεκά γε τοῦ ἐμὲ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
128. Soc. Come then, what is “taking pains over oneself”— for we may perchance be taking, unawares, no pains over ourselves, though we think we are—and when does a man actually do it?
128. ΣΩ. φέρε δή, τί ἐστιν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι—μὴ πολλάκις λάθωμεν οὐχ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι, οἰόμενοι δέ —καὶ πότʼ ἄρα αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ἅνθρωπος;
128a. Does he take pains over himself at the same time as over his own things?Alc. I at least believe so.Soc. Well now, when does a man take pains over his feet? Is it when he takes pains over what belongs to his feet?Alc. I do not understand.Soc. Is there anything you can name as belonging to the hand? For instance, does a ring belong to any other part of a man but the finger?Alc. No, indeed.Soc. And so the shoe also belongs to the foot, in the same way?Alc. Yes.Soc. And likewise clothes and coverlets belong to the whole body?
128a. ἆρʼ ὅταν τῶν αὑτοῦ ἐπιμελῆται, τότε καὶ αὑτοῦ;ΑΛ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.ΣΩ. τί δέ; ποδῶν ἅνθρωπος ποτε ἐπιμελεῖται; ἆρʼ ὅταν ἐκείνων ἐπιμελῆται ἅ ἐστι τῶν ποδῶν;ΑΛ. οὐ μανθάνω.ΣΩ. καλεῖς δέ τι χειρός; οἷον δακτύλιον ἔστιν ὅτου ἂν ἄλλου τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φαίης ἢ δακτύλου;ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ποδὸς ὑπόδημα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον;ΑΛ. ναί. ⟨ΣΩ. καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ στρώματα τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος ὁμοίως;⟩ ⟨ ΑΛ.
128b. Alc. Yes.Soc. Now when we take pains over our shoes, we take pains over our feet?Alc. I do not quite understand, Socrates.Soc. Well, but, Alcibiades, you speak of taking proper pains over this or that matter, do you not?Alc. I do.Soc. And do you call it proper pains when someone makes a thing better?Alc. Yes.Soc. Then what art makes shoes better?Alc. Shoe-making.Soc. So by shoe-making we take pains over our shoes?
128b. ναί.⟩ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὅταν ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελώμεθα, τότε ποδῶν ἐπιμελούμεθα;ΑΛ. οὐ πάνυ μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. τί δέ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη; ὀρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καλεῖς τι ὁτουοῦν πράγματος;ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὅταν τίς τι βέλτιον ποιῇ, τότε ὀρθὴν λέγεις ἐπιμέλειαν;ΑΛ. ναί.ΣΩ. τίς οὖν τέχνη ὑποδήματα βελτίω ποιεῖ;ΑΛ. σκυτική.ΣΩ. σκυτικῇ ἄρα ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελούμεθα;
128c. Alc. Yes.
128c. ΑΛ. ναί.
Soc. And over our foot too by shoe-making? Or by that art whereby we make feet better?
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ποδὸς σκυτικῇ; ἢ ἐκείνῃ ᾗ πόδας βελτίους ποιοῦμεν;
Alc. By that art.
ΑΛ. ἐκείνῃ.
Soc. And is it not the same one for making our feet as for making the whole body better?
ΣΩ. βελτίους δὲ πόδας οὐχ ᾗπερ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα;
Alc. I think so.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. And is not that gymnastic?
ΣΩ. αὕτη δʼ οὐ γυμναστική;
Alc. Certainly.
ΑΛ. μάλιστα.
Soc. So by gymnastic we take pains over our foot, but by shoe-making over what belongs to our foot?
ΣΩ. γυμναστικῇ μὲν ἄρα ποδὸς ἐπιμελούμεθα, σκυτικῇ δὲ τῶν τοῦ ποδός;
Alc. Quite so.
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And by gymnastic over our hands, but by ring-engraving over what belongs to the hand?
ΣΩ. καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν χειρῶν, δακτυλιογλυφίᾳ δὲ τῶν τῆς χειρός;
Soc. And by gymnastic over the body, but by weaving and the rest over what belongs to the body?
ΣΩ. καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν σώματος, ὑφαντικῇ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τῶν τοῦ σώματος;
128d. Alc. Absolutely so.
128d. ΑΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Soc. Then for taking pains over a thing itself and over what belongs to it we use different arts.
ΣΩ. ἄλλῃ μὲν ἄρα τέχνῃ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου ἐπιμελούμεθα, ἄλλῃ δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ.
Alc. Apparently.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
Soc. So when you take pains over your belongings you are not taking pains over yourself.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὅταν τῶν σαυτοῦ ἐπιμελῇ, σαυτοῦ ἐπιμελῇ.
Alc. Not at all.
ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
Soc. For the arts, it seems, that one used for taking pains over oneself and over one’s belongings would not be the same.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ τέχνη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ᾗ τις ἂν αὑτοῦ τε ἐπιμελοῖτο καὶ τῶν αὑτοῦ.
Alc. Apparently not.
ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.
Soc. Come then, whatever kind of art can we use for taking pains over ourselves?
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ποίᾳ ποτʼ ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμεληθείημεν;
Alc. I cannot say.
ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
128e. Soc. Well, so much at least has been admitted, that it is not one which would help us to make a single one of our possessions better, but one which would help to make ourselves so?
128e. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε ὡμολόγηται, ὅτι οὐχ ᾗ ἂν τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ ὁτιοῦν βέλτιον ποιοῖμεν, ἀλλʼ ᾗ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;
Alc. That is true.
ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Soc. Now, should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we had not known a shoe?
