973a. Cl. True to our agreement, good sir, we have come all three—you and I and Megillus here—to consider in what terms we ought to describe that part of understanding which we say produces, when it so intends, the most excellent disposition of the human being for wisdom which is possible for man. For we claim that we have described all the other matters connected with law-giving; but the most important thing for us to discover and state—what it is that mortal man should learn in order to be wise—this we have neither stated nor discovered.
973a. ΚΛ. πρὸς μὲν τὸ τῆς ὁμολογίας ἥκομεν ἅπαντες ὀρθῶς, ὦ ξένε, τρεῖς ὄντες, ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ Μέγιλλος ὅδε, τὸ τῆς φρονήσεως ἐπισκεψόμενοι τίνι ποτὲ χρὴ λόγῳ διεξελθεῖν, ὃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἕξιν φαμέν, ὅταν διανοηθῇ, κάλλιστʼ ἔχειν ποιεῖν πρὸς φρόνησιν ὅσην δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ σχεῖν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα, ὥς φαμεν, ἅπαντα διεξήλθομεν ὅσα ἦν περὶ νόμων θέσιν·
973b. Let us, however, now try to make good this defect: else we shall practically leave incomplete the quest on which we all set out, with the purpose of making our subject clear from beginning to end.Ath. My dear Cleinias, you are quite right, yet I think you are about to hear a strange statement; and, in a sense, one that is not so strange either. For many on becoming acquainted with life have the same account to give—that the human race will not be blessed or happy.
973b. ὃ δὲ μέγιστον εὑρεῖν τε καὶ εἰπεῖν, τί ποτε μαθὼν θνητὸς ἄνθρωπος σοφὸς ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο οὔτε εἴπομεν οὔτε ηὕρομεν, νῦν τε πειρώμεθα τοῦτο μὴ καταλιπεῖν· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀτελὲς ἂν πράξαιμεν οὗ χάριν ἅπαντες ὡρμήσαμεν, ὡς φανερὰ ποιήσοντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους. ΑΘ. ὦ φίλε Κλεινία, καλῶς μὲν λέγεις, ἄτοπον μὴν ἀκούσεσθαί σε λόγον οἶμαι, καί τινα τρόπον οὐκ ἄτοπον αὖ.
973c. So follow me now and apprehend if you conceive me, as well as them, to be giving a proper account of this matter. I say it is impossible for men to be blessed and happy, except a few; that is, so long as we are living: I limit it to that. But one may rightly hope to attain after death all the things for whose sake one may strive both in life to live as nobly as one can and in death to find a noble end. What I say is no subtle doctrine, but a thing that all of us, Greeks and foreigners alike, in some way perceive—that from the beginning existence is difficult for every live creature: first, partaking of the state of things conceived, then again, being born, and further, being reared and educated—all these processes involve a vast amount of toil, we all agree.
973c. πολλοὶ γὰρ δὴ προστυχεῖς τῷ βίῳ γιγνόμενοι τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον φέρουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἔσται μακάριον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος οὐδʼ εὔδαιμον. ἕπου δὴ καὶ σύνιδε ἄν σοι δοκῶ κἀγὼ μετʼ αὐτῶν καλῶς τοῦ τοιούτου πέρι λέγειν. οὔ φημι εἶναι δυνατὸν ἀνθρώποις μακαρίοις τε καὶ εὐδαίμοσιν γενέσθαι πλὴν ὀλίγων— μέχριπερ ἂν ζῶμεν τοῦτο διορίζομαι· καλὴ δὲ ἐλπὶς τελευτήσαντι τυχεῖν ἁπάντων ὧν ἕνεκά τις προθυμοῖτʼ ἂν ζῶν τε ὡς κάλλιστʼ ἂν ζῆν κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τελευτήσας τελευτῆς τοιαύτης τυχεῖν—λέγω δʼ οὐδὲν σοφόν, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ἅπαντες Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι γιγνώσκομέν τινα τρόπον, ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν ἅπαντι ζῴῳ· πρῶτον μὲν τὸ μετασχεῖν τῆς τῶν κυουμένων ἕξεως, ἔπειτʼ αὖ τὸ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὸ τρέφεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, διὰ πόνων μυρίων ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι σύμπαντα, ὥς φαμεν ἅπαντες.
974. Ath. And our time must be a short one, I do not say in the reckoning of the wretched, but on any supposition of what is tolerable. It does seem to give just a breathing-space about the middle of human life: yet swiftly old age is upon us, and must make any of us loth ever to live our life again, when one reckons over the life one has lived—unless one happens to be a bundle of childish notions. And what, pray, is my evidence for this? It is that such is the nature of the matter now under inquiry in our discussion.
974. ΑΘ. καὶ χρόνος βραχὺς ἄν τις εἴη πρὸς λογισμὸν μή τοι τῶν μοχθηρῶν, ἀλλʼ ὃ πᾶς ἂν ὑπολάβοι μέτριον. οὗτος δὲ σχεδὸν ἀναπνοὴν δοκεῖ ποιεῖν τινα κατὰ μέσον πῃ βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινον· ταχύ γε μὴν ἐπιλαβὸν γῆρας ὁντινοῦν ποιήσειʼ ἂν μήποτʼ ἐθελῆσαι πάλιν ἀναβιῶναι, λογισάμενον τὸν βεβιωμένον ἑαυτῷ βίον, ὅστις μὴ τυγχάνει παιδικῆς δόξης μεστὸς ὤν. τούτων δὴ τί ποτέ μοι τεκμήριον; ὅτι πέφυκεν ταύτῃ τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον τῷ λόγῳ.
974b. We are inquiring, you know, in what way we shall become wise, presuming that each of us has this power in some sort or other: but it evades and escapes us as soon as we attempt any knowledge of reputed arts or knowledges or any of the ordinary sciences, as we suppose them to be; for none of them is worthy to be called by the title of the wisdom that pertains to these human affairs. Yet the soul firmly believes and divines that in some fashion she has it, but what it is that she has, or when, or how, she is quite unable to discover.
974b. ζητοῦμεν δὲ δὴ τίνα τρόπον σοφοὶ γενησόμεθα, ὡς οὔσης τινὸς ἑκάστοις ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως· ἡ δὲ φυγῇ φεύγει τότε ὅταν τις πρός τινα φρόνησιν ἴῃ τῶν λεγομένων τεχνῶν ἢ φρονήσεων ἤ τινων ἄλλων τοιούτων ὡς οἰόμεθα ἐπιστημῶν, ὡς ἀξίας τούτων οὐδεμιᾶς οὔσης ἐπίκλησιν ῥηθῆναι τῆς περὶ ταῦτα σοφίας τἀνθρώπινα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς σφόδρα πεποιθυίας καὶ μαντευομένης ὡς οὔσης αὐτῇ κατά τινα φύσιν ταύτης, τίς δέ ἐστιν καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς, οὐ πάνυ δυναμένης ἐξευρίσκειν.
974c. Is not this a fair picture of our puzzle about wisdom and the inquiry that we have to make—a greater one than any of us could expect who are found able to examine ourselves and others intelligently and consistently by every kind and manner of argument? Is the case not so, or shall we agree that so it is?Cl. We shall probably agree with you on that, my good sir, in the hope which in time you will surely give us of forming hereafter the truest opinion on these matters.
