Socrates. I understand; it is because you think I am slower to understand than the judges; since it is plain that you will show them that such acts are wrong and that all the gods hate them.
ΣΩ. μανθάνω· ὅτι σοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέστερος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ἐκείνοις γε ἐνδείξῃ δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἄδικά τέ ἐστιν καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσιν.
Euthyphro. Quite clearly, Socrates; that is, if they listen to me.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάνπερ ἀκούωσί γέ μου λέγοντος.
Socrates. They will listen, if they find that you are a good speaker. But this occurred to me while you were talking, and I said to myself: “If Euthyphro should prove to me no matter how clearly that all the gods think such a death is wrongful, what have I learned from Euthyphro about the question, what is holiness and what is unholiness? For this act would, as it seems, be hateful to the gods; but we saw just now that holiness and its opposite are not defined in this way; for we saw that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to them;” and so I let you off any discussion of this point, Euthyphro. If you like, all the gods may think it wrong and may hate it. But shall we now emend our definition and say that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever they all love is holy, and what some love and others hate is neither or both? Do you wish this now to be our definition of holiness and unholiness?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀκούσονται. ἐάνπερ εὖ δοκῇς λέγειν. τόδε δέ σου ἐνενόησα ἅμα λέγοντος καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶ· εἰ ὅτι μάλιστά με Εὐθύφρων διδάξειεν ὡς οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον ἡγοῦνται ἄδικον εἶναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα παρʼ Εὐθύφρονος τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν τὸ ὅσιόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομισὲς μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ἄν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὡρισμένα τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μή· τὸ γὰρ θεομισὲς ὂν καὶ θεοφιλὲς ἐφάνη. ὥστε τούτου μὲν ἀφίημί σε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων· εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ ἡγείσθων θεοὶ ἄδικον καὶ πάντες μισούντων. ἀλλʼ ἆρα τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐπανορθούμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ—ὡς ὃ μὲν ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ μισῶσιν ἀνόσιόν ἐστιν, ὃ δʼ ἂν φιλῶσιν, ὅσιον· ὃ δʼ ἂν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφότερα—ἆρʼ οὕτω βούλει ἡμῖν ὡρίσθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου;
Euthyphro. What is to hinder, Socrates?Socrates. Nothing, so far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, but consider your own position, whether by adopting this definition you will most easily teach me what you promised.
ΕΥΘ. τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;γ ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ τὸ σὸν σκόπει, εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὕτω ῥᾷστά με διδάξεις ὃ ὑπέσχου.
Euthyphro. Well, I should say that what all the gods love is holy and, on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy.
ΕΥΘ. ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε φαίην ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον ὃ ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὃ ἂν πάντες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.
Socrates. Then shall we examine this again, Euthyphro, to see if it is correct, or shall we let it go and accept our own statement, and those of others, agreeing that it is so, if anyone merely says that it is? Or ought we to inquire into the correctness of the statement?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὖ τοῦτο, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ ἐῶμεν καὶ οὕτω ἡμῶν τε αὐτῶν ἀποδεχώμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐὰν μόνον φῇ τίς τι ἔχειν οὕτω συγχωροῦντες ἔχειν; ἢ σκεπτέον τί λέγει ὁ λέγων;
Euthyphro. We ought to inquire. However, I think this is now correct.Socrates. We shall soon know more about this, my friend.
ΕΥΘ. σκεπτέον· οἶμαι μέντοι ἔγωγε τοῦτο νυνὶ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.
10. Just consider this question:—Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?Euthyphro. I don’t know what you mean, Socrates.
10. ΣΩ. τάχʼ, ὠγαθέ, βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα. ἐννόησον γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἆρα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται ὅσιόν ἐστιν;ΕΥΘ. οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅτι λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Socrates. Then I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of being carried and of carrying, of being led and of leading, of being seen and of seeing; and you understand—do you not?—that in all such expressions the two parts differ one from the other in meaning, and how they differ.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι. λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ ἄγον καὶ ὁρώμενον καὶ ὁρῶν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνεις ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ᾗ ἕτερα;
Euthyphro. I think I understand.
