Cratylus. I think, Socrates, the man would be producing sounds without sense.Socrates. Even that reply is welcome;
ΚΡ. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως ἂν οὗτος ταῦτα φθέγξασθαι.
430. for I can ask whether the words he produced would be true, or false, or partly true and partly false. Even that would suffice.Cratylus. I should say that the man in such a case was merely making a noise, going through purposeless motions, as if he were beating a bronze pot.
430. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀγαπητὸν καὶ τοῦτο. πότερον γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἂν φθέγξαιτο ταῦτα ὁ φθεγξάμενος ἢ ψευδῆ; ἢ τὸ μέν τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος; καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ἐξαρκοῖ.ΚΡ. ψοφεῖν ἔγωγʼ ἂν φαίην τὸν τοιοῦτον, μάτην αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις χαλκίον κινήσειε κρούσας.
Socrates. Let us see, Cratylus, if we cannot come to terms somehow. You would agree, would you not, that the name is one thing and the thing of which it is the name is another?
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ἐάν πῃ διαλλαχθῶμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε· ἆρʼ οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἂν φαίης τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο οὗ τὸ ὄνομά ἐστιν;
Cratylus. Yes, I should.
ΚΡ. ἔγωγε.
Socrates. And you agree that the name is an imitation of the thing named?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ὁμολογεῖς μίμημά τι εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος;
Cratylus. Most assuredly.
ΚΡ. πάντων μάλιστα.
Socrates. And you agree that paintings also are imitations, though in a different way, of things?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα τρόπον τινὰ ἄλλον λέγεις μιμήματα εἶναι πραγμάτων τινῶν;
Socrates. Well then—for perhaps I do not understand, and you may be right—can both of these imitations, the paintings and the names, be assigned and applied to the things which they imitate, or not?
ΣΩ. φέρε δή—ἴσως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐ μανθάνω ἅττα ποτʼ ἔστιν ἃ λέγεις, σὺ δὲ τάχʼ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοις—ἔστι διανεῖμαι καὶ προσενεγκεῖν ταῦτα ἀμφότερα τὰ μιμήματα, τά τε ζωγραφήματα κἀκεῖνα τὰ ὀνόματα, τοῖς πράγμασιν ὧν μιμήματά ἐστιν, ἢ οὔ;
Cratylus. They can.
ΚΡ. ἔστιν.
Socrates. First, then, consider this question: Can we assign the likeness of the man to the man and that of the woman to the woman, and so forth?
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκόπει τόδε. ἆρʼ ἄν τις τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἰκόνα τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἀποδοίη, τὴν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς τῇ γυναικί, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως;
Cratylus. Certainly.
ΚΡ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Socrates. And can we conversely attribute that of the man to the woman, and the woman’s to the man?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὐναντίον τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τῇ γυναικί, τὴν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς τῷ ἀνδρί;
Cratylus. That is also possible.
ΚΡ. ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα.
Socrates. And are these assignments both correct, or only the former?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν αὗται αἱ διανομαὶ ἀμφότεραι ὀρθαί, ἢ ἡ ἑτέρα;
Cratylus. The former.
ΚΡ. ἡ ἑτέρα.
Socrates. The assignment, in short, which attributes to each that which belongs to it and is like it.
ΣΩ. ἣ ἂν ἑκάστῳ οἶμαι τὸ προσῆκόν τε καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀποδιδῷ.
Cratylus. That is my view.
ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Socrates. To put an end to contentious argument between you and me, since we are friends, let me state my position. I call that kind of assignment in the case of both imitations paintings and names—correct, and in the case of names not only correct, but true; and the other kind, which gives and applies the unlike imitation, I call incorrect and, in the case of names, false.
ΣΩ. ἵνα τοίνυν μὴ μαχώμεθα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φίλοι ὄντες, ἀπόδεξαί μου ὃ λέγω. τὴν τοιαύτην γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καλῶ ἔγωγε διανομὴν ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν τοῖς μιμήμασιν, τοῖς τε ζῴοις καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὀρθήν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πρὸς τῷ ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθῆ· τὴν δʼ ἑτέραν, τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου δόσιν τε καὶ ἐπιφοράν, οὐκ ὀρθήν, καὶ ψευδῆ ὅταν ἐπʼ ὀνόμασιν ᾖ.
Cratylus. But it may be, Socrates, that this incorrect assignment is possible in the case of paintings, and not in the case of names, which must be always correctly assigned.
ΚΡ. ἀλλʼ ὅπως μή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν ᾖ τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ ἀεὶ ὀρθῶς.
Socrates. What do you mean? What difference is there between the two? Can I not step up to a man and say to him, “This is your portrait,” and show him perhaps his own likeness or, perhaps, that of a woman? And by “show” I mean bring before the sense of sight.
ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις; τί τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρει; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἔστι προσελθόντα ἀνδρί τῳ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τουτί ἐστι σὸν γράμμα, καὶ δεῖξαι αὐτῷ, ἂν μὲν τύχῃ, ἐκείνου εἰκόνα, ἂν δὲ τύχῃ, γυναικός; τὸ δὲ δεῖξαι λέγω εἰς τὴν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι.
Cratylus. Certainly.
ΚΡ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. Well, then, can I not step up to the same man again and say, “This is your name”? A name is an imitation, just as a picture is.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; πάλιν αὐτῷ τούτῳ προσελθόντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι τουτί ἐστιν σὸν ὄνομα; ἔστι δέ που καὶ τὸ ὄνομα μίμημα ὥσπερ τὸ ζωγράφημα. τοῦτο δὴ λέγω· ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τουτί ἐστι σὸν ὄνομα, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀκοῆς αὖ αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι, ἂν μὲν τύχῃ, τὸ ἐκείνου μίμημα, εἰπόντα ὅτι ἀνήρ, ἂν δὲ τύχῃ, τὸ τοῦ θήλεος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους, εἰπόντα ὅτι γυνή;
431. Very well; can I not say to him, “This is your name,” and then bring before his sense of hearing perhaps the imitation of himself, saying that it is a man, or perhaps the imitation of the female of the human species, saying that it is a woman? Do you not believe that this is possible and sometimes happens?Cratylus. I am willing to concede it, Socrates, and grant that you are right.
431. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο οἷόν τʼ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐνίοτε;ΚΡ. ἐθέλω σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἔστω οὕτως.
Socrates. That is a good thing for you to do, my friend, if I am right; for now we need no longer argue about the matter. If, then, some such assignment of names takes place, we will call one kind speaking truth, and the other speaking falsehood. But if this is accepted, and if it is possible to assign names incorrectly and to give to objects not the names that befit them, but sometimes those that are unfitting, it would be possible to treat verbs in the same way. And if verbs and nouns can be assigned in this way, the same must be true of sentences; for sentences are, I conceive, a combination of verbs and nouns. What do you say to that, Cratylus?