974c. ἆρʼ οὐ τούτῳ σφόδρα προσέοιχʼ ἡμῶν ἡ περὶ σοφίαν ἀπορία καὶ ζήτησις, πλείων τῆς ἐλπίδος ἑκάστῳ γιγνομένη τῶν ὅσοι ἐν ἡμῖν δυνατοὶ γίγνονται φρονίμως αὑτοὺς ἄλλους τε ἐξετάσαι συμφώνως διὰ λόγων πάντων καὶ πάντῃ λεγομένων; ταῦτα οὐχ οὕτως ἢ ταύτῃ συμφήσομεν ἔχειν; ΚΛ. συμφήσομεν ἐπʼ ἐλπίδι σοι ἴσως ταῦτʼ, ὦ ξένε, τῇ μετὰ σοῦ κατὰ χρόνον ἂν γενομένῃ, δοξάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εἰς αὖθις τὸ ἀληθέστατον.
974d. Ath. Then first we must go through the other sciences, which are reputed as such, but do not render him wise who acquires and possesses them; in order that, having put them out of the way, we may try to bring forward those that we require, and having brought them forward, to learn them. First, therefore, let us observe that while the sciences which are first needs of the human race are about the most necessary and truly the first, yet he who acquires a knowledge of them, though in the beginning he may have been regarded as wise in some sort, is now not reputed wise at all, but rather incurs reproach
974d. ΑΘ. τὰς ἄλλας τοίνυν ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαι μέν εἰσιν λεγόμεναι, σοφὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀποτελοῦσιν τὸν λαμβάνοντά τε αὐτὰς καὶ ἔχοντα, πρῶτον διεξιτέον, ὅπως ταύτας ἐκποδὼν θέμενοι, πειρώμεθα ἐκείνας ὧν δεόμεθα παραθέσθαι τε καὶ παραθέμενοι μανθάνειν. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ὧν πρῶτον δεῖ θνητῷ γένει, ἴδωμεν ὡς εἰσὶ μὲν ἀναγκαιόταται σχεδὸν ἀληθῶς τε πρῶται, ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος, εἰ καὶ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἔδοξέν τις εἶναί ποτε σοφός, οὔκουν νῦν γε οὔτε σοφὸς εἶναι δοξάζεται
975a. by the knowledge he has got. Ath. Now we must mention what they are, and that almost everyone who makes it his aim to be thought likely to prove himself in the end as good a man as possible avoids them, in order to gain the acquirements of understanding and study. So first let us take the practice among animate beings of eating each other, which, as the story goes, has made us refrain entirely from some, while it has settled us in the lawful eating of others. May the men of old time be gracious to us, as they are: for we must take our leave of whatever men were the first of those we were just mentioning; but at any rate the making of barley-meal and flour, with the sustenance thereof, is noble and good indeed, yet it is never like to produce a perfectly wise man.
975a. ὀνείδη τε ἴσχει μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιστήμης. ΑΘ. ἐροῦμεν δὴ αἵ τʼ εἰσὶν καὶ ὅτι πᾶς ἀνὴρ αὐτάς, σχεδὸν ὅσοις ἀγὼν πρόκειται τοῦ δοκεῖν ὡς ἄριστον ἄνδρα συμβῆναι γενόμενον ἄν, φεύγει διὰ τὰς κτήσεις τῆς φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεως. ἔστω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἡ τῆς ἀλληλοφαγίας τῶν ζῴων ἡμᾶς τῶν μέν, ὡς ὁ μῦθός ἐστιν, τὸ παράπαν ἀποστήσασα, τῶν δὲ εἰς τὴν νόμιμον ἐδωδὴν καταστήσασα. ἵλεῳ δʼ ἡμῖν οἱ πρόσθεν εἴησάν τε καὶ εἰσίν—οἵτινες μὲν γὰρ οὖν ἐλέγομεν, πρῶτοι χαιρέτωσαν—ἡ δʼ οὖν ἀλφίτων τε καὶ ἀλεύρων ποίησις ἅμα καὶ τροφὴ καλὴ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθή, σοφὸν δὲ ἄνδρα τελέως οὐκ ἐθελήσει ποτὲ ἀπεργάσασθαι·
975b. For this very name of making must produce an irksomeness in the actual things that are made. Nor can it well be husbandry of land in general: for it is not by art but by a natural gift from Heaven, it seems, that we all have the earth put into our hands. Nor again is it the fabrication of dwellings and building in general, nor the production of all sorts of appliances—smiths’ work, and the supply of carpenters’, moulders’, plaiters’, and, in fine, all kinds of implements; for this is of advantage to the public, but is not accounted for virtue.
975b. τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτό, ἡ τῆς ποιήσεως ἐπίκλησις, τῶν ποιουμένων αὐτῶν δυσχέρειαν ἀπεργάζοιτʼ ἄν. σχεδὸν δʼ οὐδὲ χώρας συμπάσης γεωργία· οὐ γὰρ τέχνῃ ἀλλὰ φύσει κατὰ θεὸν πάντες φαινόμεθα γῆν μετακεχειρίσθαι. καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ ἡ τῶν οἰκήσεών γε συνυφὴ καὶ σύμπασα οἰκοδομία καὶ σκευῶν πάντων ἀπεργαστική, χαλκεία τε καὶ ἡ τῶν τεκτονικῶν καὶ πλαστικῶν καὶ πλεκτικῶν καὶ ἔτι συμπάντων ὀργάνων παρασκευή, δήμῳ τὸ πρόσφορον ἔχουσα, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀρετῇ λεγομένη.
975c. Nor again the whole practice of hunting, which although grown extensive and a matter of skilled art, gives no return of magnificence with its wisdom. Nor surely can it be divination or interpretation as a whole; for these only know what is said, but have not learnt whether it be true. And now that we see that the acquisition of necessaries is achieved by means of art, but that no such art makes any man wise, there may be some diversion remaining after this—imitative for the most part, but in no way serious.
975c. καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ ἡ σύμπασα θηρευτική, πολλή περ καὶ τεχνικὴ γεγονυῖα, τό γε μεγαλοπρεπὲς σὺν τῷ σοφῷ οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ μαντική γε οὐδʼ ἑρμηνευτικὴ τὸ παράπαν· τὸ λεγόμενον γὰρ οἶδεν μόνον, εἰ δʼ ἀληθές, οὐκ ἔμαθεν. ὅτε δὴ τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὁρῶμεν κτῆσιν διὰ τέχνης μὲν ἀπεργαζομένην, τούτων δὲ οὐδεμίαν οὐδένα σοφὸν ποιοῦσαν, τό γε μετὰ τοῦτο παιδιά τις ἂν λείποιτο, μιμητικὴ μὲν τὸ πλεῖστον ἀλλʼ οὐδαμῇ σπουδαία.
975d. For they imitate with many instruments, and with many imitative acts, not altogether seemly, of their very bodies, in performances both of speech and of every Muse, and in those whereof painting is mother, and whereby many and most various designs are elaborated in many sorts, moist and dry; and though a man ply his craft in these with the greatest zeal, in nothing is he rendered wise by imitation.