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ἔγνωμεν ἄν ποτε τίς τέχνη ὑπόδημα βέλτιον ποιεῖ, μὴ εἰδότες ὑπόδημα;
Alc. Impossible.
ΑΛ. ἀδύνατον.
Soc. Nor could we know what art makes rings better, if we had no cognizance of a ring.
ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε τίς τέχνη δακτυλίους βελτίους ποιεῖ, ἀγνοοῦντες δακτύλιον.
Soc. Well then, could we ever know what art makes the man himself better, if we were ignorant of what we are ourselves?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; τίς τέχνη βελτίω ποιεῖ αὐτόν, ἆρʼ ἄν ποτε γνοῖμεν ἀγνοοῦντες τί ποτʼ ἐσμὲν αὐτοί;
129a. Alc. Impossible.
129a. ΑΛ. ἀδύνατον.
Soc. Well, and is it an easy thing to know oneself, and was it a mere scamp who inscribed these words on the temple at Delphi; or is it a hard thing, and not a task for anybody?
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν δὴ ῥᾴδιον τυγχάνει τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτόν, καί τις ἦν φαῦλος ὁ τοῦτο ἀναθεὶς εἰς τὸν ἐν Πυθοῖ νεών, ἢ χαλεπόν τι καὶ οὐχὶ παντός;
Alc. I have often thought, Socrates, that it was for anybody; but often, too, that it was very hard.
ΑΛ. ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις μὲν ἔδοξε παντὸς εἶναι, πολλάκις δὲ παγχάλεπον.
Soc. But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, here is the fact for us all the same: if we have that knowledge, we are like to know what pains to take over ourselves; but if we have it not, we never can.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἴτε ῥᾴδιον εἴτε μή ἐστιν, ὅμως γε ἡμῖν ὧδʼ ἔχει· γνόντες μὲν αὐτὸ τάχʼ ἂν γνοῖμεν τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἀγνοοῦντες δὲ οὐκ ἄν ποτε.
Alc. That is so.
ΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
129b. Soc. Come then, in what way can the same-in-itself be discovered? For thus we may discover what we are ourselves; whereas if we remain in ignorance of it we must surely fail.
129b. ΣΩ. φέρε δή, τίνʼ ἂν τρόπον εὑρεθείη αὐτὸ ταὐτό; οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν τάχʼ εὕροιμεν τί ποτʼ ἐσμὲν αὐτοί, τούτου δʼ ἔτι ὄντες ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἀδύνατοί που.
Alc. Rightly spoken.
ΑΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
Soc. Steady, then, in Heaven’s name! To whom are you talking now? To me, are you not?
ΣΩ. ἔχε οὖν πρὸς Διός. τῷ διαλέγῃ σὺ νῦν; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐμοί;
Soc. And I in turn to you?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐγὼ σοί;
Soc. Then the talker is Socrates?
ΣΩ. Σωκράτης ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ὁ διαλεγόμενος;
Alc. To be sure.
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And the hearer, Alcibiades?
ΣΩ. Ἀλκιβιάδης δʼ ὁ ἀκούων;
Soc. And Socrates uses speech in talking?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λόγῳ διαλέγεται ὁ Σωκράτης;
129c. Alc. Of course.Soc. And you call talking and using speech the same thing, I suppose.Alc. To be sure.Soc. But the user and the thing he uses are different, are they not?Alc. How do you mean?Soc. For instance, I suppose a shoemaker uses a round tool, and a square one, and others, when he cuts.Alc. Yes.Soc. And the cutter and user is quite different from what he uses in cutting?Alc. Of course.Soc. And in the same way what the harper uses in harping will be different from the harper himself?Alc. Yes.Soc. Well then, that is what I was asking just now—whether the user and what he uses are always, in your opinion, two different things.
129c. ΑΛ. τί μήν;ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ταὐτόν που καλεῖς.ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ χρώμενος καὶ ᾧ χρῆται οὐκ ἄλλο;ΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις;ΣΩ. ὥσπερ σκυτοτόμος τέμνει που τομεῖ καὶ σμίλῃ καὶ ἄλλοις ὀργάνοις.ΑΛ. ναί.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄλλο μὲν ὁ τέμνων καὶ χρώμενος, ἄλλο δὲ οἷς τέμνων χρῆται;ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτως καὶ οἷς ὁ κιθαριστὴς κιθαρίζει καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κιθαριστὴς ἄλλο ἂν εἴη;ΑΛ. ναί.
129d. Alc. They are.Soc. Then what are we to say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only, or with his hands as well?Alc. With his hands as well.Soc. So he uses these also?Alc. Yes.Soc. Does he use his eyes, too, in his shoe-making?Alc. Yes.Soc. And we admit that the user and what he uses are different things?Alc. Yes.Soc. Then the shoemaker and the harper are different from the hands and eyes that they use for their work?
129d. ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἀρτίως ἠρώτων, εἰ ὁ χρώμενος καὶ ᾧ χρῆται ἀεὶ δοκεῖ ἕτερον εἶναι.ΑΛ. δοκεῖ.ΣΩ. τί οὖν φῶμεν τὸν σκυτοτόμον; τέμνειν ὀργάνοις μόνον ἢ καὶ χερσίν;ΑΛ. καὶ χερσίν.ΣΩ. χρῆται ἄρα καὶ ταύταις;ΑΛ. ναί.ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς χρώμενος σκυτοτομεῖ;ΑΛ. ναί.ΣΩ. τὸν δὲ χρώμενον καὶ οἷς χρῆται ἕτερα ὁμολογοῦμεν;ΑΛ. ναί.ΣΩ. ἕτερον ἄρα σκυτοτόμος καὶ κιθαριστὴς χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν οἷς ἐργάζονται;
129e. Alc. Apparently.