ΕΥΘ. ἔγωγέ μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.
Socrates. Then, too, we conceive of a thing being loved and of a thing loving, and the two are different?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενόν τί ἐστιν καὶ τούτου ἕτερον τὸ φιλοῦν;
Euthyphro. Of course.
ΕΥΘ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Socrates. Now tell me, is a thing which is carried a carried thing because one carries it, or for some other reason?Euthyphro. No, for that reason.
ΣΩ. λέγε δή μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον διότι φέρεται φερόμενόν ἐστιν, ἢ διʼ ἄλλο τι;γ ΕΥΘ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.
Socrates. And a thing which is led is led because one leads it, and a thing which is seen is so because one sees it?
ΣΩ. καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον διότι ὁρᾶται;
Euthyphro. Certainly.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. Then one does not see it because its a seen thing, but, on the contrary, it is a seen thing because one sees it; and one does not lead it because it is a led thing, but it is a led thing because one leads it; and one does not carry it because it is a carried thing, but it is a carried thing because one carries it. Is it clear, Euthyphro, what I am trying to say? I am trying to say this, that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes, and it does not undergo because it is a thing which undergoes, but because it undergoes it is a thing which undergoes; or do you not agree to this?
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὁρώμενόν γέ ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον διότι ὁρᾶται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρώμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται φερόμενον. ἆρα κατάδηλον, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν; βούλομαι δὲ τόδε, ὅτι εἴ τι γίγνεται ἤ τι πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι γίγνεται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι γίγνεται γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν· οὐδʼ ὅτι πάσχον ἐστὶ πάσχει, ἀλλʼ ὅτι πάσχει πάσχον ἐστίν· ἢ οὐ συγχωρεῖς οὕτω;
Euthyphro. I agree.
ΕΥΘ. ἔγωγε.
Socrates. Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνόμενόν τί ἐστιν ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπό του;
Euthyphro. Certainly.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. And is this case like the former ones: those who love it do not love it because it is a beloved thing, but it is a beloved thing because they love it?
ΣΩ. καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα· οὐχ ὅτι φιλούμενόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ ὧν φιλεῖται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι φιλεῖται φιλούμενον;
Euthyphro. Obviously.
ΕΥΘ. ἀνάγκη.
Socrates. Now what do you say about that which is holy, Euthyphro. It is loved by all the gods, is it not, according to what you said?Euthyphro. Yes.
ΣΩ. τί δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου, ὦ Εὐθύφρων; ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος;γ ΕΥΘ. ναί.
Socrates. For this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?
ΣΩ. ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἢ διʼ ἄλλο τι;
Euthyphro. No, for this reason.
ΕΥΘ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.
Socrates. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
ΣΩ. διότι ἄρα ὅσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅτι φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὅσιόν ἐστιν;
Euthyphro. I think so.
ΕΥΘ. ἔοικεν.
Socrates. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them and beloved by them because they love it.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν φιλούμενόν ἐστι καὶ θεοφιλές.
Euthyphro. Of course.
ΕΥΘ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Socrates. Then that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy are not identical, but differ one from the other.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅσιον θεοφιλές, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ἀλλʼ ἕτερον τοῦτο τούτου.
Euthyphro. How so, Socrates?Socrates. Because we are agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy and that it is not holy because it is loved; are we not?
ΕΥΘ. πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;γ ΣΩ. ὅτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὅσιον διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ διότι φιλεῖται ὅσιον εἶναι· ἦ γάρ;
Socrates. But we are agreed that what is dear to the gods is dear to them because they love it, that is, by reason of this love, not that they love it because it is dear.
ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς εἶναι, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅτι θεοφιλές, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.
Euthyphro. Very true.