975d. πολλοῖς μὲν γὰρ ὀργάνοις μιμοῦνται, πολλοῖς δʼ αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων οὐ πάντως εὐσχήμοσι μιμήμασιν, τά τε κατὰ λόγους καὶ μοῦσαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ὅσων γραφικὴ μήτηρ, πολλῶν καὶ παντοίων ποικιλμάτων ἀποτελουμένων ἐν πολλοῖς ὑγροῖς καὶ ξηροῖς γένεσιν· ὧν σοφὸν οὐδένα εἰς οὐδὲν σπουδῇ τῇ μεγίστῃ δημιουργοῦντα ἡ μιμητικὴ παρέχεται.
975e. And when all these have been performed, there may yet remain assistance, in countless forms and countless cases: the greatest and most useful is called warfare, the art of generalship; most glorified in time of need, requiring most good fortune, and assigned rather to a natural valor than to wisdom.
975e. πάντων δʼ ἐξειργασμένων τὸ λοιπὸν βοήθεια γίγνοιτʼ ἂν μυρία μυρίοις, ἡ μὲν μεγίστη τε καὶ εἰς πλεῖστα πολεμικὴ κληθεῖσα, στρατηγικὴ τέχνη, εὐδοκιμωτάτη πρὸς χρείαν, εὐτυχίας πλείστης δεομένη, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρείᾳ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ σοφίᾳ δεδομένη.
976. Ath. And that which they call medicine is likewise, of course, an assistance in almost every case towards things of which animal nature is deprived by seasons of untimely cold and heat and all such visitations. But none of these is of high repute for the truest wisdom: for they are borne along by opinion, as inaccurate matter of conjecture. We may, I suppose, speak of pilots and sailors alike as giving assistance: yet you shall not report, to appease us, a single wise man from amongst them all; for a man cannot know the wrath or amity of the wind, a desirable thing for all piloting.
976. ΑΘ. ἣν δὲ καλοῦσι μὲν ἰατρικήν, βοήθεια δέ που καὶ αὕτη σχεδὸν ὅσων ὧραι ψύχει καὶ καύματι ἀκαίρῳ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ληίζονται τὴν τῶν ζῴων φύσιν. εὐδόκιμον δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς σοφίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην· ἄμετρα γὰρ δόξαις φορεῖται τοπαζόμενα. βοηθοὺς δέ που καὶ τοὺς κυβερνήτας ἅμα καὶ τοὺς ναύτας ἐροῦμεν, καὶ τούτων ἄνδρα σοφὸν μηδένα τις ἡμᾶς παραμυθούμενος ἐξ ἁπάντων διαγγελλέτω· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείη τις πνεύματος ὀργὴν οὐδὲ φιλίαν, ὃ προσφιλὲς ἁπάσῃ κυβερνητικῇ.
976b. Nor again all those who say they can give assistance in law suits by their powers of speech, men who by memory and exercise of opinion pay attention to human character, but are far astray from the truth of what is really just. There still remains, as a claimant to the name of wisdom, a certain strange power, which most people would call a natural gift rather than wisdom, appearing when one perceives someone learning this or that lesson with ease, or remembering a great many things securely; or when one recalls what is suitable to each person, what should properly be done, and does it quickly.
976b. καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ ὁπόσοι βοηθοὶ δίκαις ἐν τῇ τοῦ λέγειν ῥώμῃ φασὶ γίγνεσθαι, μνήμῃ καὶ τριβῇ δόξης ἤθεσιν προσέχοντες τὸν νοῦν, ἀληθείας δὲ τῶν ὄντως δικαίων ἐκτὸς παρεσφαλμένοι. λοιπὴ δʼ ἔτι πρὸς δόξαν σοφίας ἐστίν τις ἄτοπος δύναμις, ἣν φύσιν ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ἢ σοφίαν ὀνομάσειαν, τότε ὅταν τινά τις συννοῇ ῥᾳδίως μὲν ὅτιπερ ἂν μανθάνῃ μανθάνοντα, μάλα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς μνημονεύοντα, ὅταν τε τὸ πρόσφορον ἑκάστῳ διαμνημονεύῃ τις, ὅτι γιγνόμενον ἂν πρέποι, τοῦτο δὲ ταχὺ δρᾷ·
976c. Some people will describe all this as nature, others as wisdom, and others as a natural readiness of mind: but no sensible person will ever call a man really wise for any of these gifts. But surely there must be found some science, the possession of which will cause the wisdom of him who is really wise and not wise merely in men’s opinion. Well, let us see: for in this laborious discussion we are trying our hardest to find some other science, apart from those we have mentioned, which can really and reasonably be termed wisdom; such an acquirement as will not make one a mean and witless drudge, but will enable one to be a wise and good citizen, at once a just ruler and subject of his city, and decorous.
976c. ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπαντα οἱ μὲν φύσιν, οἱ δὲ σοφίαν, οἱ δὲ ἀγχίνοιαν θήσουσιν φύσεως, σοφὸν δὲ ὄντως οὐδενὶ τούτων οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμφρόνων ἐθελήσει ποτὲ καλεῖν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ φανῆναί γέ τινα ἐπιστήμην ἣν ἔχων σοφὸς γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ὁ σοφὸς ὄντως ὢν καὶ μὴ μόνον δοξαζόμενος. ἴδωμεν δή. χαλεπῷ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ παντάπασιν ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ἑτέραν πάρεξ τῶν εἰρημένων εὑρεῖν, ἣ σοφία μὲν λέγοιτʼ ἂν ὄντως τε καὶ εἰκότως, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν οὔτε βάναυσος οὔτʼ ἠλίθιος ἔσται, σοφὸς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸς διʼ αὐτὴν πολίτης τε καὶ ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος ἐνδίκως ἔσται πόλεως ἅμα καὶ ἐμμελής.
976d. So let us examine this one first, and see what single science it is of those that we now have which, by removing itself or being absent from human nature, must render mankind the most thoughtless and senseless of creatures.
976d. κατίδωμεν δὴ ταύτην πρώτην, τίς ποτʼ ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐπιστήμη μία διεξελθοῦσα ἢ μὴ παραγενομένη τῶν νῦν παρουσῶν ἀνοητότατον ἂν καὶ ἀφρονέστατον παράσχοιτο ζῷον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. οὐ δὴ τοῦτό γε πάνυ χαλεπὸν τὸ κατιδεῖν.
976e. Well, there is no great difficulty in making that out. For if there is one more than another, so to speak, which will do this, it is the science which gave number to the whole race of mortals; and I believe God rather than some chance gave it to us, and so preserves us.
976e. μία γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν πρὸς μίαν ἡ τὸν ἀριθμὸν δοῦσα παντὶ τῷ θνητῷ γένει τοῦτʼ ἂν δράσειεν· θεὸν δʼ αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἤ τινα τύχην ἡγοῦμαι δόντα ἡμῖν σῴζειν ἡμᾶς.
977. Ath. And I must explain who it is that I believe to be God, though he be a strange one, and somehow not strange either: for why should we not believe the cause of all the good things that are ours to have been the cause also of what is far the greatest, understanding?
