271a. Cri. Who was it, Socrates, that you were talking with yesterday at the Lyceum? Why, there was such a crowd standing about you that when I came up in the hope of listening I could hear nothing distinctly: still, by craning over I got a glimpse, and it appeared to me that it was a stranger with whom you were talking. Who was he?
271a. ΚΡ. τίς ἦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ᾧ χθὲς ἐν Λυκείῳ διελέγου; ἦ πολὺς ὑμᾶς ὄχλος περιειστήκει, ὥστʼ ἔγωγε βουλόμενος ἀκούειν προσελθὼν οὐδὲν οἷός τʼ ἦ ἀκοῦσαι σαφές· ὑπερκύψας μέντοι κατεῖδον, καί μοι ἔδοξεν εἶναι ξένος τις ᾧ διελέγου. τίς ἦν;
Soc. About which are you asking, Crito? There were two of them, not one.
ΣΩ. πότερον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Κρίτων; οὐ γὰρ εἷς ἀλλὰ δύʼ ἤστην.
Cri. The man whom I mean was sitting next but one to you, on your right:
ΚΡ. ὃν μὲν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐκ δεξιᾶς τρίτος ἀπὸ σοῦ καθῆστο·
271b. between you was Axiochus’ boy; and he, Socrates, seemed to me to have grown a great deal, so as to look almost the same age as my Critobulus, who is rather puny whereas this boy has come on finely, and has a noble air about him.
271b. ἐν μέσῳ δʼ ὑμῶν τὸ Ἀξιόχου μειράκιον ἦν. καὶ μάλα πολύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιδεδωκέναι μοι ἔδοξεν, καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου οὐ πολύ τι τὴν ἡλικίαν διαφέρειν Κριτοβούλου. ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνος μὲν σκληφρός, οὗτος δὲ προφερὴς καὶ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν ὄψιν.
Soc. Euthydemus is the person to whom you refer, Crito, and the one sitting on my left was his brother, Dionysodorus. He too takes part in our discussions.
ΣΩ. Εὐθύδημος οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Κρίτων, ὃν ἐρωτᾷς, ὁ δὲ παρʼ ἐμὲ καθήμενος ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς ἀδελφὸς τούτου, Διονυσόδωρος· μετέχει δὲ καὶ οὗτος τῶν λόγων.
Cri. Neither of them is known to me, Socrates. A pair of fresh additions, I suppose, to our sophists.
ΚΡ. οὐδέτερον γιγνώσκω, ὦ Σώκρατες. καινοί τινες αὖ οὗτοι, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφισταί·
271c. Where do they hail from, and what science do they profess?
271c. ποδαποί; καὶ τίς ἡ σοφία;
Soc. By birth I believe they belong to these parts, that is to say, Chios; they went out as colonists to Thurii, but have been exiled thence and have spent a good many years now in various parts of this country. As to what you ask of their profession, it is a wonderful one, Crito. These two men are absolutely omniscient: I never knew before what “all-round sportsmen” were. They are a pair of regular all-round fighters—not in the style of the famous all-round athletes, the two brothers of Acamania; they could fight with their bodies only. But these two, in the first place, are most formidable in body and in fight against all comers Soc.
ΣΩ. οὗτοι τὸ μὲν γένος, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἐντεῦθέν ποθέν εἰσιν ἐκ Χίου, ἀπῴκησαν δὲ ἐς Θουρίους, φεύγοντες δὲ ἐκεῖθεν πόλλʼ ἤδη ἔτη περὶ τούσδε τοὺς τόπους διατρίβουσιν. ὃ δὲ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῖν, θαυμασία, ὦ Κρίτων· πάσσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς τώ γε, οὐδʼ ᾔδη πρὸ τοῦ ὅτι εἶεν οἱ παγκρατιασταί. τούτω γάρ ἐστον κομιδῇ παμμάχω. οὐ κατὰ τὼ Ἀκαρνᾶνε ἐγενέσθην τὼ παγκρατιαστὰ ἀδελφώ· ἐκείνω μὲν γὰρ τῷ σώματι μόνον οἵω τε μάχεσθαι, τούτω δὲ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ σώματι δεινοτάτω ἐστὸν [καὶ μάχῃ, ᾗ πάντων ἔστι κρατεῖν]
272. —for they are not only well skilled themselves in fighting under arms, but are able to impart that skill, for a fee, to another; and further, they are most competent also to fight the battle of the law-courts and teach others how to speak, or to have composed for them, such speeches as may win their suits.
272. ΣΩ. —ἐν ὅπλοις γὰρ αὐτώ τε σοφὼ πάνυ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἄλλον, ὃς ἂν διδῷ μισθόν, οἵω τε ποιῆσαι—ἔπειτα τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις μάχην κρατίστω καὶ ἀγωνίσασθαι καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι λέγειν τε καὶ συγγράφεσθαι λόγους οἵους εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια.
272a. Formerly they had merely some ability for this; but now they have put the finishing touch to their skill as all-round sportsmen. The one feat of fighting yet unperformed by them they have now accomplished, so that nobody dares stand up to them for a moment; such a faculty they have acquired for wielding words as their weapons and confuting any argument as readily if it be true as if it be false.
272a. πρὸ τοῦ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δεινὼ ἤστην μόνον, νῦν δὲ τέλος ἐπιτεθήκατον παγκρατιαστικῇ τέχνῃ. ἣ γὰρ ἦν λοιπὴ αὐτοῖν μάχη ἀργός, ταύτην νῦν ἐξείργασθον, ὥστε μηδʼ ἂν ἕνα αὐτοῖς οἷόν τʼ εἶναι μηδʼ ἀντᾶραι· οὕτω δεινὼ γεγόνατον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μάχεσθαί τε καὶ ἐξελέγχειν τὸ ἀεὶ λεγόμενον, ὁμοίως ἐάντε ψεῦδος ἐάντε ἀληθὲς ᾖ.
272b. And so I, Crito, am minded to place myself in these two gentlemen’s hands; for they say it would take them but a little while to make anyone else clever in just the same way.
272b. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐν νῷ ἔχω τοῖν ἀνδροῖν παραδοῦναι ἐμαυτόν· καὶ γάρ φατον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δεινόν.
Cri. What, Socrates! Are you not afraid, at your time of life, that you may be too old for that now?
ΚΡ. τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐ φοβῇ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ᾖς;
Soc. Not at all, Crito: I have enough proof and reassurance to the contrary. These same two persons were little less than old men at the time of their taking up this science, which I desire to have, of disputation.
