138. Soc. Alcibiades, are you on your way to offer a prayer to the god?
138. ΣΩ. ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἆρά γε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν προσευξόμενος πορεύῃ;
Alc. I am, certainly, Socrates.
ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. You seem, let me say, to have a gloomy look, and to keep your eyes on the ground, as though you were pondering something.
ΣΩ. φαίνῃ γέ τοι ἐσκυθρωπακέναι τε καὶ εἰς γῆν βλέπειν, ὥς τι συννοούμενος.
Alc. And what might one ponder, Socrates?
ΑΛ. καὶ τί ἄν τις συννοοῖτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Soc. The greatest of questions, Alcibiades, as I believe. For tell me, in Heaven’s name, do you not think that the gods sometimes grant in part, but in part refuse, what we ask of them in our private and public prayers, and gratify some people, but not others?
ΣΩ. τὴν μεγίστην, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, σύννοιαν, ὥς γʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τοὺς θεούς, ἃ τυγχάνομεν εὐχόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἐνίοτε τούτων τὰ μὲν διδόναι, τὰ δʼ οὔ, καὶ ἔστιν οἷς μὲν αὐτῶν, ἔστι δʼ οἷς οὔ;
Alc. I do, certainly.
ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Soc. Then you would agree that one should take great precautions against falling unawares into the error of praying for great evils in the belief that they are good, while the gods happen to be disposed to grant freely what one is praying for? Just as Oedipus, they say, suddenly prayed that his sons might divide their patrimony with the sword: it was open to him to pray that his present evils might by some means be averted, but he invoked others in addition to those which he had already. Wherefore not only were those words of his accomplished, but many other dread results therefrom, which I think there is no need to recount in detail.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι πολλῆς προμηθείας γε προσδεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ λήσεται αὑτὸν εὐχόμενος μεγάλα κακά, δοκῶν δʼ ἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ θεοὶ τύχωσιν ἐν ταύτῃ ὄντες τῇ ἕξει, ἐν ᾗ διδόασιν αὐτοὶ ἅ τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνει; ὥσπερ τὸν Οἰδίπουν αὐτίκα φασὶν εὔξασθαι χαλκῷ διελέσθαι τὰ πατρῷα τοὺς ὑεῖς· ἐξὸν αὐτῷ τῶν παρόντων αὐτῷ κακῶν ἀποτροπήν τινα εὔξασθαι, ἕτερα πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν κατηρᾶτο· τοιγαροῦν ταῦτά τε ἐξετελέσθη, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ δεινά, ἃ τί δεῖ καθʼ ἕκαστα λέγειν;
Alc. But you have instanced a madman, Socrates: why, do you suppose that anyone could bring himself, while he was in a sound state, to utter such a prayer?
ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ σὺ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον εἴρηκας· ἐπεὶ τίς ἄν σοι δοκεῖ τολμῆσαι ὑγιαίνων τοιαῦτʼ εὔξασθαι;
Soc. Do you regard madness as the opposite of wisdom?
ΣΩ. τὸ μαίνεσθαι ἆρά γε ὑπεναντίον σοι δοκεῖ τῷ φρονεῖν;
Alc. Certainly I do.
ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Soc. And there are some men whom you regard as unwise, and others as wise?
ΣΩ. ἄφρονες δὲ καὶ φρόνιμοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι εἶναι τινές σοι;
Alc. Why, yes.
ΑΛ. εἶναι μέντοι.
Soc. Come then, let us consider who these people are. We have admitted that some are unwise, some wise, and others mad.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ἐπισκεψώμεθα τίνες ποτʼ εἰσὶν οὗτοι. ὅτι μὲν γάρ εἰσί τινες, ὡμολόγηται, ἄφρονές τε καὶ φρόνιμοι, καὶ μαινόμενοι ἕτεροι.
Alc. Yes, we have.
ΑΛ. ὡμολόγηται γάρ.
Soc. And again, there are some in sound health?
ΣΩ. ἔτι δὲ ὑγιαίνοντές εἰσί τινες;
Alc. There are.
ΑΛ. εἰσίν.
Soc. And others also who are in ill-health?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσθενοῦντες ἕτεροι;
139. Alc. Quite so.
139. ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And they are not the same?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί;
Alc. No, indeed.
ΑΛ. οὐ γάρ.