ΕΥΘ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Socrates. But if that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy were identical, my dear Euthyphro, then if the holy were loved because it is holy, that which is dear to the gods would be loved because it is dear, and if that which is dear to the gods is dear because it is loved, then that which is holy would be holy because it is loved; but now you see that the opposite is the case, showing that the two are different from each other.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο τὸ ὅσιον, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἂν τὸ θεοφιλές, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἦν, καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ἂν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὅσιον ἦν·
11. For the one becomes lovable from the fact that it is loved, whereas the other is loved because it is in itself lovable. And, Euthyphro, it seems that when you were asked what holiness is you were unwilling to make plain its essence, but you mentioned something that has happened to this holiness, namely, that it is loved by the gods. But you did not tell as yet what it really is. So, if you please, do not hide it from me, but begin over again and tell me what holiness is, no matter whether it is loved by the gods or anything else happens it; for we shall not quarrel about that. But tell me frankly, What is holiness, and what is unholiness?Euthyphro. But, Socrates, I do not know how to say what I mean. For whatever statement we advance, somehow or other it moves about and won’t stay where we put it.
11. νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ὅτι ἐναντίως ἔχετον, ὡς παντάπασιν ἑτέρω ὄντε ἀλλήλων. τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δʼ ὅτι ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστίν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅτι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν· ὅτι δὲ ὄν, οὔπω εἶπες. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, μή με ἀποκρύψῃ ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἰπὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τί ποτε ὂν τὸ ὅσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν εἴτε ὁτιδὴ πάσχει—οὐ γὰρ περὶ τούτου διοισόμεθα—ἀλλʼ εἰπὲ προθύμως τί ἐστιν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;ΕΥΘ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε ὅπως σοι εἴπω ὃ νοῶ· περιέρχεται γάρ πως ἡμῖν ἀεὶ ὃ ἂν προθώμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἱδρυσώμεθα αὐτό.
Socrates. Your statements, Euthyphro, are like works of my ancestor Daedalus, and if I were the one who made or advanced them, you might laugh at me and say that on account of my relationship to him my works in words run away and won’t stay where they are put. But now—well, the statements are yours; so some other jest is demanded; for they stay fixed, as you yourself see.
ΣΩ. τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἔοικεν εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ἴσως ἄν με ἐπέσκωπτες ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου συγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἄν τις αὐτὰ θῇ· νῦν δὲ σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν. ἄλλου δή τινος δεῖ σκώμματος· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ.
Euthyphro. I think the jest does very well as it is; for I am not the one who makes these statements move about and not stay in the same place, but you are the Daedalus; for they would have stayed, so far as I am concerned.
ΕΥΘ. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδόν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ σκώμματος, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα· τὸ γὰρ περιιέναι αὐτοῖς τοῦτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ἐντιθείς, ἀλλὰ σύ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος, ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα ἔμενεν ἂν ταῦτα οὕτως.
Socrates. Apparently then, my friend, I am a more clever artist than Daedalus, inasmuch as he made only his own works move, whereas I, as it seems, give motion to the works of others as well as to my own. And the most exquisite thing about my art is that I am clever against my will; for I would rather have my words stay fixed and stable than possess the wisdom of Daedalus and the wealth of Tantalus besides. But enough of this. Since you seem to be indolent, I will aid you myself, so that you may instruct me about holiness. And do not give it up beforehand. Just see whether you do not think that everything that is holy is right.
ΣΩ. κινδυνεύω ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην τοσούτῳ, ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν τὰ αὑτοῦ μόνα ἐποίει οὐ μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δῆτα τοῦτό μοι τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός· ἐβουλόμην γὰρ ἄν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκινήτως ἱδρῦσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τῇ Δαιδάλου σοφίᾳ τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων μὲν ἅδην· ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτός σοι συμπροθυμήσομαι [δεῖξαι] ὅπως ἄν με διδάξῃς περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου. καὶ μὴ προαποκάμῃς· ἰδὲ γὰρ εἰ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ ὅσιον.
Euthyphro. I do.
ΕΥΘ. ἔμοιγε.
Socrates. But is everything that is right also holy?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὅσιον; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅσιον πᾶν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ὅσιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὅσιον, τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο;
12. Or is all which is holy right, and not all which is right holy, but part of it holy and part something else?Euthyphro. I can’t follow you, Socrates.