ΣΩ. ἥκιστά γε, ὦ Κρίτων· ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον ἔχω καὶ παραμύθιον τοῦ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι. αὐτὼ γὰρ τούτω, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γέροντε ὄντε ἠρξάσθην ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἧς ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς ἐριστικῆς· πέρυσιν ἢ προπέρυσιν οὐδέπω ἤστην σοφώ.
272c. Last year, or the year before, they were as yet without their science. The only thing I am afraid of is that I may bring the same disgrace upon our two visitors as upon Connus, son of Metrobius, the harper, who is still trying to teach me the harp; so that the boys who go to his lessons with me make fun of me and call Connus “the gaffers’ master.” This makes me fear that someone may make the same reproach to the two strangers; and, for aught I know, their dread of this very thing may make them unwilling to accept me. So, Crito, just as in the other case I have persuaded some elderly men to come and have lessons with me, in this affair I am going to try and persuade another set.
272c. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ ἓν μόνον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὖ ὄνειδος τοῖν ξένοιν περιάψω, ὥσπερ Κόννῳ τῷ Μητροβίου, τῷ κιθαριστῇ, ὃς ἐμὲ διδάσκει ἔτι καὶ νῦν κιθαρίζειν· ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ παῖδες οἱ συμφοιτηταί μοι ἐμοῦ τε καταγελῶσι καὶ τὸν Κόννον καλοῦσι γεροντοδιδάσκαλον. μὴ οὖν καὶ τοῖν ξένοιν τις ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ὀνειδίσῃ· οἱ δʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἴσως φοβούμενοι τάχα με οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν προσδέξασθαι. ἐγὼ δʼ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖσε μὲν ἄλλους πέπεικα συμμαθητάς μοι φοιτᾶν πρεσβύτας, ἐνταῦθα δέ γε ἑτέρους πειράσομαι πείθειν.
272d. Now you, I am sure, will come with me to school; and we will take your sons as a bait to entice them, for I have no doubt that the attraction of these young fellows will make them include us also in the class.
272d. καὶ σὺ τί οὐ συμφοιτᾷς; ὡς δὲ δέλεαρ αὐτοῖς ἄξομεν τοὺς σοὺς ὑεῖς· ἐφιέμενοι γὰρ ἐκείνων οἶδʼ ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς παιδεύσουσιν.
Cri. I have no objection, Socrates, if you think fit to do so. But first you must explain to me what is the science these men profess, that I may know what it is we are going to learn.
ΚΡ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν γε σοὶ δοκῇ. πρῶτον δέ μοι διήγησαι τὴν σοφίαν τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τίς ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰδῶ ὅτι καὶ μαθησόμεθα.
Soc. You shall be told at once; for I cannot plead that I did not give them my attention, since I not only attended closely but remember and will try to expound the whole thing from the beginning.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἀκούων· ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμί γε εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐ προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῖν, ἀλλὰ πάνυ καὶ προσεῖχον καὶ μέμνημαι, καί σοι πειράσομαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἅπαντα διηγήσασθαι.
272e. By some providence I chanced to be sitting in the place where you saw me, in the undressing-room, alone, and was just intending to get up and go; but the moment I did so, there came my wonted spiritual sign.
272e. κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα, οὗπερ σύ με εἶδες, ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρίῳ μόνος, καὶ ἤδη ἐν νῷ εἶχον ἀναστῆναι· ἀνισταμένου δέ μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον.
273. Soc. So I sat down again, and after a little while these two persons entered—Euthydemus and Dionysodorus—and accompanying them, quite a number, as it seemed to me, of their pupils: the two men came in and began walking round inside the cloister.
273. ΣΩ. πάλιν οὖν ἐκαθεζόμην, καὶ ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον εἰσέρχεσθον τούτω—ὅ τʼ Εὐθύδημος καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος—καὶ ἄλλοι μαθηταὶ ἅμα αὖ πολλοὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν·
273a. Hardly had they taken two or three turns, when in stepped Cleinias, who you say has come on so much, and you are right: behind him was a whole troop of lovers, and among them Ctesippus, a young fellow from Paeania, of gentle birth and breeding, except for a certain insolence of youth.
273a. εἰσελθόντε δὲ περιπατείτην ἐν τῷ καταστέγῳ δρόμῳ. καὶ οὔπω τούτω δύʼ ἢ τρεῖς δρόμους περιεληλυθότε ἤστην, καὶ εἰσέρχεται Κλεινίας, ὃν σὺ φῂς πολὺ ἐπιδεδωκέναι, ἀληθῆ λέγων· ὄπισθεν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐρασταὶ πάνυ πολλοί τε καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ Κτήσιππος, νεανίσκος τις Παιανιεύς, μάλα καλός τε κἀγαθὸς τὴν φύσιν, ὅσον μὴ ὑβριστὴς [δὲ] διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι.
273b. So when Cleinias as he entered caught sight of me sitting there alone, he came straight across and sat beside me on my right, just as you say. Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him, stood at first talking with each other, and casting an occasional glance at us—for my attention was fixed on them—but then one of them, Euthydemus, took a seat by the youth, and the other next to me on my left; the rest, where each happened to find one.
273b. ἰδὼν οὖν με ὁ Κλεινίας ἀπὸ τῆς εἰσόδου μόνον καθήμενον, ἄντικρυς ἰὼν παρεκαθέζετο ἐκ δεξιᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ φῄς. ἰδόντε δὲ αὐτὸν ὅ τε Διονυσόδωρος καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστάντε διελεγέσθην ἀλλήλοιν, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντε εἰς ἡμᾶς—καὶ γὰρ πάνυ αὐτοῖν προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν—ἔπειτα ἰόντε ὁ μὲν παρὰ τὸ μειράκιον ἐκαθέζετο, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὁ δὲ παρʼ αὐτὸν ἐμὲ ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς, οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστος ἐτύγχανεν.
273c. So I greeted the two brothers, as not having seen them for some time; after that I said to Cleinias: My dear Cleinias, these two men, you know, are skilled not in little things, but in great. For they understand all about war, that is, as much as is needful for him who is to be a good general; both the tactics and the strategy of armies, and all the teaching of troops under arms; and they can also enable one to get redress in the law courts for a wrong that one may have suffered. When I had said this, I saw they despised me for it, and they both laughed, looking at each other; then Euthydemus said: No, no, Socrates, we do not make those matters our business now; we deal with them as diversions.