977. ΑΘ. ὃν δὲ θεὸν ἡγοῦμαι, φράζειν χρή, καίπερ ἄτοπον ὄντα, καί πως οὐκ ἄτοπον αὖ· πῶς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον ἡμῖν συμπάντων οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολὺ μεγίστου, τῆς φρονήσεως, αἴτιον ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ γεγονέναι;
977a. And who is it that I magnify with the name of God, Megillus and Cleinias? Merely Heaven, which it is most our duty to honor and pray to especially, as do all other spirits and gods. That it has been the cause of all the other good things we have, we shall all admit; that it likewise gave us number we do really say, and that it will give us this hereafter, if we will but follow its lead.
977a. τίνα δὴ καὶ σεμνύνων ποτὲ λέγω θεόν, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία; σχεδὸν Οὐρανόν, ὃν καὶ δικαιότατον, ὡς σύμπαντες ἄλλοι δαίμονες ἅμα καὶ θεοί, τιμᾶν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι διαφερόντως αὐτῷ. τὸ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴτιον ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἡμῖν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογοῖμεν· δοῦναι δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως αὐτόν φαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ δώσειν, ἐάν τις θέλῃ συνακολουθεῖν.
977b. For if one enters on the right theory about it, whether one be pleased to call it World-order or Olympus or Heaven—let one call it this or that, but follow where, in bespangling itself and turning the stars that it contains, it produces all their courses and the seasons and food for all. And thence, accordingly, we have understanding in general, we may say, and therewith all number, and all other good things: but the greatest of these is when, after receiving its gift of numbers, one has covered the whole circuit. Moreover, let us turn back some little way in our discussion and recall how entirely right we were in conceiving that if we should deprive human nature of number we should never attain to any understanding.
977b. ἐὰν γὰρ ἴῃ τις ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ὀρθὴν τὴν τοῦδε, εἴτε κόσμον εἴτε ὄλυμπον εἴτε οὐρανὸν ἐν ἡδονῇ τῳ λέγειν, λεγέτω μέν, ἀκολουθείτω δὲ ὅπῃ ποικίλλων αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὑτῷ στρέφων ἄστρα πάσας διεξόδους ὥρας τε καὶ τροφὴν πᾶσιν παρέχεται. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὲ οὖν φρόνησιν, ὡς φαῖμεν ἄν, σὺν ἀριθμῷ παντί, καὶ τἆλλʼ ἀγαθά· τοῦτο δὲ μέγιστον, ἐάν τις τὴν ἀριθμῶν αὐτοῦ δόσιν δεξάμενος ἐπεξέλθῃ πᾶσαν τὴν περίοδον. ἔτι δὲ σμικρὸν ἐπανελθόντες πως τοῖς λόγοις ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὅτι καὶ μάλʼ ὀρθῶς ἐνοήσαμεν ὡς, εἴπερ ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐξέλοιμεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτέ τι φρόνιμοι γενοίμεθα.
977c. For then the soul of that creature which could not tell things would never any more be able, one may say, to attain virtue in general; and the creature that did not know two and three, or odd or even, and was completely ignorant of number, could never clearly tell of things about which it had only acquired sensations and memories. From the attainment of ordinary virtue— courage and temperance—it is certainly not debarred: but if a man is deprived of true telling he can never become wise, and he who has not the acquirement of wisdom—the greatest part of virtue as a whole—can no more achieve the perfect goodness which may make him happy.
977c. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ποτὲ ψυχὴ τούτου τοῦ ζῴου πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν λάβοι σχεδόν, ὅτου λόγος ἀπείη· ζῷον δὲ ὅτι μὴ γιγνώσκοι δύο καὶ τρία μηδὲ περιττὸν μηδὲ ἄρτιον, ἀγνοοῖ δὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀριθμόν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε διδόναι λόγον ἔχοι περὶ ὧν αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας [ἔχοι] μόνον εἴη κεκτημένον, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἀρετήν, ἀνδρείαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει.
977d. Thus it is absolutely necessary to postulate number; and why this is necessary can be shown by a still fuller argument than any that has been advanced. But here is one that will be particularly correct—that of the properties of the other arts, which we recounted just now in granting the existence of all the arts, not a single one can remain, but all of them are utterly defective, when once you remove numeration.
977d. στερόμενος δὲ ἀληθοῦς λόγου σοφὸς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, ὅτῳ δὲ σοφία μὴ προσείη, πάσης ἀρετῆς τὸ μέγιστον μέρος, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τελέως ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος εὐδαίμων ποτὲ γένοιτο. οὕτως ἀριθμὸν μὲν ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ὑποτίθεσθαι· διότι δὲ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη, λόγος ἔτι πλείων πάντων γίγνοιτʼ ἂν τῶν εἰρημένων. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ νῦν ὀρθῶς ῥηθήσεται, ὅτι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν λεγόμενα, ἃ νυνδὴ διήλθομεν ἐῶντες εἶναι πάσας τὰς τέχνας, οὐδὲ τούτων ἓν οὐδὲν μένει, πάντα δʼ ἀπολείπεται τὸ παράπαν, ὅταν ἀριθμητικήν τις ἀνέλῃ.
978. Ath. And one may judge, perhaps, for brevity’s sake how the human race needs number, by glancing at the arts—and yet that too is a great matter—but if you note the divinity of birth, and its mortality, in which awe of the divine must be acknowledged, and real number, it is not anybody who can tell how great is the power which we owe to the accompaniment of number as a whole—for it is clear that everything in music needs a distinct numeration of movement and notes—and above all, how it is the cause of all good things; and that it is the cause of no evil thing is a point that must be well understood, as it may be quickly enough.
978. ΑΘ. δόξειε δʼ ἂν ἴσως τις βραχέων ἕνεκα ἀριθμοῦ δεῖσθαι τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, εἰς τὰς τέχνας ἀποβλέψας—καίτοι μέγα μὲν καὶ τοῦτο—εἰ δέ τις ἴδοι τὸ θεῖον τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τὸ θνητόν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ θεοσεβὲς γνωρισθήσεται καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὄντως, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πᾶς ἄν τις γνοίη σύμπαντα ἀριθμὸν ὅσης ἡμῖν δυνάμεως αἴτιος ἂν εἴη συγγιγνόμενος—ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ κατὰ μουσικὴν πᾶσαν διαριθμουμένων κινήσεώς τε καὶ φθόγγων δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ—καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, ἀγαθῶν ὡς πάντων αἴτιον, ὅτι δὲ κακῶν οὐδενός, εὖ τοῦτο γνωστέον, ὃ καὶ τάχα γένοιτʼ ἄν.
978a. Nay, the motion that we may call unreasoned and unordered, lacking shape and rhythm and harmony, and everything that has a share of some evil, is deficient in number altogether; and in this light must the matter be regarded by him who means to end his life in happiness.