129e. ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
Soc. And man uses his whole body too?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ παντὶ τῷ σώματι χρῆται ἅνθρωπος;
Alc. To be sure.
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And we said that the user and what he uses are different?
ΣΩ. ἕτερον δʼ ἦν τό τε χρώμενον καὶ ᾧ χρῆται;
Soc. So man is different from his own body?
ΣΩ. ἕτερον ἄρα ἅνθρωπός ἐστι τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ;
Alc. It seems so.
ΑΛ. ἔοικεν.
Soc. Then whatever is man?
ΣΩ. τί ποτʼ οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος;
Alc. I cannot say.
ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
Soc. Oh, but you can—that he is the user of the body.
ΣΩ. ἔχεις μὲν οὖν, ὅτι γε τὸ τῷ σώματι χρώμενον.
130a. Soc. And the user of it must be the soul?
130a. ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ἄλλο τι χρῆται αὐτῷ ἢ ψυχή;
Alc. It must.
ΑΛ. οὐκ ἄλλο.
Soc. And ruler?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄρχουσα;
Soc. Now, here is a remark from which no one, I think, can dissent.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τόδε γʼ οἶμαι οὐδένα ἂν ἄλλως οἰηθῆναι.
Alc. What is it?
ΑΛ. τὸ ποῖον;
Soc. That man must be one of three things.
ΣΩ. μὴ οὐ τριῶν ἕν γέ τι εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
Alc. What things?
ΑΛ. τίνων;
Soc. Soul, body, or both together as one whole.
ΣΩ. ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα ἢ συναμφότερον, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο.
Alc. Very well.
ΑΛ. τί μήν;
Soc. But yet we have admitted that what actually rules the body is man?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχον ὡμολογήσαμεν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι;
130b. Alc. We have.
130b. ΑΛ. ὡμολογήσαμεν.
Soc. And does the body rule itself?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν σῶμα αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἄρχει;
Alc. By no means.
ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
Soc. Because we have said that it is ruled.
ΣΩ. ἄρχεσθαι γὰρ αὐτὸ εἴπομεν.
Soc. Then that cannot be what we are seeking.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν δὴ τοῦτό γε εἴη ὃ ζητοῦμεν.
Alc. It seems not.
ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.
Soc. Well then, does the combination of the two rule the body, so that we are to regard this as man?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἄρα τὸ συναμφότερον τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει, καὶ ἔστι δὴ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος;
Alc. Perhaps it is.
ΑΛ. ἴσως δῆτα.
Soc. The unlikeliest thing in the world: for if one of the two does not share in the rule, it is quite inconceivable that the combination of the two can be ruling.
ΣΩ. πάντων γε ἥκιστα· μὴ γὰρ συνάρχοντος τοῦ ἑτέρου οὐδεμία που μηχανὴ τὸ συναμφότερον ἄρχειν.
Alc. You are right.
ΑΛ. ὀρθῶς.
130c. Soc. But since neither the body nor the combination of the two is man, we are reduced, I suppose, to this: either man is nothing at all, or if something, he turns out to be nothing else than soul.
130c. ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δʼ οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε τὸ συναμφότερόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, λείπεται οἶμαι ἢ μηδὲν αὔτʼ εἶναι, ἢ εἴπερ τί ἐστι, μηδὲν ἄλλο τὸν ἄνθρωπον συμβαίνειν ἢ ψυχήν.
Alc. Precisely so.
ΑΛ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
Soc. Well, do you require some yet clearer proof that the soul is man?
ΣΩ. ἔτι οὖν τι σαφέστερον δεῖ ἀποδειχθῆναί σοι ὅτι ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος;
Alc. No, I assure you: I think it is amply proved.
ΑΛ. μὰ Δία, ἀλλʼ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν.
Soc. And if it is tolerably, though not exactly, we are content; exact knowledge will be ours later, when we have discovered the thing that we passed over just now because it would involve much consideration.
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ μετρίως, ἐξαρκεῖ ἡμῖν· ἀκριβῶς μὲν γὰρ τότε εἰσόμεθα, ὅταν εὕρωμεν ὃ νυνδὴ παρήλθομεν διὰ τὸ πολλῆς εἶναι σκέψεως.
130d. Alc. What is that?Soc. The point suggested in that remark a moment ago, that we should first consider the same-in-itself; but so far, instead of the same, we have been considering what each single thing is in itself. And perhaps we shall be satisfied with that: for surely we cannot say that anything has more absolute possession of ourselves than the soul.Alc. No, indeed.Soc. And it is proper to take the view that you and I are conversing with each other, while we make use of words, by intercourse of soul with soul?Alc. Quite so.
130d. ΑΛ. τί τοῦτο;ΣΩ. ὃ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἐρρήθη, ὅτι πρῶτον σκεπτέον εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό· νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἐσκέμμεθα ὅτι ἐστί. καὶ ἴσως ἐξαρκέσει· οὐ γάρ που κυριώτερόν γε οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν φήσαιμεν ἢ τὴν ψυχήν.ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς ἔχει οὕτω νομίζειν, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ προσομιλεῖν ἀλλήλοις τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν;
130e. Soc. Well, that is just what we suggested a little while ago—that Socrates, in using words to talk with Alcibiades, is holding speech, not with your face, it would seem, but with Alcibiades—that is, with his soul.Alc. I believe so.Soc. Then he who enjoins a knowledge of oneself bids us become acquainted with the soul.