273c. ἠσπαζόμην οὖν αὐτὼ ἅτε διὰ χρόνου ἑωρακώς· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο εἶπον πρὸς τὸν Κλεινίαν· ὦ Κλεινία, τώδε μέντοι τὼ ἄνδρε σοφώ, Εὐθύδημός τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρος, οὐ τὰ σμικρὰ ἀλλὰ τὰ μεγάλα· τὰ γὰρ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πάντα ἐπίστασθον, ὅσα δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀγαθὸν στρατηγὸν ἔσεσθαι, τάς τε τάξεις καὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας τῶν στρατοπέδων καὶ [ὅσα] ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι [διδακτέον]· οἵω τε δὲ καὶ ποιῆσαι δυνατὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὑτῷ βοηθεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ἄν τις αὐτὸν ἀδικῇ.
273d. At this I wondered and said: Your business must be a fine one, if such great matters are indeed diversions to you; so I beseech you, tell me what this fine business is. Virtue, Socrates, he replied, is what we deem ourselves able to purvey in a pre-eminently excellent and speedy manner.
273d. εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα κατεφρονήθην ὑπʼ αὐτοῖν· ἐγελασάτην οὖν ἄμφω βλέψαντε εἰς ἀλλήλω, καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος εἶπεν· οὔτοι ἔτι ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, σπουδάζομεν, ἀλλὰ παρέργοις αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα. κἀγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον· καλὸν ἄν που τὸ ἔργον ὑμῶν εἴη, εἰ τηλικαῦτα πράγματα πάρεργα ὑμῖν τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ πρὸς θεῶν εἴπετόν μοι τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλόν. ἀρετήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἰόμεθα οἵω τʼ εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστʼ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα.
273e. Good heavens, I exclaimed, a mighty affair indeed! Where did you have the luck to pick it up? I was still considering you, as I remarked just now, to be chiefly skilled in fighting under arms, and so spoke of you in those terms: for when you visited, our city before, this, I recollect, was the profession you made.
273e. ὦ Ζεῦ, οἷον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λέγετον πρᾶγμα· πόθεν τοῦτο τὸ ἕρμαιον ηὑρέτην; ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ ὑμῶν διενοούμην ἔτι, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὡς τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο δεινοῖν ὄντοιν, ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα ἔλεγον περὶ σφῷν· ὅτε γὰρ τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδημησάτην, τοῦτο μέμνημαι σφὼ ἐπαγγελλομένω.
274. Soc. But if you now in truth possess this other knowledge, have mercy—you see I address you just as though you were a couple of gods, beseeching you to forgive my former remarks.
274. ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ νῦν ἀληθῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχετον, ἵλεω εἶτον—ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε σφὼ ὥσπερ θεὼ προσαγορεύω, συγγνώμην δεόμενος ἔχειν μοι τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων.
274a. But make sure, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, that you spoke the truth: for the vastness of your promise gives me some excuse for disbelieving. You may be sure, Socrates, they replied, it is as we say. Then I congratulate you on your acquisition far more than I do the great king on his empire: only tell me whether you intend to exhibit this science of yours, or what you have determined to do. We are here for the very purpose, Socrates, of exhibiting and expounding it to anyone who wishes to learn.
274a. ἀλλʼ ὁρᾶτον, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγετον· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐπαγγέλματος οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀπιστεῖν. ἀλλʼ εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, [ἔφατον,] τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον. μακαρίζω ἄρʼ ὑμᾶς ἔγωγε τοῦ κτήματος πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ μέγαν βασιλέα τῆς ἀρχῆς· τοσόνδε δέ μοι εἴπετον, εἰ ἐν νῷ ἔχετον ἐπιδεικνύναι ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν, ἢ πῶς σφῷν βεβούλευται. ἐπʼ αὐτό γε τοῦτο πάρεσμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐπιδείξοντε καὶ διδάξοντε, ἐάν τις ἐθέλῃ μανθάνειν.
274b. Well, I guarantee that all who do not possess it will wish to—myself to begin with, then Cleinias here and, besides us, Ctesippus and all these others, I said, showing him the lovers of Cleinias, who were by this time standing about us. For Ctesippus, as it happened, was sitting some way from Cleinias, I noticed; and by chance, as Euthydemus leant forward in talking to me he obscured Ctesipus’ view of Cleinias, who was between us.
274b. ἀλλʼ ὅτι μὲν ἐθελήσουσιν ἅπαντες οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες, ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐγγυῶμαι, πρῶτος μὲν ἐγώ, ἔπειτα δὲ Κλεινίας οὑτοσί, πρὸς δʼ ἡμῖν Κτήσιππός τε ὅδε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὗτοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγὼ δεικνὺς αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐραστὰς τοὺς Κλεινίου· οἱ δὲ ἐτύγχανον ἡμᾶς ἤδη περιιστάμενοι. ὁ γὰρ Κτήσιππος ἔτυχε πόρρω καθεζόμενος τοῦ Κλεινίου—κἀμοὶ δοκεῖν ὡς ἐτύγχανεν ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐμοὶ διαλεγόμενος προνενευκὼς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, ἐν μέσῳ ὄντος ἡμῶν τοῦ Κλεινίου ἐπεσκότει τῷ Κτησίππῳ τῆς θέας—βουλόμενός τε οὖν θεάσασθαι ὁ Κτήσιππος τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ἅμα φιλήκοος ὢν ἀναπηδήσας πρῶτος προσέστη ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ καταντικρύ·
274c. Then Ctesippus, desiring to gaze on his favorite and being also an eager listener, led the way by jumping up and placing himself opposite us; and this made the others, on seeing what he did, stand around us, both Cleinias’ lovers and the followers of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. Pointing to these, I told Euthydemus that they were all ready to learn; to which Ctesippus assented with great eagerness, and so did the rest; and they all joined in urging the two men to exhibit the power of their wisdom.
274c. οὕτως οὖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκεῖνον ἰδόντες περιέστησαν ἡμᾶς, οἵ τε τοῦ Κλεινίου ἐρασταὶ καὶ οἱ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου τε καὶ Διονυσοδώρου ἑταῖροι. τούτους δὴ ἐγὼ δεικνὺς ἔλεγον τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ ὅτι πάντες ἕτοιμοι εἶεν μανθάνειν·
274d. On this I remarked: My good Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, you must do your very best to gratify my friends and, for my sake also, to give us an exhibition. To do it in full, of course, would obviously be a lengthy performance: but tell me one thing—will you be able to make a good man of him only who is already convinced that he should learn of you, or of him also who is not yet so convinced, owing to an absolute disbelief that virtue is a thing that can be learnt or that you are teachers of it?