12. ΕΥΘ. οὐχ ἕπομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις.
Socrates. And yet you are as much younger than I as you are wiser; but, as I said, you are indolent on account of your wealth of wisdom. But exert yourself, my friend; for it is not hard to understand what I mean. What I mean is the opposite of what the poet said, who wrote:Zeus the creator, him who made all things,“thou wilt not name; for where fear is, there also is reverence.” Now I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you how?
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γέ μου εἶ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ὅσῳ σοφώτερος· ἀλλʼ, ὃ λέγω, τρυφᾷς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλʼ, ὦ μακάριε, σύντεινε σαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν κατανοῆσαι ὃ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας—Ζῆνα δὲ τὸν [θʼ] ἔρξαντα καὶ ὃς τάδε πάντʼ ἐφύτευσενοὐκ ἐθέλει νεικεῖν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς.ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἴπω σοι ὅπῃ;
Euthyphro. By all means.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. It does not seem to me true that where fear is, there also is reverence; for many who fear diseases and poverty and other such things seem to me to fear, but not to reverence at all these things which they fear. Don’t you think so, too?
ΣΩ. οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἵνα δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς πολλοὶ γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδιότες δεδιέναι μέν, αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα ἃ δεδίασιν· οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;
Euthyphro. Certainly.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. But I think that where reverence is, there also is fear; for does not everyone who has a feeling of reverence and shame about any act also dread and fear the reputation for wickedness?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἵνα γε αἰδὼς ἔνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ὅστις αἰδούμενός τι πρᾶγμα καὶ αἰσχυνόμενος οὐ πεφόβηταί τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἅμα δόξαν πονηρίας;
Euthyphro. Yes, he does fear.
ΕΥΘ. δέδοικε μὲν οὖν.
Socrates. Then it is not correct to say “where fear is, there also is reverence.” On the contrary, where reverence is, there also is fear; but reverence is not everywhere where fear is, since, as I think, fear is more comprehensive than reverence; for reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, so that it is not true that where number is, there also is the odd, but that where the odd is, there also is number. Perhaps you follow me now?
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρʼ ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς, ἀλλʼ ἵνα μὲν αἰδὼς ἔνθα καὶ δέος, οὐ μέντοι ἵνα γε δέος πανταχοῦ αἰδώς· ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ οἶμαι δέος αἰδοῦς. μόριον γὰρ αἰδὼς δέους ὥσπερ ἀριθμοῦ περιττόν, ὥστε οὐχ ἵναπερ ἀριθμὸς ἔνθα καὶ περιττόν, ἵνα δὲ περιττὸν ἔνθα καὶ ἀριθμός. ἕπῃ γάρ που νῦν γε;
Euthyphro. Perfectly.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. It was something of this sort that I meant before, when I asked whether where the right is, there also is holiness, or where holiness is, there also is the right; but holiness is not everywhere where the right is, for holiness is a part of the right. Do we agree to this, or do you dissent?
ΣΩ. τὸ τοιοῦτον τοίνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ἠρώτων· ἆρα ἵνα δίκαιον ἔνθα καὶ ὅσιον; ἢ ἵνα μὲν ὅσιον ἔνθα καὶ δίκαιον, ἵνα δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πανταχοῦ ὅσιον· μόριον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον; οὕτω φῶμεν ἢ ἄλλως σοι δοκεῖ;
Euthyphro. No, I agree; for I think the statement is correct.
ΕΥΘ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτω. φαίνῃ γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέγειν.
Socrates. Now observe the next point. If holiness is a part of the right, we must, apparently, find out what part of the right holiness is. Now if you asked me about one of the things I just mentioned, as, for example, what part of number the even was, and what kind of a number it was I should say, “that which is not indivisible by two, but divisible by two”; or don’t you agree?
ΣΩ. ὅρα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν σύ με ἠρώτας τι τῶν νυνδή, οἷον ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ὢν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι ὃς ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς ᾖ ἀλλʼ ἰσοσκελής· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;
Euthyphro. I agree.