ΣΩ. καλῶς γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ φίλε, εἰ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖ νῦν πάνυ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ. εἰ δʼ οὖν ἔστι τοιαύτη τις διανομὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τούτων ἀληθεύειν βουλόμεθα καλεῖν, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον ψεύδεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν τὰ ὀνόματα μηδὲ ἀποδιδόναι τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλʼ ἐνίοτε τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα, εἴη ἂν καὶ ῥήματα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ ῥήματα καὶ ὀνόματα ἔστιν οὕτω τιθέναι, ἀνάγκη καὶ λόγους· λόγοι γάρ που, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἡ τούτων σύνθεσίς ἐστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Κρατύλε;
Cratylus. I agree; I think you are right.
ΚΡ. οὕτω· καλῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.
Socrates. If, then, we compare the earliest words to sketches, it is possible in them, as in pictures, to reproduce all the colors and shapes, or not all; some may be wanting, and some may be added, and they may be too many or too large. Is not that true?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ γράμμασιν αὖ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα ἀπεικάζομεν, ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν καὶ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα χρώματά τε καὶ σχήματα ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μὴ πάντα αὖ, ἀλλʼ ἔνια ἐλλείπειν, ἔνια δὲ καὶ προστιθέναι, καὶ πλείω καὶ μείζω· ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;
Cratylus. Yes, it is.
ΚΡ. ἔστιν.
Socrates. Then he who reproduces all, produces good sketches and pictures, and he who adds or takes away produces also sketches and pictures, but bad ones?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδοὺς πάντα καλὰ τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ ἢ προστιθεὶς ἢ ἀφαιρῶν γράμματα μὲν καὶ εἰκόνας ἐργάζεται καὶ οὗτος, ἀλλὰ πονηράς;
Socrates. And how about him who imitates the nature of things by means of letters and syllables? By the same principle, if he gives all that is appropriate, the image—that is to say, the name—will be good, and if he sometimes omits a little, it will be an image, but not a good one; and therefore some names are well and others badly made. Is that not true?
ΣΩ. τί δὲ ὁ διὰ τῶν συλλαβῶν τε καὶ γραμμάτων τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπομιμούμενος; ἆρα οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἂν μὲν πάντα ἀποδῷ τὰ προσήκοντα, καλὴ ἡ εἰκὼν ἔσται—τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὄνομα—ἐὰν δὲ σμικρὰ ἐλλείπῃ ἢ προστιθῇ ἐνίοτε, εἰκὼν μὲν γενήσεται, καλὴ δὲ οὔ; ὥστε τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰργασμένα ἔσται τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ δὲ κακῶς;
Cratylus. Perhaps.
ΚΡ. ἴσως.
Socrates. Perhaps, then, one artisan of names will be good, and another bad?
ΣΩ. ἴσως ἄρα ἔσται ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς δημιουργὸς ὀνομάτων, ὁ δὲ κακός;
Socrates. The name of such an artisan was lawgiver?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτῳ ὁ νομοθέτης ἦν ὄνομα.
Socrates. Perhaps, then, by Zeus, as is the case in the other arts, one lawgiver may be good and another bad, if we accept our previous conclusions.
ΣΩ. ἴσως ἄρα νὴ Δίʼ ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ νομοθέτης ὁ μὲν ἀγαθός, ὁ δὲ κακός, ἐάνπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκεῖνα ὁμολογηθῇ ἡμῖν.
Cratylus. That is true. But you see, Socrates, when by the science of grammar we assign these letters—alpha, beta, and the rest—to names, if we take away or add or transpose any letter, it is not true that the name is written, but written incorrectly; it is not written at all, but immediately becomes a different word, if any such thing happens to it.
ΚΡ. ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλʼ ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα, τό τε ἄλφα καὶ τὸ βῆτα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν στοιχείων, τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀποδιδῶμεν τῇ γραμματικῇ τέχνῃ, ἐάν τι ἀφέλωμεν ἢ προσθῶμεν ἢ μεταθῶμέν τι, ⟨οὐ⟩ γέγραπται μὲν ἡμῖν τὸ ὄνομα, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ γέγραπται, ἀλλʼ εὐθὺς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐάν τι τούτων πάθῃ.
432. Socrates. Perhaps we are not considering the matter in the right way.
432. ΣΩ. μὴ γὰρ οὐ καλῶς σκοπῶμεν οὕτω σκοποῦντες, ὦ Κρατύλε.
Cratylus. Why not?
ΚΡ. πῶς δή;
Socrates. It may be that what you say would be true of those things which must necessarily consist of a certain number or cease to exist at all, as ten, for instance, or any number you like, if you add or subtract anything is immediately another number; but this is not the kind of correctness which applies to quality or to images in general; on the contrary, the image must not by any means reproduce all the qualities of that which it imitates, if it is to be an image. See if I am not right. Would there be two things, Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, if some god should not merely imitate your color and form, as painters do, but should also make all the inner parts like yours, should reproduce the same flexibility and warmth, should put into them motion, life, and intellect, such as exist in you, and in short, should place beside you a duplicate of all your qualities? Would there be in such an event Cratylus and an image of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses?
ΣΩ. ἴσως ὅσα ἔκ τινος ἀριθμοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι πάσχοι ἂν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ λέγεις, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ δέκα ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός, ἐὰν ἀφέλῃς τι ἢ προσθῇς, ἕτερος εὐθὺς γέγονε· τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ τινος καὶ συμπάσης εἰκόνος μὴ οὐχ αὕτη ⟨ᾖ⟩ ἡ ὀρθότης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν δέῃ πάντα ἀποδοῦναι οἷόν ἐστιν ᾧ εἰκάζει, εἰ μέλλει εἰκὼν εἶναι. σκόπει δὲ εἰ τὶ λέγω. ἆρʼ ἂν δύο πράγματα εἴη τοιάδε, οἷον Κρατύλος καὶ Κρατύλου εἰκών, εἴ τις θεῶν μὴ μόνον τὸ σὸν χρῶμα καὶ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσειεν ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς πάντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσειεν οἷάπερ τὰ σά, καὶ μαλακότητας καὶ θερμότητας τὰς αὐτὰς ἀποδοίη, καὶ κίνησιν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν οἵαπερ ἡ παρὰ σοὶ ἐνθείη αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ πάντα ἅπερ σὺ ἔχεις, τοιαῦτα ἕτερα καταστήσειεν πλησίον σου; πότερον Κρατύλος ἂν καὶ εἰκὼν Κρατύλου τότʼ εἴη τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἢ δύο Κρατύλοι;
Cratylus. I should say, Socrates, two Cratyluses.
ΚΡ. δύο ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κρατύλοι.
Socrates. Then don’t you see, my friend, that we must look for some other principle of correctness in images and in names, of which we were speaking, and must not insist that they are no longer images if anything be wanting or be added? Do you not perceive how far images are from possessing the same qualities as the originals which they imitate?
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἄλλην χρὴ εἰκόνος ὀρθότητα ζητεῖν καὶ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκάζειν, ἐάν τι ἀπῇ ἢ προσῇ, μηκέτι αὐτὴν εἰκόνα εἶναι; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὅσου ἐνδέουσιν αἱ εἰκόνες τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν εἰκόνες εἰσίν;
Cratylus. Yes, I do.