274d. ὅ τε οὖν Κτήσιππος συνέφη μάλα προθύμως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ ἐκέλευον αὐτὼ κοινῇ πάντες ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας. εἶπον οὖν ἐγώ· ὦ Εὐθύδημε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε, πάνυ μὲν οὖν παντὶ τρόπῳ καὶ τούτοις χαρίσασθον καὶ ἐμοῦ ἕνεκα ἐπιδείξασθον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐπιδεῖξαι· τόδε δέ μοι εἴπετον, πότερον πεπεισμένον ἤδη ὡς χρὴ παρʼ ὑμῶν μανθάνειν δύναισθʼ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ποιῆσαι ἄνδρα μόνον, ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν μήπω πεπεισμένον διὰ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ὅλως τὸ πρᾶγμα τὴν ἀρετὴν μαθητὸν εἶναι ἢ μὴ σφὼ εἶναι αὐτῆς διδασκάλω;
274e. Come now, is it the business of this same art to persuade such a man that virtue is teachable and that you are the men of whom one may best learn it, or does this need some other art? No, this same one can do it, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.
274e. φέρε, καὶ τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης ἔργον πεῖσαι ὡς καὶ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ οὗτοι ὑμεῖς ἐστὲ παρʼ ὧν ἂν κάλλιστά τις αὐτὸ μάθοι, ἢ ἄλλης; ταύτης μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τῆς αὐτῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος.
275. Soc. Then you two, Dionysodorus, I said, would be the best persons now on earth to incite one to the pursuit of knowledge and the practice of virtue?
275. ΣΩ. ὑμεῖς ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων κάλλιστʼ ἂν προτρέψαιτε εἰς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν;
275a. We think so, at least, Socrates. Well then, please defer the display of all the rest to some other occasion, I said, and exhibit this one thing. You are to persuade this young fellow here that he ought to ensue wisdom and practise virtue, and so you will oblige both me and all these present. This youth happens to be in just the sort of condition I speak of; and I and all of us here are at this moment anxious for him to become as good as possible. He is the son of Axiochus, son of the former Alcibiades, and is own cousin to the Alcibiades that now is: his name is Cleinias.
275a. οἰόμεθά γε δή, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων τὴν ἐπίδειξιν ἡμῖν, ἔφην, εἰς αὖθις ἀπόθεσθον, τοῦτο δʼ αὐτὸ ἐπιδείξασθον· τουτονὶ τὸν νεανίσκον πείσατον ὡς χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ χαριεῖσθον ἐμοί τε καὶ τουτοισὶ πᾶσιν. συμβέβηκεν γάρ τι τοιοῦτον τῷ μειρακίῳ τούτῳ· ἐγώ τε καὶ οἵδε πάντες τυγχάνομεν ἐπιθυμοῦντες ὡς βέλτιστον αὐτὸν γενέσθαι. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Ἀξιόχου μὲν ὑὸς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦ παλαιοῦ, αὐτανεψιὸς δὲ τοῦ νῦν ὄντος Ἀλκιβιάδου·
275b. He is young; and so we have fears for him, as well one may for a young man, lest someone forestall us and turn his inclination to some other course of life, and so corrupt him. Hence your arrival now is most happy. Come now, if it is all the same to you, make trial of the lad and talk with him in our presence. When I had thus spoken, in almost these very words, Euthydemus answered in a tone both manly and dashing: Oh, it is all the same to us, Socrates, provided the youth is willing to answer us.
275b. ὄνομα δʼ αὐτῷ Κλεινίας. ἔστι δὲ νέος· φοβούμεθα δὴ περὶ αὐτῷ, οἷον εἰκὸς περὶ νέῳ, μή τις φθῇ ἡμᾶς ἐπʼ ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα τρέψας αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ διαφθείρῃ. σφὼ οὖν ἥκετον εἰς κάλλιστον· ἀλλʼ εἰ μή τι διαφέρει ὑμῖν, λάβετον πεῖραν τοῦ μειρακίου καὶ διαλέχθητον ἐναντίον ἡμῶν. εἰπόντος οὖν ἐμοῦ σχεδόν τι αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἅμα ἀνδρείως τε καὶ θαρραλέως, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐὰν μόνον ἐθέλῃ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὁ νεανίσκος.
275c. Why, in fact, I said, that is just what he is used to: these people here are constantly coming to him and asking him a number of questions and debating with him, so he is a fairly fearless answerer. What ensued, Crito, how am I to relate in proper style? For no slight matter it is to be able to recall in description such enormous knowledge as theirs.
275c. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε καὶ εἴθισται· θαμὰ γὰρ αὐτῷ οἵδε προσιόντες πολλὰ ἐρωτῶσίν τε καὶ διαλέγονται, ὥστε ἐπιεικῶς θαρρεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι. τὰ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, πῶς ἂν καλῶς σοι διηγησαίμην; οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν τὸ ἔργον δύνασθαι ἀναλαβεῖν διεξιόντα σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὅσην· ὥστʼ ἔγωγε, καθάπερ οἱ ποιηταί, δέομαι ἀρχόμενος τῆς διηγήσεως μούσας τε καὶ Μνημοσύνην ἐπικαλεῖσθαι.
275d. Consequently, like the poets, I must needs begin my narrative with an invocation of the Muses and Memory. Well, Euthydemus set to work, so far as I remember, in terms very much the same as these: Cleinias, which sort of men are the learners, the wise or the foolish? At this the young man, feeling the embarrassment of the question, blushed and glanced at me in his helplessness. So I, perceiving his confusion, said: Have no fear, Cleinias; answer bravely, whichever you think it is: for perchance he is doing you the greatest service in the world.
275d. ἤρξατο δʼ οὖν ἐνθένδε ποθὲν ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι· ὦ Κλεινία, πότεροί εἰσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς; καὶ τὸ μειράκιον, ἅτε μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐρωτήματος, ἠρυθρίασέν τε καὶ ἀπορήσας ἐνέβλεψεν εἰς ἐμέ· καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς αὐτὸν τεθορυβημένον, θάρρει, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ ἀπόκριναι ἀνδρείως, ὁπότερά σοι φαίνεται·
275e. Meanwhile Dionysodorus leant over a little to me, with a broad smile on his face, and whispered in my ear: Let me tell you, Socrates, beforehand that, whichever way the lad answers, he will be confuted.