978a. ἀλλʼ ἡ σχεδὸν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄτακτος ἀσχήμων τε καὶ ἄρρυθμος ἀνάρμοστός τε φορά, καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα κακοῦ κεκοινώνηκέν τινος, ἐπιλέλειπται παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ δεῖ τοῦθʼ οὕτω διανοεῖσθαι τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα τελευτήσειν·
978b. And no one who does not know the just, the good, the honorable and all the rest of such qualities, with a hold on true opinion, will number them off so as fully to persuade both himself and his neighbor. Now let us go on to inquire into the actual question of how we learnt to count in numbers. Tell me, whence have we got the conception of one and two, a natural gift that we have from the All to enable us to conceive of their existence?
978b. καὶ τό γε δὴ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδείς ποτε μὴ γιγνώσκων, ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἐπιλαβόμενος, διαριθμήσεται πρὸς τὸ ἑαυτόν τε καὶ ἕτερον πεῖσαι τὸ παράπαν. ἴωμεν δὴ σκεψόμενοι πρὸς τοῦτʼ αὐτό, πῶς ἐμάθομεν ἀριθμεῖν. φέρε· τὸ γὰρ ἓν δὴ καὶ δύο γέγονε πόθεν ἡμῖν ὥστʼ ἐννοῆσαι, φύσιν ταύτην ἔχουσιν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς πρὸς τὸ δυνατοὺς ἐννοεῖν εἶναι;
978c. Then again, many other living creatures are not endowed by nature even to the actual point of being able to learn from their father to count; whereas in us, in the first place, God implanted this very conception, so that we might be equal to comprehending it when shown to us, and in the second place, he showed it and shows it. Among such things, what one more singularly beautiful can a man behold than the world of day? Then he comes to the province of night, and views it; and there quite another sight lies before him.
978c. πολλοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις αὖ τῶν ζῴων οὐδʼ εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦθʼ ἡ φύσις παραγέγονεν, ὥστε μαθεῖν δυνατοῖς εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀριθμεῖν, παρὰ δʼ ἡμῖν τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ πρῶτον ἐνῴκισεν ὁ θεός, ὥστε ἱκανοῖς εἶναι δεικνύμενον συννοεῖν, ἔπειτʼ ἔδειξεν καὶ δείκνυσιν· ὧν τί κάλλιον ἓν ἑνὸς ἄν τις θεάσαιτο πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἡμέρας γένος, εἶτα εἰς τὸ τῆς νυκτὸς ἔλθοι μέρος ἔχων ὄψιν, ὅθεν ἕτερον πᾶν αὐτῷ φαίνοιτʼ ἄν;
978d. And so the heaven, revolving these very objects for many nights and many days, never ceases to teach men one and two, until even the most unintelligent have learnt sufficiently to number; for that there are also three and four and many, each of us must further conceive on seeing those objects. And God made one thing that he wrought from them, the moon, which shows herself at one time larger, at another smaller, and runs her course, showing ever a new shape, until fifteen days and nights are passed: this is her circuit, if one chooses to sum her orbit, as one and entire, in one; so that, we may say, even the least intelligent creature must learn it, among those on whom God has bestowed the natural gift of being able to learn.
978d. καὶ ἑλίττων δὴ ταῦτα αὐτὰ ὅταν μὴ παύηται πολλὰς μὲν νύκτας, πολλὰς δὲ ἡμέρας [ἃς] οὐρανός, οὐδέποτε παύεται διδάσκων ἀνθρώπους ἕν τε καὶ δύο, πρὶν ἂν καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος ἱκανῶς μάθῃ ἀριθμεῖν· ὡς γὰρ καὶ τρία καὶ τέτταρα καὶ πολλά, ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐπινοήσειεν ἂν ὁρῶν ταῦτα. καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἓν ἐποίησεν τὴν σελήνην ὁ θεὸς ἀπεργασάμενος, ἣ τοτὲ μὲν μείζων φαινομένη, τοτὲ δʼ ἐλάττων, διεξῆλθεν ἄλλην ἀεὶ φαίνουσα ἡμέραν, μέχρι πεντεκαίδεκα ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν· αὕτη δʼ ἔστιν περίοδος, εἰ βούλεταί τις τὸν κύκλον ἕνα ὅλον εἰς ἓν τιθέναι, ὥστε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν καὶ τὸ δυσμαθέστατον ἂν μαθεῖν ζῷον, οἷς παρέδωκεν φύσιν ὁ θεὸς τοῦ δυνατοῖς εἶναι μανθάνειν.
979. Ath. Within certain limits, and in certain cases, every creature so enabled has been made fully apt for numeration,— when it considers any unit in itself.
979. ΑΘ. καὶ μέχρι μὲν τούτων τε καὶ ἐν τούτοις σύμπαν τὸ δυνατὸν τῶν ζῴων μάλα ἀριθμητικὸν γέγονε, τὸ καθʼ ἓν αὐτὸ σκοποῦν·
979a. But as to reckoning number generally in the relations of things to each other, I think that God, if not for a greater reason, to this end interposed, as we mentioned, the waxing and waning of the moon, and arranged the months to make up the year, and all things began to comprehend number in relation to number by a happy fortune. Hence it is that we have fruits and the teeming of the earth, so that there may be food for all creatures, with no inordinate or immoderate occurrences of winds and rains:
979a. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα ἀριθμὸν ἀεὶ λογίζεσθαι, δοκῶ μὲν μείζονος ἕνεκα, καὶ τούτου δὲ σελήνην, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, αὐξανομένην καὶ φθίνουσαν ἐμποιήσας, μῆνας πρὸς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν συνεστήσατο, καὶ πάντα ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἤρξατο συνορᾶν εὐδαίμονι τύχῃ. διὰ δὲ ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν καρποί τε καὶ ἐγκύμων ἡ γῆ γέγονεν, ὥστʼ εἶναι τροφὴν πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀνέμων τε καὶ ὑετῶν γιγνομένων οὐκ ἐξαισίων οὐδὲ ἀμέτρων· ἀλλʼ εἴ τι παρὰ ταῦτα γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ φλαῦρον, οὐ τὴν θείαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην αἰτιᾶσθαι χρὴ φύσιν, οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ διανέμουσαν τὸν αὑτῶν βίον.
979b. but if in spite of this something does occur in an evil way, we ought not to charge it upon the divine but upon the human nature, for not disposing our own lives aright. Now in our inquiry about laws, you know we decided that all other things that are best for men are easy to discover, and that everyone may become competent both to understand and to perform what he is told, if he discovers what is that which is likely to profit him, and what is not profitable: well, we decided, and we are still of the same mind, that all other studies are not very difficult, but that this of learning in what way we should become good men is one of the utmost difficulty.
979b. ἡμῖν δʼ οὖν ζητοῦσιν περὶ νόμων σχεδὸν ἔδοξεν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ῥᾴδιά τʼ εἶναι γνῶναι τὰ βέλτιστα ἀνθρώποις, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ἱκανὸς γίγνεσθαι καὶ συνεῖναι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ ποιεῖν, εἰ γνοίη τί ποτʼ ἔστιν ὃ συμφέρειν εἰκὸς καὶ τί τὸ μὴ συμφέρον· ἔδοξε δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα πάντα οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπὰ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τίνα τρόπον χρὴ γίγνεσθαι χρηστοὺς ἀνθρώπους παγχάλεπον.