ΚΡ. ἔγωγε.
Socrates. Surely, Cratylus, the effect produced by the names upon the things of which they are the names would be ridiculous, if they were to be entirely like them in every respect. For everything would be duplicated, and no one could tell in any case which was the real thing and which the name.
ΣΩ. γελοῖα γοῦν, ὦ Κρατύλε, ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάθοι ἂν ἐκεῖνα ὧν ὀνόματά ἐστιν τὰ ὀνόματα, εἰ πάντα πανταχῇ αὐτοῖς ὁμοιωθείη. διττὰ γὰρ ἄν που πάντα γένοιτο, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν ⟨οὐδεὶς⟩ οὐδέτερον ὁπότερόν ἐστι τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα.
Cratylus. Quite true.
ΚΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Socrates. Then do not be faint-hearted, but have the courage to admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly given; do not insist that it must have all the letters and be exactly the same as the thing named, but grant that an inappropriate letter may be employed. But if a letter, then grant that also a noun in a clause, and if a noun, then also a clause in a sentence may be employed which is not appropriate to the things in question, and the thing may none the less be named and described, so long as the intrinsic quality of the thing named is retained, as is the case in the names of the letters of the alphabet, if you remember what Hermogenes and I were saying a while ago.
ΣΩ. θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ὦ γενναῖε, ἔα καὶ ὄνομα τὸ μὲν εὖ κεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μή, καὶ μὴ ἀνάγκαζε πάντʼ ἔχειν τὰ γράμματα, ἵνα κομιδῇ ᾖ τοιοῦτον οἷόνπερ οὗ ὄνομά ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἔα καὶ τὸ μὴ προσῆκον γράμμα ἐπιφέρειν. εἰ δὲ γράμμα, καὶ ὄνομα ἐν λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ ὄνομα, καὶ λόγον ἐν λόγῳ μὴ προσήκοντα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιφέρεσθαι, καὶ μηδὲν ἧττον ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ λέγεσθαι, ἕως ἂν ὁ τύπος ἐνῇ τοῦ πράγματος περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τῶν στοιχείων ὀνόμασιν, εἰ μέμνησαι ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ καὶ Ἑρμογένης ἐλέγομεν.
433. Cratylus. Yes, I remember.
433. ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ μέμνημαι.
Socrates. Very well, then. So long as this intrinsic quality is present, even though the name have not all the proper letters, the thing will still be named; well, when it has all the proper letters; badly, when it has only a few of them. Let us, then, grant this, my friend, or we shall get into trouble, like the belated night wanderers in the road at Aegina, and in very truth we shall be found to have arrived too late; otherwise you must look for some other principle of correctness in names, and must not admit that a name is the representation of a thing in syllables and letters. For if you maintain both positions, you cannot help contradicting yourself.
ΣΩ. καλῶς τοίνυν. ὅταν γὰρ τοῦτο ἐνῇ, κἂν μὴ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα ἔχῃ, λέξεταί γε τὸ πρᾶγμα, καλῶς ὅταν πάντα, κακῶς δὲ ὅταν ὀλίγα· λέγεσθαι δʼ οὖν, ὦ μακάριε, ἐῶμεν, ἵνα μὴ ὄφλωμεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιιόντες ὀψὲ ὁδοῦ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δόξωμεν αὖ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτω πως ἐληλυθέναι ὀψιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἢ ζήτει τινὰ ἄλλην ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα, καὶ μὴ ὁμολόγει δήλωμα συλλαβαῖς καὶ γράμμασι πράγματος ὄνομα εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἐρεῖς, οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἔσῃ συμφωνεῖν σαυτῷ.
Cratylus. Well, Socrates, I think what you say is reasonable, and I accept it.
ΚΡ. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, μετρίως λέγειν, καὶ οὕτω τίθεμαι.
Socrates. Then since we are agreed about this, let us consider the next point. If a name, we say, is to be a good one, it must have the proper letters?
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἡμῖν συνδοκεῖ, μετὰ ταῦτα τάδε σκοπῶμεν· εἰ μέλλει φαμὲν καλῶς κεῖσθαι τὸ ὄνομα, τὰ προσήκοντα δεῖ αὐτὸ γράμματα ἔχειν;
Socrates. And the proper letters are those which are like the things named?
ΣΩ. προσήκει δὲ τὰ ὅμοια τοῖς πράγμασιν;
Cratylus. Yes, certainly.
ΚΡ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. That is, then, the method by which wellgiven names are given. But if any name is not well given, the greater part of it may perhaps, if it is to be an image at all, be made up of proper and like letters, but it may contain some inappropriate element, and is on that account not good or well made. Is that our view?
ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν ἄρα καλῶς κείμενα οὕτω κεῖται· εἰ δὲ μή τι καλῶς ἐτέθη, τὸ μὲν ἂν πολὺ ἴσως ἐκ προσηκόντων εἴη γραμμάτων καὶ ὁμοίων, εἴπερ ἔσται εἰκών, ἔχοι δʼ ἄν τι καὶ οὐ προσῆκον, διʼ ὃ οὐκ ἂν καλὸν εἴη οὐδὲ καλῶς εἰργασμένον τὸ ὄνομα. οὕτω φαμὲν ἢ ἄλλως;
Cratylus. I suppose, Socrates, there is no use in keeping up my contention; but I am not satisfied that it can be a name and not be well given.
ΚΡ. οὐδὲν δεῖ οἶμαι διαμάχεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀρέσκει γέ με τὸ φάναι ὄνομα μὲν εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι καλῶς γε κεῖσθαι.
Socrates. Are you not satisfied that the name is the representation of a thing?
ΣΩ. πότερον τοῦτο οὐκ ἀρέσκει σε, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα δήλωμα τοῦ πράγματος;
Cratylus. Yes.
ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε.
Socrates. And do you not think it is true that some names are composed of earlier ones and others are primary?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκ προτέρων συγκείμενα, τὰ δὲ πρῶτα, οὐ καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι;
Cratylus. Yes.
ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε.
Socrates. But if the primary names are to be representations of any things, can you suggest any better way of making them representations than by making them as much as possible like the things which they are to represent? Or do you prefer the theory advanced by Hermogenes and many others, who claim that names are conventional and represent things to those who established the convention and knew the things beforehand, and that convention is the sole principle of correctness in names, and it makes no difference whether we accept the existing convention or adopt an opposite one according to which small would be called great and great small? Which of these two theories do you prefer?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὰ πρῶτα εἰ μέλλει δηλώματά τινων γίγνεσθαι, ἔχεις τινὰ καλλίω τρόπον τοῦ δηλώματα αὐτὰ γενέσθαι ἄλλον ἢ αὐτὰ ποιῆσαι ὅτι μάλιστα τοιαῦτα οἷα ἐκεῖνα ἃ δεῖ δηλοῦν αὐτά; ἢ ὅδε μᾶλλόν σε ἀρέσκει ὁ τρόπος ὃν Ἑρμογένης λέγει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, τὸ συνθήματα εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ δηλοῦν τοῖς συνθεμένοις προειδόσι δὲ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ εἶναι ταύτην ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος, συνθήκην, διαφέρειν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐάντε τις συνθῆται ὥσπερ νῦν σύγκειται, ἐάντε καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐπὶ μὲν ᾧ νῦν σμικρόν, μέγα καλεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ ᾧ μέγα, σμικρόν; πότερός σε ὁ τρόπος ἀρέσκει;
434. Cratylus. Representing by likeness the thing represented is absolutely and entirely superior to representation by chance signs.