Soc. And are there any others besides, who are found to be in neither state?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἕτεροί τινές εἰσιν, οἳ μηδέτερα τούτων πεπόνθασιν;
Alc. No, to be sure.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. For a human being must needs be either sick or not sick.
ΣΩ. ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἢ νοσεῖν ἢ μὴ νοσεῖν.
Alc. I agree.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. Well then, do you hold the same view about wisdom and unwisdom?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀφροσύνης ἆρά γε τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχεις σὺ γνώμην;
Alc. How do you mean?
ΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
Soc. Tell me, do you think it is only possible to be either wise or unwise, or is there some third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise?
ΣΩ. εἰ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἢ φρόνιμον ἢ ἄφρονα, ἢ ἔστι τι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα;
Alc. No, there is not.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. So he must needs be in one or the other of these two conditions.
ΣΩ. ἀνάγκη ἄρʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων πεπονθέναι.
Alc. I agree.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. And you remember that you admitted that madness is the opposite of wisdom?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ὁμολογήσας ὑπεναντίον εἶναι μανίαν φρονήσει;
Soc. And further, that there is no third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα εἶναι;
Alc. Yes, I admitted that.
ΑΛ. ὡμολόγησα γάρ.
Soc. Well now, can there possibly be two opposites of one thing?
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν δύο γε ὑπεναντία ἑνὶ πράγματι πῶς ἂν εἴη;
Alc. By no means.
ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
Soc. Then it looks as though unwisdom and madness were the same.
ΣΩ. ἀφροσύνη ἄρα καὶ μανία κινδυνεύει ταὐτὸν εἶναι.
Alc. Yes, apparently.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
Soc. So we shall be right, Alcibiades, in saying that all unwise persons are mad; for example, such of your contemporaries as happen to be unwise—some such there are—and of your elders, even: for tell me, in Heaven’s name, do you not think that in our city the wise people are but few, whereas the majority are unwise, and these you call mad?
ΣΩ. πάντας οὖν ἂν φάντες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεσθαι ὀρθῶς ἂν φαίημεν· αὐτίκα τῶν σῶν ἡλικιωτῶν εἴ τινες τυγχάνουσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες, ὥσπερ εἰσί, καὶ τῶν ἔτι πρεσβυτέρων. ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὀλίγους μὲν εἶναι τοὺς φρονίμους, ἄφρονας δὲ δὴ τοὺς πολλούς, οὓς δὴ σὺ μαινομένους καλεῖς;
Soc. Well, do you suppose we could safely live with so many madmen as our fellow-citizens, and should not long ago have paid the penalty for it in knocks and blows at their hands, and all the usual proceedings of madmen? Consider now, my wonderful friend, whether the case is not quite different?
ΣΩ. οἴει ἂν οὖν χαίροντας ἡμᾶς εἶναι μετὰ τοσούτων μαινομένων πολιτευομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν παιομένους καὶ βαλλομένους, καὶ ἅπερ εἰώθασιν οἱ μαινόμενοι διαπράττεσθαι, πάλαι δὴ δίκην δεδωκέναι; ἀλλὰ ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ταῦτʼ ἔχει.
Alc. Well, it must be, Socrates. For it looks as though it were not as I thought.
ΑΛ. πῶς ἂν οὖν ποτʼ ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες; κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ᾠήθην.
Soc. And I think so too. But there is another way of regarding it.
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ τῇδέ πῃ ἀθρητέον.
Alc. I wonder what way you mean.
ΑΛ. πῇ ποτε λέγεις;
Soc. Well, I will tell you. We conceive there are some who are sick, do we not?
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δή σοί γε ἐρῶ. ὑπολαμβάνομέν γέ τινας εἶναι νοσοῦντας· ἢ οὔ;
Alc. We do, to be sure.
ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Soc. And do you believe that a sick man must necessarily have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia? Do you not think that, although he may be afflicted in none of these ways, he may be suffering from some other disease? For surely there are many of them: these are not the only ones.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν νοσοῦντα ποδαγρᾶν ἢ πυρέττειν ἢ ὀφθαλμιᾶν, ἢ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι καὶ μηδὲν τούτων πεπονθὼς ἑτέραν νόσον νοσεῖν; πολλαὶ γὰρ δήπου γέ εἰσι, καὶ οὐχ αὗται μόναι.
Alc. I agree.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.
Soc. And is every ophthalmia, in your opinion, a disease?