979c. Everything else, again, that is good, as they say, is both possible and not difficult to acquire, and the amount of property that is wanted or not wanted, and the kind of body that is wanted or not: everyone agrees that a good soul is wanted, and agrees, moreover, as to the manner of its goodness, that for this again it must be just and temperate and brave; but whereas everyone says it must be wise, no one any longer agrees at all with anyone else, in most cases—we have just now explained—as to what its wisdom should be.
979c. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα αὖ πάντα κτᾶσθαι χρηστά, τὸ λεγόμενόν [τε], καὶ δυνατὸν καὶ οὐ χαλεπόν, οὐσίαν τε ὅσην δεῖ καὶ μὴ δεῖ, καὶ σῶμα οἷόν τε δεῖ καὶ μή· καὶ ψυχὴν ὅτι μὲν ἀγαθὴν δεῖ, συγχωρεῖ πᾶς παντί, τὸ δʼ ὅντινα τρόπον ἀγαθήν, ὅτι μὲν αὖ δικαίαν καὶ σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν, καὶ ταῦτα, ὅτι δὲ σοφήν, φησὶ μὲν πᾶς δεῖν, ἥντινα δὲ σοφίαν, ὡς ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν, οὐδεὶς οὐδενὶ τὸ παράπαν ἔτι συνομολογεῖ τῶν πολλῶν.
979d. So now we are discovering, besides all those former kinds, a wisdom of no mean worth for this very purpose of showing how he is wise who has learnt the things that we have explained. And if he is wise who has knowledge of these things and is good at them, we must now take account of him.Cl. Good sir, how properly you said that you are undertaking to express great thoughts on great subjects!
979d. νῦν οὖν δὴ παρὰ πάσας τὰς πρόσθεν σοφίας οὐ φαύλην τινὰ ἀνευρίσκομεν εἰς αὐτά γε ταῦτα, τὸ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι τόν γε μεμαθηκότα ἅπερ καὶ διεληλύθαμεν· εἰ δʼ ἔστιν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτʼ ἐπιστήμων καὶ ἀγαθός, τούτου δὴ πέρι λόγον δεῖ λαβεῖν. ΚΛ. ὦ ξένε, ὡς εἰκότως εἶπες ὅτι περὶ μεγάλων μεγάλα ἐπιχειρεῖς φράζειν.
979e. Ath. Yes, for they are not small, Cleinias: but what is more difficult is to show that they are entirely and in every sense true.
979e. ΑΘ. οὐ γὰρ σμικρά, ὦ Κλεινία· τὸ δὲ χαλεπώτερον, ὅτι παντάπασι καὶ πάντως ἀληθῆ.
Cl. Very much so, good sir: but still, do not weary of the task of stating your views.
ΚΛ. σφόδρα γε, ὦ ξένε· ἀλλʼ ὅμως μὴ ἀποκάμῃς λέγων ὃ φῄς.
Ath. I will not, and therefore you two must not weary either of listening to me.
ΑΘ. ναί, μηδὲ σφὼ τοίνυν ἀκούοντε.
Cl. Agreed: I give you my word for us both.
ΚΛ. ταῦτʼ ἔσται· καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀμφοῖν ἐγώ σοι φράζω.
980a. Ath. Thank you. To begin with, then, we must necessarily state first, it would seem best of all, in a single word, if we are able so to put it—what is that which we suppose to be wisdom; but if we are utterly unable to do this, we must say in the second place what and how many kinds of it there are that a man must have acquired, if he is to be wise according to our story.
980a. ΑΘ. καλῶς. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὴ ῥητέον ἀνάγκῃ πρῶτον, ὡς φαίνεται, μάλιστα μὲν ἄν, εἰ δυνάμεθα ἑνὶ λαβεῖν ὀνόματι, τίς ἐστιν ἣν οἰόμεθα σοφίαν εἶναι, τοῦτο δʼ εἰ σφόδρα ἀδυνατοῦμεν, τὸ δεύτερον, τίνες εἰσίν ποτε καὶ ὁπόσαι τινές, ἅς τις λαβὼν σοφὸς ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον μῦθον.
Cl. Pray speak on.
ΚΛ. λέγοις ἄν.
Ath. And as to the next step, it will be no offence in the lawgiver that he speaks finer things than have been previously said about the gods, and uses higher terms of portrayal, making as it were a noble sport and honoring the gods, with high tribute of his hymns and affluence throughout the period of his own life.
ΑΘ. τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀνεμέσητον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τὸ κάλλιον τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων περὶ θεῶν καὶ ἄμεινον ἀπεικάζοντι λέγειν, οἷον παιδιᾷ καλῇ χρωμένῳ καὶ τιμῶντι θεούς, ὕμνοις τε καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ γεραίροντι διάγειν τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον.
980b. Cl. Well spoken, indeed, good sir. Yes, may you have this consummation of your laws, after making fine sport in praising the gods and having passed a purer life, to find thereby the best and fairest end!
980b. ΚΛ. ἦ καλῶς, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις. εἰ γάρ σοι τοῦτο τέλος εἴη τῶν νόμων, θεοὺς προσπαίσαντι καθαρώτερον δὲ διαγαγόντι τὸν βίον τῆς ἅμα τελευτῆς ἀρίστης τε καὶ καλλίστης τυχεῖν.
Ath. Then how, Cleinias, do we state it? Do we honor the gods, think you, to the utmost with our hymns, praying that we may be moved to speak the fairest and best things about them? Do you state it so, or how?
ΑΘ. πῶς οὖν, ὦ Κλεινία, λέγομεν; ἦ δοκεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμνοῦντες σφόδρα τιμῶμεν, εὐχόμενοι τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιέναι λέγειν ἡμῖν; οὕτως ἢ πῶς λέγεις;
980c. Cl. Nay, absolutely so. Now, my excellent friend, pray to the gods with confidence, and utter the fine specimen of a speech that you are moved to make about the gods and goddesses.
980c. ΚΛ. θαυμαστῶς μὲν οὖν οὕτως. ἀλλʼ, ὦ δαιμόνιε, πιστεύσας τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχου τε καὶ λέγε τὸν ἐπιόντα σοι λόγον τῶν καλῶν περὶ τοὺς θεούς τε καὶ τὰς θεάς.
Ath. It shall be done, if the god himself will be our guide. Do but join in my prayer.
ΑΘ. ἔσται ταῦτα, ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ἡμῖν ὑφηγῆται. συνεύχου μόνον.
Cl. Speak what follows next.
ΚΛ. λέγοις ἂν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο.
Ath. It is necessary, then, it seems, that I should first portray in better terms, according to our previous statement, the generation of gods and of living creatures, which has been ill portrayed by those before us; I must resume the statement which I have attempted in speaking against the impious, declaring that there are gods who have a care for all things, small and greater, and who are well-nigh inexorable in what relates to the justice of things: that is, if you remember, Cleinias; for you did take memoranda besides, and indeed what then was spoken was very true.