434. ΚΡ. ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ὁμοιώματι δηλοῦν ὅτι ἄν τις δηλοῖ ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι.
Socrates. You are right. Then if the name is like the thing, the letters of which the primary names are to be formed must be by their very nature like the things, must they not? Let me explain. Could a painting, to revert to our previous comparison, ever be made like any real thing, if there were no pigments out of which the painting is composed, which were by their nature like the objects which the painter’s art imitates? Is not that impossible?
ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἔσται τὸ ὄνομα ὅμοιον τῷ πράγματι, ἀναγκαῖον πεφυκέναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ὅμοια τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματά τις συνθήσει; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· ἆρά ποτʼ ἄν τις συνέθηκεν ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ζωγράφημα ὅμοιόν τῳ τῶν ὄντων, εἰ μὴ φύσει ὑπῆρχε φαρμακεῖα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἐξ ὧν συντίθεται τὰ ζωγραφούμενα, ἐκείνοις ἃ μιμεῖται ἡ γραφική· ἢ ἀδύνατον;
Cratylus. Yes, it is impossible.
ΚΡ. ἀδύνατον.
Socrates. In the same way, names can never be like anything unless those elements of which the names are composed exist in the first place and possess some kind of likeness to the things which the names imitate; and the elements of which they are composed are the letters, are they not?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡσαύτως καὶ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὅμοια γένοιτο οὐδενί, εἰ μὴ ὑπάρξει ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ὁμοιότητά τινα ἔχοντα, ἐξ ὧν συντίθεται τὰ ὀνόματα, ἐκείνοις ὧν ἐστι τὰ ὀνόματα μιμήματα; ἔστι δέ, ἐξ ὧν συνθετέον, στοιχεῖα;
Socrates. Then I must now ask you to consider with me the subject which Hermogenes and I discussed a while ago. Do you think I am right in saying that rho is expressive of speed, motion, and hardness, or not?
ΣΩ. ἤδη τοίνυν καὶ σὺ κοινώνῃ τοῦ λόγου οὗπερ ἄρτι Ἑρμογένης. φέρε, καλῶς σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ὅτι τὸ ῥῶ τῇ φορᾷ καὶ κινήσει καὶ σκληρότητι προσέοικεν, ἢ οὐ καλῶς;
Cratylus. You are right.
ΚΡ. καλῶς ἔμοιγε.
Socrates. And lambda is like smoothness, softness, and the other qualities we mentioned?
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ λάβδα τῷ λείῳ καὶ μαλακῷ καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν;
Socrates. You know, of course, that we call the same thing σκληρότης (hardness) which the Eretrians call σκληρότηρ?
ΣΩ. οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡμεῖς μέν φαμεν σκληρότης, Ἐρετριῆς δὲ σκληροτήρ;
Cratylus. Certainly.
ΚΡ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. Have rho and sigma both a likeness to the same thing, and does the final rho mean to them just what the sigma means to us, or is there to one of us no meaning?
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τό τε ῥῶ καὶ τὸ σῖγμα ἔοικεν ἀμφότερα τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ δηλοῖ ἐκείνοις τε τὸ αὐτὸ τελευτῶντος τοῦ ῥῶ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ σῖγμα, ἢ τοῖς ἑτέροις ἡμῶν οὐ δηλοῖ;
Cratylus. They mean the same to both.
ΚΡ. δηλοῖ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέροις.
Socrates. In so far as rho and sigma are alike, or in so far as they are not?
ΣΩ. πότερον ᾗ ὅμοια τυγχάνει ὄντα τὸ ῥῶ καὶ τὸ σῖγμα, ἢ ᾗ μή;
Cratylus. In so far as they are alike.
ΚΡ. ἧι ὅμοια.
Socrates. And are they alike in all respects?
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ὅμοιά ἐστι πανταχῇ;
Cratylus. Yes; at least for the purpose of expressing motion equally.
ΚΡ. πρός γε τὸ ἴσως φορὰν δηλοῦν.
Socrates. But how about the lambda in σκληρότης? Does it not express the opposite of hardness?
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τὸ λάβδα ἐγκείμενον; οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ σκληρότητος;
Cratylus. Well, perhaps it has no right to be there, Socrates; it may be like the cases that came up in your talk with Hermogenes, when you removed or inserted letters where that was necessary. I think you did right; and in this case perhaps we ought to put a rho in place of the lambda.
ΚΡ. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔγκειται, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὥσπερ καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ σὺ πρὸς Ἑρμογένη ἔλεγες ἐξαιρῶν τε καὶ ἐντιθεὶς γράμματα οὗ δέοι, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἐδόκεις ἔμοιγε. καὶ νῦν ἴσως ἀντὶ τοῦ λάβδα ῥῶ δεῖ λέγειν.
Socrates. Excellent. However, do we not understand one another when anyone says σκληρόν, using the present pronunciation, and do you not now know what I mean?
ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις. τί οὖν; νῦν ὡς λέγομεν, οὐδὲν μανθάνομεν ἀλλήλων, ἐπειδάν τις φῇ σκληρόν, οὐδὲ οἶσθα σὺ νῦν ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω;
Cratylus. Yes, but that is by custom, my friend.
ΚΡ. ἔγωγε, διά γε τὸ ἔθος, ὦ φίλτατε.
Socrates. In saying “custom” do you think you are saying anything different from convention? Do you not mean by “convention” that when I speak I have a definite meaning and you recognize that I have that meaning? Is not that what you mean?
ΣΩ. ἔθος δὲ λέγων οἴει τι διάφορον λέγειν συνθήκης; ἢ ἄλλο τι λέγεις τὸ ἔθος ἢ ὅτι ἐγώ, ὅταν τοῦτο φθέγγωμαι, διανοοῦμαι ἐκεῖνο, σὺ δὲ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι ἐκεῖνο διανοοῦμαι; οὐ τοῦτο λέγεις;
435. Cratylus. Yes.
435. ΚΡ. ναί.