275e. ἴσως γάρ τοι ὠφελεῖ τὴν μεγίστην ὠφελίαν. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος προσκύψας μοι μικρὸν πρὸς τὸ οὖς, πάνυ μειδιάσας τῷ προσώπῳ, καὶ μήν, ἔφη, σοί, ὦ Σώκρατες, προλέγω ὅτι ὁπότερʼ ἂν ἀποκρίνηται τὸ μειράκιον, ἐξελεγχθήσεται.
276. Soc. While he was saying this, Cleinias made his reply, so that I was unable even to advise the boy to be wary: he replied that it was the wise who were the learners.
276. ΣΩ. καὶ αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ ταῦτα λέγοντος ὁ Κλεινίας ἔτυχεν ἀποκρινάμενος, ὥστε οὐδὲ παρακελεύσασθαί μοι ἐξεγένετο εὐλαβηθῆναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, ἀλλʼ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ εἶεν οἱ μανθάνοντες.
276a. Then Euthydemus asked: And are there persons whom you call teachers, or not? He agreed that there were. And the teachers of the learners are teachers in the same way as your lute-master and your writing-master, I suppose, were teachers of you and the other boys, while you were pupils? He assented. Now, of course, when you were learning, you did not yet know the things you were learning?
276a. καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, καλεῖς δέ τινας, ἔφη, διδασκάλους, ἢ οὔ;—ὡμολόγει.—οὐκοῦν τῶν μανθανόντων οἱ διδάσκαλοι διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς καὶ ὁ γραμματιστὴς διδάσκαλοι δήπου ἦσαν σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παίδων, ὑμεῖς δὲ μαθηταί;—συνέφη.—ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἡνίκα ἐμανθάνετε, οὔπω ἠπίστασθε ταῦτα ἃ ἐμανθάνετε;—οὐκ ἔφη.—ἆρʼ οὖν σοφοὶ ἦτε, ὅτε ταῦτα οὐκ ἠπίστασθε;—οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δʼ ὅς.—οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ σοφοί, ἀμαθεῖς;—πάνυ γε.—ὑμεῖς ἄρα μανθάνοντες ἃ οὐκ ἠπίστασθε, ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐμανθάνετε.—ἐπένευσε τὸ μειράκιον.—οἱ ἀμαθεῖς ἄρα μανθάνουσιν, ὦ Κλεινία, ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἱ σοφοί, ὡς σὺ οἴει.
276b. No, he said. So were you wise, when you did not know those things? No, to be sure, he said. Then if not wise, foolish? Certainly. So when you learnt what you did not know, you learnt while being foolish. To this the lad nodded assent. Hence it is the foolish who learn, Cleinias, and not the wise, as you suppose. When he had thus spoken, all those followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus raised a cheer and a laugh, like a chorus at the signal of their director; and before the boy could fairly and fully recover his breath Dionysodorus took up the cudgels and said: Well now, Cleinias, whenever your writing-master dictated from memory, which of the boys learnt the piece recited, the wise or the foolish? The wise, said Cleinias. So it is the wise who learn, and not the foolish: hence the answer you gave just now to Euthydemus was a bad one.
276b. ταῦτʼ οὖν εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορὸς ἀποσημήναντος, ἅμα ἀνεθορύβησάν τε καὶ ἐγέλασαν οἱ ἑπόμενοι ἐκεῖνοι μετὰ τοῦ Διονυσοδώρου τε καὶ Εὐθυδήμου· καὶ πρὶν ἀναπνεῦσαι καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ τὸ μειράκιον, ἐκδεξάμενος ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, τί δέ, ὦ Κλεινία, ἔφη, ὁπότε ἀποστοματίζοι ὑμῖν ὁ γραμματιστής, πότεροι ἐμάνθανον τῶν παίδων τὰ ἀποστοματιζόμενα, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;—οἱ σοφοί, ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας.—οἱ σοφοὶ ἄρα μανθάνουσιν ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς, καὶ οὐκ εὖ σὺ ἄρτι Εὐθυδήμῳ ἀπεκρίνω.
276d. Thereupon arose a great deal of laughter and loud applause from the pair’s adorers, in admiration of their cleverness; while we on our side were dismayed and held our peace. Then Euthydemus, observing our dismay, and seeking to astonish us still further, would not let the boy go, but went on questioning him and, like a skilful dancer, gave a twofold twist to his questions on the same point: Now, do the learners learn what they know, he asked, or what they do not? Then Dionysodorus whispered to me again softly:
276d. ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ πάνυ μέγα ἐγέλασάν τε καὶ ἐθορύβησαν οἱ ἐρασταὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, ἀγασθέντες τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῖν· οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι ἡμεῖς ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσιωπῶμεν. γνοὺς δὲ ἡμᾶς ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐκπεπληγμένους, ἵνʼ ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάζοιμεν αὐτόν, οὐκ ἀνίει τὸ μειράκιον, ἀλλʼ ἠρώτα, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησταί, διπλᾶ ἔστρεφε τὰ ἐρωτήματα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔφη· πότερον γὰρ οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνουσιν ἃ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἃ μὴ ἐπίστανται; καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος πάλιν μικρὸν πρός με ψιθυρίσας, καὶ τοῦτʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἕτερον τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ πρότερον.
276e. Here comes a second one, Socrates, just like the first. Heavens! I replied: surely the first question served you well enough. All our questions, Socrates, he said, are like that; they leave no escape. And consequently, as it seems to me, I remarked, you have this high repute among your disciples.
276e. ὦ Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἦ μὴν καὶ τὸ πρότερόν γε καλὸν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη τὸ ἐρώτημα. πάντʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα ἡμεῖς ἐρωτῶμεν ἄφυκτα. τοιγάρτοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δοκεῖτέ μοι εὐδοκιμεῖν παρὰ τοῖς μαθηταῖς.
277. Soc. Meanwhile Cleinias answered Euthydemus, that learners learnt what they did not know; so he had to meet the same course of questions as before:
277. ΣΩ. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ὁ μὲν Κλεινίας τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι μανθάνοιεν οἱ μανθάνοντες ἃ οὐκ ἐπίσταιντο· ὁ δὲ ἤρετο αὐτὸν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὧνπερ τὸ πρότερον·
277a. Well then, asked the other, do you not know your letters? Yes, he said. All of them? He admitted it. Now when anyone dictates some piece or other, does he not dictate letters? He admitted it. And he dictates things of which you know something, since you know all of them? He admitted this too. Well now, said the other, surely you do not learn whatever such a person dictates; it is rather he who does not know his letters that learns? No, he replied; I learn. Then you learn what you know, since you know all your letters.