ΕΥΘ. ἔμοιγε.
Socrates. Now try in your turn to teach me what part of the right holiness is, that I may tell Meletus not to wrong me any more or bring suits against me for impiety, since I have now been duly instructed by you about what is, and what is not, pious and holy.
ΣΩ. πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι τὸ ποῖον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωμεν μηκέθʼ ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μή.
Euthyphro. This then is my opinion, Socrates, that the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness, and that the remaining part of the right is that which has to do with the service of men.
ΕΥΘ. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.
Socrates. I think you are correct, Euthyphro;
ΣΩ. καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, φαίνῃ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ σμικροῦ τινος ἔτι ἐνδεής εἰμι·
13. but there is one little point about which I still want information, for I do not yet understand what you mean by “attention.” I don’t suppose you mean the same kind of attention to the gods which is paid to other things. We say, for example, that not everyone knows how to attend to horses, but only he who is skilled in horsemanship, do we not?Euthyphro. Certainly.
13. τὴν γὰρ θεραπείαν οὔπω συνίημι ἥντινα ὀνομάζεις. οὐ γάρ που λέγεις γε, οἷαίπερ καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεραπεῖαί εἰσιν, τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεούς— λέγομεν γάρ που—οἷόν φαμεν ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν ἀλλὰ ὁ ἱππικός· ἦ γάρ;ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. Then horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?
ΣΩ. ἡ γάρ που ἱππικὴ ἵππων θεραπεία.
Socrates. And not everyone knows how to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?
ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν ἀλλὰ ὁ κυνηγετικός.
Euthyphro. That is so.
ΕΥΘ. οὕτω.
Socrates. Then the huntsman’s art is the art of attending to dogs?
ΣΩ. ἡ γάρ που κυνηγετικὴ κυνῶν θεραπεία.
Socrates. And the oxherd’s art is that of attending to oxen?
ΣΩ. ἡ δέ γε βοηλατικὴ βοῶν.
Euthyphro. Certainly.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. And holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods? Is that what you mean, Euthyphro?
ΣΩ. ἡ δὲ δὴ ὁσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων; οὕτω λέγεις;
Euthyphro. Yes.
ΕΥΘ. ἔγωγε.
Socrates. Now does attention always aim to accomplish the same end? I mean something like this: It aims at some good or benefit to the one to whom it is given, as you see that horses, when attended to by the horseman’s art are benefited and made better; or don’t you think so?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταὐτὸν διαπράττεται; οἷον τοιόνδε· ἐπʼ ἀγαθῷ τινί ἐστι καὶ ὠφελίᾳ τοῦ θεραπευομένου, ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι οἱ ἵπποι ὑπὸ τῆς ἱππικῆς θεραπευόμενοι ὠφελοῦνται καὶ βελτίους γίγνονται· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι;
Euthyphro. Yes, I do.
ΕΥΘ. ἔμοιγε.
Socrates. And dogs are benefited by the huntsman’s art and oxen by the oxherd’s and everything else in the same way? Or do you think care and attention are ever meant for the injury of that which is cared for?
ΣΩ. καὶ οἱ κύνες γέ που ὑπὸ τῆς κυνηγετικῆς, καὶ οἱ βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως· ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἴει τοῦ θεραπευομένου τὴν θεραπείαν εἶναι;
Euthyphro. No, by Zeus, I do not.
ΕΥΘ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Socrates. But for its benefit?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ὠφελίᾳ;
Euthyphro. Of course.
ΕΥΘ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Socrates. Then holiness, since it is the art of attending to the gods, is a benefit to the gods, and makes them better? And you would agree that when you do a holy or pious act you are making one of the gods better?
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης θεραπεία οὖσα θεῶν ὠφελία τέ ἐστι θεῶν καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖ; καὶ σὺ τοῦτο συγχωρήσαις ἄν, ὡς ἐπειδάν τι ὅσιον ποιῇς, βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζῃ;
Euthyphro. No, by Zeus, not I.