Socrates. Then if you recognize my meaning when I speak, that is an indication given to you by me.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ γιγνώσκεις ἐμοῦ φθεγγομένου, δήλωμα σοι γίγνεται παρʼ ἐμοῦ;
Socrates. The indication comes from something which is unlike my meaning when I speak, if in your example σκληρότης the lambda is unlike hardness; and if this is true, did you not make a convention with yourself, since both like and unlike letters, by the influence of custom and convention, produce indication? And even if custom is entirely distinct from convention, we should henceforth be obliged to say that custom, not likeness, is the principle of indication, since custom, it appears, indicates both by the like and by the unlike. And since we grant this, Cratylus—for I take it that your silence gives consent—both convention and custom must contribute something towards the indication of our meaning when we speak. For, my friend, if you will just turn your attention to numbers, where do you think you can possibly get names to apply to each individual number on the principle of likeness, unless you allow agreement and convention on your part to control the correctness of names? I myself prefer the theory that names are, so far as is possible, like the things named; but really this attractive force of likeness is, as Hermogenes says, a poor thing, and we are compelled to employ in addition this commonplace expedient, convention, to establish the correctness of names. Probably language would be, within the bounds of possibility, most excellent when all its terms, or as many as possible, were based on likeness, that is to say, were appropriate, and most deficient under opposite conditions. But now answer the next question. What is the function of names, and what good do they accomplish?
ΣΩ. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου γε ἢ ὃ διανοούμενος φθέγγομαι, εἴπερ τὸ λάβδα ἀνόμοιόν ἐστι τῇ ᾗ φῂς σὺ σκληρότητι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τί ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς σαυτῷ συνέθου καί σοι γίγνεται ἡ ὀρθότης τοῦ ὀνόματος συνθήκη, ἐπειδή γε δηλοῖ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ ἀνόμοια γράμματα, ἔθους τε καὶ συνθήκης τυχόντα; εἰ δʼ ὅτι μάλιστα μή ἐστι τὸ ἔθος συνθήκη, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς ἔτι ἔχοι λέγειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα δήλωμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔθος· ἐκεῖνο γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἀνομοίῳ δηλοῖ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταῦτα συγχωροῦμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε—τὴν γὰρ σιγήν σου συγχώρησιν θήσω—ἀναγκαῖόν που καὶ συνθήκην τι καὶ ἔθος συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς δήλωσιν ὧν διανοούμενοι λέγομεν· ἐπεί, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ ʼθέλεις ἐπὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐλθεῖν, πόθεν οἴει ἕξειν ὀνόματα ὅμοια ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐπενεγκεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐᾷς τι τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ συνθήκην κῦρος ἔχειν τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος πέρι; ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν· ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς, τὸ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους, γλίσχρα ᾖ ἡ ὁλκὴ αὕτη τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ᾖ καὶ τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ συνθήκῃ, εἰς ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα. ἐπεὶ ἴσως κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν κάλλιστʼ ἂν λέγοιτο ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὡς πλείστοις ὁμοίοις λέγηται, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ προσήκουσιν, αἴσχιστα δὲ τοὐναντίον. τόδε δέ μοι ἔτι εἰπὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, τίνα ἡμῖν δύναμιν ἔχει τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τί φῶμεν αὐτὰ καλὸν ἀπεργάζεσθαι;
Cratylus. I think, Socrates, their function is to instruct, and this is the simple truth, that he who knows the names knows also the things named.
ΚΡ. διδάσκειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τοῦτο πάνυ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, ὃς ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπίστηται, ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα.
Socrates. I suppose, Cratylus, you mean that when anyone knows the nature of the name—and its nature is that of the thing—he will know the thing also, since it is like the name, and the science of all things which are like each other is one and the same. It is, I fancy, on this ground that you say whoever knows names will know things also.
ΣΩ. ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Κρατύλε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, ὡς ἐπειδάν τις εἰδῇ τὸ ὄνομα οἷόν ἐστιν—ἔστι δὲ οἷόνπερ τὸ πρᾶγμα— εἴσεται δὴ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπείπερ ὅμοιον τυγχάνει ὂν τῷ ὀνόματι, τέχνη δὲ μία ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτὴ πάντων τῶν ἀλλήλοις ὁμοίων. κατὰ τοῦτο δή μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν ὡς ὃς ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα εἰδῇ εἴσεται καὶ τὰ πράγματα.
Cratylus. You are perfectly right.
ΚΡ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
Socrates. Now let us see what this manner of giving instruction is, to which you refer, and whether there is another method, but inferior to this, or there is no other at all. What do you think?
ΣΩ. ἔχε δή, ἴδωμεν τίς ποτʼ ἂν εἴη ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς διδασκαλίας τῶν ὄντων ὃν σὺ λέγεις νῦν, καὶ πότερον ἔστι μὲν καὶ ἄλλος, οὗτος μέντοι βελτίων, ἢ οὐδʼ ἔστιν ἄλλος ἢ οὗτος. ποτέρως οἴει;
436. Cratylus. I think there is no other at all; this is both the best and the only method.
436. ΚΡ. οὕτως ἔγωγε, οὐ πάνυ τι εἶναι ἄλλον, τοῦτον δὲ καὶ μόνον καὶ βέλτιστον.
Socrates. Do you think this is also the method of discovering realities, and that he who has discovered the names has discovered also the things named; or do you think inquiry and discovery demand another method, and this belongs to instruction?
ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ καὶ εὕρεσιν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην εἶναι, τὸν τὰ ὀνόματα εὑρόντα καὶ ἐκεῖνα ηὑρηκέναι ὧν ἐστι τὰ ὀνόματα· ἢ ζητεῖν μὲν καὶ εὑρίσκειν ἕτερον δεῖν τρόπον, μανθάνειν δὲ τοῦτον;
Cratylus. I most certainly think inquiry and discovery follow this same method and in the same way.
ΚΡ. πάντων μάλιστα καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ εὑρίσκειν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον κατὰ ταὐτά.
Socrates. Let us consider the matter, Cratylus. Do you not see that he who in his inquiry after things follows names and examines into the meaning of each one runs great risks of being deceived?
ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἴ τις ζητῶν τὰ πράγματα ἀκολουθοῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, σκοπῶν οἷον ἕκαστον βούλεται εἶναι, ἆρʼ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐ σμικρὸς κίνδυνός ἐστιν ἐξαπατηθῆναι;
Cratylus. How so?
ΚΡ. πῶς;
Socrates. Clearly he who first gave names, gave such names as agreed with his conception of the nature of things. That is our view, is it not?
ΣΩ. δῆλον ὅτι ὁ θέμενος πρῶτος τὰ ὀνόματα, οἷα ἡγεῖτο εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα ἐτίθετο καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥς φαμεν. ἦ γάρ;
Socrates. Then if his conception was incorrect, and he gave the names according to his conception, what do you suppose will happen to us who follow him? Can we help being deceived?
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνος μὴ ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖτο, ἔθετο δὲ οἷα ἡγεῖτο, τί οἴει ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀκολουθοῦντας αὐτῷ πείσεσθαι; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι;
Cratylus. But, Socrates, surely that is not the case. He who gave the names must necessarily have known; otherwise, as I have been saying all along, they would not be names at all. And there is a decisive proof that the name-giver did not miss the truth, one which you must accept; for otherwise his names would not be so universally consistent. Have you not yourself noticed in speaking that all names were formed by the same method and with the same end in view?
ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ εἰδότα τίθεσθαι τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, οὐδʼ ἂν ὀνόματα εἴη. μέγιστον δέ σοι ἔστω τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἔσφαλται τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ τιθέμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε οὕτω σύμφωνα ἦν αὐτῷ ἅπαντα. ἢ οὐκ ἐνενόεις αὐτὸς λέγων ὡς πάντα κατὰ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἐγίγνετο τὰ ὀνόματα;
Socrates. But that, Cratylus, is no counter argument. For if the giver of names erred in the beginning and thenceforth forced all other names into agreement with his own initial error, there is nothing strange about that. It is just so sometimes in geometrical diagrams; the initial error is small and unnoticed, but all the numerous deductions are wrong, though consistent. Every one must therefore give great care and great attention to the beginning of any undertaking, to see whether his foundation is right or not. If that has been considered with proper care, everything else will follow. However, I should be surprised if names are really consistent. Let us review our previous discussion. Names, we said, indicate nature to us, assuming that all things are in motion and flux. Do you not think they do so?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ὠγαθὲ Κρατύλε, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀπολόγημα. εἰ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον σφαλεὶς ὁ τιθέμενος τἆλλα ἤδη πρὸς τοῦτʼ ἐβιάζετο καὶ αὑτῷ συμφωνεῖν ἠνάγκαζεν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ὥσπερ τῶν διαγραμμάτων ἐνίοτε τοῦ πρώτου σμικροῦ καὶ ἀδήλου ψεύδους γενομένου, τὰ λοιπὰ πάμπολλα ἤδη ὄντα ἑπόμενα ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις. δεῖ δὴ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς παντὸς πράγματος παντὶ ἀνδρὶ τὸν πολὺν λόγον εἶναι καὶ τὴν πολλὴν σκέψιν εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ὑπόκειται· ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης ἱκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνῃ ἑπόμενα. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ θαυμάζοιμʼ ἂν εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα συμφωνεῖ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς. πάλιν γὰρ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἃ τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν. ὡς τοῦ παντὸς ἰόντος τε καὶ φερομένου καὶ ῥέοντός φαμεν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ ὀνόματα. ἄλλο τι οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ δηλοῦν;
437. Cratylus. Yes, and they indicate it correctly.
437. ΚΡ. πάνυ σφόδρα, καὶ ὀρθῶς γε σημαίνει.
Socrates. Let us first take up again the word ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) and see how ambiguous it is, seeming to indicate that it makes our soul stand still (ἵστησιν) at things, rather than that it is carried round with them, so it is better to speak the beginning of it as we now do than to insert the epsilon and say ἐπεϊστήμ; we should insert an iota rather than an epsilon. Then take βέβαιον (firm), which expresses position and rest, not motion. And ἱστορία (inquiry) means much the same, that it stops (ἵστησιν) the flow. And πιστόν (faithful) most certainly means that which stops (ἱστόν) motion. Then again, anyone can see that μνήμη (memory) expresses rest (μονή) in the soul, not motion. On the other hand, ἁμαρτία (error) and ξυμφορά (misfortune), if you consider merely the form of the names, will appear to be the same as σύνεσις (intellect) and ἐπιστήμη and all the other names of good significance. Moreover, ἀμαθία (ignorance) and ἀκολασία (unrestraint) also appear to be like them; for the former, ἀμαθία, seems to be τοῦ ἅμα θεῷ ἰόντος πορεία (the progress of one who goes with God), and ἀκολασία seems to be exactly ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασιν (movement in company with things). And so names which we believe have the very worst meanings appear to be very like those which have the best. And I think we could, if we took pains, find many other words which would lead us to reverse our judgement and believe that the giver of names meant that things were not in progress or in motion, but were at rest.
ΣΩ. σκοπῶμεν δὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὡς ἀμφίβολόν [ἐστι], καὶ μᾶλλον ἔοικε σημαίνοντι ὅτι ἵστησιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ ὅτι συμπεριφέρεται, καὶ ὀρθότερόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ νῦν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμβάλλοντας τὸ εἶ ἑπεϊστήμην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμβολὴν ποιήσασθαι ἀντὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ εἶ ἐν τῷ ἰῶτα. ἔπειτα τὸ βέβαιον, ὅτι βάσεώς τινός ἐστιν καὶ στάσεως μίμημα ἀλλʼ οὐ φορᾶς. ἔπειτα ἡ ἱστορία αὐτό που σημαίνει ὅτι ἵστησι τὸν ῥοῦν. καὶ τὸ πιστὸν ἱστὰν παντάπασι σημαίνει. ἔπειτα δὲ ἡ μνήμη παντί που μηνύει ὅτι μονή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀλλʼ οὐ φορά. εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἡ ἁμαρτία καὶ ἡ συμφορά, εἰ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομά τις ἀκολουθήσει, φανεῖται ταὐτὸν τῇ συνέσει ταύτῃ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα ὀνόμασιν. ἔτι τοίνυν ἡ ἀμαθία καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία παραπλησία τούτοις φαίνεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἅμα θεῷ ἰόντος πορεία φαίνεται, ἡ ἀμαθία, ἡ δʼ ἀκολασία παντάπασιν ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασι φαίνεται. καὶ οὕτως, ἃ νομίζομεν ἐπὶ τοῖς κακίστοις ὀνόματα εἶναι, ὁμοιότατʼ ἂν φαίνοιτο τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πόλλʼ ἄν τις εὕροι εἰ πραγματεύοιτο, ἐξ ὧν οἰηθείη ἂν αὖ πάλιν τὸν τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενον οὐχὶ ἰόντα οὐδὲ φερόμενα ἀλλὰ μένοντα τὰ πράγματα σημαίνειν.
Cratylus. But, Socrates, you see that most of the names indicate motion.
ΚΡ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ ἐκείνως ἐσήμαινεν.
Socrates. What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count names like votes, and shall correctness rest with the majority? Are those to be the true names which are found to have that one of the two meanings which is expressed by the greater number?
ΣΩ. τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Κρατύλε; ὥσπερ ψήφους διαριθμησόμεθα τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἔσται ἡ ὀρθότης; ὁπότερα ἂν πλείω φαίνηται τὰ ὀνόματα σημαίνοντα, ταῦτα δὴ ἔσται τἀληθῆ;
Cratylus. That is not reasonable.
ΚΡ. οὔκουν εἰκός γε.
Socrates. No, not in the least, my friend.
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν, ὦ φίλε. καὶ ταῦτα μέν γε αὐτοῦ ἐάσωμεν, ἐπανέλθωμεν δὲ πάλιν ὅθεν δεῦρο μετέβημεν.
438. Now let us drop this and return to the point at which we digressed. A little while ago, you may remember, you said he who gave names must have known the things to which he gave them. Do you still hold that opinion, or not?Cratylus. I do.
438. ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα ἀναγκαῖον ἔφησθα εἶναι εἰδότα τίθεσθαι οἷς ἐτίθετο. πότερον οὖν ἔτι σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἢ οὔ;ΚΡ. ἔτι.
Socrates. And you say that he who gave the first names also knew the things which he named?
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τὸν τὰ πρῶτα τιθέμενον εἰδότα φῂς τίθεσθαι;
Cratylus. Yes, he knew them.