277a. τί δέ; ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐκ ἐπίστασαι σὺ γράμματα;—ναί, ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν ἅπαντα;—ὡμολόγει.—ὅταν οὖν τις ἀποστοματίζῃ ὁτιοῦν, οὐ γράμματα ἀποστοματίζει;—ὡμολόγει.—οὐκοῦν ὧν τι σὺ ἐπίστασαι, ἔφη, ἀποστοματίζει, εἴπερ πάντα ἐπίστασαι;—καὶ τοῦτο ὡμολόγει.—τί οὖν; ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἆρα σὺ ⟨οὐ⟩ μανθάνεις ἅττʼ ἂν ἀποστοματίζῃ τις, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος γράμματα μανθάνει;—οὔκ, ἀλλʼ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, μανθάνω.—οὐκοῦν ἃ ἐπίστασαι, ἦ δʼ ὅς, μανθάνεις, εἴπερ γε ἅπαντα τὰ γράμματα ἐπίστασαι.—ὡμολόγησεν.—οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρίνω, ἔφη.
277b. He agreed. So your answer was not correct, he said. The last word was hardly out of Euthydemus’ mouth when Dionysodorus caught, as it were, the ball of the argument and, aiming at the boy again, said: Euthydemus is deceiving you, Cleinias. Tell me, is not learning the reception of knowledge of that which one learns? Cleinias agreed. And is not knowing, he went on, just having knowledge at the time? He assented. So that not knowing is not yet having knowledge? He agreed with him. Then are those who receive anything those who have it already, or those who have it not? Those who have it not. And you have admitted that those who do not know belong also to this class of those who have it not? He nodded assent. And the learners belong to the class of the receiving and not to that of the having? He agreed. Hence it is those who do not know that learn, Cleinias, and not those who know. Euthydemus was proceeding to press the youth for the third fall, when I, perceiving the lad was going under, and wishing to give him some breathing-space lest he should shame us by losing heart, encouraged him with these words: Cleinias, do not be surprised that these arguments seem strange to you; for perhaps you do not discern what our two visitors are doing to you.
277b. καὶ οὔπω σφόδρα τι ταῦτα εἴρητο τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ, καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὥσπερ σφαῖραν ἐκδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον πάλιν ἐστοχάζετο τοῦ μειρακίου, καὶ εἶπεν· Ἐξαπατᾷ σε Εὐθύδημος, ὦ Κλεινία. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τὸ μανθάνειν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἐστὶ λαμβάνειν τούτου οὗ ἄν τις μανθάνῃ;—ὡμολόγει ὁ Κλεινίας.—τὸ δʼ ἐπίστασθαι, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἤδη ἐστίν;—συνέφη.—τὸ ἄρα μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μήπω ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἐστίν;—ὡμολόγει αὐτῷ.—πότερον οὖν εἰσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες ὁτιοῦν οἱ ἔχοντες ἤδη ἢ οἳ ἂν μὴ ἔχωσιν;—οἳ ἂν μή.—οὐκοῦν ὡμολόγηκας εἶναι τούτων καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους, τῶν μὴ ἐχόντων;—κατένευσε.—τῶν λαμβανόντων ἄρʼ εἰσὶν οἱ μανθάνοντες, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῶν ἐχόντων;—συνέφη.—οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄρα, ἔφη, μανθάνουσιν, ὦ Κλεινία, ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι.
277d. They are acting just like the celebrants of the Corybantic rites, when they perform the enthronement of the person whom they are about to initiate. There, as you know, if you have been through it, they have dancing and merrymaking: so here these two are merely dancing about you and performing their sportive gambols with a view to your subsequent initiation.
277d. ἔτι δὴ ἐπὶ τὸ τρίτον καταβαλῶν ὥσπερ πάλαισμα ὥρμα ὁ Εὐθύδημος τὸν νεανίσκον· καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς βαπτιζόμενον τὸ μειράκιον, βουλόμενος ἀναπαῦσαι αὐτό, μὴ ἡμῖν ἀποδειλιάσειε, παραμυθούμενος εἶπον· ὦ Κλεινία, μὴ θαύμαζε εἴ σοι φαίνονται ἀήθεις οἱ λόγοι. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ οἷον ποιεῖτον τὼ ξένω περὶ σέ· ποιεῖτον δὲ ταὐτὸν ὅπερ οἱ ἐν τῇ τελετῇ τῶν Κορυβάντων, ὅταν τὴν θρόνωσιν ποιῶσιν περὶ τοῦτον ὃν ἂν μέλλωσι τελεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ χορεία τίς ἐστι καὶ παιδιά, εἰ ἄρα καὶ τετέλεσαι· καὶ νῦν τούτω οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χορεύετον περὶ σὲ καὶ οἷον ὀρχεῖσθον παίζοντε, ὡς μετὰ τοῦτο τελοῦντε.
277e. You must now, accordingly, suppose you are listening to the first part of the professorial mysteries.
277e. νῦν οὖν νόμισον τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἱερῶν ἀκούειν τῶν σοφιστικῶν.
278. Soc. First of all, as Prodicus says, you have to learn about the correct use of words—the very point that our two visitors are making plain to you, namely, that you were unaware that learning is the name which people apply on the one hand to the case of a man who, having originally no knowledge about some matter, in course of time receives such knowledge;
278. ΣΩ. πρῶτον γάρ, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐνδείκνυσθόν σοι τὼ ξένω, ὅτι οὐκ ᾔδησθα τὸ μανθάνειν ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ τοιῷδε, ὅταν τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς μηδεμίαν ἔχων ἐπιστήμην περὶ πράγματός τινος ἔπειτα ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λαμβάνῃ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, καλοῦσι δὲ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἔχων ἤδη τὴν ἐπιστήμην ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πρᾶγμα ἐπισκοπῇ ἢ πραττόμενον ἢ λεγόμενον—μᾶλλον μὲν αὐτὸ συνιέναι καλοῦσιν ἢ μανθάνειν, ἔστι δʼ ὅτε καὶ μανθάνειν—σὲ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς οὗτοι ἐνδείκνυνται, διαλέληθεν, ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπʼ ἀνθρώποις ἐναντίως ἔχουσιν κείμενον, τῷ τε εἰδότι καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μή·
278a. and on the other hand the same word is applied when, having the knowledge already, he uses that knowledge for the investigation of the same matter whether occurring in action or in speech. It is true that they tend rather to call it “understanding” than “learning”, but occasionally they call it learning too; and this point, as our friends are demonstrating, has escaped your notice—how the same word is used for people who are in the opposite conditions of knowing and not knowing. A similar point underlay the second question, where they asked you whether people learn what they know, or what they do not. Such things are the sport of the sciences—and that is why I tell you these men are making game of you; I call it sport because, although one were to learn many or even all of such tricks, one would be not a whit the wiser as to the true state of the matters in hand, but only able to make game of people, thanks to the difference in the sense of the words, by tripping them up and overturning them; just as those who slyly pull stools away from persons who are about to sit down make merry and laugh when they see one sprawling on one’s back.
278a. παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ ἐρωτήματι, ἐν ᾧ ἠρώτων σε πότερα μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἃ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἃ μή. ταῦτα δὴ τῶν μαθημάτων παιδιά ἐστιν—διὸ καί φημι ἐγώ σοι τούτους προσπαίζειν—παιδιὰν δὲ λέγω διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ πολλά τις ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μάθοι, τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον εἰδείη πῇ ἔχει, προσπαίζειν δὲ οἷός τʼ ἂν εἴη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφορὰν ὑποσκελίζων καὶ ἀνατρέπων, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ σκολύθρια τῶν μελλόντων καθιζήσεσθαι ὑποσπῶντες χαίρουσι καὶ γελῶσιν, ἐπειδὰν ἴδωσιν ὕπτιον ἀνατετραμμένον.
278c. So far, then, you are to regard these gentlemen’s treatment of you as mere play: but after this they will doubtless display to you their own serious object, while I shall keep them on the track and see that they fulfil the promise they gave me. They said they would exhibit their skill in exhortation; but instead, I conceive, they thought fit to make sport with you first. So now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, let us have done with your sport: I daresay you have had as much as you want.
278c. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν σοι παρὰ τούτων νόμιζε παιδιὰν γεγονέναι· τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα δῆλον ὅτι τούτω γέ σοι αὐτὼ τὰ σπουδαῖα ἐνδείξεσθον, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑφηγήσομαι αὐτοῖν ἵνα μοι ὃ ὑπέσχοντο ἀποδῶσιν. ἐφάτην γὰρ ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν προτρεπτικὴν σοφίαν· νῦν δέ, μοι δοκεῖ, δεῖν ᾠηθήτην πρότερον παῖσαι πρὸς σέ. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε, πεπαίσθω τε ὑμῖν, καὶ ἴσως ἱκανῶς ἔχει·
278d. What you have next to do is to give us a display of exhorting this youth as to how he should devote himself to wisdom and virtue. But first I shall explain to you how I regard this matter and how I desire to hear it dealt with. If I strike you as treating it in a crude and ridiculous manner, do not laugh me to scorn; for in my eagerness to listen to your wisdom I shall venture to improvise in your presence.
278d. τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπιδείξατον προτρέποντε τὸ μειράκιον ὅπως χρὴ σοφίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμεληθῆναι. πρότερον δʼ ἐγὼ σφῷν ἐνδείξομαι οἷον αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω καὶ οἵου αὐτοῦ ἐπιθυμῶ ἀκοῦσαι. ἐὰν οὖν δόξω ὑμῖν ἰδιωτικῶς τε καὶ γελοίως αὐτὸ ποιεῖν, μή μου καταγελᾶτε· ὑπὸ προθυμίας γὰρ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι τῆς ὑμετέρας σοφίας τολμήσω ἀπαυτοσχεδιάσαι ἐναντίον ὑμῶν.
278e. So both you and your disciples must restrain yourselves and listen without laughing; and you, son of Axiochus, answer me this: Do all we human beings wish to prosper? Or is this question one of the absurdities I was afraid of just now? For I suppose it is stupid merely to ask such things, since every man must wish to prosper.
278e. ἀνάσχεσθον οὖν ἀγελαστὶ ἀκούοντες αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ μαθηταὶ ὑμῶν· σὺ δέ μοι, ὦ παῖ Ἀξιόχου, ἀπόκριναι. ἆρά γε πάντες ἄνθρωποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἐρώτημα ὧν νυνδὴ ἐφοβούμην ἓν τῶν καταγελάστων; ἀνόητον γὰρ δήπου καὶ τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὰ τοιαῦτα· τίς γὰρ οὐ βούλεται ἀνθρώπων εὖ πράττειν;— ΣΩ. οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὔκ, ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας.—εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ·
279a. Soc. Everyone in the world, said Cleinias. Well then, I asked, as to the next step, since we wish to prosper, how can we prosper? Will it be if we have many good things? Or is this an even sillier question than the other? For surely this too must obviously be so. He agreed. Come now, of things that are, what sort do we hold to be really good? Or does it appear to be no difficult matter, and no problem for an important person, to find here too a ready answer? Anyone will tell us that to be rich is good, surely? Quite true, he said. Then it is the same with being healthy and handsome, and having the other bodily endowments in plenty?
279a. τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν, πῶς ἂν εὖ πράττοιμεν; ἆρʼ ἂν εἰ ἡμῖν πολλὰ κἀγαθὰ εἴη; ἢ τοῦτο ἐκείνου ἔτι εὐηθέστερον; δῆλον γάρ που καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει.—συνέφη.—φέρε δή, ἀγαθὰ δὲ ποῖα ἄρα τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει ἡμῖν ὄντα; ἢ οὐ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ τι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔοικεν εἶναι εὐπορεῖν; πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴποι ὅτι τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀγαθόν· ἦ γάρ;—πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι;—συνεδόκει.—ἀλλὰ μὴν εὐγένειαί γε καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τιμαὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δῆλά ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα.—ὡμολόγει.—τί οὖν, ἔφην, ἔτι ἡμῖν λείπεται τῶν ἀγαθῶν;
279b. He agreed. Again, it is surely clear that good birth and talents and distinctions in one’s own country are good things. He admitted it. Then what have we still remaining, I asked, in the class of goods? What of being temperate, and just, and brave? I bay you tell me, Cleinias, do you think we shall be right in ranking these as goods, or in rejecting them? For it may be that someone will dispute it. How does it strike you? They are goods, said Cleinias. Very well, I went on, and where in the troupe shall we station wisdom?