130e. ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.ΣΩ. τοῦτʼ ἄρα ἦν ὃ καὶ ὀλίγῳ ἔμπροσθεν εἴπομεν, ὅτι Σωκράτης Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διαλέγεται λόγῳ χρώμενος, οὐ πρὸς τὸ σὸν πρόσωπον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ποιούμενος τοὺς λόγους· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή.ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.ΣΩ. ψυχὴν ἄρα ἡμᾶς κελεύει γνωρίσαι ὁ ἐπιτάττων γνῶναι ἑαυτόν.
131a. Alc. So it seems.
131a. ΑΛ. ἔοικεν.
Soc. And anyone who gets to know something belonging to the body knows the things that are his, but not himself.
ΣΩ. ὅστις ἄρα τῶν τοῦ σώματός τι γιγνώσκει, τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀλλʼ οὐχ αὑτὸν ἔγνωκεν.
Alc. That is so.
ΑΛ. οὕτως.
Soc. Then no physician, in so far as he is a physician, knows himself, nor does any trainer, in so far as he is a trainer.
ΣΩ. οὐδεὶς ἄρα τῶν ἰατρῶν ἑαυτὸν γιγνώσκει, καθʼ ὅσον ἰατρός, οὐδὲ τῶν παιδοτριβῶν, καθʼ ὅσον παιδοτρίβης.
Alc. It seems not.
ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.
Soc. And farmers, and craftsmen generally, are far from knowing themselves. For these people, it would seem, do not even know their own things, but only things still more remote than their own things, in respect of the arts which they follow; since they know but the things of the body, with which it is tended.
ΣΩ. πολλοῦ ἄρα δέουσιν οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ἑαυτῶν οὗτοί γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλʼ ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτῶν κατά γε τὰς τέχνας ἃς ἔχουσιν·
131b. Alc. That is true.Soc. So if knowing oneself is temperance, none of these people is temperate in respect of his art.Alc. None, I agree.Soc. And that is why these arts are held to be sordid, and no acquirements for a good man.Alc. Quite so.Soc. Then once again, whoever tends his body tends his own things, but not himself?Alc. It looks rather like it.Soc. But whoever tends his money tends neither himself nor his own things, but only things yet more remote than his own things?
131b. τὰ γὰρ τοῦ σώματος γιγνώσκουσιν, οἷς τοῦτο θεραπεύεται.ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν γιγνώσκειν, οὐδεὶς τούτων σώφρων κατὰ τὴν τέχνην.ΑΛ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.ΣΩ. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ βάναυσοι αὗται αἱ τέχναι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ μαθήματα.ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πάλιν ὅστις αὖ σῶμα θεραπεύει, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἀλλʼ οὐχ αὑτὸν θεραπεύει;ΑΛ. κινδυνεύει.ΣΩ. ὅστις δέ γε τὰ χρήματα, οὔθʼ ἑαυτὸν οὔτε τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλʼ ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτοῦ;
131c. Alc. I agree.
131c. ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. So that the money-maker has ceased to do his own business.
ΣΩ. οὐ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἄρα ἔτι πράττει ὁ χρηματιστής.
Soc. And if anyone is found to be a lover of Alcibiades’ body, he has fallen in love, not with Alcibiades, but with something belonging to Alcibiades?
ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τις γέγονεν ἐραστὴς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου σώματος, οὐκ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἄρα ἠράσθη ἀλλά τινος τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδου.
Alc. That is true.
ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Soc. Your lover is rather he who loves your soul?
ΣΩ. ὅστις δέ σου τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρᾷ;
Alc. He must be, apparently, by our argument.
ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη φαίνεται ἐκ τοῦ λόγου.
Soc. And he who loves your body quits you, and is gone, as soon as its bloom is over?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν τοῦ σώματός σου ἐρῶν, ἐπειδὴ λήγει ἀνθοῦν, ἀπιὼν οἴχεται;
Alc. Apparently.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
131d. Soc. Whereas he who loves your soul will not quit you so long as it makes for what is better?Alc. So it seems.Soc. And I am he who does not quit you, but remains with you when your body’s prime is over, and the rest have departed.Alc. Yes, and I am glad of it, Socrates, and hope you will not go.Soc. Then you must endeavor to be as handsome as you can.Alc. Well, I shall endeavor.Soc. You see how you stand: Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, it seems, neither had nor has any lover except one only, and that a cherished one, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.
131d. ΣΩ. ὁ δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν οὐκ ἄπεισιν, ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἴῃ;ΑΛ. εἰκός γε.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ οὐκ ἀπιὼν ἀλλὰ παραμένων λήγοντος τοῦ σώματος, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεληλυθότων.ΑΛ. εὖ γε ποιῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ μηδὲ ἀπέλθοις.ΣΩ. προθυμοῦ τοίνυν ὅτι κάλλιστος εἶναι.ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ προθυμήσομαι.
131e. Alc. True.Soc. And you said that I only just anticipated you in coming to you, for otherwise you would have come to me first for the purpose of inquiring why I am the only one who does not leave you?Alc. Yes, that was so.
131e. ΣΩ. ὡς οὕτω γέ σοι ἔχει· οὔτʼ ἐγένεθʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ Κλεινίου ἐραστὴς οὔτʼ ἔστιν ἀλλʼ ἢ εἷς μόνος, καὶ οὗτος ἀγαπητός, Σωκράτης ὁ Σωφρονίσκου καὶ Φαιναρέτης.ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἔφησθα σμικρὸν φθῆναί με προσελθόντα σοι, ἐπεὶ πρότερος ἄν μοι προσελθεῖν, βουλόμενος πυθέσθαι διʼ ὅτι μόνος οὐκ ἀπέρχομαι;ΑΛ. ἦν γὰρ οὕτω.