ΚΡ. εἰδότα.
Socrates. But from what names had he learned or discovered the things, if the first names had not yet been given, and if we declare that it is impossible to learn or discover things except by learning or ourselves discovering the names?
ΣΩ. ἐκ ποίων οὖν ὀνομάτων ἢ μεμαθηκὼς ἢ ηὑρηκὼς ἦν τὰ πράγματα, εἴπερ τά γε πρῶτα μήπω ἔκειτο, μαθεῖν δʼ αὖ φαμεν τὰ πράγματα καὶ εὑρεῖν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἄλλως ἢ τὰ ὀνόματα μαθόντας ἢ αὐτοὺς ἐξευρόντας οἷά ἐστι;
Cratylus. I think there is something in what you say, Socrates.
ΚΡ. δοκεῖς τί μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Socrates. How can we assert that they gave names or were lawgivers with knowledge, before any name whatsoever had been given, and before they knew any names, if things cannot be learned except through their names?
ΣΩ. τίνα οὖν τρόπον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς εἰδότας θέσθαι ἢ νομοθέτας εἶναι, πρὶν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ὄνομα κεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἐκείνους εἰδέναι, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι τὰ πράγματα μαθεῖν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων;
Cratylus. I think the truest theory of the matter, Socrates, is that the power which gave the first names to things is more than human, and therefore the names must necessarily be correct.
ΚΡ. οἶμαι μὲν ἐγὼ τὸν ἀληθέστατον λόγον περὶ τούτων εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, μείζω τινὰ δύναμιν εἶναι ἢ ἀνθρωπείαν τὴν θεμένην τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι αὐτὰ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.
Socrates. Then, in your opinion, he who gave the names, though he was a spirit or a god, would have given names which made him contradict himself? Or do you think there is no sense in what we were saying just now?
ΣΩ. εἶτα οἴει ἐναντία ἂν ἐτίθετο αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ θείς, ὢν δαίμων τις ἢ θεός; ἢ οὐδέν σοι ἐδοκοῦμεν ἄρτι λέγειν;
Cratylus. But, Socrates, those that make up one of the two classes are not really names.
ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἦν τούτων τὰ ἕτερα ὀνόματα.
Socrates. Which of the two, my excellent friend; the class of those which point towards rest or of those that point towards motion? We agreed just now that the matter is not to be determined by mere numbers.
ΣΩ. πότερα, ὦ ἄριστε, τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν στάσιν ἄγοντα ἢ τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν φοράν; οὐ γάρ που κατὰ τὸ ἄρτι λεχθὲν πλήθει κριθήσεται.
Cratylus. No; that would not be right, Socrates.
ΚΡ. οὔτοι δὴ δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Socrates. Then since the names are in conflict, and some of them claim that they are like the truth, and others that they are, how can we decide, and upon what shall we base our decision? Certainly not upon other names differing from these, for there are none. No, it is plain that we must look for something else, not names, which shall show us which of these two kinds are the true names, which of them, that is to say, show the truth of things.
ΣΩ. ὀνομάτων οὖν στασιασάντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φασκόντων ἑαυτὰ εἶναι τὰ ὅμοια τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, τῶν δʼ ἑαυτά, τίνι ἔτι διακρινοῦμεν, ἢ ἐπὶ τί ἐλθόντες; οὐ γάρ που ἐπὶ ὀνόματά γε ἕτερα ἄλλα τούτων· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλʼ ἄττα ζητητέα πλὴν ὀνομάτων, ἃ ἡμῖν ἐμφανιεῖ ἄνευ ὀνομάτων ὁπότερα τούτων ἐστὶ τἀληθῆ, δείξαντα δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ὄντων.
Cratylus. That is my opinion.
ΚΡ. δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω.
Socrates. Then if that is true, Cratylus, it seems that things may be learned without names.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Κρατύλε, δυνατὸν μαθεῖν ἄνευ ὀνομάτων τὰ ὄντα, εἴπερ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.
Cratylus. So it appears.
ΚΡ. φαίνεται.
Socrates. What other way is left by which you could expect to know them? What other than the natural and the straightest way, through each other, if they are akin, and through themselves? For that which is other and different from them would signify not them, but something other and different.
ΣΩ. διὰ τίνος ἄλλου οὖν ἔτι προσδοκᾷς ἂν ταῦτα μαθεῖν; ἆρα διʼ ἄλλου του ἢ οὗπερ εἰκός τε καὶ δικαιότατον, διʼ ἀλλήλων γε, εἴ πῃ συγγενῆ ἐστιν, καὶ αὐτὰ διʼ αὑτῶν; τὸ γάρ που ἕτερον ἐκείνων καὶ ἀλλοῖον ἕτερον ἄν τι καὶ ἀλλοῖον σημαίνοι ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα.
Cratylus. I think that is true.
ΚΡ. ἀληθῆ μοι φαίνῃ λέγειν.
439. Socrates. Stop for Heaven’s sake! Did we not more than once agree that names which are rightly given are like the things named and are images of them?
439. ΣΩ. ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐ πολλάκις μέντοι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὰ καλῶς κείμενα ἐοικότα εἶναι ἐκείνοις ὧν ὀνόματα κεῖται, καὶ εἶναι εἰκόνας τῶν πραγμάτων;
Socrates. Then if it be really true that things can be learned either through names or through themselves which would be the better and surer way of learning? To learn from the image whether it is itself a good imitation and also to learn the truth which it imitates, or to learn from the truth both the truth itself and whether the image is properly made?
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ἔστι μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα διʼ ὀνομάτων τὰ πράγματα μανθάνειν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ διʼ αὐτῶν, ποτέρα ἂν εἴη καλλίων καὶ σαφεστέρα ἡ μάθησις; ἐκ τῆς εἰκόνος μανθάνειν αὐτήν τε αὐτὴν εἰ καλῶς εἴκασται, καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἧς ἦν εἰκών, ἢ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτήν τε αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτῆς εἰ πρεπόντως εἴργασται;
Cratylus. I think it is certainly better to learn from the truth.
ΚΡ. ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας μοι δοκεῖ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.
Socrates. How realities are to be learned or discovered is perhaps too great a question for you or me to determine; but it is worth while to have reached even this conclusion, that they are to be learned and sought for, not from names but much better through themselves than through names.
ΣΩ. ὅντινα μὲν τοίνυν τρόπον δεῖ μανθάνειν ἢ εὑρίσκειν τὰ ὄντα, μεῖζον ἴσως ἐστὶν ἐγνωκέναι ἢ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ σέ· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὁμολογήσασθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ὀνομάτων ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν καὶ μαθητέον καὶ ζητητέον ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων.
Cratylus. That is clear, Socrates.
ΚΡ. φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Socrates. Then let us examine one further point to avoid being deceived by the fact that most of these names tend in the same direction. Suppose it should prove that although those who gave the names gave them in the belief that all things are in motion and flux—I myself think they did have that belief— still in reality that is not the case, and the namegivers themselves, having fallen into a kind of vortex, are whirled about, dragging us along with them. Consider, my worthy Cratylus, a question about which I often dream. Shall we assert that there is any absolute beauty, or good, or any other absolute existence, or not?
ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν τόδε σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ ἡμᾶς τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ὀνόματα ἐς ταὐτὸν τείνοντα ἐξαπατᾷ, εἰ τῷ ὄντι μὲν οἱ θέμενοι αὐτὰ διανοηθέντες γε ἔθεντο ὡς ἰόντων ἁπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων—φαίνονται γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι—τὸ δʼ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλʼ οὗτοι αὐτοί τε ὥσπερ εἴς τινα δίνην ἐμπεσόντες κυκῶνται καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐφελκόμενοι προσεμβάλλουσιν. σκέψαι γάρ, ὦ θαυμάσιε Κρατύλε, ὃ ἔγωγε πολλάκις ὀνειρώττω. πότερον φῶμέν τι εἶναι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων οὕτω, ἢ μή;
Cratylus. I think there is, Socrates.
ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, [εἶναι].
Socrates. Then let us consider the absolute, not whether a particular face, or something of that sort, is beautiful, or whether all these things are in flux. Is not, in our opinion, absolute beauty always such as it is?
ΣΩ. αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο σκεψώμεθα, μὴ εἰ πρόσωπόν τί ἐστιν καλὸν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα πάντα ῥεῖν· ἀλλʼ αὐτό, φῶμεν, τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιοῦτον ἀεί ἐστιν οἷόν ἐστιν;
Cratylus. That is inevitable.
ΚΡ. ἀνάγκη.
Socrates. Can we, then, if it is always passing away, correctly say that it is this, then that it is that, or must it inevitably, in the very instant while we are speaking, become something else and pass away and no longer be what it is?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οἷόν τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξιέναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν;
Cratylus. That is inevitable.
ΚΡ. ἀνάγκη.
Socrates. How, then, can that which is never in the same state be anything? For if it is ever in the same state, then obviously at that time it is not changing; and if it is always in the same state and is always the same, how can it ever change or move without relinquishing its own form?
ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη τὶ ἐκεῖνο ὃ μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει; εἰ γάρ ποτε ὡσαύτως ἴσχει, ἔν γʼ ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβαίνει· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, πῶς ἂν τοῦτό γε μεταβάλλοι ἢ κινοῖτο, μηδὲν ἐξιστάμενον τῆς αὑτοῦ ἰδέας;
Cratylus. It cannot do so at all.
ΚΡ. οὐδαμῶς.
Socrates. No, nor can it be known by anyone.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἂν γνωσθείη γε ὑπʼ οὐδενός. ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ἐπιόντος τοῦ γνωσομένου ἄλλο καὶ ἀλλοῖον γίγνοιτο, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν γνωσθείη ἔτι ὁποῖόν γέ τί ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἔχον·
440. For at the moment when he who seeks to know it approaches, it becomes something else and different, so that its nature and state can no longer be known; and surely there is no knowledge which knows that which is in no state.Cratylus. It is as you say.
440. γνῶσις δὲ δήπου οὐδεμία γιγνώσκει ὃ γιγνώσκει μηδαμῶς ἔχον.ΚΡ. ἔστιν ὡς λέγεις.
Socrates. But we cannot even say that there is any knowledge, if all things are changing and nothing remains fixed; for if knowledge itself does not change and cease to be knowledge, then knowledge would remain, and there would be knowledge; but if the very essence of knowledge changes, at the moment of the change to another essence of knowledge there would be no knowledge, and if it is always changing, there will always be no knowledge, and by this reasoning there will be neither anyone to know nor anything to be known. But if there is always that which knows and that which is known—if the beautiful, the good, and all the other verities exist—I do not see how there is any likeness between these conditions of which I am now speaking and flux or motion. Now whether this is the nature of things, or the doctrine of Heracleitus and many others is true, is another question; but surely no man of sense can put himself and his soul under the control of names, and trust in names and their makers to the point of affirming that he knows anything; nor will he condemn himself and all things and say that there is no health in them, but that all things are flowing like leaky pots, or believe that all things are just like people afflicted with catarrh, flowing and running all the time. Perhaps, Cratylus, this theory is true, but perhaps it is not. Therefore you must consider courageously and thoroughly and not accept anything carelessly—for you are still young and in your prime; then, if after investigation you find the truth, impart it to me.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ γνῶσιν εἶναι φάναι εἰκός, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἡ γνῶσις, τοῦ γνῶσις εἶναι μὴ μεταπίπτει, μένοι τε ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ γνῶσις καὶ εἴη γνῶσις. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος μεταπίπτει τῆς γνώσεως, ἅμα τʼ ἂν μεταπίπτοι εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος γνώσεως καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνῶσις· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ μεταπίπτει, ἀεὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνῶσις, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὔτε τὸ γνωσόμενον οὔτε τὸ γνωσθησόμενον ἂν εἴη. εἰ δὲ ἔστι μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνῶσκον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ καλόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔστι δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οὔ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἃ νῦν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ῥοῇ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ φορᾷ. ταῦτʼ οὖν πότερόν ποτε οὕτως ἔχει ἢ ἐκείνως ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτόν τε λέγουσιν καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, μὴ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ᾖ ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὐδὲ πάνυ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόμασιν αὑτὸν καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχὴν θεραπεύειν, πεπιστευκότα ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς θεμένοις αὐτά, διισχυρίζεσθαι ὥς τι εἰδότα, καὶ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καταγιγνώσκειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ῥεῖ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ κατάρρῳ νοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι οὕτως οἴεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι, ὑπὸ ῥεύματός τε καὶ κατάρρου πάντα [τὰ] χρήματα ἔχεσθαι. ἴσως μὲν οὖν δή, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ οὔ. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ εὖ, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποδέχεσθαι—ἔτι γὰρ νέος εἶ καὶ ἡλικίαν ἔχεις—σκεψάμενον δέ, ἐὰν εὕρῃς, μεταδιδόναι καὶ ἐμοί.
Cratylus. I will do so. However, I assure you, Socrates, that I have already considered the matter, and after toilsome consideration I think the doctrine of Heracleitus is much more likely to be true.
ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. εὖ μέντοι ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ νυνὶ ἀσκέπτως ἔχω, ἀλλά μοι σκοπουμένῳ καὶ πράγματα ἔχοντι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκείνως φαίνεται ἔχειν ὡς Ἡράκλειτος λέγει.
Socrates. Some other time, then, my friend, you will teach me, when you come back; but now go into the country as you have made ready to do; and Hermogenes here will go with you a bit.
ΣΩ. εἰς αὖθις τοίνυν με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, διδάξεις, ἐπειδὰν ἥκῃς· νῦν δέ, ὥσπερ παρεσκεύασαι, πορεύου εἰς ἀγρόν· προπέμψει δέ σε καὶ Ἑρμογένης ὅδε.
Cratylus. Very well, Socrates, and I hope you also will continue to think of these matters.
ΚΡ. ταῦτʼ ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ πειρῶ ἔτι ἐννοεῖν ταῦτα ἤδη.