ΕΥΘ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Socrates. Nor do I, Euthyphro, think that is what you meant. Far from it. But I asked what you meant by “attention to the gods” just because I did not think you meant anything like that.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οἶμαί σε τοῦτο λέγειν —πολλοῦ καὶ δέω—ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, οὐχ ἡγούμενός σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.
Euthyphro. You are right, Socrates; that is not what I mean.
ΕΥΘ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτην λέγω.
Socrates. Well, what kind of attention to the gods is holiness?
ΣΩ. εἶεν· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἴη ἂν ἡ ὁσιότης;
Euthyphro. The kind, Socrates, that servants pay to their masters.
ΕΥΘ. ἥνπερ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δοῦλοι τοὺς δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν.
Socrates. I understand. It is, you mean, a kind of service to the gods?
ΣΩ. μανθάνω· ὑπηρετική τις ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη θεοῖς.
Euthyphro. Exactly.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Socrates. Now can you tell me what result the art that serves the physician serves to produce? Is it not health?
ΣΩ. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν ἡ ἰατροῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν τυγχάνει οὖσα ὑπηρετική; οὐκ εἰς ὑγιείας οἴει;
Euthyphro. Yes.
ΕΥΘ. ἔγωγε.
Socrates. Well then; what is it which the art that serves shipbuilders serves to produce?
ΣΩ. τί δὲ ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετική; εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετική ἐστιν;
Euthyphro. Evidently, Socrates, a ship.
ΕΥΘ. δῆλον ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοίου.
Socrates. And that which serves housebuilders serves to build a house?
ΣΩ. καὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμοις γέ που εἰς οἰκίας;
Socrates. Then tell me, my friend; what would the art which serves the gods serve to accomplish? For it is evident that you know, since you say you know more than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods.
ΣΩ. εἰπὲ δή, ὦ ἄριστε· ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἂν εἴη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι σὺ οἶσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τά γε θεῖα κάλλιστα φῂς εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.
Euthyphro. And what I say is true, Socrates.
ΕΥΘ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Socrates. Then, in the name of Zeus, tell me, what is that glorious result which the gods accomplish by using us as servants?
ΣΩ. εἰπὲ δὴ πρὸς Διὸς τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρέταις χρώμενοι;
Euthyphro. They accomplish many fine results, Socrates.
ΕΥΘ. πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ὦ Σώκρατες.
14. Socrates. Yes, and so do generals, my friend; but nevertheless, you could easily tell the chief of them, namely, that they bring about victory in war. Is that not the case?Euthyphro. Of course.
14. ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοί, ὦ φίλε· ἀλλʼ ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥᾳδίως ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ἢ οὔ;γ ΕΥΘ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Socrates. And farmers also, I think, accomplish many fine results; but still the chief result of their work is food from the land?
ΣΩ. πολλὰ δέ γʼ, οἶμαι, καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ γεωργοί· ἀλλʼ ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν τῆς ἀπεργασίας ἡ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφή.
Euthyphro. Certainly.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. But how about the many fine results the gods accomplish? What is the chief result of their work?
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δὴ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται; τί τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τῆς ἐργασίας;
Euthyphro. I told you a while ago, Socrates, that it is a long task to learn accurately all about these things. However, I say simply that when one knows how to say and do what is gratifying to the gods, in praying and sacrificing, that is holiness, and such things bring salvation to individual families and to states; and the opposite of what is gratifying to the gods is impious, and that overturns and destroys everything.
ΕΥΘ. καὶ ὀλίγον σοι πρότερον εἶπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πλείονος ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἔχει μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἁπλῶς λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῖς θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτʼ ἔστι τὰ ὅσια, καὶ σῴζει τὰ τοιαῦτα τούς τε ἰδίους οἴκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων· τὰ δʼ ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἀσεβῆ, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἅπαντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.
Socrates. You might, if you wished, Euthyphro, have answered much more briefly the chief part of my question. But it is plain that you do not care to instruct me. For now, when you were close upon it you turned aside; and if you had answered it, I should already have obtained from you all the instruction I need about holiness. But, as things are, the questioner must follow the one questioned wherever he leads. What do you say the holy, or holiness, is? Do you not say that it is a kind of science of sacrificing and praying?