ΑΘ. θεογονίαν τοίνυν καὶ ζῳογονίαν ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἔοικεν, πρῶτόν μοι, κακῶς ἀπεικασάντων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, βέλτιον ἀπεικάσαι κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον, ἀναλαβόντα ὃν πρὸς τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς ἐπικεχείρηκα λέγων, φράζων ὡς εἰσὶν θεοὶ ἐπιμελούμενοι πάντων, σμικρῶν καὶ μειζόνων, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀπαραμύθητοι τῶν περὶ τὰ δίκαιά εἰσιν πράγματα— εἰ δὴ μέμνησθέ γε, ὦ Κλεινία·
980d. And the most important part of it was that every soul was senior to each body: do you remember? Or in any case, surely, this must be so? For that which is better and more ancient and more godlike is credibly so in comparison with the young, the junior, and the less emancipated; and altogether, a thing governing is senior to a thing governed, and the driver every way senior to the driven.
980d. ἐλάβετε μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὑπομνήματα—καὶ γὰρ ἦν τὰ ῥηθέντα τότε καὶ μάλα ἀληθῆ· τόδε δὲ αὐτῶν ἦν τὸ μέγιστον, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον εἴη ψυχὴ σώματος ἅπασα παντός—ἆρα μέμνησθε; ἢ πάντως που τοῦτό γε; —ὃ γὰρ ἄμεινον καὶ παλαιότερον καὶ θεοειδέστερον, πιθανὸν ὅτι τοῦ νέου καὶ νεωτέρου καὶ ἀτιμοτέρου, πανταχῇ τε ἄρχον ἀρχομένου πρεσβύτερον καὶ ἄγον ἀγομένου πάντῃ.
980e. So much, then, let us conclude—that soul is senior to body; Ath. and if this is the case, what came first in that which first was born will more credibly seem almost to have been original. So let us take it that the beginning of the beginning is more august in state, and that we are most correctly entering upon wisdom in the greatest matters relating to the generation of the gods.Cl. Let this be so, as far as we can state it.
980e. λάβωμεν δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὡς ψυχὴ πρεσβύτερόν ἐστι σώματος.ΑΘ. εἰ δʼ ἔχει τοῦτο οὕτως, τό γε πρῶτον ἡμῖν τοῦ πρώτου τῆς γενέσεως πιθανώτερον ἂν εἴη σχεδὸν ὑπηργμένον· καὶ θῶμεν δὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς εὐσχημονέστερον ἔχειν, καὶ τῶν μεγίστων σοφίας περὶ θεῶν γενέσεως ὀρθότατα ἐπιβαίνειν ἡμᾶς.ΚΛ. ἔστω ταῦτα εἰς δύναμιν λεγόμενα.
Ath. Come then, shall we say that a living creature is most truly described by its nature, as a case of one combination of soul and body so uniting as to beget one shape?
ΑΘ. φέρε δή, ζῷόν γε ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν φῶμεν τοῦτό γε, ὅταν μία συνελθοῦσα σύστασις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀποτέκῃ μίαν μορφήν;
981b. Ath. And such a thing is most justly called a living creature?
981b. ΑΘ. ζῷον μὲν δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖται δικαιότατα;
Ath. On the most likely account there are to be reckoned five solid bodies, from which one might fashion things fairest and best; but all the rest of creation has a single shape, for there is nothing that could come to be without a body and never possessing any color at all, except only that really most divine creature, the soul. And this alone, one may say, has the business of fashioning and manufacturing, whereas the body, as we call it, has that of being fashioned and produced and seen.
ΑΘ. στερεὰ δὲ σώματα λέγεσθαι χρὴ κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον πέντε, ἐξ ὧν κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστά τις ἂν πλάττοι, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο γένος ἅπαν ἔχει μορφὴν μίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀσώματον ὅτι τʼ ἄλλο γίγνοιτʼ ἂν καὶ χρῶμα οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδέποτʼ ἔχον, πλὴν τὸ θειότατον ὄντως ψυχῆς γένος. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ σχεδὸν ᾧ μόνῳ πλάττειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν προσήκει, σώματι δέ, ὃ λέγομεν, πλάττεσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι·
981c. But the other—let us repeat it, for not once only be it said—has to be invisible even to the inquiring, and merely thought, if he has got a share of memory and reckoning by both odd and even variations. The bodies, then, being five, we must name them as fire, water, and thirdly air, earth fourth, and ether fifth; and by predominance of these are each of the many varieties of creatures perfected. We should learn this by single instances in the following way.
981c. τῷ δέ—λέγωμεν πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἅπαξ ῥητέον—ἀοράτῳ τε εἶναι καὶ γιγνώσκοντι νοητῷ τε, μνήμης μεταλαβόντι λογισμοῦ τε ἐν περιτταῖς τε καὶ ἀρτίαις ἅμα μεταβολαῖς. πέντε οὖν ὄντων τῶν σωμάτων, πῦρ χρὴ φάναι καὶ ὕδωρ εἶναι καὶ τρίτον ἀέρα, τέταρτον δὲ γῆν, πέμπτον δὲ αἰθέρα, τούτων δʼ ἐν ἡγεμονίαις ἕκαστον ζῷον πολὺ καὶ παντοδαπὸν ἀποτελεῖσθαι. μαθεῖν δὲ καθʼ ἓν ὧδʼ ἔστιν χρεών. γήινον μὲν τιθῶμεν τὸ πρῶτον ἡμῖν ἕν, πάντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους, πάντα δὲ ὅσα πολύποδα καὶ ἄποδα, καὶ ὅσα πορεύσιμα καὶ ὅσα μόνιμα, διειλημμένα ῥίζαις·
981d. Let us take as earthy our first single element—all men, all things that have many feet or none, and those that move along and that stay still, held in place by roots; but we must conceive its unity thus, though all these things are the outcome of all kinds, yet for the most part it is of earth and of solid nature. And another kind of creature we must regard as second in birth as well as one that can be seen: for its greatest part is of fire, though it has some earth and air, and has slight portions of all the others also, wherefore we must say that all sorts of creatures are born of them, and things seen, and here again we must conceive the heavenly kinds of creatures, which altogether, we must agree, have been born as the divine race of stars, endowed with the fairest body as also with the happiest and best soul.
981d. τὸ δὲ ἓν αὐτοῦ τόδε νομίζειν δεῖ, ὡς πάντα μὲν ἐξ ἁπάντων ταῦτʼ ἔστιν τῶν γενῶν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ τούτου γῆς ἐστιν καὶ τῆς στερεμνίας φύσεως. ἄλλο δὲ χρὴ ζῴου γένος θεῖναι δεύτερον γιγνόμενον ἅμα καὶ δυνατὸν ὁρᾶσθαι· τὸ γὰρ πλεῖστον πυρὸς ἔχει, ἔχει μὴν γῆς τε καὶ ἀέρος, ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἁπάντων τῶν ἄλλων βραχέα μέρη, διὸ δὴ ζῷά τε ἐξ αὐτῶν παντοδαπὰ γίγνεσθαι χρὴ φάναι καὶ ὁρώμενα, νομίσαι δὲ δὴ δεῖ πάλιν τὰ κατʼ οὐρανὸν ζῴων γένη, ὃ δὴ πᾶν χρὴ φάναι θεῖον γένος ἄστρων γεγονέναι, σώματος μὲν τυχὸν καλλίστου, ψυχῆς δʼ εὐδαιμονεστάτης τε καὶ ἀρίστης.