ΣΩ. ὀφθαλμία σοι οὖν δοκεῖ πᾶσα νόσος εἶναι;
Soc. And is every disease also ophthalmia?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ πᾶσα νόσος ὀφθαλμία;
Alc. No, I should think not: still, I am in doubt as to my meaning.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα ἔμοιγε· ἀπορῶ μέντοι γε πῶς λέγω.
140. Soc. Well, if you will attend to me, “two together” will be searching, and so mayhap we shall find what we seek.
140. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἔμοιγε προσέχῃς τὸν νοῦν, σύν τε δύο σκεπτομένω τυχὸν εὑρήσομεν.
Alc. Nay, but I am attending, Socrates, to the best of my power.
ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ προσέχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς δύναμιν τὴν ἐμήν.
Soc. Then we have admitted that while every ophthalmia is a disease, every disease, on the other hand, is not ophthalmia?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήθη ἡμῖν ὀφθαλμία μὲν πᾶσα νόσος εἶναι, νόσος μέντοι οὐκ εἶναι πᾶσα ὀφθαλμία;
Alc. We have.
ΑΛ. ὡμολογήθη.
Soc. And our admission seems to me quite right. For everyone in a fever is sick, but yet not everyone who is sick has a fever or the gout or ophthalmia, I take it; though everything of the sort is a disease, but differs—to quote those whom we call doctors— in its manifestation. For they are not all alike, nor of like effect, but each works according to its own faculty, and yet all are diseases. In the same way, we conceive of some men as artisans, do we not?
ΣΩ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖ ὁμολογηθῆναι. καὶ γὰρ οἱ πυρέττοντες πάντες νοσοῦσιν, οὐ μέντοι οἱ νοσοῦντες πάντες πυρέττουσιν οὐδὲ ποδαγρῶσιν οὐδέ γε ὀφθαλμιῶσιν, οἶμαι· ἀλλὰ νόσος μὲν πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, διαφέρειν δέ φασιν οὓς δὴ καλοῦμεν ἰατροὺς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν αὐτῶν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶσιν οὔτε ὅμοιαι οὔτε ὁμοίως διαπράττονται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῆς δύναμιν ἑκάστη· νόσοι μέντοι πᾶσαί εἰσιν. ὥσπερ δημιουργούς τινας ὑπολαμβάνομεν· ἢ οὔ;
Alc. Certainly.
ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Soc. That is, cobblers and carpenters and statuaries and a host of others, whom we need not mention in particular; but any way, they have their several departments of craft, and all of them are craftsmen; yet they are not all carpenters or cobblers or statuaries, though these taken together are craftsmen.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς σκυτοτόμους καὶ τέκτονας καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους παμπληθεῖς, οὓς τί δεῖ καθʼ ἕκαστα λέγειν; ἔχουσι δʼ οὖν διειληφότες δημιουργίας μέρη, καὶ πάντες οὗτοί εἰσι δημιουργοί, οὐ μέντοι εἰσὶ τέκτονές γε οὐδὲ σκυτοτόμοι οὐδʼ ἀνδριαντοποιοί, οἳ σύμπαντές εἰσι δημιουργοί.
Alc. No, indeed.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. In the same way, then, have men divided unwisdom also among them, and those who have the largest share of it we call “mad,” and those who have a little less, “dolts” and “idiots”; though people who prefer to use the mildest language term them sometimes “romantic,” sometimes simpleminded, or again “innocent,” “inexperienced,” or “obtuse”; and many another name will you find if you look for more. But all these things are unwisdom, though they differ, as we observed that one art or one disease differs from another. Or how does it strike you?
ΣΩ. οὕτως μὲν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην διειληφότες εἰσί, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖστον αὐτῆς μέρος ἔχοντας μαινομένους καλοῦμεν, τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγον ἔλαττον ἠλιθίους τε καὶ ἐμβροντήτους· οἱ δὲ ἐν εὐφημοτάτοις ὀνόμασι βουλόμενοι κατονομάζειν οἱ μὲν μεγαλοψύχους, οἱ δὲ εὐήθεις, ἕτεροι δὲ ἀκάκους καὶ ἀπείρους καὶ ἐνεούς· εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ ἕτερα πολλὰ ἀναζητῶν ὀνόματα. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἀφροσύνη ἐστίν, διαφέρει δέ, ὥσπερ τέχνη τέχνης ἡμῖν κατεφαίνετο καὶ νόσος νόσου· ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ;
Alc. That is my view.