132. Soc. Then the reason was that I was the only lover of you, whereas the rest were lovers of what is yours; and that is losing its charm, while you are beginning to bloom.
132. ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον, ὅτι μόνος ἐραστὴς ἦν σός, οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι τῶν σῶν· τὰ δὲ σὰ λήγει ὥρας, σὺ δʼ ἄρχῃ ἀνθεῖν.
132a. So now, if you are not blighted and deformed by the Athenian people, I shall never forsake you. For my chiefest fear is of your being blighted by becoming a lover of the people, since many a good Athenian has come to that ere now. For fair of face isthe people of great-hearted Erechtheus;but you should get a view of it stripped: so take the precaution that I recommend.
132a. καὶ νῦν γε ἂν μὴ διαφθαρῇς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ αἰσχίων γένῃ, οὐ μή σε ἀπολίπω. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ μάλιστα ἐγὼ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ δημεραστὴς ἡμῖν γενόμενος διαφθαρῇς· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη καὶ ἀγαθοὶ αὐτὸ πεπόνθασιν Ἀθηναίων. εὐπρόσωπος γὰρὁ τοῦ μεγαλήτορος δῆμος Ἐρεχθέως·ἀλλʼ ἀποδύντα χρὴ αὐτὸν θεάσασθαι. εὐλαβοῦ οὖν τὴν εὐλάβειαν ἣν ἐγὼ λέγω.
Alc. What is it?
ΑΛ. τίνα;
132b. Soc. Exercise yourself first, my wonderful friend, in learning what you ought to know before entering on politics; you must wait till you have learnt, in order that you may be armed with an antidote and so come to no harm.
132b. ΣΩ. γύμνασαι πρῶτον, ὦ μακάριε, καὶ μάθε ἃ δεῖ μαθόντα ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, πρότερον δὲ μή, ἵνʼ ἀλεξιφάρμακα ἔχων ἴῃς καὶ μηδὲν πάθῃς δεινόν.
Alc. Your advice seems to me good, Socrates; but try to explain in what way we can take pains over ourselves.
ΑΛ. εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι ὅντινʼ ἂν τρόπον ἐπιμεληθεῖμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.
Soc. Well, we have made one step in advance; for there is a pretty fair agreement now as to what we are, whereas we were afraid we might fail of this and take pains, without knowing it, over something other than ourselves.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν πεπέρανται —ὃ γὰρ ἐσμέν, ἐπιεικῶς ὡμολόγηται—ἐφοβούμεθα δὲ μὴ τούτου σφαλέντες λάθωμεν ἑτέρου τινὸς ἐπιμελόμενοι ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡμῶν.
Alc. That is so.
ΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
132c. Soc. And the next step, we see, is to take care of the soul, and look to that.
132c. ΣΩ. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ ὅτι ψυχῆς ἐπιμελητέον καὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλεπτέον.
Soc. While handing over to others the care of our bodies and our coffers.
ΣΩ. σωμάτων δὲ καὶ χρημάτων τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἑτέροις παραδοτέον.
Alc. Quite so.
ΑΛ. τί μήν;
Soc. Then how shall we obtain the most certain knowledge of it? For if we know that, it seems we shall know ourselves also. In Heaven’s name, do we fail to comprehend the wise words of the Delphic inscription, which we mentioned just now?
ΣΩ. τίνʼ οὖν ἂν τρόπον γνοῖμεν αὐτὸ ἐναργέστατα; ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γνόντες, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς γνωσόμεθα. ἆρα πρὸς θεῶν εὖ λέγοντος οὗ νυνδὴ ἐμνήσθημεν τοῦ Δελφικοῦ γράμματος οὐ συνίεμεν;
Alc. With what intent do you say that, Socrates?
ΑΛ. τὸ ποῖόν τι διανοούμενος λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
132d. Soc. I will tell you what I suspect to be the real advice which the inscription gives us. I rather think there are not many illustrations of it to be found, but only in the case of sight.
132d. ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι φράσω, ὅ γε ὑποπτεύω λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἡμῖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα. κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐδὲ πολλαχοῦ εἶναι παράδειγμα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον.
Alc. What do you mean by that?
ΑΛ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;
Soc. Consider in your turn: suppose that, instead of speaking to a man, it said to the eye of one of us, as a piece of advice “See thyself,” how should we apprehend the meaning of the admonition? Would it not be, that the eye should look at that by looking at which it would see itself?
ΣΩ. σκόπει καὶ σύ. εἰ ἡμῶν τῷ ὄμματι ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβουλεῦον εἶπεν ἰδὲ σαυτόν, πῶς ἂν ὑπελάβομεν τί παραινεῖν; ἆρα οὐχὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλέπειν, εἰς ὃ βλέπων ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἔμελλεν αὑτὸν ἰδεῖν;
Soc. Then let us think what object there is anywhere, by looking at which we can see both it and ourselves.
ΣΩ. ἐννοῶμεν δὴ εἰς τί βλέποντες τῶν ὄντων ἐκεῖνό τε ὁρῷμεν ἅμα ἂν καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;
132e. Alc. Why, clearly, Socrates, mirrors and things of that sort.
132e. ΑΛ. δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι εἰς κάτοπτρά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.
Soc. Quite right. And there is also something of that sort in the eye that we see with?
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ᾧ ὁρῶμεν ἔνεστί ⟨τι⟩ τῶν τοιούτων;
Alc. To be sure.
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
133. Soc. And have you observed that the face of the person who looks into another’s eye is shown in the optic confronting him, as in a mirror, and we call this the pupil, for in a sort it is an image of the person looking?