279b. τί ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ σώφρονά τε εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον; πότερον πρὸς Διός, ὦ Κλεινία, ἡγῇ σύ, ἐὰν ταῦτα τιθῶμεν ὡς ἀγαθά, ὀρθῶς ἡμᾶς θήσειν, ἢ ἐὰν μή; ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τις ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσειεν· σοὶ δὲ πῶς δοκεῖ;—ἀγαθά, ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας.— εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ·
279c. Among the goods, or how? Among the goods. Then take heed that we do not pass over any of the goods that may deserve mention. I do not think we are leaving any out, said Cleinias. Hereupon I recollected one and said: Yes, by Heaven, we are on the verge of omitting the greatest of the goods. What is that? he asked. Good fortune, Cleinias: a thing which all men, even the worst fools, refer to as the greatest of goods. You are right, he said. Once again I reconsidered and said:
279c. τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ποῦ χοροῦ τάξομεν; ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἢ πῶς λέγεις;—ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.—ἐνθυμοῦ δὴ μή τι παραλείπωμεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὅτι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου.—ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, οὐδέν, ὁ Κλεινίας.—καὶ ἐγὼ ἀναμνησθεὶς εἶπον ὅτι ναὶ μὰ Δία κινδυνεύομέν γε τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παραλιπεῖν.—τί τοῦτο; ἦ δʼ ὅς.—τὴν εὐτυχίαν, ὦ Κλεινία· ὃ πάντες φασί, καὶ οἱ πάνυ φαῦλοι, μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι.—ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.—καὶ ἐγὼ αὖ πάλιν μετανοήσας εἶπον ὅτι ὀλίγου καταγέλαστοι ἐγενόμεθα ὑπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ὦ παῖ Ἀξιόχου.—τί δή, ἔφη, τοῦτο;—ὅτι εὐτυχίαν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν θέμενοι νυνδὴ αὖθις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐλέγομεν.—τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο;—καταγέλαστον δήπου, ὃ πάλαι πρόκειται, τοῦτο πάλιν προτιθέναι καὶ δὶς ταὐτὰ λέγειν.—πῶς, ἔφη, τοῦτο λέγεις;—ἡ σοφία δήπου, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εὐτυχία ἐστίν·
279d. We have almost made ourselves laughing-stocks, you and I, son of Axiochus, for our visitors. What is wrong now? he asked. Why, after putting good fortune in our former list, we have just been discussing the same thing again. What is the point? Surely it is ridiculous, when a thing has been before us all the time, to set it forth again and go over the same ground twice. To what are you referring? he asked. Wisdom, I replied, is presumably good fortune: even a child could see that. He wondered at this—he is still so young and simple-minded: then I, perceiving his surprise, went on: Can you be unaware, Cleinias, that for success in flute-music it is the flute-players that have the best fortune?
279d. τοῦτο δὲ κἂν παῖς γνοίη.—καὶ ὃς ἐθαύμασεν· οὕτως ἔτι νέος τε καὶ εὐήθης ἐστί.—κἀγὼ γνοὺς αὐτὸν θαυμάζοντα, ἆρα οὐκ οἶσθα, ἔφην, ὦ Κλεινία, ὅτι περὶ αὐλημάτων εὐπραγίαν οἱ αὐληταὶ εὐτυχέστατοί εἰσιν;—συνέφη.—οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ γραμμάτων γραφῆς τε καὶ ἀναγνώσεως οἱ γραμματισταί;—πάνυ γε.—τί δέ;
279e. He agreed to this. Then in writing and reading letters it will be the schoolmasters. Certainly. Well now, for the dangers of a sea-voyage, do you consider any pilots to he more fortunate, as a general rule, than the wise ones? No, to be sure.
279e. πρὸς τοὺς τῆς θαλάττης κινδύνους μῶν οἴει εὐτυχεστέρους τινὰς εἶναι τῶν σοφῶν κυβερνητῶν, ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἰπεῖν;—οὐ δῆτα.
280. Soc. Well, then, suppose you were on a campaign, with which kind of general would you prefer to share both the peril and the luck—a wise one, or an ignorant? With a wise one. Well then, supposing you were sick, with which kind of doctor would you like to venture yourself a wise one, or an ignorant? With a wise one.
280. ΣΩ. τί δέ; στρατευόμενος μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἥδιον τοῦ κινδύνου τε καὶ τῆς τύχης μετέχοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς;—μετὰ σοφοῦ.—τί δέ;
280a. And your reason, I said, is this, that you would fare with better fortune in the hands of a wise one than of an ignorant one? He assented. So that wisdom everywhere causes men to be fortunate: since I presume she could never err, but must needs be right in act and result; otherwise she could be no longer wisdom. We came to an agreement somehow or other in the end that the truth in general was this: when wisdom is present, he with whom it is present has no need of good fortune as well; and as we had agreed on this I began to inquire of him over again what we should think, in this case, of our previous agreements.
280a. ἀσθενῶν μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἡδέως κινδυνεύοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ ἰατροῦ ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς;—μετὰ σοφοῦ.—ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι εὐτυχέστερον ἂν οἴει πράττειν μετὰ σοφοῦ πράττων ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς;—συνεχώρει.—ἡ σοφία ἄρα πανταχοῦ εὐτυχεῖν ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἁμαρτάνοι γʼ ἄν ποτέ τι σοφία, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη ὀρθῶς πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν· ἦ γὰρ ἂν οὐκέτι σοφία εἴη.
280b. For we agreed, said I, that if many goods were present to us we should be happy and prosper. Yes, he said. Then would we be happy because of our present goods, if they gave us no benefit, or if they gave us some? If they gave us benefit, he said. And would a thing benefit us if we merely had it and did not use it?
280b. συνωμολογησάμεθα τελευτῶντες οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπως ἐν κεφαλαίῳ οὕτω τοῦτο ἔχειν, σοφίας παρούσης, ᾧ ἂν παρῇ, μηδὲν προσδεῖσθαι εὐτυχίας· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦτο συνωμολογησάμεθα, πάλιν ἐπυνθανόμην αὐτοῦ τὰ πρότερον ὡμολογημένα πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι. ὡμολογήσαμεν γάρ, ἔφην, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ πολλὰ παρείη, εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν καὶ εὖ πράττειν.—συνέφη.—ἆρʼ οὖν εὐδαιμονοῖμεν ἂν διὰ τὰ παρόντα ἀγαθά, εἰ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ ἢ εἰ ὠφελοῖ;—εἰ ὠφελοῖ, ἔφη.—ἆρʼ οὖν ἄν τι ὠφελοῖ, εἰ εἴη μόνον ἡμῖν, χρῴμεθα δʼ αὐτοῖς μή;