ΣΩ. ἦ πολύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἶπες ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ἠρώτων· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμός με εἶ διδάξαι—δῆλος εἶ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ ἦσθα ἀπετράπου, ὃ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, ἱκανῶς ἂν ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὁσιότητα ἐμεμαθήκη. νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐρῶντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ὑπάγῃ, τί δὴ αὖ λέγεις τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα; οὐχὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι;
Euthyphro. Yes.
ΕΥΘ. ἔγωγε.
Socrates. And sacrificing is making gifts to the gods and praying is asking from them?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαί ἐστι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δʼ εὔχεσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς;
Euthyphro. Exactly, Socrates.
ΕΥΘ. καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Socrates. Then holiness, according to this definition, would be a science of giving and asking.
ΣΩ. ἐπιστήμη ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς ὁσιότης ἂν εἴη ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.
Euthyphro. You understand perfectly what I said, Socrates.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, συνῆκας ὃ εἶπον.
Socrates. Yes, my friend, for I am eager for your wisdom, and give my mind to it, so that nothing you say shall fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service of the gods? Do you say that it consists in asking from them and giving to them?
ΣΩ. ἐπιθυμητὴς γάρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ, ὥστε οὐ χαμαὶ πεσεῖται ὅτι ἂν εἴπῃς. ἀλλά μοι λέξον τίς αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φῂς αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἐκείνοις;
Euthyphro. Yes.
ΕΥΘ. ἔγωγε.
Socrates. Would not the right way of asking be to ask of them what we need from them?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τό γε ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν ἂν εἴη ὧν δεόμεθα παρʼ ἐκείνων, ταῦτα αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν;
Euthyphro. What else?
ΕΥΘ. ἀλλὰ τί;
Socrates. And the right way of giving, to present them with what they need from us? For it would not be scientific giving to give anyone what he does not need.
ΣΩ. καὶ αὖ τὸ διδόναι ὀρθῶς, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τυγχάνουσιν δεόμενοι παρʼ ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις αὖ ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι; οὐ γάρ που τεχνικόν γʼ ἂν εἴη δωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῳ ταῦτα ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται.
Euthyphro. You are right, Socrates.
ΕΥΘ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Socrates. Then holiness would be an art of barter between gods and men?
ΣΩ. ἐμπορικὴ ἄρα τις ἂν εἴη, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τέχνη ἡ ὁσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρʼ ἀλλήλων.
Euthyphro. Yes, of barter, if you like to call it so.
ΕΥΘ. ἐμπορική, εἰ οὕτως ἥδιόν σοι ὀνομάζειν.
Socrates. I don’t like to call it so, if it is not true. But tell me, what advantage accrues to the gods from the gifts they get from us? For everybody knows what they give, since we have nothing good which they do not give.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἥδιον ἔμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνει ἀληθὲς ὄν. φράσον δέ μοι, τίς ἡ ὠφελία τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀπὸ τῶν δώρων ὧν παρʼ ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν; ἃ μὲν γὰρ διδόασι παντὶ δῆλον·
15. But what advantage do they derive from what they get from us? Or have we so much the better of them in our bartering that we get all good things from them and they nothing from us?Euthyphro. Why you don’t suppose, Socrates, that the gods gain any advantage from what they get from us, do you?Socrates. Well then, what would those gifts of ours to the gods be?
15. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἂν μὴ ἐκεῖνοι δῶσιν. ἃ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν, τί ὠφελοῦνται; ἢ τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν πλεονεκτοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὥστε πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ παρʼ αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ παρʼ ἡμῶν οὐδέν;ΕΥΘ. ἀλλʼ οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς θεοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων ἃ παρʼ ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν;γ ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τί δήποτʼ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὰ παρʼ ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς;
Euthyphro. What else than honor and praise, and, as I said before, gratitude?