133. ΣΩ. ἐννενόηκας οὖν ὅτι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τὸ πρόσωπον ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ὄψει ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ, ὃ δὴ καὶ κόρην καλοῦμεν, εἴδωλον ὄν τι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος;
Alc. That is true.
ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Soc. Then an eye viewing another eye, and looking at the most perfect part of it, the thing wherewith it sees, will thus see itself.
ΣΩ. ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὀφθαλμὸν θεώμενος, καὶ ἐμβλέπων εἰς τοῦτο ὅπερ βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ καὶ ᾧ ὁρᾷ, οὕτως ἂν αὑτὸν ἴδοι.
Alc. Apparently.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
Soc. But if it looks at any other thing in man or at anything in nature but what resembles this, it will not see itself.
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γʼ εἰς ἄλλο τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου βλέποι ἤ τι τῶν ὄντων, πλὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον, οὐκ ὄψεται ἑαυτόν.
Alc. That is true.
ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Soc. Then if an eye is to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at that region of the eye in which the virtue of an eye is found to occur; and this, I presume, is sight.
ΣΩ. ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρʼ εἰ μέλλει ἰδεῖν αὑτόν, εἰς ὀφθαλμὸν αὐτῷ βλεπτέον, καὶ τοῦ ὄμματος εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει ἡ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ ἐγγιγνομένη· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτό που ὄψις;
Alc. That is so.
ΑΛ. οὕτως.
Soc. And if the soul too, my dear Alcibiades, is to know herself, she must surely look at a soul, and especially at that region of it in which occurs the virtue of a soul—wisdom, and at any other part of a soul which resembles this?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ ψυχὴ εἰ μέλλει γνώσεσθαι αὑτήν, εἰς ψυχὴν αὐτῇ βλεπτέον, καὶ μάλιστʼ εἰς τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρετή, σοφία, καὶ εἰς ἄλλο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον ὄν;
Alc. I agree, Socrates.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
133c. Soc. And can we find any part of the soul that we can call more divine than this, which is the seat of knowledge and thought?Alc. We cannot.Soc. Then this part of her resembles God, and whoever looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself.Alc. Apparently.Soc. And self-knowledge we admitted to be temperance.Alc. To be sure.Soc. So if we have no knowledge of ourselves and no temperance, shall we be able to know our own belongings, good or evil?Alc. How can that be, Socrates?
133c. ΣΩ. ἔχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θειότερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστιν;ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔχομεν.ΣΩ. τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτʼ ἔοικεν αὐτῆς, καί τις εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίη μάλιστα.ΑΛ. φαίνεται. ⟨ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὅθʼ ὥσπερ κάτοπτρά ἐστι σαφέστερα τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ἐνόπτρου καὶ καθαρώτερα καὶ λαμπρότερα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ θεὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ βελτίστου καθαρώτερόν τε καὶ λαμπρότερον τυγχάνει ὄν;⟩ ⟨ΑΛ. ἔοικέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.⟩ ⟨ΣΩ. εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἄρα βλέποντες ἐκείνῳ καλλίστῳ ἐνόπτρῳ χρῴμεθʼ ἂν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων εἰς τὴν ψυχῆς ἀρετήν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα ὁρῷμεν καὶ γιγνώσκοιμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς.⟩ ⟨ΑΛ. ναί.⟩ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ γιγνώσκειν αὑτὸν ὡμολογοῦμεν σωφροσύνην εἶναι;ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν μὴ γιγνώσκοντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς μηδὲ σώφρονες ὄντες δυναίμεθʼ ἂν εἰδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακά τε καὶ ἀγαθά;ΑΛ. καὶ πῶς ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;
133d. Soc. For I expect it seems impossible to you that without knowing Alcibiades you should know that the belongings of Alcibiades are in fact his.
133d. ΣΩ. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἴσως σοι φαίνεται μὴ γιγνώσκοντα Ἀλκιβιάδην τὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου γιγνώσκειν ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐστίν.
Alc. Impossible indeed, upon my word.
ΑΛ. ἀδύνατον μέντοι νὴ Δία.
Soc. Nor could we know that our belongings are ours if we did not even know ourselves?
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρα τὰ ἡμέτερα ὅτι ἡμέτερα, εἰ μηδʼ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;
Alc. How could we?
ΑΛ. πῶς γάρ;
Soc. And so, if we did not so much as know our belongings, we could not know the belongings of our belongings either?
ΣΩ. εἰ δʼ ἄρα μηδὲ τὰ ἡμέτερα, οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων;
Alc. Apparently not.
ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.
Soc. Then we were not quite correct in admitting just now that there are people who, without knowing themselves, know their belongings, while others know their belongings’ belongings. For it seems to be the function of one man and one art to discern all three— himself, his belongings, and the belongings of his belongings.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα πάνυ τι ὀρθῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν ὁμολογοῦντες ἄρτι εἶναί τινας οἳ ἑαυτοὺς μὲν οὐ γιγνώσκουσιν, τὰ δʼ αὑτῶν, ἄλλους δὲ τὰ τῶν ἑαυτῶν. ἔοικε γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι κατιδεῖν ἑνός τε καὶ μιᾶς τέχνης, αὑτόν, τὰ αὑτοῦ, τὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ.
133e. Alc. It looks like it.
133e. ΑΛ. κινδυνεύει.
Soc. And anyone who is ignorant of his belongings will be similarly ignorant, I suppose, of the belongings of others.
ΣΩ. ὅστις δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων που ἂν ἀγνοοῖ κατὰ ταὐτά.
Alc. Quite so.
ΑΛ. τί μήν;
Soc. And if ignorant of others’ affairs, he will be ignorant also of the affairs of states.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἀγνοήσει.
Alc. He must be.
ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.
Soc. Then such a man can never be a statesman.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρʼ ἂν γένοιτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ πολιτικός.
Alc. No, indeed.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. No, nor an economist either.
ΣΩ. οὐ μὴν οὐδʼ οἰκονομικός γε.
134a. Alc. No, indeed.Soc. Nor will he know what he is doing.Alc. No, I agree.Soc. And will not he who does not know make mistakes?Alc. To be sure.Soc. And when he makes mistakes, will he not do ill both in private and in public?Alc. Of course.Soc. And doing ill he will be wretched?Alc. Yes, very.Soc. And what of those for whom he is doing so?Alc. They will be wretched also.Soc. Then it is impossible to be happy if one is not temperate and good.Alc. Impossible.
134a. ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε εἴσεται ὅτι πράττει.ΑΛ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται;ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. ἐξαμαρτάνων δὲ οὐ κακῶς πράξει ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ;ΑΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;ΣΩ. κακῶς δὲ πράττων οὐκ ἄθλιος;ΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.ΣΩ. τί δʼ οἷς οὗτος πράττει;ΑΛ. καὶ οὗτοι.ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε, ἐὰν μή τις σώφρων καὶ ἀγαθὸς ᾖ, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.
134b. Soc. So it is the bad men who are wretched.Alc. Yes, very.Soc. And hence it is not he who has made himself rich that is relieved of wretchedness, but he who has made himself temperate.Alc. Apparently.Soc. So it is not walls or warships or arsenals that cities need, Alcibiades, if they are to be happy, nor numbers, nor size, without virtue.Alc. No, indeed.Soc. And if you are to manage the city’s affairs properly and honorably, you must impart virtue to the citizens.Alc. Of course.
134b. ΑΛ. οὐχ οἷόν τε.ΣΩ. οἱ ἄρα κακοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄθλιοι.ΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδʼ ὁ πλουτήσας ἀθλιότητος ἀπαλλάττεται, ἀλλʼ ὁ σωφρονήσας.ΑΛ. φαίνεται.ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τειχῶν οὐδὲ τριήρων οὐδὲ νεωρίων δέονται αἱ πόλεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰ μέλλουσιν εὐδαιμονήσειν, οὐδὲ πλήθους οὐδὲ μεγέθους ἄνευ ἀρετῆς.ΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι.ΣΩ. εἰ δὴ μέλλεις τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράξειν ὀρθῶς καὶ καλῶς, ἀρετῆς σοι μεταδοτέον τοῖς πολίταις.
134c. Soc. But could one possibly impart a thing that one had not?Alc. How, indeed?Soc. Then you or anyone else who is to be governor and curator, not merely of himself and his belongings in private, but of the state and its affairs, must first acquire virtue himself.Alc. That is true.Soc. Hence it is not licence or authority for doing what one pleases that you have to secure to yourself or the state, but justice and temperance.Alc. Apparently.
134c. ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;ΣΩ. δύναιτο δʼ ἄν τις μεταδιδόναι ὃ μὴ ἔχοι;ΑΛ. καὶ πῶς;ΣΩ. αὐτῷ ἄρα σοὶ πρῶτον κτητέον ἀρετήν, καὶ ἄλλῳ ὃς μέλλει μὴ ἰδίᾳ μόνον αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἄρξειν καὶ ἐπιμελήσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πόλεως καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως.ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ἐξουσίαν σοι οὐδʼ ἀρχὴν παρασκευαστέον σαυτῷ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ, οὐδὲ τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην.ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
134d. Soc. For you and the state, if you act justly and temperately, will act so as to please God.
134d. ΣΩ. δικαίως μὲν γὰρ πράττοντες καὶ σωφρόνως σύ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράξετε.
Alc. Naturally.
ΑΛ. εἰκός γε.
Soc. And, as we were saying in what went before, you will act with your eyes turned on what is divine and bright.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ὁρῶντες πράξετε.
Alc. Apparently.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
Soc. Well, and looking thereon you will behold and know both yourselves and your good.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐνταῦθά γε βλέποντες ὑμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα ἀγαθὰ κατόψεσθε καὶ γνώσεσθε.
Soc. And so you will act aright and well?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ πράξετε;
134e. Soc. Well now, if you act in this way, I am ready to warrant that you must be happy.
134e. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε πράττοντας ὑμᾶς ἐθέλω ἐγγυήσασθαι ἦ μὴν εὐδαιμονήσειν.
Alc. And I can rely on your warranty.
ΑΛ. ἀσφαλὴς γὰρ εἶ ἐγγυητής.
Soc. But if you act unjustly, with your eyes on the godless and dark, the probability is that your acts will resemble these through your ignorance of yourselves.
ΣΩ. ἀδίκως δέ γε πράττοντες, εἰς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινὸν βλέποντες, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα, ὅμοια τούτοις πράξετε ἀγνοοῦντες ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.
Alc. That is probable.
ΑΛ. ἔοικεν.
135. Soc. For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, is at liberty to do what he pleases, but is lacking in mind, what is the probable result to him personally, or to the state as well? For instance, if he is sick and at liberty to do what he pleases—without a medical mind, but with a despot’s power which prevents anyone from even reproving him—what will be the result?
135. ΣΩ. ὧι γὰρ ⟨ἄν⟩, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἐξουσία μὲν ᾖ ποιεῖν ὃ βούλεται, νοῦν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ, τί τὸ εἰκὸς συμβαίνειν, ἰδιώτῃ ἢ καὶ πόλει; οἷον νοσοῦντι ἐξουσίας οὔσης δρᾶν ὃ βούλεται, νοῦν ἰατρικὸν μὴ ἔχοντι, τυραννοῦντι δὲ ὡς μηδὲν ἐπιπλήττοι τις αὐτῷ, τί τὸ συμβησόμενον;
135a. Will not his health, in all likelihood, be shattered?
135a. ἆρʼ οὐχ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, διαφθαρῆναι τὸ σῶμα;
Alc. That is true.
ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Soc. Again, in a ship, if a man were at liberty to do what he chose, but were devoid of mind and excellence in navigation, do you perceive what must happen to him and his fellow-sailors?
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἐν νηί, εἴ τῳ ἐξουσία εἴη ποιεῖν ὃ δοκεῖ, νοῦ τε καὶ ἀρετῆς κυβερνητικῆς ἐστερημένῳ, καθορᾷς ἃ ἂν συμβαίη αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς συνναύταις;
Alc. I do: they must all perish.
ΑΛ. ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε ἀπόλοιντο πάντες ἄν.
Soc. And in just the same way, if a state, or any office or authority, is lacking in excellence or virtue, it will be overtaken by failure?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡσαύτως ἐν πόλει τε καὶ πάσαις ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἐξουσίαις ἀπολειπομέναις ἀρετῆς ἕπεται τὸ κακῶς πράττειν;
135b. Alc. It must.Soc. Then it is not despotic power, my admirable Alcibiades, that you ought to secure either to yourself or to the state, if you would be happy, but virtue.Alc. That is true.Soc. And before getting virtue, to be governed by a superior is better than to govern, for a man as well as a child.Alc. Apparently.Soc. And the better is also nobler?Alc. Yes.Soc. And the nobler more becoming?Alc. Of course.
135b. ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τυραννίδα χρή, ὦ ἄριστε Ἀλκιβιάδη, παρασκευάζεσθαι οὔθʼ αὑτῷ οὔτε τῇ πόλει, εἰ μέλλετε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἀρετήν.ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.ΣΩ. πρὶν δέ γε ἀρετὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ἄρχεσθαι ἄμεινον ὑπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἢ τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνδρί, οὐ μόνον παιδί.ΑΛ. φαίνεται.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τό γʼ ἄμεινον καὶ κάλλιον;ΑΛ. ναί.ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ κάλλιον πρεπωδέστερον;
135c. Soc. Then it becomes a bad man to be a slave, since it is better.Alc. Yes.Soc. So vice is a thing that becomes a slave.Alc. Apparently.Soc. And virtue becomes a free man.Alc. Yes.Soc. And we should shun, my good friend, all slavishness?Alc. Most certainly, Socrates.Soc. And do you now perceive how you stand? Are you on the side of the free, or not?Alc. I think I perceive only too clearly.Soc. Then do you know how you may escape from the condition in which you now find yourself? Let us not give it a name, where a handsome person is concerned!
135c. ΑΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;ΣΩ. πρέπει ἄρα τῷ κακῷ δουλεύειν· ἄμεινον γάρ.ΑΛ. ναί.ΣΩ. δουλοπρεπὲς ἄρʼ ἡ κακία.ΑΛ. φαίνεται.ΣΩ. ἐλευθεροπρεπὲς δὲ ἡ ἀρετή.ΑΛ. ναί.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν φεύγειν χρή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὴν δουλοπρέπειαν;ΑΛ. μάλιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. αἰσθάνῃ δὲ νῦν πῶς ἔχεις; ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς ἢ οὔ;ΑΛ. δοκῶ μοι καὶ μάλα σφόδρα αἰσθάνεσθαι.ΣΩ. οἶσθʼ οὖν πῶς ἀποφεύξῃ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ σὲ νῦν; ἵνα μὴ ὀνομάζωμεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ καλῷ ἀνδρί, ΑΛ.
135d. Alc. I do.Soc. How?Alc. If it be your wish, Socrates.Soc. That is not well said, Alcibiades.Alc. Well, what should I say?Soc. If it be God’s will.Alc. Then I say it. And yet I say this besides, that we are like to make a change in our parts, Socrates, so that I shall have yours and you mine. For from this day onward it must be the case that I am your attendant, and you have me always in attendance on you.
135d. ἔγωγε.ΣΩ. πῶς;ΑΛ. ἐὰν βούλῃ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη.ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ πῶς χρὴ λέγειν;ΣΩ. ὅτι ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.ΑΛ. λέγω δή. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις μέντοι τόδε λέγω, ὅτι κινδυνεύσομεν μεταβαλεῖν τὸ σχῆμα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὲν σὸν ἐγώ, σὺ δὲ τοὐμόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐ παιδαγωγήσω σε ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, σὺ δʼ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ παιδαγωγήσῃ.
135e. Soc. Ah, generous friend! So my love will be just like a stork; for after hatching a winged love in you it is to be cherished in return by its nestling.
135e. ΣΩ. ὦ γενναῖε, πελαργοῦ ἄρα ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως οὐδὲν διοίσει, εἰ παρὰ σοὶ ἐννεοττεύσας ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον ὑπὸ τούτου πάλιν θεραπεύσεται.
Alc. Well, that is the position, and I shall begin here and now to take pains over justice.
ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄρξομαί γε ἐντεῦθεν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐπιμέλεσθαι.
Soc. I should like to think you will continue to do so; yet I am apprehensive, not from any distrust of your nature, but in view of the might of the state, lest it overcome both me and you.
ΣΩ. βουλοίμην ἄν σε καὶ διατελέσαι· ὀρρωδῶ δέ, οὔ τι τῇ σῇ φύσει ἀπιστῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ῥώμην, μὴ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ κρατήσῃ.