981e. One or other of two lots we may very well, in our judgement, assign to them: for each of them is either imperishable and immortal, and by all necessity wholly divine, or has a certain longevity sufficient for the life of each, such that nothing could ever require a longer one.
981e. δυοῖν δὲ αὐτοῖς μοιρῶν τὴν ἑτέραν χρὴ δόξῃ μεταδιδόναι σχεδόν· ἢ γὰρ ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ θεῖον τὸ παράπαν ἐξ ἁπάσης ἀνάγκης, ἤ τινα μακραίωνα βίον ἔχειν ἱκανὸν ἑκάστῳ ζωῆς, ἧς οὐδέν τι πλείονος ἂν προσδεῖσθαί ποτε.
982. Ath. Let us therefore first observe that, as we state it, such creatures are of two sorts—for let us state it again—both visible, the one of fire, as would appear, entirely, and the other of earth; and the earthy is in disorder, whereas that of fire has its motion in perfect order. Now that which has motion in disorder we should regard as unintelligent, acting like the animal creatures about us for the most part; but that which has an orderly and heavenly progress must be taken as strongly evincing its intelligence.
982. ΑΘ. νοήσωμεν οὖν πρῶτον, ὃ λέγομεν, δύο τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ζῷα—πάλιν γὰρ λέγωμεν—ὁρατὰ μὲν ἀμφότερα, τὸ μὲν ἐκ πυρός, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν, ὅλον, τὸ δʼ ἐκ γῆς, καὶ τὸ μὲν γήινον ἐν ἀταξίᾳ, τὸ δʼ ἐκ πυρὸς ἐν τάξει πάσῃ κινούμενον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀταξίᾳ κινούμενον ἄφρον χρὴ νομίζειν, ὅπερ ὡς τὸ πολὺ δρᾷ τὸ περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷον, τὸ δὲ ἐν τάξει τε καὶ οὐρανῷ πόρον ἔχον μέγα τεκμήριον χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ φρόνιμον εἶναι·
982b. For in passing on and acting and being acted upon always in the same respects and manner it must provide sufficient evidence of its intelligent life. The necessity of a soul that has acquired mind will prove itself by far the greatest of all necessities; for it makes laws as ruler, not as ruled: but this inalterable thing, when the soul has taken the best counsel in accord with the best mind, comes out as the perfect thing in truth and in accord with mind, and not even adamant could ever prove stronger than it or more inalterable; but in fact the three Fates have it in hold, and keep watch that what has been decided by each of the gods with the best counsel shall be perfect.
982b. κατὰ ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὡσαύτως πορευόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχον τεκμήριον ἱκανὸν τοῦ φρονίμως ζῆν εἴη παρεχόμενον. ἡ ψυχῆς δὲ ἀνάγκη νοῦν κεκτημένης ἁπασῶν ἀναγκῶν πολὺ μεγίστη γίγνοιτʼ ἄν—ἄρχουσα γὰρ ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀρχομένη νομοθετεῖ—τὸ δὲ ἀμετάστροφον, ὅταν ψυχὴ τὸ ἄριστον κατὰ τὸν ἄριστον βουλεύσηται νοῦν, τὸ τέλεον ἐκβαίνει τῷ ὄντι κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ οὐδὲ ἀδάμας ἂν αὐτοῦ κρεῖττον οὐδὲ ἀμεταστροφώτερον ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, ἀλλʼ ὄντως τρεῖς Μοῖραι κατέχουσαι φυλάττουσι τέλεον εἶναι τὸ βελτίστῃ βουλῇ βεβουλευμένον ἑκάστοις θεῶν.
982c. And men ought to have found proof of the stars and the whole of that travelling system being possessed of mind in the fact that they always do the same things because they do what has been decided long ago for an incalculable time, not deciding differently this way and that, and doing sometimes one thing, sometimes another, in wanderings and changes of circuit.
982c. τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις ἐχρῆν τεκμήριον εἶναι τοῦ νοῦν ἔχειν ἄστρα τε καὶ σύμπασαν ταύτην τὴν διαπορείαν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἀεὶ πράττει διὰ τὸ βεβουλευμένα πάλαι πράττειν θαυμαστόν τινα χρόνον ὅσον, ἀλλʼ οὐ μεταβουλευόμενον ἄνω καὶ κάτω, τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερα, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἄλλα πρᾶττον, πλανᾶσθαί τε καὶ μετακυκλεῖσθαι.
982d. Most of us have thought just the opposite—that because they do the same things in the same way they have no soul: the multitude followed the lead of the unintelligent so far as to suppose that, whereas humanity was intelligent and living because it moved about, divinity was unintelligent because it abode in the same courses. But if man had sided with the fairer and better and friendly part, he might have concluded that he ought to regard as intelligent—and for this very reason—that which acts always in the same respects, in the same way, and for the same reasons; and that this is the nature of the stars, fairest to see, and passing along, dancing the fairest and most magnificent of all dances in the world, they make good the needs of all living creatures.
982d. τοῦθʼ ἡμῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον ἔδοξεν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως πράττει, ψυχὴν οὐκ ἔχειν· οὕτω τοῖς ἄφροσι συνεφέσπετο τὸ πλῆθος, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον ἔμφρον καὶ ζῶν ὡς κινούμενον ὑπολαβεῖν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ἄφρον ὡς μένον ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς φοραῖς· ἐξῆν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ γε ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω καὶ βελτίω καὶ φίλα τιθεμένῳ λαμβάνειν ὡς διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἔμφρον δεῖ νομίζειν τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ διὰ ταὐτὰ πρᾶττον ἀεί, τοῦτο δʼ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φύσιν, ἰδεῖν μὲν καλλίστην, πορείαν δὲ καὶ χορείαν πάντων χορῶν καλλίστην καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτην χορεύοντα πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ δέον ἀποτελεῖν.
983. Ath. And now, to see how justly we speak of their living spirit, let us first consider their great size.
983. ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε δικαίως ἔμψυχα αὐτὰ λέγομεν, πρῶτον τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν διανοηθῶμεν.
983a. For they are not actually those small things that they appear to be, but each of them is immense in its bulk; we should do well to believe this, because there are ample proofs of such a conclusion. For we can rightly consider the whole of the sun as larger than the whole of the earth, and all the travelling stars are of amazing size. Let us conclude then whether it can possibly be that any natural force revolves this great mass that is now being revolved, continually and at the same time.
983a. οὐ γάρ, ὡς σμικρὰ φαντάζεται, τηλικαῦτα ὄντως ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ ἀμήχανον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὸν ὄγκον—πιστεῦσαι δʼ ἄξιον· ἀποδείξεσιν γὰρ ἱκαναῖς λαμβάνεται—τὸν γὰρ ἥλιον ὅλον τῆς γῆς ὅλης μείζω διανοηθῆναι δυνατὸν ὀρθῶς, καὶ πάντα δὴ τὰ φερόμενα ἄστρα θαυμαστόν τι μέγεθος ἔχει. λάβωμεν δὴ τίς τρόπος ἂν εἴη τοσοῦτον περιφέρειν ὄγκον τινὰ φύσιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ὅσον καὶ νῦν περιφέρεται.