--- title: "Cratylus · Κρατύλος" author: "Plato" translator: "Harold North Fowler" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/ cite: "Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler, Cratylus · Κρατύλος. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/" --- # Cratylus · Κρατύλος *Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler* Are names right by nature or by convention? Socrates on language and etymology. > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg005, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Harold North Fowler, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg005.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## Contents 1. [Pages 383–395](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/1.md) 2. [Pages 395–406](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/2.md) 3. [Pages 407–418](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/3.md) 4. [Pages 418–429](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/4.md) 5. [Pages 429–440](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/5.md) ## 1. Pages 383–395 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/1/#p-N [¶0] 383. Hermogenes. Here is Socrates; shall we take him as a partner in our discussion? > Greek: 383. ΕΡΜ. βούλει οὖν καὶ Σωκράτει τῷδε ἀνακοινωσώμεθα τὸν λόγον; [¶1] Cratylus. If you like. > Greek: ΚΡ. εἴ σοι δοκεῖ. [¶2] Hermogenes. Cratylus, whom you see here, Socrates, says that everything has a right name of its own, which comes by nature, and that a name is not whatever people call a thing by agreement, just a piece of their own voice applied to the thing, but that there is a kind of inherent correctness in names, which is the same for all men, both Greeks and barbarians. So I ask him whether his name is in truth Cratylus, and he agrees that it is. “And what is Socrates’ name?” I said. “Socrates,” said he. “Then that applies to all men, and the particular name by which we call each person is his name?” And he said, “Well, your name is not Hermogenes, even if all mankind call you so.” > Greek: ΕΡΜ. Κρατύλος φησὶν ὅδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα εἶναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων φύσει πεφυκυῖαν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι ὄνομα ὃ ἄν τινες συνθέμενοι καλεῖν καλῶσι, τῆς αὑτῶν φωνῆς μόριον ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι, ἀλλὰ ὀρθότητά τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων πεφυκέναι καὶ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασιν. ἐρωτῶ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ εἰ αὐτῷ Κρατύλος τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὄνομα [ἐστὶν ἢ οὔ]· ὁ δὲ ὁμολογεῖ. τί δὲ Σωκράτει; ἔφην. Σωκράτης, ἦ δʼ ὅς. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν, ὅπερ καλοῦμεν ὄνομα ἕκαστον, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα; ὁ δέ, οὔκουν σοί γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὄνομα Ἑρμογένης, οὐδὲ ἂν πάντες καλῶσιν ἄνθρωποι. [¶3] Hermogenes. Now, though I am asking him and am exerting myself to find out what in the world he means, he does not explain himself at all; he meets me with dissimulation, claiming to have some special knowledge of his own about it which would, if he chose to speak it out clearly, make me agree entirely with him. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος καὶ προθυμουμένου εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτὲ λέγει, οὔτε ἀποσαφεῖ οὐδὲν εἰρωνεύεταί τε πρός με, προσποιούμενός τι αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ διανοεῖσθαι ὡς εἰδὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὃ εἰ βούλοιτο σαφῶς εἰπεῖν, ποιήσειεν ἂν καὶ ἐμὲ ὁμολογεῖν καὶ λέγειν ἅπερ αὐτὸς λέγει. [¶4] 384. Now if you could interpret Cratylus’s oracular speech, I should like to hear you; or rather, I should like still better to hear, if you please, what you yourself think about the correctness of names. Socrates. Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying that knowledge of high things is hard to gain; and surely knowledge of names is no small matter. Now if I had attended Prodicus’s fifty-drachma course of lectures, after which, as he himself says, a man has a complete education on this subject, there would be nothing to hinder your learning the truth about the correctness of names at once; but I have heard only the one-drachma course, and so I do not know what the truth is about such matters. However, I am ready to join you and Cratylus in looking for it. But as for his saying that Hermogenes is not truly your name, I suspect he is making fun of you; for perhaps he thinks that you want to make money and fail every time. But, as I said, it is difficult to know such things. We must join forces and try to find out whether you are right, or Cratylus. > Greek: 384. εἰ οὖν πῃ ἔχεις συμβαλεῖν τὴν Κρατύλου μαντείαν, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι· μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτῷ σοι ὅπῃ δοκεῖ [ἔχειν] περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος ἔτι ἂν ἥδιον πυθοίμην, εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ [ἐστίν]. ΣΩ. ὦ παῖ Ἱππονίκου Ἑρμόγενες, παλαιὰ παροιμία ὅτι χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά ἐστιν ὅπῃ ἔχει μαθεῖν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐ σμικρὸν τυγχάνει ὂν μάθημα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠκηκόη παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν, ἣν ἀκούσαντι ὑπάρχει περὶ τοῦτο πεπαιδεῦσθαι, ὥς φησιν ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυέν σε αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα, ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμιαίαν. οὔκουν οἶδα πῇ ποτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν τοιούτων· συζητεῖν μέντοι ἕτοιμός εἰμι καὶ σοὶ καὶ Κρατύλῳ κοινῇ. ὅτι δὲ οὔ φησί σοι Ἑρμογένη ὄνομα εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὥσπερ ὑποπτεύω αὐτὸν σκώπτειν· οἴεται γὰρ ἴσως σε χρημάτων ἐφιέμενον κτήσεως ἀποτυγχάνειν ἑκάστοτε. ἀλλʼ, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, εἰδέναι μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαλεπόν, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν δὲ καταθέντας χρὴ σκοπεῖν εἴτε ὡς σὺ λέγεις ἔχει εἴτε ὡς Κρατύλος. [¶5] Hermogenes. For my part, Socrates, I have often talked with Cratylus and many others, and cannot come to the conclusion that there is any correctness of names other than convention and agreement. For it seems to me that whatever name you give to a thing is its right name; and if you give up that name and change it for another, the later name is no less correct than the earlier, just as we change the names of our servants; for I think no name belongs to any particular thing by nature, but only by the habit and custom of those who employ it and who established the usage. But if this is not the case, I am ready to hear and to learn from Cratylus or anyone else. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ καὶ τούτῳ διαλεχθεὶς καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι ὡς ἄλλη τις ὀρθότης ὀνόματος ἢ συνθήκη καὶ ὁμολογία. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὅτι ἄν τίς τῳ θῆται ὄνομα, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὀρθόν· καὶ ἂν αὖθίς γε ἕτερον μεταθῆται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μηκέτι καλῇ, οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ ὕστερον ὀρθῶς ἔχειν τοῦ προτέρου, ὥσπερ τοῖς οἰκέταις ἡμεῖς μετατιθέμεθα [οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῦτʼ εἶναι ὀρθὸν τὸ μετατεθὲν τοῦ πρότερον κειμένου]· οὐ γὰρ φύσει ἑκάστῳ πεφυκέναι ὄνομα οὐδὲν οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει τῶν ἐθισάντων τε καὶ καλούντων. εἰ δέ πῃ ἄλλῃ ἔχει, ἕτοιμος ἔγωγε καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ ἀκούειν οὐ μόνον παρὰ Κρατύλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρʼ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν. [¶6] 385. Socrates. It may be that you are right, Hermogenes; but let us see. Whatever name we decide to give each particular thing is its name? > Greek: 385. ΣΩ. ἴσως μέντοι τὶ λέγεις, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες· σκεψώμεθα δέ. ὃ ἂν φῂς καλῇ τις ἕκαστον, τοῦθʼ ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα; [¶7] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶8] Socrates. Whether the giver be a private person or a state? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ἐὰν ἰδιώτης καλῇ καὶ ἐὰν πόλις; [¶9] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φημί. [¶10] Socrates. Well, then, suppose I give a name to some thing or other, designating, for instance, that which we now call “man” as “horse” and that which we now call “horse” as “man,” will the real name of the same thing be “man” for the public and “horse” for me individually, and in the other case “horse” for the public and “man” for me individually? Is that your meaning? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἐὰν ἐγὼ καλῶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων, οἷον ὃ νῦν καλοῦμεν ἄνθρωπον, ἐὰν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἵππον προσαγορεύω, ὃ δὲ νῦν ἵππον, ἄνθρωπον, ἔσται δημοσίᾳ μὲν ὄνομα ἄνθρωπος τῷ αὐτῷ, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἵππος; καὶ ἰδίᾳ μὲν αὖ ἄνθρωπος, δημοσίᾳ δὲ ἵππος; οὕτω λέγεις; [¶11] Hermogenes. Yes, that is my opinion. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶12] Socrates. Now answer this question. Is there anything which you call speaking the truth and speaking falsehood? > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή μοι τόδε εἰπέ· καλεῖς τι ἀληθῆ λέγειν καὶ ψευδῆ; [¶13] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔγωγε. [¶14] Socrates. Then there would be true speech and false speech? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν λόγος ἀληθής, ὁ δὲ ψευδής; [¶15] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶16] Socrates. Then that speech which says things as they are is true, and that which says them as they are not is false? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὗτος ὃς ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγῃ ὡς ἔστιν, ἀληθής· ὃς δʼ ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ψευδής; [¶17] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶18] Socrates. It is possible, then, to say in speech that which is and that which is not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, λόγῳ λέγειν τὰ ὄντα τε καὶ μή; [¶19] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶20] Socrates. But is true speech true only as a whole, and are its parts untrue? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁ λόγος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀληθὴς πότερον μὲν ὅλος ἀληθής, τὰ μόρια δʼ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ; [¶21] Hermogenes. No, its parts also are true. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια. [¶22] Socrates. Are the large parts true, but not the small ones, or are all true? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μόρια ἀληθῆ, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ οὔ· ἢ πάντα; [¶23] Hermogenes. All, in my opinion. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάντα, οἶμαι ἔγωγε. [¶24] Socrates. Is there, then, anything which you say is a smaller part of speech than a name? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅτι λέγεις λόγου σμικρότερον μόριον ἄλλο ἢ ὄνομα; [¶25] Hermogenes. No, that is the smallest. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο σμικρότατον. [¶26] Socrates. And the name is spoken as a part of the true speech? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τοῦτο [ὄνομα] ἄρα τὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λόγου λέγεται; [¶27] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶28] Socrates. Then it is, according to you, true. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀληθές γε, ὡς φῄς. [¶29] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶30] Socrates. And a part of false speech is false, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ τοῦ ψεύδους μόριον οὐ ψεῦδος; [¶31] Hermogenes. It is. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φημί. [¶32] Socrates. Then it is possible to utter either a false or a true name, since one may utter speech that is either true or false? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα ὄνομα ψεῦδος καὶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, εἴπερ καὶ λόγον; [¶33] Hermogenes. Yes, of course. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶34] Socrates. Then whatever each particular person says is the name of anything, that is its name for that person? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὃ ἂν ἄρα ἕκαστος φῇ τῳ ὄνομα εἶναι, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα; [¶35] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶36] Socrates. And whatever the number of names anyone says a thing has, it will really have that number at the time when he says it? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ὁπόσα ἂν φῇ τις ἑκάστῳ ὀνόματα εἶναι, τοσαῦτα ἔσται καὶ τότε ὁπόταν φῇ; [¶37] Hermogenes. Yes, Socrates, for I cannot conceive of any other kind of correctness in names than this; I may call a thing by one name, which I gave, and you by another, which you gave. And in the same way, I see that states have their own different names for the same things, and Greeks differ from other Greeks and from barbarians in their use of names. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀνόματος ἄλλην ὀρθότητα ἢ ταύτην, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἕτερον εἶναι καλεῖν ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα, ὃ ἐγὼ ἐθέμην, σοὶ δὲ ἕτερον, ὃ αὖ σύ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ὁρῶ ἰδίᾳ [ἑκάσταις] ἐνίοις ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς κείμενα ὀνόματα, καὶ Ἕλλησι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, καὶ Ἕλλησι παρὰ βαρβάρους. [¶38] Socrates. Now, Hermogenes, let us see. Do you think this is true of the real things, that their reality is a separate one for each person, as Protagoras said with his doctrine that man is the measure of all things—that things are to me such as they seem to me, and to you such as they seem to you—or do you think things have some fixed reality of their own? > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ ἴδωμεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, πότερον καὶ τὰ ὄντα οὕτως ἔχειν σοι φαίνεται, ἰδίᾳ αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν λέγων πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον—ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα [εἶναι], τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί· [¶39] 386. Hermogenes. It has sometimes happened to me, Socrates, to be so perplexed that I have been carried away even into this doctrine of Protagoras; but I do not at all believe he is right. > Greek: 386. οἷα δʼ ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ σοί—ἢ ἔχειν δοκεῖ σοι αὐτὰ αὑτῶν τινα βεβαιότητα τῆς οὐσίας; ΕΡΜ. ἤδη ποτὲ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπορῶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξηνέχθην εἰς ἅπερ Πρωταγόρας λέγει· οὐ πάνυ τι μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν. [¶40] Socrates. Well, have you ever been carried away so far as not to believe at all that any man is bad? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἐς τόδε ἤδη ἐξηνέχθης, ὥστε μὴ πάνυ σοι δοκεῖν εἶναί τινα ἄνθρωπον πονηρόν; [¶41] Hermogenes. Lord, no; but I have often been carried away into the belief that certain men, and a good many of them, are very bad. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ πέπονθα, ὥστε μοι δοκεῖν πάνυ πονηροὺς εἶναί τινας ἀνθρώπους, καὶ μάλα συχνούς. [¶42] Socrates. Well, did you never think any were very good? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; πάνυ χρηστοὶ οὔπω σοι ἔδοξαν εἶναι [ἄνθρωποι]; [¶43] Hermogenes. Very few. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. καὶ μάλα ὀλίγοι. [¶44] Socrates. But you did think them so? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔδοξαν δʼ οὖν; [¶45] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε. [¶46] Socrates. And what is your idea about that? Are the very good very wise and the very bad very foolish? > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν τοῦτο τίθεσαι; ἆρʼ ὧδε· τοὺς μὲν πάνυ χρηστοὺς πάνυ φρονίμους, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ πονηροὺς πάνυ ἄφρονας; [¶47] Hermogenes. Yes, that is my opinion. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. [¶48] Socrates. Now if Protagoras is right and the truth is as he says, that all things are to each person as they seem to him, is it possible for some of us to be wise and some foolish? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἷόν τε οὖν [ἐστιν], εἰ Πρωταγόρας ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀλήθεια, τὸ οἷα ἂν δοκῇ ἑκάστῳ τοιαῦτα καὶ εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν ἡμῶν φρονίμους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας; [¶49] Hermogenes. No, it is not. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶50] Socrates. And you are, I imagine, strongly of the opinion that if wisdom and folly exist, it is quite impossible that Protagoras is right, for one man would not in reality be at all wiser than another if whatever seems to each person is really true to him. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ταῦτά γε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, σοὶ πάνυ δοκεῖ, φρονήσεως οὔσης καὶ ἀφροσύνης μὴ πάνυ δυνατὸν εἶναι Πρωταγόραν ἀληθῆ λέγειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου φρονιμώτερος εἴη, εἴπερ ἃ ἂν ἑκάστῳ δοκῇ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθῆ ἔσται. [¶51] Hermogenes. Quite right. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶52] Socrates. But neither do you believe with Euthydemus that all things belong equally to all men at the same time and perpetually, for on this assumption also some could not be good and others bad, if virtue and its opposite were always equally possessed by all. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατʼ Εὐθύδημόν γε οἶμαι σοὶ δοκεῖ πᾶσι πάντα ὁμοίως εἶναι ἅμα καὶ ἀεί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εἶεν οἱ μὲν χρηστοί, οἱ δὲ πονηροί, εἰ ὁμοίως ἅπασι καὶ ἀεὶ ἀρετή τε καὶ κακία εἴη. [¶53] Hermogenes. True. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶54] Socrates. Then if neither all things belong equally to all men at the same time and perpetually nor each thing to each man individually, it is clear that things have some fixed reality of their own, not in relation to us nor caused by us; they do not vary, swaying one way and another in accordance with our fancy, but exist of themselves in relation to their own reality imposed by nature. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε πᾶσι πάντα ἐστὶν ὁμοίως ἅμα καὶ ἀεί, μήτε ἑκάστῳ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον [τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν], δῆλον δὴ ὅτι αὐτὰ αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέβαιόν ἐστι τὰ πράγματα, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ἑλκόμενα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι, ἀλλὰ καθʼ αὑτὰ πρὸς τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ᾗπερ πέφυκεν. [¶55] Hermogenes. I think, Socrates, that is the case. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. δοκεῖ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω. [¶56] Socrates. Can things themselves, then, possess such a nature as this, and that of their actions be different? Or are not actions also a class of realities? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν αὐτὰ μὲν ἂν εἴη οὕτω πεφυκότα, αἱ δὲ πράξεις αὐτῶν οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον; ἢ οὐ καὶ αὗται ἕν τι εἶδος τῶν ὄντων εἰσίν, αἱ πράξεις; [¶57] Hermogenes. Certainly they are. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε καὶ αὗται. [¶58] 387. Socrates. Then actions also are performed according to their own nature, not according to our opinion. For instance, if we undertake to cut anything, ought we to cut it as we wish, and with whatever instrument we wish, or shall we, if we are willing to cut each thing in accordance with the nature of cutting and being cut, and with the natural instrument, succeed in cutting it, and do it rightly, whereas if we try to do it contrary to nature we shall fail and accomplish nothing? > Greek: 387. ΣΩ. κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἄρα φύσιν καὶ αἱ πράξεις πράττονται, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν δόξαν. οἷον ἐάν τι ἐπιχειρήσωμεν ἡμεῖς τῶν ὄντων τέμνειν, πότερον ἡμῖν τμητέον [ἐστὶν] ἕκαστον ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλώμεθα καὶ ᾧ ἂν βουληθῶμεν, ἢ ἐὰν μὲν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν βουληθῶμεν ἕκαστον τέμνειν τοῦ τέμνειν τε καὶ τέμνεσθαι καὶ ᾧ πέφυκε, τεμοῦμέν τε καὶ πλέον τι ἡμῖν ἔσται καὶ ὀρθῶς πράξομεν τοῦτο, ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, ἐξαμαρτησόμεθά τε καὶ οὐδὲν πράξομεν; [¶59] Hermogenes. I think the way is as you suggest. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω. [¶60] Socrates. Then, too, if we undertake to burn anything, we must burn not according to every opinion, but according to the right one? And that is as each thing naturally burns or is burned and with the natural instrument? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν κάειν τι ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν δόξαν δεῖ κάειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὀρθήν; αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ᾗ ἐπεφύκει ἕκαστον κάεσθαί τε καὶ κάειν καὶ ᾧ ἐπεφύκει; [¶61] Hermogenes. True. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶62] Socrates. And all other actions are to be performed In like manner? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω; [¶63] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶64] Socrates. And speaking is an action, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ καὶ τὸ λέγειν μία τις τῶν πράξεών ἐστιν; [¶65] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶66] Socrates. Then if a man speaks as he fancies he ought to speak, will he speak rightly, or will he succeed in speaking if he speaks in the way and with the instrument in which and with which it is natural for us to speak and for things to be spoken, whereas otherwise he will fail and accomplish nothing? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν ᾗ ἄν τῳ δοκῇ λεκτέον εἶναι, ταύτῃ λέγων ὀρθῶς λέξει, ἢ ἐὰν μὲν ᾗ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα λέγειν τε καὶ λέγεσθαι καὶ ᾧ, ταύτῃ καὶ τούτῳ λέγῃ, πλέον τέ τι ποιήσει καὶ ἐρεῖ· ἂν δὲ μή, ἐξαμαρτήσεταί τε καὶ οὐδὲν ποιήσει; [¶67] Hermogenes. I think the way you suggest is the right one. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις. [¶68] Socrates. Now naming is a part of speaking, for in naming I suppose people utter speech. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦ λέγειν μόριον τὸ ὀνομάζειν; διονομάζοντες γάρ που λέγουσι τοὺς λόγους. [¶69] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶70] Socrates. Then is not naming also a kind of action, if speaking is a kind of action concerned with things? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὀνομάζειν πρᾶξίς [τίς] ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ λέγειν πρᾶξίς τις ἦν περὶ τὰ πράγματα; [¶71] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶72] Socrates. But we saw that actions are not merely relative to us, but possess a separate nature of their own? > Greek: ΣΩ. αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἐφάνησαν ἡμῖν οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὖσαι, ἀλλʼ αὑτῶν τινα ἰδίαν φύσιν ἔχουσαι; [¶73] Hermogenes. True. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶74] Socrates. Then in naming also, if we are to be consistent with our previous conclusions, we cannot follow our own will, but the way and the instrument which the nature of things prescribes must be employed, must they not? And if we pursue this course we shall be successful in our naming, but otherwise we shall fail. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀνομαστέον [ἐστὶν] ᾗ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα ὀνομάζειν τε καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι καὶ ᾧ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ ἂν ἡμεῖς βουληθῶμεν, εἴπερ τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν μέλλει ὁμολογούμενον εἶναι; καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἂν πλέον τι ποιοῖμεν καὶ ὀνομάζοιμεν, ἄλλως δὲ οὔ; [¶75] Hermogenes. I think you are right. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φαίνεταί μοι. [¶76] Socrates. And again, what has to be cut, we said, has to be cut with something. > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ὃ ἔδει τέμνειν, ἔδει τῳ, φαμέν, τέμνειν; [¶77] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶78] Socrates. And what has to be woven, has to be woven with something, and what has to be bored, has to be bored with something? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ὃ ἔδει κερκίζειν, ἔδει τῳ κερκίζειν; καὶ ὃ ἔδει τρυπᾶν, ἔδει τῳ τρυπᾶν; [¶79] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶80] Socrates. And then what has to be named, has to be named with something? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ὃ ἔδει δὴ ὀνομάζειν, ἔδει τῳ ὀνομάζειν; [¶81] 388. Hermogenes. True. > Greek: 388. ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶82] Socrates. And what is that with which we have to bore? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ ἦν ἐκεῖνο ᾧ ἔδει τρυπᾶν; [¶83] Hermogenes. A borer. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τρύπανον. [¶84] Socrates. And that with which we weave? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ ᾧ κερκίζειν; [¶85] Hermogenes. A shuttle. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. κερκίς. [¶86] Socrates. And that with which we must name? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ ᾧ ὀνομάζειν; [¶87] Hermogenes. A name. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ὄνομα. [¶88] Socrates. Right. A name also, then, is a kind of instrument. > Greek: ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις. ὄργανον ἄρα τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὄνομα. [¶89] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶90] Socrates. Then if I were to ask “What instrument is the shuttle?” Is it not that with which we weave? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην τί ἦν ὄργανον ἡ κερκίς; οὐχ ᾧ κερκίζομεν; [¶91] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶92] Socrates. And what do we do when we weave? Do we not separate the mingled threads of warp and woof? > Greek: ΣΩ. κερκίζοντες δὲ τί δρῶμεν; οὐ τὴν κρόκην καὶ τοὺς στήμονας συγκεχυμένους διακρίνομεν; [¶93] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶94] Socrates. And you could give a similar answer about the borer and the rest, could you not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τρυπάνου ἕξεις οὕτως εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; [¶95] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶96] Socrates. And can you say something of the same kind about a name? The name being an instrument, what do we do with it when we name? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔχεις δὴ καὶ περὶ ὀνόματος οὕτως εἰπεῖν; ὀργάνῳ ὄντι τῷ ὀνόματι ὀνομάζοντες τί ποιοῦμεν; [¶97] Hermogenes. I cannot tell. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. [¶98] Socrates. Do we not teach one another something, and separate things according to their natures? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὐ διδάσκομέν τι ἀλλήλους καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακρίνομεν ᾗ ἔχει; [¶99] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶100] Socrates. A name is, then, an instrument of teaching and of separating reality, as a shuttle is an instrument of separating the web? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὄνομα ἄρα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστιν ὄργανον καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας ὥσπερ κερκὶς ὑφάσματος. [¶101] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶102] Socrates. But the shuttle is an instrument of weaving? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὑφαντικὸν δέ γε ἡ κερκίς; [¶103] Hermogenes. Of course. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; [¶104] Socrates. The weaver, then, will use the shuttle well, and well means like a weaver; and a teacher will use a name well, and well means like a teacher. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὑφαντικὸς μὲν ἄρα κερκίδι καλῶς χρήσεται, καλῶς δʼ ἐστὶν ὑφαντικῶς· διδασκαλικὸς δὲ ὀνόματι, καλῶς δʼ ἐστὶ διδασκαλικῶς. [¶105] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶106] Socrates. Whose work will the weaver use well when he uses the shuttle? > Greek: ΣΩ. τῷ τίνος οὖν ἔργῳ ὁ ὑφάντης καλῶς χρήσεται ὅταν τῇ κερκίδι χρῆται; [¶107] Hermogenes. The carpenter’s. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τῷ τοῦ τέκτονος. [¶108] Socrates. Is every one a carpenter, or he who has the skill? > Greek: ΣΩ. πᾶς δὲ τέκτων ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων; [¶109] Hermogenes. He who has the skill. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ὁ τὴν τέχνην. [¶110] Socrates. And whose work will the hole-maker use when he uses the borer? > Greek: ΣΩ. τῷ τίνος δὲ ἔργῳ ὁ τρυπητὴς καλῶς χρήσεται ὅταν τῷ τρυπάνῳ χρῆται; [¶111] Hermogenes. The smith’s. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τῷ τοῦ χαλκέως. [¶112] Socrates. And is every one a smith, or he who has the skill? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν πᾶς χαλκεὺς ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων; [¶113] Hermogenes. He who has the skill. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ὁ τὴν τέχνην. [¶114] Socrates. And whose work will the teacher use when he uses the name? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶεν. τῷ δὲ τίνος ἔργῳ ὁ διδασκαλικὸς χρήσεται ὅταν τῷ ὀνόματι χρῆται; [¶115] Hermogenes. I cannot tell that, either. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐδὲ τοῦτʼ ἔχω. [¶116] Socrates. And can you not tell this, either, who gives us the names we use? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲ τοῦτό γʼ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, τίς παραδίδωσιν ἡμῖν τὰ ὀνόματα οἷς χρώμεθα; [¶117] Hermogenes. No. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶118] Socrates. Do you not think it is the law that gives them to us? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὐχὶ ὁ νόμος δοκεῖ σοι [εἶναι] ὁ παραδιδοὺς αὐτά; [¶119] Hermogenes. Very likely. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔοικεν. [¶120] Socrates. Then the teacher, when he uses a name, will be using the work of a lawgiver? > Greek: ΣΩ. νομοθέτου ἄρα ἔργῳ χρήσεται ὁ διδασκαλικὸς ὅταν ὀνόματι χρῆται; [¶121] Hermogenes. I think so. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. δοκεῖ μοι. [¶122] Socrates. Do you think every man is a lawgiver, or only he who has the skill? > Greek: ΣΩ. νομοθέτης δέ σοι δοκεῖ πᾶς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων; [¶123] Hermogenes. He who has the skill. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ὁ τὴν τέχνην. [¶124] Socrates. Then it is not for every man, Hermogenes, to give names, but for him who may be called the name-maker; and he, it appears, is the lawgiver, who is of all the artisans among men the rarest. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα παντὸς ἀνδρός, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ὄνομα θέσθαι [ἐστὶν] ἀλλά τινος ὀνοματουργοῦ· [¶125] 389. Hermogenes. So it appears. > Greek: 389. οὗτος δʼ ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ νομοθέτης, ὃς δὴ τῶν δημιουργῶν σπανιώτατος ἐν ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται. ΕΡΜ. ἔοικεν. [¶126] Socrates. See now what the lawgiver has in view in giving names. Look at it in the light of what has gone before. What has the carpenter in view when he makes a shuttle? Is it not something the nature of which is to weave? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, ἐπίσκεψαι ποῖ βλέπων ὁ νομοθέτης τὰ ὀνόματα τίθεται· ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν δὲ ἀνάσκεψαι. ποῖ βλέπων ὁ τέκτων τὴν κερκίδα ποιεῖ; ἆρʼ οὐ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ὃ ἐπεφύκει κερκίζειν; [¶127] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶128] Socrates. Well, then, if the shuttle breaks while he making it, will he make another with his mind fixed on that which is broken, or on that form with reference to which he was making the one which he broke? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἂν καταγῇ αὐτῷ ἡ κερκὶς ποιοῦντι, πότερον πάλιν ποιήσει ἄλλην πρὸς τὴν κατεαγυῖαν βλέπων, ἢ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος πρὸς ὅπερ καὶ ἣν κατέαξεν ἐποίει; [¶129] Hermogenes. On that form, in my opinion. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶130] Socrates. Then we should very properly call that the absolute or real shuttle? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνο δικαιότατʼ ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν κερκὶς καλέσαιμεν; [¶131] Hermogenes. Yes, I think so. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶132] Socrates. Then whenever he has to make a shuttle for a light or a thick garment, or for one of linen or of wool or of any kind whatsoever, all of them must contain the form or ideal of shuttle, and in each of his products he must embody the nature which is naturally best for each? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὰν δέῃ λεπτῷ ἱματίῳ ἢ παχεῖ ἢ λινῷ ἢ ἐρεῷ ἢ ὁποιῳοῦν τινι κερκίδα ποιεῖν, πάσας μὲν δεῖ τὸ τῆς κερκίδος ἔχειν εἶδος, οἵα δʼ ἑκάστῳ καλλίστη ἐπεφύκει, ταύτην ἀποδιδόναι τὴν φύσιν εἰς τὸ ἔργον ἕκαστον; [¶133] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶134] Socrates. And the same applies to all other instruments. The artisan must discover the instrument naturally fitted for each purpose and must embody that in the material of which he makes the instrument, not in accordance with his own will, but in accordance with its nature. He must, it appears, know how to embody in the iron the borer fitted by nature for each special use. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ὀργάνων ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· τὸ φύσει ἑκάστῳ πεφυκὸς ὄργανον ἐξευρόντα δεῖ ἀποδοῦναι εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἂν ποιῇ [τὸ ἔργον], οὐχ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸς βουληθῇ, ἀλλʼ οἷον ἐπεφύκει. τὸ φύσει γὰρ ἑκάστῳ, ὡς ἔοικε, τρύπανον πεφυκὸς εἰς τὸν σίδηρον δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι τιθέναι. [¶135] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶136] Socrates. And he must embody in the wood the shuttle fitted by nature for each kind of weaving. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τὴν φύσει κερκίδα ἑκάστῳ πεφυκυῖαν εἰς ξύλον. [¶137] Hermogenes. True. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶138] Socrates. For each kind of shuttle is, it appears, fitted by nature for its particular kind of weaving, and the like is true of other instruments. > Greek: ΣΩ. φύσει γὰρ ἦν ἑκάστῳ εἴδει ὑφάσματος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἑκάστη κερκίς, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως. [¶139] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶140] Socrates. Then, my dear friend, must not the law-giver also know how to embody in the sounds and syllables that name which is fitted by nature for each object? Must he not make and give all his names with his eye fixed upon the absolute or ideal name, if he is to be an authoritative giver of names? And if different lawgivers do not embody it in the same syllables, we must not forget this ideal name on that account; for different smiths do not embody the form in the same iron, though making the same instrument for the same purpose, but so long as they reproduce the same ideal, though it be in different iron, still the instrument is as it should be, whether it be made here or in foreign lands, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὸ ἑκάστῳ φύσει πεφυκὸς ὄνομα τὸν νομοθέτην ἐκεῖνον εἰς τοὺς φθόγγους καὶ τὰς συλλαβὰς δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι τιθέναι, καὶ βλέποντα πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἔστιν ὄνομα, πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα ποιεῖν τε καὶ τίθεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει κύριος εἶναι ὀνομάτων θέτης; εἰ δὲ μὴ εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς συλλαβὰς ἕκαστος ὁ νομοθέτης τίθησιν, οὐδὲν δεῖ τοῦτο ἀ⟨μφι⟩γνοεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν σίδηρον ἅπας χαλκεὺς τίθησιν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ὄργανον· ἀλλʼ ὅμως, ἕως ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν ἀποδιδῷ, ἐάντε ἐν ἄλλῳ σιδήρῳ, ὅμως ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ ὄργανον, ἐάντε ἐνθάδε ἐάντε ἐν βαρβάροις τις ποιῇ. [¶141] 390. Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: 390. ἦ γάρ; ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶142] Socrates. On this basis, then, you will judge the law-giver, whether he be here or in a foreign land, so long as he gives to each thing the proper form of the name, in whatsoever syllables, to be no worse lawgiver, whether here or anywhere else, will you not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀξιώσεις καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην τόν τε ἐνθάδε καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἕως ἂν τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος ἀποδιδῷ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἐν ὁποιαισοῦν συλλαβαῖς, οὐδὲν χείρω νομοθέτην εἶναι τὸν ἐνθάδε ἢ τὸν ὁπουοῦν ἄλλοθι; [¶143] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶144] Socrates. Now who is likely to know whether the proper form of shuttle is embodied in any piece of wood? The carpenter who made it, or the weaver who is to use it? > Greek: ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ὁ γνωσόμενος εἰ τὸ προσῆκον εἶδος κερκίδος ἐν ὁποιῳοῦν ξύλῳ κεῖται; ὁ ποιήσας, ὁ τέκτων, ἢ ὁ χρησόμενος [ὁ] ὑφάντης; [¶145] Hermogenes. Probably the one who is to use it, Socrates. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. εἰκὸς μὲν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν χρησόμενον. [¶146] Socrates. Then who is to use the work of the lyre-maker? Is not he the man who would know best how to superintend the making of the lyre and would also know whether it is well made or not when it is finished? > Greek: ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ὁ τῷ τοῦ λυροποιοῦ ἔργῳ χρησόμενος; ἆρʼ οὐχ οὗτος ὃς ἐπίσταιτο ἂν ἐργαζομένῳ κάλλιστα ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ εἰργασμένον γνοίη εἴτʼ εὖ εἴργασται εἴτε μή; [¶147] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶148] Socrates. Who is he? > Greek: ΣΩ. τίς; [¶149] Hermogenes. The lyre-player. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ὁ κιθαριστής. [¶150] Socrates. And who would know best about the work of the ship-builder? > Greek: ΣΩ. τίς δὲ ὁ τῷ τοῦ ναυπηγοῦ; [¶151] Hermogenes. The navigator. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. κυβερνήτης. [¶152] Socrates. And who can best superintend the work of the lawgiver and judge of it when it is finished, both here and in foreign countries? The user, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τίς δὲ τῷ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἔργῳ ἐπιστατήσειέ τʼ ἂν κάλλιστα καὶ εἰργασμένον κρίνειε καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις; ἆρʼ οὐχ ὅσπερ χρήσεται; [¶153] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶154] Socrates. And is not this he who knows how to ask questions? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐχ ὁ ἐρωτᾶν ἐπιστάμενος οὗτός ἐστιν; [¶155] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶156] Socrates. And the same one knows also how to make replies? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι; [¶157] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶158] Socrates. And the man who knows how to ask and answer questions you call a dialectician? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸν δὲ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον ἄλλο τι σὺ καλεῖς ἢ διαλεκτικόν; [¶159] Hermogenes. Yes, that is what I call him. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. [¶160] Socrates. The work of the carpenter, then, is to make a rudder under the supervision of the steersman, if he rudder is to be a good one. > Greek: ΣΩ. τέκτονος μὲν ἄρα ἔργον ἐστὶν ποιῆσαι πηδάλιον ἐπιστατοῦντος κυβερνήτου, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι τὸ πηδάλιον. [¶161] Hermogenes. Evidently. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται. [¶162] Socrates. And the work of the lawgiver, as it seems, is to make a name, with the dialectician as his supervisor, if names are to be well given. > Greek: ΣΩ. νομοθέτου δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὄνομα, ἐπιστάτην ἔχοντος διαλεκτικὸν ἄνδρα, εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ὀνόματα θήσεσθαι. [¶163] Hermogenes. True. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶164] Socrates. Then, Hermogenes, the giving of names can hardly be, as you imagine, a trifling matter, or a task for trifling or casual persons: and Cratylus is right in saying that names belong to things by nature and that not every one is an artisan of names, but only he who keeps in view the name which belongs by nature to each particular thing and is able to embody its form in the letters and syllables. > Greek: ΣΩ. κινδυνεύει ἄρα, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, εἶναι οὐ φαῦλον, ὡς σὺ οἴει, ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος θέσις, οὐδὲ φαύλων ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων. καὶ Κρατύλος ἀληθῆ λέγει λέγων φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐ πάντα δημιουργὸν ὀνομάτων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀποβλέποντα εἰς τὸ τῇ φύσει ὄνομα ὂν ἑκάστῳ καὶ δυνάμενον αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶδος τιθέναι εἴς τε τὰ γράμματα καὶ τὰς συλλαβάς. [¶165] Hermogenes. I do not know how to answer you, Socrates; nevertheless it is not easy to change my conviction suddenly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπως χρὴ πρὸς ἃ λέγεις ἐναντιοῦσθαι. [¶166] 391. I think you would be more likely to convince me, if you were to show me just what it is that you say is the natural correctness of names. Socrates. I, my dear Hermogenes, do not say that there is any. You forget what I said a while ago, that I did not know, but would join you in looking for the truth. And now, as we are looking, you and I, we already see one thing we did not know before, that names do possess a certain natural correctness, and that not every man knows how to give a name well to anything whatsoever. Is not that true? > Greek: 391. ἴσως μέντοι οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν οὕτως ἐξαίφνης πεισθῆναι, ἀλλὰ δοκῶ μοι ὧδε ἂν μᾶλλον πιθέσθαι σοι, εἴ μοι δείξειας ἥντινα φῂς εἶναι τὴν φύσει ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος. ΣΩ. ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ μακάριε Ἑρμόγενες, οὐδεμίαν λέγω, ἀλλʼ ἐπελάθου γε ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδείην ἀλλὰ σκεψοίμην μετὰ σοῦ. νῦν δὲ σκοπουμένοις ἡμῖν, ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί, τοσοῦτον μὲν ἤδη φαίνεται παρὰ τὰ πρότερα, φύσει τέ τινα ὀρθότητα ἔχον εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα καὶ οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπίστασθαι [καλῶς] αὐτὸ πράγματι ὁτῳοῦν θέσθαι· ἢ οὔ; [¶167] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶168] Socrates. Then our next task is to try to find out, if you care to know about it, what kind of correctness that is which belongs to names. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο χρὴ ζητεῖν, εἴπερ ἐπιθυμεῖς εἰδέναι, ἥτις ποτʼ αὖ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὀρθότης. [¶169] Hermogenes. To be sure I care to know. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπιθυμῶ γε εἰδέναι. [¶170] Socrates. Then investigate. > Greek: ΣΩ. σκόπει τοίνυν. [¶171] Hermogenes. How shall I investigate? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς οὖν χρὴ σκοπεῖν; [¶172] Socrates. The best way to investigate, my friend, is with the help of those who know; and you make sure of their favour by paying them money. They are the sophists, of Protagoras altogether, should desire what is said in such a Truth, as if it were of any value. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθοτάτη μὲν τῆς σκέψεως, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων, χρήματα ἐκείνοις τελοῦντα καὶ χάριτας κατατιθέμενον. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ σοφισταί, οἷσπερ καὶ ὁ ἀδελφός σου Καλλίας πολλὰ τελέσας χρήματα σοφὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐγκρατὴς εἶ τῶν πατρῴων, λιπαρεῖν χρὴ τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ δεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ διδάξαι σε τὴν ὀρθότητα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἣν ἔμαθεν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου. ΕΡΜ. ἄτοπος μεντἂν εἴη μου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δέησις, εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν Πρωταγόρου ὅλως οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα ἀγαπῴην ὥς του ἄξια. [¶173] Socrates. Then if you do not like that, you ought to learn from Homer and the other poets. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εἰ μὴ αὖ σε ταῦτα ἀρέσκει, παρʼ Ὁμήρου χρὴ μανθάνειν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν. [¶174] Hermogenes. Why, Socrates, what does Homer say about names, and where? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. καὶ τί λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες, Ὅμηρος περὶ ὀνομάτων, καὶ ποῦ; [¶175] Socrates. In many passages; but chiefly and most admirably in those in which he distinguishes between the names by which gods and men call the same things. Do you not think he gives in those passages great and wonderful information about the correctness of names? For clearly the gods call things by the names that are naturally right. Do you not think so? > Greek: ΣΩ. πολλαχοῦ· μέγιστα δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα ἐν οἷς διορίζει ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἅ τε οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὀνόματα καλοῦσι καὶ οἱ θεοί. ἢ οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸν μέγα τι καὶ θαυμάσιον λέγειν ἐν τούτοις περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος; δῆλον γὰρ δὴ ὅτι οἵ γε θεοὶ αὐτὰ καλοῦσιν πρὸς ὀρθότητα ἅπερ ἔστι φύσει ὀνόματα· ἢ σὺ οὐκ οἴει; [¶176] Hermogenes. Of course I know that if they call things, they call them rightly. But what are these instances to which you refer? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. εὖ οἶδα μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε, εἴπερ καλοῦσιν, ὅτι ὀρθῶς καλοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ ποῖα ταῦτα λέγεις; [¶177] Socrates. Do you not know that he says about the river in Troy which had the single combat with Hephaestus, whom the gods call Xanthus, but men call Scamander? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι περὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ, ὃς ἐμονομάχει τῷ Ἡφαίστῳ, ὃν Ξάνθον, φησί, καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον; [¶178] Hermogenes. Oh yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔγωγε. [¶179] 392. Socrates. Well, do you not think this is a grand thing to know, that the name of that river is rightly Xanthus, rather than Scamander? Or, if you like, do you think it is a slight thing to learn about the bird which he says gods call chalcis, but men call cymindis, that it is much more correct for the same bird to be called chalcis than cymindis? Or to learn that the hill men call Batieia is called by the gods Myrina’s tomb, and many other such statements by Homer and other poets? But perhaps these matters are too high for us to understand; it is, I think, more within human power to investigate the names Scamandrius and Astyanax, and understand what kind of correctness he ascribes to these, which he says are the names of Hector’s son. You recall, of course: the lines which contain the words to which I refer. > Greek: 392. ΣΩ. τί οὖν δή; οὐκ οἴει τοῦτο σεμνόν τι εἶναι γνῶναι, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκεῖνον τὸν ποταμὸν Ξάνθον καλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ Σκάμανδρον; εἰ δὲ βούλει, περὶ τῆς ὄρνιθος ἣν λέγει ὅτι— χαλκίδα κικλῄσκουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ κύμινδιν, φαῦλον ἡγῇ τὸ μάθημα ὅσῳ ὀρθότερόν ἐστι καλεῖσθαι χαλκὶς κυμίνδιδος τῷ αὐτῷ ὀρνέῳ; ἢ τὴν Βατίειάν τε καὶ Μυρίνην, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ τούτου τοῦ ποιητοῦ καὶ ἄλλων; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως μείζω ἐστὶν ἢ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ ἐξευρεῖν· ὁ δὲ Σκαμάνδριός τε καὶ ὁ Ἀστυάναξ ἀνθρωπινώτερον διασκέψασθαι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ῥᾷον, ἅ φησιν ὀνόματα εἶναι τῷ τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὑεῖ, τίνα ποτὲ λέγει τὴν ὀρθότητα αὐτῶν. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω. [¶180] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶181] Socrates. Which of the names of the boy do you imagine Homer thought was more correct, Astyanax or Scamandrius? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν οἴει Ὅμηρον ὀρθότερον ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων κεῖσθαι τῷ παιδί, τὸν Ἀστυάνακτα ἢ τὸν Σκαμάνδριον; [¶182] Hermogenes. I cannot say. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. [¶183] Socrates. Look at it in this way: suppose you were asked, “Do the wise or the unwise give names more correctly?” > Greek: ΣΩ. ὧδε δὴ σκόπει. εἴ τις ἔροιτό σε πότερον οἴει ὀρθότερον καλεῖν τὰ ὀνόματα τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους ἢ τοὺς ἀφρονεστέρους; [¶184] Hermogenes. “The wise, obviously,” I should say. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, φαίην ἄν. [¶185] Socrates. And do you think the women or the men of a city, regarded as a class in general, are the wiser? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν φρονιμώτεραί σοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος; [¶186] Hermogenes. The men. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οἱ ἄνδρες. [¶187] Socrates. And do you not know that Homer says the child of Hector was called Astyanax by the men of Troy; so he must have been called Scamandrius by the women, since the men called him Astyanax? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι Ὅμηρος τὸ παιδίον τὸ τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὑπὸ τῶν Τρώων φησὶν καλεῖσθαι Ἀστυάνακτα, Σκαμάνδριον δὲ δῆλον ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐπειδὴ οἵ γε ἄνδρες αὐτὸν Ἀστυάνακτα ἐκάλουν; [¶188] Hermogenes. Yes, probably. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔοικέ γε. [¶189] Socrates. And Homer too thought the Trojan men were wiser than the women? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ Ὅμηρος τοὺς Τρῶας σοφωτέρους ἡγεῖτο ἢ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν; [¶190] Hermogenes. I suppose he did. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε. [¶191] Socrates. Then he thought Astyanax was more rightly the boy’s name than Scamandrius? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸν Ἀστυάνακτα ἄρα ὀρθότερον ᾤετο κεῖσθαι τῷ παιδὶ ἢ τὸν Σκαμάνδριον; [¶192] Hermogenes. So it appears. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται. [¶193] Socrates. Let us, then, consider the reason for this. Does he not himself indicate the reason most admirably? For he says— He alone defended their city and long walls. Therefore, as it seems, it is right to call the son of the defender Astyanax (Lord of the city), ruler of that which his father, as Homer says, defended. > Greek: ΣΩ. σκοπῶμεν δὴ διὰ τί ποτε. ἢ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν κάλλιστα ὑφηγεῖται τὸ διότι; φησὶν γάρ— οἶος γάρ σφιν ἔρυτο πόλιν καὶ τείχεα μακρά. διὰ ταῦτα δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖν τὸν τοῦ σωτῆρος ὑὸν Ἀστυάνακτα τούτου ὃ ἔσῳζεν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ὥς φησιν Ὅμηρος. [¶194] Hermogenes. That is clear to me. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φαίνεταί μοι. [¶195] Socrates. Indeed? I do not yet understand about it myself, Hermogenes. Do you? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δή ποτε; οὐ γάρ πω οὐδʼ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε μανθάνω· ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, σὺ δὲ μανθάνεις; [¶196] Hermogenes. No, by Zeus, I do not. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε. [¶197] 393. Socrates. But, my good friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name? > Greek: 393. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἆρα, ὠγαθέ, καὶ τῷ Ἕκτορι αὐτὸς ἔθετο τὸ ὄνομα Ὅμηρος; [¶198] Hermogenes. Why do you ask that? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τί δή; [¶199] Socrates. Because that name seems to me similar to Astyanax, and both names seem to be Greek. For lord (ἄναξ) and holder (ἕκτωρ) mean nearly the same thing, indicating that they are names of a king; for surely a man is holder of that of which he is lord; for it is clear that he rules it and possesses it and holds it. Or does it seem to you that there is nothing in what I am saying, and am I wrong in imagining that I have found a clue to Homer’s opinion about the correctness of names? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο παραπλήσιόν τι εἶναι τῷ Ἀστυάνακτι, καὶ ἔοικεν Ἑλληνικοῖς ταῦτα [τὰ ὀνόματα]. ὁ γὰρ ἄναξ καὶ ὁ Ἕκτωρ σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν σημαίνει, βασιλικὰ ἀμφότερα εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα· οὗ γὰρ ἄν τις ἄναξ ᾖ, καὶ Ἕκτωρ δήπου ἐστὶν τούτου· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κρατεῖ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει αὐτό. ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ λανθάνω καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οἰόμενός τινος ὥσπερ ἴχνους ἐφάπτεσθαι τῆς Ὁμήρου δόξης περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος; [¶200] Hermogenes. No, by Zeus, you are not wrong, in my opinion; I think perhaps you have found a clue. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐ σύ γε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, ἀλλὰ ἴσως τοῦ ἐφάπτῃ. [¶201] Socrates. It is right, I think, to call a lion’s offspring a lion and a horse’s offspring a horse. I am not speaking of prodigies, such as the birth of some other kind of creature from a horse, but of the natural offspring of each species after its kind. If a horse, contrary to nature, should bring forth a calf, the natural offspring of a cow, it should be called a calf, not a colt, nor if any offspring that is not human should be born from a human being, should that other offspring be called a human being; and the same applies to trees and all the rest. Do you not agree? > Greek: ΣΩ. δίκαιόν γέ τοί ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τὸν λέοντος ἔκγονον λέοντα καλεῖν καὶ τὸν ἵππου ἔκγονον ἵππον. οὔ τι λέγω ἐὰν ὥσπερ τέρας γένηται ἐξ ἵππου ἄλλο τι ἢ ἵππος, ἀλλʼ οὗ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ γένους ἔκγονον τὴν φύσιν, τοῦτο λέγω· ἐὰν βοὸς ἔκγονον φύσει ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν τέκῃ μόσχον, οὐ πῶλον κλητέον ἀλλὰ μόσχον· οὐδʼ ἂν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου οἶμαι μὴ τὸ ἀνθρώπου ἔκγονον γένηται, [ἀλλʼ ὃ ἂν] τὸ ἔκγονον ἄνθρωπος κλητέος· καὶ τὰ δένδρα ὡσαύτως καὶ τἆλλα ἅπαντα· ἢ οὐ συνδοκεῖ; [¶202] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. συνδοκεῖ. [¶203] Socrates. Good; but keep watch of me, and do not let me trick you; for by the same argument any offspring of a king should be called a king; and whether the same meaning is expressed in one set of syllables or another makes no difference; and if a letter is added or subtracted, that does not matter either, so long as the essence of the thing named remains in force and is made plain in the name. > Greek: ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις· φύλαττε γάρ με μή πῃ παρακρούσωμαί σε. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον κἂν ἐκ βασιλέως γίγνηταί τι ἔκγονον, βασιλεὺς κλητέος· εἰ δὲ ἐν ἑτέραις συλλαβαῖς ἢ ἐν ἑτέραις τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει, οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα· οὐδʼ εἰ πρόσκειταί τι γράμμα ἢ ἀφῄρηται, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ἕως ἂν ἐγκρατὴς ᾖ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος δηλουμένη ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι. [¶204] Hermogenes. What do you mean? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; [¶205] Socrates. Something quite simple. For instance, when we speak of the letters of the alphabet, you know, we speak their names, not merely the letters themselves, except in the case of four, ε, υ, ο, ω. We make names for all the other vowels and consonants by adding other letters to them; and so long as we include the letter in question and make its force plain, we may properly call it by that name, and that will designate it for us. Take beta, for instance, The addition of e(η), t(τ), a(α) does no harm and does not prevent the whole name from making clear the nature of that letter which the lawgiver wished to designate; he knew so well how to give names to letters. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ τῶν στοιχείων οἶσθα ὅτι ὀνόματα λέγομεν ἀλλʼ οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, πλὴν τεττάρων, τοῦ Ε καὶ τοῦ Υ καὶ τοῦ Ο καὶ τοῦ Ω· τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις φωνήεσί τε καὶ ἀφώνοις οἶσθα ὅτι περιτιθέντες ἄλλα γράμματα λέγομεν, ὀνόματα ποιοῦντες· ἀλλʼ ἕως ἂν αὐτοῦ δηλουμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἐντιθῶμεν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὄνομα καλεῖν ὃ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν δηλώσει. οἷον τὸ βῆτα· ὁρᾷς ὅτι τοῦ ἦτα καὶ τοῦ ταῦ καὶ τοῦ ἄλφα προστεθέντων οὐδὲν ἐλύπησεν, ὥστε μὴ οὐχὶ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ στοιχείου φύσιν δηλῶσαι ὅλῳ τῷ ὀνόματι οὗ ἐβούλετο ὁ νομοθέτης· οὕτως ἠπιστήθη καλῶς θέσθαι τοῖς γράμμασι τὰ ὀνόματα. [¶206] Hermogenes. I think you are right. Socrates. Does not the same reasoning apply to a king? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν. [¶207] 394. A king’s son will probably be a king, a good man’s good, a handsome man’s handsome, and so forth; the offspring of each class will be of the same class, unless some unnatural birth takes place; so they should be called by the same names. But variety in the syllables is admissible, so that names which are the same appear different to the uninitiated, just as the physicians’ drugs, when prepared with various colors and perfumes, seem different to us, though they are the same, but to the physician, who considers only their medicinal value, they seem the same, and he is not confused by the additions. So perhaps the man who knows about names considers their value and is not confused if some letter is added, transposed, or subtracted, or even if the force of the name is expressed in entirely different letters. So, for instance, in the names we were just discussing, Astyanax and Hector, none of the letters is the same, except T, but nevertheless they have the same meaning. And what letters has Archepolis (ruler of the city) in common with them? Yet it means the same thing; and there are many other names which mean simply “king.” Others again mean “general,” such as Agis (leader), Polemarchus (war-lord), and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others indicate physicians, as Iatrocles (famous physician) and Acesimbrotus (healer of mortals); and we might perhaps find many others which differ in syllables and letters, but express the same meaning. Do you think that is true, or not? Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: 394. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ βασιλέως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; ἔσται γάρ ποτε ἐκ βασιλέως βασιλεύς, καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθός, καὶ ἐκ καλοῦ καλός, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως, ἐξ ἑκάστου γένους ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ἔκγονον, ἐὰν μὴ τέρας γίγνηται· κλητέον δὴ ταὐτὰ ὀνόματα. ποικίλλειν δὲ ἔξεστι ταῖς συλλαβαῖς, ὥστε δόξαι ἂν τῷ ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντι ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα· ὥσπερ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν φάρμακα χρώμασιν καὶ ὀσμαῖς πεποικιλμένα ἄλλα φαίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα, τῷ δέ γε ἰατρῷ, ἅτε τὴν δύναμιν τῶν φαρμάκων σκοπουμένῳ, τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῶν προσόντων. οὕτω δὲ ἴσως καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὀνομάτων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν σκοπεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται εἴ τι πρόσκειται γράμμα ἢ μετάκειται ἢ ἀφῄρηται, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις παντάπασιν γράμμασίν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος δύναμις. ὥσπερ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, Ἀστυάναξ τε καὶ Ἕκτωρ οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν γραμμάτων ἔχει πλὴν τοῦ ταῦ, ἀλλʼ ὅμως ταὐτὸν σημαίνει. καὶ Ἀρχέπολίς γε τῶν μὲν γραμμάτων τί ἐπικοινωνεῖ; δηλοῖ δὲ ὅμως τὸ αὐτό· καὶ ἄλλα πολλά ἐστιν ἃ οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ βασιλέα σημαίνει· καὶ ἄλλα γε αὖ στρατηγόν, οἷον Ἆγις καὶ Πολέμαρχος καὶ Εὐπόλεμος. καὶ ἰατρικά γε ἕτερα, Ἰατροκλῆς καὶ Ἀκεσίμβροτος· καὶ ἕτερα ἂν ἴσως συχνὰ εὕροιμεν ταῖς μὲν συλλαβαῖς καὶ τοῖς γράμμασι διαφωνοῦντα, τῇ δὲ δυνάμει ταὐτὸν φθεγγόμενα. φαίνεται οὕτως ἢ οὔ; ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶208] Socrates. To those, then, who are born in accordance with nature the same names should be given. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῖς μὲν δὴ κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένοις τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποδοτέον ὀνόματα. [¶209] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶210] Socrates. And how about those who are born contrary to nature as prodigies? For instance, when an impious son is born to a good and pious man, ought he not, as in our former example when a mare brought forth a calf, to have the designation of the class to which he belongs, instead of that of his parent? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν, οἳ ἂν ἐν τέρατος εἴδει γένωνται; οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ θεοσεβοῦς ἀσεβὴς γένηται, ἆρʼ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, κἂν ἵππος βοὸς ἔκγονον τέκῃ, οὐ τοῦ τεκόντος δήπου ἔδει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γένους οὗ εἴη; [¶211] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶212] Socrates. Then the impious son of a pious father ought to receive the name of his class. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς ἄρα γενομένῳ ἀσεβεῖ τὸ τοῦ γένους ὄνομα ἀποδοτέον. [¶213] Hermogenes. True. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶214] Socrates. Not Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus (mindful of God) or anything of that sort; but something of opposite meaning, if names are correct. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ Θεόφιλον, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲ Μνησίθεον οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ἀλλʼ ὅτι τἀναντία τούτοις σημαίνει, ἐάνπερ τῆς ὀρθότητος τυγχάνῃ τὰ ὀνόματα. [¶215] Hermogenes. Most assuredly, Socrates. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶216] Socrates. As the name of Orestes (mountain man) is undoubtedly correct, Hermogenes, whether it was given him by chance or by some poet who indicated by the name the fierceness, rudeness, and mountain-wildness of his nature. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὁ Ὀρέστης, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, κινδυνεύει ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, εἴτε τις τύχη ἔθετο αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα εἴτε καὶ ποιητής τις, τὸ θηριῶδες τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὸ ἄγριον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ὀρεινὸν ἐνδεικνύμενος τῷ ὀνόματι. [¶217] 395. Hermogenes. So it seems, Socrates. > Greek: 395. ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶218] Socrates. And his father’s name also appears to be in accordance with nature. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔοικεν δέ γε καὶ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι. [¶219] Hermogenes. It seems so. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται. [¶220] Socrates. Yes, for Agamemnon (admirable for remaining) is one who would resolve to toil to the end and to endure, putting the finish upon his resolution by virtue. And a proof of this is his long retention of the host at Troy and his endurance. So the name Agamemnon denotes that this man is admirable for remaining. And so, too, the name of Atreus is likely to be correct; for his murder of Chrysippus and the cruelty of his acts to Thyestes are all damaging and ruinous (ἀτηρά) to his virtue. Now the form of his name is slightly deflected and hidden, so that it does not make the man’s nature plain to every one; but to those who understand about names it makes the meaning of Atreus plain enough; for indeed in view of his stubbornness (ἀτειρές) and fearlessness (ἄτρεστον) and ruinous acts (ἀτηρά) the name is correctly given to him on every ground. And I think Pelops also has a fitting name; for this name means that he who sees only what is near deserves this designation. > Greek: ΣΩ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ τοιοῦτός τις εἶναι ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων, οἷος ἃ δόξειεν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι καὶ καρτερεῖν τέλος ἐπιτιθεὶς τοῖς δόξασι διʼ ἀρετήν. σημεῖον δὲ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐν Τροίᾳ μονὴ τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ καρτερίας. ὅτι οὖν ἀγαστὸς κατὰ τὴν ἐπιμονὴν οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐνσημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀτρεὺς ὀρθῶς ἔχει. ὅ τε γὰρ τοῦ Χρυσίππου αὐτῷ φόνος καὶ ἃ πρὸς τὸν Θυέστην ὡς ὠμὰ διεπράττετο, πάντα ταῦτα ζημιώδη καὶ ἀτηρὰ πρὸς ἀρετήν. ἡ οὖν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπωνυμία σμικρὸν παρακλίνει καὶ ἐπικεκάλυπται, ὥστε μὴ πᾶσι δηλοῦν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνδρός· τοῖς δʼ ἐπαΐουσι περὶ ὀνομάτων ἱκανῶς δηλοῖ ὃ βούλεται ὁ Ἀτρεύς. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀτειρὲς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄτρεστον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀτηρὸν πανταχῇ ὀρθῶς αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα κεῖται. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τῷ Πέλοπι τὸ ὄνομα ἐμμέτρως κεῖσθαι· σημαίνει γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὸν τὰ ἐγγὺς ὁρῶντα [ἄξιον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς ἐπωνυμίας]. ## 2. Pages 395–406 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/2/#p-N [¶0] Hermogenes. How is that? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς δή; [¶1] Socrates. Why it is said of him that in murdering Myrtilus he was quite unable to forecast or foresee the ultimate effects upon his whole race, and all the misery with which it was overwhelmed, because he saw only the near at hand and the immediate— that is to say, πέλας (near)—in his eagerness to win by all means the hand of Hippodameia. And any one would think the name of Tantalus was given rightly and in accordance with nature, if the stories about him are true. > Greek: ΣΩ. οἷόν που καὶ κατʼ ἐκείνου λέγεται τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῷ τοῦ Μυρτίλου φόνῳ οὐδὲν οἵου τε γενέσθαι προνοηθῆναι οὐδὲ προϊδεῖν τῶν πόρρω τῶν εἰς τὸ πᾶν γένος, ὅσης αὐτὸ δυστυχίας ἐνεπίμπλη, τὸ ἐγγὺς μόνον ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ παραχρῆμα—τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ πέλας —ἡνίκα προεθυμεῖτο λαβεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὸν τῆς Ἱπποδαμείας γάμον. τῷ δὲ Ταντάλῳ καὶ πᾶς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο τοὔνομα ὀρθῶς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν τεθῆναι εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν λεγόμενα. [¶2] Hermogenes. What are the stories? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; [¶3] Socrates. The many terrible misfortunes that happened to him both in his life, the last of which was the utter overthrow of his country, and in Hades, after his death, the balancing (ταλαντεία) of the stone above his head, in wonderful agreement with his name; and it seems exactly as if someone who wished to call him most wretched (ταλάντατον) disguised the name and said Tantalus instead; in some such way as that chance seems to have affected his name in the legend. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἅ τέ που ἔτι ζῶντι δυστυχήματα ἐγένετο πολλὰ καὶ δεινά, ὧν καὶ τέλος ἡ πατρὶς αὐτοῦ ὅλη ἀνετράπετο, καὶ τελευτήσαντι ἐν Ἅιδου ἡ ὑπὲρ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ λίθου ταλαντεία θαυμαστὴ ὡς σύμφωνος τῷ ὀνόματι· καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις βουλόμενος ταλάντατον ὀνομάσαι ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὀνομάσειε καὶ εἴποι ἀντʼ ἐκείνου Τάνταλον, τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἔοικεν ἐκπορίσαι ἡ τύχη τῆς φήμης. [¶4] Socrates. And his father also, who is said to be Zeus, appears to have a very excellent name, but it is not easy to understand; > Greek: ΣΩ. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένῳ τῷ Διὶ παγκάλως τὸ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι· [¶5] 396. for the name of Zeus is exactly like a sentence; we divide it into two parts, and some of us use one part, others the other; for some call him Zena (Ζῆνα), and others Dia (Δία); but the two in combination express the nature of the god, which is just what we said a name should be able to do. For certainly no one is so much the author of life (ζῆν) for us and all others as the ruler and king of all. Thus this god is correctly named, through whom (δι’ ὅν) all living beings have the gift of life (ζῆν). But, as I say, the name is divided, though it is one name, into the two parts, Dia and Zena. And it might seem, at first hearing, highly irreverent to call him the son of Cronus and reasonable to say that Zeus is the offspring of some great intellect; and so he is, for κόρος (for Κρόνος) signifies not child, but the purity (καθαρόν) and unblemished nature of his mind. And Cronus, according to tradition, is the son of Uranus; but the upward gaze is rightly called by the name urania (οὐρανία), looking at the things above (ὁρῶ τὰ ἄνω), and the astronomers say, Hermogenes, that from this looking people acquire a pure mind, and Uranus is correctly named. If I remembered the genealogy of Hesiod and the still earlier ancestors of the gods he mentions, I would have gone on examining the correctness of their names until I had made a complete trial whether this wisdom which has suddenly come to me, I know not whence, will fail or not. Hermogenes. Indeed, Socrates, you do seem to me to be uttering oracles, exactly like an inspired prophet. > Greek: 396. ἔστι δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιον κατανοῆσαι. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ ἐστιν οἷον λόγος τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα, διελόντες δὲ αὐτὸ διχῇ οἱ μὲν τῷ ἑτέρῳ μέρει, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ χρώμεθα— οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ζῆνα, οἱ δὲ Δία καλοῦσιν—συντιθέμενα δʼ εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃ δὴ προσήκειν φαμὲν ὀνόματι οἵῳ τε εἶναι ἀπεργάζεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων. συμβαίνει οὖν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι οὗτος ὁ θεὸς εἶναι, διʼ ὃν ζῆν ἀεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει· διείληπται δὲ δίχα, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἓν ὂν τὸ ὄνομα, τῷ Διὶ καὶ τῷ Ζηνί. τοῦτον δὲ Κρόνου ὑὸν ὑβριστικὸν μὲν ἄν τις δόξειεν εἶναι ἀκούσαντι ἐξαίφνης, εὔλογον δὲ μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία· κόρον γὰρ σημαίνει οὐ παῖδα, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Οὐρανοῦ ὑός, ὡς λόγος· ἡ δὲ αὖ ἐς τὸ ἄνω ὄψις καλῶς ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα καλεῖσθαι, οὐρανία, ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω, ὅθεν δὴ καί φασιν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, τὸν καθαρὸν νοῦν παραγίγνεσθαι οἱ μετεωρολόγοι, καὶ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὀρθῶς τὸ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι· εἰ δʼ ἐμεμνήμην τὴν Ἡσιόδου γενεαλογίαν, τίνας ἔτι τοὺς ἀνωτέρω προγόνους λέγει τούτων, οὐκ ἂν ἐπαυόμην διεξιὼν ὡς ὀρθῶς αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα κεῖται, ἕως ἀπεπειράθην τῆς σοφίας ταυτησὶ τί ποιήσει, εἰ ἄρα ἀπερεῖ ἢ οὔ, ἣ ἐμοὶ ἐξαίφνης νῦν οὑτωσὶ προσπέπτωκεν ἄρτι οὐκ οἶδʼ ὁπόθεν. ΕΡΜ. καὶ μὲν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτεχνῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξαίφνης χρησμῳδεῖν. [¶6] Socrates. Yes, Hermogenes, and I am convinced that the inspiration came to me from Euthyphro the Prospaltian. For I was with him and listening to him a long time early this morning. So he must have been inspired, and he not only filled my ears but took possession of my soul with his superhuman wisdom. So I think this is our duty: we ought today to make use of this wisdom and finish the investigation of names, but tomorrow, if the rest of you agree, we will conjure it away and purify ourselves, when we have found some one, whether priest or sophist, who is skilled in that kind of purifying. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ αἰτιῶμαί γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, μάλιστα αὐτὴν ἀπὸ Εὐθύφρονος τοῦ Προσπαλτίου προσπεπτωκέναι μοι· ἕωθεν γὰρ πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆ καὶ παρεῖχον τὰ ὦτα. κινδυνεύει οὖν ἐνθουσιῶν οὐ μόνον τὰ ὦτά μου ἐμπλῆσαι τῆς δαιμονίας σοφίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπειλῆφθαι. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι χρῆναι οὑτωσὶ ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι· τὸ μὲν τήμερον εἶναι χρήσασθαι αὐτῇ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπισκέψασθαι, αὔριον δέ, ἂν καὶ ὑμῖν συνδοκῇ, ἀποδιοπομπησόμεθά τε αὐτὴν καὶ καθαρούμεθα ἐξευρόντες ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα δεινὸς καθαίρειν, εἴτε τῶν ἱερέων τις εἴτε τῶν σοφιστῶν. [¶7] 397. Hermogenes. I agree, for I should be very glad to hear the rest of the talk about names. > Greek: 397. ΕΡΜ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ μὲν συγχωρῶ· πάνυ γὰρ ἂν ἡδέως τὰ ἐπίλοιπα περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀκούσαιμι. [¶8] Socrates. Very well. Then since we have outlined a general plan of investigation, where shall we begin, that we may discover whether the names themselves will bear witness that they are not at all distributed at haphazard, but have a certain correctness? Now the names of heroes and men might perhaps prove deceptive; for they are often given because they were names of ancestors, and in some cases, as we said in the beginning, they are quite inappropriate; many, too, are given as the expression of a prayer, such as Eutychides (fortunate), Sosias (saviour), Theophilus (beloved of God), and many others. I think we had better disregard such as these; but we are most likely to find the correct names in the nature of the eternal and absolute; for there the names ought to have been given with the greatest care, and perhaps some of them were given by a power more divine than is that of men. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ οὕτω ποιεῖν. πόθεν οὖν βούλει ἀρξώμεθα διασκοποῦντες, ἐπειδήπερ εἰς τύπον τινὰ ἐμβεβήκαμεν, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν εἰ ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐπιμαρτυρήσει αὐτὰ τὰ ὀνόματα μὴ πάνυ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὕτως ἕκαστα κεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἔχειν τινὰ ὀρθότητα; τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἡρώων καὶ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενα ὀνόματα ἴσως ἂν ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατήσειεν· πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κεῖται κατὰ προγόνων ἐπωνυμίας, οὐδὲν προσῆκον ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἐλέγομεν, πολλὰ δὲ ὥσπερ εὐχόμενοι τίθενται, οἷον Εὐτυχίδην καὶ Σωσίαν καὶ Θεόφιλον καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι ἐᾶν· εἰκὸς δὲ μάλιστα ἡμᾶς εὑρεῖν τὰ ὀρθῶς κείμενα περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα καὶ πεφυκότα. ἐσπουδάσθαι γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μάλιστα πρέπει τὴν θέσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων· ἴσως δʼ ἔνια αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ θειοτέρας δυνάμεως ἢ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐτέθη. [¶9] Hermogenes. I think you are right, Socrates. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. δοκεῖς μοι καλῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶10] Socrates. Then is it not proper to begin with the gods and see how the gods are rightly called by that name? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ δίκαιον ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἄρχεσθαι, σκοπουμένους πῇ ποτε αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα οἱ θεοὶ ὀρθῶς ἐκλήθησαν; [¶11] Hermogenes. That is reasonable. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. εἰκός γε. [¶12] Socrates. Something of this sort, then, is what I suspect: I think the earliest men in Greece believed only in those gods in whom many foreigners believe today— sun, moon, earth, stars, and sky. They saw that all these were always moving in their courses and running, and so they called them gods (θεούς) from this running (θεῖν) nature; then afterwards, when they gained knowledge of the other gods, they called them all by the same name. Is that likely to be true, or not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τοιόνδε τοίνυν ἔγωγε ὑποπτεύω· φαίνονταί μοι οἱ πρῶτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τούτους μόνους [τοὺς θεοὺς] ἡγεῖσθαι οὕσπερ νῦν πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ γῆν καὶ ἄστρα καὶ οὐρανόν· ἅτε οὖν αὐτὰ ὁρῶντες πάντα ἀεὶ ἰόντα δρόμῳ καὶ θέοντα, ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς φύσεως τῆς τοῦ δαήμονες θεοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπονομάσαι· ὕστερον δὲ κατανοοῦντες τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἤδη τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύειν. ἔοικέ τι ὃ λέγω τῷ ἀληθεῖ ἢ οὐδέν; [¶13] Hermogenes. Yes, very likely. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔοικεν. [¶14] Socrates. What shall we consider next? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν ἂν μετὰ τοῦτο σκοποῖμεν; [¶15] Hermogenes. Spirits, obviously. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι [δαίμονάς τε καὶ ἥρωας καὶ ἀνθρώπους] δαίμονας. [¶16] Socrates. Hermogenes, what does the name “spirits” really mean? See if you think there is anything in what I am going to say. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, τί ἄν ποτε νοοῖ τὸ ὄνομα οἱ δαίμονες; σκέψαι ἄν τί σοι δόξω εἰπεῖν. [¶17] Hermogenes. Go on and say it. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. λέγε μόνον. [¶18] Socrates. Do you remember who Hesiod says the spirits are? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἶσθα οὖν τίνας φησὶν Ἡσίοδος εἶναι τοὺς δαίμονας; [¶19] Hermogenes. I do not recall it. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐκ ἐννοῶ. [¶20] Socrates. Nor that he says a golden race was the first race of men to be born? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲ ὅτι χρυσοῦν γένος τὸ πρῶτόν φησιν γενέσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων; [¶21] Hermogenes. Yes, I do know that. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οἶδα τοῦτό γε. [¶22] Socrates. Well, he says of it: But since Fate has covered up this race, They are called holy spirits under the earth, Noble, averters of evil, guardians of mortal men. > Greek: ΣΩ. λέγει τοίνυν περὶ αὐτοῦ— αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ μοῖρʼ ἐκάλυψεν, οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ὑποχθόνιοι καλέονται, ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων. [¶23] 398. Hermogenes. What of that? > Greek: 398. ΕΡΜ. τί οὖν δή; [¶24] Socrates. Why, I think he means that the golden race was not made of gold, but was good and beautiful. And I regard it as a proof of this that he further says we are the iron race. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι οἶμαι ἐγὼ λέγειν αὐτὸν τὸ χρυσοῦν γένος οὐκ ἐκ χρυσοῦ πεφυκὸς ἀλλʼ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν. τεκμήριον δέ μοί ἐστιν ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς φησιν σιδηροῦν εἶναι γένος. [¶25] Hermogenes. True. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶26] Socrates. Don’t you suppose that if anyone of our day is good, Hesiod would say he was of that golden race? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν νῦν οἴει ἂν φάναι αὐτὸν εἴ τις ἀγαθός ἐστιν ἐκείνου τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους εἶναι; [¶27] Hermogenes. Quite likely. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. εἰκός γε. [¶28] Socrates. But the good are the wise, are they not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἱ δʼ ἀγαθοὶ ἄλλο τι ἢ φρόνιμοι; [¶29] Hermogenes. Yes, they are the wise. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φρόνιμοι. [¶30] Socrates. This, then, I think, is what he certainly means to say of the spirits: because they were wise and knowing (δαήμονες) he called them spirits (δαίμονες) and in the old form of our language the two words are the same. Now he and all the other poets are right, who say that when a good man dies he has a great portion and honor among the dead, and becomes a spirit, a name which is in accordance with the other name of wisdom. And so I assert that every good man, whether living or dead, is of spiritual nature, and is rightly called a spirit. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν παντὸς μᾶλλον λέγει, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τοὺς δαίμονας· ὅτι φρόνιμοι καὶ δαήμονες ἦσαν, δαίμονας αὐτοὺς ὠνόμασεν· καὶ ἔν γε τῇ ἀρχαίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φωνῇ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει τὸ ὄνομα. λέγει οὖν καλῶς καὶ οὗτος καὶ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ ὅσοι λέγουσιν ὡς, ἐπειδάν τις ἀγαθὸς ὢν τελευτήσῃ, μεγάλην μοῖραν καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει καὶ γίγνεται δαίμων κατὰ τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως ἐπωνυμίαν. ταύτῃ οὖν τίθεμαι καὶ ἐγὼ [τὸν δαήμονα] πάντʼ ἄνδρα ὃς ἂν ἀγαθὸς ᾖ, δαιμόνιον εἶναι καὶ ζῶντα καὶ τελευτήσαντα, καὶ ὀρθῶς δαίμονα καλεῖσθαι. [¶31] Hermogenes. And I, Socrates, believe I quite agree with you in that. But what is the word “hero”? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου πάνυ σοι σύμψηφος εἶναι. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἥρως τί ἂν εἴη; [¶32] Socrates. That is easy to understand; for the name has been but slightly changed, and indicates their origin from love (ἔρως). > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν ἐννοῆσαι. σμικρὸν γὰρ παρῆκται αὐτῶν τὸ ὄνομα, δηλοῦν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἔρωτος γένεσιν. [¶33] Hermogenes. What do you mean? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς λέγεις; [¶34] Socrates. Why, they were all born because a god fell in love with a mortal woman, or a mortal man with a goddess. Now if you consider the word “hero” also in the old Attic pronunciation, you will understand better; for that will show you that it has been only slightly altered from the name of love (Eros), the source from which the heroes spring, to make a name for them. And either this is the reason why they are called heroes, or it is because they were wise and clever orators and dialecticians, able to ask questions (ἐρωτᾶν), for εἴρειν is the same as λέγειν (speak). Therefore, when their name is spoken in the Attic dialect, which I was mentioning just now, the heroes turn out to be orators and askers of questions, so that the heroic race proves to be a race of orators and sophists. That is easy to understand, but the case of men, and the reason why they are called men (ἄνθρωποι), is more difficult. Can you tell me what it is? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἡμίθεοι οἱ ἥρωες; [¶35] Hermogenes. No, my friend, I cannot; and even if I might perhaps find out, I shall not try, because I think you are more likely to find out than I am. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τί οὖν; ΣΩ. πάντες δήπου γεγόνασιν ἐρασθέντος ἢ θεοῦ θνητῆς ἢ θνητοῦ θεᾶς. ἐὰν οὖν σκοπῇς καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν παλαιὰν φωνήν, μᾶλλον εἴσῃ· δηλώσει γάρ σοι ὅτι παρὰ τὸ τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄνομα, ὅθεν γεγόνασιν οἱ ἥρωες, σμικρὸν παρηγμένον ἐστὶν ὀνόματος χάριν. καὶ ἤτοι τοῦτο λέγει τοὺς ἥρωας, ἢ ὅτι σοφοὶ ἦσαν καὶ ῥήτορες [καὶ] δεινοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοί, ἐρωτᾶν ἱκανοὶ ὄντες· τὸ γὰρ εἴρειν λέγειν ἐστίν. ὅπερ οὖν ἄρτι λέγομεν, ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ φωνῇ λεγόμενοι οἱ ἥρωες ῥήτορές τινες καὶ ἐρωτητικοὶ συμβαίνουσιν, ὥστε ῥητόρων καὶ σοφιστῶν γένος γίγνεται τὸ ἡρωικὸν φῦλον. ἀλλὰ οὐ τοῦτο χαλεπόν ἐστιν ἐννοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, διὰ τί ποτε ἄνθρωποι καλοῦνται· ⟨ἢ⟩ σὺ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; ΕΡΜ. πόθεν, ὠγαθέ, ἔχω; οὐδʼ εἴ τι οἷός τʼ ἂν εἴην εὑρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι σὲ μᾶλλον εὑρήσειν ἢ ἐμαυτόν. [¶36] 399. Socrates. You have faith in the inspiration of Euthyphro, it seems. > Greek: 399. ΣΩ. τῇ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονος ἐπιπνοίᾳ πιστεύεις, ὡς ἔοικας. [¶37] Hermogenes. Evidently. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. δῆλα δή. [¶38] Socrates. And you are right in having it; for just at this very moment I think I have had a clever thought, and if I am not careful, before the day is over I am likely to be wiser than I ought to be. So pay attention. First we must remember in regard to names that we often put in or take out letters, making the names different from the meaning we intend, and we change the accent. Take, for instance, Διὶ φίλος; to change this from a phrase to a name, we took out the second iota and pronounced the middle syllable with the grave instead of the acute accent (Diphilus). In other instances, on the contrary, we insert letters and pronounce grave accents as acute. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς γε σὺ πιστεύων· ὡς καὶ νῦν γέ μοι φαίνομαι κομψῶς ἐννενοηκέναι, καὶ κινδυνεύσω, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῶμαι, ἔτι τήμερον σοφώτερος τοῦ δέοντος γενέσθαι. σκόπει δὴ ὃ λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι περὶ ὀνομάτων, ὅτι πολλάκις ἐπεμβάλλομεν γράμματα, τὰ δʼ ἐξαιροῦμεν, παρʼ ὃ βουλόμεθα ὀνομάζοντες, καὶ τὰς ὀξύτητας μεταβάλλομεν. οἷον Διὶ φίλος —τοῦτο ἵνα ἀντὶ ῥήματος ὄνομα ἡμῖν γένηται, τό τε ἕτερον αὐτόθεν ἰῶτα ἐξείλομεν καὶ ἀντὶ ὀξείας τῆς μέσης συλλαβῆς βαρεῖαν ἐφθεγξάμεθα. ἄλλων δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐμβάλλομεν γράμματα, τὰ δὲ βαρύτερα ⟨ὀξύτερα⟩ φθεγγόμεθα. [¶39] Hermogenes. True. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶40] Socrates. Now it appears to me that the name of men (ἄνθρωπος) underwent a change of that sort. It was a phrase, but became a noun when one letter, alpha, was removed and the accent of the last syllable was dropped. > Greek: ΣΩ. τούτων τοίνυν ἓν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄνομα πέπονθεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐκ γὰρ ῥήματος ὄνομα γέγονεν, ἑνὸς γράμματος τοῦ ἄλφα ἐξαιρεθέντος καὶ βαρυτέρας τῆς τελευτῆς γενομένης. [¶41] Hermogenes. What do you mean? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς λέγεις; [¶42] Socrates. I will tell you. The name “man” (ἄνθρωπος) indicates that the other animals do not examine, or consider, or look up at (ἀναθρεῖ) any of the things that they see, but man has no sooner seen—that is, ὄπωπε—than he looks up at and considers that which he has seen. Therefore of all the animals man alone is rightly called man (ἄνθρωπος), because he looks up at (ἀναθρεῖ) what he has seen (ὄπωπε). > Greek: ΣΩ. ὧδε. σημαίνει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα θηρία ὧν ὁρᾷ οὐδὲν ἐπισκοπεῖ οὐδὲ ἀναλογίζεται οὐδὲ ἀναθρεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἅμα ἑώρακεν—τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ [τὸ] ὄπωπε —καὶ ἀναθρεῖ καὶ λογίζεται τοῦτο ὃ ὄπωπεν. ἐντεῦθεν δὴ μόνον τῶν θηρίων ὀρθῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ὠνομάσθη, ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπε. [¶43] Hermogenes. Of course. May I ask you about the next word I should like to have explained? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τί οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; ἔρωμαί σε ὃ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην; [¶44] Socrates. Certainly. > Greek: ΣΩ. πάνυ γε. [¶45] Hermogenes. It seems to me to come naturally next after those you have discussed. We speak of man’s soul and body. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ὥσπερ τοίνυν μοι δοκεῖ τούτοις ἑξῆς εἶναί τι χρῆμα. ψυχὴν γάρ που καὶ σῶμα καλοῦμεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. [¶46] Socrates. Yes, of course. > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶47] Hermogenes. Let us try to analyze these, as we did the previous words. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πειρώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα διελεῖν ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν. [¶48] Socrates. You mean consider “soul” (ψυχή) and see why it is properly called by that name, and likewise “body” (σῶμα)? > Greek: ΣΩ. ψυχὴν λέγεις ἐπισκέψασθαι ὡς εἰκότως τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνει, ἔπειτʼ αὖ τὸ σῶμα; [¶49] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶50] Socrates. To speak on the spur of the moment, I think those who gave the soul its name had something of this sort in mind: they thought when it was present in the body it was the cause of its living, giving it the power to breathe and reviving it (ἀναψῦχον), and when this revivifying force fails, the body perishes and comes to an end therefore, I think, they called it ψυχή. But—please keep still a moment. I fancy I see something which will carry more conviction to Euthyphro and his followers; for I think they would despise this attempt and would consider it cheap talk. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς μὲν τοίνυν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα λέγειν, οἶμαί τι τοιοῦτον νοεῖν τοὺς τὴν ψυχὴν ὀνομάσαντας, ὡς τοῦτο ἄρα, ὅταν παρῇ τῷ σώματι, αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ζῆν αὐτῷ, τὴν τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν δύναμιν παρέχον καὶ ἀναψῦχον, ἅμα δὲ ἐκλείποντος τοῦ ἀναψύχοντος τὸ σῶμα ἀπόλλυταί τε καὶ τελευτᾷ· ὅθεν δή μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸ ψυχὴν καλέσαι. εἰ δὲ βούλει —ἔχε ἠρέμα· δοκῶ γάρ μοί τι καθορᾶν πιθανώτερον τούτου τοῖς ἀμφὶ Εὐθύφρονα. [¶51] 400. Now see if you like the new one. Hermogenes. I am listening. > Greek: 400. τούτου μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καταφρονήσαιεν ἂν καὶ ἡγήσαιντο φορτικὸν εἶναι· τόδε δὲ σκόπει ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ἀρέσῃ. ΕΡΜ. λέγε μόνον. [¶52] Socrates. Do you think there is anything which holds and carries the whole nature of the body, so that it lives and moves, except the soul? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν φύσιν παντὸς τοῦ σώματος, ὥστε καὶ ζῆν καὶ περιιέναι, τί σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὀχεῖν ἄλλο ἢ ψυχή; [¶53] Hermogenes. No; nothing. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐδὲν ἄλλο. [¶54] Socrates. Well, and do you not believe the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that it is mind or soul which orders and holds the nature of all things? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων φύσιν οὐ πιστεύεις Ἀναξαγόρᾳ νοῦν καὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν διακοσμοῦσαν καὶ ἔχουσαν; [¶55] Hermogenes. I do. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔγωγε. [¶56] Socrates. Then there would be an admirable fitness in calling that power which carries and holds (ἔχει) nature (φύσιν) φυσέχη and this may be refined and pronounced ψυχή. > Greek: ΣΩ. καλῶς ἄρα ἂν τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχοι τῇ δυνάμει ταύτῃ ἣ φύσιν ὀχεῖ καὶ ἔχει φυσέχην ἐπονομάζειν. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ ψυχὴν κομψευόμενον λέγειν. [¶57] Hermogenes. Certainly; and I think this is a more scientific explanation than the other. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ δοκεῖ γέ μοι τοῦτο ἐκείνου τεχνικώτερον εἶναι. [¶58] Socrates. Yes, it is. But it seems actually absurd that the name was given with such truth. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν· γελοῖον μέντοι φαίνεται ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομαζόμενον ὡς ἐτέθη. [¶59] Hermogenes. Now what shall we say about the next word? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο πῶς φῶμεν ἔχειν; [¶60] Socrates. You mean “body” (σῶμα)? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ σῶμα λέγεις; [¶61] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶62] Socrates. I think this admits of many explanations, if a little, even very little, change is made; for some say it is the tomb (σῆμα) of the soul, their notion being that the soul is buried in the present life; and again, because by its means the soul gives any signs which it gives, it is for this reason also properly called sign (σῆμα). But I think it most likely that the Orphic poets gave this name, with the idea that the soul is undergoing punishment for something; they think it has the body as an enclosure to keep it safe, like a prison, and this is, as the name itself denotes, the safe (σῶμα) for the soul, until the penalty is paid, and not even a letter needs to be changed. > Greek: ΣΩ. πολλαχῇ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε· ἂν μὲν καὶ σμικρόν τις παρακλίνῃ, καὶ πάνυ. καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τινές φασιν αὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι· καὶ διότι αὖ τούτῳ σημαίνει ἃ ἂν σημαίνῃ ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ταύτῃ σῆμα ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι. δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσιν, τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σῴζηται, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, [τὸ] σῶμα, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδʼ ἓν γράμμα. [¶63] Hermogenes. I think, Socrates, enough has been said about these words; but might we not consider the names of the gods in the same way in which you were speaking about that of Zeus a few minutes ago, and see what kind of correctness there is in them? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ταῦτα μέν μοι δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρῆσθαι· περὶ δὲ τῶν θεῶν τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, ἔχοιμεν ἄν που κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπισκέψασθαι κατὰ τίνα ποτὲ ὀρθότητα αὐτῶν τὰ ὀνόματα κεῖται; [¶64] Socrates. By Zeus, Hermogenes, we, if we are sensible, must recognize that there is one most excellent kind, since of the gods we know nothing, neither of them nor of their names, whatever they may be, by which they call themselves, for it is clear that they use the true names. But there is a second kind of correctness, that we call them, as is customary in prayers, by whatever names and patronymics are pleasing to them, since we know no other. > Greek: ΣΩ. ναὶ μὰ Δία ἡμεῖς γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, εἴπερ γε νοῦν ἔχοιμεν, ἕνα μὲν τὸν κάλλιστον τρόπον, ὅτι περὶ θεῶν οὐδὲν ἴσμεν, οὔτε περὶ αὐτῶν οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἅττα ποτὲ ἑαυτοὺς καλοῦσιν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐκεῖνοί γε τἀληθῆ καλοῦσι. δεύτερος δʼ αὖ τρόπος ὀρθότητος, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νόμος ἐστὶν ἡμῖν εὔχεσθαι, οἵτινές τε καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι, ταῦτα καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καλεῖν, ὡς ἄλλο μηδὲν εἰδότας· [¶65] 401. Now I think that is an excellent custom. Socrates. So, if you like, let us first make a kind of announcement to the gods, saying that we are not going to investigate about them—for we do not claim to be able to do that—but about men, and let us inquire what thought men had in giving them their names; for in that there is no impiety. > Greek: 401. καλῶς γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νενομίσθαι. ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν βούλει, σκοπῶμεν ὥσπερ προειπόντες τοῖς θεοῖς ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἡμεῖς σκεψόμεθα—οὐ γὰρ ἀξιοῦμεν οἷοί τʼ ἂν εἶναι σκοπεῖν—ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἥν ποτέ τινα δόξαν ἔχοντες ἐτίθεντο αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνεμέσητον. [¶66] Hermogenes. I think, Socrates, you are right; let us do as you say. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, μετρίως λέγειν, καὶ οὕτω ποιῶμεν. [¶67] Socrates. Shall we, then, begin with Hestia, according to custom? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν ἀφʼ Ἑστίας ἀρχώμεθα κατὰ τὸν νόμον; [¶68] Hermogenes. That is the proper thing. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. δίκαιον γοῦν. [¶69] Socrates. Then what would you say the man had in mind who gave Hestia her name? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν ἄν τις φαίη διανοούμενον τὸν ὀνομάσαντα Ἑστίαν ὀνομάσαι; [¶70] Hermogenes. By Zeus, I think that is no more easy question than the other. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία οὐδὲ τοῦτο οἶμαι ῥᾴδιον εἶναι. [¶71] Socrates. At any rate, my dear Hermogenes, the first men who gave names were no ordinary persons, but high thinkers and great talkers. > Greek: ΣΩ. κινδυνεύουσι γοῦν, ὠγαθὲ Ἑρμόγενες, οἱ πρῶτοι τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι ἀλλὰ μετεωρολόγοι καὶ ἀδολέσχαι τινές. [¶72] Hermogenes. What then? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τί δή; [¶73] Socrates. I am sure the names were given by men of that kind; and if foreign names are examined, the meaning of each of them is equally evident. Take, for instance, that which we call οὐσία (reality, essence); some people call it ἐσσία, and still others ὠσία. First, then, in connection with the second of these forms, it is reasonable that the essence of things be called Hestia; and moreover, because we ourselves say of that which partakes of reality “it is,” (ἔστιν), the name Hestia would be correct in this connection also; for apparently we also called οὐσία (reality) ἐσσία in ancient times. And besides, if you consider it in connection with sacrifices, you would come to the conclusion that those who established them understood the name in that way; for those who called the essence of things ἐσσία would naturally sacrifice to Hestia first of all the gods. Those on the other hand, who say ὠσία would agree, well enough with Heracleitus that all things move and nothing remains still. So they would say the cause and ruler of things was the pushing power (ὠθοῦν), wherefore it had been rightly named ὠσία. But enough of this, considering that we know nothing. After Hestia it is right to consider Rhea and Cronus. The name of Cronus, however, has already been discussed. But perhaps I am talking nonsense. > Greek: ΣΩ. καταφαίνεταί μοι ἡ θέσις τῶν ὀνομάτων τοιούτων τινῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἐάν τις τὰ ξενικὰ ὀνόματα ἀνασκοπῇ, οὐχ ἧττον ἀνευρίσκεται ὃ ἕκαστον βούλεται. οἷον καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὃ ἡμεῖς οὐσίαν καλοῦμεν, εἰσὶν οἳ ἐσσίαν καλοῦσιν, οἳ δʼ αὖ ὠσίαν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομα τούτων ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐσία Ἑστία καλεῖσθαι ἔχει λόγον, καὶ ὅτι γε αὖ ἡμεῖς τὸ τῆς οὐσίας μετέχον ἔστιν φαμέν, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖτο Ἑστία· ἐοίκαμεν γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὸ παλαιὸν ἐσσίαν καλεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς θυσίας ἄν τις ἐννοήσας ἡγήσαιτο οὕτω νοεῖν ταῦτα τοὺς τιθεμένους· τὸ γὰρ πρὸ πάντων θεῶν τῇ Ἑστίᾳ πρώτῃ προθύειν εἰκὸς ἐκείνους οἵτινες τὴν πάντων οὐσίαν ἐσσίαν ἐπωνόμασαν. ὅσοι δʼ αὖ ὠσίαν, σχεδόν τι αὖ οὗτοι καθʼ Ἡράκλειτον ἂν ἡγοῖντο τὰ ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα καὶ μένειν οὐδέν· τὸ οὖν αἴτιον καὶ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ ὠθοῦν, ὅθεν δὴ καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτὸ ὠσίαν ὠνομάσθαι. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταύτῃ ὡς παρὰ μηδὲν εἰδότων εἰρήσθω· μετὰ δʼ Ἑστίαν δίκαιον Ῥέαν καὶ Κρόνον ἐπισκέψασθαι. καίτοι τό γε τοῦ Κρόνου ὄνομα ἤδη διήλθομεν. ἴσως μέντοι οὐδὲν λέγω. [¶74] Hermogenes. Why, Socrates? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶75] Socrates. My friend, I have thought of a swarm of wisdom. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὠγαθέ, ἐννενόηκά τι σμῆνος σοφίας. [¶76] Hermogenes. What is it? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο; [¶77] 402. Socrates. It sounds absurd, but I think there is some probability in it. > Greek: 402. ΣΩ. γελοῖον μὲν πάνυ εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι μέντοι τινὰ πιθανότητα ἔχον. [¶78] Hermogenes. What is this probability? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τίνα ταύτην; [¶79] Socrates. I seem to have a vision of Heracleitus saying some ancient words of wisdom as old as the reign of Cronus and Rhea, which Homer said too. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸν Ἡράκλειτόν μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν παλαίʼ ἄττα σοφὰ λέγοντα, ἀτεχνῶς τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ Ῥέας, ἃ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔλεγεν. [¶80] Hermogenes. What do you mean by that? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; [¶81] Socrates. Heracleitus says, you know, that all things move and nothing remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice into the same stream. > Greek: ΣΩ. λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης. [¶82] Hermogenes. True. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶83] Socrates. Well, don’t you think he who gave to the ancestors of the other gods the names “Rhea” and “Cronus” had the same thought as Heracleitus? Do you think he gave both of them the names of streams merely by chance? Just so Homer, too, says— Ocean the origin of the gods, and their mother Tethys; and I believe Hesiod says that also. Orpheus, too, says— Fair-flowing Ocean was the first to marry, and he wedded his sister Tethys, daughter of his mother. See how they agree with each other and all tend towards the doctrine of Heracleitus. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; δοκεῖ σοι ἀλλοιότερον Ἡρακλείτου νοεῖν ὁ τιθέμενος τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν προγόνοις Ῥέαν τε καὶ Κρόνον; ἆρα οἴει ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου αὐτὸν ἀμφοτέροις ῥευμάτων ὀνόματα θέσθαι; ὥσπερ αὖ Ὅμηρος Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσίν φησιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος. λέγει δέ που καὶ Ὀρφεὺς ὅτι Ὠκεανὸς πρῶτος καλλίρροος ἦρξε γάμοιο, ὅς ῥα κασιγνήτην ὁμομήτορα Τηθὺν ὄπυιεν. ταῦτʼ οὖν σκόπει ὅτι καὶ ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου πάντα τείνει. [¶84] Hermogenes. I think there is something in what you say, Socrates; but I do not know what the name of Tethys means. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φαίνῃ τί μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· τὸ μέντοι τῆς Τηθύος οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὄνομα τί βούλεται. [¶85] Socrates. Why, the name itself almost tells that it is the name of a spring somewhat disguised; for that which is strained (διαττώμενον) and filtered (ἠθούμενον) represents a spring, and the name Tethys is compounded of those two words. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ὀλίγου αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι πηγῆς ὄνομα ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ διαττώμενον καὶ τὸ ἠθούμενον πηγῆς ἀπείκασμά ἐστιν· ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ Τηθὺς τὸ ὄνομα σύγκειται. [¶86] Hermogenes. That is very neat, Socrates. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τοῦτο μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, κομψόν. [¶87] Socrates. Of course it is. But what comes next? Zeus we discussed before. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ οὐ μέλλει; ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; τὸν μὲν Δία εἴπομεν. [¶88] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶89] Socrates. Let us, then, speak of his brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, including also the other name of the latter. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς δὴ αὐτοῦ λέγωμεν, τόν τε Ποσειδῶ καὶ τὸν Πλούτωνα καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομα ὃ ὀνομάζουσιν αὐτόν. [¶90] Hermogenes. By all means. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶91] Socrates. I think Poseidon’s name was given by him who first applied it, because the power the sea restrained him as he was walking and hindered his advance; it acted as a bond (δεσμός) of his feet (ποδῶν). So he called the lord of this power Poseidon, regarding him as a foot-bond (ποσί-δεσμον). The e is inserted perhaps for euphony. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ Ποσειδῶνός μοι φαίνεται ὠνομάσθαι [τοῦ πρώτου ὀνομάσαντος], ὅτι αὐτὸν βαδίζοντα ἐπέσχεν ἡ τῆς θαλάττης φύσις καὶ οὐκέτι εἴασεν προελθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ δεσμὸς τῶν ποδῶν αὐτῷ ἐγένετο. τὸν οὖν ἄρχοντα τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης θεὸν ὠνόμασεν Ποσειδῶνα, ὡς ποσίδεσμον ὄντα· τὸ δὲ ε ἔγκειται ἴσως εὐπρεπείας ἕνεκα. [¶92] Socrates. But possibly that may not be right; possibly two lambdas were originally pronounced instead of the sigma, because the god knew (εἰδότος) many (πολλά) things. > Greek: ΣΩ. τάχα δὲ οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο λέγοι, ἀλλʼ ἀντὶ τοῦ σῖγμα δύο λάβδα τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγετο, ὡς πολλὰ εἰδότος τοῦ θεοῦ. [¶93] 403. Or it may be that from his shaking he was called the Shaker (ὁ σείων), and the pi and delta are additions. As for Pluto, he was so named as the giver of wealth (πλοῦτος), because wealth comes up from below out of the earth. And Hades—I fancy most people think that this is a name of the Invisible (ἀειδής), so they are afraid and call him Pluto. Hermogenes. And what do you think yourself, Socrates? > Greek: 403. ἴσως δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ σείειν ὁ σείων ὠνόμασται· πρόσκειται δὲ τὸ πεῖ καὶ τὸ δέλτα. τὸ δὲ Πλούτωνος, τοῦτο μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πλούτου δόσιν, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς γῆς κάτωθεν ἀνίεται ὁ πλοῦτος, ἐπωνομάσθη· ὁ δὲ Ἅιδης, οἱ πολλοὶ μέν μοι δοκοῦσιν ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸ ἀιδὲς προσειρῆσθαι τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ, καὶ φοβούμενοι τὸ ὄνομα Πλούτωνα καλοῦσιν αὐτόν. ΕΡΜ. σοὶ δὲ πῶς φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶94] Socrates. I think people have many false notions about the power of this god, and are unduly afraid of him. They are afraid because when we are once dead we remain in his realm for ever, and they are also terrified because the soul goes to him without the covering of the body. But I think all these facts, and the office and the name of the god, point in the same direction. > Greek: ΣΩ. πολλαχῇ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν ἅνθρωποι διημαρτηκέναι περὶ τούτου τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὸν οὐκ ἄξιον ⟨ὄν⟩. ὅτι τε γάρ, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τις ἡμῶν ἀποθάνῃ, ἀεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστιν, φοβοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ γυμνὴ τοῦ σώματος παρʼ ἐκεῖνον ἀπέρχεται, καὶ τοῦτο πεφόβηνται· τὰ δʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πάντα ἐς ταὐτόν τι συντείνειν, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα. [¶95] Hermogenes. How so? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς δή; [¶96] Socrates. I will tell you my own view. Please answer this question: Which is the stronger bond upon any living being to keep him in any one place, desire, or compulsion? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ ἅ γέ μοι φαίνεται. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, δεσμὸς ζῴῳ ὁτῳοῦν ὥστε μένειν ὁπουοῦν, πότερος ἰσχυρότερός ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἢ ἐπιθυμία; [¶97] Hermogenes. Desire, Socrates, is much stronger. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ ἐπιθυμία. [¶98] Socrates. Then do you not believe there would be many fugitives from Hades, if he did not bind with the strongest bond those who go to him there? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἴει οὖν τὸν Ἅιδην οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς ἐκφεύγειν, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἰσχυροτάτῳ δεσμῷ ἔδει τοὺς ἐκεῖσε ἰόντας; [¶99] Hermogenes. Of course there would. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. δῆλα δή. [¶100] Socrates. Apparently, then, if he binds them with the strongest bond, he binds them by some kind of desire, not by compulsion. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἄρα τινὶ αὐτούς, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ, εἴπερ τῷ μεγίστῳ δεσμῷ δεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ. [¶101] Hermogenes. Yes, that is plain. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται. [¶102] Socrates. There are many desires, are there not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπιθυμίαι αὖ πολλαί εἰσιν; [¶103] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶104] Socrates. Then he binds with the desire which is the strongest of all, if he is to restrain them with the strongest bond. > Greek: ΣΩ. τῇ μεγίστῃ ἄρα ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν δεῖ αὐτούς, εἴπερ μέλλει τῷ μεγίστῳ δεσμῷ κατέχειν. [¶105] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶106] Socrates. And is there any desire stronger than the thought of being made a better man by association with some one? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν τις μείζων ἐπιθυμία ἢ ὅταν τίς τῳ συνὼν οἴηται διʼ ἐκεῖνον ἔσεσθαι ἀμείνων ἀνήρ; [¶107] Hermogenes. No, by Zeus, Socrates, there certainly is not. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶108] Socrates. Then, Hermogenes, we must believe that this is the reason why no one has been willing to come away from that other world, not even the Sirens, but they and all others have been overcome by his enchantments, so beautiful, as it appears, are the words which Hades has the power to speak; and from this point of view this god is a perfect sophist and a great benefactor of those in his realm, he who also bestows such great blessings upon us who are on earth; such abundance surrounds him there below, and for this reason he is called Pluto. > Greek: ΣΩ. διὰ ταῦτα ἄρα φῶμεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, οὐδένα δεῦρο ἐθελῆσαι ἀπελθεῖν τῶν ἐκεῖθεν, οὐδὲ αὐτὰς τὰς Σειρῆνας, ἀλλὰ κατακεκηλῆσθαι ἐκείνας τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας· οὕτω καλούς τινας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπίσταται λόγους λέγειν ὁ Ἅιδης, καὶ ἔστιν, ὥς γʼ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου, ὁ θεὸς [οὗτος] τέλεος σοφιστής τε καὶ μέγας εὐεργέτης τῶν παρʼ αὐτῷ, ὅς γε καὶ τοῖς ἐνθάδε τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἀνίησιν· οὕτω πολλὰ αὐτῷ τὰ περιόντα ἐκεῖ ἐστιν, καὶ τὸν Πλούτωνα ἀπὸ τούτου ἔσχε τὸ ὄνομα. [¶109] Socrates. Then, too, he refuses to consort with men while they have bodies, but only accepts their society when the soul is pure of all the evils and desires of the body. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τὸ αὖ μὴ ἐθέλειν συνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔχουσι τὰ σώματα, ἀλλὰ τότε συγγίγνεσθαι, ἐπειδὰν ἡ ψυχὴ καθαρὰ ᾖ πάντων τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, οὐ φιλοσόφου δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ εὖ ἐντεθυμημένου ὅτι οὕτω μὲν ἂν κατέχοι αὐτοὺς δήσας τῇ περὶ ἀρετὴν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ἔχοντας δὲ τὴν τοῦ σώματος πτοίησιν καὶ μανίαν οὐδʼ ἂν ὁ Κρόνος δύναιτο ὁ πατὴρ συγκατέχειν αὑτῷ ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς δήσας τοῖς αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις; [¶110] 404. Do you not think this shows him to be a philosopher and to understand perfectly that under these conditions he could restrain them by binding them with the desire of virtue, but that so long as they are infected with the unrest and madness of the body, not even his father Cronus could hold them to himself, though he bound them with his famous chains? Hermogenes. There seems to be something in that, Socrates. > Greek: 404. ΕΡΜ. κινδυνεύεις τὶ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶111] Socrates. And the name “Hades” is not in the least derived from the invisible (ἀειδές), but far more probably from knowing (εἰδέναι) all noble things, and for that reason he was called Hades by the lawgiver. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τό γε ὄνομα ὁ Ἅιδης, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀιδοῦς ἐπωνομάσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντα τὰ καλὰ εἰδέναι, ἀπὸ τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου Ἅιδης ἐκλήθη. [¶112] Hermogenes. Very well; what shall we say of Demeter, Hera, Apollo, Athena, Hephaestus, Ares, and the other gods Socrates. Demeter appears to have been called Demeter, because like a mother (μήτηρ) she gives the gift of food, and Hera is a lovely one (ἐρατή), as indeed, Zeus is said to have married her for love. But perhaps the lawgiver had natural phenomena in mind, and called her Hera (Ἥρα) as a disguise for ἀήρ (air), putting the beginning at the end. You would understand, if you were to repeat the name Hera over and over. And Pherephatta!—How many people fear this name, and also Apollo! I imagine it is because they do not know about correctness of names. You see they change the name to Phersephone and its aspect frightens them. But really the name indicates that the goddess is wise; for since things are in motion (φερόμενα), that which grasps (ἐφαπτόμενον) and touches (ἐπαφῶν) and is able to follow them is wisdom. Pherepapha, or something of that sort, would therefore be the correct name of the goddess, because she is wise and touches that which is in motion (ἐπαφὴ τοῦ φερομένου)—and this is the reason why Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she is wise—but people have altered her name, attaching more importance to euphony than to truth, and they call her Pherephatta. Likewise in the case of Apollo, as I say, many people are afraid because of the name of the god, thinking that it has some terrible meaning. Have you not noticed that? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. εἶεν· τί δὲ Δήμητρά τε καὶ Ἥραν καὶ Ἀπόλλω καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν καὶ Ἥφαιστον καὶ Ἄρη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεούς, πῶς λέγομεν; ΣΩ. Δημήτηρ μὲν φαίνεται κατὰ τὴν δόσιν τῆς ἐδωδῆς διδοῦσα ὡς μήτηρ Δημήτηρ κεκλῆσθαι, Ἥρα δὲ ἐρατή τις, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ λέγεται ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτῆς ἐρασθεὶς ἔχειν. ἴσως δὲ μετεωρολογῶν ὁ νομοθέτης τὸν ἀέρα Ἥραν ὠνόμασεν ἐπικρυπτόμενος, θεὶς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τελευτήν· γνοίης δʼ ἄν, εἰ πολλάκις λέγοις τὸ τῆς Ἥρας ὄνομα. Φερρέφαττα δέ· πολλοὶ μὲν καὶ τοῦτο φοβοῦνται τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος. καὶ γὰρ μεταβάλλοντες σκοποῦνται τὴν Φερσεφόνην, καὶ δεινὸν αὐτοῖς φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ μηνύει σοφὴν εἶναι τὴν θεόν. ἅτε γὰρ φερομένων τῶν πραγμάτων τὸ ἐφαπτόμενον καὶ ἐπαφῶν καὶ δυνάμενον ἐπακολουθεῖν σοφία ἂν εἴη. Φερέπαφα οὖν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν ἐπαφὴν τοῦ φερομένου ἡ θεὸς ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖτο, ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι—διʼ ὅπερ καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῇ ὁ Ἅιδης σοφὸς ὤν, διότι τοιαύτη ἐστίν—νῦν δὲ αὐτῆς ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ ὄνομα εὐστομίαν περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενοι τῆς ἀληθείας, ὥστε Φερρέφατταν αὐτὴν καλεῖν. ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, ὅπερ λέγω, πολλοὶ πεφόβηνται περὶ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥς τι δεινὸν μηνύοντος· ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι; [¶113] Hermogenes. Certainly; what you say is true. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶114] Socrates. But really the name is admirably appropriate to the power of the god. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γʼ ἐστίν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, κάλλιστα κείμενον πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ θεοῦ. [¶115] Hermogenes. How is that? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς δή; [¶116] Socrates. I will try to tell you what I think about it; > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτι ἂν μᾶλλον ὄνομα ἥρμοσεν ἓν ὂν τέτταρσι δυνάμεσι ταῖς τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥστε πασῶν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ δηλοῦν τρόπον τινὰ μουσικήν τε καὶ μαντικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ τοξικήν. [¶117] 405. for no single name could more aptly indicate the four functions of the god, touching upon them all and in a manner declaring his power in music, prophecy, medicine, and archery. Hermogenes. Go on; you seem to imply that it is a remarkable name. > Greek: 405. ΕΡΜ. λέγε δή· ἄτοπον γάρ τί μοι λέγεις τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι. [¶118] Socrates. His name and nature are in harmony; you see he is a musical god. For in the first place, purification and purgations used in medicine and in soothsaying, and fumigations with medicinal and magic drugs, and the baths and sprinklings connected with that sort of thing all have the single function of making a man pure in body and soul, do they not? > Greek: ΣΩ. εὐάρμοστον μὲν οὖν, ἅτε μουσικοῦ ὄντος τοῦ θεοῦ. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ κάθαρσις καὶ οἱ καθαρμοὶ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ αἱ τοῖς ἰατρικοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ αἱ τοῖς μαντικοῖς περιθειώσεις τε καὶ τὰ λουτρὰ τὰ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ αἱ περιρράνσεις, πάντα ἕν τι ταῦτα δύναιτʼ ἄν, καθαρὸν παρέχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν· ἢ οὔ; [¶119] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶120] Socrates. But this is the god who purifies and washes away (ἀπαλοούων) and delivers (ἀπολύων) from such evils, is he not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ καθαίρων θεὸς καὶ ὁ ἀπολούων τε καὶ ἀπολύων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν οὗτος ἂν εἴη; [¶121] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶122] Socrates. With reference, then, to his acts of delivering and his washings, as being the physician of such diseases, he might properly be called Apoluon (ἀπαλούων, the washer), and with reference to soothsaying and truth and simplicity—for the two are identical—he might most properly be called by the name the Thessalians use; for all Thessalians call the god Aplun. And because he is always by his archery controller of darts (βολῶν) he is ever darting (ἀεὶ βάλλων). And with reference to music we have to understand that alpha often signifies “together,” and here it denotes moving together in the heavens about the poles, as we call them, and harmony in song, which is called concord; for, as the ingenious musicians and astronomers tell us, all these things move together by a kind of harmony. And this god directs the harmony, making them all move together, among both gods and men; and so, just as we call the ὁμοκέλευθον (him who accompanies), and ὁμόκοιτιν (bedfellow), by changing the ὁμο to alpha, ἀκόλουθον and ἄκοιτιν, so also we called him Apollo who was Homopolo, and the second lambda was inserted, because without it the name sounded of disaster (ἀπολῶ, ἀπόλωλα, etc.). > Greek: ΣΩ. κατὰ μὲν τοίνυν τὰς ἀπολύσεις τε καὶ ἀπολούσεις, ὡς ἰατρὸς ὢν τῶν τοιούτων, Ἀπολούων ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖτο· κατὰ δὲ τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν— ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν—ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ Θετταλοὶ καλοῦσιν αὐτόν, ὀρθότατʼ ἂν καλοῖτο· Ἄπλουν γάρ φασι πάντες Θετταλοὶ τοῦτον τὸν θεόν. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ βολῶν ἐγκρατὴς εἶναι τοξικῇ Ἀειβάλλων ἐστίν. κατὰ δὲ τὴν μουσικὴν δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν [ὥσπερ τὸν ἀκόλουθόν τε καὶ τὴν ἄκοιτιν] ὅτι τὸ ἄλφα σημαίνει πολλαχοῦ τὸ ὁμοῦ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὁμοῦ πόλησιν καὶ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, οὓς δὴ πόλους καλοῦσιν, καὶ [τὴν] περὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ᾠδῇ ἁρμονίαν, ἣ δὴ συμφωνία καλεῖται, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα, ὥς φασιν οἱ κομψοὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἁρμονίᾳ τινὶ πολεῖ ἅμα πάντα· ἐπιστατεῖ δὲ οὗτος ὁ θεὸς τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ ὁμοπολῶν αὐτὰ πάντα καὶ κατὰ θεοὺς καὶ κατʼ ἀνθρώπους· ὥσπερ οὖν τὸν ὁμοκέλευθον καὶ ὁμόκοιτιν ἀκόλουθον καὶ ἄκοιτιν ἐκαλέσαμεν, μεταβαλόντες ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁμο— ἀ—, οὕτω καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα ἐκαλέσαμεν ὃς ἦν ὁμοπολῶν, ἕτερον λάβδα ἐμβαλόντες, ὅτι ὁμώνυμον ἐγίγνετο τῷ χαλεπῷ ὀνόματι. [¶123] Socrates. Even as it is, some have a suspicion of this, because they do not properly regard the force of the name, and therefore they fear it, thinking that it denotes some kind of ruin. But in fact, as was said, the name touches upon all the qualities of the god, as simple, ever-darting, purifying, and accompanying. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ὑποπτεύοντές τινες διὰ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ ὀνόματος φοβοῦνται αὐτὸ ὡς σημαῖνον φθοράν τινα· τὸ δὲ [πολύ], ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, πασῶν ἐφαπτόμενον κεῖται τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεων, ἁπλοῦ, ἀεὶ βάλλοντος, ἀπολούοντος, ὁμοπολοῦντος. [¶124] 406. The Muses and music in general are named, apparently, from μῶσθαι, searching, and philosophy; and Leto from her gentleness, because whatever is asked of her, she is willing (ἐθελήμων). But perhaps her name is Letho, as she is called by many foreigners; and those who call her by that name seem to do so on account of the mild and gentle (λεῖον, Ληθώ) kindness of her character. Artemis appears to get her name from her healthy (ἀρτεμές) and well-ordered nature, and her love of virginity; or perhaps he who named her meant that she is learned in virtue (ἀρετή), or possibly, too, that she hates sexual intercourse (ἄροτον μισεῖ) of man and woman; or he who gave the goddess her name may have given it for any or all of these reasons. Hermogenes. What of Dionysus and Aphrodite? > Greek: 406. τὰς δὲ Μούσας τε καὶ ὅλως τὴν μουσικὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μῶσθαι, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τῆς ζητήσεώς τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἐπωνόμασεν. Λητὼ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρᾳότητος τῆς θεοῦ, κατὰ τὸ ἐθελήμονα εἶναι ὧν ἄν τις δέηται. ἴσως δὲ ὡς οἱ ξένοι καλοῦσιν— πολλοὶ γὰρ Ληθὼ καλοῦσιν—ἔοικεν οὖν πρὸς τὸ μὴ τραχὺ τοῦ ἤθους ἀλλʼ ἥμερόν τε καὶ λεῖον Ληθὼ κεκλῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦτο καλούντων. Ἄρτεμις δὲ ⟨διὰ⟩ τὸ ἀρτεμὲς φαίνεται καὶ τὸ κόσμιον, διὰ τὴν τῆς παρθενίας ἐπιθυμίαν· ἴσως δὲ ἀρετῆς ἵστορα τὴν θεὸν ἐκάλεσεν ὁ καλέσας, τάχα δʼ ἂν καὶ ὡς τὸν ἄροτον μισησάσης τὸν ἀνδρὸς ἐν γυναικί· ἢ διὰ τούτων τι ἢ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ὁ τιθέμενος ἔθετο τῇ θεῷ. ΕΡΜ. τί δὲ ὁ Διόνυσός τε καὶ ἡ ἀφροδίτη; [¶125] Socrates. You ask great things of me, son of Hipponicus. You see there is both a serious and a facetious account of the form of the name of these deities. You will have to ask others for the serious one; but there is nothing to hinder my giving you the facetious account, for the gods also have a sense of humor. Dionysus, the giver (διδούς) of wine (οἶνος), might be called in jest Didoinysus, and wine, because it makes most drinkers think (οἴεσθαι) they have wit (νοῦς) when they have not, might very justly be called Oeonus (οἰόνους). As for Aphrodite, we need not oppose Hesiod; we can accept his derivation of the name from her birth out of the foam (ἀφροῦ). > Greek: ΣΩ. μεγάλα, ὦ παῖ Ἱππονίκου, ἐρωτᾷς. ἀλλὰ ἔστι γὰρ καὶ σπουδαίως εἰρημένος ὁ τρόπος τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτοις τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ παιδικῶς. τὸν μὲν οὖν σπουδαῖον ἄλλους τινὰς ἐρώτα, τὸν δὲ παιδικὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει διελθεῖν· φιλοπαίσμονες γὰρ καὶ οἱ θεοί. ὅ τε γὰρ Διόνυσος εἴη ἂν ὁ διδοὺς τὸν οἶνον Διδοίνυσος ἐν παιδιᾷ καλούμενος, οἶνος δʼ, ὅτι οἴεσθαι νοῦν ἔχειν ποιεῖ τῶν πινόντων τοὺς πολλοὺς οὐκ ἔχοντας, οἰόνους δικαιότατʼ ἂν καλούμενος. περὶ δὲ ἀφροδίτης οὐκ ἄξιον Ἡσιόδῳ ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ συγχωρεῖν ὅτι διὰ τὴν ⟨ἐκ⟩ τοῦ ἀφροῦ γένεσιν ἀφροδίτη ἐκλήθη. [¶126] Hermogenes. But surely you, as an Athenian, will not forget Athena, nor Hephaestus and Ares. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ Ἀθηνᾶς Ἀθηναῖός γʼ ὤν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιλήσῃ, οὐδʼ Ἡφαίστου τε καὶ Ἄρεως. [¶127] Socrates. That is not likely. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲ εἰκός γε. [¶128] Hermogenes. No. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐ γάρ. [¶129] Socrates. It is easy to tell the reason of one of her two names. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ὄνομα αὐτῆς οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν διʼ ὃ κεῖται. [¶130] Hermogenes. What name? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶131] Socrates. We call her Pallas, you know. > Greek: ΣΩ. Παλλάδα που αὐτὴν καλοῦμεν. [¶132] Hermogenes. Yes, of course. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶133] Socrates. Those of us are right, I fancy, who think this name is derived from armed dances, for lifting oneself or anything else from the ground or in the hands is called shaking (πάλλειν) and being shaken, or dancing and being danced. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ὀρχήσεως ἡγούμενοι τεθῆναι ὀρθῶς ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἡγοίμεθα· τὸ γάρ που ἢ αὑτὸν ἤ τι ἄλλο μετεωρίζειν ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἢ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν πάλλειν τε καὶ πάλλεσθαι καὶ ὀρχεῖν καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι καλοῦμεν. ## 3. Pages 407–418 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/3/#p-N [¶0] 407. Hermogenes. Yes, certainly. > Greek: 407. ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶1] Socrates. So that is the reason she is called Pallas. > Greek: ΣΩ. Παλλάδα μὲν τοίνυν ταύτῃ. [¶2] Hermogenes. And rightly called so. But what can you say of her other name? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ ἕτερον πῶς λέγεις; [¶3] Socrates. You mean Athena? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς; [¶4] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶5] Socrates. That is a weightier matter, my friend. The ancients seem to have had the same belief about Athena as the interpreters of Homer have now; for most of these, in commenting on the poet, say that he represents Athena as mind (νοῦς) and intellect (διάνοια); and the maker of her name seems to have had a similar conception of her, but he gives her the still grander title of “mind of God” ἡ θεοῦ νόησις, seeming to say that she is a ἁ θεονόα; here he used the alpha in foreign fashion instead of eta, and dropped out the iota and sigma. But perhaps that was not his reason; he may have called her Theonoe because she has unequalled knowledge of divine things (τὰ θεῖα νοοῦσα). Perhaps, too, he may have wished to identify the goddess with wisdom of character (ἐν ἤθει νόησις) by calling her Ethonoe; and then he himself or others afterwards improved the name, as they thought, and called her Athenaa. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο ἐμβριθέστερον, ὦ φίλε. ἐοίκασι δὴ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν νομίζειν ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν περὶ Ὅμηρον δεινοί. καὶ γὰρ τούτων οἱ πολλοὶ ἐξηγούμενοι τὸν ποιητήν φασι τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν αὐτὸν νοῦν τε καὶ διάνοιαν πεποιηκέναι, καὶ ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα ποιῶν ἔοικε τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς διανοεῖσθαι, ἔτι δὲ μειζόνως λέγων θεοῦ νόησιν ὡσπερεὶ λέγει ὅτι ἁ θεονόα ἐστὶν αὕτη, τῷ ἄλφα ξενικῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἦτα χρησάμενος καὶ τὸ ἰῶτα καὶ τὸ σῖγμα ἀφελών. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτῃ, ἀλλʼ ὡς τὰ θεῖα νοούσης αὐτῆς διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Θεονόην ἐκάλεσεν. οὐδὲν δὲ ἀπέχει καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἤθει νόησιν ὡς οὖσαν τὴν θεὸν ταύτην Ἠθονόην μὲν βούλεσθαι προσειπεῖν· παραγαγὼν δὲ ἢ αὐτὸς ἤ τινες ὕστερον ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον ὡς ᾤοντο, Ἀθηνάαν ἐκάλεσαν. [¶6] Hermogenes. And how do you explain Hephaestus? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τί δὲ δὴ τὸν Ἥφαιστον, πῇ λέγεις; [¶7] Socrates. You ask about “the noble master of light”? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ τὸν γενναῖον τὸν φάεος ἵστορα ἐρωτᾷς; [¶8] Hermogenes. To be sure. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔοικα. [¶9] Socrates. Hephaestus is Phaestus, with the eta added by attraction; anyone could see that, I should think. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὗτος μὲν παντὶ δῆλος Φαῖστος ὤν, τὸ ἦτα προσελκυσάμενος; [¶10] Hermogenes. Very likely, unless some other explanation occurs to you, as it probably will. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. κινδυνεύει, ἐὰν μή πῄ σοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔτι ἄλλῃ δόξῃ. [¶11] Socrates. To prevent that, ask about Ares. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ, τὸν Ἄρη ἐρώτα. [¶12] Hermogenes. I do ask. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἐρωτῶ. [¶13] Socrates. Ares, then, if you like, would be named for his virility and courage, or for his hard and unbending nature, which is called ἄρρατον; so Ares would be in every way a fitting name for the god of war. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν βούλει, κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν τε καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον Ἄρης ἂν εἴη· εἰ δʼ αὖ κατὰ τὸ σκληρόν τε καὶ ἀμετάστροφον, ὃ δὴ ἄρρατον καλεῖται, καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν πανταχῇ πολεμικῷ θεῷ πρέποι Ἄρη καλεῖσθαι. [¶14] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶15] Socrates. For God’s sake, let us leave the gods, as I am afraid to talk about them; but ask me about any others you please, “that you may see what” Euthyphro’s “horses are.” > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν θεῶν πρὸς θεῶν ἀπαλλαγῶμεν, ὡς ἐγὼ δέδοικα περὶ αὐτῶν διαλέγεσθαι· περὶ δὲ ἄλλων ⟨ὧν⟩ τινων βούλει προβαλλέ μοι, ὄφρα ἴδηαι οἷοι Εὐθύφρονος ἵπποι. [¶16] Hermogenes. I will do so, but first one more god. I want to ask you about Hermes, since Cratylus says I am not Hermogenes (son of Hermes). Let us investigate the name of Hermes, to find out whether there is anything in what he says. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα, ἔτι γε ἓν ἐρόμενός σε περὶ Ἑρμοῦ, ἐπειδή με καὶ οὔ φησιν Κρατύλος Ἑρμογένη εἶναι. πειρώμεθα οὖν τὸν Ἑρμῆν σκέψασθαι τί καὶ νοεῖ τὸ ὄνομα, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶμεν εἰ τὶ ὅδε λέγει. [¶17] Socrates. Well then, this name “Hermes” seems to me to have to do with speech; he is an interpreter (ἡρμηνεύς) and a messenger, is wily and deceptive in speech, and is oratorical. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἔοικε περὶ λόγον τι εἶναι ὁ Ἑρμῆς, καὶ τὸ ἑρμηνέα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον καὶ τὸ κλοπικόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἐν λόγοις καὶ τὸ ἀγοραστικόν, περὶ λόγου δύναμίν ἐστιν πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία· [¶18] 408. All this activity is concerned with the power of speech. Now, as I said before, εἴρειν denotes the use of speech; moreover, Homer often uses the word ἐμήσατο, which means contrive. From these two words, then, the lawgiver imposes upon us the name of this god who contrived speech and the use of speech—εἴρεινmeans speak— and tells us: “Ye human beings, he who contrived speech (εἴρειν ἐμήσατο) ought to be called Eiremes by you.” We, however, have beautified the name, as we imagine, and call him Hermes. Iris also seems to have got her name from εἴρειν, because she is a messenger. Hermogenes. By Zeus, I believe Cratylus was right in saying I was not Hermogenes; I certainly am no good contriver of speech. > Greek: 408. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, τὸ εἴρειν λόγου χρεία ἐστί, τὸ δέ, οἷον καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ λέγει, ἐμήσατό φησιν, τοῦτο δὲ μηχανήσασθαί ἐστιν. ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων οὖν τούτων τὸν τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ τὸν λόγον μησάμενον—τὸ δὲ λέγειν δή ἐστιν εἴρειν—τοῦτον τὸν θεὸν ὡσπερεὶ ἐπιτάττει ἡμῖν ὁ νομοθέτης· ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὃς τὸ εἴρειν ἐμήσατο, δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ὑπὸ ὑμῶν εἰρέμης· νῦν δὲ ἡμεῖς, ὡς οἰόμεθα, καλλωπίζοντες τὸ ὄνομα Ἑρμῆν καλοῦμεν. [καὶ ἥ γε Ἶρις ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴρειν ἔοικεν κεκλημένη, ὅτι ἄγγελος ἦν.] ΕΡΜ. νὴ τὸν Δία, εὖ ἄρα μοι δοκεῖ Κρατύλος λέγειν τὸ ἐμὲ μὴ εἶναι Ἑρμογένη· οὔκουν εὐμήχανός γέ εἰμι λόγου. [¶19] Socrates. And it is reasonable, my friend, that Pan is the double-natured son of Hermes. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τό γε τὸν Πᾶνα τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ εἶναι ὑὸν διφυῆ ἔχει τὸ εἰκός, ὦ ἑταῖρε. [¶20] Hermogenes. How is that? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς δή; [¶21] Socrates. You know that speech makes all things (πᾶν) known and always makes them circulate and move about, and is twofold, true and false. > Greek: ΣΩ. οἶσθα ὅτι ὁ λόγος τὸ πᾶν σημαίνει καὶ κυκλεῖ καὶ πολεῖ ἀεί, καὶ ἔστι διπλοῦς, ἀληθής τε καὶ ψευδής. [¶22] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶23] Socrates. Well, the true part is smooth and divine and dwells aloft among the gods, but falsehood dwells below among common men, is rough and like the tragic goat; for tales and falsehoods are most at home there, in the tragic life. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ λεῖον καὶ θεῖον καὶ ἄνω οἰκοῦν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος κάτω ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τραχὺ καὶ τραγικόν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πλεῖστοι οἱ μῦθοί τε καὶ τὰ ψεύδη ἐστίν, περὶ τὸν τραγικὸν βίον. [¶24] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶25] Socrates. Then Pan, who declares and always moves (ἀεὶ πολῶν) all, is rightly called goat-herd (αἰπόλος), being the double-natured son of Hermes, smooth in his upper parts, rough and goat-like in his lower parts. And Pan, if he is the son of Hermes, is either speech or the brother of speech, and that brother resembles brother is not at all surprising. But, as I said, my friend, let us get away from the gods. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ἄρʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ ὁ πᾶν μηνύων καὶ ἀεὶ πολῶν Πὰν αἰπόλος εἴη, διφυὴς Ἑρμοῦ ὑός, τὰ μὲν ἄνωθεν λεῖος, τὰ δὲ κάτωθεν τραχὺς καὶ τραγοειδής. καὶ ἔστιν ἤτοι λόγος ἢ λόγου ἀδελφὸς ὁ Πάν, εἴπερ Ἑρμοῦ ὑός ἐστιν· ἀδελφῷ δὲ ἐοικέναι ἀδελφὸν οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὦ μακάριε, ἀπαλλαγῶμεν ἐκ τῶν θεῶν. [¶26] Hermogenes. From such gods as those, if you like, Socrates; but why should you not tell of another kind of gods, such as sun, moon, stars, earth, ether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τῶν γε τοιούτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ βούλει. περὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε δὲ τί σε κωλύει διελθεῖν, οἷον ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων καὶ γῆς καὶ αἰθέρος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ὡρῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ; [¶27] Socrates. You are imposing a good many tasks upon me; however, if it will give you pleasure, I am willing. > Greek: ΣΩ. συχνὰ μέν μοι προστάττεις, ὅμως δέ, εἴπερ σοι κεχαρισμένον ἔσται, ἐθέλω. [¶28] Hermogenes. It will give me pleasure. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. καὶ μὴν χαριῇ. [¶29] Socrates. What, then, do you wish first? Shall we discuss the sun (Ἥλιος), as you mentioned it first? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὴ οὖν πρῶτον βούλει; ἢ ὥσπερ εἶπες τὸν ἥλιον διέλθωμεν; [¶30] Hermogenes. By all means. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶31] Socrates. I think it would be clearer if we were to use the Doric form of the name. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔοικε τοίνυν κατάδηλον γενόμενον ἂν μᾶλλον εἰ τῷ Δωρικῷ τις ὀνόματι χρῷτο— ἅλιον γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ Δωριῆς— ἅλιος οὖν εἴη μὲν ἂν κατὰ τὸ ἁλίζειν εἰς ταὐτὸν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπειδὰν ἀνατείλῃ, εἴη δʼ ἂν καὶ τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀεὶ εἱλεῖν ἰών, ἐοίκοι δʼ ἂν καὶ ὅτι ποικίλλει ἰὼν τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐκ τῆς γῆς· [¶32] 409. The Dorians call it Ἅλιος. Now ἅλιος might be derived from collecting (ἁλίζειν) men when he rises, or because he always turns (ἀεὶ εἱλεῖν) about the earth in his course, or because he variegates the products of the earth, for variegate is identical with αἰολλεῖν. Hermogenes. And what of the moon, Selene? > Greek: 409. τὸ δὲ ποικίλλειν καὶ αἰολεῖν ταὐτόν. ΕΡΜ. τί δὲ ἡ σελήνη; [¶33] Socrates. That name appears to put Anaxagoras in an uncomfortable position. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ὄνομα φαίνεται τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν πιέζειν. [¶34] Hermogenes. How so? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τί δή; [¶35] Socrates. Why, it seems to have anticipated by many years the recent doctrine of Anaxagoras, that the moon receives its light from the sun. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔοικε δηλοῦντι παλαιότερον ὃ ἐκεῖνος νεωστὶ ἔλεγεν, ὅτι ἡ σελήνη ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἔχει τὸ φῶς. [¶36] Hermogenes. How is that? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς δή; [¶37] Socrates. Σέλας (gleam) and φῶς (light) are the same thing. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ μέν που σέλας καὶ τὸ φῶς ταὐτόν. [¶38] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶39] Socrates. Now the light is always new and old about the moon, if the Anaxagoreans are right; for they say the sun, in its continuous course about the moon, always sheds new light upon it, and the light of the previous month persists. > Greek: ΣΩ. νέον δέ που καὶ ἕνον ἀεί ἐστι περὶ τὴν σελήνην τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι λέγουσιν· κύκλῳ γάρ που ἀεὶ αὐτὴν περιιὼν νέον ἀεὶ ἐπιβάλλει, ἕνον δὲ ὑπάρχει τὸ τοῦ προτέρου μηνός. [¶40] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶41] Socrates. The moon is often called Σελαναία. > Greek: ΣΩ. Σελαναίαν δέ γε καλοῦσιν αὐτὴν πολλοί. [¶42] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶43] Socrates. Because it has always a new and old gleam (σέλα νέον τε καὶ ἕνον) the very most fitting name for it would be Σελαενονεοάεια, which has been compressed into Σελαναία. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι δὲ σέλας νέον καὶ ἕνον ἔχει ἀεί, Σελαενονεοάεια μὲν δικαιότατʼ ἂν [τῶν] ὀνομάτων καλοῖτο, συγκεκροτημένον δὲ Σελαναία κέκληται. [¶44] Hermogenes. That is a regular opera bouffe name, Socrates. But what have you to say of the month (μήν) and the stars? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. διθυραμβῶδές γε τοῦτο τοὔνομα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἀλλὰ τὸν μῆνα καὶ τὰ ἄστρα πῶς λέγεις; [¶45] Socrates. The word “month” (μείς) would be properly pronounced μείης, from μειοῦσθαι, to grow less, and I think the stars (ἄστερα) get their name from ἀστραπή (lightning). But ἀστραπή, because it turns our eyes upwards (τὰ ὦπα ἀναστρέθει), would be called ἀναστρωπή, which is now pronounced more prettily ἀστραπή. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁ μὲν μεὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ μειοῦσθαι εἴη ἂν μείης ὀρθῶς κεκλημένος, τὰ δʼ ἄστρα ἔοικε τῆς ἀστραπῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν. ἡ δὲ ἀστραπή, ὅτι τὰ ὦπα ἀναστρέφει, ἀναστρωπὴ ἂν εἴη, νῦν δὲ ἀστραπὴ καλλωπισθεῖσα κέκληται. [¶46] Hermogenes. And what of πῦρ (fire) and ὕδωρ (water)? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τί δὲ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ; [¶47] Socrates. Πῦρ is too much for me. It must be that either the muse of Euthyphro has deserted me or this is a very difficult word. Now just note the contrivance I introduce in all cases like this which are too much for me. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ πῦρ ἀπορῶ· καὶ κινδυνεύει ἤτοι ἡ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονός με μοῦσα ἐπιλελοιπέναι, ἢ τοῦτό τι παγχάλεπον εἶναι. σκέψαι οὖν ἣν εἰσάγω μηχανὴν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἃ ἂν ἀπορῶ. [¶48] Hermogenes. What contrivance? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τίνα δή; [¶49] Socrates. I will tell you. Answer me; can you tell the reason of the word πῦρ? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. ἀπόκριναι γάρ μοι· ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πῦρ κατὰ τίνα τρόπον καλεῖται; [¶50] Hermogenes. Not I, by Zeus. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε. [¶51] Socrates. See what I suspect about it. I know that many Greeks, especially those who are subject to the barbarians, have adopted many foreign words. > Greek: ΣΩ. σκέψαι δὴ ὃ ἐγὼ ὑποπτεύω περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ ὅτι πολλὰ οἱ Ἕλληνες ὀνόματα ἄλλως τε καὶ οἱ ὑπὸ τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκοῦντες παρὰ τῶν βαρβάρων εἰλήφασιν. [¶52] Hermogenes. What of that? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τί οὖν δή; [¶53] Socrates. If we should try to demonstrate the fitness of those words in accordance with the Greek language, and not in accordance with the language from which they are derived, you know we should get into trouble. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἴ τις ζητοῖ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν φωνὴν ὡς εἰκότως κεῖται, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατʼ ἐκείνην ἐξ ἧς τὸ ὄνομα τυγχάνει ὄν, οἶσθα ὅτι ἀποροῖ ἄν. [¶54] Hermogenes. Naturally. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. εἰκότως γε. [¶55] 410. Socrates. Well, this word πῦρ is probably foreign; for it is difficult to connect it with the Greek language, and besides, the Phrygians have the same word, only slightly altered. The same is the case with ὕδωρ (water), κύων (dog), and many other words. > Greek: 410. ΣΩ. ὅρα τοίνυν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὸ πῦρ μή τι βαρβαρικὸν ᾖ. τοῦτο γὰρ οὔτε ῥᾴδιον προσάψαι ἐστὶν Ἑλληνικῇ φωνῇ, φανεροί τʼ εἰσὶν οὕτως αὐτὸ καλοῦντες Φρύγες σμικρόν τι παρακλίνοντες· καὶ τό γε ὕδωρ καὶ τὰς κύνας καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. [¶56] Hermogenes. Yes, that is true. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶57] Socrates. So we must not propose forced explanations of these words, though something might be said about them. I therefore set aside πῦρ and ὕδωρ in this way. But is air called ἀήρ because it raises (αἴρει) things from the earth, or because it is always flowing (ἀεὶ ῥεῖ), or because wind arises from its flow? The poets call the winds ἀήτας, blasts. Perhaps the poet means to say “air-flow” (ἀητόρρουν), as he might say “wind-flow” (πνευματόρρουν). The word αἴθηρ (ether) I understand in this way: because it always runs and flows about the air (ἀεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέον), it may properly be called ἀειθεήρα. The word γῆ (earth) shows the meaning better in the form γαῖα; for γαῖα is a correct word for “mother,” as Homer says, for he uses γεγάασιν to mean γεγενῆσθαι (be born). Well, now what came next? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ταῦτα προσβιάζεσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἔχοι γʼ ἄν τις εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πῦρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ταύτῃ ἀπωθοῦμαι· ὁ δὲ δὴ ἀὴρ ἆρά γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ὅτι αἴρει τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, ἀὴρ κέκληται; ἢ ὅτι ἀεὶ ῥεῖ; ἢ ὅτι πνεῦμα ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίγνεται ῥέοντος; οἱ γὰρ ποιηταί που τὰ πνεύματα ἀήτας καλοῦσιν· ἴσως οὖν λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι πνευματόρρουν, ἀητόρρουν [ὅθεν δὴ βούλεται αὐτὸν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀήρ]. τὸν δὲ αἰθέρα τῇδέ πῃ ὑπολαμβάνω, ὅτι ἀεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέων ἀειθεὴρ δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο. γῆ δὲ μᾶλλον σημαίνει ὃ βούλεται ἐάν τις γαῖαν ὀνομάσῃ· γαῖα γὰρ γεννήτειρα ἂν εἴη ὀρθῶς κεκλημένη, ὥς φησιν Ὅμηρος· τὸ γὰρ γεγάασιν γεγεννῆσθαι λέγει. εἶεν· τί οὖν ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; [¶58] Hermogenes. The seasons, Socrates, and the two words for year. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ὧραι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς καὶ ἔτος. [¶59] Socrates. The word ὧραι (seasons) should be pronounced in the old Attic fashion, ὅραι, if you wish to know the probable meaning; ΗΟΡΑΙ exist to divide winters and summers and winds and the fruits of the earth; and since they divide (ὁρίζουσι), they would rightly be called ὅραι. The two words for year, ἐνιαυτός and ἔτος, are really one. For that which brings to light within itself the plants and animals, each in its turn, and examines them, is called by some ἐνιαυτός, because of its activity within itself (ἐν ἑαυτῷ), and by others ἔτος, because it examines (ἐτάζει), just as we saw before that the name of Zeus was divided and some said Δία and others Ζῆνα. The whole phrase is “that which examines within itself” (τὸ ἐν ἁυτῷ ἐτάζον), and this one phrase is divided in speech so that the two words ἐνιαυτός and ἔτος are formed from one phrase. > Greek: ΣΩ. αἱ μὲν δὴ ὧραι Ἀττικιστὶ ὡς τὸ παλαιὸν ῥητέον, εἴπερ βούλει τὸ εἰκὸς εἰδέναι· ΗΟΡΑΙ γάρ εἰσι διὰ τὸ ὁρίζειν χειμῶνάς τε καὶ θέρη καὶ πνεύματα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς γῆς· ὁρίζουσαι δὲ δικαίως ἂν ὅραι καλοῖντο. ἐνιαυτὸς δὲ καὶ ἔτος κινδυνεύει ἕν τι εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τὰ φυόμενα καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον προάγον εἰς φῶς καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ ἐξετάζον, τοῦτο, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα δίχα διῃρημένον οἱ μὲν Ζῆνα, οἱ δὲ Δία ἐκάλουν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οἱ δὲ ἔτος, ὅτι ἐτάζει· ὁ δὲ ὅλος λόγος ἐστὶν τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐτάζον τοῦτο προσαγορεύεσθαι ἓν ὂν δίχα, ὥστε δύο ὀνόματα γεγονέναι, ἐνιαυτόν τε καὶ ἔτος, ἐξ ἑνὸς λόγου. [¶60] Hermogenes. Truly, Socrates, you are going ahead at a great rate. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀλλὰ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολὺ ἐπιδίδως. [¶61] Socrates. Yes, I fancy I am already far along on the road of wisdom. > Greek: ΣΩ. πόρρω ἤδη οἶμαι φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαύνειν. [¶62] Hermogenes. I am sure you are. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶63] Socrates. You will be surer presently. > Greek: ΣΩ. τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις. [¶64] 411. Hermogenes. Now after the class of words you, have explained, I should like to examine the correctness of the noble words that relate to virtue, such as wisdom, intelligence, justice, and all the others of that sort. > Greek: 411. ΕΡΜ. ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος ἔγωγε ἡδέως ἂν θεασαίμην ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ ὀνόματα τίνι ποτὲ ὀρθότητι κεῖται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀρετήν, οἷον φρόνησίς τε καὶ σύνεσις καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα. [¶65] Socrates. You are stirring up a mighty tribe of words, my friend; however, since I have put on the lion helmet, I must not play the coward, but must, it seems, examine wisdom, intelligence, thought, knowledge, and all the other noble words of which you speak. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐγείρεις μέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐ φαῦλον γένος ὀνομάτων· ὅμως δὲ ἐπειδήπερ τὴν λεοντῆν ἐνδέδυκα, οὐκ ἀποδειλιατέον ἀλλʼ ἐπισκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικε, φρόνησιν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ γνώμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ τἆλλα δὴ ἃ φῂς πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ ὀνόματα. [¶66] Hermogenes. Certainly we must not stop until that is done. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐ δεῖ ἡμᾶς προαποστῆναι. [¶67] Socrates. By dog, I believe I have a fine intuition which has just come to me, that the very ancient men who invented names were quite like most of the present philosophers who always get dizzy as they turn round and round in their search for the nature of things, and then the things seem to them to turn round and round and be in motion. They think the cause of this belief is not an affection within themselves, but that the nature of things really is such that nothing is at rest or stable, but everything is flowing and moving and always full of constant motion and generation. I say this because I thought of it with reference to all these words we are now considering. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μήν, νὴ τὸν κύνα, δοκῶ γέ μοι οὐ κακῶς μαντεύεσθαι, ὃ καὶ νυνδὴ ἐνενόησα, ὅτι οἱ πάνυ παλαιοὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ τιθέμενοι τὰ ὀνόματα παντὸς μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν νῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυκνὰ περιστρέφεσθαι ζητοῦντες ὅπῃ ἔχει τὰ ὄντα εἰλιγγιῶσιν, κἄπειτα αὐτοῖς φαίνεται περιφέρεσθαι τὰ πράγματα καὶ πάντως φέρεσθαι. αἰτιῶνται δὴ οὐ τὸ ἔνδον τὸ παρὰ σφίσιν πάθος αἴτιον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς δόξης, ἀλλὰ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα οὕτω πεφυκέναι, οὐδὲν αὐτῶν μόνιμον εἶναι οὐδὲ βέβαιον, ἀλλὰ ῥεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι καὶ μεστὰ εἶναι πάσης φορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως ἀεί. λέγω δὴ ἐννοήσας πρὸς πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ ὀνόματα. [¶68] Hermogenes. How is that, Socrates? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶69] Socrates. Perhaps you did not observe that the names we just mentioned are given under the assumption that the things named are moving and flowing and being generated. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ κατενόησας ἴσως τὰ ἄρτι λεγόμενα ὅτι παντάπασιν ὡς φερομένοις τε καὶ ῥέουσι καὶ γιγνομένοις τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπίκειται. [¶70] Hermogenes. No, I did not notice that at all. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐ πάνυ ἐνεθυμήθην. [¶71] Socrates. Surely the first one we mentioned is subject to such assumptions. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ὃ πρῶτον εἴπομεν παντάπασιν ὡς ἐπὶ τοιούτων ἐστίν. [¶72] Hermogenes. What is the word? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶73] Socrates. Wisdom (φρόνησις); for it is perception (νόησις) of motion (φορᾶς) and flowing (ῥοῦ); or it might be understood as benefit (ὄνησις) of motion (φορᾶς); in either case it has to do with motion. And γνώμη (thought), if you please, certainly denotes contemplation and consideration of generation (γονῆς νώμησις); for to consider is the same as to contemplate. Or, if you please, νόησις (intelligence) is merely ἕσις (desire) τοῦ νεοῦ (of the new); but that things are new shows that they are always being generated; therefore the soul’s desire for generation is declared by the giver of the name νεόεσις; for in antiquity the name was not νόησις, but two epsilons had to be spoken instead of the eta. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἡ φρόνησις· φορᾶς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ῥοῦ νόησις. εἴη δʼ ἂν καὶ ὄνησιν ὑπολαβεῖν φορᾶς· ἀλλʼ οὖν περί γε τὸ φέρεσθαί ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἡ γνώμη παντάπασιν δηλοῖ γονῆς σκέψιν καὶ νώμησιν· τὸ γὰρ νωμᾶν καὶ τὸ σκοπεῖν ταὐτόν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸ ἡ νόησις τοῦ νέου ἐστὶν ἕσις, τὸ δὲ νέα εἶναι τὰ ὄντα σημαίνει γιγνόμενα ἀεὶ εἶναι· τούτου οὖν ἐφίεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν μηνύει τὸ ὄνομα ὁ θέμενος τὴν νεόεσιν. οὐ γὰρ νόησις τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκαλεῖτο, ἀλλʼ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἦτα εἶ ἔδει λέγειν δύο, νοέεσιν. [¶74] Socrates. Σωφροσύνη (self-restraint) is σωτηρία (salvation) of φρόνησις (wisdom), which we have just been discussing. > Greek: ΣΩ. σωφροσύνη δὲ σωτηρία οὗ νυνδὴ ἐσκέμμεθα, φρονήσεως. [¶75] 412. And ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) indicates that the soul which is of any account accompanies (ἕπεται) things in their motion, neither falling behind them nor running in front of them; therefore we ought to insert an epsilon and call it ἐπεϊστήμη. Σύνεσις (intelligence) in its turn is a kind of reckoning together; when one says συνιέναι (understand), the same thing as ἐπίστασθαι is said; for συνιέναι means that the soul goes with things. Certainly σοφία (wisdom) denotes the touching of motion. This word is very obscure and of foreign origin; but we must remember that the poets often say of something which begins to advance ἐσύθη (it rushed). There was a famous Laconian whose name was Σοῦς (Rush), for this is the Laconian word for rapid motion. Now σοφία signifies the touching (ἐπαφή) of this rapid motion, the assumption being that things are in motion. And the word ἀγαθόν (good) is intended to denote the admirable (ἀγαστόν) in all nature. For since all things are in motion, they possess quickness and slowness; now not all that is swift, but only part of it, is admirable; this name ἀγαθόν is therefore given to the admirable (ἀγαστόν) part of the swift (θοοῦ).It is easy to conjecture that the word δικαιασύνη applies to the understanding (σύνεσις) of the just (τοῦ διαίον) but the word δίκαιον (just) is itself difficult. Up to a certain point, you see, many men seem to agree about it, but beyond that they differ. For those who think the universe is in motion believe that the greater part of it is of such a nature as to be a mere receptacle, and that there is some element which passes through all this, by means of which all created things are generated. And this element must be very rapid and very subtle; for it could not pass through all the universe unless it were very subtle, so that nothing could keep it out, and it must be very swift, so that all other things are relatively at rest. Since, then, it superintends and passes through (διαϊόν) all other things, this is rightly called by the name δίκαιον, the sound of the kappa being added merely for the sake of euphony. Socrates. Up to this point, as I said just now, many men agree about justice (δίκαιον); > Greek: 412. καὶ μὴν ἥ γε ἐπιστήμη μηνύει ὡς φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἑπομένης τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀξίας λόγου, καὶ οὔτε ἀπολειπομένης οὔτε προθεούσης· διὸ δὴ ἐμβάλλοντας δεῖ τὸ εἶ ἑπεϊστήμην αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν. σύνεσις δʼ αὖ οὕτω μὲν δόξειεν ἂν ὥσπερ συλλογισμὸς εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ συνιέναι λέγῃ, ταὐτὸν παντάπασιν τῷ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει λεγόμενον· συμπορεύεσθαι γὰρ λέγει τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸ συνιέναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε σοφία φορᾶς ἐφάπτεσθαι σημαίνει. σκοτωδέστερον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ξενικώτερον· ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐκ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι ὅτι πολλαχοῦ λέγουσιν περὶ ὅτου ἂν τύχωσιν τῶν ἀρχομένων ταχὺ προϊέναι ἐσύθη φασίν. Λακωνικῷ δὲ ἀνδρὶ τῶν εὐδοκίμων καὶ ὄνομα ἦν Σοῦς· τὴν γὰρ ταχεῖαν ὁρμὴν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦτο καλοῦσιν. ταύτης οὖν τῆς φορᾶς ἐπαφὴν σημαίνει ἡ σοφία, ὡς φερομένων τῶν ὄντων. καὶ μὴν τό γε ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο τῆς φύσεως πάσης τῷ ἀγαστῷ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα ἐπικεῖσθαι. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πορεύεται τὰ ὄντα, ἔνι μὲν ἄρʼ αὐτοῖς τάχος, ἔνι δὲ βραδυτής. ἔστιν οὖν οὐ πᾶν τὸ ταχὺ ἀλλὰ τὶ αὐτοῦ ἀγαστόν. τοῦ θοοῦ δὴ τῷ ἀγαστῷ αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστίν, τἀγαθόν.δικαιοσύνη δέ, ὅτι μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ δικαίου συνέσει τοῦτο κεῖται τὸ ὄνομα, ῥᾴδιον συμβαλεῖν· αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον χαλεπόν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἔοικε μέχρι μέν του ὁμολογεῖσθαι παρὰ πολλῶν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι. ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι οἷον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χωρεῖν, διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναί τι διεξιόν, διʼ οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι· εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἰέναι παντός, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε ἦν ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον ὥστε χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ ἑστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ δʼ οὖν ἐπιτροπεύει τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διαϊόν, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὀρθῶς δίκαιον, εὐστομίας ἕνεκα τὴν τοῦ κάππα δύναμιν προσλαβόν. ΣΩ. μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, παρὰ πολλῶν ὁμολογεῖται τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· [¶76] 413. and I, Hermogenes, being very much in earnest about it, have persistently asked questions and have been told in secret teachings that this is justice, or the cause—for that through which creation takes place is a cause—and some one told me that it was for this reason rightly called Zeus (Δία). But when, after hearing this, I nevertheless ask them quietly, “What then, my most excellent friend, if this is true, is justice?” they think I am asking too many questions and am leaping over the trenches. They say I have been told enough; they try to satisfy me by saying all sorts of different things, and they no longer agree. For one says the sun is justice, for the sun alone superintends all things, passing through and burning (διαϊόντα καὶ καίοντα) them. Then when I am pleased and tell this to some one, thinking it is a fine answer, he laughs at me and asks if I think there is no justice among men when the sun has set. So I beg him to tell me what he thinks it is, and he says “Fire.” But this is not easy to understand. He says it is not actual fire, but heat in the abstract that is in the fire. Another man says he laughs at all these notions, and that justice is what Anaxagoras says it is, mind; for mind, he says, is ruled only by itself, is mixed with nothing, orders all things, and passes through them. Then, my friend, I am far more perplexed than before I undertook to learn about the nature of justice. But I think the name—and that was the subject of our investigation—was given for the reasons I have mentioned. Hermogenes. I think, Socrates, you must have heard this from some one and are not inventing it yourself. > Greek: 413. ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ἅτε λιπαρὴς ὢν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπέπυσμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον—διʼ ὃ γὰρ γίγνεται, τοῦτʼ ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον—καὶ Δία καλεῖν ἔφη τις τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἔχειν διὰ ταῦτα. ἐπειδὰν δʼ ἠρέμα αὐτοὺς ἐπανερωτῶ ἀκούσας ταῦτα μηδὲν ἧττον· τί οὖν ποτʼ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε, δίκαιον, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; δοκῶ τε ἤδη μακρότερα τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα ἅλλεσθαι. ἱκανῶς γάρ μέ φασι πεπύσθαι [ἀκηκοέναι] καὶ ἐπιχειροῦσιν, βουλόμενοι ἀποπιμπλάναι με, ἄλλος ἄλλα ἤδη λέγειν, καὶ οὐκέτι συμφωνοῦσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τίς φησιν τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον· τοῦτον γὰρ μόνον διαϊόντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὰν οὖν τῳ λέγω αὐτὸ ἅσμενος ὡς καλόν τι ἀκηκοώς, καταγελᾷ μου οὗτος ἀκούσας καὶ ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἶμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἥλιος δύῃ. λιπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ὅτι αὖ ἐκεῖνος λέγει αὐτό, τὸ πῦρ φησιν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι. ὁ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησιν, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνόν. ὁ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελᾶν φησιν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο· αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμειγμένον πάντα φησὶν αὐτὸν κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, πολὺ ἐν πλείονι ἀπορίᾳ εἰμὶ ἢ πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι μανθάνειν περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν. ἀλλʼ οὖν οὗπερ ἕνεκα ἐσκοποῦμεν, τό γε ὄνομα τοῦτο φαίνεται αὐτῷ διὰ ταῦτα κεῖσθαι. ΕΡΜ. φαίνῃ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα μὲν ἀκηκοέναι του καὶ οὐκ αὐτοσχεδιάζειν. [¶77] Socrates. And how about the rest of my talk? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ τἆλλα; [¶78] Hermogenes. I do not at all think you had heard that. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐ πάνυ. [¶79] Socrates. Listen then; perhaps I may deceive you into thinking that all I am going to say is my own. What remains to consider after justice? I think we have not yet discussed courage. It is plain enough that injustice (ἀδικία) is really a mere hindrance of that which passes through (τοῦ διαϊόντος, but the word ἀδρεία (courage) implies that courage got its name in battle, and if the universe is flowing, a battle in the universe can be nothing else than an opposite current or flow (ῥοή). Now if we remove the delta from the word ἀνδρεία, the word ἀνρεία signifies exactly that activity. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἄκουε δή· ἴσως γὰρ ἄν σε καὶ τὰ ἐπίλοιπα ἐξαπατήσαιμι ὡς οὐκ ἀκηκοὼς λέγω. μετὰ γὰρ δικαιοσύνην τί ἡμῖν λείπεται; ἀνδρείαν οἶμαι οὔπω διήλθομεν. ἀδικία μὲν γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶν ὄντος ἐμπόδισμα τοῦ διαϊόντος, ἀνδρεία δὲ σημαίνει ὡς ἐν μάχῃ ἐπονομαζομένης τῆς ἀνδρείας—μάχην δʼ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ὄντι, εἴπερ ῥεῖ, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν ῥοήν—ἐὰν οὖν τις ἐξέλῃ τὸ δέλτα τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς ἀνδρείας, αὐτὸ μηνύει τὸ ἔργον τὸ ὄνομα ἡ ἀνρεία. [¶80] Socrates. Of course it is clear that not the current opposed to every current is courage, but only that opposed to the current which is contrary to justice; > Greek: ΣΩ. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐ πάσῃ ῥοῇ ἡ ἐναντία ῥοὴ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ῥεούσῃ· [¶81] 414. for otherwise courage would not be praised. The words ἄρρεν (male) and ἀνήρ (man) refer, like ἀνδρεία, to the upward (ἄνω) current or flow. The word γυνή (woman) seems to me to be much the same as γονή (birth). I think θῆλυ (female) is derived from θηλή (teat); and is not θηλή, Hermogenes, so called because it makes things flourish (τεθηλέναι), like plants wet with showers? Hermogenes. Very likely, Socrates. > Greek: 414. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐπῃνεῖτο ἡ ἀνδρεία. καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ παραπλησίῳ τινὶ τούτῳ ἐστί, τῇ ἄνῳ ῥοῇ. γυνὴ δὲ γονή μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι εἶναι. τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἀπὸ τῆς θηλῆς τι φαίνεται ἐπωνομάσθαι· ἡ δὲ θηλὴ ἆρά γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ὅτι τεθηλέναι ποιεῖ ὥσπερ τὰ ἀρδόμενα; ΕΡΜ. ἔοικέν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶82] Socrates. And again, the word θάλλειν (flourish) seems to me to figure the rapid and sudden growth of the young. Something of that sort the namegiver has reproduced in the name, which he compounded of θεῖν (run) and ἅλλεσθαι (jump). You do not seem to notice how I rush along outside of the race-course, when I get on smooth ground. But we still have plenty of subjects left which seem to be serious. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε τὸ θάλλειν τὴν αὔξην μοι δοκεῖ ἀπεικάζειν τὴν τῶν νέων, ὅτι ταχεῖα καὶ ἐξαιφνιδία γίγνεται. οἷόνπερ οὖν μεμίμηται τῷ ὀνόματι, συναρμόσας ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν καὶ ἅλλεσθαι τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλʼ οὐ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖς με ὥσπερ ἐκτὸς δρόμου φερόμενον ἐπειδὰν λείου ἐπιλάβωμαι· ἐπίλοιπα δὲ ἡμῖν ἔτι συχνὰ τῶν δοκούντων σπουδαίων εἶναι. [¶83] Hermogenes. True. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶84] Socrates. One of which is to see what the word τέχνη (art, science) means. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὧν γʼ ἔστιν ἓν καὶ τέχνην ἰδεῖν ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται εἶναι. [¶85] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶86] Socrates. Does not this denote possession of mind, if you remove the tau and insert omicron between the chi and the nu and the nu and the eta (making ἐχονόη)? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε ἕξιν νοῦ σημαίνει, τὸ μὲν ταῦ ἀφελόντι, ἐμβαλόντι δὲ οὖ μεταξὺ τοῦ χεῖ καὶ τοῦ νῦ καὶ ⟨τοῦ νῦ καὶ⟩ τοῦ ἦτα; [¶87] Hermogenes. It does it very poorly, Socrates. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. καὶ μάλα γε γλίσχρως, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶88] Socrates. My friend, you do not bear in mind that the original words have before now been completely buried by those who wished to dress them up, for they have added and subtracted letters for the sake of euphony and have distorted the words in every way for ornamentation or merely in the lapse of time. Do you not, for instance, think it absurd that the letter rho is inserted in the word κάαπτρον (mirror)? I think that sort of thing is the work of people who care nothing for truth, but only for the shape of their mouths; so they keep adding to the original words until finally no human being can understand what in the world the word means. So the sphinx, for instance, is called sphinx, instead of phix, and there are many other examples. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τεθέντα κατακέχωσται ἤδη ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τραγῳδεῖν αὐτά, περιτιθέντων γράμματα καὶ ἐξαιρούντων εὐστομίας ἕνεκα καὶ πανταχῇ στρεφόντων, καὶ ὑπὸ καλλωπισμοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρόνου. ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ κατόπτρῳ οὐ δοκεῖ [σοι] ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ ἐμβεβλῆσθαι τὸ ῥῶ; ἀλλὰ τοιαῦτα οἶμαι ποιοῦσιν οἱ τῆς μὲν ἀληθείας οὐδὲν φροντίζοντες, τὸ δὲ στόμα πλάττοντες, ὥστʼ ἐπεμβάλλοντες πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τελευτῶντες ποιοῦσιν μηδʼ ἂν ἕνα ἀνθρώπων συνεῖναι ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα· ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν Σφίγγα ἀντὶ φικὸς σφίγγα καλοῦσιν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. [¶89] Hermogenes. Yes, that is true, Socrates. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ταῦτα μὲν ἔστιν οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶90] Socrates. And if we are permitted to insert and remove any letters we please in words, it will be perfectly easy to fit any name to anything. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δʼ αὖ τις ἐάσει καὶ ἐντιθέναι καὶ ἐξαιρεῖν ἅττʼ ἂν βούληταί τις εἰς τὰ ὀνόματα, πολλὴ εὐπορία ἔσται καὶ πᾶν ἂν παντί τις ὄνομα πράγματι προσαρμόσειεν. [¶91] Hermogenes. True. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶92] Socrates. Yes, quite true. But I think you, as a wise director, must observe the rule of moderation and probability. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ μέντοι. ἀλλὰ τὸ μέτριον οἶμαι δεῖ φυλάττειν καὶ τὸ εἰκὸς σὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἐπιστάτην. [¶93] Hermogenes. I should like to do so. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. βουλοίμην ἄν. [¶94] Socrates. And I, too, Hermogenes. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγώ σοι συμβούλομαι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες. ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀκριβολογοῦ, μή μʼ ἀπογυιώσῃς μένεος. [¶95] 415. But do not, my friend, demand too much precision, lest you “enfeeble me of my sight.” For now that τέχνη (art) is disposed of, I am nearing the loftiest height of my subject, when once we have investigated μηχανή(contrivance). For I think μηχανή signifies ἄνειν ἐπὶ πολύ (much accomplishment); for μῆκος (length) has about the same meaning as τὸ πολύ (much), and the name μηχανή is composed of these two, μῆκος and ἄνειν. But, as I was just saying, we must go on to the loftiest height of our subject; we must search for the meaning of the words ἀρετή (virtue) and κακία (wickedness). Now one of them I cannot yet see; but the other seems to be quite clear, since it agrees with everything we have said before. For inasmuch as all things are in motion, everything that moves badly (κακῶς ἰόν) would be evil (κακία); and when this evil motion in relation to its environment exists in the soul, it receives the general name κακία (evil) in the special sense of wickedness. But the nature of evil motion (κακῶς ἰέναι) is made clear, I think, also in the word δειλία (cowardice), which we have not yet discussed. We passed it by, when we ought to have examined it after ἀνδρεία (courage); and I fancy we passed over a good many other words. Now the meaning of δειλία is a strong bond of the soul; for λίαν (excessively) is, in a way, expressive of strength; so δειλία would be the excessive or greatest bond (δεσμός, δεῖν) of the soul; and so, too, ἀπορία (perplexity) is an evil, as is everything, apparently, which hinders motion and progress (πορεύεσθαι). This, then, seems to be the meaning of evil motion (κακῶς ἰέναι), that advance is halting and impeded; and the soul that is infected by it becomes filled with wickedness (κακία). If these are the reasons for the name of wickedness, virtue (ἀρετή) would be the opposite of this; it would signify first ease of motion, and secondly that the flow of the good soul is always unimpeded, and therefore it has received this name, which designates that which always flows (ἀεὶ ῥέον) without let or hindrance. It is properly called ἀειρειτή, or perhaps also αἱρετή, indicating that this condition is especially to be chosen; but it has been compressed and is pronounced ἀρετή. Perhaps you will say this is another invention of mine; but I say if what I said just now about κακία is right, this about the name of ἀρετή is right too. > Greek: 415. ἔρχομαι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν ὧν εἴρηκα, ἐπειδὰν μετὰ τέχνην μηχανὴν ἐπισκεψώμεθα. μηχανὴ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦ ἄνειν ἐπὶ πολὺ σημεῖον εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ μῆκός πως τὸ πολὺ σημαίνει· ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὖν τούτοιν σύγκειται, μήκους τε καὶ τοῦ ἄνειν, τὸ ὄνομα ἡ μηχανή. ἀλλʼ, ὅπερ νυνδὴ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν δεῖ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐλθεῖν· ἀρετὴ γὰρ καὶ κακία ὅτι βούλεται τὰ ὀνόματα ζητητέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον οὔπω καθορῶ, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον δοκεῖ μοι κατάδηλον εἶναι. συμφωνεῖ γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν πᾶσιν. ἅτε γὰρ ἰόντων τῶν πραγμάτων, πᾶν τὸ κακῶς ἰὸν κακία ἂν εἴη· τοῦτο δὲ ὅταν ἐν ψυχῇ ᾖ, τὸ κακῶς ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα, μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει τῆς κακίας. τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἰέναι ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν, δοκεῖ μοι δηλοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ δειλίᾳ, ὃ οὔπω διήλθομεν ἀλλʼ ὑπερέβημεν, δέον αὐτὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν σκέψασθαι· δοκοῦμεν δέ μοι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὑπερβεβηκέναι. ἡ δʼ οὖν δειλία τῆς ψυχῆς σημαίνει δεσμὸν εἶναι ἰσχυρόν· τὸ γὰρ λίαν ἰσχύς τίς ἐστιν. δεσμὸς οὖν ὁ λίαν καὶ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δειλία ἂν εἴη· ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἡ ἀπορία κακόν, καὶ πᾶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι ἂν ἐμποδὼν ᾖ τῷ ἰέναι καὶ πορεύεσθαι. τοῦτʼ οὖν φαίνεται τὸ κακῶς ἰέναι δηλοῦν, τὸ ἰσχομένως τε καὶ ἐμποδιζομένως πορεύεσθαι, ὃ δὴ ψυχὴ ὅταν ἔχῃ, κακίᾳ μεστὴ γίγνεται. εἰ δʼ ἐπὶ τοιούτοις ἡ κακία ἐστὶν τοὔνομα, τοὐναντίον τούτου ἡ ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη, σημαῖνον πρῶτον μὲν εὐπορίαν, ἔπειτα δὲ λελυμένην τὴν ῥοὴν τῆς ἀγαθῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι ἀεί, ὥστε τὸ ἀσχέτως καὶ τὸ ἀκωλύτως ἀεὶ ῥέον ἐπωνυμίαν εἴληφεν, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦτο τοὔνομα, ⟨ὃ⟩ ὀρθῶς μὲν ἔχει ἀειρείτην καλεῖν, [ἴσως δὲ αἱρετὴν λέγει, ὡς οὔσης ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως αἱρετωτάτης,] συγκεκρότηται δὲ καὶ καλεῖται ἀρετή. καὶ ἴσως με αὖ φήσεις πλάττειν· ἐγὼ δέ φημι, εἴπερ ὃ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἡ κακία, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν ἀρετὴν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν. [¶96] 416. Hermogenes. But what is the meaning of the word κακόν which you used in many of your derivations? > Greek: 416. ΕΡΜ. τὸ δὲ δὴ κακόν, διʼ οὗ πολλὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηκας, τί ἂν νοοῖ τοὔνομα; [¶97] Socrates. By Zeus, I think it is a strange word and hard to understand; so I apply to it that contrivance of mine. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἄτοπόν τι νὴ Δία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ χαλεπὸν συμβαλεῖν. ἐπάγω οὖν καὶ τούτῳ ἐκείνην τὴν μηχανήν. [¶98] Hermogenes. What contrivance? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ποίαν ταύτην; [¶99] Socrates. The claim of foreign origin, which I advance in this case as in those others. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν τοῦ βαρβαρικόν τι καὶ τοῦτο φάναι εἶναι. [¶100] Hermogenes. Well, probably you are right. But, if you please, let us drop these words and try to discover the reasons for the words καλόν (beautiful, noble) and αἰσχρόν (base). > Greek: ΕΡΜ. καὶ ἔοικάς γε ὀρθῶς λέγοντι. ἀλλʼ εἰ δοκεῖ, ταῦτα μὲν ἐῶμεν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ [τὸ] αἰσχρὸν πειρώμεθα ἰδεῖν πῇ εὐλόγως ἔχει. [¶101] Socrates. I think the meaning of αἰσχρόν is clear, and this also agrees with what has been said before. For the giver of names appears to me throughout to denounce that which hinders and restrains things from flowing, and in this instance he gave to that which always restrains the flow (ἀεὶ ἴσχει τὸν ῥοῦν) this name ἀεισχοροῦν, which is now compressed and pronounced αἰσχρόν. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχρὸν καὶ δὴ κατάδηλόν μοι φαίνεται ὃ νοεῖ· καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογεῖται. τὸ γὰρ ἐμποδίζον καὶ ἴσχον τῆς ῥοῆς τὰ ὄντα λοιδορεῖν μοι φαίνεται διὰ παντὸς ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθείς, καὶ νῦν τῷ ἀεὶ ἴσχοντι τὸν ῥοῦν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔθετο ⟨τὸ⟩ ἀεισχοροῦν· νῦν δὲ συγκροτήσαντες αἰσχρὸν καλοῦσιν. [¶102] Hermogenes. What about καλόν? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τί δὲ τὸ καλόν; [¶103] Socrates. That is harder to understand, and yet it expresses its meaning: it has been altered merely in accent and in the length of the O. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο χαλεπώτερον κατανοῆσαι. καίτοι λέγει γε αὐτό· ἁρμονίᾳ μόνον καὶ μήκει τοῦ οὖ παρῆκται. [¶104] Hermogenes. How is that? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς δή; [¶105] Socrates. I think this word denotes intellect. > Greek: ΣΩ. τῆς διανοίας τις ἔοικεν ἐπωνυμία εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα. [¶106] Hermogenes. What do you mean? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς λέγεις; [¶107] Socrates. Why, what do you think is the cause why anything is called by a name? Is it not the power which gave the name? > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε, τί οἴει σὺ εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον κληθῆναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τὸ τὰ ὀνόματα θέμενον; [¶108] Hermogenes. Why, certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάντως που. [¶109] Socrates. And is not that power the intellect either of gods or of men or both? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διάνοια ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ἤτοι θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἀμφότερα; [¶110] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶111] Socrates. Are not that which called things by name and that which calls them by name (τὸ καλοῦν) the same thing, namely intellect? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ καλέσαν τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὸ καλοῦν ταὐτόν ἐστιν τοῦτο, διάνοια; [¶112] Hermogenes. Yes, clearly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται. [¶113] Socrates. And are not all works which are done by mind and intelligence worthy of praise, and those that are not done by them worthy of blame? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσα μὲν ἂν νοῦς τε καὶ διάνοια ἐργάσηται, ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἐπαινετά, ἃ δὲ μή, ψεκτά; [¶114] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶115] Socrates. Does not the medical power perform medical works and the power of carpentry works of carpentry? Do you agree to that? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ οὖν ἰατρικὸν ἰατρικὰ ἐργάζεται καὶ τὸ τεκτονικὸν τεκτονικά; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; [¶116] Hermogenes. I agree. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὕτως ἔγωγε. [¶117] Socrates. And the beautiful performs beautiful works? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τὸ καλοῦν ἄρα καλά; [¶118] Hermogenes. It must do so. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. δεῖ γέ τοι. [¶119] Socrates. And the beautiful is, we say, intellect? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστι δέ γε τοῦτο, ὥς φαμεν, διάνοια; [¶120] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶121] Socrates. Then this name, the beautiful, is rightly given to mind, since it accomplishes the works which we call beautiful and in which we delight. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ἄρα φρονήσεως αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστὶν τὸ καλὸν τῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζομένης, ἃ δὴ καλὰ φάσκοντες εἶναι ἀσπαζόμεθα. [¶122] Hermogenes. Evidently. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται. [¶123] Socrates. What further words of this sort are left for us? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν ἔτι ἡμῖν λοιπὸν τῶν τοιούτων; [¶124] Hermogenes. Those that are related to the good and the beautiful, such as συμφέροντα (advantageous), λυσιτελοῦντα (profitable), ὠφέλιμα (useful), κερδαλέα (gainful), and their opposites. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ταῦτα τὰ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν, συμφέροντά τε καὶ λυσιτελοῦντα καὶ ὠφέλιμα καὶ κερδαλέα καὶ τἀναντία τούτων. [¶125] 417. Socrates. You might by this time be able to find the meaning of συμφέροντα by yourself in the light of the previous explanations, for it appears to be own brother to ἐπιστήμη. It means nothing else but the motion (φορά) of the soul in company with the world, and naturally things which are done by such a power are called συμφέροντα and σύμφορα because they are carried round with (συμπεριφέρεσθαι) the world. But κερδαλέον is from κέρδος (gain). If you restore nu in the word κέρδος in place of the delta, the meaning is plain; it signifies good, but in another way. Because it passes through and is mingled (κεράννυται) with all things, he who named it gave it this name which indicates that function; but he inserted a delta instead of nu and said κέρδος. > Greek: 417. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν συμφέρον ἤδη που κἂν σὺ εὕροις ἐκ τῶν πρότερον ἐπισκοπῶν· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἀδελφόν τι φαίνεται. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο δηλοῖ ἢ τὴν ἅμα φορὰν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου πραττόμενα συμφέροντά τε καὶ σύμφορα κεκλῆσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ συμπεριφέρεσθαι ἔοικε, τὸ δέ γε κερδαλέον ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους. κέρδος δὲ νῦ ἀντὶ τοῦ δέλτα ἀποδιδόντι ἐς τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῖ ὃ βούλεται· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν κατʼ ἄλλον τρόπον ὀνομάζει. ὅτι γὰρ κεράννυται ἐς πάντα διεξιόν, ταύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπονομάζων ἔθετο τοὔνομα· δέλτα ⟨δʼ⟩ ἐνθεὶς ἀντὶ τοῦ νῦ κέρδος ἐφθέγξατο. [¶126] Hermogenes. And what is λυσιτελοῦν? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. Λυσιτελοῦν δὲ τί δή; [¶127] Socrates. I do not think, Hermogenes, the name-giver gives the meaning to λυσιτελοῦν which it has in the language of tradesfolk, when profit sets free (ἀπολύει) the sum invested, but he means that because it is the swiftest thing in the world it does not allow things to remain at rest and does not allow the motion to come to any end (τέλος) of movement or to stop or pause, but always, if any end of the motion is attempted, it sets it free, making it unceasing and immortal. It is in this sense, I think, that the good is dubbed λυσιτελοῦν, for it frees (λύει) the end (τέλος) of the motion. But the word ὠφέλιμον is a foreign one, which Homer often uses in the verbal form ὀφέλλειν. This is a synonym of “increase” and “create.” > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔοικεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, οὐχὶ καθάπερ οἱ κάπηλοι αὐτῷ χρῶνται, ἐὰν τὸ ἀνάλωμα ἀπολύῃ, οὐ ταύτῃ λέγειν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι τάχιστον ὂν τοῦ ὄντος ἵστασθαι οὐκ ἐᾷ τὰ πράγματα, οὐδὲ τέλος λαβοῦσαν τὴν φορὰν τοῦ φέρεσθαι στῆναί τε καὶ παύσασθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ λύει αὐτῆς ἄν τι ἐπιχειρῇ τέλος ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ παρέχει ἄπαυστον καὶ ἀθάνατον αὐτήν, ταύτῃ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιφημίσαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν λυσιτελοῦν· τὸ γὰρ τῆς φορᾶς λύον τὸ τέλος λυσιτελοῦν καλέσαι. ὠφέλιμον δὲ ξενικὸν τοὔνομα, ᾧ καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ κέχρηται, τῷ ὀφέλλειν· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ αὔξειν καὶ ποιεῖν ἐπωνυμία. [¶128] Hermogenes. What shall be our explanations of the opposites of these? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τὰ δὲ δὴ τούτων ἐναντία πῶς ἔχει ἡμῖν; [¶129] Socrates. Those of them that are mere negatives, need, I think, no discussion. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅσα μὲν ἀπόφησιν αὐτῶν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτα διεξιέναι. [¶130] Hermogenes. Which are those? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ποῖα ταῦτα; [¶131] Socrates. Disadvantageous, useless, unprofitable, and ungainful. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀσύμφορον καὶ ἀνωφελὲς καὶ ἀλυσιτελὲς καὶ ἀκερδές. [¶132] Hermogenes. True. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶133] Socrates. But βλαβερόν (harmful) and ζημιῶδες (hurtful) do need it. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ βλαβερόν γε καὶ ζημιῶδες. [¶134] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶135] Socrates. And βλαβερόν means that which harms (βλάπτον) the flow (ῥοῦν); but βλάπτον means wishing to fasten (ἅπτειν), and ἅπτειν is the same thing as δεῖν (bind), which the name-giver constantly finds fault with. Now τὸ βουλόμενον ἅπτειν ῥοῦν (that which wishes to fasten the flow) would most correctly be called βουλαπτεροῦν, but is called βλαβερόν merely, as I think, to make it prettier. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τὸ μέν γε βλαβερὸν τὸ βλάπτον τὸν ῥοῦν εἶναι λέγει· τὸ δὲ βλάπτον αὖ σημαίνει βουλόμενον ἅπτειν· τὸ δὲ ἅπτειν καὶ δεῖν ταὐτόν ἐστι, τοῦτο δὲ πανταχοῦ ψέγει. τὸ βουλόμενον οὖν ἅπτειν ῥοῦν ὀρθότατα μὲν ἂν εἴη βουλαπτεροῦν, καλλωπισθὲν δὲ καλεῖσθαί μοι φαίνεται βλαβερόν. [¶136] Hermogenes. Elaborate names these are, Socrates, that result from your method. Just now, when you pronounced βουλαπτεροῦν, you looked as if you had made up your mouth to whistle the flute-prelude of the hymn to Athena. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ποικίλα γέ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκβαίνει τὰ ὀνόματα. καὶ γὰρ νῦν μοι ἔδοξας ὥσπερ τοῦ τῆς Ἀθηνάας νόμου προαύλιον στομαυλῆσαι, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα προειπὼν τὸ βουλαπτεροῦν. [¶137] 418. Socrates. Not I, Hermogenes, am responsible, but those who gave the name. > Greek: 418. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἐγώ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, αἴτιος, ἀλλʼ οἱ θέμενοι τὸ ὄνομα. [¶138] Hermogenes. True. Well, what is the origin of ζημιῶδες? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ ζημιῶδες τί ἂν εἴη; [¶139] Socrates. What can the origin of ζημιῶδες be? See, Hermogenes, how true my words are when I say that by adding and taking away letters people alter the sense of words so that even by very slight changes they sometimes make them mean the opposite of what they meant before; as, for instance, in the case of the word δέον (obligation, right), for that just occurred to me and I was reminded of it by what I was going to say to you, that this fine modern language of ours has turned δέον and also ζημιῶδες round, so that each has the opposite of its original meaning, whereas the ancient language shows clearly the real sense of both words. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἂν εἴη ποτὲ ζημιῶδες; θέασαι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω λέγων ὅτι προστιθέντες γράμματα καὶ ἐξαιροῦντες σφόδρα ἀλλοιοῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων διανοίας, οὕτως ὥστε σμικρὰ πάνυ παραστρέφοντες ἐνίοτε τἀναντία ποιεῖν σημαίνειν. οἷον καὶ ἐν τῷ δέοντι· ἐνενόησα γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνεμνήσθην ἄρτι ἀπὸ τοῦδε ὃ ἔμελλόν σοι ἐρεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν νέα φωνὴ ἡμῖν ἡ καλὴ αὑτηὶ καὶ τοὐναντίον περιέτρεψε μηνύειν τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ ζημιῶδες, ἀφανίζουσα ὅτι νοεῖ, ἡ δὲ παλαιὰ ἀμφότερον δηλοῖ ὃ βούλεται τοὔνομα. [¶140] Hermogenes. What do you mean? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς λέγεις; [¶141] Socrates. I will tell you. You know that our ancestors made good use of the sounds of iota and delta, and that is especially true of the women, who are most addicted to preserving old forms of speech. But nowadays people change iota to eta or epsilon, and delta to zeta, thinking they have a grander sound. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι τῷ ἰῶτα καὶ τῷ δέλτα εὖ μάλα ἐχρῶντο, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα αἱ γυναῖκες, αἵπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σῴζουσι. νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἰῶτα ἢ εἶ ἢ ἦτα μεταστρέφουσιν, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ δέλτα ζῆτα, ὡς δὴ μεγαλοπρεπέστερα ὄντα. [¶142] Hermogenes. How is that? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς δή; [¶143] Socrates. For instance, in the earliest times they called day ἱμέρα, others said ἑμέρα, and now they say ἡμέρα. > Greek: ΣΩ. οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότατοι ἱμέραν τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάλουν, οἱ δὲ ἑμέραν, οἱ δὲ νῦν ἡμέραν. [¶144] Hermogenes. That is true. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶145] Socrates. Only the ancient word discloses the intention of the name-giver, don’t you know? For day comes out of darkness to men; they welcome it and long (ἱμείρουσι) for it, and so they called it ἱμέρα. > Greek: ΣΩ. οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι μόνον τούτων δηλοῖ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄνομα τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ θεμένου; ὅτι γὰρ ἁσμένοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἱμείρουσιν ἐκ τοῦ σκότους τὸ φῶς ἐγίγνετο, ταύτῃ ὠνόμασαν ἱμέραν. [¶146] Hermogenes. That is clear. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται. [¶147] Socrates. But now ἡμέρα is masquerading so that you could not guess its meaning. Why, some people think day is called ἡμέρα because it makes things gentle (ἥμερα). > Greek: ΣΩ. νῦν δέ γε τετραγῳδημένον οὐδʼ ἂν κατανοήσαις ὅτι βούλεται ἡ ἡμέρα. καίτοι τινὲς οἴονται, ὡς δὴ ἡ ἡμέρα ἥμερα ποιεῖ, διὰ ταῦτα ὠνομάσθαι αὐτὴν οὕτως. ## 4. Pages 418–429 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/4/#p-N [¶0] Hermogenes. I believe they do. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. δοκεῖ μοι. [¶1] Socrates. And you know the ancients called ζυγόν (yoke) δυογόν. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τό γε ζυγὸν οἶσθα ὅτι δυογὸν οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκάλουν. [¶2] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶3] Socrates. And ζυγόν conveys no clear meaning, but the name δυογόν is quite properly given to that which binds two together for the purpose of draught; now, however, we say ζυγόν. There are a great many other such instances. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τὸ μέν γε ζυγὸν οὐδὲν δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν ἕνεκα τῆς δέσεως ἐς τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπωνόμασται δυογὸν δικαίως· νῦν δὲ ζυγόν. καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα οὕτως ἔχει. [¶4] Hermogenes. Yes, that is plain. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται. [¶5] Socrates. Similarly the word δέον (obligation) at first, when spoken in this way, denotes the opposite of all words connected with the good; for although it is a form of good, δέον seems to be a bond (δεσμός) and hindrance of motion, own brother, as it were, toβλαβερόν. > Greek: ΣΩ. κατὰ ταὐτὰ τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δέον οὕτω λεγόμενον τοὐναντίον σημαίνει πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀνόμασιν· ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἰδέα οὖσα τὸ δέον φαίνεται δεσμὸς εἶναι καὶ κώλυμα φορᾶς, ὥσπερ ἀδελφὸν ὂν τοῦ βλαβεροῦ. [¶6] Hermogenes. Yes, Socrates, it certainly does seem so. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω φαίνεται. [¶7] Socrates. But it does not, if you employ the ancient word, which is more likely to be right than the present one. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐὰν τῷ ἀρχαίῳ ὀνόματι χρῇ, ὃ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστιν ὀρθῶς κεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ νῦν, ἀλλʼ ὁμολογήσει τοῖς πρόσθεν ἀγαθοῖς, ἐὰν ἀντὶ τοῦ εἶ τὸ ἰῶτα ἀποδιδῷς, ὥσπερ τὸ παλαιόν· [¶8] 419. You will find that it agrees with the previous words for “good,” if instead of the epsilon you restore the iota, as it was in old times for διόν (going through), not δέον, signifies good, which the name-giver praises. And so the giver of names does not contradict himself, but δέον (obligation, right), ὠφέλιμον (useful), λυσιτελοῦν (profitable), κερδαλέον (gainful), ἀγαθόν (good), ξυμφέρον (advantageous), and εὔπορον (prosperous), are plainly identical, signifying under different names the principle of arrangement and motion which has constantly been praised, whereas the principle of constraint and bondage is found fault with. And likewise in the case of ζημιῶδες, if you restore the ancient delta in place of the zeta, you will see that the name, pronounced δημιῶδες, was given to that which binds motion (δοῦντι τὸ ἰόν). Hermogenes. What of ἡδονή (pleasure) and λύπη (pain) and ἐπιθυμία (desire), and the like, Socrates? > Greek: 419. διϊὸν γὰρ αὖ σημαίνει, ἀλλʼ οὐ δέον, τἀγαθόν, ὅπερ δὴ ἐπαινεῖ. καὶ οὕτω οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενος, ἀλλὰ δέον καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν καὶ κερδαλέον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ συμφέρον καὶ εὔπορον τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται, ἑτέροις ὀνόμασι σημαῖνον τὸ διακοσμοῦν καὶ ἰὸν πανταχοῦ ἐγκεκωμιασμένον, τὸ δὲ ἴσχον καὶ δοῦν ψεγόμενον. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ζημιῶδες, ἐὰν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν ἀποδῷς ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆτα δέλτα, φανεῖταί σοι κεῖσθαι τὸ ὄνομα ἐπὶ τῷ δοῦντι τὸ ἰόν, ἐπονομασθὲν δημιῶδες. ΕΡΜ. τί δὲ δὴ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶9] Socrates. I do not think they are at all difficult, Hermogenes, for ἡδονή appears to have this name because it is the action that tends towards advantage (ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὄνησιν τείνουσα); the delta is inserted, so that we say ἡδονή instead of ἡονή. Λύπη appears to have received its name from the dissolution (διάλυσις) of the body which takes place through pain. Ἀνία (sorrow) is that which hinders motion (ἰέναι). Ἀλγηδών (distress) is, I think, a foreign word, derived from ἀλγεινός (distressing). Ὀδύνη (grief) appears to be so called from the putting on of pain (τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης). Ἀχθηδών (vexation) has a name, as anyone can see, made in the likeness of the weight (ἄχθος, burden) which vexation imposes upon motion. Χαρά (joy) seems to have its name from the plenteous diffusion (διάχυσις) of the flow of the soul. Τέρψις (delight) is from τερπνόν (delightful); and τερπνόν is called from the creeping (ἕρψις) of the soul, which is likened to a breath (πνοή), and would properly be called ἕρπνουν, but the name has been changed in course of time to τερπνόν. Εὐφροσύνη(mirth) needs no explanation, for it is clear to anyone that from the motion of the soul in harmony (εὖ) with the universe, it received the name εὐφεροσύνη, as it rightfully is; but we call it ευφροσύνη. Nor is there any difficulty about ἐπιθυμία (desire), for this name was evidently given to the power that goes (ἰοῦσα) into the soul (θυμός). And θυμός has its name from the raging (θύσις) and boiling of the soul. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ πάνυ χαλεπά μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες. ἥ τε γὰρ ἡδονή, ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὄνησιν ἔοικε τείνουσα πρᾶξις τοῦτο ἔχειν τὸ ὄνομα—τὸ δέλτα δὲ ἔγκειται, ὥστε ἡδονὴ ἀντὶ ἡονῆς καλεῖται—ἥ τε λύπη ἀπὸ τῆς διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος ἔοικεν ἐπωνομάσθαι ἣν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει ἴσχει τὸ σῶμα. καὶ ἥ γε ἀνία τὸ ἐμποδίζον τοῦ ἰέναι. ἡ δὲ ἀλγηδὼν ξενικόν τι φαίνεταί μοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ ὠνομασμένον. ὀδύνη δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης κεκλημένῃ ἔοικεν. ἀχθηδὼν δὲ καὶ παντὶ δῆλον ἀπεικασμένον τὸ ὄνομα τῷ τῆς φορᾶς βάρει. χαρὰ δὲ τῇ διαχύσει καὶ εὐπορίᾳ τῆς ῥοῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἔοικε κεκλημένῃ. τέρψις δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τερπνοῦ· τὸ δὲ τερπνὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕρψεως πνοῇ ἀπεικασθὲν κέκληται, ἐν δίκῃ μὲν ἂν ἕρπνουν καλούμενον, ὑπὸ χρόνου δὲ τερπνὸν παρηγμένον. εὐφροσύνη δὲ οὐδὲν προσδεῖται τοῦ διότι ῥηθῆναι· παντὶ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ εὖ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν συμφέρεσθαι τοῦτο ἔλαβε τὸ ὄνομα, εὐφεροσύνην τό γε δίκαιον· ὅμως δὲ αὐτὸ καλοῦμεν εὐφροσύνην. οὐδʼ ἐπιθυμία χαλεπόν· τῇ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἰούσῃ δυνάμει δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκλήθη τὸ ὄνομα. θυμὸς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχοι ἂν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα. [¶10] Socrates. The name ἵμερος (longing) was given to the stream (ῥοῦς) which most draws the soul; > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἵμερός γε τῷ μάλιστα ἕλκοντι τὴν ψυχὴν ῥῷ ἐπωνομάσθη· [¶11] 420. for because it flows with a rush (ἱέμενος) and with a desire for things and thus draws the soul on through the impulse of its flowing, all this power gives it the name of ἵμερος. And the word πόθος (yearning) signifies that it pertains not to that which is present, but to that which is elsewhere (ἄλλοθί που) or absent, and therefore the same feeling which is called ἵμερος when its object is present, is called πόθος when it is absent. And ἔρως (love) is so called because it flows in (ἐσρεῖ) from without, and this flowing is not inherent in him who has it, but is introduced through the eyes; for this reason it was in ancient times called ἔσρος, from ἐσρεῖν—for we used to employ omicron instead of omega—but now it is called ἔρως through the change of omicron to omega. Well, what more is there that you want to examine? Hermogenes. What is your view about δόξα (opinion) and the like? > Greek: 420. ὅτι γὰρ ἱέμενος ῥεῖ καὶ ἐφιέμενος τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐπισπᾷ σφόδρα τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὴν ἕσιν τῆς ῥοῆς, ἀπὸ ταύτης οὖν πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως ἵμερος ἐκλήθη. καὶ μὴν πόθος αὖ καλεῖται σημαίνων οὐ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι [ἱμέρου τε καὶ ῥεύματος] ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἄλλοθί που ὄντος καὶ ἀπόντος, ὅθεν πόθος ἐπωνόμασται ὃς τότε, ὅταν παρῇ οὗ τις ἐφίετο, ἵμερος ἐκαλεῖτο· ἀπογενομένου δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος πόθος ἐκλήθη. ἔρως δέ, ὅτι εἰσρεῖ ἔξωθεν καὶ οὐκ οἰκεία ἐστὶν ἡ ῥοὴ αὕτη τῷ ἔχοντι ἀλλʼ ἐπείσακτος διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων, διὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐσρεῖν ἔσρος τό γε παλαιὸν ἐκαλεῖτο— τῷ γὰρ οὖ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὦ ἐχρώμεθα—νῦν δʼ ἔρως κέκληται διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὦ ἀντὶ τοῦ οὖ μεταλλαγήν. ἀλλὰ τί ἔτι σὺ λέγεις ὅτι σκοπῶμεν; ΕΡΜ. δόξα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πῇ σοι φαίνεται; [¶12] Socrates. Δόξα is derived either from the pursuit (δίωξις) which the soul carries on as it pursues the knowledge of the nature of things, or from the shooting of the bow (τόξον); the latter is more likely; at any rate οἴησις (belief) supports this view, for it appears to mean the motion (οἶσις) of the soul towards the essential nature of every individual thing, just as βουλή (intention) denotes shooting (βολή) and βούλεσθαι (wish), as well as βουλεύεσθαι (plan), denotes aiming at something. All these words seem to follow δόξα and to express the idea of shooting, just as ἀβουλία (ill-advisedness), on the other hand, appears to be a failure to hit, as if a person did not shoot or hit that which he shot at or wished or planned or desired. > Greek: ΣΩ. δόξα δὴ ἤτοι τῇ διώξει ἐπωνόμασται, ἣν ἡ ψυχὴ διώκουσα τὸ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ ἔχει τὰ πράγματα πορεύεται, ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόξου βολῇ. ἔοικε δὲ τούτῳ μᾶλλον. ἡ γοῦν οἴησις τούτῳ συμφωνεῖ. οἶσιν γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν πρᾶγμα, οἷόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, δηλούσῃ προσέοικεν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἡ βουλή πως τὴν βολήν, καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι τὸ ἐφίεσθαι σημαίνει καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ βουλεύεσθαι· πάντα ταῦτα δόξῃ ἑπόμενʼ ἄττα φαίνεται τῆς βολῆς ἀπεικάσματα, ὥσπερ αὖ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἡ ἀβουλία ἀτυχία δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὡς οὐ βαλόντος οὐδὲ τυχόντος οὗ τʼ ἔβαλλε καὶ ὃ ἐβούλετο καὶ περὶ οὗ ἐβουλεύετο καὶ οὗ ἐφίετο. [¶13] Hermogenes. I think you are hurrying things a bit, Socrates. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ταῦτα ἤδη μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πυκνότερα ἐπάγειν. [¶14] Socrates. Yes, for I am running the last lap now. But I think I must still explain ἀνάγκη (compulsion) and ἑκούσιον (voluntary) because they naturally come next. Now by the word ἑκούσιον is expressed the yielding (εἶκον) and not opposing, but, as I say, yielding to the motion which is in accordance with the will; but the compulsory (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον) and resistant, being contrary to the will, is associated with error and ignorance; so it is likened to walking through ravines (ἄγκη), because they are hard to traverse, rough, and rugged, and retard motion; the word ἀναγκαῖον may, then, originate in a comparison with progress through a ravine. But let us not cease to use my strength, so long as it lasts and do not you cease from asking questions. Hermogenes. I ask, then, about the greatest and noblest words, truth (ἀλήθεια), falsehood (ψεῦδος), being (τὸ ὄν), and why name, the subject of our whole discourse, has the name ὄνομα. > Greek: ΣΩ. τέλος γὰρ ἤδη θέω. ἀνάγκην δʼ οὖν ἔτι βούλομαι διαπερᾶναι, ὅτι τούτοις ἑξῆς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἑκούσιον, τὸ εἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀντιτυποῦν ἀλλʼ, ὥσπερ λέγω, εἶκον τῷ ἰόντι δεδηλωμένον ἂν εἴη τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, τῷ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν γιγνομένῳ· τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἀντίτυπον, παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν ὄν, τὸ περὶ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀμαθίαν, ἀπείκασται δὲ τῇ κατὰ τὰ ἄγκη πορείᾳ, ὅτι δύσπορα καὶ τραχέα καὶ λάσια ὄντα ἴσχει τοῦ ἰέναι. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ἴσως ἐκλήθη ἀναγκαῖον, τῇ διὰ τοῦ ἄγκους ἀπεικασθὲν πορείᾳ. ἕως δὲ πάρεστιν ἡ ῥώμη, μὴ ἀνιῶμεν αὐτήν· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ μὴ ἀνίει, ἀλλὰ ἐρώτα. [¶15] 421. Socrates. Does the word μαίσθαι (search) mean anything to you? > Greek: 421. ΕΡΜ. ἐρωτῶ δὴ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα, τήν τε ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ὄνομα, διʼ ὅτι τὸ ὄνομα ἔχει. ΣΩ. μαίεσθαι οὖν καλεῖς τι; [¶16] Hermogenes. Yes, it means seek. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔγωγε, τό γε ζητεῖν. [¶17] Socrates. The word ὄνομα seems to be a word composed from a sentence signifying “this is a being about which our search is.” You can recognize that more readily in the adjective ὀνομαστόν, for that says clearly that this is ὄν οὗ μάσμα ἐστίν (being of which the search is). And ἀλήθεια (truth) is like the others; for the divine motion of the universe is, I think, called by this name, ἀλήθεια, because it is a divine wandering θεία ἄλη. But ψεῦδος (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; for once more that which is held back and forced to be quiet is found fault with, and it is compared to slumberers (εὕουσι); but the addition of the psi conceals the meaning of the word. The words τὸ ὄν (being) and οὐσία (existence) agree with ἀληθής with the loss of iota, for they mean going (ἰόν). And οὐκ ὄν (not being) means οὐκ ἰόν (not going), and indeed some people pronounce it so. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔοικε τοίνυν ἐκ λόγου ὀνόματι συγκεκροτημένῳ, λέγοντος ὅτι τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὄν, οὗ τυγχάνει ζήτημα ⟨ὄν⟩, [τὸ] ὄνομα. μᾶλλον δὲ ἂν αὐτὸ γνοίης ἐν ᾧ λέγομεν τὸ ὀνομαστόν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ σαφῶς λέγει τοῦτο εἶναι ὂν οὗ μάσμα ἐστίν. ἡ δʼ ἀλήθεια, καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔοικε [συγκεκροτῆσθαι]· ἡ γὰρ θεία τοῦ ὄντος φορὰ ἔοικε προσειρῆσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ῥήματι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς θεία οὖσα ἄλη. τὸ ⟨δὲ⟩ ψεῦδος τοὐναντίον τῇ φορᾷ· πάλιν γὰρ αὖ λοιδορούμενον ἥκει τὸ ἰσχόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαζόμενον ἡσυχάζειν, ἀπείκασται δὲ τοῖς καθεύδουσι· τὸ ψεῖ δὲ προσγενόμενον ἐπικρύπτει τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ ὀνόματος. τὸ δὲ ὂν καὶ ἡ οὐσία ὁμολογεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ ἰῶτα ἀπολαβόν· ἰὸν γὰρ σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ οὐκ ὂν αὖ, ὥς τινες καὶ ὀνομάζουσιν αὐτό, οὐκ ἰόν. [¶18] Hermogenes. I think you have knocked these words to pieces manfully, Socrates; but if anyone should ask you what propriety or correctness there was in these words that you have employed—ἰόν and ρἕον and δοῦν— Socrates. What answer should I make? Is that your meaning? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ταῦτα μέν μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνδρείως πάνυ διακεκροτηκέναι· εἰ δέ τίς σε ἔροιτο τοῦτο τὸ ἰὸν καὶ τὸ ῥέον καὶ τὸ δοῦν, τίνα ἔχει ὀρθότητα ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα— ΣΩ. τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμεθα; λέγεις; ἦ γάρ; [¶19] Hermogenes. Yes, exactly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶20] Socrates. We acquired just now one way of making an answer with a semblance of sense in it. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἓν μὲν τοίνυν ἄρτι που ἐπορισάμεθα ὥστε δοκεῖν τὶ λέγειν ἀποκρινόμενοι. [¶21] Hermogenes. What way was that? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τὸ ποῖον τοῦτο; [¶22] Socrates. Saying, if there is a word we do not know about, that it is of foreign origin. Now this may be true of some of them, and also on account of the lapse of time it may be impossible to find out about the earliest words; for since words get twisted in all sorts of ways, it would not be in the least wonderful if the ancient Greek word should be identical with the modern foreign one. > Greek: ΣΩ. φάναι, ὃ ἂν μὴ γιγνώσκωμεν, βαρβαρικόν τι τοῦτʼ εἶναι. εἴη μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἄν τι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν, εἴη δὲ κἂν ὑπὸ παλαιότητος τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνεύρετα εἶναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πανταχῇ στρέφεσθαι τὰ ὀνόματα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν [ἂν] εἰ ἡ παλαιὰ φωνὴ πρὸς τὴν νυνὶ βαρβαρικῆς μηδὲν διαφέρει. [¶23] Hermogenes. That is not unlikely. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγεις. [¶24] Socrates. It is indeed quite probable. However, we must play the game and investigate these questions vigorously. But let us bear in mind that if a person asks about the words by means of which names are formed, and again about those by means of which those words were formed, and keeps on doing this indefinitely, he who answers his questions will at last give up; will he not? > Greek: ΣΩ. λέγω γὰρ οὖν εἰκότα. οὐ μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ προφάσεις ἀγὼν δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ προθυμητέον ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἐνθυμηθῶμεν δέ, εἴ τις ἀεί, διʼ ὧν ἂν λέγηται τὸ ὄνομα, ἐκεῖνα ἀνερήσεται τὰ ῥήματα, καὶ αὖθις αὖ διʼ ὧν ἂν τὰ ῥήματα λεχθῇ, ἐκεῖνα πεύσεται, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ παύσεται ποιῶν, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα ἀπειπεῖν τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον; [¶25] Hermogenes. Yes, I think so. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶26] 422. Socrates. Now at what point will he be right in giving up and stopping? Will it not be when he reaches the names which are the elements of the other names and words? For these, if they are the elements, can no longer rightly appear to be composed of other names. For instance, we said just now that ἀγαθόν was composed of ἀγαστόν and θοόν; and perhaps we might say that θοόν was composed of other words, and those of still others; but if we ever get hold of a word which is no longer composed of other words, we should be right ill saying that we had at last reached an element, and that we must no longer refer to other words for its derivation. > Greek: 422. ΣΩ. πότε οὖν ἀπειπὼν ὁ ἀπαγορεύων δικαίως παύοιτο ἄν; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐπειδὰν ἐπʼ ἐκείνοις γένηται τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ἃ ὡσπερεὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ καὶ λόγων καὶ ὀνομάτων; ταῦτα γάρ που οὐκέτι δίκαιον φανῆναι ἐξ ἄλλων ὀνομάτων συγκείμενα, ἃν οὕτως ἔχῃ. οἷον νυνδὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔφαμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαστοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θοοῦ συγκεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ θοὸν ἴσως φαῖμεν ἂν ἐξ ἑτέρων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων· ἀλλʼ ἐάν ποτέ γε λάβωμεν ὃ οὐκέτι ἔκ τινων ἑτέρων σύγκειται ὀνομάτων, δικαίως ἂν φαῖμεν ἐπὶ στοιχείῳ τε ἤδη εἶναι καὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο ἡμᾶς δεῖν εἰς ἄλλα ὀνόματα ἀναφέρειν. [¶27] Hermogenes. I think you are right. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν. [¶28] Socrates. Are, then, these words about which you are now asking elements, and must we henceforth investigate their correctness by some other method? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ νῦν ἅ γʼ ἐρωτᾷς τὰ ὀνόματα στοιχεῖα ὄντα τυγχάνει, καὶ δεῖ αὐτῶν ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἤδη τὴν ὀρθότητα ἐπισκέψασθαι ἥτις ἐστίν; [¶29] Hermogenes. Probably. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. εἰκός γε. [¶30] Socrates. Yes, probably, Hermogenes; at any rate, all the previous words were traced back to these. But if this be true, as I think it is, come to my aid again and help me in the investigation, that I may not say anything foolish in declaring what principle must underlie the correctness of the earliest names. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰκὸς δῆτα, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες· πάντα γοῦν φαίνεται τὰ ἔμπροσθεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνεληλυθέναι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν, δεῦρο αὖ συνεπίσκεψαι μετʼ ἐμοῦ μή τι παραληρήσω λέγων οἵαν δεῖ τὴν τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα εἶναι. [¶31] Hermogenes. Go on, and I will help you to the best of my ability. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. λέγε μόνον, ὡς ὅσον γε δυνάμεως παρʼ ἐμοί ἐστιν συνεπισκέψομαι. [¶32] Socrates. I think you agree with me that there is but one principle of correctness in all names, the earliest as well as the latest, and that none of them is any more a name than the rest. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν μία γέ τις ἡ ὀρθότης παντὸς ὀνόματος καὶ πρώτου καὶ ὑστάτου, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῷ ὄνομα εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν, οἶμαι καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ. [¶33] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶34] Socrates. Now the correctness of all the names we have discussed was based upon the intention of showing the nature of the things named. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γε νυν⟨δὴ⟩ διεληλύθαμεν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ ὀρθότης τοιαύτη τις ἐβούλετο εἶναι, οἵα δηλοῦν οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων. [¶35] Hermogenes. Yes, of course. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶36] Socrates. And this principle of correctness must be present in all names, the earliest as well as the later ones, if they are really to be names. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ τὰ πρῶτα δεῖ ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ὕστερα, εἴπερ ὀνόματα ἔσται. [¶37] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶38] Socrates. But the later ones, apparently, were able to accomplish this by means of the earlier ones. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὕστερα, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ τῶν προτέρων οἷά τε ἦν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεσθαι. [¶39] Hermogenes. Evidently. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται. [¶40] Socrates. Well, then, how can the earliest names, which are not as yet based upon any others, make clear to us the nature of things, so far as that is possible, which they must do if they are to be names at all? Answer me this question: If we had no voice or tongue, and wished to make things clear to one another, should we not try, as dumb people actually do, to make signs with our hands and head and person generally? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶεν· τὰ δὲ δὴ πρῶτα, οἷς οὔπω ἕτερα ὑπόκειται, τίνι τρόπῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅτι μάλιστα φανερὰ ἡμῖν ποιήσει τὰ ὄντα, εἴπερ μέλλει ὀνόματα εἶναι; ἀπόκριναι δέ μοι τόδε· εἰ φωνὴν μὴ εἴχομεν μηδὲ γλῶτταν, ἐβουλόμεθα δὲ δηλοῦν ἀλλήλοις τὰ πράγματα, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἄν, ὥσπερ νῦν οἱ ἐνεοί, ἐπεχειροῦμεν ἂν σημαίνειν ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι; [¶41] Hermogenes. Yes. What other method is there, Socrates? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶42] 423. Socrates. If we wished to designate that which is above and is light, we should, I fancy, raise our hand towards heaven in imitation of the nature of the thing in question; but if the things to be designated were below or heavy, we should extend our hands towards the ground; and if we wished to mention a galloping horse or any other animal, we should, of course, make our bodily attitudes as much like theirs as possible. > Greek: 423. ΣΩ. εἰ μέν γʼ οἶμαι τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κοῦφον ἐβουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, ᾔρομεν ἂν πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν τὴν χεῖρα, μιμούμενοι αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος· εἰ δὲ τὰ κάτω καὶ τὰ βαρέα, πρὸς τὴν γῆν. καὶ εἰ ἵππον θέοντα ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων ἐβουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, οἶσθα ὅτι ὡς ὁμοιότατʼ ἂν τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν σώματα καὶ σχήματα ἐποιοῦμεν ἐκείνοις. [¶43] Hermogenes. I think you are quite right; there is no other way. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀνάγκη μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. [¶44] Socrates. For the expression of anything, I fancy, would be accomplished by bodily imitation of that which was to be expressed. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι δήλωμά του [σώματος] ἐγίγνετο, μιμησαμένου, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἐβούλετο δηλῶσαι. [¶45] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶46] Socrates. And when we wish to express anything by voice or tongue or mouth, will not our expression by these means be accomplished in any given instance when an imitation of something is accomplished by them? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ φωνῇ τε καὶ γλώττῃ καὶ στόματι βουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, ἆρʼ οὐ τότε ἑκάστου δήλωμα ἡμῖν ἔσται τὸ ἀπὸ τούτων γιγνόμενον, ὅταν μίμημα γένηται διὰ τούτων περὶ ὁτιοῦν; [¶47] Hermogenes. I think that is inevitable. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀνάγκη μοι δοκεῖ. [¶48] Socrates. A name, then, it appears, is a vocal imitation of that which is imitated, and he who imitates with his voice names that which he imitates. Hermogenes. I think that is correct. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὄνομʼ ἄρʼ ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῇ ἐκείνου ὃ μιμεῖται, καὶ ὀνομάζει ὁ μιμούμενος τῇ φωνῇ ὃ ἂν μιμῆται ΕΡΜ. δοκεῖ μοι. [¶49] Socrates. By Zeus, I do not think it is quite correct, yet, my friend. > Greek: ΣΩ. μὰ Δίʼ ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐμοί πω δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε. [¶50] Hermogenes. Why not? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τί δή; [¶51] Socrates. We should be obliged to agree that people who imitate sheep and cocks and other animals were naming those which they imitate. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοὺς τὰ πρόβατα μιμουμένους τούτους καὶ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ἀναγκαζοίμεθʼ ἂν ὁμολογεῖν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα ἅπερ μιμοῦνται. [¶52] Hermogenes. Yes, so we should. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶53] Socrates. And do you think that is correct? > Greek: ΣΩ. καλῶς οὖν ἔχειν δοκεῖ σοι; [¶54] Hermogenes. No, I do not; but, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name? > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ τίς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μίμησις εἴη τὸ ὄνομα; [¶55] Socrates. In the first place we shall not, in my opinion, be making names, if we imitate things as we do in music, although musical imitation also is vocal; and secondly we shall make no names by imitating that which music imitates. What I mean is this: all objects have sound and shape, and many have color, have they not? > Greek: ΣΩ. πρῶτον μέν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐὰν καθάπερ τῇ μουσικῇ μιμούμεθα τὰ πράγματα οὕτω μιμώμεθα, καίτοι φωνῇ γε καὶ τότε μιμούμεθα· ἔπειτα οὐκ ἐὰν ἅπερ ἡ μουσικὴ μιμεῖται καὶ ἡμεῖς μιμώμεθα, οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν ὀνομάσειν. λέγω δέ τοι τοῦτο· ἔστι τοῖς πράγμασι φωνὴ καὶ σχῆμα ἑκάστῳ, καὶ χρῶμά γε πολλοῖς; [¶56] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε. [¶57] Socrates. Well then, the art of naming is not employed in the imitation of those qualities, and has nothing to do with them. The arts which are concerned with them are music and design, are they not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔοικε τοίνυν οὐκ ἐάν τις ταῦτα μιμῆται, οὐδὲ περὶ ταύτας τὰς μιμήσεις ἡ τέχνη ἡ ὀνομαστικὴ εἶναι. αὗται μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἡ μὲν μουσική, ἡ δὲ γραφική· ἦ γάρ; [¶58] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶59] Socrates. Here is another point. Has not each thing an essential nature, just as it has a color and the other qualities we just mentioned? Indeed, in the first place, have not color and sound and all other things which may properly be said to exist, each and all an essential nature? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ δὴ τόδε; οὐ καὶ οὐσία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν; πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅσα ἠξίωται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως, τοῦ εἶναι; [¶60] Hermogenes. I think so. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶61] Socrates. Well, then, if anyone could imitate this essential nature of each thing by means of letters and syllables, he would show what each thing really is, would he not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύναιτο ἑκάστου, τὴν οὐσίαν, γράμμασί τε καὶ συλλαβαῖς, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν; ἢ οὔ; [¶62] 424. Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: 424. ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶63] Socrates. And what will you call him who can do this, as you called the others musician and painter? What will you call this man? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τί ἂν φαίης τὸν τοῦτο δυνάμενον, ὥσπερ τοὺς προτέρους τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν ἔφησθα, τὸν δέ [τινα] γραφικόν. τοῦτον δὲ τίνα; [¶64] Hermogenes. I think, Socrates, he is what we have been looking for all along, the name-maker. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. τοῦτο ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπερ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν, οὗτος ἂν εἶναι ὁ ὀνομαστικός. [¶65] Socrates. If that is the case, is it our next duty to consider whether in these names about which you were asking—flow, motion, and restraint—the namemaker grasps with his letters and syllables the reality of the things named and imitates their essential nature, or not? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἤδη ἔοικεν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ὀνομάτων ὧν σὺ ἤρου, περὶ ῥοῆς τε καὶ τοῦ ἰέναι καὶ σχέσεως, εἰ τοῖς γράμμασι καὶ ταῖς συλλαβαῖς τοῦ ὄντος ἐπιλαμβάνεται αὐτῶν ὥστε ἀπομιμεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, εἴτε καὶ οὔ; [¶66] Hermogenes. Certainly. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶67] Socrates. Well now, let us see whether those are the only primary names, or there are others. > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ ἴδωμεν πότερον ἄρα ταῦτα μόνα ἐστὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ἢ καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. [¶68] Hermogenes. I think there are others. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλα. [¶69] Socrates. Yes, most likely there are. Now what is the method of division with which the imitator begins his imitation? Since the imitation of the essential nature is made with letters and syllables, would not the most correct way be for us to separate the letters first, just as those who undertake the practice of rhythms separate first the qualities of the letters, then those of the syllables, and then, but not till then, come to the study of rhythms? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰκὸς γάρ. ἀλλὰ τίς ἂν εἴη ὁ τρόπος τῆς διαιρέσεως ὅθεν ἄρχεται μιμεῖσθαι ὁ μιμούμενος; ἆρα οὐκ ἐπείπερ συλλαβαῖς τε καὶ γράμμασιν ἡ μίμησις τυγχάνει οὖσα τῆς οὐσίας, ὀρθότατόν ἐστι διελέσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα πρῶτον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς τῶν στοιχείων πρῶτον τὰς δυνάμεις διείλοντο, ἔπειτα τῶν συλλαβῶν, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς σκεψόμενοι, πρότερον δʼ οὔ; [¶70] Hermogenes. Yes. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ναί. [¶71] Socrates. Must not we, too, separate first the vowels, then in their several classes the consonants or mutes, as they are called by those who specialize in phonetics, and also the letters which are neither vowels nor mutes, as well as the various classes that exist among the vowels themselves? And when we have made all these divisions properly, we must in turn give names to the things which ought to have them, if there are any names to which they can all, like the letters, be referred, from which it is possible to see what their nature is and whether there are any classes among them, as there are among letters. When we have properly examined all these points, we must know how to apply each letter with reference to its fitness, whether one letter is to be applied to one thing or many are to be combined; just as painters, when they wish to produce an imitation, sometimes use only red, sometimes some other color, and sometimes mix many colors, as when they are making a picture of a man or something of that sort, employing each color, I suppose, as they think the particular picture demands it. In just this way we, too, shall apply letters to things, using one letter for one thing, when that seems to be required, or many letters together, forming syllables, as they are called, and in turn combining syllables, and by their combination forming nouns and verbs. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτω δεῖ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνήεντα διελέσθαι, ἔπειτα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ εἴδη τά τε ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα—οὑτωσὶ γάρ που λέγουσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων— καὶ τὰ αὖ φωνήεντα μὲν οὔ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα; καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν φωνηέντων ὅσα διάφορα εἴδη ἔχει ἀλλήλων; καὶ ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα διελώμεθα [τὰ ὄντα] εὖ πάντα αὖ οἷς δεῖ ὀνόματα ἐπιθεῖναι, εἰ ἔστιν εἰς ἃ ἀναφέρεται πάντα ὥσπερ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν αὐτά τε καὶ εἰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔνεστιν εἴδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις· ταῦτα πάντα καλῶς διαθεασαμένους ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιφέρειν ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα, ἐάντε ἓν ἑνὶ δέῃ ἐπιφέρειν, ἐάντε συγκεραννύντα πολλὰ [ἑνί], ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι βουλόμενοι ἀφομοιοῦν ἐνίοτε μὲν ὄστρεον μόνον ἐπήνεγκαν, ἐνίοτε δὲ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν φαρμάκων, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε πολλὰ συγκεράσαντες, οἷον ὅταν ἀνδρείκελον σκευάζωσιν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων—ὡς ἂν οἶμαι δοκῇ ἑκάστη ἡ εἰκὼν δεῖσθαι ἑκάστου φαρμάκου—οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐποίσομεν, καὶ ἓν ἐπὶ ἕν, οὗ ἂν δοκῇ δεῖν, καὶ σύμπολλα, ποιοῦντες ὃ δὴ συλλαβὰς καλοῦσιν, καὶ συλλαβὰς αὖ συντιθέντες, ἐξ ὧν τά τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συντίθενται· [¶72] 425. And from nouns and verbs again we shall finally construct something great and fair and complete. Just as in our comparison we made the picture by the art of painting, so now we shall make language by the art of naming, or of rhetoric, or whatever it be. Socrates. No, not we; I said that too hastily. For the ancients gave language its existing composite character; and we, if we are to examine all these matters with scientific ability, must take it to pieces as they put it together and see whether the words, both the earliest and the later, are given systematically or not; for if they are strung together at haphazard, it is a poor, unmethodical performance, my dear Hermogenes. > Greek: 425. καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων μέγα ἤδη τι καὶ καλὸν καὶ ὅλον συστήσομεν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὸ ζῷον τῇ γραφικῇ, ἐνταῦθα τὸν λόγον τῇ ὀνομαστικῇ ἢ ῥητορικῇ ἢ ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη. ΣΩ. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐχ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ λέγων ἐξηνέχθην. συνέθεσαν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ᾗπερ σύγκειται οἱ παλαιοί· ἡμᾶς δὲ δεῖ, εἴπερ τεχνικῶς ἐπιστησόμεθα σκοπεῖσθαι αὐτὰ πάντα, οὕτω διελομένους, εἴτε κατὰ τρόπον τά τε πρῶτα ὀνόματα κεῖται καὶ τὰ ὕστερα εἴτε μή, οὕτω θεᾶσθαι· ἄλλως δὲ συνείρειν μὴ φαῦλον ᾖ καὶ οὐ καθʼ ὁδόν, ὦ φίλε Ἑρμόγενες. [¶73] Hermogenes. By Zeus, Socrates, may be it is. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ἴσως νὴ Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶74] Socrates. Well, do you believe you could take them to pieces in that way? I do not believe I could. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; σὺ πιστεύεις σαυτῷ οἷός τʼ ἂν εἶναι ταῦτα οὕτω διελέσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὔ. [¶75] Hermogenes. Then I am sure I could not. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πολλοῦ ἄρα δέω ἔγωγε. [¶76] Socrates. Shall we give up then? Or shall we do the best we can and try to see if we are able to understand even a little about them, and, just as we said to the gods a while ago that we knew nothing about the truth but were guessing at human opinion about them, so now, before we proceed, shall we say to ourselves that if anyone, whether we or someone else, is to make any analysis of names, he will have to analyze them in the way we have described, and we shall have to study them, as the saying is, with all our might? Do you agree, or not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐάσομεν οὖν, ἢ βούλει οὕτως ὅπως ἂν δυνώμεθα, καὶ ἂν σμικρόν τι αὐτῶν οἷοί τʼ ὦμεν κατιδεῖν, ἐπιχειρῶμεν, προειπόντες, ὥσπερ ὀλίγον πρότερον τοῖς θεοῖς, ὅτι οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόγματα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰκάζομεν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ νῦν αὖ εἰπόντες [ἡμῖν] αὐτοῖς ἴωμεν, ὅτι εἰ μέν τι χρῆν [ἔδει] αὐτὰ διελέσθαι εἴτε ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν εἴτε ἡμᾶς, οὕτως ἔδει αὐτὰ διαιρεῖσθαι, νῦν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον κατὰ δύναμιν δεήσει ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματεύεσθαι; δοκεῖ ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς λέγεις; [¶77] Hermogenes. Yes, I agree most heartily. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶78] Socrates. It will, I imagine, seem ridiculous that things are made manifest through imitation in letters and syllables; nevertheless it cannot be otherwise. For there is no better theory upon which we can base the truth of the earliest names, unless you think we had better follow the example of the tragic poets, who, when they are in a dilemma, have recourse to the introduction of gods on machines. So we may get out of trouble by saying that the gods gave the earliest names, and therefore they are right. Is that the best theory for us? Or perhaps this one, that we got the earliest names from some foreign folk and the foreigners are more ancient than we are? Or that it is impossible to investigate them because of their antiquity, as is also the case with the foreign words? Socrates. > Greek: ΣΩ. γελοῖα μὲν οἶμαι φανεῖσθαι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, γράμμασι καὶ συλλαβαῖς τὰ πράγματα μεμιμημένα κατάδηλα γιγνόμενα· ὅμως δὲ ἀνάγκη. οὐ γὰρ ἔχομεν τούτου βέλτιον εἰς ὅτι ἐπανενέγκωμεν περὶ ἀληθείας τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ⟨βού⟩λει, ὥσπερ οἱ τραγῳδοποιοὶ ἐπειδάν τι ἀπορῶσιν ἐπὶ τὰς μηχανὰς καταφεύγουσι θεοὺς αἴροντες, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως εἰπόντες ἀπαλλαγῶμεν, ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα οἱ θεοὶ ἔθεσαν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἔχει. ἆρα καὶ ἡμῖν κράτιστος οὗτος τῶν λόγων; ἢ ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι παρὰ βαρβάρων τινῶν αὐτὰ παρειλήφαμεν, εἰσὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ἀρχαιότεροι βάρβαροι; ΣΩ. ἢ ὅτι ὑπὸ παλαιότητος ἀδύνατον αὐτὰ ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ βαρβαρικά; [¶79] 426. All these are merely very clever evasions on the part of those who refuse to offer any rational theory of the correctness of the earliest names. And yet if anyone is, no matter why, ignorant of the correctness of the earliest names, he cannot know about that of the later, since they can be explained only by means of the earliest, about which he is ignorant. No, it is clear that anyone who claims to have scientific knowledge of names must be able first of all to explain the earliest names perfectly, or he can be sure that what he says about the later will be nonsense. Or do you disagree? Hermogenes. No, Socrates, not in the least. > Greek: 426. αὗται γὰρ ἂν πᾶσαι ἐκδύσεις εἶεν καὶ μάλα κομψαὶ τῷ μὴ ἐθέλοντι λόγον διδόναι περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ὡς ὀρθῶς κεῖται. καίτοι ὅτῳ τις τρόπῳ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων τὴν ὀρθότητα μὴ οἶδεν, ἀδύνατόν που τῶν γε ὑστέρων εἰδέναι, ἃ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἀνάγκη δηλοῦσθαι ὧν τις πέρι μηδὲν οἶδεν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν φάσκοντα περὶ αὐτῶν τεχνικὸν εἶναι περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων μάλιστά τε καὶ καθαρώτατα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀποδεῖξαι, ἢ εὖ εἰδέναι ὅτι τά γε ὕστερα ἤδη φλυαρήσει. ἢ σοὶ ἄλλως δοκεῖ; ΕΡΜ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως. [¶80] Socrates. Now I think my notions about the earliest names are quite outrageous and ridiculous. I will impart them to you, if you like; if you can find anything better, please try to impart it to me. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἃ μὲν τοίνυν ἐγὼ ᾔσθημαι περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ὑβριστικὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα. τούτων οὖν σοι μεταδώσω, ἂν βούλῃ· σὺ δʼ ἄν τι ἔχῃς βέλτιόν ποθεν λαβεῖν, πειρᾶσθαι καὶ ἐμοὶ μεταδιδόναι. [¶81] Hermogenes. I will do so. Go on, and do not be afraid. > Greek: ΕΡΜ. ποιήσω ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν λέγε. [¶82] Socrates. First, then, the letter rho seems to me to be an instrument expressing all motion. We have not as yet said why motion has the name κίνησις; but it evidently should be ἴεσις, for in old times we did not employ eta, but epsilon. And the beginning of κίνησις is from κίειν, a foreign word equivalent to ἰέναι (go). So we should find that the ancient word corresponding to our modern form would be ἴεσις; but now by the employment of the foreign word κίειν, change of epsilon to eta, and the insertion of nu it has become κίνησις, though it ought to be κιείνεσις or εἶσις. And στάσις (rest) signifies the negation of motion, but is called στάσις for euphony. Well, the letter rho, as I was saying, appeared to be a fine instrument expressive of motion to the name-giver who wished to imitate rapidity, and he often applies it to motion. In the first place, in the words ῥεῖν (flow) and ῥοή (current) he imitates their rapidity by this letter, then in τρόμος (trembling) and in τρέχειν (run), and also in such words as κρούειν (strike), θραύειν (break), ἐρείκειν (rend), θρύπτειν (crush),κερματίζειν (crumble), ῥυμβεῖν (whirl), he expresses the action of them all chiefly by means of the letter rho; for he observed, I suppose, that the tongue is least at rest and most agitated in pronouncing this letter, and that is probably the reason why he employed it for these words. Iota again, he employs for everything subtle, which can most readily pass through all things. Socrates. > Greek: ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τὸ ῥῶ ἔμοιγε φαίνεται ὥσπερ ὄργανον εἶναι πάσης τῆς κινήσεως, ἣν οὐδʼ εἴπομεν διʼ ὅτι ἔχει τοῦτο τοὔνομα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἕσις βούλεται εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἦτα ἐχρώμεθα ἀλλὰ εἶ τὸ παλαιόν. ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ κίειν —ξενικὸν δὲ τοὔνομα—τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἰέναι. εἰ οὖν τις τὸ παλαιὸν αὐτῆς εὕροι ὄνομα εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν φωνὴν συμβαῖνον, ἕσις ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖτο· νῦν δὲ ἀπό τε τοῦ ξενικοῦ τοῦ κίειν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἦτα μεταβολῆς καὶ τῆς τοῦ νῦ ἐνθέσεως κίνησις κέκληται, ἔδει δὲ κιείνησιν καλεῖσθαι [ἢ εἶσιν]. ἡ δὲ στάσις ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἰέναι βούλεται εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸν καλλωπισμὸν στάσις ὠνόμασται. τὸ δὲ οὖν ῥῶ τὸ στοιχεῖον, ὥσπερ λέγω, καλὸν ἔδοξεν ὄργανον εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως τῷ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ ἀφομοιοῦν τῇ φορᾷ, πολλαχοῦ γοῦν χρῆται αὐτῷ εἰς αὐτήν· πρῶτον μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ῥεῖν καὶ ῥοῇ διὰ τούτου τοῦ γράμματος τὴν φορὰν μιμεῖται, εἶτα ἐν τῷ τρόμῳ, εἶτα ἐν τῷ τρέχειν, ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε ῥήμασιν οἷον κρούειν, θραύειν, ἐρείκειν, θρύπτειν, κερματίζειν, ῥυμβεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα τὸ πολὺ ἀπεικάζει διὰ τοῦ ῥῶ. ἑώ⟨ρα⟩ γὰρ οἶμαι τὴν γλῶτταν ἐν τούτῳ ἥκιστα μένουσαν, μάλιστα δὲ σειομένην· διὸ φαίνεταί μοι τούτῳ πρὸς ταῦτα κατακεχρῆσθαι. τῷ δὲ αὖ ἰῶτα πρὸς τὰ λεπτὰ πάντα, ἃ δὴ μάλιστα διὰ πάντων ἴοι ἄν. ΣΩ. διὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἰέναι καὶ τὸ ἵεσθαι διὰ τοῦ ἰῶτα ἀπομιμεῖται, ὥσπερ γε διὰ τοῦ φεῖ καὶ τοῦ ψεῖ καὶ τοῦ σῖγμα καὶ τοῦ ζῆτα, ὅτι πνευματώδη τὰ γράμματα, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μεμίμηται αὐτοῖς ὀνομάζων, οἷον τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ζέον καὶ τὸ σείεσθαι καὶ ὅλως σεισμόν. [¶83] 427. Therefore he imitates the nature of ἰέναι (go) and ἵεσθαι (hasten) by means of iota, just as he has imitated all such notions as ψυχρόν (cold, shivering), ζέον (seething), σείεσθαι (shake), and σεισμός (shock) by means of phi, psi, sigma, and zeta, because those letters are pronounced with much breath. Whenever he imitates that which resembles blowing, the giver of names always appears to use for the most part such letters. And again he appears to have thought that the compression and pressure of the tongue in the pronunciation of delta and tau was naturally fitted to imitate the notion of binding and rest. And perceiving that the tongue has a gliding movement most in the pronunciation of lambda, he made the words λεῖα (level), ὀλισθάναιν (glide) itself, λιπαρόν (sleek), κολλῶδες (glutinous), and the like to conform to it. Where the gliding of the tongue is stopped by the sound of gamma he reproduced the nature of γλισχρόν (glutinous), γλυκύ (sweet), and γλοιῶδες (gluey). And again, perceiving that nu is an internal sound, he made the words ἔνδον (inside) and ἐντός (within), assimilating the meanings to the letters, and alpha again he assigned to greatness, and eta to length, because the letters are large. He needed the sign Ο for the expression of γόγγυλον (round), and made it the chief element of the word. And in this way the lawgiver appears to apply the other letters, making by letters and syllables a name for each and every thing, and from these names he compounds all the rest by imitation. This, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the theory of the correctness of names, unless, indeed, Cratylus has some other view. Hermogenes. Truly, Socrates, as I said in the beginning, Cratylus often troubles me a good deal; he declares that there is such a thing as correctness of names, but does not say clearly what it is; and so I cannot tell whether he speaks so obscurely about it on any given occasion intentionally or unintentionally. So now, Cratylus, tell me, in the presence of Socrates, do you like what Socrates says about names, or have you a better theory to propose? And if you have, tell us about it; then you will either learn from Socrates or instruct both him and me. > Greek: 427. καὶ ὅταν που τὸ φυσῶδες μιμῆται, πανταχοῦ ἐνταῦθα ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ τοιαῦτα γράμματα ἐπιφέρειν φαίνεται ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενος. τῆς δʼ αὖ τοῦ δέλτα συμπιέσεως καὶ τοῦ ταῦ καὶ ἀπερείσεως τῆς γλώττης τὴν δύναμιν χρήσιμον φαίνεται ἡγήσασθαι πρὸς τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσμοῦ καὶ τῆς στάσεως. ὅτι δὲ ὀλισθάνει μάλιστα ἐν τῷ λάβδα ἡ γλῶττα κατιδών, ἀφομοιῶν ὠνόμασε τά τε λεῖα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὀλισθάνειν καὶ τὸ λιπαρὸν καὶ τὸ κολλῶδες καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ᾗ δὲ ὀλισθανούσης τῆς γλώττης ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἡ τοῦ γάμμα δύναμις, τὸ γλίσχρον ἀπεμιμήσατο καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ γλοιῶδες. τοῦ δʼ αὖ νῦ τὸ εἴσω αἰσθόμενος τῆς φωνῆς, τὸ ἔνδον καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς ὠνόμασεν, ὡς ἀφομοιῶν τοῖς γράμμασι τὰ ἔργα. τὸ δʼ αὖ ἄλφα τῷ μεγάλῳ ἀπέδωκε, καὶ τῷ μήκει τὸ ἦτα, ὅτι μεγάλα τὰ γράμματα. εἰς δὲ τὸ γογγύλον τοῦ οὖ δεόμενος σημείου, τοῦτο πλεῖστον αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ ὄνομα ἐνεκέρασεν. καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω φαίνεται προσβιβάζειν καὶ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων σημεῖόν τε καὶ ὄνομα ποιῶν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη αὐτοῖς τούτοις συντιθέναι ἀπομιμούμενος. αὕτη μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, βούλεσθαι εἶναι ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης, εἰ μή τι ἄλλο Κρατύλος ὅδε λέγει. ΕΡΜ. καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλά γέ μοι πολλάκις πράγματα παρέχει Κρατύλος, ὥσπερ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, φάσκων μὲν εἶναι ὀρθότητα ὀνομάτων, ἥτις δʼ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν σαφὲς λέγων, ὥστε με μὴ δύνασθαι εἰδέναι πότερον ἑκὼν ἢ ἄκων οὕτως ἀσαφῶς ἑκάστοτε περὶ αὐτῶν λέγει. νῦν οὖν μοι, ὦ Κρατύλε, ἐναντίον Σωκράτους εἰπὲ πότερον ἀρέσκει σοι ᾗ λέγει Σωκράτης περὶ ὀνομάτων, ἢ ἔχεις πῃ ἄλλῃ κάλλιον λέγειν; καὶ εἰ ἔχεις, λέγε, ἵνα ἤτοι μάθῃς παρὰ Σωκράτους ἢ διδάξῃς ἡμᾶς ἀμφοτέρους. [¶84] Cratylus. But, Hermogenes, do you think it is an easy matter to learn or teach any subject so quickly, especially so important an one as this, which appears to me to be one of the most important? > Greek: ΚΡ. τί δέ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες; δοκεῖ σοι ῥᾴδιον εἶναι οὕτω ταχὺ μαθεῖν τε καὶ διδάξαι ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ ὅτι τοσοῦτον, ὃ δὴ δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς [μεγίστοις] μέγιστον εἶναι; [¶85] 428. Hermogenes. No, by Zeus, I do not. But I think Hesiod is right in saying: If you can only add little to little, it is worth while. So now if you can make even a little progress, do not shirk the trouble, but oblige Socrates—you owe it to him—and me. > Greek: 428. ΕΡΜ. μὰ Δίʼ, οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου καλῶς μοι φαίνεται ἔχειν, τὸ εἰ καί τις σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθείη, προὔργου εἶναι. εἰ οὖν καὶ σμικρόν τι οἷός τʼ εἶ πλέον ποιῆσαι, μὴ ἀπόκαμνε ἀλλʼ εὐεργέτει καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε—δίκαιος δʼ εἶ—καὶ ἐμέ. [¶86] Socrates. For that matter, Cratylus, I would not positively affirm any of the things I have said. I merely expressed the opinions which I reached with the help of Hermogenes. So far as I am concerned, you need not hesitate, and if your view is better than mine, I will accept it. And I should not be at all surprised if it were better; for I think you have not only investigated such matters yourself but have been taught about them by others. So if you have any better theory to propound, put me down as one of your pupils in the course on the correctness of names. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὲν δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὐδὲν ἂν ἰσχυρισαίμην ὧν εἴρηκα, ᾗ δέ μοι ἐφαίνετο μεθʼ Ἑρμογένους ἐπεσκεψάμην, ὥστε τούτου γε ἕνεκα θαρρῶν λέγε, εἴ τι ἔχεις βέλτιον, ὡς ἐμοῦ ἐνδεξομένου. εἰ μέντοι ἔχεις τι σὺ κάλλιον τούτων λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι αὐτός τε ἐσκέφθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ παρʼ ἄλλων μεμαθηκέναι. ἐὰν οὖν λέγῃς τι κάλλιον, ἕνα τῶν μαθητῶν περὶ ὀρθότητος ὀνομάτων καὶ ἐμὲ γράφου. [¶87] Cratylus. Yes, Socrates, I have, as you say, paid attention to these matters, and perhaps I might make you my pupil. However, I am afraid the opposite is the case, and I am impelled to say to you what Achilles says in the “Prayers” to Ajax. He says: Ajax, descendant of Zeus, son of Telamon, chief of thy people, All thou hast uttered is good in my sight and pleases my spirit. And so, Socrates, your oracular utterances seem to me to be much to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro or some other Muse has dwelt within you all along without our knowing it. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, μεμέληκέν τέ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἴσως ἄν σε ποιησαίμην μαθητήν. φοβοῦμαι μέντοι μὴ τούτου πᾶν τοὐναντίον ᾖ, ὅτι μοί πως ἐπέρχεται λέγειν πρὸς σὲ τὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, ὃ ἐκεῖνος ἐν Λιταῖς πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα λέγει. φησὶ δὲ Αἶαν διογενὲς Τελαμώνιε, κοίρανε λαῶν, πάντα τί μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἐείσω μυθήσασθαι. καὶ ἐμοὶ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς φαίνῃ κατὰ νοῦν χρησμῳδεῖν, εἴτε παρʼ Εὐθύφρονος ἐπίπνους γενόμενος, εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη τις Μοῦσα πάλαι σε ἐνοῦσα ἐλελήθει. [¶88] Socrates. My excellent Cratylus, I myself have been marvelling at my own wisdom all along, and I cannot believe in it. So I think we ought to reexamine my utterances. For the worst of all deceptions is self-deception. How can it help being terrible, when the deceiver is always present and never stirs from the spot? So I think we must turn back repeatedly to what we have said and must try, as the poet says, to look both forwards and backwards. Then let us now see what we have said. Correctness of a name, we say, is the quality of showing the nature of the thing named. Shall we call that a satisfactory statement? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὠγαθὲ Κρατύλε, θαυμάζω καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ σοφίαν καὶ ἀπιστῶ. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι χρῆναι ἐπανασκέψασθαι τί καὶ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ πάντων χαλεπώτατον· ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἀποστατῇ ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ παρῇ ὁ ἐξαπατήσων, πῶς οὐ δεινόν; δεῖ δή, ὡς ἔοικε, θαμὰ μεταστρέφεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι, τὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ ποιητοῦ, βλέπειν ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω. καὶ δὴ καὶ νυνὶ ἡμεῖς ἴδωμεν τί ἡμῖν εἴρηται. ὀνόματος, φαμέν, ὀρθότης ἐστὶν αὕτη, ἥτις ἐνδείξεται οἷόν ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα· τοῦτο φῶμεν ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι; [¶89] Cratylus. I am perfectly satisfied with it, Socrates. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ πάνυ σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶90] Socrates. Names, then, are given with a view to instruction? > Greek: ΣΩ. διδασκαλίας ἄρα ἕνεκα τὰ ὀνόματα λέγεται; [¶91] Cratylus. Certainly. > Greek: ΚΡ. πάνυ γε. [¶92] Socrates. Shall we, then; say that this instruction is an art and has its artisans? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν φῶμεν καὶ ταύτην τέχνην εἶναι καὶ δημιουργοὺς αὐτῆς; [¶93] Cratylus. Certainly. > Greek: ΚΡ. πάνυ γε. [¶94] Socrates. Who are they? > Greek: ΣΩ. τίνας; [¶95] 429. Cratylus. The lawgivers, as you said in the beginning. > Greek: 429. ΚΡ. οὕσπερ σὺ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἔλεγες, τοὺς νομοθέτας. [¶96] Socrates. Shall we declare that this art arises in men like the other arts, or not? What I mean is this: Some painters are better, and others worse, are they not? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν καὶ ταύτην φῶμεν τὴν τέχνην ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγίγνεσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἢ μή; βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε. ζωγράφοι εἰσίν που οἱ μὲν χείρους, οἱ δὲ ἀμείνους; [¶97] Cratylus. Certainly. > Greek: ΚΡ. πάνυ γε. [¶98] Socrates. And the better produce better works—that is, their paintings—and the others worse works? And likewise some builders build better houses and others worse? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ μὲν ἀμείνους τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα καλλίω παρέχονται, τὰ ζῷα, οἱ δὲ φαυλότερα; καὶ οἰκοδόμοι ὡσαύτως οἱ μὲν καλλίους τὰς οἰκίας ἐργάζονται, οἱ δὲ αἰσχίους; [¶99] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ναί. [¶100] Socrates. Then do some lawgivers produce better, and others worse works? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ νομοθέται οἱ μὲν καλλίω τὰ [ἔργα] αὑτῶν παρέχονται, οἱ δὲ αἰσχίω; [¶101] Cratylus. No; at that point I cease to agree. > Greek: ΚΡ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἔτι. [¶102] Socrates. Then you do not think that some laws are better, and some worse? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι νόμοι οἱ μὲν βελτίους, οἱ δὲ φαυλότεροι εἶναι; [¶103] Cratylus. No, I do not. > Greek: ΚΡ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶104] Socrates. And you do not, it appears, think that one name is better, and another worse? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲ δὴ ὄνομα, ὡς ἔοικε, δοκεῖ σοι κεῖσθαι τὸ μὲν χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ ἄμεινον; [¶105] Cratylus. No, I do not. > Greek: ΚΡ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶106] Socrates. Then all names are correct? > Greek: ΣΩ. πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα ὀρθῶς κεῖται; [¶107] Cratylus. All that are really names. > Greek: ΚΡ. ὅσα γε ὀνόματά ἐστιν. [¶108] Socrates. How about the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was mentioned a while ago? Shall we say that it is not his name at all, unless he belongs to the race of Hermes, or that it is his name, but is incorrect? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ὃ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, Ἑρμογένει τῷδε πότερον μηδὲ ὄνομα τοῦτο κεῖσθαι φῶμεν, εἰ μή τι αὐτῷ Ἑρμοῦ γενέσεως προσήκει, ἢ κεῖσθαι μέν, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς γε; [¶109] Cratylus. I think, Socrates, that it is not his name at all; it appears to be his, but is really the name of some one else who possesses the nature that makes the name clear. > Greek: ΚΡ. οὐδὲ κεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν κεῖσθαι, εἶναι δὲ ἑτέρου τοῦτο τοὔνομα, οὗπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις [ἡ τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῦσα]. [¶110] Socrates. And when anyone says that our friend is Hermogenes, is he not even speaking falsely? For perhaps it is not even possible to say that he is Hermogenes, if he is not. > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὐδὲ ψεύδεται ὅταν τις φῇ Ἑρμογένη αὐτὸν εἶναι; μὴ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αὖ ᾖ, τὸ τοῦτον φάναι Ἑρμογένη εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν; [¶111] Cratylus. What do you mean? > Greek: ΚΡ. πῶς λέγεις; [¶112] Socrates. Do you mean to say that it is impossible to speak falsehood at all? For there are, my dear Cratylus, many who do so, and who have done so in the past. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρα ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἆρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; συχνοὶ γάρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὦ φίλε Κρατύλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι. [¶113] Cratylus. Why, Socrates, how could anyone who says that which he says, say that which is not? Is not falsehood saying that which is not? > Greek: ΚΡ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγων γέ τις τοῦτο ὃ λέγει, μὴ τὸ ὂν λέγοι; ἢ οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ψευδῆ λέγειν, τὸ μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγειν; [¶114] Socrates. Your reasoning is too clever for me at my age, my friend. However, tell me this: Do you think it is possible to speak falsehood, but not to say it? > Greek: ΣΩ. κομψότερος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἢ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἡλικίαν, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ὅμως μέντοι εἰπέ μοι τοσόνδε· πότερον λέγειν μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ψευδῆ, φάναι δέ; [¶115] Cratylus. Neither to speak nor to say it. > Greek: ΚΡ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ οὐδὲ φάναι. [¶116] Socrates. Nor utter it or use it as a form of address? For instance, if some one should meet you in hospitable fashion, should grasp your hand and say, “Well met, my friend from Athens, son of Smicrion, Hermogenes,” would he be saying or speaking or uttering or addressing these words not to you, but to Hermogenes—or to nobody? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ προσειπεῖν; οἷον εἴ τις ἀπαντήσας σοι ἐπὶ ξενίας, λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς εἴποι· χαῖρε, ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, ὑὲ Σμικρίωνος Ἑρμόγενες, οὗτος λέξειεν ἂν ταῦτα ἢ φαίη ἂν ταῦτα ἢ εἴποι ἂν ταῦτα ἢ προσείποι ἂν οὕτω σὲ μὲν οὔ, Ἑρμογένη δὲ τόνδε; ἢ οὐδένα; ## 5. Pages 429–440 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/5/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-cratylus/5/#p-N [¶0] Cratylus. I think, Socrates, the man would be producing sounds without sense. Socrates. Even that reply is welcome; > Greek: ΚΡ. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως ἂν οὗτος ταῦτα φθέγξασθαι. [¶1] 430. for I can ask whether the words he produced would be true, or false, or partly true and partly false. Even that would suffice. Cratylus. I should say that the man in such a case was merely making a noise, going through purposeless motions, as if he were beating a bronze pot. > Greek: 430. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀγαπητὸν καὶ τοῦτο. πότερον γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἂν φθέγξαιτο ταῦτα ὁ φθεγξάμενος ἢ ψευδῆ; ἢ τὸ μέν τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος; καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ἐξαρκοῖ. ΚΡ. ψοφεῖν ἔγωγʼ ἂν φαίην τὸν τοιοῦτον, μάτην αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις χαλκίον κινήσειε κρούσας. [¶2] Socrates. Let us see, Cratylus, if we cannot come to terms somehow. You would agree, would you not, that the name is one thing and the thing of which it is the name is another? > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ἐάν πῃ διαλλαχθῶμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε· ἆρʼ οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἂν φαίης τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο οὗ τὸ ὄνομά ἐστιν; [¶3] Cratylus. Yes, I should. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἔγωγε. [¶4] Socrates. And you agree that the name is an imitation of the thing named? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ὁμολογεῖς μίμημά τι εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος; [¶5] Cratylus. Most assuredly. > Greek: ΚΡ. πάντων μάλιστα. [¶6] Socrates. And you agree that paintings also are imitations, though in a different way, of things? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα τρόπον τινὰ ἄλλον λέγεις μιμήματα εἶναι πραγμάτων τινῶν; [¶7] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ναί. [¶8] Socrates. Well then—for perhaps I do not understand, and you may be right—can both of these imitations, the paintings and the names, be assigned and applied to the things which they imitate, or not? > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή—ἴσως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐ μανθάνω ἅττα ποτʼ ἔστιν ἃ λέγεις, σὺ δὲ τάχʼ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοις—ἔστι διανεῖμαι καὶ προσενεγκεῖν ταῦτα ἀμφότερα τὰ μιμήματα, τά τε ζωγραφήματα κἀκεῖνα τὰ ὀνόματα, τοῖς πράγμασιν ὧν μιμήματά ἐστιν, ἢ οὔ; [¶9] Cratylus. They can. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἔστιν. [¶10] Socrates. First, then, consider this question: Can we assign the likeness of the man to the man and that of the woman to the woman, and so forth? > Greek: ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκόπει τόδε. ἆρʼ ἄν τις τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἰκόνα τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἀποδοίη, τὴν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς τῇ γυναικί, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως; [¶11] Cratylus. Certainly. > Greek: ΚΡ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶12] Socrates. And can we conversely attribute that of the man to the woman, and the woman’s to the man? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὐναντίον τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τῇ γυναικί, τὴν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς τῷ ἀνδρί; [¶13] Cratylus. That is also possible. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα. [¶14] Socrates. And are these assignments both correct, or only the former? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν αὗται αἱ διανομαὶ ἀμφότεραι ὀρθαί, ἢ ἡ ἑτέρα; [¶15] Cratylus. The former. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἡ ἑτέρα. [¶16] Socrates. The assignment, in short, which attributes to each that which belongs to it and is like it. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἣ ἂν ἑκάστῳ οἶμαι τὸ προσῆκόν τε καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀποδιδῷ. [¶17] Cratylus. That is my view. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶18] Socrates. To put an end to contentious argument between you and me, since we are friends, let me state my position. I call that kind of assignment in the case of both imitations paintings and names—correct, and in the case of names not only correct, but true; and the other kind, which gives and applies the unlike imitation, I call incorrect and, in the case of names, false. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἵνα τοίνυν μὴ μαχώμεθα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φίλοι ὄντες, ἀπόδεξαί μου ὃ λέγω. τὴν τοιαύτην γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καλῶ ἔγωγε διανομὴν ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν τοῖς μιμήμασιν, τοῖς τε ζῴοις καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὀρθήν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πρὸς τῷ ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθῆ· τὴν δʼ ἑτέραν, τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου δόσιν τε καὶ ἐπιφοράν, οὐκ ὀρθήν, καὶ ψευδῆ ὅταν ἐπʼ ὀνόμασιν ᾖ. [¶19] Cratylus. But it may be, Socrates, that this incorrect assignment is possible in the case of paintings, and not in the case of names, which must be always correctly assigned. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀλλʼ ὅπως μή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν ᾖ τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ ἀεὶ ὀρθῶς. [¶20] Socrates. What do you mean? What difference is there between the two? Can I not step up to a man and say to him, “This is your portrait,” and show him perhaps his own likeness or, perhaps, that of a woman? And by “show” I mean bring before the sense of sight. > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις; τί τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρει; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἔστι προσελθόντα ἀνδρί τῳ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τουτί ἐστι σὸν γράμμα, καὶ δεῖξαι αὐτῷ, ἂν μὲν τύχῃ, ἐκείνου εἰκόνα, ἂν δὲ τύχῃ, γυναικός; τὸ δὲ δεῖξαι λέγω εἰς τὴν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι. [¶21] Cratylus. Certainly. > Greek: ΚΡ. πάνυ γε. [¶22] Socrates. Well, then, can I not step up to the same man again and say, “This is your name”? A name is an imitation, just as a picture is. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; πάλιν αὐτῷ τούτῳ προσελθόντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι τουτί ἐστιν σὸν ὄνομα; ἔστι δέ που καὶ τὸ ὄνομα μίμημα ὥσπερ τὸ ζωγράφημα. τοῦτο δὴ λέγω· ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τουτί ἐστι σὸν ὄνομα, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀκοῆς αὖ αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι, ἂν μὲν τύχῃ, τὸ ἐκείνου μίμημα, εἰπόντα ὅτι ἀνήρ, ἂν δὲ τύχῃ, τὸ τοῦ θήλεος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους, εἰπόντα ὅτι γυνή; [¶23] 431. Very well; can I not say to him, “This is your name,” and then bring before his sense of hearing perhaps the imitation of himself, saying that it is a man, or perhaps the imitation of the female of the human species, saying that it is a woman? Do you not believe that this is possible and sometimes happens? Cratylus. I am willing to concede it, Socrates, and grant that you are right. > Greek: 431. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο οἷόν τʼ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐνίοτε; ΚΡ. ἐθέλω σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἔστω οὕτως. [¶24] Socrates. That is a good thing for you to do, my friend, if I am right; for now we need no longer argue about the matter. If, then, some such assignment of names takes place, we will call one kind speaking truth, and the other speaking falsehood. But if this is accepted, and if it is possible to assign names incorrectly and to give to objects not the names that befit them, but sometimes those that are unfitting, it would be possible to treat verbs in the same way. And if verbs and nouns can be assigned in this way, the same must be true of sentences; for sentences are, I conceive, a combination of verbs and nouns. What do you say to that, Cratylus? > Greek: ΣΩ. καλῶς γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ φίλε, εἰ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖ νῦν πάνυ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ. εἰ δʼ οὖν ἔστι τοιαύτη τις διανομὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τούτων ἀληθεύειν βουλόμεθα καλεῖν, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον ψεύδεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν τὰ ὀνόματα μηδὲ ἀποδιδόναι τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλʼ ἐνίοτε τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα, εἴη ἂν καὶ ῥήματα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ ῥήματα καὶ ὀνόματα ἔστιν οὕτω τιθέναι, ἀνάγκη καὶ λόγους· λόγοι γάρ που, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἡ τούτων σύνθεσίς ἐστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Κρατύλε; [¶25] Cratylus. I agree; I think you are right. > Greek: ΚΡ. οὕτω· καλῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν. [¶26] Socrates. If, then, we compare the earliest words to sketches, it is possible in them, as in pictures, to reproduce all the colors and shapes, or not all; some may be wanting, and some may be added, and they may be too many or too large. Is not that true? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ γράμμασιν αὖ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα ἀπεικάζομεν, ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν καὶ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα χρώματά τε καὶ σχήματα ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μὴ πάντα αὖ, ἀλλʼ ἔνια ἐλλείπειν, ἔνια δὲ καὶ προστιθέναι, καὶ πλείω καὶ μείζω· ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; [¶27] Cratylus. Yes, it is. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἔστιν. [¶28] Socrates. Then he who reproduces all, produces good sketches and pictures, and he who adds or takes away produces also sketches and pictures, but bad ones? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδοὺς πάντα καλὰ τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ ἢ προστιθεὶς ἢ ἀφαιρῶν γράμματα μὲν καὶ εἰκόνας ἐργάζεται καὶ οὗτος, ἀλλὰ πονηράς; [¶29] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ναί. [¶30] Socrates. And how about him who imitates the nature of things by means of letters and syllables? By the same principle, if he gives all that is appropriate, the image—that is to say, the name—will be good, and if he sometimes omits a little, it will be an image, but not a good one; and therefore some names are well and others badly made. Is that not true? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ ὁ διὰ τῶν συλλαβῶν τε καὶ γραμμάτων τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπομιμούμενος; ἆρα οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἂν μὲν πάντα ἀποδῷ τὰ προσήκοντα, καλὴ ἡ εἰκὼν ἔσται—τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὄνομα—ἐὰν δὲ σμικρὰ ἐλλείπῃ ἢ προστιθῇ ἐνίοτε, εἰκὼν μὲν γενήσεται, καλὴ δὲ οὔ; ὥστε τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰργασμένα ἔσται τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ δὲ κακῶς; [¶31] Cratylus. Perhaps. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἴσως. [¶32] Socrates. Perhaps, then, one artisan of names will be good, and another bad? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴσως ἄρα ἔσται ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς δημιουργὸς ὀνομάτων, ὁ δὲ κακός; [¶33] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ναί. [¶34] Socrates. The name of such an artisan was lawgiver? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτῳ ὁ νομοθέτης ἦν ὄνομα. [¶35] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ναί. [¶36] Socrates. Perhaps, then, by Zeus, as is the case in the other arts, one lawgiver may be good and another bad, if we accept our previous conclusions. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴσως ἄρα νὴ Δίʼ ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ νομοθέτης ὁ μὲν ἀγαθός, ὁ δὲ κακός, ἐάνπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκεῖνα ὁμολογηθῇ ἡμῖν. [¶37] Cratylus. That is true. But you see, Socrates, when by the science of grammar we assign these letters—alpha, beta, and the rest—to names, if we take away or add or transpose any letter, it is not true that the name is written, but written incorrectly; it is not written at all, but immediately becomes a different word, if any such thing happens to it. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλʼ ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα, τό τε ἄλφα καὶ τὸ βῆτα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν στοιχείων, τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀποδιδῶμεν τῇ γραμματικῇ τέχνῃ, ἐάν τι ἀφέλωμεν ἢ προσθῶμεν ἢ μεταθῶμέν τι, ⟨οὐ⟩ γέγραπται μὲν ἡμῖν τὸ ὄνομα, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ γέγραπται, ἀλλʼ εὐθὺς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐάν τι τούτων πάθῃ. [¶38] 432. Socrates. Perhaps we are not considering the matter in the right way. > Greek: 432. ΣΩ. μὴ γὰρ οὐ καλῶς σκοπῶμεν οὕτω σκοποῦντες, ὦ Κρατύλε. [¶39] Cratylus. Why not? > Greek: ΚΡ. πῶς δή; [¶40] Socrates. It may be that what you say would be true of those things which must necessarily consist of a certain number or cease to exist at all, as ten, for instance, or any number you like, if you add or subtract anything is immediately another number; but this is not the kind of correctness which applies to quality or to images in general; on the contrary, the image must not by any means reproduce all the qualities of that which it imitates, if it is to be an image. See if I am not right. Would there be two things, Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, if some god should not merely imitate your color and form, as painters do, but should also make all the inner parts like yours, should reproduce the same flexibility and warmth, should put into them motion, life, and intellect, such as exist in you, and in short, should place beside you a duplicate of all your qualities? Would there be in such an event Cratylus and an image of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴσως ὅσα ἔκ τινος ἀριθμοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι πάσχοι ἂν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ λέγεις, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ δέκα ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός, ἐὰν ἀφέλῃς τι ἢ προσθῇς, ἕτερος εὐθὺς γέγονε· τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ τινος καὶ συμπάσης εἰκόνος μὴ οὐχ αὕτη ⟨ᾖ⟩ ἡ ὀρθότης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν δέῃ πάντα ἀποδοῦναι οἷόν ἐστιν ᾧ εἰκάζει, εἰ μέλλει εἰκὼν εἶναι. σκόπει δὲ εἰ τὶ λέγω. ἆρʼ ἂν δύο πράγματα εἴη τοιάδε, οἷον Κρατύλος καὶ Κρατύλου εἰκών, εἴ τις θεῶν μὴ μόνον τὸ σὸν χρῶμα καὶ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσειεν ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς πάντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσειεν οἷάπερ τὰ σά, καὶ μαλακότητας καὶ θερμότητας τὰς αὐτὰς ἀποδοίη, καὶ κίνησιν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν οἵαπερ ἡ παρὰ σοὶ ἐνθείη αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ πάντα ἅπερ σὺ ἔχεις, τοιαῦτα ἕτερα καταστήσειεν πλησίον σου; πότερον Κρατύλος ἂν καὶ εἰκὼν Κρατύλου τότʼ εἴη τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἢ δύο Κρατύλοι; [¶41] Cratylus. I should say, Socrates, two Cratyluses. > Greek: ΚΡ. δύο ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κρατύλοι. [¶42] Socrates. Then don’t you see, my friend, that we must look for some other principle of correctness in images and in names, of which we were speaking, and must not insist that they are no longer images if anything be wanting or be added? Do you not perceive how far images are from possessing the same qualities as the originals which they imitate? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἄλλην χρὴ εἰκόνος ὀρθότητα ζητεῖν καὶ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκάζειν, ἐάν τι ἀπῇ ἢ προσῇ, μηκέτι αὐτὴν εἰκόνα εἶναι; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὅσου ἐνδέουσιν αἱ εἰκόνες τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν εἰκόνες εἰσίν; [¶43] Cratylus. Yes, I do. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἔγωγε. [¶44] Socrates. Surely, Cratylus, the effect produced by the names upon the things of which they are the names would be ridiculous, if they were to be entirely like them in every respect. For everything would be duplicated, and no one could tell in any case which was the real thing and which the name. > Greek: ΣΩ. γελοῖα γοῦν, ὦ Κρατύλε, ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάθοι ἂν ἐκεῖνα ὧν ὀνόματά ἐστιν τὰ ὀνόματα, εἰ πάντα πανταχῇ αὐτοῖς ὁμοιωθείη. διττὰ γὰρ ἄν που πάντα γένοιτο, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν ⟨οὐδεὶς⟩ οὐδέτερον ὁπότερόν ἐστι τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα. [¶45] Cratylus. Quite true. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶46] Socrates. Then do not be faint-hearted, but have the courage to admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly given; do not insist that it must have all the letters and be exactly the same as the thing named, but grant that an inappropriate letter may be employed. But if a letter, then grant that also a noun in a clause, and if a noun, then also a clause in a sentence may be employed which is not appropriate to the things in question, and the thing may none the less be named and described, so long as the intrinsic quality of the thing named is retained, as is the case in the names of the letters of the alphabet, if you remember what Hermogenes and I were saying a while ago. > Greek: ΣΩ. θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ὦ γενναῖε, ἔα καὶ ὄνομα τὸ μὲν εὖ κεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μή, καὶ μὴ ἀνάγκαζε πάντʼ ἔχειν τὰ γράμματα, ἵνα κομιδῇ ᾖ τοιοῦτον οἷόνπερ οὗ ὄνομά ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἔα καὶ τὸ μὴ προσῆκον γράμμα ἐπιφέρειν. εἰ δὲ γράμμα, καὶ ὄνομα ἐν λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ ὄνομα, καὶ λόγον ἐν λόγῳ μὴ προσήκοντα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιφέρεσθαι, καὶ μηδὲν ἧττον ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ λέγεσθαι, ἕως ἂν ὁ τύπος ἐνῇ τοῦ πράγματος περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τῶν στοιχείων ὀνόμασιν, εἰ μέμνησαι ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ καὶ Ἑρμογένης ἐλέγομεν. [¶47] 433. Cratylus. Yes, I remember. > Greek: 433. ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ μέμνημαι. [¶48] Socrates. Very well, then. So long as this intrinsic quality is present, even though the name have not all the proper letters, the thing will still be named; well, when it has all the proper letters; badly, when it has only a few of them. Let us, then, grant this, my friend, or we shall get into trouble, like the belated night wanderers in the road at Aegina, and in very truth we shall be found to have arrived too late; otherwise you must look for some other principle of correctness in names, and must not admit that a name is the representation of a thing in syllables and letters. For if you maintain both positions, you cannot help contradicting yourself. > Greek: ΣΩ. καλῶς τοίνυν. ὅταν γὰρ τοῦτο ἐνῇ, κἂν μὴ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα ἔχῃ, λέξεταί γε τὸ πρᾶγμα, καλῶς ὅταν πάντα, κακῶς δὲ ὅταν ὀλίγα· λέγεσθαι δʼ οὖν, ὦ μακάριε, ἐῶμεν, ἵνα μὴ ὄφλωμεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιιόντες ὀψὲ ὁδοῦ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δόξωμεν αὖ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτω πως ἐληλυθέναι ὀψιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἢ ζήτει τινὰ ἄλλην ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα, καὶ μὴ ὁμολόγει δήλωμα συλλαβαῖς καὶ γράμμασι πράγματος ὄνομα εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἐρεῖς, οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἔσῃ συμφωνεῖν σαυτῷ. [¶49] Cratylus. Well, Socrates, I think what you say is reasonable, and I accept it. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, μετρίως λέγειν, καὶ οὕτω τίθεμαι. [¶50] Socrates. Then since we are agreed about this, let us consider the next point. If a name, we say, is to be a good one, it must have the proper letters? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἡμῖν συνδοκεῖ, μετὰ ταῦτα τάδε σκοπῶμεν· εἰ μέλλει φαμὲν καλῶς κεῖσθαι τὸ ὄνομα, τὰ προσήκοντα δεῖ αὐτὸ γράμματα ἔχειν; [¶51] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ναί. [¶52] Socrates. And the proper letters are those which are like the things named? > Greek: ΣΩ. προσήκει δὲ τὰ ὅμοια τοῖς πράγμασιν; [¶53] Cratylus. Yes, certainly. > Greek: ΚΡ. πάνυ γε. [¶54] Socrates. That is, then, the method by which wellgiven names are given. But if any name is not well given, the greater part of it may perhaps, if it is to be an image at all, be made up of proper and like letters, but it may contain some inappropriate element, and is on that account not good or well made. Is that our view? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν ἄρα καλῶς κείμενα οὕτω κεῖται· εἰ δὲ μή τι καλῶς ἐτέθη, τὸ μὲν ἂν πολὺ ἴσως ἐκ προσηκόντων εἴη γραμμάτων καὶ ὁμοίων, εἴπερ ἔσται εἰκών, ἔχοι δʼ ἄν τι καὶ οὐ προσῆκον, διʼ ὃ οὐκ ἂν καλὸν εἴη οὐδὲ καλῶς εἰργασμένον τὸ ὄνομα. οὕτω φαμὲν ἢ ἄλλως; [¶55] Cratylus. I suppose, Socrates, there is no use in keeping up my contention; but I am not satisfied that it can be a name and not be well given. > Greek: ΚΡ. οὐδὲν δεῖ οἶμαι διαμάχεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀρέσκει γέ με τὸ φάναι ὄνομα μὲν εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι καλῶς γε κεῖσθαι. [¶56] Socrates. Are you not satisfied that the name is the representation of a thing? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον τοῦτο οὐκ ἀρέσκει σε, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα δήλωμα τοῦ πράγματος; [¶57] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε. [¶58] Socrates. And do you not think it is true that some names are composed of earlier ones and others are primary? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκ προτέρων συγκείμενα, τὰ δὲ πρῶτα, οὐ καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι; [¶59] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε. [¶60] Socrates. But if the primary names are to be representations of any things, can you suggest any better way of making them representations than by making them as much as possible like the things which they are to represent? Or do you prefer the theory advanced by Hermogenes and many others, who claim that names are conventional and represent things to those who established the convention and knew the things beforehand, and that convention is the sole principle of correctness in names, and it makes no difference whether we accept the existing convention or adopt an opposite one according to which small would be called great and great small? Which of these two theories do you prefer? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὰ πρῶτα εἰ μέλλει δηλώματά τινων γίγνεσθαι, ἔχεις τινὰ καλλίω τρόπον τοῦ δηλώματα αὐτὰ γενέσθαι ἄλλον ἢ αὐτὰ ποιῆσαι ὅτι μάλιστα τοιαῦτα οἷα ἐκεῖνα ἃ δεῖ δηλοῦν αὐτά; ἢ ὅδε μᾶλλόν σε ἀρέσκει ὁ τρόπος ὃν Ἑρμογένης λέγει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, τὸ συνθήματα εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ δηλοῦν τοῖς συνθεμένοις προειδόσι δὲ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ εἶναι ταύτην ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος, συνθήκην, διαφέρειν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐάντε τις συνθῆται ὥσπερ νῦν σύγκειται, ἐάντε καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐπὶ μὲν ᾧ νῦν σμικρόν, μέγα καλεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ ᾧ μέγα, σμικρόν; πότερός σε ὁ τρόπος ἀρέσκει; [¶61] 434. Cratylus. Representing by likeness the thing represented is absolutely and entirely superior to representation by chance signs. > Greek: 434. ΚΡ. ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ὁμοιώματι δηλοῦν ὅτι ἄν τις δηλοῖ ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι. [¶62] Socrates. You are right. Then if the name is like the thing, the letters of which the primary names are to be formed must be by their very nature like the things, must they not? Let me explain. Could a painting, to revert to our previous comparison, ever be made like any real thing, if there were no pigments out of which the painting is composed, which were by their nature like the objects which the painter’s art imitates? Is not that impossible? > Greek: ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἔσται τὸ ὄνομα ὅμοιον τῷ πράγματι, ἀναγκαῖον πεφυκέναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ὅμοια τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματά τις συνθήσει; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· ἆρά ποτʼ ἄν τις συνέθηκεν ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ζωγράφημα ὅμοιόν τῳ τῶν ὄντων, εἰ μὴ φύσει ὑπῆρχε φαρμακεῖα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἐξ ὧν συντίθεται τὰ ζωγραφούμενα, ἐκείνοις ἃ μιμεῖται ἡ γραφική· ἢ ἀδύνατον; [¶63] Cratylus. Yes, it is impossible. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀδύνατον. [¶64] Socrates. In the same way, names can never be like anything unless those elements of which the names are composed exist in the first place and possess some kind of likeness to the things which the names imitate; and the elements of which they are composed are the letters, are they not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡσαύτως καὶ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὅμοια γένοιτο οὐδενί, εἰ μὴ ὑπάρξει ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ὁμοιότητά τινα ἔχοντα, ἐξ ὧν συντίθεται τὰ ὀνόματα, ἐκείνοις ὧν ἐστι τὰ ὀνόματα μιμήματα; ἔστι δέ, ἐξ ὧν συνθετέον, στοιχεῖα; [¶65] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ναί. [¶66] Socrates. Then I must now ask you to consider with me the subject which Hermogenes and I discussed a while ago. Do you think I am right in saying that rho is expressive of speed, motion, and hardness, or not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἤδη τοίνυν καὶ σὺ κοινώνῃ τοῦ λόγου οὗπερ ἄρτι Ἑρμογένης. φέρε, καλῶς σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ὅτι τὸ ῥῶ τῇ φορᾷ καὶ κινήσει καὶ σκληρότητι προσέοικεν, ἢ οὐ καλῶς; [¶67] Cratylus. You are right. > Greek: ΚΡ. καλῶς ἔμοιγε. [¶68] Socrates. And lambda is like smoothness, softness, and the other qualities we mentioned? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ λάβδα τῷ λείῳ καὶ μαλακῷ καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν; [¶69] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ναί. [¶70] Socrates. You know, of course, that we call the same thing σκληρότης (hardness) which the Eretrians call σκληρότηρ? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡμεῖς μέν φαμεν σκληρότης, Ἐρετριῆς δὲ σκληροτήρ; [¶71] Cratylus. Certainly. > Greek: ΚΡ. πάνυ γε. [¶72] Socrates. Have rho and sigma both a likeness to the same thing, and does the final rho mean to them just what the sigma means to us, or is there to one of us no meaning? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τό τε ῥῶ καὶ τὸ σῖγμα ἔοικεν ἀμφότερα τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ δηλοῖ ἐκείνοις τε τὸ αὐτὸ τελευτῶντος τοῦ ῥῶ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ σῖγμα, ἢ τοῖς ἑτέροις ἡμῶν οὐ δηλοῖ; [¶73] Cratylus. They mean the same to both. > Greek: ΚΡ. δηλοῖ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέροις. [¶74] Socrates. In so far as rho and sigma are alike, or in so far as they are not? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον ᾗ ὅμοια τυγχάνει ὄντα τὸ ῥῶ καὶ τὸ σῖγμα, ἢ ᾗ μή; [¶75] Cratylus. In so far as they are alike. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἧι ὅμοια. [¶76] Socrates. And are they alike in all respects? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ὅμοιά ἐστι πανταχῇ; [¶77] Cratylus. Yes; at least for the purpose of expressing motion equally. > Greek: ΚΡ. πρός γε τὸ ἴσως φορὰν δηλοῦν. [¶78] Socrates. But how about the lambda in σκληρότης? Does it not express the opposite of hardness? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τὸ λάβδα ἐγκείμενον; οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ σκληρότητος; [¶79] Cratylus. Well, perhaps it has no right to be there, Socrates; it may be like the cases that came up in your talk with Hermogenes, when you removed or inserted letters where that was necessary. I think you did right; and in this case perhaps we ought to put a rho in place of the lambda. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔγκειται, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὥσπερ καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ σὺ πρὸς Ἑρμογένη ἔλεγες ἐξαιρῶν τε καὶ ἐντιθεὶς γράμματα οὗ δέοι, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἐδόκεις ἔμοιγε. καὶ νῦν ἴσως ἀντὶ τοῦ λάβδα ῥῶ δεῖ λέγειν. [¶80] Socrates. Excellent. However, do we not understand one another when anyone says σκληρόν, using the present pronunciation, and do you not now know what I mean? > Greek: ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις. τί οὖν; νῦν ὡς λέγομεν, οὐδὲν μανθάνομεν ἀλλήλων, ἐπειδάν τις φῇ σκληρόν, οὐδὲ οἶσθα σὺ νῦν ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω; [¶81] Cratylus. Yes, but that is by custom, my friend. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἔγωγε, διά γε τὸ ἔθος, ὦ φίλτατε. [¶82] Socrates. In saying “custom” do you think you are saying anything different from convention? Do you not mean by “convention” that when I speak I have a definite meaning and you recognize that I have that meaning? Is not that what you mean? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔθος δὲ λέγων οἴει τι διάφορον λέγειν συνθήκης; ἢ ἄλλο τι λέγεις τὸ ἔθος ἢ ὅτι ἐγώ, ὅταν τοῦτο φθέγγωμαι, διανοοῦμαι ἐκεῖνο, σὺ δὲ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι ἐκεῖνο διανοοῦμαι; οὐ τοῦτο λέγεις; [¶83] 435. Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: 435. ΚΡ. ναί. [¶84] Socrates. Then if you recognize my meaning when I speak, that is an indication given to you by me. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ γιγνώσκεις ἐμοῦ φθεγγομένου, δήλωμα σοι γίγνεται παρʼ ἐμοῦ; [¶85] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ναί. [¶86] Socrates. The indication comes from something which is unlike my meaning when I speak, if in your example σκληρότης the lambda is unlike hardness; and if this is true, did you not make a convention with yourself, since both like and unlike letters, by the influence of custom and convention, produce indication? And even if custom is entirely distinct from convention, we should henceforth be obliged to say that custom, not likeness, is the principle of indication, since custom, it appears, indicates both by the like and by the unlike. And since we grant this, Cratylus—for I take it that your silence gives consent—both convention and custom must contribute something towards the indication of our meaning when we speak. For, my friend, if you will just turn your attention to numbers, where do you think you can possibly get names to apply to each individual number on the principle of likeness, unless you allow agreement and convention on your part to control the correctness of names? I myself prefer the theory that names are, so far as is possible, like the things named; but really this attractive force of likeness is, as Hermogenes says, a poor thing, and we are compelled to employ in addition this commonplace expedient, convention, to establish the correctness of names. Probably language would be, within the bounds of possibility, most excellent when all its terms, or as many as possible, were based on likeness, that is to say, were appropriate, and most deficient under opposite conditions. But now answer the next question. What is the function of names, and what good do they accomplish? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου γε ἢ ὃ διανοούμενος φθέγγομαι, εἴπερ τὸ λάβδα ἀνόμοιόν ἐστι τῇ ᾗ φῂς σὺ σκληρότητι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τί ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς σαυτῷ συνέθου καί σοι γίγνεται ἡ ὀρθότης τοῦ ὀνόματος συνθήκη, ἐπειδή γε δηλοῖ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ ἀνόμοια γράμματα, ἔθους τε καὶ συνθήκης τυχόντα; εἰ δʼ ὅτι μάλιστα μή ἐστι τὸ ἔθος συνθήκη, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς ἔτι ἔχοι λέγειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα δήλωμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔθος· ἐκεῖνο γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἀνομοίῳ δηλοῖ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταῦτα συγχωροῦμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε—τὴν γὰρ σιγήν σου συγχώρησιν θήσω—ἀναγκαῖόν που καὶ συνθήκην τι καὶ ἔθος συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς δήλωσιν ὧν διανοούμενοι λέγομεν· ἐπεί, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ ʼθέλεις ἐπὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐλθεῖν, πόθεν οἴει ἕξειν ὀνόματα ὅμοια ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐπενεγκεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐᾷς τι τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ συνθήκην κῦρος ἔχειν τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος πέρι; ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν· ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς, τὸ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους, γλίσχρα ᾖ ἡ ὁλκὴ αὕτη τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ᾖ καὶ τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ συνθήκῃ, εἰς ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα. ἐπεὶ ἴσως κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν κάλλιστʼ ἂν λέγοιτο ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὡς πλείστοις ὁμοίοις λέγηται, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ προσήκουσιν, αἴσχιστα δὲ τοὐναντίον. τόδε δέ μοι ἔτι εἰπὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, τίνα ἡμῖν δύναμιν ἔχει τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τί φῶμεν αὐτὰ καλὸν ἀπεργάζεσθαι; [¶87] Cratylus. I think, Socrates, their function is to instruct, and this is the simple truth, that he who knows the names knows also the things named. > Greek: ΚΡ. διδάσκειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τοῦτο πάνυ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, ὃς ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπίστηται, ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα. [¶88] Socrates. I suppose, Cratylus, you mean that when anyone knows the nature of the name—and its nature is that of the thing—he will know the thing also, since it is like the name, and the science of all things which are like each other is one and the same. It is, I fancy, on this ground that you say whoever knows names will know things also. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Κρατύλε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, ὡς ἐπειδάν τις εἰδῇ τὸ ὄνομα οἷόν ἐστιν—ἔστι δὲ οἷόνπερ τὸ πρᾶγμα— εἴσεται δὴ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπείπερ ὅμοιον τυγχάνει ὂν τῷ ὀνόματι, τέχνη δὲ μία ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτὴ πάντων τῶν ἀλλήλοις ὁμοίων. κατὰ τοῦτο δή μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν ὡς ὃς ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα εἰδῇ εἴσεται καὶ τὰ πράγματα. [¶89] Cratylus. You are perfectly right. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. [¶90] Socrates. Now let us see what this manner of giving instruction is, to which you refer, and whether there is another method, but inferior to this, or there is no other at all. What do you think? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔχε δή, ἴδωμεν τίς ποτʼ ἂν εἴη ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς διδασκαλίας τῶν ὄντων ὃν σὺ λέγεις νῦν, καὶ πότερον ἔστι μὲν καὶ ἄλλος, οὗτος μέντοι βελτίων, ἢ οὐδʼ ἔστιν ἄλλος ἢ οὗτος. ποτέρως οἴει; [¶91] 436. Cratylus. I think there is no other at all; this is both the best and the only method. > Greek: 436. ΚΡ. οὕτως ἔγωγε, οὐ πάνυ τι εἶναι ἄλλον, τοῦτον δὲ καὶ μόνον καὶ βέλτιστον. [¶92] Socrates. Do you think this is also the method of discovering realities, and that he who has discovered the names has discovered also the things named; or do you think inquiry and discovery demand another method, and this belongs to instruction? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ καὶ εὕρεσιν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην εἶναι, τὸν τὰ ὀνόματα εὑρόντα καὶ ἐκεῖνα ηὑρηκέναι ὧν ἐστι τὰ ὀνόματα· ἢ ζητεῖν μὲν καὶ εὑρίσκειν ἕτερον δεῖν τρόπον, μανθάνειν δὲ τοῦτον; [¶93] Cratylus. I most certainly think inquiry and discovery follow this same method and in the same way. > Greek: ΚΡ. πάντων μάλιστα καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ εὑρίσκειν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον κατὰ ταὐτά. [¶94] Socrates. Let us consider the matter, Cratylus. Do you not see that he who in his inquiry after things follows names and examines into the meaning of each one runs great risks of being deceived? > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἴ τις ζητῶν τὰ πράγματα ἀκολουθοῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, σκοπῶν οἷον ἕκαστον βούλεται εἶναι, ἆρʼ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐ σμικρὸς κίνδυνός ἐστιν ἐξαπατηθῆναι; [¶95] Cratylus. How so? > Greek: ΚΡ. πῶς; [¶96] Socrates. Clearly he who first gave names, gave such names as agreed with his conception of the nature of things. That is our view, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. δῆλον ὅτι ὁ θέμενος πρῶτος τὰ ὀνόματα, οἷα ἡγεῖτο εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα ἐτίθετο καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥς φαμεν. ἦ γάρ; [¶97] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ναί. [¶98] Socrates. Then if his conception was incorrect, and he gave the names according to his conception, what do you suppose will happen to us who follow him? Can we help being deceived? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνος μὴ ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖτο, ἔθετο δὲ οἷα ἡγεῖτο, τί οἴει ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀκολουθοῦντας αὐτῷ πείσεσθαι; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι; [¶99] Cratylus. But, Socrates, surely that is not the case. He who gave the names must necessarily have known; otherwise, as I have been saying all along, they would not be names at all. And there is a decisive proof that the name-giver did not miss the truth, one which you must accept; for otherwise his names would not be so universally consistent. Have you not yourself noticed in speaking that all names were formed by the same method and with the same end in view? > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ εἰδότα τίθεσθαι τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, οὐδʼ ἂν ὀνόματα εἴη. μέγιστον δέ σοι ἔστω τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἔσφαλται τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ τιθέμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε οὕτω σύμφωνα ἦν αὐτῷ ἅπαντα. ἢ οὐκ ἐνενόεις αὐτὸς λέγων ὡς πάντα κατὰ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἐγίγνετο τὰ ὀνόματα; [¶100] Socrates. But that, Cratylus, is no counter argument. For if the giver of names erred in the beginning and thenceforth forced all other names into agreement with his own initial error, there is nothing strange about that. It is just so sometimes in geometrical diagrams; the initial error is small and unnoticed, but all the numerous deductions are wrong, though consistent. Every one must therefore give great care and great attention to the beginning of any undertaking, to see whether his foundation is right or not. If that has been considered with proper care, everything else will follow. However, I should be surprised if names are really consistent. Let us review our previous discussion. Names, we said, indicate nature to us, assuming that all things are in motion and flux. Do you not think they do so? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ὠγαθὲ Κρατύλε, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀπολόγημα. εἰ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον σφαλεὶς ὁ τιθέμενος τἆλλα ἤδη πρὸς τοῦτʼ ἐβιάζετο καὶ αὑτῷ συμφωνεῖν ἠνάγκαζεν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ὥσπερ τῶν διαγραμμάτων ἐνίοτε τοῦ πρώτου σμικροῦ καὶ ἀδήλου ψεύδους γενομένου, τὰ λοιπὰ πάμπολλα ἤδη ὄντα ἑπόμενα ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις. δεῖ δὴ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς παντὸς πράγματος παντὶ ἀνδρὶ τὸν πολὺν λόγον εἶναι καὶ τὴν πολλὴν σκέψιν εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ὑπόκειται· ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης ἱκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνῃ ἑπόμενα. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ θαυμάζοιμʼ ἂν εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα συμφωνεῖ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς. πάλιν γὰρ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἃ τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν. ὡς τοῦ παντὸς ἰόντος τε καὶ φερομένου καὶ ῥέοντός φαμεν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ ὀνόματα. ἄλλο τι οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ δηλοῦν; [¶101] 437. Cratylus. Yes, and they indicate it correctly. > Greek: 437. ΚΡ. πάνυ σφόδρα, καὶ ὀρθῶς γε σημαίνει. [¶102] Socrates. Let us first take up again the word ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) and see how ambiguous it is, seeming to indicate that it makes our soul stand still (ἵστησιν) at things, rather than that it is carried round with them, so it is better to speak the beginning of it as we now do than to insert the epsilon and say ἐπεϊστήμ; we should insert an iota rather than an epsilon. Then take βέβαιον (firm), which expresses position and rest, not motion. And ἱστορία (inquiry) means much the same, that it stops (ἵστησιν) the flow. And πιστόν (faithful) most certainly means that which stops (ἱστόν) motion. Then again, anyone can see that μνήμη (memory) expresses rest (μονή) in the soul, not motion. On the other hand, ἁμαρτία (error) and ξυμφορά (misfortune), if you consider merely the form of the names, will appear to be the same as σύνεσις (intellect) and ἐπιστήμη and all the other names of good significance. Moreover, ἀμαθία (ignorance) and ἀκολασία (unrestraint) also appear to be like them; for the former, ἀμαθία, seems to be τοῦ ἅμα θεῷ ἰόντος πορεία (the progress of one who goes with God), and ἀκολασία seems to be exactly ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασιν (movement in company with things). And so names which we believe have the very worst meanings appear to be very like those which have the best. And I think we could, if we took pains, find many other words which would lead us to reverse our judgement and believe that the giver of names meant that things were not in progress or in motion, but were at rest. > Greek: ΣΩ. σκοπῶμεν δὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὡς ἀμφίβολόν [ἐστι], καὶ μᾶλλον ἔοικε σημαίνοντι ὅτι ἵστησιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ ὅτι συμπεριφέρεται, καὶ ὀρθότερόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ νῦν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμβάλλοντας τὸ εἶ ἑπεϊστήμην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμβολὴν ποιήσασθαι ἀντὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ εἶ ἐν τῷ ἰῶτα. ἔπειτα τὸ βέβαιον, ὅτι βάσεώς τινός ἐστιν καὶ στάσεως μίμημα ἀλλʼ οὐ φορᾶς. ἔπειτα ἡ ἱστορία αὐτό που σημαίνει ὅτι ἵστησι τὸν ῥοῦν. καὶ τὸ πιστὸν ἱστὰν παντάπασι σημαίνει. ἔπειτα δὲ ἡ μνήμη παντί που μηνύει ὅτι μονή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀλλʼ οὐ φορά. εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἡ ἁμαρτία καὶ ἡ συμφορά, εἰ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομά τις ἀκολουθήσει, φανεῖται ταὐτὸν τῇ συνέσει ταύτῃ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα ὀνόμασιν. ἔτι τοίνυν ἡ ἀμαθία καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία παραπλησία τούτοις φαίνεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἅμα θεῷ ἰόντος πορεία φαίνεται, ἡ ἀμαθία, ἡ δʼ ἀκολασία παντάπασιν ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασι φαίνεται. καὶ οὕτως, ἃ νομίζομεν ἐπὶ τοῖς κακίστοις ὀνόματα εἶναι, ὁμοιότατʼ ἂν φαίνοιτο τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πόλλʼ ἄν τις εὕροι εἰ πραγματεύοιτο, ἐξ ὧν οἰηθείη ἂν αὖ πάλιν τὸν τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενον οὐχὶ ἰόντα οὐδὲ φερόμενα ἀλλὰ μένοντα τὰ πράγματα σημαίνειν. [¶103] Cratylus. But, Socrates, you see that most of the names indicate motion. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ ἐκείνως ἐσήμαινεν. [¶104] Socrates. What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count names like votes, and shall correctness rest with the majority? Are those to be the true names which are found to have that one of the two meanings which is expressed by the greater number? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Κρατύλε; ὥσπερ ψήφους διαριθμησόμεθα τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἔσται ἡ ὀρθότης; ὁπότερα ἂν πλείω φαίνηται τὰ ὀνόματα σημαίνοντα, ταῦτα δὴ ἔσται τἀληθῆ; [¶105] Cratylus. That is not reasonable. > Greek: ΚΡ. οὔκουν εἰκός γε. [¶106] Socrates. No, not in the least, my friend. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν, ὦ φίλε. καὶ ταῦτα μέν γε αὐτοῦ ἐάσωμεν, ἐπανέλθωμεν δὲ πάλιν ὅθεν δεῦρο μετέβημεν. [¶107] 438. Now let us drop this and return to the point at which we digressed. A little while ago, you may remember, you said he who gave names must have known the things to which he gave them. Do you still hold that opinion, or not? Cratylus. I do. > Greek: 438. ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα ἀναγκαῖον ἔφησθα εἶναι εἰδότα τίθεσθαι οἷς ἐτίθετο. πότερον οὖν ἔτι σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἢ οὔ; ΚΡ. ἔτι. [¶108] Socrates. And you say that he who gave the first names also knew the things which he named? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τὸν τὰ πρῶτα τιθέμενον εἰδότα φῂς τίθεσθαι; [¶109] Cratylus. Yes, he knew them. > Greek: ΚΡ. εἰδότα. [¶110] Socrates. But from what names had he learned or discovered the things, if the first names had not yet been given, and if we declare that it is impossible to learn or discover things except by learning or ourselves discovering the names? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκ ποίων οὖν ὀνομάτων ἢ μεμαθηκὼς ἢ ηὑρηκὼς ἦν τὰ πράγματα, εἴπερ τά γε πρῶτα μήπω ἔκειτο, μαθεῖν δʼ αὖ φαμεν τὰ πράγματα καὶ εὑρεῖν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἄλλως ἢ τὰ ὀνόματα μαθόντας ἢ αὐτοὺς ἐξευρόντας οἷά ἐστι; [¶111] Cratylus. I think there is something in what you say, Socrates. > Greek: ΚΡ. δοκεῖς τί μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶112] Socrates. How can we assert that they gave names or were lawgivers with knowledge, before any name whatsoever had been given, and before they knew any names, if things cannot be learned except through their names? > Greek: ΣΩ. τίνα οὖν τρόπον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς εἰδότας θέσθαι ἢ νομοθέτας εἶναι, πρὶν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ὄνομα κεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἐκείνους εἰδέναι, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι τὰ πράγματα μαθεῖν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων; [¶113] Cratylus. I think the truest theory of the matter, Socrates, is that the power which gave the first names to things is more than human, and therefore the names must necessarily be correct. > Greek: ΚΡ. οἶμαι μὲν ἐγὼ τὸν ἀληθέστατον λόγον περὶ τούτων εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, μείζω τινὰ δύναμιν εἶναι ἢ ἀνθρωπείαν τὴν θεμένην τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι αὐτὰ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν. [¶114] Socrates. Then, in your opinion, he who gave the names, though he was a spirit or a god, would have given names which made him contradict himself? Or do you think there is no sense in what we were saying just now? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶτα οἴει ἐναντία ἂν ἐτίθετο αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ θείς, ὢν δαίμων τις ἢ θεός; ἢ οὐδέν σοι ἐδοκοῦμεν ἄρτι λέγειν; [¶115] Cratylus. But, Socrates, those that make up one of the two classes are not really names. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἦν τούτων τὰ ἕτερα ὀνόματα. [¶116] Socrates. Which of the two, my excellent friend; the class of those which point towards rest or of those that point towards motion? We agreed just now that the matter is not to be determined by mere numbers. > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερα, ὦ ἄριστε, τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν στάσιν ἄγοντα ἢ τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν φοράν; οὐ γάρ που κατὰ τὸ ἄρτι λεχθὲν πλήθει κριθήσεται. [¶117] Cratylus. No; that would not be right, Socrates. > Greek: ΚΡ. οὔτοι δὴ δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶118] Socrates. Then since the names are in conflict, and some of them claim that they are like the truth, and others that they are, how can we decide, and upon what shall we base our decision? Certainly not upon other names differing from these, for there are none. No, it is plain that we must look for something else, not names, which shall show us which of these two kinds are the true names, which of them, that is to say, show the truth of things. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀνομάτων οὖν στασιασάντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φασκόντων ἑαυτὰ εἶναι τὰ ὅμοια τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, τῶν δʼ ἑαυτά, τίνι ἔτι διακρινοῦμεν, ἢ ἐπὶ τί ἐλθόντες; οὐ γάρ που ἐπὶ ὀνόματά γε ἕτερα ἄλλα τούτων· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλʼ ἄττα ζητητέα πλὴν ὀνομάτων, ἃ ἡμῖν ἐμφανιεῖ ἄνευ ὀνομάτων ὁπότερα τούτων ἐστὶ τἀληθῆ, δείξαντα δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ὄντων. [¶119] Cratylus. That is my opinion. > Greek: ΚΡ. δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω. [¶120] Socrates. Then if that is true, Cratylus, it seems that things may be learned without names. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Κρατύλε, δυνατὸν μαθεῖν ἄνευ ὀνομάτων τὰ ὄντα, εἴπερ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. [¶121] Cratylus. So it appears. > Greek: ΚΡ. φαίνεται. [¶122] Socrates. What other way is left by which you could expect to know them? What other than the natural and the straightest way, through each other, if they are akin, and through themselves? For that which is other and different from them would signify not them, but something other and different. > Greek: ΣΩ. διὰ τίνος ἄλλου οὖν ἔτι προσδοκᾷς ἂν ταῦτα μαθεῖν; ἆρα διʼ ἄλλου του ἢ οὗπερ εἰκός τε καὶ δικαιότατον, διʼ ἀλλήλων γε, εἴ πῃ συγγενῆ ἐστιν, καὶ αὐτὰ διʼ αὑτῶν; τὸ γάρ που ἕτερον ἐκείνων καὶ ἀλλοῖον ἕτερον ἄν τι καὶ ἀλλοῖον σημαίνοι ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα. [¶123] Cratylus. I think that is true. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀληθῆ μοι φαίνῃ λέγειν. [¶124] 439. Socrates. Stop for Heaven’s sake! Did we not more than once agree that names which are rightly given are like the things named and are images of them? > Greek: 439. ΣΩ. ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐ πολλάκις μέντοι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὰ καλῶς κείμενα ἐοικότα εἶναι ἐκείνοις ὧν ὀνόματα κεῖται, καὶ εἶναι εἰκόνας τῶν πραγμάτων; [¶125] Cratylus. Yes. > Greek: ΚΡ. ναί. [¶126] Socrates. Then if it be really true that things can be learned either through names or through themselves which would be the better and surer way of learning? To learn from the image whether it is itself a good imitation and also to learn the truth which it imitates, or to learn from the truth both the truth itself and whether the image is properly made? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ἔστι μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα διʼ ὀνομάτων τὰ πράγματα μανθάνειν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ διʼ αὐτῶν, ποτέρα ἂν εἴη καλλίων καὶ σαφεστέρα ἡ μάθησις; ἐκ τῆς εἰκόνος μανθάνειν αὐτήν τε αὐτὴν εἰ καλῶς εἴκασται, καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἧς ἦν εἰκών, ἢ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτήν τε αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτῆς εἰ πρεπόντως εἴργασται; [¶127] Cratylus. I think it is certainly better to learn from the truth. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας μοι δοκεῖ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. [¶128] Socrates. How realities are to be learned or discovered is perhaps too great a question for you or me to determine; but it is worth while to have reached even this conclusion, that they are to be learned and sought for, not from names but much better through themselves than through names. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅντινα μὲν τοίνυν τρόπον δεῖ μανθάνειν ἢ εὑρίσκειν τὰ ὄντα, μεῖζον ἴσως ἐστὶν ἐγνωκέναι ἢ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ σέ· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὁμολογήσασθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ὀνομάτων ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν καὶ μαθητέον καὶ ζητητέον ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων. [¶129] Cratylus. That is clear, Socrates. > Greek: ΚΡ. φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶130] Socrates. Then let us examine one further point to avoid being deceived by the fact that most of these names tend in the same direction. Suppose it should prove that although those who gave the names gave them in the belief that all things are in motion and flux—I myself think they did have that belief— still in reality that is not the case, and the namegivers themselves, having fallen into a kind of vortex, are whirled about, dragging us along with them. Consider, my worthy Cratylus, a question about which I often dream. Shall we assert that there is any absolute beauty, or good, or any other absolute existence, or not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν τόδε σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ ἡμᾶς τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ὀνόματα ἐς ταὐτὸν τείνοντα ἐξαπατᾷ, εἰ τῷ ὄντι μὲν οἱ θέμενοι αὐτὰ διανοηθέντες γε ἔθεντο ὡς ἰόντων ἁπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων—φαίνονται γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι—τὸ δʼ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλʼ οὗτοι αὐτοί τε ὥσπερ εἴς τινα δίνην ἐμπεσόντες κυκῶνται καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐφελκόμενοι προσεμβάλλουσιν. σκέψαι γάρ, ὦ θαυμάσιε Κρατύλε, ὃ ἔγωγε πολλάκις ὀνειρώττω. πότερον φῶμέν τι εἶναι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων οὕτω, ἢ μή; [¶131] Cratylus. I think there is, Socrates. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, [εἶναι]. [¶132] Socrates. Then let us consider the absolute, not whether a particular face, or something of that sort, is beautiful, or whether all these things are in flux. Is not, in our opinion, absolute beauty always such as it is? > Greek: ΣΩ. αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο σκεψώμεθα, μὴ εἰ πρόσωπόν τί ἐστιν καλὸν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα πάντα ῥεῖν· ἀλλʼ αὐτό, φῶμεν, τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιοῦτον ἀεί ἐστιν οἷόν ἐστιν; [¶133] Cratylus. That is inevitable. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀνάγκη. [¶134] Socrates. Can we, then, if it is always passing away, correctly say that it is this, then that it is that, or must it inevitably, in the very instant while we are speaking, become something else and pass away and no longer be what it is? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οἷόν τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξιέναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν; [¶135] Cratylus. That is inevitable. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀνάγκη. [¶136] Socrates. How, then, can that which is never in the same state be anything? For if it is ever in the same state, then obviously at that time it is not changing; and if it is always in the same state and is always the same, how can it ever change or move without relinquishing its own form? > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη τὶ ἐκεῖνο ὃ μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει; εἰ γάρ ποτε ὡσαύτως ἴσχει, ἔν γʼ ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβαίνει· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, πῶς ἂν τοῦτό γε μεταβάλλοι ἢ κινοῖτο, μηδὲν ἐξιστάμενον τῆς αὑτοῦ ἰδέας; [¶137] Cratylus. It cannot do so at all. > Greek: ΚΡ. οὐδαμῶς. [¶138] Socrates. No, nor can it be known by anyone. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἂν γνωσθείη γε ὑπʼ οὐδενός. ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ἐπιόντος τοῦ γνωσομένου ἄλλο καὶ ἀλλοῖον γίγνοιτο, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν γνωσθείη ἔτι ὁποῖόν γέ τί ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἔχον· [¶139] 440. For at the moment when he who seeks to know it approaches, it becomes something else and different, so that its nature and state can no longer be known; and surely there is no knowledge which knows that which is in no state. Cratylus. It is as you say. > Greek: 440. γνῶσις δὲ δήπου οὐδεμία γιγνώσκει ὃ γιγνώσκει μηδαμῶς ἔχον. ΚΡ. ἔστιν ὡς λέγεις. [¶140] Socrates. But we cannot even say that there is any knowledge, if all things are changing and nothing remains fixed; for if knowledge itself does not change and cease to be knowledge, then knowledge would remain, and there would be knowledge; but if the very essence of knowledge changes, at the moment of the change to another essence of knowledge there would be no knowledge, and if it is always changing, there will always be no knowledge, and by this reasoning there will be neither anyone to know nor anything to be known. But if there is always that which knows and that which is known—if the beautiful, the good, and all the other verities exist—I do not see how there is any likeness between these conditions of which I am now speaking and flux or motion. Now whether this is the nature of things, or the doctrine of Heracleitus and many others is true, is another question; but surely no man of sense can put himself and his soul under the control of names, and trust in names and their makers to the point of affirming that he knows anything; nor will he condemn himself and all things and say that there is no health in them, but that all things are flowing like leaky pots, or believe that all things are just like people afflicted with catarrh, flowing and running all the time. Perhaps, Cratylus, this theory is true, but perhaps it is not. Therefore you must consider courageously and thoroughly and not accept anything carelessly—for you are still young and in your prime; then, if after investigation you find the truth, impart it to me. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ γνῶσιν εἶναι φάναι εἰκός, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἡ γνῶσις, τοῦ γνῶσις εἶναι μὴ μεταπίπτει, μένοι τε ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ γνῶσις καὶ εἴη γνῶσις. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος μεταπίπτει τῆς γνώσεως, ἅμα τʼ ἂν μεταπίπτοι εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος γνώσεως καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνῶσις· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ μεταπίπτει, ἀεὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνῶσις, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὔτε τὸ γνωσόμενον οὔτε τὸ γνωσθησόμενον ἂν εἴη. εἰ δὲ ἔστι μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνῶσκον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ καλόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔστι δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οὔ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἃ νῦν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ῥοῇ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ φορᾷ. ταῦτʼ οὖν πότερόν ποτε οὕτως ἔχει ἢ ἐκείνως ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτόν τε λέγουσιν καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, μὴ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ᾖ ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὐδὲ πάνυ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόμασιν αὑτὸν καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχὴν θεραπεύειν, πεπιστευκότα ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς θεμένοις αὐτά, διισχυρίζεσθαι ὥς τι εἰδότα, καὶ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καταγιγνώσκειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ῥεῖ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ κατάρρῳ νοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι οὕτως οἴεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι, ὑπὸ ῥεύματός τε καὶ κατάρρου πάντα [τὰ] χρήματα ἔχεσθαι. ἴσως μὲν οὖν δή, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ οὔ. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ εὖ, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποδέχεσθαι—ἔτι γὰρ νέος εἶ καὶ ἡλικίαν ἔχεις—σκεψάμενον δέ, ἐὰν εὕρῃς, μεταδιδόναι καὶ ἐμοί. [¶141] Cratylus. I will do so. However, I assure you, Socrates, that I have already considered the matter, and after toilsome consideration I think the doctrine of Heracleitus is much more likely to be true. > Greek: ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. εὖ μέντοι ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ νυνὶ ἀσκέπτως ἔχω, ἀλλά μοι σκοπουμένῳ καὶ πράγματα ἔχοντι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκείνως φαίνεται ἔχειν ὡς Ἡράκλειτος λέγει. [¶142] Socrates. Some other time, then, my friend, you will teach me, when you come back; but now go into the country as you have made ready to do; and Hermogenes here will go with you a bit. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰς αὖθις τοίνυν με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, διδάξεις, ἐπειδὰν ἥκῃς· νῦν δέ, ὥσπερ παρεσκεύασαι, πορεύου εἰς ἀγρόν· προπέμψει δέ σε καὶ Ἑρμογένης ὅδε. [¶143] Cratylus. Very well, Socrates, and I hope you also will continue to think of these matters. > Greek: ΚΡ. ταῦτʼ ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ πειρῶ ἔτι ἐννοεῖν ταῦτα ἤδη.