ΑΛ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὕτως.
Soc. Then let us turn at this point and retrace our steps. For we said, you know, at the beginning that we must consider who the unwise can be, and who the wise: for we had admitted that there are such persons, had we not?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀπʼ ἐκείνου πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν. ἦν γὰρ δήπου καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου, σκεπτέον εἶναι τοὺς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ φρονίμους, τίνες ποτʼ εἰσίν. ὡμολόγητο γὰρ εἶναί τινας· ἦ γὰρ οὔ;
Alc. Yes, we have admitted it.
ΑΛ. ναί, ὡμολόγηται.
Soc. Then you conceive those to be wise who know what one ought to do and say?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τούτους φρονίμους ὑπολαμβάνεις, οἳ ἂν εἰδῶσιν ἅττα δεῖ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν;
Soc. And which are the unwise? Those who know neither of these things?
ΣΩ. ἄφρονας δὲ ποτέρους; ἆρά γε τοὺς μηδέτερα τούτων εἰδότας;
Alc. The same.
ΑΛ. τούτους.
Soc. And those who know neither of these things will say and do unawares what one ought not?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἵ γε μὴ εἰδότες μηδέτερα τούτων λήσουσιν αὑτοὺς καὶ λέγοντες καὶ πράττοντες ἅττα μὴ δεῖ;
Alc. Apparently.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
Soc. Well, just such a person, as I was saying, Alcibiades, was Oedipus; and even in our time you will find many who do the same, not in a fit of anger, as he was: they think they pray not for something evil, but for something good.
ΣΩ. τούτων μέντοι ἔλεγον, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ τὸν Οἰδίπουν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων·
141. He neither prayed for that, nor thought he did, but there are others who are in the opposite case. For I imagine that if the god to whom you are now going should appear to you and first ask you, before you made any prayer, whether you would be content to become sovereign of the Athenian state and, on your accounting this as something poor and unimportant, should add “and of all the Greeks also”; and if he saw you were still unsatisfied unless he promised you besides the mastery of all Europe, and should not merely promise you that, but on the self-same day a recognition by all men, if you so desired, of Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, as their sovereign—I imagine you would actually depart in a transport of delight, as having secured the greatest of goods.Alc. So would anybody else, I imagine, Socrates, at such a stroke of luck!
141. εὑρήσεις δʼ ἔτι καὶ τῶν νῦν πολλοὺς οὐκ ὀργῇ κεχρημένους, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον, οὐδʼ οἰομένους κακά σφισιν εὔχεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀγαθά. ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ηὔχετο, οὐδʼ ᾤετο· ἕτεροι δέ τινές εἰσιν οἳ τἀναντία τούτων πεπόνθασιν. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαί σε πρῶτον, εἴ σοι ἐμφανὴς γενόμενος ὁ θεὸς πρὸς ὃν τυγχάνεις πορευόμενος, ἐρωτήσειεν, πρὶν ὁτιοῦν εὔξασθαί σε, εἰ ἐξαρκέσει σοι τύραννον γενέσθαι τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φαῦλον ἡγήσαιο καὶ μὴ μέγα τι, προσθείη καὶ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων· εἰ δέ σε ὁρῴη ἔτι ἔλαττον δοκοῦντα ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ καὶ πάσης Εὐρώπης, ὑποσταίη σοι καὶ τοῦτο, ⟨καὶ τοῦτο⟩ μὴ μόνον ὑποσταίη, ⟨ἀλλʼ⟩ αὐθημερόν σου βουλομένου ὡς πάντας αἰσθήσεσθαι ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου τύραννός ἐστιν· αὐτὸν οἶμαι ἄν σε ἀπιέναι περιχαρῆ γενόμενον, ὡς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν κεκυρηκότα.ΑΛ. ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν, εἴπερ τοιαῦτα συμβαίη αὐτῷ.
Soc. But still you would not wish to sacrifice your life even for the territory and sovereignty of all the Greeks and barbarians together.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀντί γε τῆς σῆς ψυχῆς οὐδʼ ἂν τὴν πάντων Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων χώραν τε καὶ τυραννίδα βουληθείης σοι γενέσθαι.
Alc. I should think not. How could I, without a prospect of making any use of them?
ΑΛ. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, μηθέν γέ τι μέλλων αὐτοῖς χρήσεσθαι;
Soc. And what if you had a prospect of making an evil and injurious use of them? Not in this case either?
ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ μέλλοις κακῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς χρῆσθαι; οὐδʼ ἂν οὕτως;
Alc. No, indeed.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. So you see it is not safe either to accept casually what one is given, or to pray for one’s own advancement, if one is going to be injured in consequence, or deprived of one’s life altogether. Yet we could tell of many ere now who, having desired sovereignty, and endeavored to secure it, with the idea of working for their good, have lost their lives by plots which their sovereignty has provoked. And I expect you are not unacquainted with certain events “of a day or two ago,” when Archelaus, the monarch of Macedonia, was slain by his favorite, who was as much in love with the monarchy as Archelaus was with him, and who killed his lover with the expectation of being not only the monarch, but also a happy man: but after holding the monarchy for three or four days he was plotted against by others in his turn, and perished.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς οὔτε τὰ διδόμενα εἰκῇ δέχεσθαί τε οὔτε αὐτὸν εὔχεσθαι γενέσθαι, εἴ γέ τις βλάπτεσθαι μέλλοι διὰ ταῦτα ἢ τὸ παράπαν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλαγῆναι. πολλοὺς δʼ ἂν ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν, ὅσοι τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμήσαντες ἤδη καὶ σπουδάσαντες τοῦτʼ αὐτοῖς παραγενέσθαι, ὡς ἀγαθόν τι πράξαντες, διὰ τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπιβουλευθέντες τὸν βίον ἀφῃρέθησαν. οἶμαι δέ σε οὐκ ἀνήκοον εἶναι ἔνιά γε χθιζά τε καὶ πρωιζὰ γεγενημένα, ὅτε Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Μακεδόνων τύραννον τὰ παιδικά, ἐρασθέντα τῆς τυραννίδος οὐθὲν ἧττον ἤπερ ἐκεῖνος τῶν παιδικῶν, ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἐραστὴν ὡς τύραννός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἀνὴρ ἐσόμενος· κατασχὼν δὲ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἡμέρας τὴν τυραννίδα πάλιν αὐτὸς ἐπιβουλευθεὶς ὑφʼ ἑτέρων τινῶν ἐτελεύτησεν.
Soc. You have only to look at some of our own citizens—and these are examples that we know, not by hearsay, but by personal observation—who in their time have desired to hold military command and have obtained it, and see how some to this very day are exiles from our city, while others have lost their lives.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων πολιτῶν—ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλων ἀκηκόαμεν, ἀλλʼ αὐτοὶ παρόντες οἴδαμεν— ὅσοι στρατηγίας ἐπιθυμήσαντες ἤδη καὶ τυχόντες αὐτῆς οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν φυγάδες τῆσδε τῆς πόλεώς εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν·
142. And even those who are deemed to be faring best have not only gone through many dangers and terrors in holding their command, but on returning home have continued to be as sorely besieged by informers as they were by the enemy, so that some of them wished to heaven that they had been anything but commanders rather than have held such appointments. Of course, if these dangers and toils were conducive to our advantage, there would be some reason for them; but the case is quite the contrary. And you will find it is just the same in regard to children: some people have been known to pray that they might have them, and when they have got them have fallen into the greatest disasters and pains. For some have had children that were utterly bad, and have spent their whole lives in repining; while others, though they had good ones, were bereft of them by disasters that overtook them, and thus were cast into as great misfortune as the others, and wished that no children at all had been born to them. But nevertheless, with all this plain evidence, and a great deal more of a similar kind, before men’s eyes, it is rare to find anyone who has either declined what was offered to him or, when he was likely to gain something by prayer, refrained from praying. Most men would not decline the offer of either a monarchy or a generalship or any of the various other things which bring with them harm rather than benefit, but would even pray to be granted them in cases where they were lacking: but after a little while they often change their tune, and retract all their former prayers. I question therefore if men are not really wrong in blaming the gods as the authors of their ills, when “they themselves by their own presumption” —or unwisdom, shall we say?— “have gotten them more than destined sorrows.” It would seem, at any rate, Alcibiades, that one old poet had some wisdom; for I conceive it was because he had some foolish friends, whom he saw working and praying for things that were not for their advantage, though supposed to be by them, that he made a common prayer on behalf of them all, in terms something like these:
142. οἱ δὲ ἄριστα δοκοῦντες αὐτῶν πράττειν διὰ πολλῶν κινδύνων ἐλθόντες καὶ φόβων οὐ μόνον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ στρατηγίᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατῆλθον, ὑπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν πολιορκούμενοι πολιορκίαν οὐδὲν ἐλάττω τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων διετέλεσαν, ὥστε ἐνίους αὐτῶν εὔχεσθαι ἀστρατηγήτους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐστρατηγηκέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ κίνδυνοί τε καὶ πόνοι φέροντες εἰς ὠφέλειαν, εἶχεν ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τοὐναντίον. εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ περὶ τέκνων τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, εὐξαμένους τινὰς ἤδη γενέσθαι καὶ γενομένων εἰς συμφοράς τε καὶ λύπας τὰς μεγίστας καταστάντας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν διὰ τέλους ὄντων τῶν τέκνων ὅλον τὸν βίον λυπούμενοι διήγαγον· τοὺς δὲ χρηστῶν μὲν γενομένων, συμφοραῖς δὲ χρησαμένων ὥστε στερηθῆναι, καὶ τούτους οὐδὲν εἰς ἐλάττονας δυστυχίας καθεστηκότας ἤπερ ἐκείνους καὶ βουλομένους ἂν ἀγένητα μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι. ἀλλʼ ὅμως τούτων τε καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν ὁμοιοτρόπων τούτοις οὕτω σφόδρα καταδήλων ὄντων, σπάνιον εὑρεῖν ὅστις ἂν ἢ διδομένων ἀπόσχοιτο ἢ μέλλων διʼ εὐχῆς τεύξεσθαι παύσαιτο ἂν εὐχόμενος· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ οὔτε ἂν τυραννίδος διδομένης ἀπόσχοιντο ἂν οὔτε στρατηγίας οὐδʼ ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ἃ παρόντα βλάπτει μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖ, ἀλλὰ κἂν εὔξαιντο ἂν γενέσθαι, εἴ τῳ μὴ παρόντα τυγχάνει· ὀλίγον δὲ ἐπισχόντες ἐνίοτε παλινῳδοῦσιν, ἀνευχόμενοι ἅττʼ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εὔξωνται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἀπορῶ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάτην θεοὺς ἄνθρωποι αἰτιῶνται, ἐξ ἐκείνων φάμενοι κακά σφισιν εἶναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ σφῇσιν εἴτε ἀτασθαλίαισιν εἴτε ἀφροσύναις χρὴ εἰπεῖν, ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγεʼ ἔχουσι. κινδυνεύει γοῦν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, φρόνιμός τις εἶναι ἐκεῖνος ὁ ποιητής, ὃς δοκεῖ μοι φίλοις ἀνοήτοις τισὶ χρησάμενος, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ πράττοντας καὶ εὐχομένους ἅπερ οὐ βέλτιον ἦν, ἐκείνοις δὲ ἐδόκει, κοινῇ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων αὐτῶν εὐχὴν ποιήσασθαι· λέγει δέ πως ὡδί— Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλά, φησί, καὶ εὐχομένοιςκαὶ ἀνεύκτοιςἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δειλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξεινκελεύει.
143. King Zeus, give unto us what is good, whether we pray or pray not;But what is grievous, even if we pray for it, do thou avert.Soc. So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of an answer to his words, do not be silent.
143. ΣΩ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καλῶς δοκεῖ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς λέγειν ὁ ποιητής· σὺ δʼ εἴ τι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα, μὴ σιώπα.
Alc. It is difficult, Socrates, to gainsay what has been well spoken: one thing, however, I do observe —how many evils are caused to men by ignorance, when, as it seems, we are beguiled by her not only into doing, but—worst of all—into praying to be granted the greatest evils. Now that is a thing that no one would suppose of himself; each of us would rather suppose he was competent to pray for his own greatest good, not his greatest evil. Why, that would seem, in truth, more like some sort of curse than a prayer!
ΑΛ. χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐστὶν ἀντιλέγειν πρὸς τὰ καλῶς εἰρημένα· ἐκεῖνο δʼ οὖν ἐννοῶ, ὅσων κακῶν αἰτία ἡ ἄγνοια τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὁπότε, ὡς ἔοικε, λελήθαμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διὰ ταύτην καὶ πράττοντες καὶ τό γε ἔσχατον εὐχόμενοι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τὰ κάκιστα. ὅπερ οὖν οὐδεὶς ἂν οἰηθείη, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε πᾶς ἂν οἴοιτο ἱκανὸς εἶναι, αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τὰ βέλτιστα εὔξασθαι, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ κάκιστα. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς κατάρᾳ τινὶ ἀλλʼ οὐκ εὐχῇ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη.
Soc. But perhaps, my excellent friend, some person who is wiser than either you or I may say we are wrong to be so free with our abuse of ignorance, unless we can add that it is ignorance of certain things, and is a good to certain persons in certain conditions, as to those others it is an evil.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως, ὦ βέλτιστε, φαίη ἄν τις ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ σοφώτερος ὢν τυγχάνοι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡμᾶς λέγειν, οὕτως εἰκῇ ψέγοντας ἄγνοιαν, εἴ γε μὴ προσθείημεν τὴν ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις κακόν.
Alc. How do you mean? Can there be anything of which it is better for anybody, in any condition whatsoever, to be ignorant than cognizant?
ΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις; ἔστι γὰρ ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα ὅτῳ δὴ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντι ἄμεινον ἀγνοεῖν ἢ γιγνώσκειν;
Soc. I believe so; and do not you?
ΣΩ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· σοὶ δʼ οὔ;
Alc. No, indeed, upon my word.
ΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία.
Soc. But surely I shall not have to tax you with an inclination to commit such an act against your own mother as Orestes and Alcmaeon, and any others who have followed their example, are said to have committed against theirs.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνό σου καταγνώσομαι, ἐθέλειν ἄν σε πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μητέρα διαπεπρᾶχθαι ἅπερ Ὀρέστην φασὶ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ εἰ δή τινες ἄλλοι ἐκείνοις τυγχάνουσι ταὐτὰ διαπεπραγμένοι.
Alc. No unlucky words, in Heaven’s name, Socrates!
ΑΛ. εὐφήμει πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Why, it is not the person who says, Alcibiades, that you would not like to be guilty of such an act, whom you should bid avoid unlucky words, but much rather him who might say the contrary; since the act seems to you so very dreadful as to be unfit even for such casual mention. But do you think that Orestes, if he had had all his wits about him and had known what was best for him to do, would have brought himself to commit any act of the sort?
ΣΩ. οὔτοι τὸν λέγοντα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις σοι ταῦτα πεπρᾶχθαι, εὐφημεῖν δεῖ σε κελεύειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πολύ, εἴ τις τὰ ἐναντία λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ σφόδρα δεινὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ ῥητέον εἶναι οὕτως εἰκῇ. δοκεῖς δʼ ἂν τὸν Ὀρέστην, εἰ ἐτύγχανε φρόνιμος ὢν καὶ εἰδὼς ὅτι βέλτιστον ἦν αὐτῷ πράττειν, τολμῆσαι ἄν τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι;
Alc. No, indeed.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. Nor would anyone else, I imagine.
ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε ἄλλον οἶμαι οὐδένα.
Soc. Then it seems that ignorance of what is best, and to be ignorant of the best, is a bad thing.
ΣΩ. κακὸν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἄγνοια καὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον.
Alc. I agree.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. And not only for the person himself, but for everyone else?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκείνῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν;
Soc. Then let us consider this further case. Suppose it should quite suddenly occur to your mind that you had better take a dagger and go to the door of Pericles, your own guardian and friend, and ask if he were at home, with the design of killing just him and no one else, and his servants said he was at home: now, I do not say you would be inclined to do any such thing, but I suppose, if you are under the impression which at some moment may well be present, surely, to the mind of a man who is ignorant of the best—that what is really the worst is best at some moment—or do you not agree?
ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα· εἴ σοι αὐτίκα μάλα παρεσταίη, οἰηθέντι βέλτιον εἶναι, Περικλέα τὸν σεαυτοῦ ἐπίτροπόν τε καὶ φίλον, ἐγχειρίδιον λαβόντα, ἐλθόντα ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας, εἰπεῖν εἰ ἔνδον ἐστί, βουλόμενον ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα·
144. Alc. Quite so.
144. οἱ δὲ φαῖεν ἔνδον εἶναι—καὶ οὐ λέγω ἐθέλειν ἄν σε τούτων τι πράττειν· ἀλλʼ εἰ, οἶμαι, δόξει σοι, ὅπερ οὐθὲν κωλύει δήπου τῷ γε ἀγνοοῦντι τὸ βέλτιστον παραστῆναί ποτε δόξαν, ὥστε οἰηθῆναι καὶ τὸ κάκιστόν ποτε βέλτιστον εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι;ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Soc. Well then, if you went indoors and saw Pericles himself, but did not know him, and thought he was somebody else, would you still venture to kill him?
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν παρελθὼν εἴσω καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ἀγνοήσαις τε καὶ οἰηθείης ἂν ἄλλον εἶναί τινα, ἆρʼ ἔτι ἂν αὐτὸν τολμήσαις ἀποκτεῖναι;
Alc. No, upon my word, I should think not.
ΑΛ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκῶ.
Soc. For your man was, I presume, not anyone you met, but that particular person whom you wished to kill?
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὸν ἐντυχόντα, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ὃν ἠβούλου. ἦ γάρ;
Soc. And although you might make a number of attempts, if you always failed to know Pericles when you were about to commit the act, you would never attack him.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ πολλάκις ἐγχειροῖς, αἰεὶ δὲ ἀγνοοῖς τὸν Περικλέα, ὁπότε μέλλοις τοῦτο πράττειν, οὔποτε ἂν ἐπίθοιο αὐτῷ.
Alc. No, indeed.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. Well now, do you suppose that Orestes would ever have attacked his mother if he had similarly failed to know her?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὸν Ὀρέστην δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε τῇ μητρὶ ἐπιθέσθαι, εἴ γε ὡσαύτως ἠγνόησεν;
Alc. I do not think he would.
ΑΛ. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
Soc. For presumably he, too, had no intention of killing the first woman he met, or anybody else’s mother, but only his own.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ δήπου οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνος τὴν προστυχοῦσαν γυναῖκα οὐδὲ τὴν ὁτουοῦν μητέρα διενοεῖτο ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ.
Alc. That is so.
ΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
Soc. Then to be ignorant in such matters is better for those who are so disposed and have formed such resolves.
ΣΩ. ἀγνοεῖν ἄρα τά γε τοιαῦτα βέλτιον τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις καὶ τοιαύτας δόξας ἔχουσιν.
Alc. Apparently.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
Soc. So you see that ignorance of certain things is for certain persons in certain states a good, not an evil, as you supposed just now.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι ἡ ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοια καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ οὐ κακόν, ὥσπερ ἄρτι σοι ἐδόκει;
Alc. It seems to be.
ΑΛ. ἔοικεν.
Soc. Then if you care to consider the sequel of this, I daresay it will surprise you.
ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν εἰ βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἄτοπον ἂν ἴσως ἄν σοι δόξειεν εἶναι.
Alc. What may that be, Socrates?
ΑΛ. τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Soc. I mean that, generally speaking, it rather looks as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, if it does not include possession of the science of the best, will in a few instances help, but in most will harm, the owner. Consider it this way: must it not be the case, in your opinion, that when we are about to do or say anything, we first suppose that we know, or do really know, the thing we so confidently intend to say or do?
ΣΩ. ὅτι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, κινδυνεύει τό γε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου κεκτημένος ᾖ, ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό. σκόπει δὲ ὧδε. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅταν τι μέλλωμεν ἤτοι πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, οἰηθῆναι δεῖν πρῶτον ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι ἢ τῷ ὄντι εἰδέναι τοῦθʼ ὃ ἂν προχειροτέρως μέλλωμεν ἢ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν;
Alc. I think so.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. Well, take the orators, for example: they either know, or think they know, how to advise us on various occasions—some about war and peace, and others about building walls or fitting up harbors;
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ ῥήτορες αὐτίκα ἤτοι εἰδότες συμβουλεύειν ἢ οἰηθέντες εἰδέναι συμβουλεύουσιν ἡμῖν ἑκάστοτε, οἱ μὲν περὶ πολέμου τε καὶ εἰρήνης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τειχῶν οἰκοδομίας ἢ καὶ λιμένων κατασκευῆς· ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, ὅσα δή ποτε ἡ πόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἢ αὐτὴ καθʼ αὑτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων συμβουλῆς πάντα γίγνεται.