--- title: "Alcibiades II · Ἀλκιβιάδης βʹ" author: "Plato" translator: "Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-ii/ cite: "Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, Alcibiades II · Ἀλκιβιάδης βʹ. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-ii/" --- # Alcibiades II · Ἀλκιβιάδης βʹ *Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb* What should we pray for? Socrates and Alcibiades on ignorance and the gods. > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg014, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg014.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## Contents 1. [Pages 138–144](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-ii/1.md) 2. [Pages 145–151](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-ii/2.md) ## 1. Pages 138–144 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-ii/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-ii/1/#p-N [¶0] 138. Soc. Alcibiades, are you on your way to offer a prayer to the god? > Greek: 138. ΣΩ. ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἆρά γε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν προσευξόμενος πορεύῃ; [¶1] Alc. I am, certainly, Socrates. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶2] Soc. You seem, let me say, to have a gloomy look, and to keep your eyes on the ground, as though you were pondering something. > Greek: ΣΩ. φαίνῃ γέ τοι ἐσκυθρωπακέναι τε καὶ εἰς γῆν βλέπειν, ὥς τι συννοούμενος. [¶3] Alc. And what might one ponder, Socrates? > Greek: ΑΛ. καὶ τί ἄν τις συννοοῖτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶4] Soc. The greatest of questions, Alcibiades, as I believe. For tell me, in Heaven’s name, do you not think that the gods sometimes grant in part, but in part refuse, what we ask of them in our private and public prayers, and gratify some people, but not others? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν μεγίστην, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, σύννοιαν, ὥς γʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τοὺς θεούς, ἃ τυγχάνομεν εὐχόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἐνίοτε τούτων τὰ μὲν διδόναι, τὰ δʼ οὔ, καὶ ἔστιν οἷς μὲν αὐτῶν, ἔστι δʼ οἷς οὔ; [¶5] Alc. I do, certainly. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶6] Soc. Then you would agree that one should take great precautions against falling unawares into the error of praying for great evils in the belief that they are good, while the gods happen to be disposed to grant freely what one is praying for? Just as Oedipus, they say, suddenly prayed that his sons might divide their patrimony with the sword: it was open to him to pray that his present evils might by some means be averted, but he invoked others in addition to those which he had already. Wherefore not only were those words of his accomplished, but many other dread results therefrom, which I think there is no need to recount in detail. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι πολλῆς προμηθείας γε προσδεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ λήσεται αὑτὸν εὐχόμενος μεγάλα κακά, δοκῶν δʼ ἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ θεοὶ τύχωσιν ἐν ταύτῃ ὄντες τῇ ἕξει, ἐν ᾗ διδόασιν αὐτοὶ ἅ τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνει; ὥσπερ τὸν Οἰδίπουν αὐτίκα φασὶν εὔξασθαι χαλκῷ διελέσθαι τὰ πατρῷα τοὺς ὑεῖς· ἐξὸν αὐτῷ τῶν παρόντων αὐτῷ κακῶν ἀποτροπήν τινα εὔξασθαι, ἕτερα πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν κατηρᾶτο· τοιγαροῦν ταῦτά τε ἐξετελέσθη, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ δεινά, ἃ τί δεῖ καθʼ ἕκαστα λέγειν; [¶7] Alc. But you have instanced a madman, Socrates: why, do you suppose that anyone could bring himself, while he was in a sound state, to utter such a prayer? > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ σὺ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον εἴρηκας· ἐπεὶ τίς ἄν σοι δοκεῖ τολμῆσαι ὑγιαίνων τοιαῦτʼ εὔξασθαι; [¶8] Soc. Do you regard madness as the opposite of wisdom? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ μαίνεσθαι ἆρά γε ὑπεναντίον σοι δοκεῖ τῷ φρονεῖν; [¶9] Alc. Certainly I do. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶10] Soc. And there are some men whom you regard as unwise, and others as wise? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἄφρονες δὲ καὶ φρόνιμοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι εἶναι τινές σοι; [¶11] Alc. Why, yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. εἶναι μέντοι. [¶12] Soc. Come then, let us consider who these people are. We have admitted that some are unwise, some wise, and others mad. > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ἐπισκεψώμεθα τίνες ποτʼ εἰσὶν οὗτοι. ὅτι μὲν γάρ εἰσί τινες, ὡμολόγηται, ἄφρονές τε καὶ φρόνιμοι, καὶ μαινόμενοι ἕτεροι. [¶13] Alc. Yes, we have. > Greek: ΑΛ. ὡμολόγηται γάρ. [¶14] Soc. And again, there are some in sound health? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι δὲ ὑγιαίνοντές εἰσί τινες; [¶15] Alc. There are. > Greek: ΑΛ. εἰσίν. [¶16] Soc. And others also who are in ill-health? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσθενοῦντες ἕτεροι; [¶17] 139. Alc. Quite so. > Greek: 139. ΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶18] Soc. And they are not the same? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί; [¶19] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ γάρ. [¶20] Soc. And are there any others besides, who are found to be in neither state? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἕτεροί τινές εἰσιν, οἳ μηδέτερα τούτων πεπόνθασιν; [¶21] Alc. No, to be sure. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶22] Soc. For a human being must needs be either sick or not sick. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἢ νοσεῖν ἢ μὴ νοσεῖν. [¶23] Alc. I agree. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶24] Soc. Well then, do you hold the same view about wisdom and unwisdom? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀφροσύνης ἆρά γε τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχεις σὺ γνώμην; [¶25] Alc. How do you mean? > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις; [¶26] Soc. Tell me, do you think it is only possible to be either wise or unwise, or is there some third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἢ φρόνιμον ἢ ἄφρονα, ἢ ἔστι τι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα; [¶27] Alc. No, there is not. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶28] Soc. So he must needs be in one or the other of these two conditions. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀνάγκη ἄρʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων πεπονθέναι. [¶29] Alc. I agree. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶30] Soc. And you remember that you admitted that madness is the opposite of wisdom? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ὁμολογήσας ὑπεναντίον εἶναι μανίαν φρονήσει; [¶31] Alc. I do. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶32] Soc. And further, that there is no third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα εἶναι; [¶33] Alc. Yes, I admitted that. > Greek: ΑΛ. ὡμολόγησα γάρ. [¶34] Soc. Well now, can there possibly be two opposites of one thing? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν δύο γε ὑπεναντία ἑνὶ πράγματι πῶς ἂν εἴη; [¶35] Alc. By no means. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς. [¶36] Soc. Then it looks as though unwisdom and madness were the same. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀφροσύνη ἄρα καὶ μανία κινδυνεύει ταὐτὸν εἶναι. [¶37] Alc. Yes, apparently. > Greek: ΑΛ. φαίνεται. [¶38] Soc. So we shall be right, Alcibiades, in saying that all unwise persons are mad; for example, such of your contemporaries as happen to be unwise—some such there are—and of your elders, even: for tell me, in Heaven’s name, do you not think that in our city the wise people are but few, whereas the majority are unwise, and these you call mad? > Greek: ΣΩ. πάντας οὖν ἂν φάντες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεσθαι ὀρθῶς ἂν φαίημεν· αὐτίκα τῶν σῶν ἡλικιωτῶν εἴ τινες τυγχάνουσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες, ὥσπερ εἰσί, καὶ τῶν ἔτι πρεσβυτέρων. ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὀλίγους μὲν εἶναι τοὺς φρονίμους, ἄφρονας δὲ δὴ τοὺς πολλούς, οὓς δὴ σὺ μαινομένους καλεῖς; [¶39] Alc. I do. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶40] Soc. Well, do you suppose we could safely live with so many madmen as our fellow-citizens, and should not long ago have paid the penalty for it in knocks and blows at their hands, and all the usual proceedings of madmen? Consider now, my wonderful friend, whether the case is not quite different? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἴει ἂν οὖν χαίροντας ἡμᾶς εἶναι μετὰ τοσούτων μαινομένων πολιτευομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν παιομένους καὶ βαλλομένους, καὶ ἅπερ εἰώθασιν οἱ μαινόμενοι διαπράττεσθαι, πάλαι δὴ δίκην δεδωκέναι; ἀλλὰ ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ταῦτʼ ἔχει. [¶41] Alc. Well, it must be, Socrates. For it looks as though it were not as I thought. > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς ἂν οὖν ποτʼ ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες; κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ᾠήθην. [¶42] Soc. And I think so too. But there is another way of regarding it. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ τῇδέ πῃ ἀθρητέον. [¶43] Alc. I wonder what way you mean. > Greek: ΑΛ. πῇ ποτε λέγεις; [¶44] Soc. Well, I will tell you. We conceive there are some who are sick, do we not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δή σοί γε ἐρῶ. ὑπολαμβάνομέν γέ τινας εἶναι νοσοῦντας· ἢ οὔ; [¶45] Alc. We do, to be sure. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶46] Soc. And do you believe that a sick man must necessarily have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia? Do you not think that, although he may be afflicted in none of these ways, he may be suffering from some other disease? For surely there are many of them: these are not the only ones. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν νοσοῦντα ποδαγρᾶν ἢ πυρέττειν ἢ ὀφθαλμιᾶν, ἢ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι καὶ μηδὲν τούτων πεπονθὼς ἑτέραν νόσον νοσεῖν; πολλαὶ γὰρ δήπου γέ εἰσι, καὶ οὐχ αὗται μόναι. [¶47] Alc. I agree. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν. [¶48] Soc. And is every ophthalmia, in your opinion, a disease? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀφθαλμία σοι οὖν δοκεῖ πᾶσα νόσος εἶναι; [¶49] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶50] Soc. And is every disease also ophthalmia? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ πᾶσα νόσος ὀφθαλμία; [¶51] Alc. No, I should think not: still, I am in doubt as to my meaning. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα ἔμοιγε· ἀπορῶ μέντοι γε πῶς λέγω. [¶52] 140. Soc. Well, if you will attend to me, “two together” will be searching, and so mayhap we shall find what we seek. > Greek: 140. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἔμοιγε προσέχῃς τὸν νοῦν, σύν τε δύο σκεπτομένω τυχὸν εὑρήσομεν. [¶53] Alc. Nay, but I am attending, Socrates, to the best of my power. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ προσέχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς δύναμιν τὴν ἐμήν. [¶54] Soc. Then we have admitted that while every ophthalmia is a disease, every disease, on the other hand, is not ophthalmia? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήθη ἡμῖν ὀφθαλμία μὲν πᾶσα νόσος εἶναι, νόσος μέντοι οὐκ εἶναι πᾶσα ὀφθαλμία; [¶55] Alc. We have. > Greek: ΑΛ. ὡμολογήθη. [¶56] Soc. And our admission seems to me quite right. For everyone in a fever is sick, but yet not everyone who is sick has a fever or the gout or ophthalmia, I take it; though everything of the sort is a disease, but differs—to quote those whom we call doctors— in its manifestation. For they are not all alike, nor of like effect, but each works according to its own faculty, and yet all are diseases. In the same way, we conceive of some men as artisans, do we not? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖ ὁμολογηθῆναι. καὶ γὰρ οἱ πυρέττοντες πάντες νοσοῦσιν, οὐ μέντοι οἱ νοσοῦντες πάντες πυρέττουσιν οὐδὲ ποδαγρῶσιν οὐδέ γε ὀφθαλμιῶσιν, οἶμαι· ἀλλὰ νόσος μὲν πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, διαφέρειν δέ φασιν οὓς δὴ καλοῦμεν ἰατροὺς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν αὐτῶν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶσιν οὔτε ὅμοιαι οὔτε ὁμοίως διαπράττονται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῆς δύναμιν ἑκάστη· νόσοι μέντοι πᾶσαί εἰσιν. ὥσπερ δημιουργούς τινας ὑπολαμβάνομεν· ἢ οὔ; [¶57] Alc. Certainly. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶58] Soc. That is, cobblers and carpenters and statuaries and a host of others, whom we need not mention in particular; but any way, they have their several departments of craft, and all of them are craftsmen; yet they are not all carpenters or cobblers or statuaries, though these taken together are craftsmen. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς σκυτοτόμους καὶ τέκτονας καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους παμπληθεῖς, οὓς τί δεῖ καθʼ ἕκαστα λέγειν; ἔχουσι δʼ οὖν διειληφότες δημιουργίας μέρη, καὶ πάντες οὗτοί εἰσι δημιουργοί, οὐ μέντοι εἰσὶ τέκτονές γε οὐδὲ σκυτοτόμοι οὐδʼ ἀνδριαντοποιοί, οἳ σύμπαντές εἰσι δημιουργοί. [¶59] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶60] Soc. In the same way, then, have men divided unwisdom also among them, and those who have the largest share of it we call “mad,” and those who have a little less, “dolts” and “idiots”; though people who prefer to use the mildest language term them sometimes “romantic,” sometimes simpleminded, or again “innocent,” “inexperienced,” or “obtuse”; and many another name will you find if you look for more. But all these things are unwisdom, though they differ, as we observed that one art or one disease differs from another. Or how does it strike you? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὕτως μὲν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην διειληφότες εἰσί, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖστον αὐτῆς μέρος ἔχοντας μαινομένους καλοῦμεν, τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγον ἔλαττον ἠλιθίους τε καὶ ἐμβροντήτους· οἱ δὲ ἐν εὐφημοτάτοις ὀνόμασι βουλόμενοι κατονομάζειν οἱ μὲν μεγαλοψύχους, οἱ δὲ εὐήθεις, ἕτεροι δὲ ἀκάκους καὶ ἀπείρους καὶ ἐνεούς· εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ ἕτερα πολλὰ ἀναζητῶν ὀνόματα. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἀφροσύνη ἐστίν, διαφέρει δέ, ὥσπερ τέχνη τέχνης ἡμῖν κατεφαίνετο καὶ νόσος νόσου· ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ; [¶61] Alc. That is my view. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὕτως. [¶62] Soc. Then let us turn at this point and retrace our steps. For we said, you know, at the beginning that we must consider who the unwise can be, and who the wise: for we had admitted that there are such persons, had we not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀπʼ ἐκείνου πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν. ἦν γὰρ δήπου καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου, σκεπτέον εἶναι τοὺς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ φρονίμους, τίνες ποτʼ εἰσίν. ὡμολόγητο γὰρ εἶναί τινας· ἦ γὰρ οὔ; [¶63] Alc. Yes, we have admitted it. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί, ὡμολόγηται. [¶64] Soc. Then you conceive those to be wise who know what one ought to do and say? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τούτους φρονίμους ὑπολαμβάνεις, οἳ ἂν εἰδῶσιν ἅττα δεῖ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν; [¶65] Alc. I do. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶66] Soc. And which are the unwise? Those who know neither of these things? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἄφρονας δὲ ποτέρους; ἆρά γε τοὺς μηδέτερα τούτων εἰδότας; [¶67] Alc. The same. > Greek: ΑΛ. τούτους. [¶68] Soc. And those who know neither of these things will say and do unawares what one ought not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἵ γε μὴ εἰδότες μηδέτερα τούτων λήσουσιν αὑτοὺς καὶ λέγοντες καὶ πράττοντες ἅττα μὴ δεῖ; [¶69] Alc. Apparently. > Greek: ΑΛ. φαίνεται. [¶70] Soc. Well, just such a person, as I was saying, Alcibiades, was Oedipus; and even in our time you will find many who do the same, not in a fit of anger, as he was: they think they pray not for something evil, but for something good. > Greek: ΣΩ. τούτων μέντοι ἔλεγον, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ τὸν Οἰδίπουν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων· [¶71] 141. He neither prayed for that, nor thought he did, but there are others who are in the opposite case. For I imagine that if the god to whom you are now going should appear to you and first ask you, before you made any prayer, whether you would be content to become sovereign of the Athenian state and, on your accounting this as something poor and unimportant, should add “and of all the Greeks also”; and if he saw you were still unsatisfied unless he promised you besides the mastery of all Europe, and should not merely promise you that, but on the self-same day a recognition by all men, if you so desired, of Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, as their sovereign—I imagine you would actually depart in a transport of delight, as having secured the greatest of goods. Alc. So would anybody else, I imagine, Socrates, at such a stroke of luck! > Greek: 141. εὑρήσεις δʼ ἔτι καὶ τῶν νῦν πολλοὺς οὐκ ὀργῇ κεχρημένους, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον, οὐδʼ οἰομένους κακά σφισιν εὔχεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀγαθά. ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ηὔχετο, οὐδʼ ᾤετο· ἕτεροι δέ τινές εἰσιν οἳ τἀναντία τούτων πεπόνθασιν. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαί σε πρῶτον, εἴ σοι ἐμφανὴς γενόμενος ὁ θεὸς πρὸς ὃν τυγχάνεις πορευόμενος, ἐρωτήσειεν, πρὶν ὁτιοῦν εὔξασθαί σε, εἰ ἐξαρκέσει σοι τύραννον γενέσθαι τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φαῦλον ἡγήσαιο καὶ μὴ μέγα τι, προσθείη καὶ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων· εἰ δέ σε ὁρῴη ἔτι ἔλαττον δοκοῦντα ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ καὶ πάσης Εὐρώπης, ὑποσταίη σοι καὶ τοῦτο, ⟨καὶ τοῦτο⟩ μὴ μόνον ὑποσταίη, ⟨ἀλλʼ⟩ αὐθημερόν σου βουλομένου ὡς πάντας αἰσθήσεσθαι ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου τύραννός ἐστιν· αὐτὸν οἶμαι ἄν σε ἀπιέναι περιχαρῆ γενόμενον, ὡς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν κεκυρηκότα. ΑΛ. ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν, εἴπερ τοιαῦτα συμβαίη αὐτῷ. [¶72] Soc. But still you would not wish to sacrifice your life even for the territory and sovereignty of all the Greeks and barbarians together. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀντί γε τῆς σῆς ψυχῆς οὐδʼ ἂν τὴν πάντων Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων χώραν τε καὶ τυραννίδα βουληθείης σοι γενέσθαι. [¶73] Alc. I should think not. How could I, without a prospect of making any use of them? > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, μηθέν γέ τι μέλλων αὐτοῖς χρήσεσθαι; [¶74] Soc. And what if you had a prospect of making an evil and injurious use of them? Not in this case either? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ μέλλοις κακῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς χρῆσθαι; οὐδʼ ἂν οὕτως; [¶75] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶76] Soc. So you see it is not safe either to accept casually what one is given, or to pray for one’s own advancement, if one is going to be injured in consequence, or deprived of one’s life altogether. Yet we could tell of many ere now who, having desired sovereignty, and endeavored to secure it, with the idea of working for their good, have lost their lives by plots which their sovereignty has provoked. And I expect you are not unacquainted with certain events “of a day or two ago,” when Archelaus, the monarch of Macedonia, was slain by his favorite, who was as much in love with the monarchy as Archelaus was with him, and who killed his lover with the expectation of being not only the monarch, but also a happy man: but after holding the monarchy for three or four days he was plotted against by others in his turn, and perished. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς οὔτε τὰ διδόμενα εἰκῇ δέχεσθαί τε οὔτε αὐτὸν εὔχεσθαι γενέσθαι, εἴ γέ τις βλάπτεσθαι μέλλοι διὰ ταῦτα ἢ τὸ παράπαν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλαγῆναι. πολλοὺς δʼ ἂν ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν, ὅσοι τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμήσαντες ἤδη καὶ σπουδάσαντες τοῦτʼ αὐτοῖς παραγενέσθαι, ὡς ἀγαθόν τι πράξαντες, διὰ τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπιβουλευθέντες τὸν βίον ἀφῃρέθησαν. οἶμαι δέ σε οὐκ ἀνήκοον εἶναι ἔνιά γε χθιζά τε καὶ πρωιζὰ γεγενημένα, ὅτε Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Μακεδόνων τύραννον τὰ παιδικά, ἐρασθέντα τῆς τυραννίδος οὐθὲν ἧττον ἤπερ ἐκεῖνος τῶν παιδικῶν, ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἐραστὴν ὡς τύραννός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἀνὴρ ἐσόμενος· κατασχὼν δὲ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἡμέρας τὴν τυραννίδα πάλιν αὐτὸς ἐπιβουλευθεὶς ὑφʼ ἑτέρων τινῶν ἐτελεύτησεν. [¶77] Soc. You have only to look at some of our own citizens—and these are examples that we know, not by hearsay, but by personal observation—who in their time have desired to hold military command and have obtained it, and see how some to this very day are exiles from our city, while others have lost their lives. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων πολιτῶν—ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλων ἀκηκόαμεν, ἀλλʼ αὐτοὶ παρόντες οἴδαμεν— ὅσοι στρατηγίας ἐπιθυμήσαντες ἤδη καὶ τυχόντες αὐτῆς οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν φυγάδες τῆσδε τῆς πόλεώς εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν· [¶78] 142. And even those who are deemed to be faring best have not only gone through many dangers and terrors in holding their command, but on returning home have continued to be as sorely besieged by informers as they were by the enemy, so that some of them wished to heaven that they had been anything but commanders rather than have held such appointments. Of course, if these dangers and toils were conducive to our advantage, there would be some reason for them; but the case is quite the contrary. And you will find it is just the same in regard to children: some people have been known to pray that they might have them, and when they have got them have fallen into the greatest disasters and pains. For some have had children that were utterly bad, and have spent their whole lives in repining; while others, though they had good ones, were bereft of them by disasters that overtook them, and thus were cast into as great misfortune as the others, and wished that no children at all had been born to them. But nevertheless, with all this plain evidence, and a great deal more of a similar kind, before men’s eyes, it is rare to find anyone who has either declined what was offered to him or, when he was likely to gain something by prayer, refrained from praying. Most men would not decline the offer of either a monarchy or a generalship or any of the various other things which bring with them harm rather than benefit, but would even pray to be granted them in cases where they were lacking: but after a little while they often change their tune, and retract all their former prayers. I question therefore if men are not really wrong in blaming the gods as the authors of their ills, when “they themselves by their own presumption” —or unwisdom, shall we say?— “have gotten them more than destined sorrows.” It would seem, at any rate, Alcibiades, that one old poet had some wisdom; for I conceive it was because he had some foolish friends, whom he saw working and praying for things that were not for their advantage, though supposed to be by them, that he made a common prayer on behalf of them all, in terms something like these: > Greek: 142. οἱ δὲ ἄριστα δοκοῦντες αὐτῶν πράττειν διὰ πολλῶν κινδύνων ἐλθόντες καὶ φόβων οὐ μόνον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ στρατηγίᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατῆλθον, ὑπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν πολιορκούμενοι πολιορκίαν οὐδὲν ἐλάττω τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων διετέλεσαν, ὥστε ἐνίους αὐτῶν εὔχεσθαι ἀστρατηγήτους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐστρατηγηκέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ κίνδυνοί τε καὶ πόνοι φέροντες εἰς ὠφέλειαν, εἶχεν ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τοὐναντίον. εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ περὶ τέκνων τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, εὐξαμένους τινὰς ἤδη γενέσθαι καὶ γενομένων εἰς συμφοράς τε καὶ λύπας τὰς μεγίστας καταστάντας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν διὰ τέλους ὄντων τῶν τέκνων ὅλον τὸν βίον λυπούμενοι διήγαγον· τοὺς δὲ χρηστῶν μὲν γενομένων, συμφοραῖς δὲ χρησαμένων ὥστε στερηθῆναι, καὶ τούτους οὐδὲν εἰς ἐλάττονας δυστυχίας καθεστηκότας ἤπερ ἐκείνους καὶ βουλομένους ἂν ἀγένητα μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι. ἀλλʼ ὅμως τούτων τε καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν ὁμοιοτρόπων τούτοις οὕτω σφόδρα καταδήλων ὄντων, σπάνιον εὑρεῖν ὅστις ἂν ἢ διδομένων ἀπόσχοιτο ἢ μέλλων διʼ εὐχῆς τεύξεσθαι παύσαιτο ἂν εὐχόμενος· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ οὔτε ἂν τυραννίδος διδομένης ἀπόσχοιντο ἂν οὔτε στρατηγίας οὐδʼ ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ἃ παρόντα βλάπτει μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖ, ἀλλὰ κἂν εὔξαιντο ἂν γενέσθαι, εἴ τῳ μὴ παρόντα τυγχάνει· ὀλίγον δὲ ἐπισχόντες ἐνίοτε παλινῳδοῦσιν, ἀνευχόμενοι ἅττʼ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εὔξωνται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἀπορῶ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάτην θεοὺς ἄνθρωποι αἰτιῶνται, ἐξ ἐκείνων φάμενοι κακά σφισιν εἶναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ σφῇσιν εἴτε ἀτασθαλίαισιν εἴτε ἀφροσύναις χρὴ εἰπεῖν, ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγεʼ ἔχουσι. κινδυνεύει γοῦν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, φρόνιμός τις εἶναι ἐκεῖνος ὁ ποιητής, ὃς δοκεῖ μοι φίλοις ἀνοήτοις τισὶ χρησάμενος, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ πράττοντας καὶ εὐχομένους ἅπερ οὐ βέλτιον ἦν, ἐκείνοις δὲ ἐδόκει, κοινῇ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων αὐτῶν εὐχὴν ποιήσασθαι· λέγει δέ πως ὡδί— Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλά, φησί, καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δειλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν κελεύει. [¶79] 143. King Zeus, give unto us what is good, whether we pray or pray not; But what is grievous, even if we pray for it, do thou avert. Soc. So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of an answer to his words, do not be silent. > Greek: 143. ΣΩ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καλῶς δοκεῖ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς λέγειν ὁ ποιητής· σὺ δʼ εἴ τι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα, μὴ σιώπα. [¶80] Alc. It is difficult, Socrates, to gainsay what has been well spoken: one thing, however, I do observe —how many evils are caused to men by ignorance, when, as it seems, we are beguiled by her not only into doing, but—worst of all—into praying to be granted the greatest evils. Now that is a thing that no one would suppose of himself; each of us would rather suppose he was competent to pray for his own greatest good, not his greatest evil. Why, that would seem, in truth, more like some sort of curse than a prayer! > Greek: ΑΛ. χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐστὶν ἀντιλέγειν πρὸς τὰ καλῶς εἰρημένα· ἐκεῖνο δʼ οὖν ἐννοῶ, ὅσων κακῶν αἰτία ἡ ἄγνοια τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὁπότε, ὡς ἔοικε, λελήθαμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διὰ ταύτην καὶ πράττοντες καὶ τό γε ἔσχατον εὐχόμενοι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τὰ κάκιστα. ὅπερ οὖν οὐδεὶς ἂν οἰηθείη, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε πᾶς ἂν οἴοιτο ἱκανὸς εἶναι, αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τὰ βέλτιστα εὔξασθαι, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ κάκιστα. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς κατάρᾳ τινὶ ἀλλʼ οὐκ εὐχῇ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη. [¶81] Soc. But perhaps, my excellent friend, some person who is wiser than either you or I may say we are wrong to be so free with our abuse of ignorance, unless we can add that it is ignorance of certain things, and is a good to certain persons in certain conditions, as to those others it is an evil. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως, ὦ βέλτιστε, φαίη ἄν τις ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ σοφώτερος ὢν τυγχάνοι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡμᾶς λέγειν, οὕτως εἰκῇ ψέγοντας ἄγνοιαν, εἴ γε μὴ προσθείημεν τὴν ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις κακόν. [¶82] Alc. How do you mean? Can there be anything of which it is better for anybody, in any condition whatsoever, to be ignorant than cognizant? > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις; ἔστι γὰρ ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα ὅτῳ δὴ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντι ἄμεινον ἀγνοεῖν ἢ γιγνώσκειν; [¶83] Soc. I believe so; and do not you? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· σοὶ δʼ οὔ; [¶84] Alc. No, indeed, upon my word. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία. [¶85] Soc. But surely I shall not have to tax you with an inclination to commit such an act against your own mother as Orestes and Alcmaeon, and any others who have followed their example, are said to have committed against theirs. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνό σου καταγνώσομαι, ἐθέλειν ἄν σε πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μητέρα διαπεπρᾶχθαι ἅπερ Ὀρέστην φασὶ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ εἰ δή τινες ἄλλοι ἐκείνοις τυγχάνουσι ταὐτὰ διαπεπραγμένοι. [¶86] Alc. No unlucky words, in Heaven’s name, Socrates! > Greek: ΑΛ. εὐφήμει πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶87] Soc. Why, it is not the person who says, Alcibiades, that you would not like to be guilty of such an act, whom you should bid avoid unlucky words, but much rather him who might say the contrary; since the act seems to you so very dreadful as to be unfit even for such casual mention. But do you think that Orestes, if he had had all his wits about him and had known what was best for him to do, would have brought himself to commit any act of the sort? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὔτοι τὸν λέγοντα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις σοι ταῦτα πεπρᾶχθαι, εὐφημεῖν δεῖ σε κελεύειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πολύ, εἴ τις τὰ ἐναντία λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ σφόδρα δεινὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ ῥητέον εἶναι οὕτως εἰκῇ. δοκεῖς δʼ ἂν τὸν Ὀρέστην, εἰ ἐτύγχανε φρόνιμος ὢν καὶ εἰδὼς ὅτι βέλτιστον ἦν αὐτῷ πράττειν, τολμῆσαι ἄν τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι; [¶88] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶89] Soc. Nor would anyone else, I imagine. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε ἄλλον οἶμαι οὐδένα. [¶90] Alc. No. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι. [¶91] Soc. Then it seems that ignorance of what is best, and to be ignorant of the best, is a bad thing. > Greek: ΣΩ. κακὸν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἄγνοια καὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον. [¶92] Alc. I agree. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶93] Soc. And not only for the person himself, but for everyone else? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκείνῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν; [¶94] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. φημί. [¶95] Soc. Then let us consider this further case. Suppose it should quite suddenly occur to your mind that you had better take a dagger and go to the door of Pericles, your own guardian and friend, and ask if he were at home, with the design of killing just him and no one else, and his servants said he was at home: now, I do not say you would be inclined to do any such thing, but I suppose, if you are under the impression which at some moment may well be present, surely, to the mind of a man who is ignorant of the best—that what is really the worst is best at some moment—or do you not agree? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα· εἴ σοι αὐτίκα μάλα παρεσταίη, οἰηθέντι βέλτιον εἶναι, Περικλέα τὸν σεαυτοῦ ἐπίτροπόν τε καὶ φίλον, ἐγχειρίδιον λαβόντα, ἐλθόντα ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας, εἰπεῖν εἰ ἔνδον ἐστί, βουλόμενον ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα· [¶96] 144. Alc. Quite so. > Greek: 144. οἱ δὲ φαῖεν ἔνδον εἶναι—καὶ οὐ λέγω ἐθέλειν ἄν σε τούτων τι πράττειν· ἀλλʼ εἰ, οἶμαι, δόξει σοι, ὅπερ οὐθὲν κωλύει δήπου τῷ γε ἀγνοοῦντι τὸ βέλτιστον παραστῆναί ποτε δόξαν, ὥστε οἰηθῆναι καὶ τὸ κάκιστόν ποτε βέλτιστον εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι; ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶97] Soc. Well then, if you went indoors and saw Pericles himself, but did not know him, and thought he was somebody else, would you still venture to kill him? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν παρελθὼν εἴσω καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ἀγνοήσαις τε καὶ οἰηθείης ἂν ἄλλον εἶναί τινα, ἆρʼ ἔτι ἂν αὐτὸν τολμήσαις ἀποκτεῖναι; [¶98] Alc. No, upon my word, I should think not. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκῶ. [¶99] Soc. For your man was, I presume, not anyone you met, but that particular person whom you wished to kill? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὸν ἐντυχόντα, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ὃν ἠβούλου. ἦ γάρ; [¶100] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶101] Soc. And although you might make a number of attempts, if you always failed to know Pericles when you were about to commit the act, you would never attack him. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ πολλάκις ἐγχειροῖς, αἰεὶ δὲ ἀγνοοῖς τὸν Περικλέα, ὁπότε μέλλοις τοῦτο πράττειν, οὔποτε ἂν ἐπίθοιο αὐτῷ. [¶102] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶103] Soc. Well now, do you suppose that Orestes would ever have attacked his mother if he had similarly failed to know her? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὸν Ὀρέστην δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε τῇ μητρὶ ἐπιθέσθαι, εἴ γε ὡσαύτως ἠγνόησεν; [¶104] Alc. I do not think he would. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε. [¶105] Soc. For presumably he, too, had no intention of killing the first woman he met, or anybody else’s mother, but only his own. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ δήπου οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνος τὴν προστυχοῦσαν γυναῖκα οὐδὲ τὴν ὁτουοῦν μητέρα διενοεῖτο ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ. [¶106] Alc. That is so. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶107] Soc. Then to be ignorant in such matters is better for those who are so disposed and have formed such resolves. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀγνοεῖν ἄρα τά γε τοιαῦτα βέλτιον τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις καὶ τοιαύτας δόξας ἔχουσιν. [¶108] Alc. Apparently. > Greek: ΑΛ. φαίνεται. [¶109] Soc. So you see that ignorance of certain things is for certain persons in certain states a good, not an evil, as you supposed just now. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι ἡ ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοια καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ οὐ κακόν, ὥσπερ ἄρτι σοι ἐδόκει; [¶110] Alc. It seems to be. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔοικεν. [¶111] Soc. Then if you care to consider the sequel of this, I daresay it will surprise you. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν εἰ βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἄτοπον ἂν ἴσως ἄν σοι δόξειεν εἶναι. [¶112] Alc. What may that be, Socrates? > Greek: ΑΛ. τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶113] Soc. I mean that, generally speaking, it rather looks as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, if it does not include possession of the science of the best, will in a few instances help, but in most will harm, the owner. Consider it this way: must it not be the case, in your opinion, that when we are about to do or say anything, we first suppose that we know, or do really know, the thing we so confidently intend to say or do? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, κινδυνεύει τό γε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου κεκτημένος ᾖ, ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό. σκόπει δὲ ὧδε. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅταν τι μέλλωμεν ἤτοι πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, οἰηθῆναι δεῖν πρῶτον ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι ἢ τῷ ὄντι εἰδέναι τοῦθʼ ὃ ἂν προχειροτέρως μέλλωμεν ἢ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν; [¶114] Alc. I think so. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶115] Soc. Well, take the orators, for example: they either know, or think they know, how to advise us on various occasions—some about war and peace, and others about building walls or fitting up harbors; > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ ῥήτορες αὐτίκα ἤτοι εἰδότες συμβουλεύειν ἢ οἰηθέντες εἰδέναι συμβουλεύουσιν ἡμῖν ἑκάστοτε, οἱ μὲν περὶ πολέμου τε καὶ εἰρήνης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τειχῶν οἰκοδομίας ἢ καὶ λιμένων κατασκευῆς· ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, ὅσα δή ποτε ἡ πόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἢ αὐτὴ καθʼ αὑτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων συμβουλῆς πάντα γίγνεται. ## 2. Pages 145–151 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-ii/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-alcibiades-ii/2/#p-N [¶0] 145. and in a word, whatever the city does to another city or within herself, all comes about by the advice of the orators. Alc. That is true. > Greek: 145. ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶1] Soc. Then observe the consequence. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅρα τοίνυν καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις. [¶2] Alc. If I am able. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἂν δυνηθῶ. [¶3] Soc. Why, surely you call men either wise or unwise? > Greek: ΣΩ. καλεῖς γὰρ δήπου φρονίμους τε καὶ ἄφρονας; [¶4] Alc. I do. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶5] Soc. And the many unwise, and the few wise? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἄφρονας, τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγους φρονίμους; [¶6] Alc. Precisely. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὕτως. [¶7] Soc. And in either case you name them in reference to something? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πρός τι ἀποβλέπων ἀμφοτέρους; [¶8] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶9] Soc. Then do you call a man wise who knows how to give advice, without knowing whether and when it is better to act upon it? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὸν τοιοῦτον συμβουλεύειν εἰδότα, χωρὶς τοῦ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ ὅτε βέλτιον, φρόνιμον καλεῖς; [¶10] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶11] Soc. Nor, I conceive, a man who knows what war is in itself, without knowing when or for how long a time it is better to make war? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε οἶμαι ὅστις τὸ πολεμεῖν αὐτὸ οἶδε χωρὶς τοῦ ὁπότε βέλτιον καὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον βέλτιον. ἦ γάρ; [¶12] Alc. Agreed. > Greek: ΑΛ. ναί. [¶13] Soc. Nor, again, a man who knows how to kill another, or seize his property, or make him an exile from his native land, without knowing when or to whom it is better so to behave? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ εἴ τίς τινα ἀποκτεινύναι οἶδεν οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι καὶ φυγάδα ποιεῖν τῆς πατρίδος, χωρὶς τοῦ ὁπότε βέλτιον καὶ ὅντινα βέλτιον; [¶14] Alc. No, to be sure. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι. [¶15] Soc. Then it is a man who knows something of this sort, and is assisted by knowledge of what is best,—and this is surely the same as knowledge of the useful, is it not? Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅστις ἄρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, ἐὰν μὲν παρέπηται αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη—αὕτη δʼ ἦν ἡ αὐτὴ δήπου ἥπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου· ἦ γάρ; — ΑΛ. ναί. [¶16] Soc. And we shall call him wise, and a competent adviser both of the city and of his own self; but a man not so qualified we shall call the opposite of these. How do you think? > Greek: ΣΩ. φρόνιμον δέ γε αὐτὸν φήσομεν καὶ ἀποχρῶντα σύμβουλον καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ· τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον τἀναντία τούτων. ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ; [¶17] Alc. I agree. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὕτως. [¶18] Soc. And what of a man who knows how to ride or shoot, or else to box or wrestle or contend in any other sport, or do anything that we know by rule of art? What do you call him who knows what is better done by rule of that particular art? Do you not say that he who goes by the rules of riding is a good rider? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἴ τις ἱππεύειν ἢ τοξεύειν οἶδεν, ἢ αὖ πυκτεύειν ἢ παλαίειν ἤ τι τῆς ἄλλης ἀγωνίας ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ὅσα τέχνῃ οἴδαμεν, τί καλεῖς ὃς ἂν εἰδῇ τὸ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν τέχνην βέλτιον γιγνόμενον; ἆρʼ οὐ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἱππικὴν ἱππικόν; [¶19] Alc. I do. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶20] Soc. And the rules of boxing, I suppose, make a good boxer, and those of flute-playing a good flute-player, and so, on the same lines, I presume, with the rest; or is there any difference? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸν δέ γε οἶμαι κατὰ τὴν πυκτικὴν πυκτικόν, τὸν δὲ κατʼ αὐλητικὴν αὐλητικόν, καὶ τἆλλα δήπου ἀνὰ λόγον τούτοις· ἢ ἄλλως πως; [¶21] Alc. No, it is as you say. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτως. [¶22] Soc. Then do you think it inevitable that he who has some knowledge about these things should also be a wise man, or shall we say he comes far short of it? > Greek: ΣΩ. δοκεῖ οὖν σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν περὶ τούτων τι ἐπιστήμονα ὄντα ἄρα καὶ ἄνδρα φρόνιμον εἶναι, ἢ πολλοῦ φήσομεν ἐνδεῖν; [¶23] Alc. Far short of it, I declare. > Greek: ΑΛ. πολλοῦ μέντοι νὴ Δία. [¶24] Soc. Then what sort of state do you suppose it would be, where the people were good bowmen and flute-players, together with athletes and artists in general, and mingled with these the men whom we have just mentioned as knowing war in itself and slaughter in itself, and orator-windbags too with their political bluster, but all of them lacked this knowledge of the best, and none knew when or upon whom it was better to employ their respective arts? > Greek: ΣΩ. ποίαν οὖν οἴει πολιτείαν εἶναι τοξοτῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀθλητῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν, ἀναμεμειγμένων δʼ ἐν τούτοις οὓς ἄρτι εἰρήκαμεν τῶν τε αὐτὸ τὸ πολεμεῖν εἰδότων καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀποκτεινύναι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν ῥητορικῶν πολιτικὸν φύσημα φυσώντων, ἁπάντων δὲ τούτων ὄντων ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος, ὁπότε βέλτιον ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τούτων χρῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τίνα; [¶25] 146. Alc. A paltry one, I should call it, Socrates. > Greek: 146. ΑΛ. φαύλην τινὰ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶26] Soc. Yes, you would, I expect, when you saw each one of them vying with the other and assigning the largest part in the conduct of the state to that Wherein himself is found most excellent, I mean, what is done best by rule of his particular art—while he is entirely off the track of what is best for the state and for himself, because, I conceive, he has put his trust in opinion apart from intelligence. In these circumstances, should we not be right in saying that such a state is one great mass of turmoil and lawlessness? > Greek: ΣΩ. φαίης γε ἂν οἶμαι ὁπόταν ὁρῴης ἕνα ἕκαστον αὐτῶν φιλοτιμούμενόν τε καὶ νέμοντα τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς πολιτείας... τούτῳ μέρος, ἵνʼ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει κράτιστος ὤν· λέγω δὲ τὸ κατʼ αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην βέλτιστον γιγνόμενον· τοῦ δὲ τῇ πόλει τε καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ βελτίστου ὄντος τὰ πολλὰ διημαρτηκότα, ἅτε οἶμαι ἄνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότα. οὕτως δὲ τούτων ἐχόντων, ἆρα οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιμεν φάντες πολλῆς ταραχῆς τε καὶ ἀνομίας μεστὴν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν; [¶27] Alc. We should, upon my word. > Greek: ΑΛ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι νὴ Δία. [¶28] Soc. And we took it to be necessary that we should first think we know, or really know, anything that we confidently intend either to do or to say? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἐδόκει οἰηθῆναι δεῖν πρῶτον ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι ἢ τῷ ὄντι εἰδέναι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν προχείρως μέλλωμεν ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν; [¶29] Alc. We did. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἐδόκει. [¶30] Soc. And if a man does what he knows or thinks he knows, and is assisted by knowing how to make it beneficial, we shall find him profitable both to the city and to himself? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κἂν μὲν πράττῃ ἅ τις οἶδεν ἢ δοκεῖ εἰδέναι, παρέπηται δὲ τὸ ὠφελίμως, καὶ λυσιτελούντως ἡμᾶς ἕξειν καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ; [¶31] Alc. Certainly. > Greek: ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶32] Soc. But if, I suppose, he does the contrary, he will not be so either to the city or to himself? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐὰν δέ γʼ οἶμαι τἀναντία τούτων, οὔτε τῇ πόλει οὔτʼ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ; [¶33] Alc. No, indeed. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶34] Soc. Well then, do you still take the same view now as before, or do you think differently? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὡσαύτως σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἄλλως πως; [¶35] Alc. No, I take the same view. > Greek: ΑΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτως. [¶36] Soc. And you said you called the many unwise, and the few wise? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἔφησθα καλεῖν τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἄφρονας, τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγους φρονίμους; [¶37] Alc. I did. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶38] Soc. So now we repeat our statement that the many have missed getting the best because in most cases, I conceive, they have put their trust in opinion apart from intelligence. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν φαμεν πάλιν τοὺς πολλοὺς διημαρτηκέναι τοῦ βελτίστου, ὡς τὰ πολλά γε οἶμαι ἄνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότας. [¶39] Alc. Yes. > Greek: ΑΛ. φαμὲν γάρ. [¶40] Soc. Then it is an advantage to the many neither to know nor to think they know anything, if they are going to be specially eager to do what they know or think they know, but are likely on the whole, in doing it, to be injured rather than benefited. > Greek: ΣΩ. Λυσιτελεῖ ἄρα τοῖς πολλοῖς μήτʼ εἰδέναι μηδὲν μήτʼ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι, εἴπερ γε μᾶλλον προθυμήσονται πράττειν μὲν ταῦτα ἅττʼ ἂν εἰδῶσιν ἢ οἰηθῶσιν εἰδέναι, πράττοντες δὲ βλάπτεσθαι τὰ πλείω μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι. [¶41] Alc. That is very true. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. [¶42] Soc. So you see that when I said it looked as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, where it did not include the science of the best, in a few cases helped, but in most harmed the owner, I was evidently right in very truth, was I not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὅτε γʼ ἔφην κινδυνεύειν τό γε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης κεκτημένος ᾖ, ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό, ἆρʼ οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι ὀρθῶς ἐφαινόμην λέγων; [¶43] Alc. Though I did not then, I think so now, Socrates. > Greek: ΑΛ. καὶ εἰ μὴ τότε, ἀλλὰ νῦν μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶44] Soc. Hence the state or soul that is to live aright must hold fast to this knowledge, exactly as a sick man does to a doctor, or as he who would voyage safely does to a pilot. For without this, the more briskly it is wafted by fortune either to the acquisition of wealth or to bodily strength or aught else of the sort, the greater will be the mistakes in which these things, it would seem, must needs involve it. > Greek: ΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν μέλλουσαν ὀρθῶς βιώσεσθαι ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀντέχεσθαι, ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἀσθενοῦντα ἰατροῦ ἤ τινος κυβερνήτου τὸν ἀσφαλῶς μέλλοντα πλεῖν. [¶45] 147. And he who has acquired the so-called mastery of learning and arts, but is destitute of this knowledge and impelled by this or that one among those others, is sure to meet with much rough weather, as he truly deserves; since, I imagine, he must continue without a pilot on the high seas, and has only the brief span of his life in which to run his course. So that his case aptly fits the saying of the poet, in which he complains of somebody or other that Full many crafts he knew: but still He knew them all so very ill. Alc. Why, how on earth is the poet’s saying apposite, Socrates? For to my mind it has nothing to do with the point. > Greek: 147. ἄνευ γὰρ ταύτης, ὅσῳπερ ἂν λαμπρότερον ἐπουρίσῃ τὸ τῆς τύχης ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἢ σώματος ῥώμην ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, τοσούτῳ μείζω ἁμαρτήματα ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν καλουμένην πολυμαθίαν τε καὶ πολυτεχνίαν κεκτημένος, ὀρφανὸς δὲ ὢν ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἑκάστης τῶν ἄλλων, ἆρʼ οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι δικαίως πολλῷ χειμῶνι χρήσεται, ἅτε οἶμαι ἄνευ κυβερνήτου διατελῶν ἐν πελάγει, χρόνον οὐ μακρὸν βίου θέων; ὥστε συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὃ λέγει κατηγορῶν πού τινος, ὡς ἄρα πολλὰ μὲν ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δέ, φησίν, ἠπίστατο πάντα. ΑΛ. καὶ τί δή ποτε συμβαίνει τὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν δοκεῖ πρὸς λόγον εἰρηκέναι. [¶46] Soc. It is very much to the point: but he, good sir, like almost every other poet, speaks in riddles. For poetry as a whole is by nature inclined to riddling, and it is not every man who can apprehend it. And furthermore, besides having this natural tendency, when it gets hold of a grudging person who wishes not to show forth to us his own wisdom but to conceal it as much as possible, we find it an extraordinarily difficult matter to make out whatever this or that one of them may mean. For surely you do not suppose that Homer, divinest and wisest of poets, did not know it was impossible to know ill; for it is he who says of Margites that he knew many things, but knew them all ill: but it is a riddle, I think, in which he has made “ill” stand for “evil,” and “knew” for “to know.” So if we put it together, letting the meter go, indeed, but grasping his meaning, we get this: “Full many crafts he knew, but it was evil for him to know them all.” Then clearly, if it was evil for him to know many things, he was in fact a paltry fellow, assuming we are to believe what we have previously argued. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μάλα γε πρὸς λόγον· ἀλλʼ αἰνίττεται, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ οὗτος καὶ ἇλλοι δὲ ποιηταὶ σχεδόν τι πάντες. ἔστιν τε γὰρ φύσει ποιητικὴ ἡ σύμπασα αἰνιγματώδης καὶ οὐ τοῦ προστυχόντος ἀνδρὸς γνωρίσαι· ἔτι τε πρὸς τῷ φύσει τοιαύτη εἶναι, ὅταν λάβηται ἀνδρὸς φθονεροῦ τε καὶ μὴ βουλομένου ἡμῖν ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἀλλʼ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ σοφίαν, ὑπερφυῶς δὴ τὸ χρῆμα ὡς δύσγνωστον φαίνεται, ὅτι ποτὲ νοοῦσιν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν. οὐ γὰρ δήπου Ὅμηρόν γε τὸν θειότατόν τε καὶ σοφώτατον ποιητὴν ἀγνοεῖν δοκεῖς ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἐπίστασθαι κακῶς—ἐκεῖνος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λέγων τὸν Μαργίτην πολλὰ μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, κακῶς δέ, φησί, πάντα ἠπίστατο—ἀλλʼ αἰνίττεται οἶμαι παράγων τὸ κακῶς μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἠπίστατο ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι· γίγνεται οὖν συντεθὲν ἔξω μὲν τοῦ μέτρου, ἔστι δʼ ὅ γε βούλεται, ὡς πολλὰ μὲν ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακὸν δʼ ἦν ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῷ πάντα ταῦτα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι εἴπερ ἦν αὐτῷ κακὸν τὸ πολλὰ εἰδέναι, φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐτύγχανεν, εἴπερ γε πιστεύειν δεῖ τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις. [¶47] Alc. But I think we may, Socrates: at least, if I cannot believe those arguments of ours, I shall find it hard to trust any others. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἦ χαλεπῶς γʼ ἂν ἄλλοις τισὶ πιστεύσαιμι λόγοις, εἴπερ μηδὲ τούτοις. [¶48] Soc. And you are right in so thinking. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ σοι δοκεῖ. [¶49] Alc. I repeat that I think so. > Greek: ΑΛ. πάλιν αὖ μοι δοκεῖ. [¶50] Soc. But come now, in Heaven’s name—for I suppose you see how great and strange is our perplexity, in which you, as it seems to me, have your share; for you change about from this side to that without settling down for a moment, but as soon as you are firmly convinced of a thing you seem to slip out of it again and cease to hold the same view—well, if the god to whom you are going should even now appear to you and ask before you uttered any prayer, whether you would be content to obtain one of those things which were mentioned at the beginning, or whether he should leave you to pray as you were, how do you suppose you would make the best of your chance—by accepting his offer, or by praying for something on your own account? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ φέρε πρὸς Διός—ὁρᾷς γὰρ δήπου τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅση τε καὶ οἵα, ταύτης δὲ καὶ σύ μοι δοκεῖς κεκοινωνηκέναι· μεταβαλλόμενός γέ τοι ἄνω καὶ κάτω οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν παύῃ, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἂν μάλιστά σοι δόξῃ, τοῦτο καὶ ἐκδεδυκέναι αὖ καὶ οὐκέτι ὡσαύτως δοκεῖν—εἰ οὖν σοί γʼ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμφανὴς γενόμενος ὁ θεὸς πρὸς ὃν τυγχάνεις πορευόμενος ἐρωτήσειε, πρὶν ὁτιοῦν εὔξασθαί σε, εἰ ἐξαρκέσει σοι ἐκείνων τι γενέσθαι ὧνπερ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐλέγετο, εἴτε καὶ αὐτῷ σοι ἐπιτρέψειεν εὔξασθαι, τί ποτʼ ἂν οἴει ἢ τῶν παρʼ ἐκείνου διδομένων λαμβάνων ἢ αὐτὸς εὐξάμενος γενέσθαι τοῦ καιροῦ τυχεῖν; [¶51] 148. Alc. Well, by the gods, I could not answer your question, Socrates, offhand. Why, I take it to be a fatuous request, when it is really a case for great caution lest one pray unawares for what is evil while thinking it to be one’s good, and then after a little while, as you were saying, one change one’s tune and retract all one’s former prayers. > Greek: 148. ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐθὲν ἂν ἔχοιμί σοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως· ἀλλὰ μάργον τί μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολλῆς φυλακῆς, ὅπως μὴ λήσει τις αὑτὸν εὐχόμενος μὲν κακά, δοκῶν δὲ τἀγαθά, ἔπειτʼ ὀλίγον ἐπισχών, ὅπερ καὶ σὺ ἔλεγες, παλινῳδῇ, ἀνευχόμενος ἅττʼ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εὔξηται. [¶52] Soc. And did not the poet whom I quoted at the beginning of our discussion know more than we, when he bade us pray for the averting of what is grievous, even though we pray for it? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐχὶ εἰδώς τι πλέον ἡμῶν ὁ ποιητής, οὗ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου ἐπεμνήσθην, τὰ δειλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν ἐκέλευεν; [¶53] Alc. I think so. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶54] Soc. Then it is their admiration of this poet, Alcibiades, or perhaps the result of their own study, that causes the Spartans to offer a similar prayer whether the occasion be private or public—that the gods will give them for their own benefit the beautiful as well as the good: more than this no one can ever hear them pray for. The consequence is that to the present time they have been just as fortunate as any other people; and if it has befallen them to be not invariably fortunate, it was anyhow not owing to their prayer. It rests with the gods, I conceive, to give us either what we may pray for or the reverse. And I would like to give you an account of something else, which I once heard from some of my seniors. A quarrel having arisen between the Athenians and the Spartans, it befell our city to be always unsuccessful in every battle by land and sea, and she could never win a victory. So the Athenians, in their annoyance at this result, and at a loss for some means of finding a deliverance from the trouble they were in, took counsel together and decided that the best thing they could do was to send and inquire of Ammon; and moreover, to ask also for what reason the gods granted victory to the Spartans rather than to themselves: “for we”—such was the message—“offer up to them more and finer sacrifices than any of the Greeks, and have adorned their temples with votive emblems as no other people have done, and presented to the gods the costliest and stateliest processions year by year, and spent more money thus than all the rest of the Greeks together.” > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτον μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὸν ποιητὴν ἐζηλωκότες, εἴτε καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτως ἐπεσκεμμένοι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἑκάστοτε παραπλησίαν εὐχὴν εὔχονται, τὰ καλὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τοὺς θεοὺς διδόναι κελεύοντες αὖ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς· πλείω δʼ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐκείνων εὐξαμένων ἀκούσειεν. τοιγαροῦν εἰς τὸ παρῆκον τοῦ χρόνου οὐδένων ἧττον εὐτυχεῖς εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι· εἰ δʼ ἄρα καὶ συμβέβηκεν αὐτοῖς ὥστε μὴ πάντα εὐτυχεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὖν ⟨οὐ⟩ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων εὐχήν, ἐπὶ τοῖς θεοῖς δʼ ἐστὶν ὥστε οἶμαι καὶ διδόναι ἅττʼ ἄν τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνῃ καὶ τἀναντία τούτων. βούλομαι δέ σοι καὶ ἕτερόν τι διηγήσασθαι, ὅ ποτε ἤκουσα [τῶν πρεσβυτέρων] τινῶν, ὡς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις διαφορᾶς γενομένης συνέβαινεν ἀεὶ τῇ πόλει ἡμῶν ὥστε καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὁπότε μάχη γένοιτο δυστυχεῖν καὶ μηδέποτε δύνασθαι κρατῆσαι· τοὺς οὖν Ἀθηναίους ἀγανακτοῦντας τῷ πράγματι καὶ ἀπορουμένους τίνι χρὴ μηχανῇ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀποτροπὴν εὑρεῖν, βουλευομένοις αὐτοῖς δοκεῖν κράτιστον εἶναι πέμψαντας πρὸς Ἄμμωνα ἐκεῖνον ἐπερωτᾶν· ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις τάδε, [καὶ] ἀνθʼ ὅτου ποτὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις οἱ θεοὶ μᾶλλον νίκην διδόασιν ἢ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, οἳ πλείστας, φάναι, μὲν θυσίας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄγομεν, ἀναθήμασί τε κεκοσμήκαμεν τὰ ἱερὰ αὐτῶν ὡς οὐδένες ἄλλοι, πομπάς τε πολυτελεστάτας καὶ σεμνοτάτας ἐδωρούμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς ἀνʼ ἕκαστον ἔτος, καὶ ἐτελοῦμεν χρήματα ὅσα οὐδʼ ἇλλοι σύμπαντες Ἕλληνες· [¶55] 149. Soc. “But the Spartans have never taken any such pains, and indeed are so neglectful in their behavior to the gods, that they make a practice of sacrificing defective victims, and generally are very much behind us in the honors that they pay, though the wealth they possess is quite equal to that of our city.” When they had so spoken, and added the question, what they should do in order to find a deliverance from the trouble they were in, the prophet’s only answer — evidently it was all that the god allowed—was to call them to him and say: “Thus saith Ammon to the Athenians: I would rather have the reverent reserve of the Spartans than all the ritual of the Greeks.” So much he said, and not a word further. Now by “reverent reserve” I suppose the god could only mean their prayer, since in fact it differs greatly from those that are generally offered. For the Greeks in general either lead up bulls with gilded horns, or else present the gods with votive emblems, and pray for any odd thing, whether it be good or bad: so when the gods hear their irreverent speech they reject all these costly processions and sacrifices. Whereas I think we ought to be very cautious, and fully consider what is to be said and what is not. And in Homer too you will find other tales of a similar sort. For he relates how the Trojans, in making their bivouac, Sacrificed to the immortals perfect hecatombs, and how the winds bore the sweet savour from the plain into heaven: But the blessed gods partook not of it, nor would have it, For deep was their hate against holy Ilium, And Priam, and the folk of Priam of the good ashen spear. So it was nothing to their purpose to sacrifice and pay tribute of gifts in vain, when they were hated by the gods. For it is not, I imagine, the way of the gods to be seduced with gifts, like a base insurer. And indeed it is but silly talk of ours, if we claim to surpass the Spartans on this score. For it would be a strange thing if the gods had regard to our gifts and sacrifices instead of our souls, and the piety and justice that may be found in any of us. > Greek: 149. ΣΩ. Λακεδαιμονίοις δέ, φάναι, οὐδεπώποτʼ ἐμέλησεν οὐδὲν τούτων, ἀλλʼ οὕτως ὀλιγώρως διάκεινται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ὥστε καὶ ἀνάπηρα θύουσιν ἑκάστοτε καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὐκ ὀλίγῳ ἐνδεεστέρως τιμῶσιν ἤπερ ἡμεῖς, χρήματα οὐδὲν ἐλάττω κεκτημένοι τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως. ἐπεὶ δὴ εἰρηκέναι ταῦτα καὶ ἐπερωτῆσαι τί χρὴ πράττοντας αὐτοὺς τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλαγὴν εὑρεῖν, ἄλλο μὲν οὐθὲν ἀποκριθῆναι τὸν προφήτην—τὸν γὰρ θεὸν οὐκ ἐᾶν δῆλον ὅτι—καλέσαντα δὲ αὐτόν, Ἀθηναίοις, φάναι, τάδε λέγει Ἄμμων· φησὶν ἂν βούλεσθαι αὑτῷ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων εὐφημίαν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σύμπαντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἱερά. τοσαῦτα εἰπεῖν, οὐκέτι περαιτέρω. τήν γʼ οὖν εὐφημίαν οὐκ ἄλλην τινά μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ θεὸς ἢ τὴν εὐχὴν αὐτῶν· ἔστι γὰρ τῷ ὄντι πολὺ διαφέρουσα τῶν ἄλλων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες οἱ μὲν χρυσόκερως βοῦς παραστησάμενοι, ἕτεροι δʼ ἀναθήμασι δωρούμενοι τοὺς θεούς, εὔχονται ἅττʼ ἂν τύχῃ ταῦτα, ἄντε ἀγαθὰ ἄντε κακά· βλασφημούντων οὖν αὐτῶν ἀκούοντες οἱ θεοὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται τὰς πολυτελεῖς ταυτασὶ πομπάς τε καὶ θυσίας. ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μοι πολλῆς φυλακῆς δεῖσθαι καὶ σκέψεως ὅτι ποτὲ ῥητέον ἐστὶ καὶ μή.εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ παρʼ Ὁμήρῳ ἕτερα παραπλήσια τούτοις εἰρημένα. φησὶν γὰρ τοὺς Τρῶας ἔπαυλιν ποιουμένους ἔρδειν ἀθανάτοισι τεληέσσας ἑκατόμβας· τὴν δὲ κνῖσαν ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου τοὺς ἀνέμους φέρειν οὐρανὸν εἴσω ἡδεῖαν· τῆς δʼ οὔ τι θεοὺς μάκαρας δατέεσθαι, οὐδʼ ἐθέλειν· μάλα γάρ σφιν ἀπήχθετο Ἴλιος ἱρὴ καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς ἐυμμελίω Πριάμοιο· ὥστε οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἦν προύργου θύειν τε καὶ δῶρα τελεῖν μάτην, θεοῖς ἀπηχθημένους. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ τῶν θεῶν ὥστε ὑπὸ δώρων παράγεσθαι οἷον κακὸν τοκιστήν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμεῖς εὐήθη λόγον λέγομεν, ἀξιοῦντες Λακεδαιμονίων ταύτῃ περιεῖναι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη εἰ πρὸς τὰ δῶρα καὶ τὰς θυσίας ἀποβλέπουσιν ἡμῶν οἱ θεοὶ ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, ἄν τις ὅσιος καὶ δίκαιος ὢν τυγχάνῃ. [¶56] 150. Soc. Far rather at these, I believe, do they look than at those costly processions and sacrifices which are offered, it well may be, by individual and state, year in, year out, though they may have offended greatly against the gods, or as greatly against their neighbors. But the gods are not to be won by bribes, and so they despise all these things, as Ammon and the holy prophet say. Certainly it would seem that justice and wisdom are held in especial honor both by the gods and by men of intelligence; and wise and just are they alone who know what acts and words to use towards gods and men. But I should like now to hear what may be your opinion on the subject. > Greek: 150. ΣΩ. πολλῷ γε μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἢ πρὸς τὰς πολυτελεῖς ταύτας πομπάς τε καὶ θυσίας, ἃς οὐδὲν κωλύει πολλὰ μὲν εἰς θεούς, πολλὰ δʼ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἡμαρτηκότας καὶ ἰδιώτην καὶ πόλιν ἔχειν ἀνʼ ἕκαστον ἔτος τελεῖν· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐ δωροδόκοι ὄντες, καταφρονοῦσιν ἁπάντων τούτων, ὥς φησιν ὁ θεὸς καὶ θεῶν προφήτης. κινδυνεύει γοῦν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρʼ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ φρόνησις διαφερόντως τετιμῆσθαι· φρόνιμοι δὲ καὶ δίκαιοι οὐκ ἄλλοι τινές εἰσιν [ἢ] τῶν εἰδότων ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους. βουλοίμην δʼ ἂν καὶ σοῦ πυθέσθαι ὅτι ποτʼ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα. [¶57] Alc. Why, Socrates, it in no wise differs from yours and the god’s; for indeed it would not be fitting for me to record my vote against the god. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄλλῃ πῃ δοκεῖ ἢ ᾗπερ σοί τε καὶ τῷ θεῷ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν εἰκὸς εἴη ἀντίψηφον ἐμὲ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι. [¶58] Soc. And you remember you professed to be in great perplexity lest you should pray unawares for evil, while supposing it to be good? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ἐν πολλῇ ἀπορίᾳ φάσκων εἶναι, ὅπως μὴ λάθῃς σεαυτὸν εὐχόμενος κακά, δοκῶν δὲ ἀγαθά; [¶59] Alc. I do. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶60] Soc. You see, then, how unsafe it is for you to approach the god with your prayers, for it may chance that when he hears your irreverent speech he will reject your sacrifice altogether, and you may perhaps be accorded some other bad thing as well. In my opinion, therefore, it is best to hold your peace: for I expect you will not consent to use the Spartan’s prayer, you have such a romantic spirit—to give it the fairest of folly’s names. It is necessary, therefore, to bide one’s time until one can learn how one should behave towards gods and men. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἀσφαλές σοί ἐστιν ἐλθεῖν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐξομένῳ, ἵνα μηδʼ ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, βλασφημοῦντός σου ἀκούων οὐθὲν ἀποδέξηται τῆς θυσίας ταύτης, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ἕτερόν τι προσαπολαύσῃς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ βέλτιστον εἶναι ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν· τῇ μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων εὐχῇ διὰ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν—τοῦτο γὰρ κάλλιστον τῶν ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ γε ὀνομάτων—οὐκ ἂν οἶμαί σε ἐθέλειν χρῆσθαι. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἐστι περιμένειν ἕως ἄν τις μάθῃ ὡς δεῖ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους διακεῖσθαι. [¶61] Alc. Well, when will that time arrive, Socrates, and who is to be my instructor? For I feel I should very much like to see who the man is, Soc. It is he who is concerned about you. But I think, as Homer relates how Athena removed the mist from the eyes of Diomede, That be might well discern both god and man, so you too must first have the mist removed which now enwraps your soul, and then you will be ready to receive the means whereby you will discern both evil and good. For at present I do not think you could do so. > Greek: ΑΛ. πότε οὖν παρέσται ὁ χρόνος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τίς ὁ παιδεύσων; ἥδιστα γὰρ ἄν μοι δοκῶ ἰδεῖν τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τίς ἐστιν. ΣΩ. οὗτος ᾧ μέλει περὶ σοῦ. ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μοι, ὥσπερ τῷ Διομήδει φησὶν τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν Ὅμηρος ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀχλύν, ὄφρʼ εὖ γιγνώσκοι ἠμὲν θεὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα, οὕτω καὶ σοὶ δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρῶτον τὴν ἀχλὺν ἀφελόντα, ἣ νῦν παροῦσα τυγχάνει, τὸ τηνικαῦτʼ ἤδη προσφέρειν διʼ ὧν μέλλεις γνώσεσθαι ἠμὲν κακὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖς δυνηθῆναι. [¶62] Alc. Let him remove the mist or whatever else he likes to call it: for I am prepared to obey every one of his commands, without shirking, whoever the man may be, so long as I am to be the better for them. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀφαιρείτω, εἴτε βούλεται τὴν ἀχλὺν εἴτε ἄλλο τι· ὡς ἐγὼ παρεσκεύασμαι μηθὲν ἂν φυγεῖν τῶν ὑπʼ ἐκείνου προσταττομένων, ὅστις ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἅνθρωπος, εἴ γε μέλλοιμι βελτίων γενέσθαι. [¶63] 151. Soc. I tell you, he on his part is prodigiously anxious to help you. > Greek: 151. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνος θαυμαστὴν ὅσην περὶ σὲ προθυμίαν ἔχει. [¶64] Alc. Then I think it best to defer the sacrifice also till the time comes. > Greek: ΑΛ. εἰς τότε τοίνυν καὶ τὴν θυσίαν ἀναβάλλεσθαι κράτιστον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ. [¶65] Soc. And you are quite right: for that is safer than running so serious a risk. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ σοι δοκεῖ· ἀσφαλέστερον γάρ ἐστιν ἢ παρακινδυνεύειν τοσοῦτον κίνδυνον. [¶66] Alc. But how say you, Socrates? Look now, I will crown you with this garland, as I consider you have given me such good advice; and to the gods we shall offer both garlands and all the other customary things when I see that day has come. And come it will ere long, if they are willing. > Greek: ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; καὶ μὴν τουτονὶ τὸν στέφανον, ἐπειδή μοι δοκεῖς καλῶς συμβεβουλευκέναι, σοὶ περιθήσω· τοῖς θεοῖς δὲ καὶ στεφάνους καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ νομιζόμενα τότε δώσομεν, ὅταν ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐλθοῦσαν ἴδω. ἥξει δʼ οὐ διὰ μακροῦ τούτων θελόντων. [¶67] Soc. Well, I accept this gift; and anything else besides, that you may give me, I shall be only too happy to accept. And as Euripides has made Creon say when he sees Teiresias wearing his wreaths, and hears that he has obtained them, on account of his art, as first-fruits of the spoils of war: As omen good I take thy victor’s wreaths; For in the waves we labour, as you know,— so do I take this opinion of yours as a good omen. For I consider I am no less wave-tossed than Creon, and would like to come off victorious over your lovers. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δέχομαι καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ ἄλλο δὲ ἄν τι τῶν παρὰ σοῦ δοθέντων ἡδέως ἴδοιμι δεξάμενον ἐμαυτόν. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ὁ Κρέων Εὐριπίδῃ πεποίηται τὸν Τειρεσίαν ἰδὼν ἔχοντα τὰ στέφη καὶ ἀκούσας ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπαρχὰς αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι διὰ τὴν τέχνην, οἰωνὸν ἐθέμην, φησί, καλλίνικα ⟨σὰ⟩ στέφη· ἐν γὰρ κλύδωνι κείμεθʼ, ὥσπερ οἶσθα σύ· οὕτω δὲ κἀγὼ παρὰ σοῦ τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οἰωνὸν τίθεμαι. δοκῶ δέ μοι οὐκ ἐν ἐλάττονι κλύδωνι τοῦ Κρέοντος εἶναι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν καλλίνικος γενέσθαι τῶν σῶν ἐραστῶν.