ΕΥΘ. τί δʼ οἴει ἄλλο ἢ τιμή τε καὶ γέρα καί, ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις;
Socrates. Then, Euthyphro, holiness is grateful to the gods, but not advantageous or precious to the gods?Euthyphro. I think it is precious, above all things.
ΣΩ. κεχαρισμένον ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὸ ὅσιον, ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ ὠφέλιμον οὐδὲ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς;γ ΕΥΘ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον.
Socrates. Then again, it seems, holiness is that which is precious to the gods.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο ἄρʼ ἐστὶν αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ὅσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.
Euthyphro. Certainly.
ΕΥΘ. μάλιστά γε.
Socrates. Then will you be surprised, since you say this, if your words do not remain fixed but walk about, and will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk, when you are yourself much more skilful than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not see that our definition has come round to the point from which it started? For you remember, I suppose, that a while ago we found that holiness and what is dear to the gods were not the same, but different from each other; or do you not remember?
ΣΩ. θαυμάσῃ οὖν ταῦτα λέγων ἐάν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσῃ τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὢν πολύ γε τεχνικώτερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἥκει; μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἀλλʼ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;
Euthyphro. Yes, I remember.
ΕΥΘ. ἔγωγε.
Socrates. Then don’t you see that now you say that what is precious to the gods is holy? And is not this what is dear to the gods?
ΣΩ. νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον φῂς ὅσιον εἶναι; τοῦτο δʼ ἄλλο τι ἢ θεοφιλὲς γίγνεται; ἢ οὔ;
Euthyphro. Certainly.
ΕΥΘ. πάνυ γε.
Socrates. Then either our agreement a while ago was wrong, or if that was right, we are wrong now.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἢ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν, ἢ εἰ τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθέμεθα.
Euthyphro. So it seems.
ΕΥΘ. ἔοικεν.
Socrates. Then we must begin again at the beginning and ask what holiness is. Since I shall not willingly give up until I learn. And do not scorn me, but by all means apply your mind now to the utmost and tell me the truth; for you know, if anyone does, and like Proteus, you must be held until you speak. For if you had not clear knowledge of holiness and unholiness, you would surely not have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder for the sake of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the anger of the gods, in case your conduct should be wrong, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure you think you know what is holy and what is not. So tell me, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal your thought.
ΣΩ. ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἡμῖν πάλιν σκεπτέον τί ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον, ὡς ἐγὼ πρὶν ἂν μάθω ἑκὼν εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσω. ἀλλὰ μή με ἀτιμάσῃς ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προσσχὼν τὸν νοῦν ὅτι μάλιστα νῦν εἰπὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν· οἶσθα γὰρ εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέος εἶ ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεὺς πρὶν ἂν εἴπῃς. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ᾔδησθα σαφῶς τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἄν ποτε ἐπεχείρησας ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκάθειν φόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσοις, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ᾐσχύνθης· νῦν δὲ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι σαφῶς οἴει εἰδέναι τό τε ὅσιον καὶ μή. εἰπὲ οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρων, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὅτι αὐτὸ ἡγῇ.
Euthyphro. Some other time, Socrates. Now I am in a hurry and it is time for me to go.
ΕΥΘ. εἰς αὖθις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες· νῦν γὰρ σπεύδω ποι, καί μοι ὥρα ἀπιέναι.
Socrates. Oh my friend, what are you doing? You go away and leave me cast down from the high hope I had that I should learn from you what is holy, and what is not, and should get rid of Meletus’s indictment by showing him that I have been made wise by Euthyphro about divine matters and am no longer through ignorance acting carelessly and making innovations in respect to them, and that I shall live a better life henceforth.
ΣΩ. οἷα ποιεῖς, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἀπʼ ἐλπίδος με καταβαλὼν μεγάλης ἀπέρχῃ ἣν εἶχον, ὡς παρὰ σοῦ μαθὼν τά τε ὅσια καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενος ἐκείνῳ ὅτι σοφὸς ἤδη παρʼ Εὐθύφρονος τὰ θεῖα γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ὑπʼ ἀγνοίας αὐτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὅτι ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην.